Chemical and Biological Defense
Observations on DOD's Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities Gao ID: GAO-03-137T October 1, 2002The Department of Defense (DOD) believes it is increasingly likely that an adversary of the United States will use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces to degrade superior U.S. conventional warfare capabilities, placing service members' lives and effective military operations at risk. During the past 6 years, GAO has identified many problems with DOD's capabilities to defend against chemical and biological weapons and sustain operations in the midst of their use. Although GAO has found that DOD has made some improvements--in equipment, training, and reporting, and in the coordination of research and development activities--it has continuing concerns in each of these areas. One particular issue is the supply of chemical protective clothing and the way associated risk is assessed. Due to the upcoming expiration of existing protective suits, the slower rate at which new suits are entering the inventory, and DOD's method of assessing risk for individual items rather than complete protective ensembles, GAO believes that the risk for protective clothing shortages may increase dramatically from now through 2007. GAO is also concerned that certain management weaknesses, such as program organizational complexity and prolonged vacancies in key leadership positions, may have sent a message throughout the department about the relative priority and importance of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
GAO-03-137T, Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities
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United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m.
Tuesday, October 1, 2002:
Chemical And Biological Defense:
Observations on DOD‘s Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities:
Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-03-137T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense‘s
(DOD) continuing efforts to protect U.S. military forces against
chemical and biological attack. DOD believes it is increasingly likely
that an adversary will use chemical or biological weapons against U.S.
forces to degrade superior U.S. conventional warfare capabilities,
placing service members‘ lives and effective military operations at
risk. Currently, more than 20 states or non-state groups either have,
or have an interest in acquiring, chemical weapons. Also, about 12
countries are believed to have biological warfare programs, and
terrorist groups are known to be interested in these weapons.
Potential adversaries, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia,
have chemical and biological weapons stocks and the means to deliver
them. U.S. forces therefore need to be properly trained and equipped to
operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. As we
have reported, when the threat of chemical and biological weapons use
occurred during the Gulf War, deploying U.S. forces encountered a wide
array of problems, including unsuitable and inadequate supplies of
protective equipment, inadequate training in its use, and unsatisfactory
chemical and biological detectors.
Summary:
During the past 6 years, we have identified many problems in DOD‘s
capabilities to defend against chemical and biological weapons and
sustain operations in the midst of their use. While we have found that
DOD has made some improvements ” in equipment, training, and reporting,
and in the coordination of research and development activities ” we have
continuing concerns in each of these areas. One particular issue is the
supply of chemical protective clothing and the way associated risk is
assessed. Due to the upcoming expiration of existing protective suits,
the slower rate at which new suits are entering the inventory, and DOD‘s
method of assessing risk for individual items rather than complete
protective ensembles, we believe that the risk for protective clothing
shortages may increase dramatically from now through at least 2007. We
also are concerned that certain management weaknesses, such as program
organizational complexity and prolonged vacancies in key leadership
positions, may have sent a message throughout the department about the
relative priority and importance of the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program.
Today, as requested, we will: (1) briefly discuss the shortcomings we
identified in previous work with regard to DOD‘s protection of its
forces against chemical and biological warfare and the steps DOD has
taken to date to address them; (2) discuss the status of DOD‘s current
and projected inventory of chemical and biological protective suits,
and (3) present our observations on the management of DOD‘s Chemical and
Biological Defense Program. We will furnish an additional statement for
the closed session this afternoon.
Chemical and Biological Defense Has Improved, but Problems Persist:
Since 1995, GAO has focused on the chemical and biological defense area,
which has resulted in a series of reports and testimonies before
Congress on DOD‘s efforts to prepare troops to survive and operate in a
chemically and biologically contaminated environment. Major problem
areas have included shortfalls in equipment, training, and reporting
and weaknesses in coordinating program research and development
activities. Although DOD has taken significant actions to improve the
program and has increased its funding, serious problems still persist.
