Military Personnel
Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed Gao ID: GAO-03-238 December 19, 2002DOD has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD's military leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the law that address the development of officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD's ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act.
DOD has taken positive steps to implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions that address the education, assignment, and promotion of officers serving in joint positions. However, DOD has relied on waivers allowable under the law to comply with the provisions and has experienced difficulties implementing some of its programs. Because of these difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. (1) Education. DOD has met provisions in the act to develop officers through education by establishing a two-phased joint education program, but has not determined how many officers should complete both phases. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions had completed both phases of the program. (2) Assignment. DOD has increasingly not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers, who are required to have both prior education and experience in joint matters. In fiscal year 2001, DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers. (3) Promotion. DOD has promoted more officers with prior joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior levels. Beginning in fiscal year 2008, most officers promoted to these senior levels will also have to complete DOD's joint education program or otherwise meet the requirements to be a joint specialty officer. Our analysis of officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 out of 124 officers promoted to the general and flag level did not meet these requirements. DOD has promoted mid-grade officers who serve in joint organizations at rates equal to or better than the promotion rates of their peers. However, DOD has had difficulty meeting this objective for colonels and Navy captains. DOD's ability to respond fully to these provisions has been hindered by the absence of a strategic plan that (1) establishes clear goals for officer development in joint matters and (2) links those goals to DOD's overall mission and goals. DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs and, without this information, cannot determine if its joint education programs are properly structured. The services vary in the emphasis they place on joint officer development and continue to struggle to balance joint requirements against their own service needs. DOD has also not fully addressed how it will develop reserve officers in joint matters--despite the fact that it is increasingly relying on reservists to carry out its mission. Finally, DOD has not tracked meaningful data consistently to measure progress in meeting the act's provisions.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-238, Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed
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Report to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
December 2002:
MILITARY PERSONNEL:
Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is
Needed:
GAO-03-238:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-238, a report to the Subcommittee on Military
Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
December 2002:
MILITARY PERSONNEL:
Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is
Needed:
Why GAO Did This Study:
DOD has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational
operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD‘s military
leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint
operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the
law that address the development of officers in joint matters and
evaluated impediments affecting DOD‘s ability to fully respond to
the provisions in the act.
What GAO Found:
DOD has taken positive steps to implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions that address the education, assignment, and promotion of
officers serving in joint positions. However, DOD has relied on waivers
allowable under the law to comply with the provisions and has
experienced difficulties implementing some of its programs. Because of
these difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers
in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and
leadership positions.
* Education. DOD has met provisions in the act to develop officers
through education by establishing a two-phased joint education program,
but has not determined how many officers should complete both phases.
In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers serving in joint
positions had completed both phases of the program.
* Assignment. DOD has increasingly not filled all of its critical joint
duty positions with joint specialty officers, who are required to have
both prior education and experience in joint matters. In fiscal year
2001, DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical
joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.
* Promotion. DOD has promoted more officers with prior joint experience
to the general and flag officer pay grades. However, in fiscal year
2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience
to promote one in four officers to these senior levels. Beginning in
fiscal year 2008, most officers promoted to these senior levels will
also have to complete DOD‘s joint education program or otherwise meet
the requirements to be a joint specialty officer. Our analysis of
officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 out of 124
officers
promoted to the general and flag level did not meet these requirements.
DOD has promoted mid-grade officers who serve in joint organizations at
rates equal to or better than the promotion rates of their peers.
However, DOD has had difficulty meeting this objective for colonels
and Navy captains.
DOD‘s ability to respond fully to these provisions has been hindered
by the absence of a strategic plan that (1) establishes clear goals
for officer development in joint matters and (2) links those goals to
DOD‘s overall mission and goals. DOD has not identified how many joint
specialty officers it needs and, without this information, cannot
determine if its joint education programs are properly structured. The
services vary in the emphasis they place on joint officer development
and continue to struggle to balance joint requirements against their
own service needs. DOD has also not fully addressed how it will develop
reserve officers in joint matters”despite the fact that it is
increasingly relying on reservists to carry out its mission. Finally,
DOD has not tracked meaningful data consistently to measure progress
in meeting the act‘s provisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a
strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD‘s overall
mission and goals. At a minimum, this plan should:
* identify the number of joint specialty officers needed,
* include provisions for the education and assignment of reservists
who may serve in joint organizations, and,
* be developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data
to track progress made against the plan.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation because it views
provisions in the act as impediments that must be removed before
it can develop an effective strategic plan.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-238.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart
at (202) 512-5140 or stewartd@gao.gov.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Positive Actions Taken, but Gaps Remain in Education, Assignments, and
Promotions:
Lack of a Strategic Approach Is Contributing to DOD‘s Difficulties to
Fully Respond to the Act‘s Intent:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Demographic Data for Joint Positions:
Appendix III: Mid-Level Promotion Statistics:
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses:
Officers‘ Background:
Officers‘ Views on Joint Assignments:
Officers‘ Views of Phase I of DOD‘s Joint Professional Military
Education Program:
Officers‘ Views of Phase II of DOD‘s Joint Professional Military
Education Program:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Service Fill Rates and Vacancy Rates at the Joint Forces Staff
College for Academic Years 1996 through 2001:
Table 2: Placement of Non-Joint Specialty Officers after Graduation
from Joint Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal Years
1996 through 2001:
Table 3: Placement of Joint Specialty Officers after Graduation from
Joint Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal Years 1996
through 2001:
Table 4: Officers Filling Joint Duty Positions in July 2002 Who Are
Joint Specialty Nominees or Joint Specialty Officers:
Table 5: Joint Positions by Major Command or Activity:
Table 6: Promotion Rates for Mid-Level Officers Assigned to the Joint
Staff Compared to Officers Assigned to Their Service Headquarters
during Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001:
Table 7: Promotion Rates for Mid-Level Joint Specialty Officers
Compared to Promotion Rates of Officers Assigned to Their Service
Headquarters during Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001:
Table 8: Promotion Rates for Mid-Level Officers Assigned to Other Joint
Organizations Compared to the Board Average Promotion Rate during
Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001:
Figures:
Figure 1: Allocation of Joint Positions by Service in Fiscal Year 2001:
Figure 2: Distribution of Vacant and Filled Critical Joint Positions
during Fiscal Years 1989 through 2001:
Figure 3: Number of Officers Designated Annually as Joint Specialty
Officers and Total Number of Joint Specialty Officers for Fiscal Years
1990 through 2001:
Figure 4: Percentage of Officers Promoted to General or Flag Rank with
Joint Experience between Fiscal Years 1995 and 2001:
Figure 5: Good-of-the-Service Waiver Usage for Fiscal Years 1989
through 2001:
Figure 6: Distribution of Joint Positions by Pay Grade:
Figure 7: Distribution of Joint Positions by Occupational Categories:
Letter:
December 19, 2002:
The Honorable John McHugh:
Chairman
The Honorable Vic Snyder
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
Prior to 1986, the Department of Defense (DOD) primarily operated under
a culture in which the four military services educated their officers
in service-specific matters, assigned their most talented officers to
key service positions, and promoted them to leadership positions within
their own service. This arrangement served DOD well when military
operations fell primarily within the capabilities of one of the
military branches. Given that DOD was increasingly moving toward
engaging in joint--multiservice and multinational--operations,
however, Congress recognized that cultural change was needed to move
DOD away from its service parochialisms toward interservice cooperation
and coordination. Congress also believed that DOD needed to better
prepare its military leaders to plan, support, and conduct joint
operations. It enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986,[Footnote 1] in part, to improve officers‘
professional development through education in joint matters and
assignment to joint organizations. The act further requires DOD to
factor this joint education and experience into its officer promotion
decisions.
The act has been hailed as landmark legislation, given the significance
of the cultural change that it was designed to achieve, and DOD has, in
fact, subsequently issued joint vision statements that anticipate an
armed force that will be ’fully joint: intellectually, operationally,
organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.“[Footnote 2] During
the 16 years since the act‘s passage, however, DOD has repeatedly
sought legislative relief from the act‘s provisions that address the
development of officers in joint matters and, although it has complied
with many of these provisions, it is still experiencing difficulties in
implementing some of its joint officer development programs and
policies. Concerns exist in Congress about the extent of DOD‘s progress
in this area and impediments to further change. For this report, we (1)
assessed DOD‘s actions to implement the major provisions of the law in
terms of the education of officers in joint matters, their assignment
to joint organizations, and the services‘ promotion of officers who are
serving or who have served in joint positions[Footnote 3] and (2)
evaluated impediments affecting DOD‘s ability to fully respond to the
act‘s intent regarding the development of officers in joint matters. We
also surveyed and spoke with more than 500 officers serving in joint
positions on the Joint Staff and in joint organizations located in the
United States and abroad to obtain their perspectives on joint officer
development. Appendix I contains a more detailed discussion of our
scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
DOD has taken positive steps to implement the major provisions of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act that address the education and assignment of
officers in joint matters and the promotion of officers who are serving
or who have served in joint positions. In certain cases, DOD has met or
surpassed the act‘s objectives. DOD, however, has also relied on
waivers allowable under the law to comply with some of the provisions
and has experienced difficulties in implementing some of its programs
and policies that address joint officer development. Because of these
difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in
the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and
leadership positions. For example,
* DOD has met provisions in the act that require it to develop officers
in joint matters through education by establishing a two-phased joint
professional military education program. The act, however, did not
establish specific numerical requirements and DOD has also not
determined the number of officers who should complete the joint
education program. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers
who were serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of
the education.
* DOD has surpassed certain provisions in the act that require it to
assign officers who meet specified criteria to joint positions.
However, DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers and has
not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with officers who
hold a joint specialty designation. This number reached an all-time
high in fiscal year 2001 when DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-
third, of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty
officers.
* DOD has, in response to the requirements of the act, promoted more
officers with previous joint experience to the general and flag officer
pay grades. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable
waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to
these senior pay grades. Furthermore, DOD has made progress, but it is
still not fully meeting provisions to promote mid-grade officers
(majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels in the Air Force, Army, and
Marine Corps and lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains in the
Navy) who are serving or who have served in joint positions at rates
not less than the promotion rates of their peers who have not served in
joint positions. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met more than
90 percent of its promotion goals for officers who served on the Joint
Staff, almost 75 percent of its promotion goals for joint specialty
officers, and just over 70 percent of its promotion goals for all other
officers who served in joint positions.
A significant impediment affecting DOD‘s ability to fully realize the
cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has
not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters.
