Military Readiness
Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May Need Revamping Gao ID: GAO-03-278 December 30, 2002In the event of a national emergency, the Department of Defense (DOD) can use commercial aircraft drawn from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment its own airlift capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a fleet of aircraft owned by U.S. commercial air carriers but committed voluntarily to DOD for use during emergencies. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many air carriers experienced financial difficulties. This sparked concern about the fleet's ability to respond, if activated, and prompted the Subcommittee to ask GAO to determine whether the fleet could respond to an activation with the required number of aircraft and crews and in the required time frame. The Subcommittee also wanted to know whether the incentives used to attract and retain participants are effective.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants can respond to an emergency or a war with the required number of aircraft and crews and within the required time frame. Currently, there are more aircraft committed to the fleet than are needed to fill the wartime requirements identified in the DOD Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which determined the requirements to fight and win two major theater wars. However, Civil Reserve Air Fleet requirements may increase the next time mobility requirements are studied. The last mobility requirements study was limited in that it did not consider the use of excess Civil Reserve Air Fleet capacity and the ability of some commercial aircraft to carry larger cargo than standard-sized pallets. The incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the program, especially the incentive to participate in DOD's peacetime business, might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives in the future. Some participants are not able to bid on peacetime cargo business because their fleets do not include B- 747s, the predominant aircraft DOD uses for peacetime cargo missions. GAO found that B-747s carried out 94 percent of 946 missions flown by commercial aircraft in the first 10 months of fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, over 40 percent of recent missions did not use all available space or weight limits aboard B-747s. These missions might have been carried out less expensively with smaller wide-body aircraft. Using smaller aircraft would provide more peacetime business to a greater share of program participants, thus enhancing current incentives. However, the Air Force does not have sufficient management information to identify options for selecting the best available aircraft type for the mission.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-278, Military Readiness: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May Need Revamping
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
December 2002:
Military Readiness:
Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May Need
Revamping:
GAO-03-278:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-278, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives:
December 2002:
Military Readiness:
Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May Need
Revamping:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In the event of a national emergency, the Department of Defense (DOD)
can use commercial aircraft drawn from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to
augment its own airlift capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a
fleet of aircraft owned by U.S. commercial air carriers but committed
voluntarily to DOD for use during emergencies.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many air carriers
experienced financial difficulties. This sparked concern about the
fleet‘s
ability to respond, if activated, and prompted the Subcommittee to ask
GAO to determine whether the fleet could respond to an activation with
the required number of aircraft and crews and in the required time
frame.
The Subcommittee also wanted to know whether the incentives used to
attract
and retain participants are effective.
What GAO Found:
Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants can respond to an emergency or a
war with the required number of aircraft and crews and within the
required time frame. Currently, there are more aircraft committed to
the fleet than are needed to fill the wartime requirements identified
in the DOD Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which determined the
requirements to fight and win two major theater wars. However, Civil
Reserve Air Fleet requirements may increase the next time mobility
requirements are studied. The last mobility requirements study was
limited in that it did not consider the use of excess Civil Reserve Air
Fleet capacity and the ability of some commercial aircraft to carry
larger cargo than standard-sized pallets.
The incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the
program, especially the incentive to participate in DOD‘s peacetime
business, might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives
in the future. Some participants are not able to bid on peacetime
cargo business because their fleets do not include B-747s, the
predominant aircraft DOD uses for peacetime cargo missions. GAO found
that B-747s carried out 94 percent of 946 missions flown by commercial
aircraft in the first 10 months of fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, over
40 percent of recent missions did not use all available space or weight
limits aboard B-747s. These missions might have been carried out less
expensively with smaller wide-body aircraft. Using smaller aircraft
would provide more peacetime business to a greater share of program
participants, thus enhancing current incentives. However, the Air Force
does not have sufficient management information to identify options for
selecting the best available aircraft type for the mission.