Shortfalls in Equipment, Training, and Reporting:
Our first major report, issued in March 1996, discussed the overall
capability of U.S. forces to fight and survive chemical and biological
warfare and is the centerpiece for much of the work we have performed
since then.[Footnote 1] We reported that DOD was slow in responding to
the lessons learned during the Gulf War. Specifically,
* early deploying units lacked required equipment such as chemical
detector paper, decontamination kits, and sufficient quantities of
protective clothing;
* Army and Marine forces remained inadequately trained for effective
chemical and biological defense;
* joint exercises included little chemical or biological defense
training;
* Army medical units often lacked chemical and biological defense
equipment and training;
* biological agent vaccine stocks and immunization plans remained
inadequate; and;
* research and development progress was slower than planned.
We also reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff‘s Status of Resources
and Training System (SORTS) ” DOD‘s system for reporting the overall
readiness of units ” was of limited value in determining the readiness
of units to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment. The system was established to provide the current status
of specific elements considered essential to readiness assessments,
such as personnel and equipment on hand, equipment condition, and
training. However, we found that this system allowed commanders to
report their unit‘s overall readiness subjectively regardless of the
unit‘s actual readiness to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment.
We concluded that chemical and biological defense equipment, training,
and medical problems were persisting and, if not addressed, were likely
to result in needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. war fighting
capability. We noted that despite DOD‘s increased emphasis on chemical
and biological defense, it continued to receive a lower priority than
traditional mission tasks at all levels of command. Many field
commanders accepted a level of chemical and biological defense
unpreparedness and told us that the resources devoted to that area were
appropriate, given other threat concerns and budgetary constraints.
Unit Equipment Levels Have Improved, but Shortages Remain in Key Areas:
When we looked again in 2000 at the readiness of early deploying U.S.
forces to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment, we found the situation generally improved.[Footnote 2]
Units we reviewed included three Army divisions, two Air Force fighter
wings, and one Marine Corps expeditionary force. Military units are
generally expected to have at least 70 percent of their equipment
requirements on hand.
The units we visited had all their required individual protective
equipment (such as suits, boots, and gloves) and most chemical and
biological medical supplies and detection and decontamination equipment
needed to operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment. In the medical arena, the Army divisions had all their
needed medical supplies. The Air Force wings had most of their medical
supplies, but we noted shortages of some critical items. For example,
one wing had only 25 percent of the protective masks required to treat
contaminated patients and only 48 percent of required patient
decontamination kits. The units we visited had shortages in detection
and decontamination equipment, but these shortages varied both across
and within the services. For example, one Marine Corps unit and one Air
Force unit had 31 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of their
chemical agent monitors, whereas the other Air Force unit had 100
percent of its monitors. The three Army units we reviewed had between
88 and 103 percent of their requirements for the same item. Officials
at the units with shortages of equipment said that when the units
deploy, the shortages would be filled from stocks held by later
deployers or from war reserves. However, the units had not determined
whether this solution would meet their equipment requirements or what
impact this action might have on the later deploying units‘
capabilities or on war reserves. The medical readiness of some units
to conduct operations in a contaminated environment therefore remained
questionable.
Training Deficiencies Persist:
Chemical and biological defense training continues to be a problem area.
We reported in 1996 that commanders were not integrating chemical and
biological defense into unit exercises and that the training was not
always realistic in terms of how units would operate in wartime. For
example, Marine Corps commanders did not fully integrate chemical and
biological defense into unit exercises, as required by Marine Corps
policies, because operating in protective equipment is difficult and
time consuming and this (1) decreases the number of combat essential
tasks that can be performed during an exercise and (2) limits offensive
combat operations. Officials stated that chemical and biological
defense training is still being adversely impacted by (1) a shortage of
chemical and biological defense specialists and (2) the fact that these
specialists are often assigned multiple responsibilities unrelated to
their specialties. For example, Army units we reviewed had from 76 to
102 percent of their authorized enlisted chemical personnel and from 75
to 88 percent of their chemical officers. The Marine Corps unit we
visited had 84 percent of its authorized enlisted chemical specialists
and 80 percent of its chemical officers.
Reporting Has Improved, but Changes are Incomplete:
We also reported that DOD‘s monitoring of chemical and biological
defense readiness has improved since our 1996 report. In April 2000, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff directed changes to the Status of Resources and
Training System that would require units to report more clearly on the
quantity of chemical and biological equipment on hand and on training
readiness. However, we noted the changes do not require that units
report on the condition of their chemical and biological defense
equipment. Thus, these reports could indicate that a unit had its
chemical and biological equipment, but they would not show whether this
equipment was serviceable.
