Electronic Warfare
Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses Gao ID: GAO-03-51 November 25, 2002U.S. military aircraft are often at great risk from enemy air defenses, and the services use specialized aircraft to neutralize or destroy them. In January 2001, GAO reported that a gap existed between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs and recommended that a comprehensive strategy was needed to fix the situation. In response to GAO's report, DOD emphasized that a major study underway at the time would provide the basis for a Department-wide strategy and lead to a balanced set of acquisition programs between the services. This report updates our previous work and assesses actions that DOD has taken to improve its suppression capabilities.
The Department of Defense continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air defenses and its capabilities to do so, despite some progress in upgrading its capabilities. There are not enough existing suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements, some aircraft are experiencing wing and engine problems, and improvements are needed to counter evolving threats. DOD's primary suppression aircraft, the EA-6B, is also reaching the end of its life cycle and a replacement is needed as early as 2009. Furthermore, some aircraft self-protection equipment, which provide additional suppression capabilities, have also been found to be unreliable. DOD has not yet developed an integrated, comprehensive approach to the U.S. air defense suppression mission but has recently completed an Analysis of Alternatives that presented the services with 27 options for replacing the aging EA-6B. The services formed a coordinating group to assess the options, and in June 2002 presented service-specific proposals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for analysis and consideration in the 2004 budget. However, the Analysis of Alternatives did not provide the basis for a comprehensive strategy to address the department's overall suppression needs. It only analyzed the airborne electronic attack portion of the mission and did not address needed improvements in aircraft self-protection systems or the technical and funding challenges of other service programs such as the Navy's and Air Force's air-launched decoy programs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-51, Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses
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Report to the Secretary of Defense:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing
Enemy Air Defenses:
Highlights of GAO-03-51, a report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
Secretary of Defense:
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. military aircraft are often at great risk from enemy air defenses,
and the services use specialized aircraft to neutralize or destroy
them.
In January 2001, GAO reported that a gap existed between the services‘
suppression capabilities and their needs and recommended that a
comprehensive
strategy was needed to fix the situation. In response to GAO‘s report,
DOD
emphasized that a major study underway at the time would provide the
basis
for a Department-wide strategy and lead to a balanced set of
acquisition
programs between the services. This report updates our previous work
and
assesses actions that DOD has taken to improve its suppression
capabilities.
What GAO Found:
The Department of Defense continues to face a gap between its need to
suppress enemy air defenses and its capabilities to do so, despite some
progress in upgrading its capabilities. There are not enough existing
suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements, some aircraft are
experiencing wing and engine problems, and improvements are needed to
counter
evolving threats. DOD‘s primary suppression aircraft, the EA-6B, is
also
reaching the end of its life cycle and a replacement is needed as early
as
2009. Furthermore, some aircraft self-protection equipment, which
provide
additional suppression capabilities, have also been found to be
unreliable.
DOD has not yet developed an integrated, comprehensive approach to the
U.S.
air defense suppression mission but has recently completed an Analysis
of
Alternatives that presented the services with 27 options for replacing
the
aging EA-6B. The services formed a coordinating group to assess the
options,
and in June 2002 presented service-specific proposals to the Office of
the
Secretary of Defense for analysis and consideration in the 2004 budget.
However, the Analysis of Alternatives did not provide the basis for a
comprehensive strategy to address the department‘s overall suppression
needs. It only analyzed the airborne electronic attack portion of the
mission and did not address needed improvements in aircraft self-
protection
systems or the technical and funding challenges of other service
programs
such as the Navy‘s and Air Force‘s air-launched decoy programs.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO continues to recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a
comprehensive, cross-service strategy to close the gap between DOD‘s
suppression capabilities and needs. In addition, an effective
coordinating
entity is needed to develop and monitor implementation of the
strategy.
In answer to a draft of GAO‘s report, DOD concurred with its
recommendations.
Staff changes are being made to address cross-cutting issues, and an
integrated
product team process established to form a comprehensive approach to
the
electronic warfare mission.
The full report, including GAO‘s objectives, scope, methodology, and
analysis
is available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/gerpt?GAO-03-51. For additional
information
about the report, call R.E. Levin on (202) 512-3519.
This is a test for developing highlights for a GAO report. The full
report,
including GAO‘s objectives, scope, methodology, and analysis is
available
at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-. For additional information about
the
report, contact . To provide comments on this test highlights, contact
Keith Fultz (202-512-3200) or email HighlightsTest@gao.gov.