For example, DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers
it needs, and the four services have emphasized joint officer
development to varying degrees. In addition, DOD has not yet, within a
total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint
development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations-
-despite the fact that DOD officials have stated that no significant
operation can be conducted without reserve involvement. Finally, DOD
has not been tracking certain data consistently to measure its progress
in meeting the act‘s joint officer development objectives. For example,
the four services have not kept historical data on the number of joint
positions that are filled with joint specialty officers and joint
specialty officer nominees. Without these data, DOD cannot assess the
degree to which it is properly targeting its joint education programs.
The officers we interviewed in focus group discussions told us that
they expect, and willingly accept orders, to work in joint assignments
during their careers. In fact, about 50 percent of the services‘ mid-
grade officers have served in at least one joint assignment. In
addition, more than 75 percent of the officers in our survey who had
completed the second phase of the joint education program stated that
the second phase was important from a moderate to a great extent. Those
officers who did not find the program helpful stated in focus group
discussions that the program is too long, redundant with the first
phase of the education program, and of little added value.
This report contains a recommendation that DOD develop a strategic plan
that will link joint officer development to DOD‘s overall mission and
goals. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred
with our recommendation because it views provisions in the act as
impediments that must be removed before it can develop an effective
strategic plan.
Background:
The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was, in
part, to reorganize DOD into a more unified military structure. Within
that act, Congress included several provisions that specifically
address the education of officers in joint matters,[Footnote 4] their
assignment to joint organizations, and the promotion of officers
serving in joint positions. The act also established a joint specialty
officer designation for officers who are specifically trained in and
oriented toward joint matters.[Footnote 5] Although the act contains a
number of specific requirements, Congress also provided DOD with
flexibility in meeting the requirements by granting it waiver authority
when it can demonstrate justification. DOD approves waivers on a case-
specific basis.[Footnote 6] These waivers apply to a number of the
provisions, including (1) the methods for designating joint specialty
officers, (2) the posteducation assignments for joint specialty
officers, (3) the assignment of joint specialty officers to critical
joint duty positions, and (4) the promotions of officers to the general
and flag officer pay grades.
Moreover, Congress has issued follow-on reports and made changes to the
law in subsequent legislation. For example, a congressional panel on
military education issued a report in April 1989 that contained
numerous recommendations regarding joint professional military
education.[Footnote 7] Among other things, this panel recommended that
the services‘ professional military education schools teach both
service and joint matters and that the student body and faculty at each
of the service schools include officers from the other services. DOD
has implemented these recommendations. Most recently, Congress amended
the law regarding the promotion criteria for officers being considered
for promotion to the general and flag officer pay grades.[Footnote 8]
The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a requirement that officers must
have served in a joint position prior to being selected for these
promotions. The amendment, contained in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, will require most officers
being considered for appointment to this grade after September 30,
2007, to complete the joint education program as well.
DOD uses a number of multiservice and multinational commands and
organizations to plan and support joint matters. Since passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, officers serving in these commands and
organizations have overseen a number of joint and multinational
military operations that range from humanitarian assistance and
peacekeeping to major operations such as Operation Desert Storm and
ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The number of joint positions in
these organizations has ranged from a low of 8,217 positions in fiscal
year 1988 to a high of 9,371 positions in fiscal year 1998. Changing
missions and reorganizations have contributed to this variation. In
fiscal year 2001, DOD had a total of 9,146 joint positions. Of these
positions, 3,400 positions were allocated to the Air Force; 3,170
positions were allocated to the Army; 2,004 positions were allocated to
the Navy; and 572 positions were allocated to the Marine Corps. Figure
1 shows that the Air Force had the largest percentage, followed by the
Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.
Figure 1: Allocation of Joint Positions by Service in Fiscal Year 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Officers in pay grades O-4 (majors in the Air Force, Army, and Marine
Corps and lieutenant commanders in the Navy) and above can receive
credit for joint experience when they serve in the Joint Staff, joint
geographic and functional commands, combined forces commands, and
defense agencies. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has authority
to award joint credit to officers for serving in certain joint task
force headquarters staffs.[Footnote 9] DOD has developed a joint duty
assignment list that includes all of the active duty positions in pay
grades O-4 and above in the multiservice organizations that are
involved in or support the integrated employment of the armed forces.
DOD‘s policy places limits on the number of positions in the defense
agencies and other jointly staffed activities that can be included on
the list. The list of joint organizations and demographic descriptions
of the officers serving in those organizations are provided in appendix
II.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, under
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, has overall responsibility for the policies and procedures
governing DOD‘s joint officer management program. Among other things,
the Assistant Secretary is responsible for reviewing joint professional
military education initiatives, approving the list of joint duty
assignments, reviewing the promotion and appointment of joint specialty
officers and other officers who are serving or have served in joint
duty positions, and acting on requests to waive DOD joint officer
management requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
responsibility, among other things, for implementing DOD‘s policies
governing joint officer management and for making recommendations to
the Assistant Secretary. The service secretaries are responsible for,
among other things, supporting DOD policy and for ensuring the
qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty positions. These
responsibilities are delineated in DOD‘s Joint Officer Management
Program Directive 1300.19, issued on September 9, 1997.
Positive Actions Taken, but Gaps Remain in Education, Assignments, and
Promotions:
DOD has taken positive steps to implement the provisions of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act that address the education of officers in joint
matters, officers‘ assignments to joint organizations, and the
promotion of officers who are serving or who have served in joint
positions. [Footnote 10] In certain cases, DOD has met or surpassed the
act‘s objectives. However, DOD has also relied on waivers allowable
under the law to comply with the provisions. In addition, DOD has
experienced difficulties in implementing some of its programs and
policies that address joint officer development. Because of these
difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in
the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and
leadership positions.
Education Program in Joint Matters Developed, but Not Delivered to Most
Officers:
One of the provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DOD to
develop officers, in part, through education in joint matters.[Footnote
11] Accordingly, DOD defined joint education requirements in terms of a
two-phased program in joint matters. It incorporated the first phase of
the program into the curricula of the services‘ intermediate-and
senior-level professional military education schools.[Footnote 12] DOD
offers the second phase of the program at the National Defense
University‘s Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. This
phase is designed to provide officers with the opportunity to study in
a truly joint environment and to apply the knowledge they gained during
the first phase of their joint education. DOD also offers a combined
program that includes both phases at the National Defense University‘s
National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces in
Washington, D.C. The Secretary of Defense is required to educate
sufficient numbers of officers so that approximately one-half of the
joint positions are filled at any time by officers who have either
successfully completed the joint professional education program or
received an allowable waiver to complete the education after their
assignment.[Footnote 13] The act, however, did not identify a specific
numerical requirement and, similarly, DOD has not established numerical
goals concerning the number of officers who should complete joint
professional military education.
In the most effective model, officers would complete the first phase of
joint education in an in-resident or nonresident program through one of
the services‘ professional military education schools. The in-resident
programs are a full academic year in length; officers completing the
curricula in nonresident programs will often do this over several
years, given that they are completing their education on a part-time
basis in addition to their normal duties. Upon completion of the first
phase, officers would attend the second phase of the program at the
Joint Forces Staff College. The Joint Forces Staff College offers the
second phase three times during the year and, by law, this phase may
not be less than 3 months.[Footnote 14] Upon graduation from the second
phase, officers would be assigned to a joint position.
According to DOD data, only one-third of the officers serving in joint
positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint
education program. This is due, in large part, to space and facility
limitations at the National Defense University schools that provide the
second phase. Although DOD assigns approximately 3,000 active duty
officers to joint positions each year, the three schools, collectively,
have about 1,200 seats available for active duty officers.
Furthermore, the Joint Forces Staff College, from which most officers
receive the second phase, is currently operating at 83 percent of its
906-seat capacity. Moreover, the number of unfilled seats at the Joint
Forces Staff College has risen significantly in recent years, from a
low of 12 empty seats in fiscal year 1998 to a high of 154 empty seats
in fiscal year 2001. DOD officials cited pressing needs to assign
officers to the increasing number of military operations as a major
reason for these vacancies. A Joint Staff officer responsible for joint
education expressed concern about the services‘ ability to fill seats
in the future due to the ongoing war on terrorism.
Logistics, timing, and budget issues are also making it difficult for
officers to attend the second phase of the joint education program. The
Joint Forces Staff College can only accommodate approximately 300
students in each 3-month term and does not have the space to receive
all of the service professional military education school graduates at
the same time. Given that, officers can report to their joint position
after completing the first phase and subsequently attend the second
phase on a temporary duty basis at some point during their assignment.
However, officers and senior leaders at the sites we visited told us
that their joint commands cannot afford a 3-month gap in a position due
to pressing schedules and workload demands. Officers at the U.S. Forces
in Korea posed a slightly different problem. Given its remote location,
officers typically serve in Korea for only 1-2 years. That command
cannot afford to send someone serving in a 1-year billet away for 3
months. In addition to logistics and timing issues, related budget
issues exist. When an officer attends the second phase en route to a
joint command, the officer‘s service pays the expenses associated with
sending the officer to the Joint Forces Staff College. When the officer
attends the program midtour, the joint organization pays the expenses.
Officers serving on the Joint Staff told us that a former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instituted a policy that the Joint Staff
would not send officers to the Joint Forces Staff College--or to any
other training lasting more than 30 days--after they reported to the
Joint Staff for duty. DOD officials confirmed this and explained that
the former chairman understood the budget implications and, believing
in the importance of joint education, instituted his policy with the
expectation that the services would send their officers to the second
phase of the education before sending them to their Joint Staff
assignments. DOD officials acknowledged, however, that unintended
consequences resulted from this policy. The services still are not
sending their officers to the second phase before they assign them to
the Joint Staff.
Officers we interviewed suggested that alternatives should be
considered for delivering the second phase of DOD‘s joint education
program. For example, some officers believed that the course should be
shortened while others thought that it should be integrated into the
first phase of the program that is offered in the services‘
professional military education schools. However, to shorten the
principal course of instruction at the Joint Forces Staff College,
which delivers the second phase, would require a change in the
law.[Footnote 15]
In addition, considerable variation exists among the services in terms
of the number of officers each service sends to the Joint Forces Staff
College. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that
the seats at the Joint Forces Staff College be allocated among the
services in accordance with the distribution of service positions on
the joint duty assignment list. The percentage of seats reserved for
each service at the school does, in fact, reflect the distribution on
the list. However, while the Air Force filled almost 98 percent of its
allocated seats in academic year 2001, the Navy filled only 67 percent
of its seats. Moreover, vacancy rates for the Army and the Navy have,
for the most part, increased between academic years 1996 and 2001.
