Force Structure

By retaining 12 divisions rather than the 10 recommended by the Defense Department's Bottom Up Review, the Army would incur additional expenses during fiscal years 1995-99 of anywhere from $1.2 billion to more than $4.9 billion, depending on how it decided to staff the two divisions. One option would be for the Army to staff these components by transferring military personnel from noncombat military positions to positions in the division base and echelon above division and hiring civilians to fill the vacant noncombat jobs. This option would entail additional Army payroll of about $3.7 billion. Another option would be for the Army to staff the division bases and echelons above division by drawing from other existing combat units. Although the Army would not incur any salary costs under this option, the Army views it as undesirable because it would deplete the Army's force structure. It is possible that the Army could incur an additional $4.9 billion over a six-year time period because retaining two additional divisions precludes the Army from closing two division installations.

GAO found that: (1) the establishment of a 12-division Army force between FY 1995 and 1999 could cost from $1.2 billion to over $4.9 billion; (2) the Army's estimates include over $1 billion in operation and modernization costs and about $3.7 billion in civilian salary costs; (3) adding two additional divisions would require about 17,100 additional personnel; (4) increases to the Army's civilian salary costs will depend on how it staffs the additional division base and echelon above division (EAD) components; (5) the Army's civilian payroll could increase significantly if it reassigns personnel from noncombat positions in the division bases and EAD and replaces all reassigned personnel with civilians; (6) the two additional divisions could cost as little as $1.2 billion if the Army transfers noncombat military personnel to division bases and EAD, does not fill any of the vacant noncombat positions with civilians, and draws personnel from existing Army combat units; (7) the Army views the low cost option as undesirable, since it would deplete its force structure; (8) the Army estimates that installation costs could increase by $4.9 billion over a 6-year period if two additional divisions are established because it would have to delay closing two division installations; and (9) since closing installations can take several years, the Army may not incur any additional costs until after the 1995 through 1999 time period.