Continuing Problems Confront DOD‘s Coordination of Research and
Development Programs:
We have issued a series of reports that address DOD‘s coordination of
chemical and biological defense research and development programs. For
example, in September 1998 we reported on DOD‘s approach to
addressing U.S. troop exposures to low levels of chemical warfare
agents.[Footnote 3] Low-level exposure is a concern because it may
potentially cause or contribute to health problems that may not become
evident for years after exposure. Specifically, we reported that:
* DOD did not have an integrated strategy to address exposure to low
levels of chemical warfare agents.
* Past research by DOD and others indicated that single and repeated
low-level exposures to some chemical warfare agents could result in
adverse psychological, physiological, behavioral, and performance
effects that may have military implications. We also highlighted
limitations of the current research.
* DOD had allocated nearly $10 million (about 1.5 percent) of its
chemical and biological defense research, development, testing, and
evaluation program to fund projects on low-level chemical warfare
agent exposures.
In August 1999 we reported on the coordination of federal research and
development efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to
chemical and biological defense, an issue that DOD has not addressed
until recently.[Footnote 4] We identified four programs engaged in
activities ranging from applied research to prototype development: two
of these programs developed technologies primarily for military war
fighting applications, and two others developed technologies primarily
to assist civilians responding to terrorist incidents. We concluded
that the formal and informal program coordination mechanisms may not
ensure that potential overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for
collaboration would be addressed. We highlighted that agency officials
were aware of the deficiencies in the existing coordination mechanisms
and that some had initiated additional informal contacts.
We are currently reviewing the effectiveness of DOD‘s research and
testing activities in providing the scientific information needed to
address doctrinal, policy, and procedural shortcomings affecting DOD‘s
ability to operate in a chemically contaminated environment, as well as
DOD‘s approach to ensure the survivability of mission-essential systems
in the case of a chemical or biological attack. DOD‘s work in this area
is crucial for developing the means to assure the restoration of
operations in the event of chemical and biological attacks on U.S.
forces at critical overseas depots, ports, and airfields.
Concerns Remain Regarding DOD‘s Inventory of Protective Clothing:
Individual protection is a critically important component of the overall
chemical and biological defense program. DOD has recognized that
military service members may not be able to avoid exposure to chemical
and biological agents and has consequently provided U.S. forces with
individual protective equipment, including clothing ensembles. We have
conducted several recent reviews on this subject and are continuing to
focus on DOD‘s acquisition and management of this equipment because of
the potential for increased risks in this area. Specifically, our
primary concerns involve DOD‘s (1) process for assessing the risk of
wartime protective equipment shortages, (2) plans for addressing
projected suit shortages due to the expiration by 2007 of most of the
existing inventory, and (3) related inventory management and business
practices. After updating equipment status and trends, we will discuss
our recent reports and ongoing work in this area.
Current Inventory Status and Trends:
Until recently, DOD calculated its chemical and biological defense
equipment needs in one of two ways: by assessing either how much would
be needed to prevail in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars
(often referred to as the ’2-MTW“ requirement), or how much would be
needed to fight two MTWs as well as maintaining supplies for peacetime
and training use, the ’total service requirement.“ In its most recent
Annual Report to Congress, for example, DOD reported both inventory and
these requirements for each item as of the end of fiscal year 2001. The
report shows that several items, particularly in Navy stocks, qualify
as ’high-risk;“ that is, less than 70 percent of needed equipment is on
hand. Other items, such as masks, are ’low-risk;“ that is, the services
have more than 85 percent of the needed equipment on hand. (We have
been able to update some of the data, in which we generally found only
modest changes from the data we show here.) Figure 1 shows these
inventory levels, by service, for key components of the protective
clothing ensemble.
Figure 1: Individual Protective Clothing Inventory, End of Fiscal Year
2001:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following
approximated data:
Individual Protective Clothing Inventory, End of Fiscal Year 2001
(percent of 2-MTW requirement on-hand):
Service: Army;
Mask: 145%;
Filters: 95%;
Suits: 1005;
Boots: 75%;
Gloves: 85%.
Service: Air Force;
Mask: 85%;
Filters: 125%;
Suits: 50%;
Boots: 130%;
Gloves: 55%.