Table 1 shows seats filled and vacancy rates, by service, at the school
for academic years 1996 through 2001. Table 1 also shows that the
allocation of seats has been constant for the last 3 years.
Table 1: Service Fill Rates and Vacancy Rates at the Joint Forces Staff
College for Academic Years 1996 through 2001:
Army:
Fiscal year: : 1996; Seats
available: : 289; Seats
filled: : 282; Difference: : -7; Percent of seats unfilled: : 2.
Fiscal year: : 1997; Seats
available: : 282; Seats
filled: : 271; Difference: : -11; Percent of seats unfilled: : 4.
Fiscal year: : 1998; Seats
available: : 298; Seats
filled: : 286; Difference: : -12; Percent of seats unfilled: : 4.
Fiscal year: : 1999; Seats
available: : 297; Seats
filled: : 253; Difference: : -44; Percent of seats unfilled: : 15.
Fiscal year: : 2000; Seats
available: : 297; Seats
filled: : 248; Difference: : -49; Percent of seats unfilled: : 16.
Fiscal year: : 2001; Seats
available: : 297; Seats
filled: : 228; Difference: : -69; Percent of seats unfilled: : 23.
Total; Fiscal year: [Empty]; Seats
available: 1,760; Seats
filled: 1,568; Difference: -192; Percent of seats unfilled: 11.
Air Force:
Fiscal year: : 1996; Seats
available: : 321; Seats
filled: : 321; Difference: : 0; Percent of seats unfilled: : 0.
Fiscal year: : 1997; Seats
available: : 321; Seats
filled: : 329; Difference: : +8; Percent of seats unfilled: : 0.
Fiscal year: : 1998; Seats
available: : 333; Seats
filled: : 341; Difference: : +8; Percent of seats unfilled: : 0.
Fiscal year: : 1999; Seats
available: : 336; Seats
filled: : 348; Difference: : +12; Percent of seats unfilled: : 0.
Fiscal year: : 2000; Seats
available: : 336; Seats
filled: : 332; Difference: : -4; Percent of seats unfilled: : 1.
Fiscal year: : 2001; Seats
available: : 336; Seats
filled: : 328; Difference: : -8; Percent of seats unfilled: : 2.
Total; Fiscal year: [Empty]; Seats
available: 1,983; Seats
filled: 1,999; Difference: +16; Percent of seats unfilled: -1.
Marine Corps:
Fiscal year: : 1996; Seats
available: : 52; Seats
filled: : 46; Difference: : -6; Percent of seats unfilled: : 12.
Fiscal year: : 1997; Seats
available: : 51; Seats
filled: : 48; Difference: : -3; Percent of seats unfilled: : 6.
Fiscal year: : 1998; Seats
available: : 51; Seats
filled: : 48; Difference: : -3; Percent of seats unfilled: : 6.
Fiscal year: : 1999; Seats
available: : 54; Seats
filled: : 51; Difference: : -3; Percent of seats unfilled: : 6.
Fiscal year: : 2000; Seats
available: : 54; Seats
filled: : 61; Difference: : +7; Percent of seats unfilled: : 0.
Fiscal year: : 2001; Seats
available: : 54; Seats
filled: : 49; Difference: : -5; Percent of seats unfilled: : 9.
Total; Fiscal year: [Empty]; Seats
available: 316; Seats
filled: 303; Difference: -13; Percent of seats unfilled: 4.
Navy:
Fiscal year: : 1996; Seats
available: : 217; Seats
filled: : 213; Difference: : -4; Percent of seats unfilled: : 2.
Fiscal year: : 1997; Seats
available: : 207; Seats
filled: : 195; Difference: : -12; Percent of seats unfilled: : 6.
Fiscal year: : 1998; Seats
available: : 207; Seats
filled: : 202; Difference: : -5; Percent of seats unfilled: : 2.
Fiscal year: : 1999; Seats
available: : 219; Seats
filled: : 168; Difference: : -51; Percent of seats unfilled: : 23.
Fiscal year: : 2000; Seats
available: : 219; Seats
filled: : 170; Difference: : -49; Percent of seats unfilled: : 22.
Fiscal year: : 2001; Seats
available: : 219; Seats
filled: : 147; Difference: : -72; Percent of seats unfilled: : 33.
Total; Fiscal year: [Empty]; Seats
available: 1,288; Seats
filled: 1,095; Difference: -193; Percent of seats unfilled: 15.
Grand total; Fiscal year: [Empty]; Seats
available: 5,347; Seats
filled: 4,965; Difference: -382; Percent of seats unfilled: 7.
Source: Joint Forces Staff College.
[End of table]
The officers we spoke with told us that they see the importance of
completing the first phase of the joint professional military education
program perhaps because, in most services, there is a clear correlation
between completion of the first phase and promotion potential. In the
Army and the Air Force, completion of the first phase has become a
prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant colonel, if not by directive,
then at least in practice. In all services, completion of the first
phase, whether or not it is an absolute requirement, is looked upon
favorably, at the very least, for promotion purposes.
The officers we surveyed provided mixed responses when we asked them
about their observations of the second phase of the program at the
Joint Forces Staff College. Of the 184 officers in our survey who had
completed the second phase of the program, 11 percent responded that
attending the second phase was important to a very great extent, 33
percent responded that attending the second phase was important to a
great extent, and 33 percent responded that attending the second phase
was important to a moderate extent. About 24 percent of the officers
who had completed the second phase responded that attending the second
phase was important to a little or no extent. In focus group
discussions, these officers said that the program is too long,
redundant with the first phase of joint education, and of little added
value. Some of these officers also said that the second phase of the
program only had value for officers who were interested in being
appointed to the general and flag officer grades in their future.
Officers from all the services and pay grades in our focus groups
agreed that, if an officer were to attend the second phase at all, an
officer should attend en route before reporting to a joint position.
Overall, officers at the commands we visited reported that they were
adequately prepared for their joint position but, often times, cited a
steep learning curve involved with working in their particular joint
organization. Officers in over one-half of the focus groups we
conducted said that they were most prepared for their joint positions
because (1) they were serving in joint positions that drew upon their
tactical level primary military occupation skills; (2) their military
occupation, by nature, was oriented toward joint matters (e.g.,
communications, intelligence, special operations, foreign affairs);
(3) they had previously served in a joint or staff position; or (4)
they had attended both phases of the joint education program. Officers
who responded that they were least prepared said that they were serving
in joint positions unrelated to their military occupations or that they
lacked familiarity of joint structures or organization, systems, and
processes.
General and flag officers with whom we spoke also provided mixed
responses. While the senior officers talked about the strengths and
importance of the joint education, some senior officers told us that
they did not check the records of the officers serving under them to
see whether the officers had attended the second phase of the joint
professional military education program and that they did not view this
lack of education as an issue.
DOD Assigning Officers to Joint Positions but Unable to Fill Critical
Positions:
The act contains a number of provisions affecting the assignment of
officers to joint positions. These provisions include (1) the
percentage of graduates of the National Defense University schools who
must be assigned to joint duty, (2) the number of joint critical
positions that must be filled by designated joint specialty officers,
and (3) the percentage of positions on the joint duty assignment list
that must be filled by joint specialty officers or joint specialty
officer nominees.
Assignment of National Defense University Graduates:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act established specific requirements for DOD to
assign officers who attended a joint professional military education
school to joint positions after graduation.[Footnote 16] Placement of
these graduates in joint positions was intended to help DOD realize the
full benefit of education provided by all three joint colleges. First,
DOD must send more than 50 percent of the officers who are not joint
specialists to a joint position upon graduation from a joint
professional military school.[Footnote 17] Table 2 shows that DOD has
exceeded this requirement since fiscal year 1996.
Table 2: Placement of Non-Joint Specialty Officers after Graduation
from Joint Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal Years
1996 through 2001:
Fiscal year: 1996; Number of graduates: 1,133; Number of graduates
placed in joint assignments: 937; Percent of graduates placed in joint
assignments: 82.
Fiscal year: 1997; Number of graduates: 1,114; Number of graduates
placed in joint assignments: 938; Percent of graduates placed in joint
assignments: 84.
Fiscal year: 1998; Number of graduates: 1,134; Number of graduates
placed in joint assignments: 934; Percent of graduates placed in joint
assignments: 82.
Fiscal year: 1999; Number of graduates: 1,069; Number of graduates
placed in joint assignments: 874; Percent of graduates placed in joint
assignments: 82.
Fiscal year: 2000; Number of graduates: 1,058; Number of graduates
placed in joint assignments: 896; Percent of graduates placed in joint
assignments: 85.
Fiscal year: 2001; Number of graduates: 998; Number of graduates placed
in joint assignments: 857; Percent of graduates placed in joint
assignments: 86.
Fiscal year: Total; Number of graduates: 6,506; Number of graduates
placed in joint assignments: 5,436; Percent of graduates placed in
joint assignments: 84.
Source: The Joint Staff.
[End of table]
Second, DOD must assign all joint specialty officers who graduate from
joint professional military education schools, including the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces and the National War College, to joint
positions upon graduation unless a waiver is granted.[Footnote 18]
Table 3 shows that 140 joint specialty officers graduated from one of
these schools in the past 6 years and that DOD did not place 35
officers, or 25 percent, into joint positions. DOD officials explained
that the primary reason that these officers were given allowable
waivers was because they had received orders to command assignments
within their own service.
Table 3: Placement of Joint Specialty Officers after Graduation from
Joint Professional Military Education Schools for Fiscal Years 1996
through 2001:
Fiscal year: 1996; Joint specialty officer graduating: 21; Number
placed in joint assignments: 16; Number not placed in joint
assignments: 5; Percent of officers not placed in joint assignments
after graduating: 24.
Fiscal year: 1997; Joint specialty officer graduating: 22; Number
placed in joint assignments: 17; Number not placed in joint
assignments: 5; Percent of officers not placed in joint assignments
after graduating: 23.
Fiscal year: 1998; Joint specialty officer graduating: 26; Number
placed in joint assignments: 22; Number not placed in joint
assignments: 4; Percent of officers not placed in joint assignments
after graduating: 15.
Fiscal year: 1999; Joint specialty officer graduating: 25; Number
placed in joint assignments: 11; Number not placed in joint
assignments: 14; Percent of officers not placed in joint assignments
after graduating: 56.
