Navy Aviation

V-22 Cost and Capability to Meet Requirements Are Yet to Be Determined Gao ID: NSIAD-98-13 October 22, 1997

The V-22 Osprey program, which is intended to provide the military with more than 500 new tilt-rotor aircraft, has been in development for nearly 15 years. Despite significant spending on the V-22, the system has yet to achieve program stability in terms of cost or aircraft design. Cost estimates for each aircraft have ranged from $40 million to $58 million. The aircraft's design will not be finalized until further testing is completed and several important performance and operational issues, such as payload capability, aerial refueling, and downwash, are resolved. Resolving these issues will likely escalate program costs and extend the program schedule. The Defense Department's (DOD) April 1997 decision to begin low-rate initial production of the V-22 was based, in large part, on the results of early operational testing using aircraft produced under an earlier full-scale development program. However, those aircraft are not representative of the aircraft now being developed during the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the V-22 program. Moreover, some of the tests on which the decision was based have been criticized within DOD as being "extremely artificial" because of significant test limitations.

GAO noted that: (1) the V-22 has been in development for almost 15 years; (2) although Congress has provided significant funding and support to the Department of Defense (DOD), the system has not yet achieved program stability in terms of cost or aircraft design; (3) there are large disparities among the cost estimates from the program office, the contractors, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense; (4) these estimates range from about $40 million to $58 million for each aircraft; (5) the design of the aircraft will not be stabilized until further testing is completed and several important performance and operational issues, such as payload capability, aerial refueling, and downwash are resolved; (6) resolution of these issues, which could also require mission trade-offs or changes to planned operational concepts, will likely escalate program costs and extend the program schedule; (7) the April 1997 low-rate initial production (LRIP) decision was based, in large part, on the results of early operational testing using aircraft produced under an earlier full-scale development program; (8) however, those aircraft are not representative of the aircraft currently being developed during the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the V-22 program; (9) furthermore, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), has characterized the tests on which the LRIP decision was based as extremely artificial because of significant test limitations; and (10) future production decisions for the V-22 should be based on more realistic testing.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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