Tactical Aircraft

Since the F-22 program entered full-scale development in 1991, the severity of the projected military threat has declined. Instead of confronting thousands of modern Soviet fighters, U.S. air forces are likely to face adversaries with few fighters capable of challenging the F-15--the U.S. front line fighter. GAO found that the F-15 exceeds the most advanced threat expected to exist. GAO assumed that no improvements will be made to the F-15 but the capability of the "most advanced threat" assumes some modifications. GAO's analysis suggests that the current inventory of F-15s can be economically maintained in a structurally sound condition until 2015 or later. Thus, the F-15's initial operational capability can be delayed seven years and its planned production start date of 1996 can be postponed to a future date that the Pentagon deems appropriate to meet the new initial operational capability date. In addition to a declining need for the F-22 to counter threats, the aircraft has not been designed to handle multiple missions or joint use among the services, important features for future solution for tactical aircraft modernization. The F-22, as designed, will be a land-based fighter unable to operate from aircraft carriers. Further, the F-22 is designed mainly for one mission--air superiority against opposing fighters.

GAO found that: (1) the F-22 was designed to meet the threat of superior hostile aircraft, but the threat of hostile aircraft has declined with the changing world political structure; (2) potential adversaries are not likely to purchase many high-performance fighters because of their cost; (3) the U.S. Air Force has more fighter aircraft than any other individual country; (4) the F-15 outperforms the most advanced fighter aircraft in most performance categories; (5) the Air Force has additional personnel and equipment capabilities that potential adversaries lack; (6) the 918 F-15 aircraft in inventory can be economically maintained until 2015 or later; (7) the F-22 was not designed to emphasize multiple missions or joint use among the services; (8) the lessened air threat, greater economic constraints, and reduced quantities of combat aircraft make the use of common aircraft or components more attractive and allow for a greater degree of compromise in design; and (9) production of the F-22 can be delayed for 7 years.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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