November 2002:
Electronic Warfare:
Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses:
GAO-03-51:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Despite Some Increases in Capabilities, a Gap Remains:
DOD Has Made Little Progress in Establishing a Coordinating Entity and
Comprehensive Strategy for the Suppression Mission:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Locations Visited during This Review:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Figures:
Figure 1: EA-6B with Jammer Pod and HARM Preparing for Launch from an
Aircraft Carrier:
Figure 2: F-16CJ Aircraft with the HARM Targeting Pod and HARM:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 25, 2002:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
The Secretary of Defense:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In conducting military operations, U.S. aircraft are often at great
risk from enemy air defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles. The
services use specialized aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or
temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems through either electronic
warfare or physical attack. These aircraft use electronic warfare
devices, called jammers, which transmit electronic signals that disrupt
enemy radar and communications to temporarily suppress enemy air
defenses. Other specialized aircraft use antiradiation missiles that
home in on radars used by surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft
artillery systems to degrade or destroy them. Because specialized
aircraft protect all service aircraft in hostile airspace, the
suppression mission necessarily crosses individual service lines. In
addition, military aircraft use on-board self-protection equipment to
detect and suppress enemy air defenses, such as radar warning receivers
and jammers.
In 1993 and 1996, we issued reports expressing concerns over Department
of Defense (DOD) decisions to eliminate the F-4G and EF-111 suppression
aircraft without first fielding comparable replacements.[Footnote 1]
These aircraft were retired because the cost of maintaining them was
perceived to be too great, and because the Air Force planned to field
stealthy aircraft[Footnote 2] in the future. However, after stealth
aircraft were revealed to be vulnerable in Kosovo, the services
realized that the loss of suppression capability had actually increased
U.S. aircraft vulnerability to enemy air defenses and that suppression
assets were still needed. Because no replacements were yet available,
the Navy‘s aging EA-6B became DOD‘s only standoff radar jammer
aircraft, providing suppression support for all the services.
In January 2001, we expressed concern about the acknowledged gap
between the services‘ suppression capabilities and their needs, and
DOD‘s fragmented approach to the suppression mission. The gap is a
consequence of the increasing modernization of enemy air defenses that
has outpaced DOD‘s effort to improve its suppression capabilities. We
recommended that DOD designate an interservice coordinating entity to
develop a comprehensive, cross-service strategy to close the
gap.[Footnote 3] DOD agreed with our findings but disagreed with our
recommendation. The Department stated that a study --the Airborne
Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives --underway at the time,
would provide a basis for its future strategy and lead to a balanced
set of acquisition programs for the services. The objective of this
report is to update our previous work and assess the actions DOD has
taken to (1) improve its suppression capabilities and (2) develop an
integrated, comprehensive approach for closing the gap between its
capabilities and needs. Due to security classification, some details
about the various suppression programs are not included in this report.
Results in Brief:
DOD has been making some progress in upgrading its capabilities, but it
continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air defenses
and the availability of equipment to allow it to do so. There are not
enough existing suppression aircraft to meet overall requirements, some
aircraft are experiencing wing and engine problems, and improvements
are needed to counter evolving threats. In addition, DOD‘s primary
suppression aircraft, the EA-6B, is reaching the end of its life cycle
and a replacement aircraft is needed as early as 2009. Furthermore,
some aircraft self-protection equipment, which is intended to provide
additional suppression capabilities, has also been found to be
unreliable. Individual service efforts to address problems by
refurbishing aircraft, procuring and fielding more of the current
suppression aircraft, and upgrading some electronic warfare equipment,
while closing some of the gap, will not fill all current and future
needs.
DOD has not yet developed an integrated, comprehensive approach to the
U.S. air defense suppression mission. In December 2001, DOD completed
an Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives that examined
options for replacing the aging EA-6B. Although the analysis provided
detailed modeling of the estimated costs and capabilities of 27
options, it contained no recommendations on what system or systems
should be acquired. The analysis did not provide the basis for a
balanced, comprehensive strategy to address DOD‘s overall suppression
needs. For example, it did not address improvements in aircraft self-
protection systems or the technical and funding challenges of other
service programs such as the Navy‘s and Air Force‘s air-launched decoy
programs. The services formed a coordinating group to assess the
options, and in June 2002 the Navy and the Air Force presented specific
proposals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for consideration
in the fiscal year 2004 budget. These proposals emphasized only
separate service-specific programs to replace EA-6B capabilities. DOD
is currently analyzing the services‘ proposals to determine what mix of
systems to approve.
We continue to recommend that you develop a comprehensive, integrated,
cost-effective cross-service strategy to close the gap between DOD‘s
suppression capabilities and needs. In addition, an effective
coordinating entity is needed to develop and monitor implementation of
the strategy.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
findings and recommendations.
