Army Logistics
Report on Manpower and Workload System Inadequate and System Interface Untested Gao ID: GAO-03-21 October 30, 2002At the direction of the House Committee on National Security, the Army began developing the Army Workload and Performance System (AWPS) in 1996. This automated system was intended to address a number of specific weaknesses highlighted in several GAO and Army studies since 1994 regarding the Army's inability to support its civilian personnel requirements by using an analytically based workload forecasting system. Army's May 2002 report on AWPS does not provide Congress with adequate information to assess the Army's progress in implementing the system. Specifically, the 2002 plan does not include (1) a detailed summary of all costs that the Army has incurred, or the expenditures that it anticipates in the future, to develop and implement the system; (2) a list of the milestones that the Army has, or has not, achieved in the previous year and a list of milestones that are projected for the future; and (3) an evaluation of how well the system has performed to date in fulfilling its primary function--that is, of matching manpower needs with depot workloads. Although the Army has begun developing an interface between AWPS and the Logistics Modernization Program, it has not sufficiently tested the interface to ensure that data can be shared between the two systems and that the capability of the workload and performance system will not be adversely affected.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-21, Army Logistics: Report on Manpower and Workload System Inadequate and System Interface Untested
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United States General Accounting Office:
Report to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services:
October 2002:
Army Logistics:
Report on Manpower and Workload System Inadequate and System Interface
Untested:
GAO-03-21:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Report Does Not Contain Adequate Information to Assess Progress:
Army Has Not Sufficiently Tested the Interface between AWPS and the
Logistics Modernization Program:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix II: Task List for 2001 and 2002:
Appendix III: Milestone Schedule:
Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology:
Tables:
Table 1: Logistics Modernization Program: Milestones to First
Deployment:
Table 2: Comparison of Criteria Contained in DOD Regulation 5000.2-R
and Army‘s 2002 Report:
Table 3: Presence or Absence of Defense Criteria in the Army‘s 2002
Plan, by Individual Task:
Table 4: Army Projected Costs for Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
Abbreviations:
AWPS: Army Workload and Performance System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
October 30, 2002:
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John Warner
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
At the direction of the House Committee on National Security,[Footnote
1] the Army began developing the Army Workload and Performance System
in 1996. This automated system was intended to address a number of
specific weaknesses highlighted in several of our and Army studies
since 1994 regarding the Army‘s inability to support its civilian
personnel requirements by using an analytically based workload
forecasting system. The Department of Defense‘s fiscal years 1997 and
1998 Annual Statements of Assurance highlighted the problems of not
being able to relate personnel requirements to workload and budget as a
material weakness in the Army‘s manpower requirements determination
system. The Army Workload and Performance System was designed to
address this weakness and to coordinate workforce requirements with
workloads, initially at the Army‘s five maintenance depots and
subsequently at other Army maintenance and industrial activities.
The Army first outlined its strategy for designing and fielding this
system in a master plan in April 1999. We reported in November
1999,[Footnote 2] however, that this master plan provided limited and
incomplete information on future development plans and insufficient
funding information. We recommended that the Army strengthen the
management controls and oversight for the system‘s development and
prepare a more comprehensive master plan that contained priorities,
costs, benefits, and schedules. In response to congressional direction,
the Army updated its original master plan in May 2001. Section 346 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-
107) required that the Army provide Congress annually a progress report
on the implementation of the master plan during the preceding year. In
May 2002, the Army submitted to Congress its first progress report on
the implementation of the master plan. The report was presented in the
form of a revised master plan. Section 346 also required that the
General Accounting Office evaluate the Army‘s progress report. Lastly,
section 346 encouraged the Army to develop a process to enhance data
sharing between the Army Workload and Performance System and the
Logistics Modernization Program.[Footnote 3] Beginning in February
2003, the Logistics Modernization Program will replace many of the old
information systems that currently support the workload and performance
system, and will become the primary data source for this system.
As agreed with your offices, this report addresses whether (1) the
May 2002 report provides adequate information for Congress to assess
the Army‘s progress in implementing the Army Workload and Performance
System, and (2) the interface the Army is developing between this
system and the Logistics Modernization Program has been sufficiently
tested to ensure that data can be shared between the two systems and
that the capability of the workload and performance system will not be
adversely affected.
