National Missile Defense

The Defense Department (DOD) plans to ask for an additional $2.3 billion for the national missile defense program, which is intended to shield the United States from ballistic missile attacks. However, DOD's plan to develop the national missile defense program in only six years--about half as long as it has taken to deploy other U.S.-based ballistic missile defense systems--is fraught with risks, including possible schedule slippages and technical problems stemming from limited testing. Schedule risk is high because DOD will need to complete many activities in a relatively short period of time. Moreover, the compressed development schedule allows only limited testing. If later tests reveal problems, costly redesign or modifications of already produced hardware may be required.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD faces significant challenges in the NMD program because of high schedule and technical risks; (2) schedule risk is high because the schedule requires a large number of activities to be completed in a relatively short amount of time; (3) the sequential nature of key developmental activities--such as not being able to proceed in earnest until a prime NMD contractor is selected in the spring of 1998--magnifies time pressures; (4) furthermore, developing and deploying an NMD system in the 6 years allotted under the program will be a significant challenge for DOD given its past history with other weapon systems; (5) for example, NMD's aquisition schedule is about one-half as long as that of the only other U.S.-based ballistic missile defense system; (6) DOD acknowledges the high schedule risk; (7) technical risks are high because the compressed development schedule only allows limited testing; (8) the NMD acquisition strategy calls for conducting: (a) one system test prior to the initial system deployment decision--a test that would not include all system elements or involve stressing conditions such as threats employing sophisticated countermeasures or multiple warheads; and (b) one test of the integrated ground-based interceptor before production of the interceptor's booster element must begin; and (9) if subsequent tests reveal problems, costly redesign or modification of already produced hardware may be required.