Background:
The United States experienced heavy aircraft and aircrew losses to
enemy air defenses during the Vietnam War. Since then, the services
have recognized air defense suppression as a necessary component of air
operations. Consequently, when a crisis arises, suppression aircraft
are among the first to be called in and the last to leave. Radar is the
primary means used by enemy forces to detect, track, and target U.S.
aircraft with missiles and guns. Hence, U.S. suppression aircraft focus
on trying to neutralize, degrade, or destroy the enemy‘s air defense
radar equipment. U.S. suppression aircraft, using missiles and jammers,
generally begin suppressing enemy air defenses after they begin
emitting radio-frequency signals. Also, in some cases, aircraft launch
antiradiation missiles that can search for and destroy enemy radars if
they are turned on. At some risk to the aircraft and aircrews,
suppression aircraft must be in the vicinity of the enemy air defenses
to complete their mission.
Enemy radars in the past were usually fixed in position, operated
independent of each other, and turned on for lengthy periods of time--
all of which made them relatively easy to find and suppress through
electronic warfare or physical attack. Such was the case in Operation
Desert Storm, when suppression aircraft such as EA-6B and the
now-retired EF-111 and F-4G played a vital role in protecting other
U.S. aircraft from radar-guided missile systems. In fact, strike
aircraft were normally not permitted to conduct air operations unless
protected by these suppression aircraft. The EA-6B and EF-111 were
equipped with transmitters to disrupt or ’jam“ radar equipment used by
enemy surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery systems. The
F-4G, F/A-18, and EA-6B used antiradiation missiles that homed in on
enemy radar systems to destroy them. The Air Force replaced the F-4G
with a less capable aircraft, the F-16CG, but did not upgrade or
replace
the EF-111.[Footnote 4]
According to DOD, countries have sought to make their air defenses more
resistant to suppression. These efforts include increasing the mobility
of their surface-to-air missiles and radar equipment, connecting radars
together into integrated air defense systems, and adding sophisticated
capabilities so that the radar can detect aircraft while turned on for
a shorter period of time. These defenses use various means to track and
target aircraft, including modern telecommunications equipment and
computers to create networks of early warning radar, missile system
radar, and passive detection systems that pick up aircraft
communications or heat from aircraft engines. Integrated networks
provide air defense operators with the ability to track and target
aircraft even if individual radar elements of the network are jammed or
destroyed.
Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, U.S. suppression aircraft have
been continuously deployed to protect fighter aircraft maintaining the
no-fly zones over Iraq. More recently, these aircraft have been
deployed to Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. In 1999, during Operation
Allied Force in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, these aircraft were extremely
important for protecting strike aircraft from enemy radar-guided
missiles. However, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, these
aircraft were unable to destroy their integrated air defense system
because Yugoslav forces often engaged in elaborate efforts to protect
their air defense assets. These efforts reduced Yugoslav opportunities
to engage U.S. and coalition aircraft because their air defense assets
could not be used and protected simultaneously. Nevertheless, in two
separate incidents, Yugoslav forces managed to shoot down an F-117
stealth fighter and an F-16CG. In addition to the two losses, the
inability of the United States to counter Yugoslav air defenses that
included radar and infrared guided missiles made it necessary for U.S.
forces to (1) fly thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing
suppression forces in Europe to their limits, and (2) raise their
strike
missions to higher altitudes or keep low-flying aircraft such as the
Army‘s
Apache attack helicopters out of combat to reduce risk from infrared
missile threats.
DOD now primarily uses Navy and Marine Corps EA-6Bs for radar jamming
and Air Force EC-130s for communications jamming. Recently, EA-6Bs and
EC-130s saw combat in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Air
defenses there were relatively weak compared to those faced by U.S.
aircraft in Yugoslavia, placing fewer demands on suppression aircraft
to jam air defense systems. This gave the EA-6B an opportunity to
exploit new techniques to jam ground communications by working with the
EC-130 and other electronic intelligence gathering aircraft.
Despite Some Increases in Capabilities, a Gap Remains:
Since our January 2001 report,[Footnote 5] the services have had some
success in improving their suppression capabilities, but they have not
reached a level needed to counter future threats. When the Air Force
retired the EF-111 without a replacement, the Navy‘s EA-6B became DOD‘s
primary airborne radar jammer, providing suppression support for all
the services. High demand for the aircraft has exacerbated current wing
and engine problems, and the Navy has been unable to meet its overall
requirements. Efforts are underway to address the EA-6B‘s problems and
improve its suppression equipment, but the Navy projects that the
declining EA-6B inventory will be insufficient to meet DOD‘s needs
beyond 2009. The Air Force‘s F-16CJ fleet has grown and the aircraft‘s
capabilities are being improved, but it still lacks some of the
capabilities of the F-4G, the aircraft it replaced. Also, the Air Force
and the Navy have improvements underway for other systems such as the
EC-130 and antiradiation missiles but face funding challenges. Finally,
to the extent there are gaps in suppression capabilities, U.S. fighter
aircraft and helicopters must rely on self-protection equipment to
suppress enemy air defenses, but some of this equipment has been proven
to be unreliable. The services have some programs underway to improve
this self-protection equipment, such as developing new towed decoys,
but, as discussed below, these programs have been hampered by technical
and funding issues.
