Tactical Aircraft

Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced Gao ID: NSIAD-95-59 April 19, 1995

Because the F-22 fighter plane is not urgently needed and the Defense Department (DOD) has discovered engine and software problems with the aircraft, GAO urges that the F-22 be thoroughly tested before large numbers of these expensive aircraft are acquired. Concurrency between the development and production phases of F-22 means that independent testing of high-tech features of the aircraft will not be completed before the Air Force makes a significant commitment to producing the F-22. Among other things, the F-22 boasts an advanced architecture for the integrated avionics system, a propulsion system that will allow cruising at supersonic speeds without the afterburners that current fighters need, and low observable technologies. The military has already disclosed engine and stealthiness problems, and the potential for avionics and software problems underscores the need to demonstrate the aircraft's capabilities before committing to production.

GAO found that: (1) the F-22 program has a high degree of concurrency because it will enter production before initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) is completed; (2) F-22 concurrency poses substantial production and operational risks because the aircraft may be procured before technological advances are flight-tested; (3) the Air Force plans to procure 80 F-22 aircraft at a cost of $12.4 billion before completing IOT&E; (4) the F-22 low-rate initial production (LRIP) quantities substantially exceed the 10-percent guideline included in federal acquisition streamlining requirements; (5) the percentage of F-22 committed to production before IOT&E is higher than most recent fighter programs; (6) the Air Force plans to accelerate F-22 production rates in the LRIP phase of the program so that 75 percent of the full production rate will be achieved; (7) the planned rate of acceleration appears to exceed the amount that is needed to complete the program's LRIP phase and represents a plan to commit to a full-rate production schedule before IOT&E is completed; (8) the Air Force should limit LRIP quantities each year given the program's high degree of concurrency; (9) technology advances and innovations are critical to F-22 operational success; (10) the need for F-22 aircraft is not urgent and its procurement could be deferred; and (11) existing operational and technological problems need to be addressed before significant commitments are made to F-22 production.

Recommendations

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