Results in Brief:
The May 2002 report on the Army Workload and Performance System does
not provide Congress with adequate information to assess the Army‘s
progress in implementing the system. In response to the mandate for a
progress report, as specified in section 346 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, the Army submitted an updated
version of its May 2001 master plan. This version does not identify the
changes that the Army made to the previous plan, particularly in
setting out milestones and tasks, as was required by section 346. In
addition, the May 2002 version does not contain detailed information on
the system‘s cost, schedule, and performance, which is required by
Department of Defense regulations for reporting on major automated
information systems acquisitions.[Footnote 4] Specifically, the 2002
plan does not include (1) a detailed summary of all costs that the Army
has incurred, or the expenditures that it anticipates in the future, to
develop and implement the system; (2) a list of the milestones that the
Army has, or has not, achieved in the previous year and a list of
milestones that are projected for the future; and (3) an evaluation of
how well the system has performed to date in fulfilling its primary
function--that is, of matching manpower needs with depot workloads.
Because this data is not included in the updated plan, it is difficult
to determine if the system is meeting its original budgetary,
scheduling, and performance objectives and if the Army will need
additional resources to complete the system‘s development and
implementation. Finally, the updated version does not address the
potential duplication and overlap in some functions of the Army
Workload and Performance System and the Army‘s Logistics Modernization
Program. Specifically, the module in the Army Workload and Performance
System that allows the user to compare actual resource expenditures
against production plans, scheduled workloads, and related budgets for
specific projects is a capability that also exists within the Logistics
Modernization Program. In addition, because the Logistics Modernization
Program is not complete, the Army cannot be certain what other
capabilities may be duplicated. Army officials are concerned that this
potential duplication and overlap may result in unnecessary costs and
other inefficiencies.
While the Army has begun developing an interface between the Army
Workload and Performance System and the Logistics Modernization
Program, it has not sufficiently tested the interface to ensure that
data can be shared between the two systems and that the capability of
the workload and performance system will not be adversely affected. For
example, initial testing of this interface began in August 2002 but
will be tested at only one of the five Army depots by February 2003
when the Logistics Modernization Program is scheduled to become
operational. Additionally, the Army plans to shut down many of the old
information systems that provide data for the workload and performance
system once the Logistics Modernization Program comes on line even
though there are no assurances that the data from the Logistics
Modernization Program will allow the workload and performance system to
continue to operate. Until the Army has installed and tested the
interface at several sites, it will be too early to assess whether data
sharing can occur and the extent to which the workload and performance
system will be affected.
We are recommending that the Army improve its progress reports
to Congress on the Army Workload and Performance System‘s
implementation status and ensure that the interface between this system
and the Logistics Modernization Program is evaluated in such a way that
its effectiveness and functionality are assured. In its written
comments on a draft of this report (see app. I), the Department fully
concurred with our recommendations.
Background:
The Army Workload and Performance System (AWPS) is intended to resolve
long-standing systemic problems in the Army‘s civilian manpower
requirements determination process. It is an information and reporting
system that draws production and manpower data from other existing
programs, including the Army‘s Standard Depot System. Its main purpose
is to provide decision support tools for linking workload demands to
manpower requirements and the budget process. The system was initially
installed at Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas, in June 1996. Since
then, it has been put into operation at the Army‘s four other
maintenance depots--Anniston, Letterkenny, Red River, and Tobyhanna. In
1999, the Assistant Secretary of the Army certified the system as fully
operational for the maintenance mission at the five maintenance depots.
The Army is moving forward with the installation of AWPS at all of its
logistics and industrial activities. To date the system is being used
as a decision-making tool in other functional areas, including
ammunition logistics, base operations, materials usage, working capital
fund budgets, and reporting of net operating results. The Secretary of
the Army has directed that AWPS be used throughout the Army as the
standard Armywide mechanism for determining manpower requirements for
all of its logistics and industrial activities.
The first AWPS master plan, submitted to Congress in April 1999,
described the Army‘s progress and future plans for developing and
implementing the system. In our November 1999 report regarding that
master plan, we pointed out that the information it contained was
limited, and we recommended that the Army develop a more substantial
master plan that incorporated all applications for which the system was
to be implemented, along with their priorities, costs and benefits,
and proposed schedules. We also recommended that the Army make
improvements in the existing management and oversight structures.
The House Report to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2001 required the Army to submit a revised master plan,
incorporating our recommendations, by February 2001. Subsequently,
section 346 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002 required the Army to submit an annual progress report on its
implementation of the revised master plan. Section 346 also required
that these reports specifically address any changes made to the master
plan since the previous report.
