Combating Terrorism
Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations Gao ID: GAO-03-14 November 1, 2002After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, domestic military installations increased their antiterrorism measures to their highest levels. These measures were reduced in the weeks following the attacks, but because of the persistent nature of the threat, the antiterrorism posture at domestic installations remains at a higher than normal level more than 1 year later. The Department of Defense's (DOD) budget request for fiscal year 2003 includes more than $10 billion for combating terrorism activities, which includes a substantial increase in funding for antiterrorism measures to safeguard personnel and strategic issues. The service headquarters GAO reviewed did not use a comprehensive results-oriented management framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts. According to service officials, a comprehensive results-oriented management framework for antiterrorism efforts is not consistently used across all services and commands because DOD does not require it, and service officials indicated that they were reluctant to develop such an approach before the forthcoming DOD-wide antiterrorism strategy was issued. Although the Department has recently restarted its efforts toward developing this strategy, it has not set a specific time frame for its completion. The services and commands are following prescribed guidance and regulations to conduct risk management analyses to support their antiterrorism requirements, but significant weaknesses exist with the current approach. The commands do not always require documentation of the assessments, and they do not periodically evaluate the assessment methodology used at each installation to determine the thoroughness of the analyses or the consistency with required assessment methodology. DOD has reported that $32.1 billion has been allocated or requested for combating terrorism activities from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003; however, these reported amounts may not present a clear picture of total combating terrorism costs. GAO's analysis indicates that $19.4 billion of this amount is for military and civilian personnel and personnel-related operating costs associated with individuals in designated specialties that have combating terrorism-related missions, such as military police, civilian police, and security guard.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-14, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations
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Report to the Chairman, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
November 2002:
COMBATING TERRORISM:
Actions Needed to Guide Services‘ Antiterrorism Efforts at
Installations:
Combating Terrorism:
GAO-03-14:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Services‘ Antiterrorism Efforts Lack a Results-Oriented Management
Framework:
Services Are Implementing Risk Management but Provide Inadequate
Oversight:
DOD‘s Combating Terrorism Funding Reports Do Not Clearly Reflect Costs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Results-Oriented Management Framework Principles:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD‘s Combating Terrorism Funding for Fiscal Years 1999 to
2003:
Figure 2: Estimated Personnel Costs as Part of Combating Terrorism
Funding for Fiscal Years 1999 to 2003:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
Letter:
November 1, 2002:
The Honorable Jim Saxton
Chairman, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, domestic military
installations increased their antiterrorism measures[Footnote 1] to
their highest levels. These measures were reduced in the weeks
following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, but because of
the persistent nature of the threat, the antiterrorism posture at
domestic installations remains at a higher than normal level more than
1 year later. The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) budget request for
fiscal year 2003 includes over $10 billion for combating terrorism
activities,[Footnote 2] which includes a substantial increase in
funding for antiterrorism measures to safeguard personnel and strategic
assets.
We previously examined the implementation of DOD‘s antiterrorism
initiatives, and focused on the measures taken by domestic military
installations to reduce vulnerabilities last year. We reported that at
the departmental level, the antiterrorism efforts lacked critical
management elements, such as a strategic plan containing long-term
goals and a performance plan to measure results, assess progress, and
identify corrective actions.[Footnote 3] To strengthen the management
of the antiterrorism program, we recommended that DOD establish a
management framework containing these elements, which could then
provide a vehicle to guide resource allocations and measure the results
of DOD‘s improvement efforts. DOD agreed with this recommendation and
initiated steps to develop the framework but temporarily suspended
these efforts after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The
Department has recently restarted these efforts.
If consistent with our previous recommendation, this forthcoming
Department-wide framework should represent a significant and important
shift in management focus--from measuring program activities and
processes to measuring program results. To supplement and support this
results-oriented approach, a comprehensive risk management process can
be an effective foundation for allocating antiterrorism resources. Risk
management is a systematic, analytical process to determine the
likelihood that a threat will harm individuals or physical assets and
to identify actions to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of a
terrorist attack. (More detailed information on risk management appears
in the background section of this report.):
Because of the increased emphasis on and funding for DOD‘s
antiterrorism efforts, you asked us to examine the management framework
each military Department has established to implement antiterrorism
initiatives. Accordingly, this report specifically focuses on the
extent to which the military services and selected commands (1) use a
results-oriented management framework to guide their antiterrorism
efforts at domestic installations[Footnote 4] and (2) have established
an effective risk management approach to develop specific antiterrorism
requirements. Because you also asked us to examine how DOD reports
combating terrorism funding, we also reviewed funding trends and
determined whether DOD‘s annual budget reports to Congress completely
and accurately portray funding for combating terrorism.
To accomplish this work we obtained and reviewed documents, examined
the operations of the four service headquarters and eight major service
commands and reserve components, and interviewed cognizant officials.
Collectively, these eight commands have antiterrorism responsibilities
for approximately 444 installations.[Footnote 5] Although the
information we obtained at these commands cannot be generalized to
describe the Department‘s overall antiterrorism efforts, it provides
insights into the antiterrorism programs within these commands. Further
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
For the most part, the service headquarters and commands we reviewed
did not use a comprehensive results-oriented management framework to
guide their antiterrorism efforts. For example, resource decisions
generally were not made with reference to specific, long-term goals,
and short-term measurable performance goals had not been set. However,
3 of the 12 organizations included in our review--Air Force
headquarters, Army Forces Command, and the Navy‘s Atlantic Fleet--did
have some, but not all, elements of a results-oriented management
framework in place. The Army Forces Command‘s management framework
appeared to be the most complete, containing elements such as long-term
and annual goals, clear performance measures, quarterly reviews, and
the identification of resource requirements. The Forces Command‘s
framework also appeared to have strong support from senior command
officials, without which it might not have been as fully implemented.