Fiscal year: 2000; Joint specialty officer graduating: 22; Number
placed in joint assignments: 19; Number not placed in joint
assignments: 3; Percent of officers not placed in joint assignments
after graduating: 14.
Fiscal year: 2001; Joint specialty officer graduating: 24; Number
placed in joint assignments: 20; Number not placed in joint
assignments: 4; Percent of officers not placed in joint assignments
after graduating: 17.
Fiscal year: Total; Joint specialty officer graduating: 140; Number
placed in joint assignments: 105; Number not placed in joint
assignments: 35; Percent of officers not placed in joint assignments
after graduating: 25.
Source: The Joint Staff.
[End of table]
Assignment to Critical Joint Duty Positions:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as amended, further requires DOD to
designate at least 800 joint positions as critical joint duty
positions[Footnote 19]--positions where the duties and
responsibilities are such that it is highly important that officers
assigned to the positions are particularly trained in, and oriented
toward, joint matters. DOD has met this requirement and has designated
808 positions as critical joint duty positions. However, DOD is also
required to place only joint specialty officers in these positions
unless the Secretary exercises his waiver authority.[Footnote 20] DOD
has increasingly used its waiver authority to meet this requirement.
The percentage of critical joint duty positions that were filled by
officers other than joint specialty officers has steadily increased
from 9 percent in fiscal year 1996 to 38 percent in fiscal year 2001.
In fiscal year 2001, DOD was not able to fill 311 of its critical joint
duty positions with joint specialty officers. In addition, DOD has left
other critical joint duty positions vacant. The percentage of unfilled
critical joint duty positions has steadily increased from 8 percent in
fiscal year 1989 to 22 percent in fiscal year 2001. Therefore, only 331
positions, or 41 percent, of the 808 critical joint duty positions were
filled by joint specialty officers in fiscal year 2001. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of vacant and filled critical joint duty positions by
joint specialty officers and non-joint specialty officers during fiscal
years 1989 through 2001.
Figure 2: Distribution of Vacant and Filled Critical Joint Positions
during Fiscal Years 1989 through 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The services fill these critical joint positions with officers who have
both the joint specialty designation and the appropriate primary
military skill, any additional required skills, and pay grade. However,
when (1) no joint specialty officer with the other requisite skills is
available for assignment (e.g., pay grade and military occupation) or
(2) the best-qualified candidate is not a joint specialty officer, a
waiver must be approved to fill the position with an otherwise
qualified officer. Service and Joint Staff officials explained that
DOD‘s inability to fill a critical position with a joint specialty
officer may be due to the fact that the critical joint duty position
description may not reflect the commander‘s needs at the time the
position is filled. These officials told us that the most frequently
cited reason for requesting an allowable waiver was because the
commander believed that the best-qualified officer for the position was
not a joint specialty officer.
In addition, DOD‘s population of joint specialty officers may not be
sufficient to meet this requirement. By fiscal year 1990, DOD had
designated just over 12,000 officers, who already had the joint
education and experience, as joint specialty officers. However, DOD
experienced a 56 percent decrease in its joint specialty officers
between fiscal years 1990 and 1997 and has experienced moderate
decreases in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Officials on the Joint Staff
attributed the decreases in the early years to the fact that the
attrition of officers who received the designation in fiscal year 1990
has exceeded the number of new designations of joint specialty
officers. DOD officials also projected that they would need to
designate approximately 800 new joint specialty officers each year to
maintain its current population. Since fiscal year 1990, however, DOD
has only met this projection in 3 of the last 4 fiscal years. Figure 3
shows the number of new designations of joint specialty officers each
year and the total number of joint specialty officers for fiscal years
1990 through 2001.
Figure 3: Number of Officers Designated Annually as Joint Specialty
Officers and Total Number of Joint Specialty Officers for Fiscal Years
1990 through 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Officials told us that DOD has been selective in nominating and
designating officers for the joint specialty because of the promotion
objectives specified in the law. Officials noted that as a result, the
population of joint specialty officers has been small. The act requires
the services to promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate
not less than the rate of officers being promoted who are serving on,
or have served on, the headquarters staff of their service.[Footnote
21] This higher promotion standard is applied to joint specialty
officers from the time they receive the joint specialty designation
until they are considered for or promoted to pay grade O-6. DOD sought
relief from this provision and, in December 2001, Congress reduced the
standard for 3 years. During this 3-year period, the services are to
promote joint specialty officers at a rate not less than the promotion
rates of all other officers being promoted from the same military
service, pay grade, and competitive category. Currently, about 2,700
officers meet the joint specialty officer qualifications but have not
been designated, and DOD, given this change in the law, is in the
process of designating these officers. Once they are designated, DOD
will have a population of about 7,600 joint specialty officers.
Assignment to Joint Duty Assignment List Positions:
The act also requires DOD to fill approximately 50 percent of all of
the joint positions on the joint duty assignment list either with fully
qualified joint specialty officers or with officers who have been
nominated for that designation.[Footnote 22] Although the act does not
establish specific numerical requirements, it does require that the
number should be large enough so that approximately one-half of the
joint positions in pay grades O-4 and above will be filled by officers
who are joint specialty officers or nominees who meet certain
requirements. Because the act does not require DOD to report these data
to Congress and DOD has not maintained historical data on the
percentage of joint positions filled by either fully qualified joint
specialty officers or joint specialty officer nominees, we were not
able to measure progress. Nevertheless, we did ask DOD to provide us
with data for a point in time. Table 4 shows that more than 70 percent
of the officers who served in joint positions in July 2002 were joint
specialty officers or nominees.
Table 4: Officers Filling Joint Duty Positions in July 2002 Who Are
Joint Specialty Nominees or Joint Specialty Officers:
Service: Army; Number of officers who are joint specialty officer
nominees: 1,466; Number of officers who are joint specialty officers:
381; Total number of filled joint positions: 2,493; Percent of joint
positions filled by joint specialty officers or nominees: 74.
Service: Air Force; Number of officers who are joint specialty officer
nominees: 1,491; Number of officers who are joint specialty officers:
314; Total number of filled joint positions: 2,620; Percent of joint
positions filled by joint specialty officers or nominees: 69.
Service: Marine Corps; Number of officers who are joint specialty
officer nominees: 318; Number of officers who are joint specialty
officers: 49; Total number of filled joint positions: 479; Percent of
joint positions filled by joint specialty officers or nominees: 77.
Service: Navy; Number of officers who are joint specialty officer
nominees: 1,024; Number of officers who are joint specialty officers:
196; Total number of filled joint positions: 1,638; Percent of joint
positions filled by joint specialty officers or nominees: 74.
Service: Total; Number of officers who are joint specialty officer
nominees: 4,299; Number of officers who are joint specialty officers:
940; Total number of filled joint positions: 7,230; Percent of joint
positions filled by joint specialty officers or nominees: 72.
Source: GAO‘s analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
We note, however, that DOD met this requirement by relying heavily on
joint specialty officer nominees who filled more than 80 percent of the
positions being filled by joint specialty officers or joint specialty
officer nominees. This ranged from 79 percent in the Army to 87 percent
in the Marine Corps. Comparable figures for the Air Force and the Navy
are 83 percent and 84 percent, respectively.
DOD Promoting Officers with Joint Experience with Mixed Results:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion requirements and
objectives for officers being selected for appointment to the general
or flag officer pay grade and for mid-grade officers who are serving or
have served in joint positions.
General and Flag Officer Promotions:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act set a requirement that officers must complete
a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or receive a waiver,
prior to being selected for appointment to the general or flag officer
pay grade. The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for (1)
officers when the selection is necessary for the good of the service;
(2) officers with scientific and technical qualifications for which
joint requirements do not exist; (3) medical officers, dental officers,
veterinary officers, medical service officers, nurses, biomedical
science officers, chaplains, or judge advocates; (4) officers who had
served at least 180 days in a joint assignment at the time the
selection board convened and the officer‘s total consecutive service in
joint duty positions within that immediate organization is not less
than 2 years; and (5) officers who served in a joint assignment prior
to 1987 that involved significant duration of not less than 12
months.[Footnote 23]
As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has been promoting more officers who had
the requisite joint experience to the general and flag officer pay
grades than it did in fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2001, however,
DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to
promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. Figure 4 shows
that the percentage of officers who were selected for promotion to the
general and flag officer pay grades, and who had previous joint
experience, rose from 51 percent in fiscal year 1995 to 80 percent in
fiscal year 1999. Conversely, DOD‘s reliance on waivers decreased from
49 percent in fiscal year 1995 to
20 percent in fiscal year 1999. Figure 4 also shows, however, that DOD
experienced slight increases in its use of promotion waivers in fiscal
years 2000 and 2001.
Figure 4: Percentage of Officers Promoted to General or Flag Rank with
Joint Experience between Fiscal Years 1995 and 2001:
[See PDF for image]
Note: DOD did not report this information in this format prior to
fiscal year 1995.
[End of figure]
DOD‘s reliance on good-of-the-service waivers,[Footnote 24] in
particular, to promote officers who had not previously served in joint
positions is one indicator of how DOD is promoting its senior
leadership. The service secretaries request use of this waiver
authority when they believe they have sound justification for promoting
an officer who (1) has not completed a full tour of duty in a joint
position and (2) does not qualify for promotion through one of the
other four specific waivers. We analyzed the extent to which DOD has
relied on this waiver category to promote its senior officers because
these waivers apply most directly to the population of general and flag
officers who are likely to be assigned to senior leadership positions
in the joint organizations.[Footnote 25] The Secretary of Defense has
also paid particular attention to this waiver category and, in 2000,
established a policy that restricts the use of good-of-the-service
waivers to 10 percent of total promotions to the general and flag
officer pay grades each year.[Footnote 26]
DOD approved 185 good-of-the-service waivers, representing 11 percent
of the 1,658 promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades,
between fiscal years 1989 and 2001. Specifically, DOD approved 10 or
more good-of-the-service waivers each year between fiscal years 1989
and 1998 and only 3 to 7 waivers in fiscal years 1999 through 2001. DOD
relied most heavily on good-of-the-service waivers in fiscal year 1995,
when it approved 25 waivers, and used them on a decreasing basis
between fiscal years 1995 and 1999. In fiscal year 1999, DOD approved
just 3 good-of-the service waivers. In the 2 years since the Secretary
of Defense issued limitations on the use of these waivers, DOD has used
them in about 5 percent of its promotions. Figure 5 shows the extent to
which DOD has used good-of-the-service waivers between fiscal years
1989 and 2001.
