DOD Personnel

Between 1982 and 1999, 80 people were convicted of committing espionage against the United States; 68 of them were Defense Department (DOD) employees, and all had undergone personnel security investigations and held security clearances. GAO's evaluation of personnel security investigations by the Defense Security Service--the key agency responsible for investigating DOD's civilian and military personnel, consultants, and contractors--uncovered serious lapses in the thoroughness and timeliness of the investigations. This finding raises questions about the risks that such lapses pose to national security. An analysis of 530 personnel security investigations found that the vast majority did not comply with federal standards for conducting such investigations. All of the persons investigated were granted top security clearances even though Defense Security Service investigators had not always verified such basic information as residency, citizenship, or employment. Also, investigations had not been completed in a timely manner, and a backlog of more than 600,000 cases now awaits reinvestigation. In examining the reasons for these deficiencies, GAO found that the Defense Security Service--in an effort to streamline operations and improve efficiency--relaxed its investigative guidance, eliminated key quality control mechanisms, inadequately trained its investigators, and ineffectively managed the automation of its case-processing system. The underlying cause of the Defense Security Service's problems, however, is poor oversight by DOD.

GAO noted that: (1) safeguarding sensitive national security information is one of the most important responsibilities entrusted to public servants; (2) GAO's evaluation of DSS personnel security investigations revealed serious lapses in the thoroughness and timeliness of the investigations, raising questions about the risks such lapses pose to national security; (3) 530 personnel security investigations showed the vast majority did not comply with federal standards for conducting such investigations; (4) all of the individuals investigated were granted top secret security clearances even though DSS investigators had not always verified such basic information as residency, citizenship, or employment; (5) DSS investigations had not been completed in a timely manner and there is a backlog of over 600,000 cases for reinvestigation; (6) as a result, some of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2.4 million personnel currently holding security clearances may be handling sensitive national security information without having been thoroughly screened; (7) in 1994, the Joint Security Commission reported that delays in obtaining security clearances cost DOD several billion dollars because workers were unable to perform their jobs while awaiting a clearance; (8) GAO identified a series of ineffective management reforms at DSS that occurred from 1996 through early 1999; (9) GAO found that DSS--in an effort to streamline operations and improve efficiency--relaxed its investigative guidance, eliminated key quality control mechanisms, inadequately trained its investigators, and ineffectively managed automation of its case processing system; (10) however, the underlying cause of DSS problems is insufficient oversight by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence); and (11) GAO believes that these factors led to incomplete investigations and exacerbated the growing backlog of uninvestigated cases.