In December 1999, the Army contracted with the Computer Sciences
Corporation to create the Logistics Modernization Program, which is a
new information system for managing the Army‘s supply, maintenance, and
transportation functions. This system, initially called the Wholesale
Logistics Modernization Program, will replace the existing Standard
Depot System and many other source data systems, several of which
provide data to AWPS. The Logistics Modernization Program is designed
to improve readiness and logistics support to the war fighter by (1)
reducing requisition response times, (2) improving the availability of
supplies, (3) optimizing the use of inventory, and (4) responding more
quickly to changing customer requirements. The milestones to the first
deployment of the Logistics Modernization Program are shown in table 1.
Table 1: Logistics Modernization Program: Milestones to First
Deployment:
[See pdf for image]
Milestones: Begin first deployment; Dates: 02/03; Status: Not complete.
Source: Department of the Army.
[End of table]
Once the Logistics Modernization Program becomes operational at the
maintenance depots, the Army plans to shut down many of the old
information systems that currently support AWPS and it will become the
primary source for the data that AWPS needs to function. As a result,
section 346 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002 encouraged the Army to set up a process that would permit or
enhance data sharing between the two systems. To ensure that the Army‘s
AWPS capabilities remained intact, section 346 also mandated that the
Army retain AWPS as its standard servicewide manpower system, under the
Secretary of the Army‘s supervision and management. This mandate was
further underscored in a letter dated August 9, 2001, from several
congressional representatives to the Commander of the U.S. Materiel
Command, which further requested that the Army refrain from
incorporating the new system into the Logistics Modernization Program.
Report Does Not Contain Adequate Information to Assess Progress:
The Army‘s May 2002 report on its workload and performance system does
not contain the information that Congress needs to assess the Army‘s
progress in implementing the system. In response to the requirement for
a progress report, as specified in section 346 of the Fiscal Year 2002
National Defense Authorization Act, the Army submitted an updated
version of its May 2001 master plan. This updated version did not
identify or explain the changes that the Army had made to the master
plan since the May 2001 version. In addition, the Army‘s report did not
contain certain cost, schedule, and performance information that would
normally be expected. Moreover, the Army‘s report did not fully discuss
the potential duplication and overlap in functions performed by the
Logistics Modernization Program and the workload and performance
system.
Report Fails to Address Changes in Milestones and Tasks since May 2001:
Although required by section 346, the Army‘s 2002 report did not
address the changes made to the milestones or tasks set out in the May
2001 AWPS master plan. Appendixes II and III provide tables showing the
milestones and tasks identified in both the 2001 and 2002 reports. In
comparing the two reports, we found that several milestones had been
changed, but the 2002 report did not identify these changes nor did it
provide a detailed discussion of the reasons for these changes or their
significance. For example, in its 2001 report the Army had scheduled
Corpus Christi Army Depot as the first site to prototype the Net
Operating Result capability, beginning in August 2001. We found,
however, that in the 2002 report this task was set back by 1 year--to
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2002. The same task was also
scheduled to be prototyped at one of the ammunition sites by March
2002, but this milestone was later delayed by about 1 year until
sometime between January and March 2003. In each case, the 2002 report
did not provide an analysis or explanation for the scheduling change.
We also found discrepancies between the two reports related to the
phasing of certain tasks involved in implementing the new system. Some
tasks that were assigned to a specific phase in the 2001 report were
moved to a different phase in the 2002 report, and there was no
discussion of why these changes were made or what their impact on the
overall implementation schedule might be. For example, phase 1 of the
2001 report involved only the consolidation of ongoing implementation
actions, whereas in the 2002 report phase 1 also included non-Army
Material Command maintenance activities. The 2002 report, however, does
not clearly address the status of tasks previously listed under
phase 1.
Report Lacks Cost, Schedule, and Performance Data:
The Army‘s 2002 plan does not contain the cost, schedule, and
performance data that might normally be expected. For example,
according to the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) Regulation 5000.2-R,
progress reports related to the acquisition of major new automated
information systems should contain detailed information on such key
parameters as cost, schedule, and performance. Army officials stated
that the scope and cost of the AWPS system does not meet the minimum
threshold to be considered a major information system and, thus, the
regulation does not apply to it. While we agree that the AWPS system
does not meet the threshold requirements of the regulation, we believe
certain criteria in the regulation would provide Congress with the
necessary information to properly evaluate the AWPS system and should
therefore be addressed in the Army‘s progress reports. Consequently, we
have analyzed the AWPS report using criteria from the regulation.
