Navy Aviation

Serious deficiencies discovered during operational testing of the Navy's F/A-18E/F fighter plane, including "wing drop," which can cause the plane to rock back and forth, and engine problems, raise questions about its effectiveness and suitability. Meanwhile, the Navy's claim that the F/A-18E/F can be developed within budget seem doubtful. Although Congress has capped development costs for the aircraft at $4.88 billion, overcoming existing and potential future deficiencies could cause the development effort to exceed the congressional cost cap. In addition, the Navy's F/A-18E/F unit procurement cost estimates are understated.

GAO noted that: (1) the Navy has revised the F/A-18E/F flight test program by decreasing the data collection requirements that were originally planned; (2) program documents state that, although flight testing is behind schedule, program decisions to reduce test points will enable the Navy to regain lost time and complete development testing in November 1998, as originally planned; (3) F/A-18E/F program documents identified numerous deficiencies relative to the aircraft's operational performance; (4) the most challenging technical issue is wing drop; (5) until these issues are resolved through software or hardware changes that have been adequately tested, the cost, schedule, and operational performance impact of resolving these deficiencies cannot be determined; (6) the Navy remains confident that it can correct these deficiencies; (7) in addition, a Navy board that assesses risk areas in the E/F program stated in July 1997, that operational testing may determine that the aircraft is not operationally effective or suitable; (8) a December 1997 preliminary operational assessment report, which is classified and based on limited data and analysis, identified 16 major deficiencies with the E/F aircraft but concluded that the F/A-18E/F is potentially operationally effective and suitable; (9) the Navy has consistently stated that the F/A-18E/F will be developed and produced within the cost estimates established for the program; (10) certain key assumptions on which the cost estimate was made have been overtaken by events; (11) program documents state that the current development effort is funded based on the assumption that problems would not occur during testing; (12) unanticipated aircraft deficiencies have occurred, and most of the program's management reserve has been depleted; (13) since the flight test program has about 1 year remaining, it is probable that additional deficiencies will develop; (14) correcting current and potential future deficiencies could result in the development effort exceeding the congressional cost cap; (15) the Navy's F/A-18E/F unit procurement cost estimates are understated; (16) these cost estimates were based on what has become unrealistically high quantities of E/F aircraft that will be bought; and (17) more realistic assumptions indicate that, although the total procurement cost will decrease, the F/A-18E/F unit cost will be more than the Navy currently estimates.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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