Missile Defense

The Navy Theater Wide system is being developed to defend military and civilian targets, including U.S. and allied military forces in the field, against attacks by medium- and long-range ballistic missiles while they are still outside the atmosphere. From 1997 through 1999, Congress increased funding for the program by 150 percent?about $663 million?over the $444 million requested by the President. The purpose of the increase was to help the Navy to reduce technical risks and develop system technologies earlier than planned. Members of Congress have raised concerns that, despite the funding increases, the program was viewed in 1998 by high ranking Pentagon officials and an independent panel of experts as "high risk" because of technical challenges, such as improving the system's ability to track and destroy enemy ballistic missiles. This report determines (1) how the additional funding provided by Congress was used and (2) whether significant risks to the program remain.

GAO noted that: (1) the Navy used the $663 million in increased funding as intended to reduce technical risks and develop system technologies earlier than originally planned; (2) about 41 percent was used for system design and analysis efforts, such as reducing the technical risks associated with improving the system's ability to differentiate intended targets from other objects; (3) about 20 percent of the funding was used for procuring hardware items, such as rocket motors and test interceptor missiles; (4) according to program officials, the additional funding also allowed the program to shift from a demonstration effort to an acquisition program in which a weapon system will be fully developed and produced; (5) although the Navy used this additional funding to reduce technical risk and develop the system sooner, significant technical and schedule risks still exist; (6) technological advancement is required to differentiate the target from other objects; (7) such discrimination requires that the system's computer network can process an enormous amount of data in real time; (8) this network has not been built, and its software must be integrated with the computer code that is already installed on each ship's computer system; (9) current activities include writing software, examining several computer architectures for the network, and building the capability to test the network; (10) technological advancement is also required in developing the capability of the interceptor missile to seek and destroy the target; (11) GAO is concerned that the program office has proposed a schedule calling for initial operational testing of the missile in 2010 even though 50 percent of the required 80 missiles would be produced and delivered by 2008 and 100 percent by 2010; (12) operational testing is designed to provide an independent evaluation of whether a system meets required performance levels prior to beginning production; (13) GAO has found that cost overruns and the deployment of substandard systems occur when the Department of Defense proceeds into production before systems are tested under operational conditions; (14) the Navy has scheduled up to 7 flight tests between July 2000 and September 2001; (15) according to testing officials, test programs typically separate flight tests by about 6 months; (16) a longer interval between tests gives officials better opportunities to evaluate test results, understand problems, and incorporate solutions into the next test; and (17) the approved level of funding does not match the Navy program office's estimate of how much it needs to implement the program on schedule.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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