Figure 5: Good-of-the-Service Waiver Usage for Fiscal Years 1989
through 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
For most appointments to the general and flag level made after
September 30, 2007, officers will have to meet the requirements
expected of a joint specialty officer.[Footnote 27] This means that
most officers, in addition to completing a full tour of duty in a joint
position, will also have to complete DOD‘s joint education program as
well.[Footnote 28] Our analysis of the 124 officers promoted in fiscal
year 2001 showed that 58 officers, or 47 percent, had not fulfilled the
joint specialty officer requirements. These 58 officers included 18 of
43 officers promoted in the Air Force, 18 of 40 officers promoted in
the Army, 19 of 33 officers promoted in the Navy, and 3 of the 8
officers promoted in the Marine Corps.
Mid-grade Officer Promotions:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act also established promotion policy objectives
for officers serving in pay grades O-4 and above who (1) are serving on
or have served on the Joint Staff, (2) are designated as joint
specialty officers, and (3) are serving in or have served in other
joint positions. DOD has been most successful in achieving its
promotion objectives for officers assigned to the Joint Staff, but it
has made less significant progress in achieving the promotion
objectives for officers in the other two categories.[Footnote 29]
(Appendix III provides detailed promotion data.):
DOD has been most successful in meeting the promotion objective set for
officers assigned to the Joint Staff. The act established an
expectation that officers who are serving or have served on the Joint
Staff be promoted, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate of
officers who are serving or have served in their service
headquarters.[Footnote 30] Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD met
its promotion objectives for officers assigned to the Joint Staff in 43
out of 68 promotion groups, or 63 percent of the time. Between fiscal
years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 55 out of 60 promotion
groups, or 92 percent of the time.
DOD has also made improvements in meeting its promotion objective for
joint specialty officers. The act established an expectation that joint
specialty officers, as a group, be promoted at a rate not less than the
rate of officers who are serving or have served in their service
headquarters.[Footnote 31] Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD met
this promotion objective in 26 of 52 promotion groups, or 50 percent of
the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met the promotion
objective in 37 out of 50 promotion groups, or 74 percent of the time.
Where DOD did not meet its promotion objective was somewhat random and
we were not able to attribute problem areas to specific pay grades or
services. As we noted earlier, this standard has been temporarily
reduced, and, through December 2004, DOD is required to promote joint
specialty officers, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate for
other officers in the same service, pay grade, and competitive
category. We also compared the promotion rates of joint specialty
officers against this lower standard and found that, with few
exceptions, DOD would have met this standard between fiscal years 1988
and 2001.
DOD has made less significant improvement in meeting its promotion
objective for officers assigned to other joint organizations.[Footnote
32] The act established an expectation that officers who are serving or
have served in joint positions be promoted, as a group, at a rate not
less than the rate for all officers in their service.[Footnote 33]
Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD met its promotion objective in
41 out of 82 promotion groups, or 50 percent of the time. Between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 60 out of 84
promotion groups, or 71 percent of the time. With few exceptions during
the last 7 years, all services are meeting the promotion objective for
their officers being promoted to the O-5 pay grade who are assigned to
the other joint organizations. However, the services have had
significant difficulty meeting the promotion objectives for their
officers being promoted to the O-6 pay grade. For example, the Navy has
failed to meet this objective for its O-6 officers since fiscal year
1988, and the Army has only met this promotion objective twice--in
fiscal years 1995 and 2001--since fiscal year 1988. The Air Force has
generally met this objective for its officers at the O-6 pay grade, but
it has not met this objective in the past 4 years. Conversely, the
Marine Corps had difficulty in meeting this promotion objective for its
officers at the O-6 pay grade between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, but
it met this objective in every year until fiscal year 2001.
Lack of a Strategic Approach Is Contributing to DOD‘s Difficulties to
Fully Respond to the Act‘s Intent:
A significant impediment affecting DOD‘s ability to fully realize the
cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has
not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters.
For example, DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers
it needs, and the four services have emphasized joint officer
development to varying degrees. In addition, DOD has not yet, within a
total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint
development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations-
-despite the fact that it is increasingly relying on reservists to
carry out its mission. Moreover, DOD has not been tracking certain data
in a consistent manner that would help DOD measure its progress in
following a strategy to meet the act‘s overall objectives and its own
goals as well.
DOD Lacks a Strategic Plan Regarding Joint Officer Development:
DOD has issued a number of publications, directives, and policy papers
regarding joint officer development. However, it has not developed a
strategic plan that establishes clear goals for officer development in
joint matters and links those goals to DOD‘s overall mission and goals.
This lack of an overarching vision or strategy will continue to hamper
DOD‘s ability to make continued progress in this area. A well-developed
human capital strategy would provide a means for aligning all elements
of DOD‘s human capital management, including joint officer development,
with its broader organizational objectives. Professional military
education and joint assignments are tools that an organization can use
to shape its officer workforce, fill gaps, and meet future
requirements.
In prior reports and testimony, we identified strategic human capital
management planning as a governmentwide high-risk area and a key area
of challenge.[Footnote 34] We stated that agencies, including DOD, need
to develop integrated human capital strategies that support the
organizations‘ strategic and programmatic goals. In March 2002, we
issued an exposure draft of our model for strategic human capital
management to help federal agency leaders effectively lead and manage
their people.[Footnote 35] We also testified on how strategic human
capital management can contribute to transforming the cultures of
federal agencies.[Footnote 36]
Several DOD studies have also identified the need for a more strategic
approach to human capital planning within DOD. The 8th Quadrennial
Review of Military Compensation, completed in 1997, strongly advocated
that DOD adopt a strategic human capital planning approach. The review
found that DOD lacked an institutionwide process for systematically
examining human capital needs or translating needs into a coherent
strategy. Subsequent DOD and service studies, including the Defense
Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy and the Naval
Personnel Task Force, endorsed the concept of human capital strategic
planning.
DOD‘s Joint Vision 2020 portrays a future in which the armed forces are
’fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally,
doctrinally, and technically.“ To exploit emerging technologies and to
respond to diverse threats and new enemy capabilities requires
increasingly agile, flexible, and responsive organizations. The vision
requires the services to reexamine traditional criteria governing span
of control and organizational layers; to develop organizational
climates that reward critical thinking, encourage competition of ideas,
and reduce barriers to innovation; to develop empowered individual
warfighters; and to generate and reinforce specific behaviors such as
judgment, creativity, adaptability, initiative, teamwork, commitment,
and innovative strategic and operational thinking.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act not only defined new duty positions and
educational requirements but also envisioned a new culture that is
truly oriented toward joint matters. The key question, today, is how
does DOD best seize the opportunity and build on current momentum. In
April 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued the Military
Personnel Human Resource Strategic Plan to establish the military
priorities for the next several years. The new military personnel
strategy captures the DOD leadership‘s guidance regarding aspects of
managing human capital, but the strategy‘s linkage to the overall
mission and programmatic goals is not stated. DOD‘s human capital
strategy does not address the vision cited in Joint Vision 2020. DOD‘s
human capital approach to joint officer development--if it were linked
to its overall mission--would emphasize individuals with the knowledge,
skills, and abilities needed to function in the joint environment.
Number of Joint Specialty Officers Needed Unknown:
DOD has not fully assessed how many joint specialty officers it
actually needs. As we have previously shown, the number of joint
specialty officers has decreased by almost 60 percent over the years,
and DOD has a significant backlog of officers who, although otherwise
qualified, have not been designated as joint specialty officers.
Moreover, without knowing how many joint specialty officers it needs,
DOD‘s joint professional military education system may not be
structured or targeted properly. For example, without first defining
how many officers should be joint specialty officers--all officers,
most officers, or only those needed to fill joint positions--DOD has
not been able to determine the number of joint professional military
education graduates it needs. Although we have already noted that there
are many vacant seats at the Joint Forces Staff College, DOD does not
know if the total number of available seats is sufficient to meet its
needs or if it will need to explore alternatives for providing joint
education to greater numbers of officers.
Furthermore, comments from officers we surveyed at various commands
demonstrate that they place different values on the importance of the
joint specialty designation. Overall, officers told us that they viewed
their assignment to a joint position as a positive experience and that
their services also saw joint assignments as valuable career moves.
Moreover, 51 percent of the officers surveyed responded that an
assignment to a joint position is a defined aspect of their career
path. Responses ranged from 57 percent in the Air Force, to 52 percent
in the Army, 47 percent in the Navy, and 29 percent in the Marine
Corps. However, many officers also told us that they were reluctant to
seek the joint specialty designation. Their concern was that they would
be flagged as joint specialty officers and, accordingly, be reassigned
to subsequent tours of duty within joint organizations. They were
concerned about the need to balance the requirements of already crowded
service career paths and the expectation to serve in joint
organizations. Their ultimate concern was that multiple joint
assignments would take them away from service assignments for too great
a period and that this time away could adversely affect their career
progression and promotion potential. The officers responded that the
joint specialty officer designation was not really important for the
rank and
file--but really only important for those who were going to be admirals
and generals. In other words, these officers believed that the need to
meet service expectations seemed to override any advantages that the
joint specialty officer designation might provide. Our survey and more
detailed responses to that survey are presented in appendix IV.
Service Emphasis on Joint Education and Assignments Varies:
Each of the four services has been assigning officers in pay grades O-
4 through O-6 to joint organizations and, as of fiscal year 2002, about
50 percent of the services‘ mid-level officers had served in at least
one joint assignment. The percentage of officers who served in a joint
position ranged from 46 percent in the Navy and the Marine Corps to 52
percent and 57 percent in the Air Force and the Army, respectively.
Data--including some that we have already presented--however, suggest
that the four services continue to struggle to balance joint
requirements against their own service needs and vary in the degree of
importance that they place on joint education, assignments, and
promotions. The Air Force, for example, filled 16 more than its 1,983
allocated seats at the Joint Forces Staff College between fiscal years
1996 and 2001. During that 6-year period, the Air Force actually
surpassed its collective allocation by
1 percent. The Marine Corps left 13 of its 316 allocated seats, or 4
percent, unfilled during those same fiscal years. Also during that time
period, the Army left 192 of 1,760 seats, or 11 percent, unfilled and
the Navy left 193 of 1,288 allocated seats, or 15 percent, unfilled.
Accordingly, the Air Force has been able to send a higher percentage of
its officers to a joint position after the officers attend a joint
professional military education school. In fiscal year 2001, for
example, 44 percent of Air Force officers serving in joint positions
had previously attended a joint professional military education school.