Service: Navy;
Mask: 65%
Filters: 25%;
Suits: 15%;
Boots: 75%;
Gloves: 15%.
Service: Marine Corps;
Mask: 150%;
Filters: 85%;
Suits: 80%;
Boots: 35%;
Gloves: 50%.
Source: Chemical and Biological Defense Program Report to Congress,
April 2002.
[End of figure]
Process for Assessing Risk is Flawed:
We found, though, that the raw data may understate the real risk because
the method that DOD has used to calculate risk may be flawed. In
September 2001, we reported that DOD‘s criteria for assessing the risk
of wartime shortages for protective clothing are unreliable. At that
time we found that DOD had inaccurately reported the risk in most cases
as ’low.“ We reported that the process for determining risk is
fundamentally flawed because (1) DOD determines requirements by
individual pieces of protective equipment ” suits, masks, breathing
filters, gloves, boots, and hoods ” rather than by the number of
complete protective ensembles that can be provided to deploying service
members, and (2) the process for determining risk combines individual
service requirements and reported inventory data into general
categories, masking specific critical shortages that affect individual
service readiness. Had DOD assessed the risk on the basis of the number
of complete ensembles it had available, by service, the risk would have
risen to ’high“ for all of the services.
Suit Inventory May be Insufficient to Meet Requirements:
As a result of the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD has
begun to reexamine its requirements. At present, there are several
requirements levels against which inventory is measured. Official
reports have commonly used the ’2 Major Theater War“ and the ’Total
Service Requirement“ standards. New interim guidance indicates that DOD
should be able to fully meet conflict equipment needs in one theater,
while meeting only partial requirements in another. This requirement,
which is expected to be finalized when DOD publishes the Illustrative
Planning Scenario annex to its Defense Planning Guidance, is referred
to as the ’150 percent of an MTW“ option.
Whatever the official requirement, the risk to U.S. forces may be
increasing for two reasons. First, DOD has not yet revised its risk
assessment process to consider ensemble needs and service imbalances.
Second, suit shortages are projected to escalate in the next few years
because (1) the majority of suits in the current inventory will reach
the end of their useful life and expire by 2007, and (2) new Joint
Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) suits, along
with other new generation protective ensemble components such as gloves
and boots, are not entering the inventory as quickly as originally
planned. Consequently, the old suits are expiring faster than they are
being replaced.
We are concerned that some ensemble components, particularly suits, may
not be available in adequate numbers to meet near-term minimum
requirements. As of August 30, 2002, DOD had procured about 1.5 million
of the new JSLIST suits, of which the majority were issued to the
military services. (Others are held in Defense Logistics Agency
reserves, provided to foreign governments under the Foreign Military
Sales program, or allocated to domestic uses.) Together with the
existing inventory of earlier-generation suits, we estimate that DOD
has a total of 4.5 million suits. This level is now barely sufficient
to meet the new requirement to supply 150 percent of an MTW. It is far
below the Army-chaired Joint Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense
Board requirement, called the Joint Acquisition Objective, which
combines elements of DOD and service calculations. If new suit funding
and production does not increase sufficiently to replace the expiring
suits, the inventory will even drop below minimal needs for the 150
percent of an MTW requirement until at least 2007. The risk for
protective clothing shortages may therefore increase dramatically
during this period. Figure 2 illustrates this trend.
