Attack Submarines

Faced with a changed world threat, a new defense posture, and shrinking budgets, the Navy is reducing the size of its nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) fleet. To maintain a force of 45 to 55 SSN submarines, as directed in the Defense Department's bottom-up review budgets, the Navy plans to extend the amount of time SSN operate between major maintenance periods, allow no more than three costly SSN-699 submarine refuelings per year, and operate the submarines for their service life of 30 years. At the same time, the Navy plans to buy 31 SSN through 2014 at an estimated cost of $48 billion. GAO identified several alternatives that would allow the Navy to free up money and still maintain the minimum force structure of 45 SSN. For example, if the Navy were to acquire only 25 SSN through 2014, it would save $9 billion and maintain close to 55 SSN through 2013, but declining to 45 SSN by 2020--still within the range directed by the bottom-up review. Under another alternative, the Navy could study the feasibility of operating some SSN-688 beyond 30 years and defer spending an additional $8 billion in procurement costs. A third alternative would be to defer new construction of SSN and free up billions of dollars in the near term. This alternative offers the opportunity to defer near-term costs at a time when defense budgets have been reduced. Further, studies have shown that the estimated reconstitution costs to restart submarine construction in 2003 are less than the potential $9 billion in savings, suggesting that a deferral strategy warrants further study.

GAO found that: (1) to maintain its SSN force at the directed size and within affordable budgets, the Navy plans to extend the SSN operational cycle between major maintenance periods, limit costly SSN-688 submarine refuelings to 3 per year, and operate the submarines for their entire 30-year design life; (2) the Navy plans to procure 31 SSN through year 2014 at an estimated cost of $48 billion; (3) the Navy's approach will allow it to maintain a SSN force of 55 submarines; (4) if the Navy procured only 25 SSN, it would save $9 billion in procurement costs and maintain a SSN force of almost 55 submarines through 2013, but the force would decline to 45 SSN by 2020; (5) the Navy could consider studying the feasibility of extending the submarines' operational life beyond 30 years and deferring $8 billion in procurement costs; (6) this alternative would reduce the number of submarines the Navy would need to build and save $17 billion in total costs; (7) because there is no need for new SSN before 2001, the Navy could defer SSN construction, which would free up billions of dollars in the near term; and (8) the impact of deferring SSN construction on the industrial base is unclear because of disagreement over what constitutes critical vendors and the costs needed to reconstitute the industrial base.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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