According to service officials, a comprehensive results-oriented
management framework for antiterrorism efforts is not consistently used
across all services and commands because DOD does not require it, and
service officials indicated that they were reluctant to develop such an
approach before the forthcoming DOD-wide antiterrorism strategy was
issued. Although the Department has recently restarted its efforts
toward developing this strategy, it has not set a specific time frame
for its completion. Without a results-oriented management framework at
both DOD and the service levels to prioritize, integrate, and evaluate
antiterrorism initiatives, the services and commands may not be
efficiently allocating the significant resources currently applied to
antiterrorism efforts or effectively assessing progress in safeguarding
military personnel and assets.
The services and commands we reviewed are generally following
prescribed guidance and regulations to conduct risk management analyses
(i.e., terrorist threat, vulnerability, and asset criticality
assessments) to support their antiterrorism requirements, but
significant weaknesses exist with the current approach. Each service
has established requirements for installations to use a risk management
approach in developing funding requirements and generally provided
implementing guidance on preparing the assessments; in addition, each
command verified that assessments have been completed. However,
weaknesses exist in the services‘ oversight of this process.
Specifically, the commands do not always require documentation of the
assessments, and they do not periodically evaluate the assessment
methodology used at each installation to determine the thoroughness of
the analyses or the consistency with required assessment methodology.
If the services and commands do not evaluate installation assessments
and do not require the documentation of all assessments, then they have
no assurance that installations‘ antiterrorism requirements are based
on a rigorous application of risk management principles or that these
assessments produce comparable results across a service. Consequently,
when the services consolidate their antiterrorism requirements, the
result may not accurately reflect the most pressing needs.
DOD has reported that $32.1 billion has been allocated or requested for
combating terrorism activities from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal
year 2003; however, these reported amounts may not present a clear
picture of total combating terrorism costs. Our analysis indicates that
$19.4 billion (60 percent) of this amount is for military and civilian
personnel and personnel-related operating costs associated with
individuals in designated specialties that have combating terrorism-
related missions, such as military police, civilian police, and
security guards. This allocation may overstate actual combating
terrorism costs, however, because the military services accounting
systems do not track the actual time that these individuals spend on
activities related to combating terrorism. Consequently, the total
funding allocated to these personnel specialties are included in the
report, even if the individuals spend only a portion of their time
performing combating terrorism activities.
We are recommending that DOD accelerate its efforts to develop a
Department-wide strategy, set a target date for its completion, and
work with the military services to concurrently initiate steps to adopt
a results-based management framework for their antiterrorism efforts
that is consistent with this Department-wide approach. We also are
recommending that the services take steps to improve their risk
management approaches that underpin antiterrorism requirements.
Additionally, we are recommending that steps be taken to clarify DOD‘s
combating terrorism budget report provided to Congress. In written
comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with all of our
recommendations and it identified actions that are under way at the
Department to address these recommendations.
Background:
DOD‘s Antiterrorism Policy and Guidance:
DOD issued a directive[Footnote 6] signed by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense that provides DOD‘s antiterrorism policy and assigns
responsibilities to DOD organizations for implementing antiterrorism
initiatives. This directive places responsibility for developing
antiterrorism policy and guidance with the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict.[Footnote 7] In this capacity, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense issued an instruction that established 31 antiterrorism
standards that DOD organizations, including the services, are required
to implement.[Footnote 8], [Footnote 9] These standards address
antiterrorism planning, training requirements, physical security
measures, and related issues. The office also issued a handbook
containing additional detailed guidance on antiterrorism policies and
practices, including guidance on assessment methodology.[Footnote 10]
The Joint Staff has also issued an installation-planning template to
help installations prepare their antiterrorism plans.[Footnote 11]
Additionally, each of the services has issued regulations, orders and
instructions to implement the DOD guidance and establish its own
specific policies and standards. DOD and the services have recently
revised some of these key guidance documents, and others are now under
revision.
Process for Developing Services‘ Antiterrorism Requirements:
The services assign responsibility for protecting installations from
terrorist attacks to installation commanders, who identify and
prioritize antiterrorism requirements. Installation commanders are to
compose a prioritized list of antiterrorism requirements from annual
assessments of threat, vulnerability, and the criticality of assets,
which they submit to their respective major commands. The major
commands merge the antiterrorism requirements from all of their
installations, prioritize them, and forward their integrated list to
the service‘s headquarters. Similarly, the services merge and
prioritize the antiterrorism requirements of their major commands, and
the consolidated list is then used as a basis for funding decisions.
DOD‘s Risk Management Approach:
The required assessments of threat, vulnerability, and criticality of
assets form the foundation of each installation‘s antiterrorism plan
and support a risk management approach to resource allocation. These
three assessments are designed to assess (1) the threats to the
installation, (2) the installation‘s vulnerabilities, and (3) the
installation‘s critical assets.
The threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of such factors as the threats‘ capabilities, intentions, and
past activities. This assessment represents a systematic approach to
identify potential threats before they materialize. However, this
assessment might not adequately capture some emerging threats, even in
cases where the assessment is frequently updated. The risk management
approach therefore uses vulnerability and asset criticality assessments
as additional inputs to the risk management decision-making process.