Figure 2. Trends in Suit Procurement and Requirements:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a combination line and stacked vertical bar graph
depicting the following approximated data:
Fiscal year: 2001;
Total service requirement: 8 million suits;
2-major theater war requirement: 6 million suits;
Joint Acquisition Objective: 5 million suits;
JSLIST/Saratoga (new suites): 2.7 million;
Battle Dress Overgarment (old suit): 3 million.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Total service requirement: 8 million suits;
2-major theater war requirement: 6 million suits;
Joint Acquisition Objective: 6 million suits;
150% MTW: 4.5 million;
JSLIST/Saratoga (new suites): 2 million;
Battle Dress Overgarment (old suit): 2.5 million.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Total service requirement: 8 million suits;
2-major theater war requirement: 6 million suits;
Joint Acquisition Objective: 6 million suits;
150% MTW: 4.5 million;
JSLIST/Saratoga (new suites): 2.5 million;
Battle Dress Overgarment (old suit): 2 million.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Total service requirement: 8 million suits;
2-major theater war requirement: 6 million suits;
Joint Acquisition Objective: 6.25 million suits;
150% MTW: 4.5 million;
JSLIST/Saratoga (new suites): 2.8 million;
Battle Dress Overgarment (old suit): 1.2 million.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Total service requirement: 8 million suits;
2-major theater war requirement: 6 million suits;
Joint Acquisition Objective: 6.25 million suits;
150% MTW: 4.5 million;
JSLIST/Saratoga (new suites): 3 million;
Battle Dress Overgarment (old suit): 0.8 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Total service requirement: 8 million suits;
2-major theater war requirement: 6 million suits;
Joint Acquisition Objective: 6.25 million suits;
150% MTW: 4.5 million;
JSLIST/Saratoga (new suites): 3.5 million;
Battle Dress Overgarment (old suit): 0.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Total service requirement: 8 million suits;
2-major theater war requirement: 6 million suits;
Joint Acquisition Objective: 6.25 million suits;
150% MTW: 4.5 million;
JSLIST/Saratoga (new suites): 3.8 million;
Battle Dress Overgarment (old suit): 0.
Note: The Joint Acquisition Objective increased in 2002. This estimate
assumes that none of the suits counted as available in FY 2002 has
already expired or is defective.
Sources: DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Research, Development and
Acquisition Plan, April 2002; Program Strategy Guidance; GAO data
analysis.
[End of figure]
Inventory Management Practices Prevent Accurate Risk Assessment:
Inadequate management of inventory is an additional risk factor because
readiness can be compromised by DOD‘s inventory management practices,
which prevent an accurate accounting of availability or adequacy of
DOD‘s protective equipment. The practices we identified regarding
inventories of chemical and biological equipment contribute to the
development of erroneous inventory data that in turn affect the
accuracy of the risk assessment. Specifically, we reported the
following:
* DOD could not monitor the status of the entire inventory of protective
equipment because the services and the Defense Logistics Agency use at
least nine different systems of inventory management with differing
data fields to manage suit inventories. The systems‘ records contain
data that cannot be easily linked.
* DOD could not determine whether its older suits would adequately
protect service members because some of the systems‘ records omit
essential data on suit expiration.
* DOD could not easily identify, track, and locate defective suits
because inventory records do not always include contract and lot
numbers. In May 2000, DOD directed units and depots to locate 778,924
defective suits produced by a single manufacturer; as of July 2002, as
many as 250,000 of these suits remained unaccounted for.
* DOD counted new suits as on hand before they had been delivered and
consequently overstated the actual inventory. In response to one of our
report recommendations, DOD now reports ’on hand“ and ’due-in“ suits
separately in its Annual Program Report to the Congress.
DOD‘s Business Processes Remain Inefficient:
We have also testified before this Committee as part of our work on the
need for DOD to reform its business operations.[Footnote 5] We noted
that inventory management procedures related to JSLIST suits, systems,
and processes result in DOD, the military services, and military units
not knowing how many items they have and where they are located.
DOD‘s business processes for procuring, controlling, and paying for
JSLIST suits rely on manual data transmission and entry into
nonintegrated data systems. We identified 128 processing steps performed
by 11 DOD components, such as the Defense Logistics Agency, Defense
Finance and Accounting Service, and the military services. Of the 128
steps, 100 steps, or 78 percent, involved manual entry or re-entry of
data into one or more of the 13 nonintegrated data systems supporting
the JSLIST processes. However, the complex, nonintegrated, error-prone
process precludes DOD from being able to quickly and accurately identify
the suits‘ location and condition.
Further, at the military units that GAO visited, the methods used to
control and maintain visibility over JSLIST suits issued to them ranged
from automated information systems, to spreadsheet applications, to
paper, to dry eraser board, to none. The data maintained also varied.
Some units maintained specific data, including manufacturer,
manufacture date, and production lot number, while other units
maintained little or no data. DOD is now taking steps to correct this
problem and improve asset visibility at all levels. As recently as 2000
there was no single office that tracked all JSLIST suit production and
fielding DOD-wide, for example, and the annual report to Congress was
compiled by data calls to each individual service and major command
within the services. Now there is such an office: the Marine Corps, in
its role as commodity area manager for individual protection, can
report new production of JSLIST ensemble items (suits, boots, and
gloves) and the services to which they have been fielded. Our work to
date has found that the Marine Corps program office has established an
effective system for managing this information.