Aging EA-6B Aircraft Are Unable to Meet Force Structure Objectives:
The Navy does not have enough EA-6Bs to meet DOD‘s suppression needs
due to wing fatigue and engine problems that have grounded aircraft;
downtime required for routinely scheduled depot level maintenance; and,
in the future, downtime to install major capability upgrades in the
aircraft. Because of its limited numbers and high rate of use by the
warfighting commanders, DOD designated the EA-6B as a ’low density,
high demand“ asset to support worldwide joint military operations. EA-
6Bs are included in all aircraft carrier deployments and support the
Air Force‘s Aerospace Expeditionary Forces. To meet a requirement to
field 104 aircraft out of a total inventory of 124 (with an average age
of 19 years), the Navy refurbished 20 retired EA-6Bs. Subsequently, in
2001, 2 EA-6Bs crashed, reducing the total inventory to 122 aircraft.
Also in that year, the Navy planned to raise the requirement to 108
aircraft and establish an additional EA-6B squadron, but that has been
delayed until March 2004. In February 2002, the Navy had only 91 EA-6Bs
available for operations instead of the 104 required. As a result,
while the Navy has been able to meet operational commitments, it has
been unable to meet some of its training and exercise requirements.
Figure 1: EA-6B with Jammer Pod and HARM Preparing for Launch from an
Aircraft Carrier:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
The Navy is currently taking action to remedy EA-6B wing fatigue and
engine failures, and flight restrictions have been put in place.
However, because wing fatigue has continued to grow, the Navy may have
to ground additional aircraft. The Navy plans to replace a total of 67
wing center sections to remedy the problem, and it will spend $4.4
million each for such replacements for 17 aircraft in the fiscal year
2002 budget. In addition, DOD‘s 2002 supplemental funds covered 8
additional wing replacements, and the Navy is programming funds for 10
more wing replacements for each year in the Future Years Defense Plan.
In 2001, the Navy also began experiencing problems with the EA-6B‘s
engines. Premature failure of certain engine bearings caused some
engines to fail, and it may have caused the crash of two aircraft in
2001. The Navy grounded over 50 engines until they could be overhauled,
but it expects to have them back in service by late this year.
The constant deployment of this ’low density“ EA-6B fleet for
contingency operations has contributed to its deterioration and to
other maintenance-related problems. For example, to maintain the
readiness of squadrons deployed to Kosovo and other ongoing
commitments, the Navy took spare parts and personnel from nondeployed
squadrons and subjected the EA-6B to above average cannibalization of
parts.[Footnote 6] This impacted the ability of nondeployed units to
train and maintain aircrew proficiency. The constant deployments also
added to personnel problems in terms of quality of life. EA-6B crews,
for example, are often away from home for extended periods of time
creating hardships for their families.
Given the EA-6B‘s age and high rate of use, the Navy says that even if
the EA-6B fleet‘s problems are remedied, it will be unable to meet
force structure requirements in 2009, and all EA-6B aircraft will be
out of the force by 2015. Therefore, the Navy says it needs a
replacement aircraft to begin entering the force by 2009 if
requirements are to be met.
Navy Is Improving EA-6B Jamming Capabilities:
The Navy has been upgrading its EA-6B electronic warfare equipment over
the years, and it is currently modifying its radar signal receiver and
related equipment. The modification program, known as the Improved
Capability Program (ICAP) III, provides improved radar locating and
jamming capabilities to counter modern enemy air defense threats. As of
January 2002, according to DOD, ICAP III engineering and manufacturing
development was about 94 percent complete, and the modification began
testing on the first aircraft in November 2001. The Navy expects ICAP
III to reach initial operational capability in 2005 and to be installed
on all EA-6Bs by 2010, about the time when the aircraft begins to reach
the end of its service life. The Navy is considering using a modified
version of the ICAP III equipment on whatever follow-on suppression
aircraft are developed and fielded, and is also upgrading the EA-6B
jammer pods to increase the number of frequencies that can be jammed.