A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be exploited
by identified threats and suggests options that address those
weaknesses. For example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal
weaknesses in an installation‘s access control system, its
antiterrorism awareness training, or how mission-critical assets such
as fuel storage sites and communications centers are protected. Teams
of multidisciplinary experts skilled in such areas as structural
engineering, physical security, and installation preparedness conduct
these assessments.
A criticality assessment evaluates and prioritizes assets and functions
to identify which assets and missions are relatively more important to
protect from attack. For example, important communications facilities,
utilities, or major weapons systems might be identified as critical to
the execution of U.S. military war plans, and therefore receive
additional protection. Criticality assessments provide information in
order to prioritize resources while at the same time, reducing the
potential application of resources on lower-priority assets.
Services‘ Antiterrorism Efforts Lack a Results-Oriented Management
Framework:
The critical elements of a results-oriented management framework are
not being used by the services to guide their antiterrorism efforts. In
results-based management, program effectiveness is measured in terms of
outcomes or impact rather than outputs (i.e., activities and
processes). Results-oriented principles and elements, which we have
derived from the Government Performance and Results Act,[Footnote 12]
are presented in table 1. Benefits from a results-based management
approach depend upon the combined use of all eight of the critical
elements that appear in the table. These elements, when combined with
effective leadership can provide a management framework to guide major
programs and activities.
Table 1: Results-Oriented Management Framework Principles:
Principle: Strategic plan--defines the program‘s overall purpose,
mission, and intent.; Critical elements: Long-term goals--typically
general in nature that lay out what the agency wants to accomplish in
the next 5 years..
Critical elements: Strategies to be used--general methods the agency
plans to use to accomplish long-term goals..
Critical elements: External factors--factors that may significantly
affect the agency‘s ability to accomplish goals..
Principle: Performance plan--describes detailed implementation actions
as well as measurements and indicators of performance.; Critical
elements: Performance goals--stated in objective measurable form..
Critical elements: Resources--a description of the resources needed to
meet the performance goals..
Critical elements: Performance indicators--mechanisms to measure
outcomes of the program..
Critical elements: Evaluation plan--means to compare and report on
program results vs. performance goals..
Critical elements: Corrective actions--a list of actions needed to
address or revise any unmet goals..
Source: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.
[End of table]
The critical elements of a results-oriented management framework were
largely absent in the antiterrorism efforts of three services‘
headquarters and at six of the eight commands we examined.
Specifically, the services have not published and disseminated
unambiguous results-based, strategic and performance goals for their
antiterrorism efforts. Some service antiterrorism officials did
articulate broadly stated goals--such as protecting personnel and
material assets against terrorist attack, and defeating terrorism--but
these goals have not been endorsed and disseminated by service
headquarters as servicewide goals nor have the services described how
these goals will be achieved or how they intend to evaluate results in
terms of the goals. The Air Force, however, has taken some steps toward
a results-based management framework. For example, it has published
long-term goals and established service-level working groups to
evaluate the effectiveness of its antiterrorism program and identify
the actions needed to address or revise any unmet goals. Although the
Air Force has taken these positive steps, Air Force officials
acknowledge that the elements may not have been effectively articulated
servicewide so that installations can understand the ’big picture“ and
how all elements fit together. In fact, officials we contacted from Air
Combat Command and Air National Guard were not aware of the service-
level goals or performance-planning elements.
At the command level, a results-oriented management framework was
largely absent in the antiterrorism efforts of six of the eight major
commands we reviewed. For example, the Air Combat Command did not have
overarching antiterrorism goals for its 15 bases, although command
officials said that they planned to develop them. Also, the Army
National Guard has not issued antiterrorism goals for its 3,900
armories and 211 installations and has no plan to do so.
Two of the commands--the Army‘s Forces Command and the Navy‘s Atlantic
Fleet--adopted aspects of a results-oriented framework, and officials
said that they did so on their own initiative and without direction
from their parent service. The Army Forces Command management framework
contained most of the critical management elements, such as quarterly
reviews, long-term and annual goals, clear performance measures, and
identification of resource requirements. Army Forces Command officials
said that the results-based management approach enables its senior
officers to monitor the command‘s progress toward its short-and long-
term goals and make necessary adjustments to the strategy and resource
allocation to accomplish these goals. Forces Command officials
attributed their management approach‘s success, in large part, to the
involvement of senior command officials and their endorsement of
this management approach. According to Army headquarters
antiterrorism officials, the Forces Command management framework
has been an effective approach and may be useful as a model for other
major commands.
The Navy‘s Atlantic Fleet Command also articulated long-term goals
and strategies to accomplish its antiterrorism goals. For example, the
fleet developed a plan of action to address security deficiencies that
were identified through assessments by establishing a database to
track deficiencies and identify trends. The fleet also linked resource
requirements to accomplish these steps and developed metrics to measure
results. According to the Atlantic Fleet officials we spoke with,
however, these strategies are not currently being used by the fleet to
shape its antiterrorism efforts because they are waiting for the Navy
to issue servicewide antiterrorism goals. Atlantic Fleet officials
stated they wanted to avoid having separate and different strategic
plans for each command.