Additionally, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires agencies to have
investment management processes and information to help ensure that
information technology projects are being implemented at an acceptable
cost and within a reasonable and expected time frame. In effect, these
requirements and guidance recognize that one cannot manage what one
cannot measure. Finally, in our November 1999 report on the Army‘s
original master plan for AWPS, we identified several shortcomings,
including the lack of detailed information on costs and expenditures,
milestones, and performance. We recommended in that report that the
Army develop a more substantive master plan that included priorities,
costs and benefits, and schedules.
In our analysis of the Army‘s 2002 plan, we found that, while it
addresses some of these elements, it does not provide the detailed or
complete data that is needed to adequately assess the Army‘s progress
in implementing the workload and performance system. As table 2 shows,
the 2002 plan contained information on a few parameters identified in
DOD‘s guidance, including direct costs; dates for certain events, such
as reaching initial operating capabilities; and objectives for
operational requirements. However, it did not include information on a
large number of parameters, such as total procurement costs, critical
schedule dates, and measures of performance.
Table 2: Comparison of Criteria Contained in DOD Regulation 5000.2-R
and Army‘s 2002 Report:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD Regulation 5000.2-R and GAO analysis.
[End of table]
In addition, the 2002 report did not contain necessary cost,
scheduling, and performance data for the individual tasks that the Army
has assigned to each implementation phase. Phase 1, implementation of
the workload and performance system at non-Army Materiel Command
maintenance depots; phase 2, expansion of the system into
nonmaintenance missions (e.g., base operations, medical); and phase 3,
development of decision-support tools for use at the major command and
headquarters levels (e.g., working capital fund budget, links to depot
maintenance operational system, and cross-organizational activities).
As table 3 illustrates, the Army‘s report contained cost, scheduling,
and performance information for only a small number of these tasks.
Furthermore, we could only identify specific costs for one of the tasks
and, in most cases, the milestones and performance measures were too
broad and did not include interim measures and specific performance
targets to measure progress.
Table 3: Presence or Absence of Defense Criteria in the Army‘s 2002
Plan, by Individual Task:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Phase 1-Implementation of AWPS at non-Army Materiel
Command maintenance depots; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: [Empty];
Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Basic components of AWPS; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones:
[Empty];
Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Develop strategic plans and forecasts; Cost: [Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Develop performance measures and controls; Cost: [Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Schedule resource and controls; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones:
[Empty]; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Create decision support system; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones:
[Empty]; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Upgrade modules from FoxPro programming language to an
Oracle/Power Builder/Silver Stream; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes;
Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Implement the Enterprise Resource Planning System; Cost:
[Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Phase 2-Expansion of AWPS into nonmaintenance missions;
Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Consolidate current ongoing implementation; Cost: [Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Maintenance depots; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes;
Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Ammunition logistics at eight munitions centers; Cost:
[Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Ammunition manufacturing; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes;
Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Base operations at all maintenance depots; Cost: [Empty];
Milestones: Yes; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Manufacturing arsenals; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes;
Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Continued upgrade of Web-based executive module; Cost:
[Empty]; Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Expand AWPS to additional maintenance activities; Cost:
[Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Expand AWPS to non-Army materiel command maintenance
activities at[A]; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: [Empty]; Performance
measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: General support organizations at Fort Lewis and Fort
Riley; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Aviation repair facility at Fort Rucker; Cost: [Empty];
Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: National Guard tank engine repair facility at Fort Riley;
Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: National Guard readiness sustainment maintenance site;
Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: National Guard aviation repair facility at Springfield,
Mo.; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Expand AWPS into other nonmaintenance missions[A]; Cost:
[Empty]; Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Army transformation installation management; Cost:
[Empty];
Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Medical; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance
measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Conduct review to determine applicability of AWPS in
testing, training, and research and development activities; Cost:
[Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Phase 3-Development of decision support system tools;
Cost: Yes; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Net Operating Result Reporting Capability Module; Cost:
[Empty]; Milestones: Yes; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Working capital fund budget linkage; Cost: [Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Material module; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes;
Performance
measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Depot maintenance operations planning system tool; Cost:
[Empty]; Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Production of Operations Planning budget; Cost: [Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Depot Maintenance Operations Planning System tool to
manage 50/50 requirement; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: [Empty];
Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Linkage between depot maintenance operations; Cost:
[Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Planning System lock points and AWPS study capability;
Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Business process re-engineering tools between maintenance
provider-process model; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: [Empty];
Performance
measures: Partially[B].
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Model to evaluate new investment vs. repair; Cost:
[Empty];
Milestones: [Empty]; Performance measures:
Army Workload and Performance System Tasks included in the Armyís 2002
Master Plan: Mission indirect; Cost: [Empty]; Milestones: Yes;
Performance
measures: Partially[B].