Air Force Continues F-16CJ and EC-130 Upgrades but Has Not Fully Funded
the Programs:
The Air Force is procuring 30 additional F-16CJ suppression aircraft to
meet force structure requirements for the Air Force‘s Aerospace
Expeditionary Forces. In all, 219 F-16CJ aircraft will be available. To
fully implement its concept of operations for the Expeditionary Forces,
the Air Force also plans to increase the capability of the latest model
F-16C/Ds (block 40) and the F-16CJs (block 50) to be used for both
attack and suppression missions. To accomplish this, the F-16C/Ds will
be modified to carry the HARM Targeting System, and the F-16CJs will be
modified to carry the Advanced Target Pod. The HARM Targeting System
will provide situational awareness to the F-16C/Ds and targeting
information to the HARM missile to permit them to perform the
suppression mission. The Advanced Target Pod will enable the F-16CJs to
deliver precision-guided munitions.
Figure 2: F-16CJ Aircraft with the HARM Targeting Pod and HARM:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Air Force
[End of figure]
The Air Force recently upgraded the HARM Targeting System and is
procuring additional systems. The upgrade (known as R-6) provides
better and faster targeting information to the missile, but even with
this pod the F-16CJ still lacks some of the capabilities of the retired
F-4G. The Air Force completed the R-6 upgrade on fielded systems in
December 2001 and systems subsequently produced will have it. Once 31
additional systems are delivered in 2002, the F-16CJs will have a total
inventory of 202 systems, short of the Air Force‘s original goal of
having 1.1 systems per aircraft, or about 240 systems. Also, the Air
Force has partially funded additional upgrades (called R-7) for the
HARM Targeting System in 2003, and plans to fully fund the upgrade in
the 2004 budget cycle, according to Air Force operational requirements
officials. These officials also stated that they are considering
funding for additional R-7 HARM Targeting Systems for F-16CJs and F-
16C/Ds in the 2004 budget submission.
The Air Force is also upgrading the capabilities of the EC-130 Compass
Call Aircraft, which perform primarily communications jamming missions.
The upgrades are intended to improve the aircraft‘s jamming
capabilities, reliability, and maintainability. The EC-130 is another
’low density, high demand“ asset with a total of only 13 operational
aircraft, of which 11 are being funded for upgrade.
Aircraft Self-Protection Systems Are Also Experiencing Problems:
Gaps in the services‘ air defense suppression aircraft make it
essential that other aircraft have the ability to protect themselves
from enemy defenses. The services have already identified serious
reliability problems with current self-protection systems on U.S.
combat aircraft, including jammers, radar warning receivers, and
countermeasures dispensers. Most of the current systems use older
technology and have logistics support problems due to obsolescence.
Also, as we reported last year,[Footnote 7] the self-protection systems
on strike aircraft may have more problems than the services estimate.
In reviewing test results using the new Joint Service Electronic Combat
System Tester, we found that aircraft the services believed to be
mission capable were not because of faults in their electronic combat
systems that were undetected by older test equipment. The faults ranged
from the identification of parts needing to be replaced inside the
electronic combat systems, to the wiring, antennas, and control units
that connect the systems to the aircraft. For example, 41 of 44
F-15C aircraft and 10 of 10 F-18C aircraft previously believed to be
fully mission capable were subsequently found to have one or more
faults in their self-protection systems, and 1 F-18C had 12 such
faults. Coupled with the problems in the suppression aircraft, these
shortcomings could create survivability problems for the aircraft
should they encounter significant enemy air defense capabilities in
some future conflict.
The services have some programs underway to improve self-protection
capabilities such as the joint Navy and Air Force Integrated Defensive
Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) system and the Precision Location
and Identification (PLAID) system. The IDECM system will provide the
F-15, F/A-18E/F, and B-1B aircraft with improved self-protection
through jammers and towed decoys. The system has experienced some
delays in engineering and development, and the estimated procurement
cost has doubled. The PLAID system will provide aircrews with accurate
location and identification of enemy air defense systems. The services
expect to field both systems in 2004.
Other Development Efforts Are Underway with Some Facing Funding
Constraints and Technology Challenges:
The services have initiated additional research and development efforts
to improve their ability to suppress enemy air defenses, but they face
technology challenges and/or a lack of funding priority for many of
these programs. The Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD), which an Air
Force analysis has shown could make a significant contribution to
aircraft survivability, illustrates this problem. MALD is supposed to
mimic an aircraft and draw enemy air defenses away from the real
aircraft. A recently completed Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration, it had been funded by the Air Force for an initial small
procurement of 300 decoys, with potential for further procurement.
According to the Air Force, after experiencing technical problems, MALD
did not meet user needs, and its procurement cost estimates increased.
Thus, the Air Force canceled the procurement and restructured MALD to
address deficiencies highlighted in the demonstration.
The Navy has been developing its own decoy, the Improved Tactical Air
Launched Decoy (ITALD), but it has procured only part of its inventory
objective. Despite recurring congressional increases for the past
several fiscal years, the Navy has not submitted budget requests for
ITALDs or procured units to complete its inventory objective because of
competing priorities.