In contrast, 38 percent of Army officers and 33 percent of Navy and
Marine Corps officers serving in joint positions had attended a joint
professional military education school prior to their joint
assignments. This difference can be largely attributed to the fact that
the Air Force sends a higher percentage of its officers at the O-4 pay
grade to the Joint Forces Staff College.
Promotion statistics also suggest differences among the services. As we
noted earlier, the Navy did not meet the pay grade O-6 promotion
objective for officers serving in joint organizations other than the
Joint Staff, and who are not joint specialty officers, between fiscal
years 1988 and 2001. The Army met this objective 2 times, the Marine
Corps met it 6 times, and the Air Force met it 10 times in the 14-year
period. Our analysis of general and flag officer promotions showed
that, between fiscal years 1995 and 2000, the Marine Corps used good-
of-the service waivers to promote
19 percent of its officers to brigadier general. The Army used this
waiver authority for 17 percent of its promotions, and the Navy used
the authority for 13 percent of its promotions. In contrast, the Air
Force only approved one good-of-the-service waiver during that time
period.
Development of Reserve Officers in Joint Positions Not Fully Realized:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that the Secretary of Defense should
establish personnel policies for reserve officers that emphasize
education and experience in joint matters.[Footnote 37] A recent
congressionally-sponsored study concluded, however, that DOD has not
yet met this requirement and that DOD‘s reserve components lack
procedures to identify and track positions that will provide reserve
officers with the knowledge and experience that come from working with
other services and from joint operations.[Footnote 38] Providing
education in joint matters to reservists has become increasingly
important since 1986, given that DOD has increasingly relied on
reservists in the conduct of its mission. When the act was enacted,
reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that would
supplement active forces during a major war. Since then the Cold War
has ended and a shift has occurred in the way DOD uses the reserve
forces. Today, no significant military operation can be conducted
without reserve involvement. In addition, the current mobilization for
the war on terrorism is adding to this increased use and is expected to
last a long time. A few of the officers who attended our focus groups
were, in fact, reservists serving on active duty in joint commands. We
excluded their responses, however, since the educational and experience
requirements for joint officers do not directly apply to reserve
officers and, as indicated above, the Secretary of Defense has not as
yet issued personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in
joint matters for reserve officers as required by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act. Nevertheless, many of the active duty officers we spoke with
raised the issue of providing education to reservists.
We interviewed officers at several joint organizations and found that
reservists are serving in positions at all levels from the Chief of
Staff at one command down to the mid-grade officer positions. Moreover,
DOD has identified 2,904 additional positions that it will fill with
reservists when it operates under mobilized conditions. All of this
suggests that reservists can be assigned to joint positions without the
benefit of joint education.
In 1995, the Office of the DOD Inspector General recommended that DOD
develop policy guidance that provides for the necessary training and
education of reserve component officers assigned to joint
organizations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness concurred with this recommendation. In 1997, we reported that
DOD officials noted that many details needed to be resolved. For
example, they said that, since reservists typically perform duties on
an intermittent or part-time basis, it is difficult for reservists to
find the time to attend the 3-month second phase of the joint education
program. Reservists also cannot be readily assigned to locations
outside of their reserve unit area, thus limiting their availability
for joint education. Another concern raised by a DOD official was that
if the education and experience requirements for reservists are too
stringent, the available pool of reservists who can meet them will be
limited, thereby denying joint duty assignments to many highly
qualified personnel. During our review, officials on the Joint Staff
told us that DOD recently completed a pilot program that considered
alternatives for providing joint education to reservists. DOD officials
anticipate that they will be able to deliver joint education to
reservists through distance-learning beginning in fiscal year 2004.
Difficult to Measure Progress due to Variations in Data Tracking
Methods:
DOD has a wealth of information to support its implementation of
provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and it has been collecting
data and submitting annual reports to Congress in accordance with the
act‘s reporting requirements. However, in cases where the act does not
require DOD to report data, DOD has not tracked meaningful information
that it needs in order to fully assess its progress. For example, DOD
has not kept historical data on the number of positions in joint
organizations that are filled with joint specialty officers and joint
specialty officer nominees. Without trend data, DOD and others cannot
assess the degree to which DOD is properly targeting its joint
education program or foresee problematic trends as they arise. Also,
when we attempted to identify the number of officers who have completed
both phases of the joint education program, DOD officials told us that
they did not have fully reliable data because the services do not
consistently maintain and enter such information into their databases.
Furthermore, DOD does not track the degree to which reservists are
filling joint positions. Given that DOD plans to offer joint education
to reservists and that reservists are serving in joint positions,
tracking this type of data would help DOD identify reservists who have
joint education and experience during mobilizations.
Effective organizations link human capital approaches to their overall
mission and programmatic goals. An organization‘s human capital
approaches should be designed, implemented, and assessed by the
standard of how well they help an organization pursue its mission and
achieve desired results or outcomes. High-performing organizations use
data to determine key performance objectives and goals that enable them
to evaluate the success of their human capital approaches. Collecting
and analyzing data are fundamental building blocks for measuring the
effectiveness of human capital approaches in support of the mission and
goals of the agency.
Conclusions:
DOD has taken positive steps to implement the major provisions of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act that address joint officer development. However,
DOD has not taken a strategic approach toward joint officer development
and, without a strategic plan that will address the development of the
total force in joint matters, it is more than likely that DOD will
continue to experience difficulties in the future in meeting the
provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. While DOD has made progress in
implementing provisions of the law, it has not identified how many
joint specialty officers it needs. Moreover, the fact that the four
services have emphasized the development of their officers in joint
matters to varying degrees suggests that DOD has not taken a fully
unified approach and that service parochialisms still prevail.
Addressing these points will provide DOD with data it needs to
determine whether it has the resources or capacity to deliver its two-
phased joint education program to all of the active duty officers who
need it. Furthermore, although DOD is increasingly relying upon its
reserve forces, including using reserves in some of its key joint
positions, it has not fully assessed how it will develop its reserve
officers in joint matters. Finally, DOD has not been consistent in
tracking key indicators since enactment of the act in 1986. A strategic
plan that is designed appropriately will help DOD assess progress made
toward meeting the act‘s specific objectives and overall intent
regarding joint officer development.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Because the services lack the guidance they need to undertake a unified
approach that will address the development of the total force in joint
matters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a strategic
plan that links joint officer development to DOD‘s overall mission and
goals. At a minimum, this plan should (1) identify the number of joint
specialty officers needed, (2) include provisions for the education and
assignment of reservists who are serving in joint organizations, and
(3) be developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data
to track progress made against the plan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested written comments from the Department of Defense, but none
were provided. However, the Office of the Vice Director, Joint Staff,
did provide us with DOD‘s oral comments in which DOD partially
concurred with our recommendation that it develop a strategic plan that
links joint officer development to DOD‘s overall mission and goals. DOD
stated that its ability to develop a strategic plan, that would improve
DOD‘s capability to conduct successful joint operations, is limited by
the current legislation that specifies 1) quotas that artificially
drive the production of joint specialty officers, 2) requirements that
limit the availability of the second phase of DOD‘s joint education
program, and 3) post-education requirements that make advance planning
for joint education difficult. DOD added that it views provisions in
the
act as impediments that must be removed before it can develop an
effective strategic plan. Our report recognizes that DOD is required
to comply with numerous provisions in the act that address the
education,
assignment, and promotion of officers in joint matters. While we
recognize that DOD must be mindful of these provisions as it attempts
to develop a strategic plan, we do not believe that the act‘s
provisions prohibit DOD from developing a strategic plan to achieve its
goals. We believe that DOD will not be able to demonstrate that changes
to the law are needed unless it first develops a strategic plan that
identifies the department‘s goals and objectives for joint officer
development and produces empirical data to support needed changes.
In response to our recommendation that DOD develop a strategic plan
that identifies the number of joint specialty officers needed, DOD
asserted that numerical quotas prevent it from pursuing a strategic
approach to joint officer development that is based on true joint
specialty requirements. Instead, DOD stated that it will produce about
1,000 joint specialty officers each year in order to satisfy the law.
However, the statute does, in fact, provide some flexibility and
permits the Secretary of Defense to determine the number of joint
specialty officers. The act only requires that approximately one-half
of the joint positions be filled at any time by officers who have
either successfully completed the joint education program or received
an allowable waiver to complete the education after their joint
assignment. DOD also asserted that officers today are more experienced
in joint matters and therefore believes that the difference between a
joint educated officer and a joint specialty officer has diminished.
During our review, officers who participated in our focus groups told
us they believe that today‘s senior leaders should have joint
experience and education. We continue to believe that, in the absence
of a strategic plan that is requirements based, DOD is not in a
position to determine whether it is producing too many or too few joint
specialty officers.
In response to our recommendation that a strategic plan should include
provisions for the education and assignment of reservists who are
serving in joint organizations, DOD stated that it has recently
finalized guidance for their development and management and is
developing a joint education program for reserve officers. However,
this guidance was not available at the time of our review. The act
states that the Secretary of Defense should establish personnel
policies for reserve officers that emphasize education and experience
in joint matters. Our report acknowledges the steps DOD is taking.
Given that reservists play an integral role within the total force, we
view these recent actions that DOD is taking to integrate reserve
officers in joint matters as positive steps.
In response to our recommendation that a strategic plan should be
developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data to track
progress made against the plan, DOD reported that it is revamping the
data system it uses to evaluate joint officer management. When
complete, DOD stated that it will have current and historical data and
that this information will be used to identify and correct
inconsistencies. We believe that a strategic plan would help DOD
identify its goals and track progress made in its joint officer
program. We view DOD‘s effort in this area as a positive step, provided
that the revamped data system gives DOD the information it needs to
better manage its joint officer program.
DOD also commented on our findings that address critical joint duty
positions, joint education, and general and flag officers promotions.
Concerning critical joint duty positions, DOD stated that it is further
inhibited from achieving its joint vision by a legislative requirement
to identify 800 critical joint duty positions and fill them with joint
specialty officers. Moreover, DOD questioned whether there is a valid
requirement for critical billets within joint organizations. DOD
believes that the essential factors that should be considered to
identify those officers who best meet the needs of a joint organization
are service competencies and expertise in a military occupational
skill. It stated that joint qualifications should be viewed as one of
many attributes that can be used. Although we did not validate the
numerical requirements for critical joint positions, we do discuss
difficulties DOD has experienced in filling these positions with joint
specialty officers. In the absence of a strategic plan that is
requirements based, we continue to believe that DOD is not in a
position to determine whether it is filling its critical billets
appropriately.
