B-2 Bomber

Additional Costs to Correct Deficiencies and Make Improvements Gao ID: NSIAD-98-152 June 16, 1998

The Air Force evaluated the B-2A bomber's ability to meet several broad objectives--strike rapidly, sustain operations, deploy to forward locations, survive in hostile environments, and deliver weapons accurately. Operational test reports concluded that the B-2As in the block 30 configuration (the latest defined configuration) are operationally effective but plagued by significant deficiencies that limit the aircraft's ability to meet those objectives. These deficiencies involve the (1) incomplete development of the automated ground mission planning system, (2) unsatisfactory performance of the defensive avionics system, (3) inadequate reliability and maintainability of low observable materials and structures, and (4) lack of environmental shelters to maintain low observable materials and to protect the aircraft from certain weather conditions during deployment. The cost to complete the B-2A program for the block 30 configuration is estimated at $44.3 billion. Included in this amount is funding to correct or improve some, but not all, of these deficiencies. Modifications of B-2As to the block 30 configuration have not been accomplished on schedule. According to the Air Force, the contractor has had difficulty hiring enough personnel to meet the schedule.

GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force evaluated the B-2A capability to meet several broad objectives--strike rapidly, sustaining operations, deploy to forward locations, survive in hostile environments, and accurately deliver weapons; (2) the November 1997 operational test reports concluded that B-2As, in the block 30 configuration, are operationally effective, but with several important deficiencies that limit the aircraft's ability to fully meet those objectives as planned; (3) the test reports identify four deficiencies: (a) incomplete development of the automated ground mission planning system, which is needed to rapidly plan and carry out B-2A strike missions; (b) unsatisfactory performance of the defensive avionics system, which is used to provide enemy threat information to the crews and increase their survivability in certain situations; (c) inadequate reliability and maintainability of low observable materials and structures, reducing the ability to sustain the defined pace of operations while maintaining a high degree of survivability for conventional B-2A missions; and (d) lack of environmental shelters to maintain low observable materials and to protect the aircraft from certain weather conditions during deployment; (4) the fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate identifies the cost to complete the B-2A program for the block 30 configuration at $44.3 billion then-year dollars; (5) included in this figure is funding to correct or improve some, but not all, of the deficiencies listed above; (6) for example, the estimate does not include the additional costs that would be incurred if defensive avionics were to be required to achieve the originally planned capability, which Department of Defense officials said is no longer required at this time; (7) however, it does include funding for software upgrades to improve the system performance, which meets current operational objectives; (8) further, it does not include the cost to improve low observable materials, which are needed to sustain the pace of B-2A operations, and to provide for a sufficient number of deployment shelters to accommodate repairs to B-2As; (9) the estimate also excludes costs to buy spare parts that are being identified to support the B-2A's nuclear mission; (10) modifications of B-2As to the block 30 configuration have not been accomplished on schedule; (11) four modified aircraft were delivered as of April 1998--three later than scheduled and one ahead of schedule; and (12) according to the Air Force, the contractor has had difficulty hiring enough personnel to achieve the schedule.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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