Also, the Navy is upgrading the HARM missile used to attack shipborne
and ground-based radars. The first phase of the upgrade improves
missile accuracy by incorporating global positioning and inertial
navigation systems into the missile. A second upgrade, the Advanced
Anti-Radiation Guided Missile, will add millimeter wave capability to
allow the missile to target radars that have stopped emitting. While
the Air Force employs the HARM missile as well, it is not involved in
the HARM upgrade program.
DOD Has Made Little Progress in Establishing a Coordinating Entity and
Comprehensive Strategy for the Suppression Mission:
DOD has acknowledged the gap in U.S. air defense suppression
capabilities for some time and has conducted several studies to
identify solutions, but it has had little success in closing the gap.
Our past work and the work of others have cited the need for DOD to
establish some coordinating entity to develop a comprehensive strategy
that addresses this capability gap. In response to our previous report,
DOD stated that its Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives
would provide the basis for such a strategy. However, the analysis was
limited to assessing options for replacing the EA-6B rather than
assessing the needs of the overall suppression mission. Upon completion
of the analysis, the Navy and the Air Force proposed options for
replacing EA-6B capabilities, and DOD is currently evaluating these
proposals for consideration in the 2004 budget submission.
The Analysis of Alternatives Did Not Provide the Basis for a
Comprehensive Strategy for the Suppression Mission:
In fiscal year 2000, Congress expressed concerns that DOD did not have
a serious plan for a successor to the EA-6B aircraft and directed DOD
to conduct the Airborne Electronic Attack Analysis of Alternatives for
replacing the EA-6B.[Footnote 8] DOD indicated in its response to our
January 2001 report that the analysis would lead to a DOD-wide strategy
and balanced set of acquisition programs to address the overall gaps
between suppression needs and capabilities. However, it was only
intended to address the airborne electronic attack aspect of the
suppression mission and therefore did not address the acknowledged
problems with aircraft self-protection systems or the technical and
funding challenges of other service programs such as the Navy‘s ITALD
program, the Air Force‘s MALD program, and the Air Force‘s EC-130
modifications.
The Navy took the lead on the joint analysis with participation by all
the services. The analysis, completed in December 2001, concluded that
the services needed a standoff system or a combination of systems to
operate at a distance from enemy targets and a stand-in system that
would provide close-in suppression protection for attacking aircraft
where the threat is too great for the standoff systems. The analysis
established the capabilities of the EA-6B upgraded with ICAP III as the
foundation for any future system. It presented the Navy and the Air
Force with detailed models of estimated costs and capabilities of 27
mixes of new and/or upgraded aircraft to consider for follow-on
electronic attack capabilities but did not recommend any particular
option. These options ranged in estimated 20-year life cycle costs from
$20 billion to $80 billion.
In conjunction with the analysis, the services formed a Joint
Requirements Coordination and Oversight Group to coordinate operational
requirements for airborne electronic attack, review ongoing and planned
production programs for the mission, and exchange information among the
services to avoid unnecessary duplication. A key activity of the group
is to coordinate Navy and Air Force proposals for replacing the EA-6B.
According to group members, this mechanism will help address airborne
electronic attack needs through the coordination of complementary
systems agreed to by the services. In June 2002, the services presented
their proposals for follow-on capabilities to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. According to the services, the Navy proposed to
replace the EA-6B with an electronic attack version of its new F/A-18E/
F fighter and attack aircraft. The Air Force proposed adapting the B-
52H bomber for standoff suppression by adding jamming pods to it, plus
a stand-in suppression capability provided by a MALD-type decoy with
jamming capabilities or an unmanned aerial vehicle equipped with
jammers. The services see these proposals as a coordinated, effective
solution to the near-and far-term needs for airborne electronic attack.
DOD is currently conducting an additional analysis of the proposals,
and the Secretary will decide later this year what proposals to include
in the fiscal year 2004 budget submission.
The development of systems to replace the EA-6B will help close the gap
between DOD‘s suppression capabilities and needs. However, the service
proposals that are currently being considered by DOD do not provide an
integrated, comprehensive solution to the overall suppression needs. In
addition, while the Joint Requirements Coordination and Oversight Group
provides a mechanism to coordinate the services‘ efforts, it has not
been directed to develop a comprehensive strategy and monitor its
implementation.
Other assessments have also pointed to the lack of a coordinated
approach to addressing the gap in air suppression capabilities. At
DOD‘s request, the Institute for Defense Analyses studied problems in
acquiring electronic warfare systems. The Institute found several
causes for the problems, including uncertainties in characterizing
rapidly changing threats and systems requirements, lack of adequate and
stable funding, complexity of electronic warfare hardware and software,
challenges in integrating the hardware and software on platforms, and
difficulties in getting and keeping experienced electronic warfare
personnel. Among other things, the Institute recommended that DOD
establish central offices for electronic warfare matters in the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and in each service, create a senior oversight panel,
and prepare an annual electronic warfare roadmap to help correct some
of the problems DOD faces in electronic warfare acquisition programs.