Regarding joint education, DOD stated that it realizes the value of
joint education and the importance of acculturating its officers in
joint matters. However, DOD also stated that it does not have the
flexibility it needs to educate top quality officers in joint matters.
DOD viewed the existing requirements that it must follow as inhibitors
to good personnel management and further stated that these requirements
cause some officers to miss joint education due to timing limitations.
DOD believes that, in order to develop an effective strategic plan, it
needs greater flexibility and that leveraging new educational
technologies would facilitate its ability to prepare officers for the
joint environment. Specifically, DOD asserted that, while it has the
flexibility to offer the first phase of its joint education program in
both resident and nonresident settings, it can only provide the second
phase of its joint education program in an in-resident setting, and
then must assign 50 percent of the graduates to a joint assignment. Our
report acknowledges the progress DOD has made in providing joint
education to its officers and the difficulties DOD has experienced in
providing the second phase of its joint education program. We believe,
however, that while legislative provisions address the education needed
to qualify an officer for the joint specialty, DOD is not precluded
from using new technologies and alternative venues to provide joint
education. While officers educated under alternative approaches may not
be awarded the joint specialty officer designation, these officers,
nonetheless, would be better educated in joint matters and prepared for
joint positions. We continue to believe that a strategic approach will
help DOD better identify its joint education needs.
Concerning general and flag officer promotions to pay grade O-7, DOD
acknowledged that our findings regarding waiver usage are correct.
However, DOD believed that without further analysis, our finding that
DOD still relies heavily on allowable waivers to promote one in four
officers to this level without joint experience is misleading. DOD
pointed out that a closer examination of the types of waivers used
might be a better indicator of how well it is doing. In our report, we
identify the five categories of allowable waivers. We discuss the
progress DOD has made in promoting officers with joint experience as
well as its progress in limiting its use of good-of-the-service waivers
in particular. During our review, we attempted to obtain data on the
other categories of waivers. However, DOD does not capture and report
waiver usage by the various categories in its annual reports and DOD
was not able to provide it to us at the time of our review.
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary
of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
call me at (202) 512-5140. Major contributors to this report are listed
in appendix V.
Derek B. Stewart
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Derek B. Stewart:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the steps the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to
address the education and assignment of officers in joint matters, we
initially conducted a legislative history of the act, reviewed joint
directives and publications, and analyzed data contained in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Reports that are presented as an
appendix to DOD‘s Annual Reports to the Congress for fiscal years 1988
through 2001. We also analyzed data contained in DOD‘s joint duty
assignment list database and interviewed and gathered data from
officials serving in the Manpower and Personnel Directorate within the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the
four military services headquarters. In certain cases, we analyzed data
dating back to fiscal year 1989. In other cases, we could only analyze
data going back to fiscal year 1996 due to changes in DOD‘s reporting
methods that made comparisons difficult. We used fiscal year 2001 as
our end point because that year represents the last year for which
complete annual data were available.
To assess the services‘ compliance with provisions that pertain to the
promotion of officers to the flag and general officer pay grades, we
measured the extent to which the services promoted officers with the
requisite joint experience or used allowable waivers. In addition, we
obtained and analyzed individual biographies and service histories for
each officer promoted to these senior pay grades in fiscal year 2001.
To analyze the extent to which DOD has complied with provisions that
address the promotions of mid-grade officers who are serving or have
served in joint positions, we obtained and analyzed data from the
Manpower and Personnel Directorate within the Joint Staff for fiscal
years 1988 through 2001.
To evaluate impediments affecting DOD‘s ability to fully respond to the
act‘s intent, we reviewed previously issued Department of Defense
vision statements and human resource strategic plans. We also analyzed
existing data to measure trends over time and identify the key reasons
why DOD is having difficulty in responding to the act.
We interviewed agency officials and obtained data at the following
locations:
* Manpower and Personnel Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, D.C.;
* Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Washington, D.C.;
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Policy,
Washington, D.C.;
* Air Force Education Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington,
D.C.;
* Joint Officer Management Branch, Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph
Air Force Base, Texas;
* Joint Management Branch, Army Personnel Command, Alexandria,
Virginia;
* Office of Joint Officer Management Policy Office, Naval Bureau of
Personnel, Arlington, Virginia;
* Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia;
* Personnel Management Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,
Quantico, Virginia;
* National Defense University, Washington, D.C.; and:
* Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.
To obtain the perspectives of officers serving in joint positions on
joint officer development, we surveyed 557 officers and conducted focus
group discussions with 513 officers serving in 11 different locations.
We did not conduct a random sample due to the dispersion of officers
serving in joint positions, and, therefore, cannot project from the
information the officers provided us. However, we did attempt to
include the different types of organizations in which officers serve in
joint positions by selecting the Joint Staff, three geographic
commands, two functional commands, three combined forces commands, and
two defense agencies. While the results cannot be projected, the
population of officers surveyed reflects the overall composition of the
joint duty assignment list. At each location, we administered a survey
(shown in appendix IV) and conducted focus group interviews with active
duty officers in pay grades O-4, O-5, and O-6. To gain firsthand
information from officers serving in joint duty positions, we asked
them about their joint education and assignments. We also asked them
about the value they place on (1) serving in a joint position and
(2) attaining the joint specialty officer designation. In addition, we
conducted individual interviews with senior officers and personnel
officers at the commands we visited.
We surveyed officers and conducted focus group discussions at the
following offices, commands, and agencies:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
Combined Commands
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium
Allied Forces South, Naples, Italy
U.S. Forces Korea, Seoul, Korea:
Functional Commands
Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida
Strategic Command, Omaha, Nebraska:
Geographic Commands
Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia
European Command, Stuttgart, Germany
Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii:
Defense Agencies
Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, Virginia
Defense Intelligence Agency, Arlington, Virginia:
We administered surveys, but did not conduct site visits, to officers
serving in joint positions at the following locations within the U.S.
Central Command‘s area of responsibility:
* Joint Task Force--Southwest Asia,
* Office of Military Cooperation--Egypt, and:
* U.S. Military Training--Saudi Arabia:
We conducted our review from January 2002 through October 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Demographic Data for Joint Positions:
This appendix presents information about the distribution of joint
positions in DOD‘s joint duty assignment list by organization, pay
grade, and occupational category.
Table 5 identifies the major commands and activities where joint
positions are located and the number of joint positions that were in
each command or activity in fiscal year 2001.
Table 5: Joint Positions by Major Command or Activity:
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Pacific Command; Number of positions:
923.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. European Command; Number of positions:
602.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Central Command; Number of positions:
575.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Joint Forces Command; Number of
positions: 564.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Strategic Command; Number of positions:
539.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Special Operations Command; Number of
positions: 438.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Space Command; Number of positions: 356.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Southern Command; Number of positions:
344.
Organizations/Activities: U.S. Transportation Command; Number of
positions: 242.
Organizations/Activities: North American Aerospace Defense Command;
Number of positions: 112.
Organizations/Activities: Allied and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization activities; Number of positions: 884.
Organizations/Activities: Defense Agencies; Number of positions:
1,669.
Organizations/Activities: Office of the Secretary of Defense; Number of
positions: 365.
Organizations/Activities: Miscellaneous DOD and other activities;
Number of positions: 267.
Organizations/Activities: Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; Number of
positions: 158.
Organizations/Activities: Joint Staff and miscellaneous joint
activities; Number of positions: 877.
Organizations/Activities: General and flag officer joint positions;
Number of positions: 231.
Organizations/Activities: Total; Number of positions: 9,146.
Source: GAO‘s analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
In fiscal year 2001, DOD‘s joint duty assignment list contained 9,146
joint positions for active duty officers in pay grades O-4 and above.
Figure 6 shows that 80 percent of the positions were equally divided
between the O-4 and O-5 pay grades.
Figure 6: Distribution of Joint Positions by Pay Grade:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Joint positions include a wide range of occupational categories. Figure
7 shows that, in fiscal year 2001, the single largest percentage of
joint positions fell within the category of tactics and operations.
Officers with military occupation skills such as aviation and
navigation, armor and infantry, and surface and submarine warfare serve
in this category of positions. The second largest percentage of joint
positions fell within the intelligence category. This category includes
strategic intelligence, politico-military affairs, and information
operations.
Figure 7: Distribution of Joint Positions by Occupational Categories:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Mid-Level Promotion Statistics:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion policy objectives for
three categories of mid-level officers who are serving in or have
served in joint positions. The act set expectations that these officers
be promoted at a rate not less than the promotion rate of their peers.
The services are expected to:
* promote officers who are in or have been assigned to the Joint Staff,
as a group, at a rate equal to or better than the promotion rate of
officers who are or have been assigned to their service headquarters;
* promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate equal to or
better than the promotion rate of officers who are or have been
assigned to their service headquarters; and:
* promote officers who are serving in or have served in other joint
assignments, as a group, that are not included in the previous two
categories, at a rate equal to or better than their service average
promotion rates.
For our analysis, we compared progress DOD made between fiscal years
1988 and 1994 with progress DOD made between fiscal years 1995 and
2001. For each of the three promotion categories (Joint Staff, joint
specialty officers, and officers serving in other joint positions), we
multiplied the three pay grades by the four services by the 7 years and
identified 84 potential promotion groups. We then eliminated those
groups in which no promotions occurred to identify the actual promotion
groups. We then counted the number of groups in which DOD met or
exceeded the applicable standard.
Table 6 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid-level
officers assigned to the Joint Staff in 43 out of 68 promotion groups
between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, or 63 percent of the time. Between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 55 out of 60
promotion groups, or 92 percent of the time.
Table 6: Promotion Rates for Mid-Level Officers Assigned to the Joint
Staff Compared to Officers Assigned to Their Service Headquarters
during Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Table 7 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid-level joint
specialty officers in 26 out of 52 promotion groups between fiscal
years 1988 and 1994, or 50 percent of the time. Between fiscal years
1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 37 out of 50 promotion groups,
or
74 percent of the time.
Table 7: Promotion Rates for Mid-Level Joint Specialty Officers
Compared to Promotion Rates of Officers Assigned to Their Service
Headquarters during Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
Table 8 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid-level
officers assigned to joint organizations other than the Joint Staff in
41 out of 82 promotion groups between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, or 50
percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this
objective in 60 out of 84 promotion groups, or 71 percent of the time.
Table 8: Promotion Rates for Mid-Level Officers Assigned to Other Joint
Organizations Compared to the Board Average Promotion Rate during
Fiscal Years 1988 through 2001:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Asterisks (*) indicate that the other joint officer promotion
rate was not equal to or greater than the service board average
promotion rate.
