Chemical Weapons and Materiel

Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule Gao ID: NSIAD-97-18 February 10, 1997

Destroying the stockpile of U.S. chemical munitions will exceed the Army's estimate of nearly $25 billion and will take longer than planned because of public concerns over the safety of incineration, compliance with environmental laws, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies. The costs and schedule of the disposal program are largely driven by whether states and local communities agree with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile sites. Reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army had anticipated. Recognizing the difficulty of satisfying public concerns about specific disposal locations, suggestions have been made by Congress, the Defense Department (DOD), and others to change the program's basic approach to destruction. However, these proposals entail trade-offs and would require changes in existing legal requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative to incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional site, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and changing existing laws to standardize environmental requirements. Notwithstanding these overarching issues, DOD and the Army have taken steps to improve program management.

GAO found that: (1) while there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the destruction method that should be used; (2) as a result, the cost and schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain; however, they will cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above current expenditures and take longer than currently planned; (3) key factors impacting the programs include public concerns over the safety of incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations, legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies; (4) the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile sites; (5) based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated; (6) congressional direction to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled chemical munitions indicates that there are continued public concerns about the proposed disposal method; (7) until DOD and the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for the remaining stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy; (8) many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army's ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program; (9) recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving public concerns associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change the programs' basic approach to destruction; (10) however, the suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in existing legal requirements; (11) these suggestions have included deferring plans for additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements; (12) DOD and the Army have taken actions in response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations to improve program management; and (13) however, the Army cannot implement some of the more significant initiatives without the cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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