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Not included in May 2001 plan.
[B] Performance measures primarily state objectives. These performance
measures did not include interim measures and performance targets to
measure progress.
[End of table]
Report Lacks Detailed Cost Data:
While the Army‘s May 2002 report provided some estimated funding
requirements for AWPS for fiscal years 2004 through 2006, it did not
contain the detailed information that could be used to assess the costs
of implementing the system thus far and the costs of expanding it into
other functional areas in the future. According to the Army Materiel
Command, the total estimated costs for the AWPS program were about
$44.8 million for fiscal years 1996 through 2002, and the estimated
program costs for fiscal year 2003 are about $8.9 million. The primary
source for this funding has been the Army‘s working capital fund. These
figures and the funding sources, however, were not included in the
Army‘s report. In addition, the Army‘s report did not identify the
extent to which actual expenditures relate to the budgeted amounts. The
report also did not provide any cost estimates for funding the Army‘s
plan to expand AWPS to other nonmaintenance activities, such as base
operations support. According to Army officials, these expansion plans
will require funding through the Army‘s appropriated operations and
maintenance accounts.
In its report, the Army estimated that it would need about $20.1
million over the next 3 fiscal years (2004 through 2006), to ensure
that the remaining tasks are implemented. Table 4 shows the Army‘s
projected costs for fiscal years 2004 through 2006, which were included
in its May 2002 report. According to the report, these future year
costs are unfunded and the Army has not yet identified funding sources
for them. These officials stated that, other than the funding that has
been provided through the working capital fund, the department has not
adequately funded the AWPS expansion effort in recent years and that
this lack of funding has hampered their ability to plan and implement
further expansions.
Table 4: Army Projected Costs for Fiscal Years 2004-2006:
Dollars in millions.
Task: Additional Army workload and performance system implementation;
Projected costs for fiscal years: 2004:
$3.7; Projected costs for fiscal years: 2005:
$4.9; Projected costs for fiscal years: 2006:
$5.5; Projected costs for fiscal years: Total:
$14.1.
Task: Decision support tools; Projected costs for fiscal years: 2004:
2.0;
Projected costs for fiscal years: 2005: 2.5; Projected costs for fiscal
years: 2006: 1.5; Projected costs for fiscal years: Total: 6.0.
Total; Projected costs for fiscal years: 2004: $5.7; Projected costs
for fiscal years: 2005: $7.4; Projected costs for fiscal years: 2006:
$7.0; Projected costs for fiscal years: Total: $20.1.
Source: Army May 2002 AWPS master plan.
[End of table]
As table 4 indicates, the Army did not provide a detailed cost analysis
regarding the historical and projected costs for AWPS, nor did it
provide a complete summary of the estimated costs to complete the tasks
listed for each phase. Specifically, the table includes cost estimates
for additional system implementation (phase 1) and for the development
of decision support tools (phase 3), but it provides no specific
estimates for expanding the system into other functional areas (phase
2). Additionally, the Army did not include the associated costs to
support the development of all the specific tasks required to complete
each phase.
Report Contains Limited Milestone Data:
The Army‘s May 2002 report contained only limited information on the
milestones established to implement the new system and no data on
whether earlier milestones had been reached, thereby making it
difficult to assess the progress of the system‘s development and
implementation. Specifically, the report lacked schedules that include
implementation and completion dates and interim milestones. For
example, the Army is updating the Workload and Performance System
applications from the original programming language to a more up-to-
date programming language. According to the Army, this upgrade has been
installed at all five maintenance depots and will be installed at other
installations between May 2002 and May 2003. However, specific dates
for implementing or completing this upgrade were not included in the
May 2002 report. In another example, the Army indicates that it intends
to install AWPS at other nonmaintenance activities outside the Army
Materiel Command, but it does not provide specific milestones for each
location or the specific tasks associated with the development and
installation process. As shown in appendix III, the Army has
established expected completion dates for some of the AWPS
applications, but the completion dates for other long-term applications
have not yet been set.
The Army‘s May 2002 report also did not provide milestones for
completing the interface between AWPS and the Logistics Modernization
Program. Instead, it simply stated that between May 2002 and February
2003 the system has to accept, and operate with, data from the
Logistics Modernization Program. The original date (July 2001) set to
operationalize the interface at the first site, the Tobyhanna Army
Depot, had changed by about 18 months. In addition, the report noted
that the Operations Support Command is scheduled to transition to the
Logistics Modernization Program 1 year after the Communications and
Electronics Command, which is approximately January 2004. This date is
about 2 years beyond the original date of October 2000.