Program Review Underway:
We are currently reviewing factors related to JSLIST production and the
implications of the removal of the expiring suits from the inventory.
Our work will (1) evaluate whether DOD‘s requirements and activities for
acquiring and sustaining chemical protective equipment provide the
military with sufficient usable chemical and biological protective
clothing ensembles; (2) assess DOD‘s current risk assessment, testing,
development, and production procedures; and (3) evaluate the
effectiveness of DOD‘s actions to mitigate any shortfalls. We plan to
report our results early next year.
Observations on Program Management:
Our body of work over 7 years highlights a serious gap between the
priority given chemical and biological defense by DOD and the actual
implementation of the program. Both the 1997 and 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Reviews identified chemical and biological defense as key
priorities of the Department of Defense. Although the program overall is
clearly improved and better funded since 1995, many of the problems we
previously reported still have not been resolved. We are concerned that
DOD‘s efforts to implement this program are not consistent with the
emphasis given to it in overall department guidance. Organization
complexity, vacancies in key positions, and priority conflicts are all
factors that have contributed to program difficulties and, if not
resolved, will continue to weaken DOD‘s management of this program.
Program Organizational Complexity:
The management of the Chemical and Biological Defense program is
diffuse, with numerous offices and activities responsible for separate
aspects, notwithstanding the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994‘s (P.L. 103-160) attempt to bring oversight under one
organizational authority. Concurrence on program direction is therefore
sometimes difficult to achieve. This act required the Secretary of
Defense to assign responsibility for overall coordination and
integration of the Chemical and Biological Defense program to a single
office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and to
designate the Army as executive agent to coordinate and integrate the
chemical and biological research, development, test and evaluation, and
acquisition requirements of the military departments. Although this
office was established shortly thereafter, many aspects of DOD‘s
management of chemical and biological defense remain spread between
this office, the military services, and other DOD organizations.
Furthermore, each individual service also has numerous offices devoted
to various aspects of chemical and biological defense, including
planning, logistics, and acquisition. The services purchase their own
consumable items such as protective suit replacements under their role
of managing their own operations and maintenance funds; a process over
which OSD has limited visibility. Figure 3 depicts the current
organization for DOD‘s management of its Chemical and Biological
Defense Program (CBDP), as well as some of the changes now being
implemented or under consideration.
Figure 3. Current CBDP Organization and Potential Changes:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an organizational chart indicating potential changes, as
follows:
Today's Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Organization:
Oversight:
USD(AT&L):
* DDR&E:
- DARPA BWD;
USD(AT&L): OSD CB Defense Steering Committee (to be replaced by OIPT);
* ATSD (NCB), Chair;
- DTRA;
* ATSD (NCB), Executive Secretary;
- DTRA (CB);
* Joint Staff;
- ASD (HA), non-voting member;
- ASD (ISP), non-voting member;
ASBREM Committee.
Management:
ASBREM Steering Group;
* Joint NBC Defense Board, Army as Executive Agent;
- JSIG (To be replaced by a Joint Requirements Office);
- MPSP;
- JSMG (to be replaced by JPEO);
- MCBDRP;
- JSTPCBD.
Execution, MDAs:
Army:
* Soldier and Biological Chemical Command;
* Medical Materiel Development Activity;
* JPO for Biological Defense;
Navy:
* Naval Sea Systems Command;
* Naval Air Systems Comment;
* Marine Corps Systems Command;
* SPAWAR Command;
Air Force:
* Air Force Materiel Commend;
Others:
* DTRA (ACTDs/Counterproliferation Support Program).
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
The OSD office at the Assistant Secretary level that is charged with
overall coordination of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program
also went through upheaval during the latter part of the 1990s. The
position was initially slated for elimination under the terms of the
1997 Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). As a result of the DRI, OSD
oversight functions were transferred to a different staff office within
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Director, Defense Research and
Engineering), while management and most staffing of the program were
transferred to a directorate within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
(DTRA). This directorate, in turn, has had five directors in less than
4 years.
