Bosnia

Costs Are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed DOD's Estimate Gao ID: NSIAD-96-120BR March 14, 1996

The Defense Department's (DOD) cost to send almost 27,000 troops to Bosnia as part of peacekeeping operations is uncertain at this time but could well exceed DOD's estimate. Army costs, which are estimated at two-thirds of total operation costs, are likely to exceed DOD projections, while Air Force costs are likely to be less than estimated. DOD estimated deployment transportation costs at nearly $73 million, but through the end of January 1996, DOD had spent about $157 million on deployment transportation. DOD estimated the cost of contractor support at $192 million; through February 1996, however, the Army had spent more than $247 million on contractor services, and Army officials said that contractor costs could go as high as $500 million. Several major cost areas remain uncertain. They involve the operating tempo of the forces in Bosnia, the cost of redeploying the implementation force, and the expense of reconstituting equipment used in the operation.

GAO found that: (1) DOD costs for the Bosnia operation are uncertain and could exceed its estimate; (2) while the Army's costs, which represent about two-thirds of the operation's costs, are expected to exceed the DOD estimate, the Air Force's projected costs are likely to be less than estimated; (3) DOD deployment transportation and contractor costs are expected to exceed cost estimates by $84 million and $55.7 million respectively; (4) the costs for deploying and operating the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System were underestimated by $39 million; (5) Air Force costs were understated by $39 million because per diem costs were overestimated, flying hours were reduced, and many aircraft were returned to home stations; (6) DOD special pays and reserve activation cost estimates could be overstated by $43 million and $20 million respectively because of overestimates in the number of personnel eligible for special pay and reservists needed; (7) DOD could not reliably estimate the costs of operating tempo of forces in Bosnia, redeploying the NATO Implementation Force, and reconstituting the operation's equipment because several factors need to be clarified; (8) the Army projects that it will run out of discretionary operation tempo funding in June 1996 and may have to curtail training if this shortfall occurs; and (9) DOD plans to finance the 1996 portion of Bosnia operations by reprogramming certain appropriated funds and requesting additional supplemental appropriations.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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