Report Lacks Adequate Performance Assessments:
The Army‘s May 2002 report does not address in detail the extent to
which AWPS is providing the Army with the capability to match manpower
requirements and workload for which it was initially intended. While
the report states that the implementation of AWPS in several mission
areas within the Army Materiel Command has shown that the system can
efficiently draw data from other existing systems and manipulate this
information to link personnel needs with projected workloads, the Army
has not demonstrated that AWPS has improved its ability to support its
long-term forecasting of civilian personnel requirements based on
projected workload. Because the Army did not provide supporting
evidence for the statement in its May 2002 report that the system has
led to increased operational efficiencies, the extent of the
improvements is unclear. We did not independently review the
effectiveness of the AWPS system at the depots we visited.
Report Does Not Address Potential Overlap with Logistics Modernization
Program:
The Army‘s report also fails to discuss the potential overlap and
duplication that exists between AWPS and the Logistics Modernization
Program. Although these two systems were designed to serve different
functions, Army and contractor officials point out that there is some
potential overlap and redundancy in the systems‘ capabilities. For
example, the capability of the performance measurement and control
module in the AWPS software also exists in the Logistics Modernization
Program software configuration. This module allows the user to compare
actual resource expenditures against production plans, scheduled
workload, and related budgets for specific projects in order to
determine the likelihood of completing a project within its estimated
time frame and budget. In addition, because the Logistics Modernization
Program is not complete, the Army cannot be certain what other
capabilities may be duplicated. Army officials at the Tobyhanna Army
Depot expressed concerns that the need to operate and maintain both
systems could lead to higher costs and duplication of efforts.
A second module in AWPS, however, the strategic planning and
forecasting module, is unique to AWPS and does not currently exist
within the software configuration for the Logistics Modernization
Program. This module provides the user with the capability to forecast
manpower and capacity requirements based on future projected workload.
More specifically, this module allows the Army the ability to conduct
’what if“ analyses for manpower and capacity requirements based on
future workload projections at each of its maintenance activities.
Contractor officials stated that although this capability could be
built into the Logistics Modernization Program, it would have to be
modified to be compatible with the current software configuration. By
incorporating this capability into the Logistics Modernization Program,
the Army could eliminate the need to operate and maintain two separate
systems. Computer Sciences Corporation submitted a formal proposal to
the Army in August 2001 to incorporate all of the capabilities of AWPS
into the Logistics Modernization Program for an estimated contract
price increase of about $2 million. Contractor officials told us in May
2002, however, that because of the amount of work they have dedicated
to building the interface between the two systems, this cost estimate
is no longer valid.
Army Has Not Sufficiently Tested the Interface between AWPS and the
Logistics Modernization Program:
Although the Army has begun developing an interface between AWPS and
the Logistics Modernization Program, it has not sufficiently tested the
interface to ensure that data can be shared between the two systems and
that the AWPS capability will not be adversely affected. Once the
Logistics Modernization Program is implemented, the Army plans to shut
down several systems, including the Standard Depot System, that
currently provide data for AWPS. However, the Army has not demonstrated
that the Logistics Modernization Program databases will be able to
supply AWPS with the data that it needs to continue to function. Until
the Army has placed the interface in operation at several sites, it
will be too early to assess its effectiveness.
The Army‘s contract with the Computer Sciences Corporation to develop
and field the Logistics Modernization Program required that the
contractor would create an interface between the two systems, and this
work started in 1999. In February 2002, Army and contractor officials
developed an interface control document that identified the data
elements that AWPS would need from the Logistics Modernization Program
databases to maintain its current capabilities. Since that time,
contractor personnel have been working to locate the sources within the
Logistics Modernization Program databases for each data element and
determine the most expedient way to move that data into AWPS. According
to Army and contractor officials, about 90 percent of the data elements
had been located by May 2002.
While initial testing of the interface began in August 2002, it will be
tested at only one of the five Army depots by February 2003 when the
Logistics Modernization Program is scheduled to come on line.
Specifically, the Army will be testing the interface at Tobyhanna Army
Depot between August 2002 and February 2003, and expects that the
interface will be fully functional by the time the Logistics
Modernization Program is deployed at the depot in February 2003.
Subsequently, the Army plans to install the Logistics Modernization
Program and the AWPS interface at the four remaining Army maintenance
depots, along with the Army‘s ammunition maintenance facilities.