Vacancies in Key OSD Positions:
We also believe that the emphasis DOD placed on the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program was adversely affected by the absence of
leadership at the Assistant Secretary level for nearly 4 years. In
accordance with P.L. 103-160, the Secretary designated the Assistant to
the Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense (ATSD) as
the principal officer responsible for oversight and coordination of the
program. However, this position was vacant from 1998 through late 2001.
The Deputy ATSD, who exercises day-to-day oversight over the program,
was also vacant for more than a year during that period. We believe
these OSD vacancies adversely affected the high-level attention
received by the program as well as its ability to compete for funding
against other defense needs, thereby sending a message throughout the
Department about the relative priority and importance attached to the
program.
Competing Priorities:
DOD has requested almost $1.4 billion for the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program in fiscal year 2003 ” more than three times the fiscal
year 1994 amount. Nevertheless, the program has consistently had
difficulty competing against other service priorities, such as those
associated with traditional mission tasks. Despite the emphasis placed
on this program by the Quadrennial Defense Review, spending on chemical
and biological defense represents about a third of a percent of the
entire $369 billion DOD budget request.
DOD officials and field commanders alike have repeatedly stressed that
they must balance chemical and biological defense requirements against
all other defense needs, and do so within a constrained budget
environment. For example, as we reported in 1996, officers have cited
other-than-war deployments, quality of life considerations, and
peacetime medical care as higher priorities than chemical and
biological defense. We have previously recommended that chemical and
biological defense needed direct representation by a general officer on
the Joint Staff in order to receive the appropriate program emphasis
and support. DOD has recently implemented this change. It remains to be
seen what the effect of this change will be. Figure 4 shows the growth
in Chemical and Biological Defense Program funding since fiscal year
1994.
Figure 4. Funding for Chemical and Biological Defense Program:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting funding for Chemical and
Biological Defense Program in constant FY2002 dollars in millions for
the following categories:
Procurement;
RDT&E;
Military construction;
Total.
Note: FY 2002 includes $0.7 million for military construction and FY
2003 includes $5.0 million for military construction. The peak in FY
2003 is caused by inclusion in the CBDP budget of $420 million to
support Office of Homeland Security biodefense projects and $56 million
for installation force protection.
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
There is also competition within the program between the main categories
of research and development and procurement.[Footnote 6] At present,
some components of the clothing ensemble, such as the JSLIST glove and
nextgeneration mask, are in the developmental phase; others, like the
JSLIST suit, are in procurement. In deciding how much money to allocate
to each of the various categories and specific projects, DOD relies on
the Joint Priority List, which integrates and rank-orders the
preferences of combatant commanders for all chemical and biological
equipment needs. On this year‘s Joint Priority List, for example, the
JSLIST suit ranked 35 out of 72 items. Biodetection capabilities
occupied the first spaces on that list. In fiscal year 2003, $96
million is earmarked for the procurement of JSLIST suits. Conflicts
over internal program priorities thus can also affect issues such as
shortages of JSLIST suits.
Conclusion:
DOD has made improvements over the years to defend against and sustain
operations in the midst of chemical and biological weapons use. These
gains have been primarily in the areas of equipment, training, and
readiness reporting. During the past 6 years, DOD has concurred or
partially concurred with 36 of the 37 recommendations contained in the
GAO reports referred to in this testimony, and initiated or completed
action on many of these. DOD recognizes that the management and
organization of the program needs improvement and has recently
proposed organizational and other changes designed to address many of
the shortcomings we identified in prior reports. In particular, DOD
recently approved the establishment of a Joint Requirements office
within the Joint Staff and named a general officer as its director.
However, a real gap remains between the priority and emphasis given
chemical and biological defense by DOD and the actual implementation of
the program. Many needed improvements remain to be realized.
Furthermore, we are concerned that without the leadership and
commitment of the department to address the long term conditions we
have identified, the service members of our country may be at risk in a
contaminated environment. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you have.
[End of testimony]
Footnotes:
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-96-103]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1996).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Units Better Equipped, but Training and Readiness Reporting Problems
Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-27]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2000).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have
a Strategy to Address Low-Level Exposures [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-228] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 23, 1998).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-160]
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 1999).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Management: Examples of
Inefficient and Ineffective Business Processes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-873T] (Washington, D.C.: June
25, 2002).
[6] Small sums are also spent on military construction projects.
[End of section]