While DOD has not established a coordinating entity to provide
leadership for the suppression mission, it has recognized the need for
such entities in other cross-service initiatives areas such as the
development and fielding of unmanned aerial vehicles. In October 2001,
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics established a joint unmanned aerial vehicles planning task
force that will develop and coordinate road maps, recommend priorities
for development and procurement efforts, and prepare implementing
guidance to the services on common programs and functions.
Conclusions:
The air defense suppression mission continues to be essential for
maintaining air superiority. Over the past several years, however, the
quantity and quality of the services‘ suppression equipment have
declined while enemy air defense tactics and equipment have improved.
DOD has recognized a gap exists in suppression capabilities but has
made little progress in closing it. In our view, progress in improving
capabilities has been hampered by the lack of a comprehensive strategy,
cross-service coordination, and funding commitments that address the
overall suppression needs. DOD relies on individual service programs to
fill the void, but these programs have not historically received a high
priority, resulting in the now existing capability gap. We continue to
believe that a formal coordinating entity needs to be established to
bring the services together to develop an integrated, cost-effective
strategy for addressing overall joint air defense suppression needs. A
strategy is needed to identify mission objectives and guide efforts to
develop effective and integrated solutions for improving suppression
capabilities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To close the gap between enemy air defense suppression needs and
capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a
coordinating entity and joint comprehensive strategy to address the
gaps that need to be filled in the enemy air defense suppression
mission. The strategy should provide the means to identify and
prioritize promising technologies, determine the funding, time frames,
and responsibilities needed to develop and acquire systems, and
establish evaluation mechanisms to track progress in achieving
objectives.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments to a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations and supported the need for a mechanism to coordinate
electronic warfare strategy and systems acquisition. DOD stated that
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) is currently restructuring its staff to address cross-
cutting issues, including the creation of an Assistant Director of
Systems Integration for Electronic Warfare and an Integrated Product
Team process to formulate a comprehensive approach to the electronic
warfare mission area, including defense suppression. We believe this is
a good step forward.
DOD also stated that we were overly critical in our characterization of
individual defense suppression systems and failed to acknowledge its
full range of capabilities to suppress air defenses. We recognize that
the services have substantial capabilities but remain concerned because
there are insufficient aircraft to meet overall requirements and
improvements have not kept pace with evolving threats. Several service-
specific attempts have been made to remedy the acknowledged gap in
capabilities, but they have faltered in competition for funding. In
some cases, Congress intervened with guidance and increases to
services‘ budget requests for defense suppression to ensure that DOD
addresses the capabilities gap. We believe that creation of a
comprehensive strategy and effective coordinating entity would
strengthen DOD‘s ability to compete for funding and address the gap.
DOD‘s comments are reprinted in appendix II. In addition, DOD provided
technical comments that we incorporated into the report where
appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To assess the condition of DOD‘s suppression capabilities and DOD‘s
progress in developing a strategy for closing the gap in suppression
capabilities, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Defense Advanced Research Program Agency, Air Force,
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officials responsible for electronic
warfare requirements and programs. We also interviewed service program
managers for the EA-6B, EC-130, F-16CJ, HARM, aircraft self-protection
systems, and programs under development. We also met with officials
from selected EA-6B squadrons and an EA-6B maintenance depot. We
interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency officials and reviewed related
intelligence documents to ascertain the capabilities of current and
future enemy air defense systems. We also discussed air defense
suppression programs and issues with various DOD contractors, including
RAND Corporation, Northrup-Grumman Corporation, General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated, and Raytheon Systems Company. We
reviewed pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing
the status of suppression capabilities, plans for maintaining them, and
potential solutions for closing the gap in capabilities. Specific
locations we visited are listed in appendix I.
We performed our review from October 2001 through August 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As you know, the head of a federal agency is required under 31 U.S.C.
720 to submit a written statement of actions taken on our
recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the
House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the
date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency‘s first request for appropriations made
more than 60 days after the date of the report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Army,
Air Force, and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact me on
(202)512-4841. Major contributors to this report were Michael Aiken,
Gaines Hensley, John Oppenheim, Terry Parker, Robert Pelletier, and
Robert Swierczek.