The services and their major commands cite two primary reasons for
not employing a results-based management framework to guide and
implement their antiterrorism efforts. First, the services do not want
to adopt goals and strategies that might prove inconsistent with DOD‘s
forthcoming, Department-wide antiterrorism strategy. As discussed
earlier, the Department was in the process of developing an
antiterrorism strategy, but suspended its efforts after the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon because of the pressing needs
of the war on terrorism. DOD officials have indicated that they have
reinitiated their efforts to develop a strategy but have not set a
target date for their completion. The second reason cited by service
officials for not employing a results-oriented management framework was
that strategic planning and performance planning called for by the
Results Act applies to agencies and not to specific efforts such as
antiterrorism. We agree that the services and major commands are not
required by the Results Act to prepare strategic plans and performance
plans specific to their antiterrorism efforts. Nonetheless, the Results
Act offers a model for developing an effective management framework to
improve the likelihood of successfully implementing initiatives and
assessing results.
Without a results-based management approach to prioritize, integrate,
and evaluate their efforts, it will be difficult for the services and
their major commands to systematically plan and implement antiterrorism
programs or assess their progress in reducing the likelihood and impact
of terrorist attacks. It is crucial that the services identify and
support those efforts that are most likely to achieve long-term
antiterrorism goals because funding is not sufficient to eliminate or
mitigate all identified vulnerabilities.
Services Are Implementing Risk Management but Provide Inadequate
Oversight:
The services and commands we reviewed are generally following
prescribed guidance and regulations to use the DOD risk management
approach in developing their installation antiterrorism requirements,
but a significant weakness exists with the oversight of this process.
Specifically, the services are not required to evaluate the
thoroughness of all installations‘ annual risk management assessments
or whether installations used required methodologies to perform these
assessments. As previously discussed, under DOD‘s antiterrorism
approach, three assessments (threat, vulnerability, and criticality)
provide the installation commanders with the information necessary to
manage the risk of a terrorist attack, and develop an antiterrorism
program for the installation.[Footnote 13] It also provides guidance
for completing these assessments;[Footnote 14] and it requires the
military Departments, through the services, to oversee the
antiterrorism efforts at their installations.[Footnote 15] In their
oversight role, the military Departments, through the services, are
required to ensure that installation antiterrorism efforts adhere to
the antiterrorism standards established by DOD.[Footnote 16]
To implement DOD‘s required risk management approach, the services have
issued supplements to DOD‘s guidance requiring installations to conduct
the three risk management assessments and indicating how these
assessments should be performed. The supplemental guidance of three of
the services--the Army, Air Force, and the Marine Corps--requires
service-specific methodologies to be used for the assessments.[Footnote
17] The commands, to which the services have delegated some oversight
responsibility for installations‘ antiterrorism efforts, generally
verified that installations completed annual threat, vulnerability, and
asset criticality assessments. Command officials indicated that they
verify whether installations‘ annual risk assessments have been
completed in one of two ways: (1) through the request for and receipt
of copies of the written assessments or (2) through verbal verification
from the installation commanders. The Navy, however, does not require
that annual vulnerability assessments be documented and does not verify
that these assessments are completed.
To provide oversight of the risk management process, DOD‘s
antiterrorism standards require a higher headquarters review of
subordinate installations‘ antiterrorism programs once every 3 years
for installations that meet specific criteria.[Footnote 18] These
reviews are conducted by teams of specialists skilled in various
disciplines (such as engineering, intelligence, and security) from the
Joint Staff, service headquarters, or major command. The reviews
assess, among other things, an installation‘s antiterrorism plans,
physical security, vulnerabilities and solutions for enhanced
protection, and incident response measures. These reviews, however, do
not routinely evaluate the methodology used to develop the annual
installation assessments.[Footnote 19] Moreover, there is no
requirement to review the antiterrorism programs of installations that
do not meet DOD‘s criteria for higher headquarters assessments.
Because the results of assessments form the foundation of installation
antiterrorism plans, which drive servicewide requirements, it is
critical that assessments be performed consistently across each service
to ensure that assessment results are comparable. According to DOD
officials, installations‘ risk assessments were not evaluated for two
reasons. First, DOD does not specifically require the services and
their commands to evaluate installation assessments. Second, several
command officials indicated that evaluating assessment methodologies
would provide little or no added value to the process.
The Air Force and the Navy have initiatives under way that will place a
greater emphasis and importance on the results of the installations‘
risk management efforts. Both services are using to varying degrees an
automated risk management program that should improve visibility over
installation assessments and the resulting antiterrorism requirements.
This program--the Vulnerability Assessment Management Program--will
enable service and command officials to track assessment results and
prioritize corrective actions servicewide.[Footnote 20] The program
will contain information about installations‘ antiterrorism
requirements and the threat, vulnerability, and asset criticality
assessments that support these requirements. It is also designed to
allow service officials to conduct trend analyses, identify common
vulnerabilities, and track corrective actions. Service officials stated
that this program will also enable them to evaluate the risk assessment
methodologies used at each installation, but it is unclear how this
will be accomplished.
If installations‘ risk assessments are not periodically evaluated to
ensure that assessments are complete and that a consistent or
compatible methodology has been applied, then commands have no
assurance that their installations‘ antiterrorism requirements are
comparable or based on the application of risk management principles.
Consequently, when the services and commands consolidate their
antiterrorism requirements (through the process of merging and
reprioritizing the requirements of their multiple installations), the
result may not accurately reflect the services‘ most pressing needs.
For example, if a standard methodology is not consistently applied,
then vulnerabilities may not be identified and critical facilities may
be overlooked. Or in the case of the Navy, the lack of assessment
documentation further limits the command‘s ability to perform its
oversight responsibility.
