Combat Air Power

The Defense Department (DOD) plans to spend more than $300 billion during the next 15 to 20 years to modernize its combat air power capabilities, but it lacks sufficient information from a joint perspective to prioritize programs, objectively weigh the merits of new programs, and decide whether current programs should receive continued funding. Hundreds of billions of dollars more will likely be needed for programs, such as the Joint Strike Fighter, that are still on the drawing board. Serious concerns have been raised about the affordability of these plans. At the same time, the air defenses of potential adversaries in the post-Cold War era have not been substantially improved and pose little threat to the advanced capabilities of U.S. forces. GAO concludes that the Pentagon is proceeding with some major investments without clear evidence that the programs are justified. The air power components of the four services now focus on a strategy of fighting two major regional conflicts versus a global war. In spite of congressional direction to manage the military from a joint perspective rather than on a service-by-service basis, in many areas the services are undertaking duplicative programs or are advocating programs to fulfill a need that may not exist. Because DOD does not routinely develop information on joint mission needs and aggregate capabilities, it has few assurances that decisions to buy, modify, or retire air power systems are sound.

GAO found that: (1) although DOD believes that its modernization plans are affordable, it faces a major challenge in attempting to fund the services' air modernization programs; (2) DOD has not sufficiently assessed joint mission requirements or compared these requirements to the services' aggregate capabilities; (3) DOD is proceeding with some major air modernization programs without clear evidence that the programs are justified; (4) the services plan to acquire numerous advanced weapons systems over the next 15 to 20 years to enhance their interdiction capabilities despite the availability of viable, less costly alternatives; (5) reductions in combat aircraft inventories have been largely offset by improvements in night-fighting and targeting capabilities and increases in advanced long-range missile inventories; (6) although potential adversaries possess capabilities that could threaten U.S. air power, the severity of these threats appears to be limited; and (7) DOD has taken steps to enhance information on joint combat requirements, but these efforts have had little impact in identifying duplication in existing air combat capabilities.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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