Quadrennial Defense Review

Although broader in scope and more rigorous in some aspects than the Defense Department's (DOD) 1993 Bottom-Up Review of U.S. defense requirements, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a blueprint for meeting the military's needs through 2015, did not consider certain force structure alternatives. Moreover, the QDR did not fully consider the potential effects of new technologies and war-fighting concepts on DOD's planned force structure. As a result, it is unclear whether the QDR identified the force structure that is best suited to carrying out the defense strategy, as required by Congress. The QDR's modernization review examined some variations of the services' procurement plans but did not include a thorough, mission-oriented review of the mix of capabilities that the United States will need to counter future threats. DOD can provide a more thorough review of U.S. defense needs in the next QDR by preparing early, improving its analytical tools, and considering changes to the structure and design of the QDR process. If Congress chooses to establish another independent panel of experts to review defense needs, it may want to require the panel to complete its work before the next QDR to provide DOD with a broader set of alternatives to consider.

GAO noted that: (1) QDR did not examine alternatives that would provide greater assurance that it identified the force structure that is best suited to implement the defense strategy; (2) the QDR's force assessments built on DOD's Bottom-Up Review analysis by examining requirements for a broader range of military operations beyond major theater wars, and by analyzing the potential impact of some key assumptions; (3) only one of the three major force assessments modeled any force structure alternatives; (4) the assessment did not examine alternatives that involved targeted changes because DOD officials foresaw problems in obtaining service consensus and DOD's models are not sensitive enough to assess the effects of some types of force structure changes; (5) although some technologies consistent with Joint Vision 2010 were modeled, none of the assessments fully examined the potential effects of new technologies and war-fighting concepts on DOD's planned force structure; (6) DOD's modernization review examined some variations of the services' procurement plans but did not include a thorough, mission-oriented review of the mix of capabilities the United States will need to counter future threats; (7) DOD divided responsibility for analyzing major procurement programs and investment issues among 17 task forces; (8) this approach did not always provide a mission focus that examined trade-offs or facilitated a fundamental reassessment of modernization needs in light of emerging threats and technological advances; (9) the modernization and force assessment panels conducted most of their work independently and concurrently, which hampered their ability to explore linkages and trade-offs between force structure and modernization alternatives; (10) DOD can provide a more thorough review of U.S. defense needs in the next QDR by preparing early, improving its analytical tools, and considering changes to the structure and design of the QDR process; (11) DOD has not yet developed a formal process to prepare for and coordinate activities related to the next QDR; and (12) delaying the start of the next QDR until later in the next Presidential administration may also facilitate a more thorough review.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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