DOD‘s Combating Terrorism Funding Reports Do Not Clearly Reflect Costs:
DOD has reported that $32.1 billion has been allocated or requested for
combating terrorism activities from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal
year 2003; however, these reported amounts may not present a clear
picture of total combating terrorism costs. Each year, DOD is required
to provide Congress with a report on the funds allocated to combat
terrorism activities.[Footnote 21] DOD‘s reported annual combating
terrorism allocations have risen from $4.5 billion in fiscal year 1999
to $10 billion in the fiscal year 2003 budget request. Significant
uncertainty exists, however, regarding the accuracy of these reported
amounts because over half are associated with personnel who may or may
not be engaged in combating terrorism activities full-time.
DOD Is Required to Report Its Funding Requirements Annually:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 requires
DOD to provide Congress with an annual consolidated budget
justification display that includes all of its combating terrorism
activities and programs and the associated funding.[Footnote 22] In
response, DOD has submitted a separate budget report for fiscal years
2001, 2002, and 2003 that portrays its allocation of funds within the
four categories of combating terrorism: antiterrorism/force
protection, counterterrorism, consequence management, and intelligence
support. The most recent budget report, submitted to Congress in March
2002, includes the following: the combating terrorism program
descriptions and budget request estimates for fiscal year 2003, the
estimated budget for fiscal year 2002, and the actual obligations for
fiscal year 2001. It also reflects the funding provided by the Defense
Emergency Response Fund[Footnote 23] for fiscal years 2001 and
2002.[Footnote 24]
Funding for Combating Terrorism Activities More Than Double Over 5-Year
Period:
If Congress passes the fiscal year 2003 budget request as submitted,
annual funding to combat terrorism will increase 122 percent from
fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003[Footnote 25]--rising from
$4.5 billion (actual obligations) to $10 billion (budget request),
including the Defense Emergency Response Fund request for fiscal year
2003. (See fig. 1.) In total, DOD reports that $32.1 billion has been
allocated for combating terrorism activities during this 5-year period.
The dollar amounts shown in figure 1 do not include funding for the
current global war on terrorism, such as military operations in
Afghanistan, because these activities are not intended to be included.
Figure 1: DOD‘s Combating Terrorism Funding for Fiscal Years 1999 to
2003:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of DOD‘s combating terrorism budget reports.
[End of figure]
Reported Combating Terrorism Funding May Be Overstated:
Although not clearly identified in DOD‘s budget reports, our analysis
estimates that $19.4 billion (60 percent) of the $32.1 billion
combating terrorism funding is for military ($14.1 billion) and
civilian personnel and personnel-related operating costs
($5.3 billion); however, this estimate may be overstated. (See fig. 2.)
In accordance with DOD‘s Financial Management Regulation,[Footnote 26]
the Department‘s combating terrorism costs include funding for
personnel in designated specialties that have combating terrorism
missions, such as military police, civilian police, and security
guards. The military services‘ accounting systems do not track the time
that individuals in these specialties spend on activities related to
combating terrorism; therefore, the total personnel costs are reported
even if the individuals spend only a portion of their time performing
combating terrorism activities. The actual proportion of time these
personnel spend between combating terrorism and unrelated activities
(such as counter drug investigations) varies, although all of these
personnel are available to perform combating terrorism duties
when needed.
Figure 2: Estimated Personnel Costs as Part of Combating Terrorism
Funding for Fiscal Years 1999 to 2003:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of DOD‘s combating terrorism budget reports.
[End of figure]
The $19.4 billion of estimated combating terrorism personnel costs
shown in figure 2 consists of military personnel costs of $14.1 billion
and estimated operation and maintenance civilian personnel costs of
$5.3 billion. Other components of the total $32 billion shown
include $4.3 billion from the Defense Emergency Response Fund
and $8.4 billion in other appropriations, including procurement,
research and development, and military construction.
Officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict recognize that
improvements could be made in the budget report for next year and plan
to consider ways to restructure its contents to include more summary
information.
Conclusions:
Funding for antiterrorism requirements has increased since fiscal year
1999, but it is widely recognized that vulnerabilities at military
installations will continue to outpace available funding. It is
therefore essential that funds be spent efficiently and effectively if
the services are to achieve the highest level of protection possible
for military personnel, equipment, and critical facilities and
operations. Our analysis indicates that the military services generally
are not applying a results-oriented management framework to guide their
antiterrorism efforts, in part, because DOD does not yet have a
Department-wide antiterrorism strategy. Without a results-oriented
management framework to implement antiterrorism efforts and monitor
results, the services, military commanders, and Congress will not be
able to determine if past and future resources--which have been
significantly increased--are achieving their desired results in the
most efficient and effective manner.
The services and commands we reviewed are adhering to prescribed
policies and procedures and taking significant steps to improve their
capability to use a risk management approach. We identified a
significant weakness in the services‘ current risk management approach,
however, which limits their ability to ensure that these methodologies
are consistently used. As a result, there is limited assurance that
assessment results--which ultimately drive funding allocations--have
been achieved through a consistent assessment process prescribed by DOD
guidance. This creates the potential that limited resources could be
misapplied and important opportunities to improve an installation‘s
force protection posture could be overlooked.
The Department‘s annual combating terrorism report to Congress
provides a detailed description of DOD funds allocated for combating
terrorism activities, but that report should be viewed with caution
because over half of the reported amounts are estimates that do not
reflect actual activities dedicated to combating terrorism.
