Weapons Acquisition

Low-Rate Initial Production Used to Buy Weapon Systems Prematurely Gao ID: NSIAD-95-18 November 21, 1994

The Pentagon plans to spend more than $79 billion in fiscal year 1995 for the acquisition of weapon systems. Because the Defense Department (DOD) allows low-rate initial production to begin before operational testing and evaluation is completed, the military has amassed large inventories of unsatisfactory weapons requiring modification; meanwhile, combat troops have been outfitted with substandard equipment. Once begun, low-rate initial production significantly limits the options available to DOD and Congress when a system proves deficient. In GAO's view, the key decision as to whether to proceed with production should be made at the start of low-rate initial production because, in many cases, it is also the de-facto full-rate production decision. Therefore, decisionmakers need good independent information on the system's performance and suitability at that point. In today's national security environment, there should be very few cases in which an urgent need dictates that DOD will start low-rate initial production without being certain that the system will work as intended.

GAO found that: (1) despite congressional emphasis on the need for operational test and evaluation (OT&E) prior to system production, legislation and DOD policies permit LRIP to start before any OT&E is conducted because there are no specific guidelines on the type and amount of testing required prior to LRIP; (2) the lack of guidelines has resulted in substantial inventories of unsatisfactory weapons that need costly modifications and some deployments of substandard systems to combat forces; (3) correction of system deficiencies in prematurely produced systems lengthens production schedules and increases resource consumption; (4) major production decisions are often made during LRIP; (5) LRIP severely limits Congress' and DOD decisionmakers' options for dealing with deficient systems; (6) DOD needs accurate, independent information on system performance and suitability to minimize the risks of procuring costly and ineffective systems; and (7) in light of the current national security environment, there should not be an urgent need to start LRIP before system capabilities are adequately tested.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director: Team: Phone:


The Justia Government Accountability Office site republishes public reports retrieved from the U.S. GAO These reports should not be considered official, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Justia.