Army Ranger Training

The Army has taken steps to improve the safety of training conditions since four students died of hypothermia during ranger training in a Florida swamp in 1995, but it needs to strengthen oversight of key safety controls to avoid such tragedies in the future. The Ranger Training Brigade has improved safety by developing systems to better monitor and predict swamp conditions. It has moved training exercises out of high-risk areas in the swamp, eliminated discretion to deviate from planned exercise locations, and incorporated the latest guidance on training safety. Evacuation procedures have been revised and rehearsed, new medevac helicopters and refueling capacity have been obtained, and medics have been assigned directly to the Brigade. In addition, GAO recommends that the Ranger Training Bridge be required to identify critical training safety controls at each location; that periodic safety inspections be conducted to ensure compliance with these controls; and that inspections of these controls be made periodically by groups outside the chain of command, such as the Army Inspector General.

GAO found that: (1) the Ranger Training Brigade has completed most of the corrective actions recommended by the Army; (2) the Brigade has improved safety by developing systems to better monitor and predict swamp conditions, and improved command and control by revising its procedures to move training exercises outside high-risk areas of the swamp, eliminate discretion to deviate from planned exercise locations, and incorporate the latest guidance on training safety; (3) evacuation procedures have been revised and rehearsed, new medevac helicopters and refueling capacity have been obtained, and medics have been assigned directly to the Brigade; (4) if the Army is to sustain the key corrective actions taken after the accident in the future, the actions must become institutionalized; (5) if the important corrective actions are to become institutionalized, formal Army inspections will have to be expanded to include testing or observing to determine whether they are working effectively; (6) the Army plans to fully staff the Ranger Training Brigade at the mandated 90-percent level by February 1997; (7) although the Army raised the Brigade's staffing priority subsequent to GAO's field work, high-risk training units generally are not recognized in Army personnel staffing priorities; (8) the Brigade's long-term ability to sustain the required number of officers may be hindered by competition with Army priorities given to units who are first to fight and with other important noncombatant units; (9) currently, members of the Ranger Training Brigade and battalion chains of command serve as the safety cell organization established pursuant to the act; (10) the act did not establish specific criteria to guide decisions on the makeup of a safety cell, and the option chosen by the Army represents little change from the safety oversight practice that was in place at the time of the accident; (11) personnel in these positions have limited experience in the local training areas due to the Army's policy of rotating them to new units every 2 or 3 years; and (12) the Army Infantry Center is considering requesting authorization for additional civilian and military positions to serve as full-time safety cell members.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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