Sincerely yours,
R.E. Levin
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[Signed by R.E. Levin]
[End of section]
Appendix I: Locations Visited during This Review:
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
Headquarters Elements, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy,
Washington, D.C.:
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.:
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia:
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia:
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California:
Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia:
Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland:
U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio:
U.S Air Force Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada:
11th and 15th Reconnaissance Squadrons, Indian Springs Air Force Base,
Nevada:
Headquarters, Pacific Fleet, North Island Naval Air Station, San Diego,
California:
Naval Aviation Depot, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington:
Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station Whidbey,
Island, Washington:
Northrop Grumman Corporation, San Diego, California:
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Incorporated, San Diego,
California:
Raytheon Systems Company, Goleta, California:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
Mr. Robert Levin:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
15 NOV 2002:
Dear Mr. Levin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, ’ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for
Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses,“ dated October 7, 2002 (GAO Code
120169/GAO-03-51).
In reviewing this report, we have taken into account the complexity and
variety of platforms and systems that the Department has developed over
the years to address a dynamic and highly diverse threat base whose
technologies and tactics are constantly evolving. Whereas this report
focuses on system specific comparisons such as the individual
capability of the F-16 CJ relative to the retired F-4G, or the limited
numbers of remaining EA-6B aircraft, the Department has long recognized
that the most successful strategy for suppressing and defeating
adversary air defense systems is a full range of countermeasures aimed
at forcing any adversary to overcome not just one but many simultaneous
electronic and kinetic countermeasure attacks.
This variety of existing capabilities has been so successful that, as
noted in the report, adversaries have been forced to adapt new tactics,
frequent defensive maneuvers, and reduced periods of active radar
operations. In view of this success, the department believes the report
is overly critical in its characterization of individual system
capabilities and fails to appropriately credit the substantial existing
capability of the US to suppress air defenses.
In spite of this differing perspective, the Department supports the
need for an enduring mechanism to coordinate strategy and systems
acquisition. To ensure this level of coordination across vital segments
of acquisition, we have recently implemented several organizational
changes to address cross-cutting issues. Included among these is an
Assistant Director of Systems Integration for Electronic Warfare who
will oversee an Integrated Product Team process that will formulate
comprehensive systems-of-systems architectures across all electronic
warfare missions, including air defense suppression.
Sincerely,
Glenn F. Lamartin
Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems:
[Signed by an official for Glenn F. Lamartin]
Attachment:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED OCTOBER 7, 2002 GAO CODE 120169/GAO-03-51:
’ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for
Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish a coordinating entity and joint comprehensive strategy to
address the gaps that need to be filled in the enemy air defense
suppression mission. The strategy should provide the means to identify
and prioritize promising technologies, determine the funding,
timeframes and responsibilities needed to develop and acquire systems,
and establish evaluation mechanisms to track progress in achieving
objectives. (p. 13/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: CONCUR.
The Department has long recognized that the most successful strategy
for suppressing and defeating adversary air defense systems is a full
range of countermeasures aimed at forcing any adversary to overcome not
just one but many simultaneous electronic countermeasures and kinetic
attacks. In spite of any differences in opinion with the report
regarding individual program comparisons, the existing variety of US
defense suppression capabilities has been so successful that, as noted
in the report, adversaries have been forced to adapt new tactics that
require frequent defensive movements and minimal periods of active
radar operations to survive.
To ensure a continuing mechanism for coordinating systems acquisition
with evolving strategies, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics) is restructuring elements of his staff which
include an Assistant Director of Systems Integration for Electronic
Warfare to oversee an Integrated Product Team process to formulate
comprehensive systems-of-systems architectures across all electronic
warfare mission areas, including the area of defense suppression. The
Assistant Director will work closely with the Counter Air Defenses
Joint Requirements Coordination Oversight Group, which the Services
have already formed, to ensure effective harmonization of defense
suppression strategies and requirements.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses:
Air Force Plans, GAO/NSIAD-93-221 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 1993)
and Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses May Be Too Low, GAO-96-128 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.10, 1996).
[2] Aircraft are referred to as stealthy or stealth when they are
constructed with features that make them harder to detect with radar
and infrared systems.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive
Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses, GAO-01-28
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2001).
[4] The Air Force planned to replace the F-4G with an F-15 modified for
the suppression mission with at least the same capability as the F-4G.
The Air Force fielded the F-16CG as an interim capability while it
planned the development of the F-15 suppression aircraft. Subsequently,
the Air Force terminated the F-15 effort and the F-16CG and the newer
F-16CJ became permanent replacements for the F-4G. The F-15 effort was
terminated because of its expected high costs.
[5] See GAO-01-28.
[6] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Services
Need Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations, GAO-02-86 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001). DOD defines cannibalization as removing
serviceable parts for one piece of equipment and installing them in
another.
[7] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Electronic Combat: Services
Should Consider Greater Use of New Test Equipment for Their Aircraft,
GAO-01-843 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2001).
[8] H.R Conf. Rep. No. 106-301 at 625 (1999).
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