Consequently, as Congress considers DOD‘s budget requests and oversees
DOD‘s combating terrorism activities, it may not have a clear picture
of total costs incurred by DOD for this purpose.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Because of the magnitude of the funds being allocated for, and the
importance of antiterrorism efforts within, DOD, we recommend that
simultaneous steps be taken within the Department to improve the
management framework guiding these efforts. Accordingly, to establish
a foundation for the services‘ antiterrorism efforts, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense (1) direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to accelerate and set
a target date to issue a Department-wide antiterrorism strategy that
will underpin each service‘s efforts, and (2) work with each service to
ensure that its management framework is consistent with this
Department-wide strategy.
To improve the effectiveness of the services‘ antiterrorism efforts,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force to adopt and effectively communicate a
results-oriented management framework, consistent with DOD‘s overall
antiterrorism strategy, to guide each service‘s antiterrorism efforts.
This framework should include the following:
A strategy that defines:
* long-term antiterrorism goals,
* approaches to achieve the goals, and:
* key factors that might significantly affect achieving the goals:
An implementation approach that provides:
* performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable;
* resources to achieve the goals;
* performance indicators to measure outputs;
* an evaluation plan to compare program results with established goals;
and:
* actions needed to address any unmet goals.
To improve their risk management approach for identifying antiterrorism
requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to require:
* installation commanders to document all threat, vulnerability, and
asset criticality assessments and:
* periodic higher headquarters evaluations of the methodologies used by
installations to conduct their threat, vulnerability, and asset
criticality assessments. Such an evaluation may be incorporated into
the existing service-level review process; however, for those
installations that are not covered by this process, the services should
develop an alternative approach.
To clarify the annual consolidated budget justification display for
combating terrorism reported to Congress, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense highlight the military and civilian personnel
funding included in the report and clearly indicate that these total
personnel funds are reported even though the individuals may spend only
a portion of their time performing combating terrorism activities.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
DOD agreed with all of our recommendations and stated that it is
accelerating the development of an antiterrorism strategy and working
with the military services to ensure that a consistent approach is
followed across the Department. In commenting on this report, DOD said
that it would publish an antiterrorism strategic plan by January 2003
that articulates strategic goals, objectives, and an approach to
achieve them. Moreover, DOD will require each service to develop its
own antiterrorism strategic plan that complements and supports the
Department‘s plan. DOD also agreed to improve its risk management
process for establishing antiterrorism requirements. In its comments,
DOD said that it is revising guidance to validate the methodologies
their installations use to perform threat, vulnerability, and asset
criticality assessments and the thoroughness of these three assessments
as part of regularly scheduled antiterrorism program reviews. DOD
agreed with our recommendation to clarify how personnel costs that
appear in the Department‘s annual combating terrorism funding report to
Congress were calculated. In its fiscal year 2004 combating terrorism
funding report to Congress, DOD plans to highlight the personnel costs
and the methodology used to determine them.
DOD officials also provided technical comments that we have
incorporated as appropriate. DOD‘s written comments are reprinted in
their entirety in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6020. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Raymond J. Decker, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Raymond J. Decker:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
The scope of our study was limited to the antiterrorism preparedness of
Department of Defense (DOD) installations in the continental United
States. To perform our review, we contacted the antiterrorism offices
for each of the four military services, as well as two commands within
each service. We selected an active-duty command from each service that
was responsible for a large number of installations and that had a key
role in providing personnel and weapons systems for military
operations. Additionally, we selected a reserve command from each
service because they typically have smaller-sized installations than do
active-duty commands; consequently, a large number of them do not
receive service-level reviews of their antiterrorism efforts.[Footnote
27]
To determine whether the services use a results-oriented management
framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts, we met with Office of
the Secretary of Defense and service headquarters and command
antiterrorism officials, and reviewed their strategic-planning
documents for evidence of the critical elements of a strategic plan and
performance plan--as embodied in the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993. We also reviewed service-and command-specific documents,
such as campaign plans, operating orders, and briefing slides, which
describe and communicate the management structure of the services and
commands antiterrorism programs. We interviewed officials and gathered
relevant documentation for our review primarily from the following DOD
organizations located in the Washington, D.C., area:
* Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict.
* Headquarters, Department of the Army, Force Protection and Law
Enforcement Division, Antiterrorism Branch.
* Headquarters, Department of the Navy, Interagency Support and
Antiterrorism/ Force Protection Division.
* Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Force Protection Branch,
Directorate of Security Forces.
* Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Homeland Defense Branch, Security
Division.
We also spoke with officials from the following commands, who provided
data on the number of domestic installations within their respective
commands.
* Army Forces Command, Atlanta, Georgia (number of installations = 11).
* Navy Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia (number of installations =
18).
* Air Combat Command, Hampton, Virginia (number of installations = 16).
* Marine Forces Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia (number of installations =
7).
* Army National Guard, Arlington, Virginia (number of installations =
165).
* Naval Reserve Force, New Orleans, Louisiana (number of installations
= 116).
* Air National Guard, Arlington, Virginia (number of installations =
69).
* Marine Force Reserve, New Orleans, Louisiana (number of installations
= 42).
To determine the extent to which the military services use risk
management analysis to develop antiterrorism requirements, we obtained
relevant documents and interviewed antiterrorism officials from the
organizations and commands previously listed as well as the following
organizations:
* Joint Staff Directorate for Combating Terrorism Programs and
Requirements, Washington, D.C.
* Air Force Security Forces Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San
Antonio, Texas.