[End of table]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of DOD data.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire and Summary of Responses:
We administered a survey to 557 officers serving in joint positions
regarding their current joint duty assignment, their thoughts and
opinions on joint duty assignments in general, joint professional
military education, and other opinions regarding joint officer
management. A copy of the survey appears at the end of this summary.
Officers‘ Background:
Although the survey findings cannot be generalized to all officers
serving in joint positions, the composition of the officers in our
survey generally reflected the service and pay grade distribution in
DOD‘s joint duty assignment list. Thirty-seven percent of the officers
were in the Air Force, 33 percent were in the Army, 24 percent were in
the Navy, and about 6 percent were in the Marine Corps. Forty-seven
percent of the officers were in pay grade O-4, 35 percent were in pay
grade O-5, and 18 percent were in pay grade O-6. On average, the
officers we surveyed had 16 years of commissioned service.
We asked the officers in our survey to identify their current joint
duty position in the context of broad functional areas and types of
duties performed.
* Twenty-seven percent of the officers responded that their joint
positions fell within the functional area of strategic, tactical, or
contingency operations. Their duties involved command and control of
combat operations or combat support forces; military operations; or the
planning, development, staffing, assessment, or implementation of plans
or requirements for forces and materiel.
* Twenty-eight percent of the officers surveyed responded that their
joint positions fell within the functional area of direct or general
support or the development, staffing, or assessment of military
doctrine or policy.
* Forty-five percent of the officers responded that they were engaged
in the functional areas of education and training or administration.
They performed duties that included (1) directing, commanding, and
controlling noncombat units, organizations, or activities or:
* (2) providing general, administrative, or technical support services
to military operations.
Seventy-one percent of the officers we surveyed were serving in their
first joint duty position in the joint duty assignment list. Twenty-one
percent of the officers were in their second joint duty position, and
the remaining 8 percent were serving in their third joint duty
position.
Officers‘ Views on Joint Assignments:
Most officers (85 percent) responded that their service had clearly
defined the career path for their military occupation. On the other
hand, just over half (51percent) of the officers responded that a joint
assignment was a clearly defined component of their career path and
about 35 percent of the officers responded that a joint duty assignment
was not a well-defined aspect of their career path. (Fourteen percent
of the officers responded that they were unsure.):
Most officers (70 percent) responded that a joint duty assignment was
beneficial to their career to a moderate or very great extent, while
about 19 percent responded that a joint duty assignment was beneficial
only to a little extent. The remaining 7 percent of the officers
responded that a joint duty assignment was not beneficial to their
careers. We asked the officers to identify the greatest incentive for
serving in a joint position. The most common response offered by Army,
Air Force, and Marine Corps officers was that joint duty assignments
broadened their experience, perspective, and knowledge of the
multiservice and multinational environment. The most common response
offered by officers in the Navy was that joint duty assignments
enhanced their promotion potential and professional development.
Conversely, when we asked officers to provide their opinion regarding
the greatest disincentive to serving in a joint duty position, officers
in all of the services cited the time they spent in a joint position
that took them away from their service.
Officers‘ Views of Phase I of DOD‘s Joint Professional Military
Education Program:
Seventy-seven percent of the officers we surveyed had attended the
first phase of DOD‘s joint professional military education program.
Among those who had attended the first phase, 56 percent completed it
at one of the professional military education schools and 44 percent
completed Phase I through a nonresident program.
Most officers (59 percent) responded that the first phase of the joint
education program was beneficial to their careers to a great or
moderate extent. Sixty-three percent of the officers responded that it
was important to a great or moderate extent to complete the first phase
of the joint education prior to serving in a joint position. Sixty-six
percent of the officers believed that the first phase of the joint
education increased their effectiveness in their joint position.
Officers in all services responded that the first phase of the joint
education provided a foundation of joint knowledge--a first exposure to
joint doctrine, other service‘s methods, and the operational and
strategic levels of war-fighting.
Officers‘ Views of Phase II of DOD‘s Joint Professional Military
Education Program:
Thirty-six percent of the officers we surveyed said that they had
attended the second phase of DOD‘s joint professional military
education program. The majority of these officers had attended the
Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia (92 percent), while
significantly smaller percentages had attended the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces (5 percent) and the National War College (3
percent).
Sixty-four percent of the officers had not completed the second phase
of the joint professional military education program and the
overwhelming majority (86 percent) of these officers reported that they
would not likely attend the second phase before the end of their
current joint duty assignment. Officers in all services cited timing,
budget, and logistics issues as reasons for not attending the second
phase after reporting to a joint assignment. They added their views
that neither the losing nor gaining command wanted to be responsible
for funding the education.
About 60 percent of the officers responded that it was important to
complete the second phase of the joint professional military education
program prior to serving in a joint assignment and that this education
would increase an officer‘s effectiveness in a joint position. Slightly
fewer officers (56 percent) responded that the second phase of the
joint education program was beneficial to their careers.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Brenda S. Farrell (202) 512-3604:
Acknowledgments:
In addition, Ann M. Asleson, James R. Bancroft, Larry J. Bridges,
Jocelyn O. Cortese, Herbert I. Dunn, Jack E. Edwards, Alicia E.
Johnson, David E. Moser, Krislin M. Nalwalk, Madelon B. Savaides, and
Susan K. Woodward contributed to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. 99-433, Oct. 1, 1986.
[2] Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020,
Washington, D.C.
[3] The Goldwater-Nichols Act uses the term joint duty assignment. For
the purposes of this report, we use the term joint positions.
[4] Congress defined joint matters as those matters relating to the
integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters
relating to national military strategy, strategic planning and
contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations
under unified command. 10 U.S.C. sec. 668.
[5] There are four methods for an officer to be selected for the joint
specialty: (1) An officer completes joint professional military
education and subsequently serves in a joint position; (2) An officer
who has a military occupational specialty that is a critical
occupational specialty involving combat operations, serves in a joint
position, and then completes the joint professional military education
program; (3) An officer serves in a joint position and then completes
the joint professional military education, provided the Secretary of
Defense determines a waiver is in the interest of sound personnel
management; and (4) An officer completes two joint assignments and the
Secretary of Defense waives the joint education requirement. A
numerical limitation on the last two waivers is specified in the law.
10 U.S.C. sec. 661.
[6] 10 U.S.C. secs. 619a (b), 661 (c)(3) (and) (d)(2)(C), 663 (d).
[7] Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, April 21, 1989.
[8] Pub. L. 107-107, Div. A, Title V, sec. 525 (a), (b), Dec. 28, 2001.
[9] 10 U.S.C. sec. 664 (i).
[10] Pub. L. 99-433, Oct. 1, 1986; 10 U.S.C. secs. 661 (c), 662 (a),
and 663 (d).
[11] 10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (c).
[12] These schools include the Air Command and Staff College and the
Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama; the Army Command and General
Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas; the Army War College in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania; the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine
Corps War College in Quantico, Virginia; and the College of Naval
Command and Staff and the College of Naval Warfare in Newport, Rhode
Island.
[13] 10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (b) and (d).
[14] 10 U.S.C. sec. 663 (e).
[15] 10 U.S.C. sec. 663 (e).
[16] 10 U.S.C. sec. 663 (d).
[17] The Goldwater-Nichols Act was amended in 1993 to allow DOD the
flexibility to send these officers to a joint position as their first
or second assignment after graduation. 10 U.S.C. sec. 663 (d)(2)(A).
[18] 10 U.S.C. 663 (d)(1).
[19] The act originally required the Secretary to designate no fewer
than 1,000 critical joint duty positions, but the act was amended in
1996 by Public Law 104-106 section 501(a) to reduce the number to 800.
10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (d)(2)(A).
[20] 10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (d)(2)(B) and (C).
[21] 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (a)(2).
[22] In order for those nominated for the joint specialty to count
toward the approximate 50 percent requirement, the officers must have
completed joint professional military education prior to their joint
assignment or have a military occupational specialty that is designated
as a critical occupational specialty involving combat operations.
Officers with critical occupational specialties involving combat,
therefore, can be nominated to be joint specialty officers without
having completed joint professional military education prior to their
joint assignment. 10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (d)(1).
[23] 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (b).
[24] 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (b)(1).
[25] We did not analyze the four other waiver categories because they
apply to officers for whom joint requirements generally do not exist,
officers who already had joint experience that predated the
implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and officers who were
already serving in joint positions when they were selected for
promotion.
[26] Secretary of Defense memorandum dated July 6, 2000.
[27] 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (a)(2).
[28] The existing waiver authority remains unchanged by the amendments
made to 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (a) by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Pub. L. 107-107, Div. A, Title V, sec. 525,
Dec. 28, 2001.
[29] For our analysis, we compared progress DOD made between fiscal
years 1988 and 1994 with progress DOD made between fiscal years 1995
and 2001. For each of the three promotion categories (Joint Staff,
joint specialty officers, and other officers serving in joint
positions), we multiplied the three pay grades by the four services by
the 7 years and identified 84 potential promotion groups. We then
eliminated those groups in which no promotions occurred to identify the
actual promotion groups. We then counted the number of groups in which
DOD met or exceeded the applicable standard. DOD is required to report,
on an annual basis, the extent to which it met the promotion objectives
in a given year. However, DOD is not required to report this type of
trend analysis over time. 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (b).
[30] The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that ’officers who are serving
on, or have served on, the Joint Staff are expected, as a group, to be
promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for
officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive
category who are who are serving on, or have served on, the
headquarters staff of their armed force.“ 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (a)(1).
[31] The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that ’officers who have the joint
specialty are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less
than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade
and competitive category who are serving on, or have served on, the
headquarters staff of their armed force.“ 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (a)(2).
[32] This category excludes officers who have served on the Joint Staff
and joint specialty officers.
[33] The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that ’officers who are serving
in, or have served in, joint duty assignments (other than officers
covered in paragraphs (1) and (2)) are expected, as a group, to be
promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for
all officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive
category.“ 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (a)(3).
[34] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-
Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OGC-00-14G (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 2000); Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the
Departments of Defense and State, GAO-01- 565T (Washington, D.C.: Mar
29, 2001); and Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Department of Defense, GAO-01-244 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001).
[35] See U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human
Capital Management, Exposure Draft, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 2002).
[36] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Building
on the Momentum for Strategic Human Capital Reform, GAO-02-528T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar.18, 2002).
[37] 10 U.S.C. sec. 666.
[38] See Congressional Research Service, Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer
Personnel Management Program (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2000).
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