Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition

Development Schedule Should Be Changed to Reduce Risks Gao ID: NSIAD-00-74 May 9, 2000

The key objective of the Joint Strike Fighter acquisition strategy is affordability--reducing the development, production, and ownership costs of the program relative to earlier fighter aircraft programs. The Pentagon expects the Joint Strike Fighter acquisition strategy to save nearly $18 billion in development costs. To achieve these savings, the program has incorporated various military and commercial acquisition initiatives into the acquisition strategy. However, the program's implementation of the acquisition strategy will not guarantee that the Joint Strike Fighter program will enter the engineering and manufacturing phase with low technical risk. The planes being produced during the concept demonstration phase are not intended to demonstrate many of the technologies considered critical for achieving Joint Strike Fighter program cost and performance requirements. Instead, many of these technologies--such as avionics, flight systems, manufacturing and producibility, propulsion, supportability, and weapons delivery systems--will only be demonstrated in laboratory or ground-testing environments. Therefore, these critical technologies will be at low levels of technical maturity when the engineering and manufacturing development contract is schedule to be awarded. To demonstrate DOD's commitment to acquisition reform, follow best commercial practices, and reduce the risk of future cost growth, the program should focus on risk reduction efforts by maturing critical technologies before entering engineering and manufacturing development and it should be allowed to do so without the penalty of withdrawal of funding support.

GAO noted that: (1) the key objective of the JSF acquisition strategy is affordability--reducing the development, production, and ownership costs of the program relative to prior fighter aircraft programs; (2) DOD expects the JSF acquisition strategy to save nearly $18 billion (in fiscal year 1995 dollars) in development costs; (3) to achieve its affordability objective, the JSF program office has incorporated various DOD and commercial acquisition initiatives into the JSF acquisition strategy; (4) these initiatives include modifying the traditional weapons acquisition cycle, revising the requirements determination process, and developing critical technologies to a level where they represent low technical risk before the engineering and manufacturing contract is awarded; (5) the expectation is that incorporating these initiatives into the JSF acquisition strategy will result in a better match between the maturity of key technologies and the aircraft's requirements; (6) matching the requirements and the maturity of technology when a program enters engineering and manufacturing development is a critical determinant of a program's success; (7) once the development phase begins, a large, fixed investment in the form of human capital, facilities, and materials is sunk into the program and any significant changes will have a large, rippling effect on cost and schedule; (8) beginning the engineering and manufacturing development phase when critical technologies are at a low level of maturity serves to significantly increase program risk and the likelihood of schedule delays, which in turn result in increased program costs; (9) the JSF program office's implementation of its acquisition strategy will not ensure that the JSF program will enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase with low technical risk; (10) the aircraft being produced during the concept demonstration phase are not intended to demonstrate many of the technologies considered critical for achieving JSF program cost and performance requirements; (11) instead, many of these technologies--such as avionics, flight systems, manufacturing and producibility, propulsion, supportability, and weapons delivery system--will only be demonstrated in laboratory or ground-testing environments; and (12) therefore, these critical technologies will be at low levels of technical maturity when the engineering and manufacturing development contract is scheduled to be awarded.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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