Military Bases

The Defense Department's (DOD) report to Congress on the costs and savings attributable to base realignments and closures contained most but not all of the information required by law. For example, although DOD provided aggregate estimates of savings in support costs due to base closures and realignments, it did not provide this information by service, type of facility, and fiscal year. DOD concludes that the four prior rounds of base closures, taken in aggregate, are saving the military billions of dollars each year. However, because of data and records weaknesses, DOD's reports should be viewed as providing a rough approximation of costs and savings rather than a precise accounting. Because the methodology used to identify excess capacity has several limitations, DOD's report gives only a rough indication that excess capacity has increased relative to force structure since 1989. However, other DOD studies, statements by DOD officials, and prior GAO work support the report's general conclusion that DOD continues to retain excess capacity. DOD's analysis of operational and readiness indicators has shown no long-term problems affecting military capabilities that can be related to base realignment and closure actions. This conclusion is consistent with earlier GAO work. DOD's report emphasizes that communities affected by prior base realignment and closure actions appear to be rebounding economically. GAO also found this to be the case, although some communities are faring better than others.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD's report to Congress provided most, but not all, of the information required in section 2824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998; (2) in selected instances, usually because data were not available, DOD either did not provide the information required or did not provide it in the level of specificity required; (3) DOD's report concludes that the four prior BRAC rounds, taken in aggregate, are saving DOD billions of dollars annually; (4) GAO's prior work examining BRAC cost and savings and related issues affirms that past BRAC recommendations will result in substantial savings once implementation costs have been offset and net savings begin to accrue; (5) however, because of data and records weaknesses, DOD's report should be viewed as providing a rough approximation of costs and savings rather than a precise accounting; (6) DOD's data systems do not capture all savings associated with BRAC actions, nor has DOD established a separate system to track BRAC savings; (7) DOD's estimates of costs and savings for future BRAC rounds should also be viewed as rough estimates because there is no assurance that the cost and savings experiences from prior BRAC rounds will be precisely replicated in the future; (8) because the methodology used to identify excess capacity has a number of limitations, DOD's report gives only a rough indication that excess capacity has increased relative to force structure since 1989; (9) however, other DOD studies, statements by DOD officials, and GAO's prior work support the report's general conclusion that DOD continues to retain excess capacity; (10) GAO's work has shown this to be the case, particularly in maintenance depots and in research, development, test, and evaluation facilities; (11) DOD's analysis of operational and readiness indicators have shown no long-term problems affecting military capabilities that can be related to BRAC actions; (12) this general conclusion is also consistent with GAO's prior work; (13) DOD's report emphasizes that communities affected by prior BRAC actions appear to be rebounding economically; (14) GAO also found this to be the case, although its work also shows that some communities are faring better than others; (15) DOD's report suggests that proposed BRAC rounds in 2001 and 2005 would be conducted like prior rounds; and (16) DOD's legislative proposal requesting authority to conduct two additional BRAC rounds provides a good starting point for considering future legislation, should Congress decide to authorize additional rounds.