We reviewed DOD as well as Joint Staff-, service-, and command-specific
regulations, orders, pamphlets, manuals, and other antiterrorism
guidance to determine whether organizations were required to perform
the three assessments (of threat, vulnerability, and asset criticality)
that comprise risk management to identify and prioritize antiterrorism
requirements. We also reviewed these documents for procedures and
directions on how these assessments are to be performed. We spoke with
headquarters and command officials about their involvement in
overseeing how installations identify antiterrorism requirements and
about their process for merging, reprioritizing, and funding these
installation requirements. Additionally, we spoke with Air Force and
Navy headquarters officials as well as officials from the Air Force
Security Forces Center about the utility of the Vulnerability
Assessment Management Program for prioritizing and tracking
installation antiterrorism requirements servicewide.
To identify funding trends and determine if DOD accurately and
completely reports its combating terrorism funding to Congress, we
obtained and analyzed the three annual combating terrorism activities
budget reports that cover fiscal years 1999 through 2003. We did not
independently verify the information contained in the funding reports,
although we did examine the methodology and assumptions that were used
to develop the information. We discussed how the budget report is
reviewed and consolidated with officials from the DOD Comptroller‘s
Office, the Office for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict,
and the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. To determine if
the military services‘ funding information is accurate and complete, we
interviewed budget officials responsible for compiling the information
for each service.
To estimate the combating terrorism personnel funding that appears in
figure 2, we analyzed 5 fiscal years of funding from the previously
mentioned combating terrorism budget reports. The $14.1 billion of
military personnel presented in the figure represents appropriations
for military personnel for combating terrorism. We estimated civilian
personnel funding by combining the four antiterrorism activities that
contain most of the operation and maintenance funds for personnel:
physical security management and planning, security forces and
technicians, law enforcement, and security and investigative matters.
DOD‘s budget report does not distinguish civilian personnel funds from
the other funds contained in these activities; therefore, our estimate
of civilian personnel funds includes the nonpersonnel funds as well.
However, we believe that the estimate is appropriate on the basis of
our analysis of DOD‘s budget report and discussions with DOD officials.
We could not determine the civilian personnel funds embedded in other
operation and maintenance activities and in research and development
activities and, therefore, did not include them in our estimate of
personnel funding.
We conducted our review from February through August 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense:
Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500:
OCT 22 2002:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS/ LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT:
Mr. Raymond J. Decker:
Director, Defense Capabilities Management U.S. General Accounting
Office Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Decker:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report GAO-03-14, ’COMBATING TERRORISM:
Actions Needed to Guide Services‘ Antiterrorism Efforts at
Installations,“ dated November 2002 (GAO Code 350084).
The Department concurs with the draft report. Comments on the
recommendations are included in the enclosure. Technical and factual
comments have been forwarded to your staff for consideration and
inclusion into the report, as appropriate.
Sincerely,
Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy:
Signed by Marshall Billingslea:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED NOVEMBER 2002 GAO-03-14 / CODE 350084:
’COMBATING TERRORISM: Actions Needed to Guide Services‘ Antiterrorism
Efforts at Installations“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: Because of the magnitude of the funds being allocated
for, and the importance of antiterrorism efforts within, DoD, GAO
recommends that simultaneous steps be taken within the Department to
improve the management framework guiding these efforts. Accordingly, to
establish a foundation for the Services‘ antiterrorism efforts, GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) direct the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
to accelerate and set a target date to issue a department-wide
antiterrorism strategy that will underpin each Service‘s efforts, and
(2) work with each Service to ensure that its management framework is
consistent with this department-wide strategy. (pp. 16-17/GAO Draft
Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. OASD(SO/LIC) has completed the draft of the
Department of Defense Antiterrorism Strategic Plan to guide DOD‘s
antiterrorism program efforts by articulating strategic goals,
objectives, and a proposed strategy to achieve them. This plan will
serve as strategic guidance for all DoD Component antiterrorism
programs. OASD(SO/LIC) will publish the plan no later than January
2003. OASD(SO/LIC) will orchestrate the implementation of the strategic
goals and objectives throughout DoD in coordination with other OSD
offices, the Joint Staff, the Services, and DoD agencies.
RECOMMENDATION 2: To improve the effectiveness of the Services‘
antiterrorism efforts, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to adopt and
effectively communicate a results-oriented management framework,
consistent with DOD‘s overall antiterrorism strategy, to guide each
Service‘s antiterrorism efforts. This framework should include the
following:
A strategy that defines:
-long-term antiterrorism goals,
-approaches to achieve the goals, and:
-key factors that might significantly affect achieving the goals:
An implementation approach that provides:
-performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable; -
resources to achieve the goals;
-performance indicators to measure outputs;
-an evaluation plan to compare program results with established goals;
and - actions needed to address any unmet goals. (p. 17/GAO Draft
Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comments. DoD Directive 2000.12 is currently
being revised to require the Secretaries of the Military Departments to
develop Service-oriented Antiterrorism Strategic Plans that detail the
vision, mission, goals, and performance measures in support of the DoD
Strategic Plan. The Vulnerability Assessment Management Program is one
management framework tool being used to guide Commanders in
implementing performance goals.