According to the May 2002 report, the Army expects to shut down the
current information systems that support AWPS at the same time as it
turns on the Logistics Modernization Program. As a result, there will
be no transition period during which the current information systems
and the Logistics Modernization Program are in operation at the same
time.
Conclusions:
The Army‘s May 2002 report to Congress on the development and
implementation of AWPS has a number of significant limitations. The
report does not contain key information regarding the changes to the
program since the submission of the May 2001 master plan, and it does
not provide adequate information on the costs, schedule, and
performance of the system. As a result, the report is of limited use to
Congress in evaluating whether the AWPS project is still in line with
its original cost, schedule, and performance objectives. The Army has
not demonstrated to Congress how well the system has helped it thus far
to determine future civilian workload requirements based on projected
workloads. Moreover, the report does not contain the information that
Congress needs to determine how much funding will be required to
complete the initial implementation of the system and expand it into
other functional areas.
AWPS provides the Army with a capability for strategic planning and
forecasting at its maintenance facilities that currently does not exist
within the Logistics Modernization Program. The interface that is being
developed between the two systems is intended to allow the workload and
performance system to maintain its current capabilities, including its
strategic planning and forecasting module. Because each system offers
the Army certain unique capabilities, a rationale for operating both
systems at the same time exists. However, because the two systems may
develop some overlap and redundant capabilities in the future, there is
some potential for increased costs or other inefficiencies.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to improve the quality of the Army‘s annual progress reports
to Congress on the implementation of AWPS and to enhance the efficiency
and effectiveness of the system, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to:
* submit to Congress annual progress reports on the implementation of
AWPS that contain a complete description of any changes to the master
plan since the submission of the previous report and a detailed
explanation of the status of the AWPS program in relation to the costs,
milestones, and performance data contained in the previous report;
* ensure that these progress reports contain detailed cost, schedule,
and performance information to allow Congress to fully assess the
status of the Army‘s implementation of the workload and performance
system and its interface with the Logistics Modernization Program, and
the extent to which the system is providing the Army with the
capability to match manpower and workload requirements;
* undertake a review of the interface between AWPS and the Logistics
Modernization Program, once it has been successfully installed at the
Army‘s five maintenance depots, to ensure that it is the most efficient
and cost-effective use of these two systems; and:
* ensure that the data-sharing mechanisms between the Logistics
Modernization Program and AWPS are complete and allow for full
functionality of AWPS before turning off the information systems that
currently support AWPS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of Defense fully concurred with our finding and
recommendations. In response to our recommendation that the Army ensure
that future progress reports contain cost, schedule, and performance
information as specified in relevant Defense regulations and other
congressional guidance, DOD will implement the recommendation in its
February 2003 report. However, DOD noted that the workload and
performance system is not a major automated information system and,
therefore, is not required to strictly adhere to the requirements of
Department of Defense Regulation 5000.2-R. We agree that the workload
and performance system does not meet the minimum threshold to be
considered a major system. However, we believe that the parameters
outlined in this regulation provide an appropriate management framework
for the types of information that should be included in future progress
reports.
DOD also informally provided other suggested revisions to address
certain technical and factual information in the text of the draft
report. We reviewed these suggested revisions and made changes where
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, and the Director,
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Appendix IV contains our scope and methodology. Please contact me or
Julia Denman at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staffs have any questions
regarding this report. Key contributors to this report were David
Schmitt, Patricia Albritton, Leslie Harmonson, and Nancy Benco.
Signed by David R. Warren:
David R. Warren
Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500:
OCT 9 2002:
Mr. David R. Warren:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street NW Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Warren:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, ’ARMY LOGISTICS: Report on
Manpower and Workload System Inadequate and System Interface Untested,“
September 5, 2002 (GAO Code 350170/GAO-03-21).
The Department concurs with the report‘s recommendations. However,
portions of the report supporting the recommendations could be somewhat
misleading, and for that reason we are informally providing your staff
suggested changes to the draft report to improve its accuracy and
clarity. The DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by Allen W. Beckett:
Allen W. Beckett
Principal Assistant:
Enclosure:
GAO Draft Report:
(GAO 350170/GAO 03-21):
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 GAO CODE 350170/GAO-03-21:
’ARMY LOGISTICS: REPORT ON MANPOWER AND WORKLOAD SYSTEM INADEQUATE AND
SYSTEM INTERFACE UNTESTED“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Army to:
RECOMMENDATION la: Submit to Congress annual progress reports on the
implementation of the Army Workload and Performance System (AWPS) that
contain a complete description of any changes to the master plan since
the submission of the Army‘s previous report to Congress and a detailed
explanation of the status of the AWPS program in relation to cost,
milestones and performance data contained in the previous report.
