Force Structure

Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy has reduced its active military forces by about 28 percent and plans to further reduce its personnel to help modernize a smaller but more capable force. In 1996, pay and allowances for active duty Navy personnel totaled $17 billion, or about 25 percent of the Navy's total obligational authority. In response to congressional concerns about active duty personnel levels, this report examines (1) the size and composition of Navy active duty forces between 1989 and 1999, (2) the Navy's plans to achieve its fiscal year 1999 active duty force goal and initiatives that could further reduce forces beyond the planned fiscal year 1999 level, and (3) the Navy's processes for determining active military force requirements. GAO has issued related reports on the Army and the Air Force. (See GAO/NSIAD-97-66, Feb. 1997, and GAO/NSIAD-97-78, Mar. 1997.)

GAO noted that: (1) the Navy plans to reduce its active military forces from 592,652 in FY 1989 to 394,900 in FY 1999; (2) by the end of FY 1999, infrastructure-related positions will have been reduced at a slightly greater rate than mission-related positions; (3) during the drawdown, the Navy plans to reduce the number of enlisted personnel at a higher rate than officers and the number of junior officers and enlisted personnel at higher rates than senior personnel; (4) while officers and enlisted personnel in mission-related positions will decline by nearly the same percentage, enlisted personnel will decline by a greater percentage than officers in infrastructure positions; (5) as a result, the proportion of officers in infrastructure positions will increase from about 17 percent in FY 1989 to 21 percent in FY 1999; (6) the effect is that costs will not decline in proportion to personnel; (7) as of September 30, 1996, the Navy had reduced its active military personnel by 164,700 primarily by decommissioning ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons and closing shore-based activities; (8) the Navy will need to reduce its forces by another 33,100 to reach its end strength goal by continuing to close bases, decommission ships, submarines, and aircraft squadrons, plus reducing recruiting and associated training and outsourcing some functions; (9) for 25 years, the Navy has not properly assessed personnel requirements for its shore-based activities primarily because of the low priority that the Navy traditionally gave to managing the shore establishment, ineffective Navy management and oversight of the shore requirements program, and changes in program direction; (10) the Navy is instituting several measures to strengthen the shore requirements program; (11) however, without continued high-level Navy support and long-term commitment, there is no guarantee that the fate of these proposals will be any different than those of earlier years; (12) the Navy has little assurance that resources are being used efficiently and that its shore establishment is appropriately sized without an effective long-term program for determining personnel requirements; (13) accordingly, GAO believes this represents a material weakness in the Navy that should be reported under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA); and (14) GAO believes improving the requirements process is particularly important as the Navy looks for savings and efficiencies to modernize and recapitalize its operating forces.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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