RECOMMENDATION 3: To improve risk management approach for identifying
antiterrorism requirements, GAO recommends that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to
require:
-installation commanders to document all threat, vulnerability, and
asset criticality assessments and:
-periodic higher headquarters evaluations of the methodologies used by
installations to conduct their threat, vulnerability, and asset
criticality assessments. Such an evaluation may be incorporated into
the existing service-level review process; however, for those
installations that are not covered by this process, the Services should
develop an alternative approach. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comments. DoD Instruction 2000.16, Standard
20, requires Commanders at all levels to review their own antiterrorism
program and plans, and the program of their immediate subordinate in
the chain of command, at least annually. DoD Directive 2000.12 is
currently being revised to require the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to ensure all installations and activities conduct
comprehensive antiterrorism program reviews and assessments in
accordance with DoD Instruction 2000.16. The Directive will also
require Services to ensure antiterrorism program reviews include an
evaluation of the Risk Management process to validate the methodology
and thoroughness of assessments conducted for critical assets,
terrorist threat, and vulnerabilities.
RECOMMENDATION 4: To clarify the annual consolidated budget
justification display for combating terrorism reported to Congress, the
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense highlight the military and
civilian personnel funding included in the report and clearly indicate
that these total personnel funds are reported even though the
individuals may spend only a portion of their time performing combating
terrorism activities. (p. 18/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Fiscal Year 2004 consolidated budget
justification display for combating terrorism activities will be
annotated to highlight the personnel costs and the methodology used to
determine the military and civilian personnel costs associated with
combating terrorism activities.
[End of section]
Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Ray Decker, (202) 512-6020
Bob Repasky, (202) 512-9868:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Alan Byroade, J. Paul Newton,
Marc Schwartz, Corinna Wengryn, R. K. Wild, Susan Woodward, and Richard
Yeh made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
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Abroad. GAO-02-1021. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force
Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to
Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.:
March 1, 2002.
Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and
Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2001.
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness
Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical
and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2001.
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-
150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation‘s Issues. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations.
GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD‘s
Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909.
Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and
National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and
Resources. T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for
Forces Overseas. NSIAD-00-181. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000).
Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework. T-NSIAD-00-180. Washington, D.C.: May 24,
2000.
Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken
to Protect Military Forces. T-NSIAD-00-49. Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 1999.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on
Year 2000 Experiences. AIMD-00-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments
of Chemical and Biological Attacks. NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic
Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency. NSIAD-99-3.
Washington, D.C.: November 12, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help
Prioritize and Target Program Investments. NSIAD-98-74.
Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998.
Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the
Middle East. T-NSIAD-98-44. Washington, D.C.: October 28, 1997.
Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas. GAO/NSIAD-97-207. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 1997.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Antiterrorism represents defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. Examples
of defensive measures include reducing the number of access points onto
an installation, verifying the identity of personnel entering
installations, increasing security patrol activity at high-risk
targets, and issuing weapons to all security and law enforcement
personnel.
[2] Antiterrorism constitutes only one of four combating terrorism
categories. The other three categories are counterterrorism (offensive
measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),
consequence management (preparation for and response to a terrorist
attack), and intelligence support (collection, analysis, and
dissemination of terrorism-related information).
[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Actions
Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism Program Implementation and
Management, GAO-01-909 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2001).
[4] ’Domestic“ refers to the continental United States and excludes
Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. territories.
[5] The number of installations is based on information provided by the
respective commands.
[6] DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program,
Apr. 13, 1999.
[7] The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict performs these duties under the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy.
[8] DOD Instruction 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14,
2001.
[9] The 31 antiterrorism standards in DOD Instruction 2000.16 also
apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commands, the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, defense agencies, and
field activities.
[10] DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H, Protection of DOD Personnel and
Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence, Feb. 19,
1993.
[11] Joint Staff Antiterrorism Force Protection Installation Planning
Template, July 1, 1998.
[12] P.L. 103-62. Congress enacted the Government Performance and
Results Act in 1993 to provide for, among other things, the
establishment of strategic planning and performance measurement in the
federal government.
[13] DOD Instruction 2000.16, para. E3.1.1.15 also calls for an
assessment of incident deterrence and response capabilities.
[14] See DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H, para. E3.1.1.5, E3.1.1.15, and
E3.1.1.15.4.
[15] See DOD Directive 2000.12, para. 5.9.
[16] See DOD Directive 2000.12, para. 5.9.12.
[17] Toward the end of our review, the Marine Corps issued instructions
on how installations are to perform their assessments.
[18] DOD Instruction 2000.16 requires a service-level review of DOD
facilities with (1) at least 300 personnel, (2) an emergency response
and physical security mission, or (3) contact with local nonmilitary or
foreign agencies at least once every 3 years.
[19] In technical comments provided by the Air Force, officials stated
that Air Force higher headquarters reviews also include a review of
annual
installation assessments.
[20] Both the Air Force and the Navy are requiring their installations
to submit antiterrorism requirements for fiscal year 2003 in the format
prescribed by the Vulnerability Assessment Management Program.
[21] 10 U.S.C. sec. 229.
[22] P.L. 106-65, sec. 932, Oct. 5, 1999; 10 U.S.C. sec. 229.
[23] The Defense Emergency Response Fund is DOD‘s portion of the
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations of September 2001, which was
approved immediately following the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon.
[24] The Defense Emergency Response Fund request for fiscal year 2003
was provided to Congress in a separate budget justification book.
[25] In terms of fiscal year 2002 dollars, which adjusts for inflation,
this increase would be 105 percent.
[26] DOD 7000.14-R, Vol. 2B, Ch. 19, June 2000.
[27] DOD Instruction 2000.16 requires facilities with (1) at least 300
personnel, (2) an emergency response and physical security mission, or
(3) contact with local nonmilitary or foreign agencies to receive a
service-level review at least once every 3 years.
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