(p.17/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
RECOMMENDATION 1b: Ensure that these progress reports contain cost,
schedule and performance information as specified in the Department‘s
regulations and other Congressional guidance related to the acquisition
and reporting for major information systems to allow Congress to fully
assess the status of the Army‘s implementation of the workload and
performance system and its interface with Logistics Modernization
Program, and the extent to which the system is providing the Army with
the capability to match manpower and workload requirements. (p.17/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Army will implement the recommendation in their
February 2003 report. However, it should be noted that the Army
Workload and Performance System is not a major automated information
system as defined by DoD 5000.2R. AWPS is essentially a reporting
application that is designed to integrate data from data sources in
other systems.
RECOMMENDATION lc: Undertake a review of the interface between AWPS and
the Logistics Modernization Program, once it has been successfully
installed at the Army‘s five maintenance depots, to ensure that the
most efficient and cost-effective use of these two systems; and (p.18/
GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
RECOMMENDATION Id: Ensure that the data sharing mechanisms between the
Logistics Modernization Program and AWPS are complete and allow for the
functionality of AWPS before turning off the information systems that
currently support AWPS. (p.18/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Task List for 2001 and 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Milestone Schedule:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether the Army‘s May 2002 master plan contains adequate
information to assess the Army‘s progress in implementing AWPS, we
reviewed the Army‘s May 2001 and May 2002 master plans. We compared the
contents of these plans to the key requirements set forth in section
346 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. In
addition, we reviewed the May 2002 master plan to determine the extent
to which it addressed the recommendations outlined in our November 1999
report.[Footnote 5] We also examined the Department of Defense‘s
regulation[Footnote 6] outlining the mandatory procedures for the
acquisition of major automated information systems to determine
specific criteria required for a progress report. We compared the
contents of the May 2002 master plan to the criteria outlined in this
regulation. Although this regulation does not specifically apply to the
development of the AWPS system, we believe that sound management
practices support the need to address these parameters in the Army‘s
progress reports. We also met with officials at the Headquarters,
Department of the Army; Headquarters, Army Material Command; and the
Operations Support Command in Rock Island, Illinois, to discuss the
development and implementation of the AWPS system. In addition, we
discussed the benefits and problems that the depots have experienced
with AWPS with officials at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Tobyhanna,
Pennsylvania; and Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas. We
did not, however, independently review the effectiveness of the AWPS
system at the depots we visited. Lastly, we relied on prior work done
in connection with the implementation of AWPS.
To identify the measures the Army has taken to ensure appropriate
coordination and data sharing between AWPS and the Logistics
Modernization Program, we reviewed the February 2002 Interface Control
Document developed jointly by the Department of the Army and the
Computer Sciences Corporation, and discussed the related interface
initiatives with appropriate Army and contractor officials. We also
reviewed the actions the Army had taken to facilitate the interface and
data sharing between the two systems to identify what additional
actions were needed before the Army could be assured that the AWPS
system would remain fully operational during the transition period.
Specifically, we met with officials at the Headquarters, Department of
the Army; Headquarters, Army Materiel Command; the Army‘s Operations
Support Command in Rock Island, Illinois; the Logistics Modernization
Project Office in Moorestown, New Jersey; and Tobyhanna Army Depot and
Corpus Christi Army Depot. Because the interface between the two
systems is still being developed and has not been fully tested, we were
unable to assess its effectiveness.
We conducted our review between March 2002 and August 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Now known as the House Committee on Armed Services.
[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Army Should
Assess Cost and Benefits of the Workload Performance System Expansion,
GAO/NSIAD-00-16 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 1999).
[3] In July 2002, the Army changed the name of this program from the
Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program to the Logistics
Modernization Program. This is a new information system that is
intended to help manage the Army‘s supply, maintenance, and
transportation functions.
[4] Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and
Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs (Department of
Defense Regulation 5000.2-R, Apr. 5, 2002). While the Army stated that
the workload and performance system does not meet the minimum threshold
to be considered a major system, we believe that the parameters
outlined in this regulation should be addressed in the Army‘s progress
reports.
[5] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Army Should
Assess Cost and Benefits of the Workload Performance System Expansion,
GAO/NSIAD-00-16 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 1999).
[6] Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and
Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs (Department of
Defense Regulation 5000.2-R, Apr. 5, 2002).
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