Figure: Loading a B-747 at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Air Force:
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the next evaluation of mobility requirements
include a more thorough study of Civil Reserve Air Fleet capabilities
and that the Air Mobility Command study whether smaller wide-body
aircraft
could be used as efficiently and effectively as the larger B-747-type
aircraft to handle DOD‘s peacetime cargo business. DOD concurred with
these recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-278.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above.For more information, contact Neal Curtin at (757)
552-8100 or curtinn@gao.gov.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Participants and Total
Number of Aircraft Committed at Stage III as of October 2002:
Appendix II: Department of Defense Commercial Airlift Contracts:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Aircraft Committed to the CRAF Program by Stage and Type of
Aircraft (as of October 2002):
Table 2: Stage III CRAF Requirements and Commitments
(as of October 2002):
Table 3: Cost Comparison by Aircraft Type:
Table 4: DOD Contracts for Commercial Airlift, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: Loading a B-747 at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware:
Figure 2: B-747 and MD-11 Cross-Section Views with Cargo Pallets:
Abbreviations:
AMC: Air Mobility Command:
CRAF: Civil Reserve Air Fleet:
DOD: Department of Defense:
MRS-05: Mobility Requirements Study 2005:
Letter:
December 30, 2002:
The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In the event of a national emergency, the Department of Defense (DOD)
will face requirements for air transportation that exceed its military
airlift capabilities.[Footnote 1] To meet additional requirements, DOD
can use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, aircraft from U.S. commercial air
carriers voluntarily committed and put under contract to DOD for use
during emergencies. The commercial air carriers receive no compensation
for their participation in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet unless they are
activated, but they are given an incentive to participate by being made
eligible to bid for DOD‘s peacetime airlift business. Air carriers are
paid for missions they fly at predetermined rates based on a weighted
average of their costs plus a return on investment. The Air Force‘s Air
Mobility Command at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, manages the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet program.
Commercial air carriers experienced financial difficulties after the
attacks of September 11, 2001. In your December 2001 letter, you
expressed concern over the carriers‘ ability to respond to the
requirements of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program in the event of an
activation for an emergency or a war, including the ability to provide
crews that do not have National Guard or Reserve obligations. As agreed
with your office, we determined whether (1) program participants could
respond to an activation with the required number of aircraft and crews
and in the required time frame and (2) incentives used to attract and
retain program participants are effective.
To respond to your letter, we referred to the Mobility Requirements
Study 2005, issued in January 2001, to determine the requirements for
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program. This study determined the airlift
required to meet the former national military strategy of fighting and
winning two major theater wars. It does not reflect the new Defense
Planning Guidance, issued in May 2002, the new national security
strategy, issued in September 2002, or the airlift needed to meet that
strategy.
Results in Brief:
Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants can respond to an emergency or a
war with the required number of aircraft and crews and within the
required time frame. Currently, there are more aircraft committed to
the program than are needed to fill the wartime requirements identified
in DOD‘s Mobility Requirements Study 2005. Participants stated that
they would be able to provide the required numbers of crews despite
layoffs in the industry after September 11, 2001, even though some
crewmembers have National Guard or Reserve commitments that would
prevent them from flying for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet if it were
activated. However, Civil Reserve Air Fleet requirements may increase
the next time mobility requirements are studied. The last study was
limited in that it did not consider excess Civil Reserve Air Fleet
capacity and the ability of some commercial aircraft to carry larger
than standard-sized cargo pallets, which could increase the amount of
cargo the fleet is expected to carry.
The incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the
program might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives in
the future, according to some program participants. Civil Reserve Air
Fleet participants with 62 percent of the wide-body cargo aircraft in
their fleets are not able to bid on peacetime cargo business because
their fleets do not include B-747s, the predominant commercial aircraft
DOD uses for peacetime cargo missions. DOD usually requests aircraft
with the capacity of a B-747 because it carries more weight and can be
loaded with a standard-sized pallet that also fits on military
aircraft. We found that B-747s carried out 892 of 946 missions
(94 percent) flown by commercial aircraft in the first 10 months of
fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, over 40 percent of recent missions did
not use all available space or weight limits aboard B-747s. These
missions might have been carried out less expensively with smaller
wide-body aircraft. Using these smaller wide-body aircraft would also
provide more peacetime business to a greater share of program
participants. However, the Air Force does not have sufficient
management information to identify options for selecting the most
efficient and economical aircraft type for the mission.
To ensure that mobility requirements are met in the most effective and
economical manner, we are recommending that DOD fully assess
Civil Reserve Air Fleet capabilities in any new mobility requirements
studies. To enhance the effectiveness of Civil Reserve Air Fleet
program incentives, we are recommending that the Air Mobility Command
study the option of optimizing its use of aircraft other than B-747s
for peacetime missions. DOD concurred with both recommendations and
indicated that there are already two ongoing studies that could include
assessments of Civil Reserve Air Fleet capabilities. We agree that
these studies would address our first recommendation concerning a more
thorough study of Fleet capabilities. In a subsequent discussion, a DOD
official stated that DOD intends to perform an additional study that
would address the second recommendation. See the ’Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation“ section for our detailed response to DOD‘s comments.
Background:
The National Airlift Policy,[Footnote 2] issued in June 1987,
reinforced the need for and use of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
program, established in 1951.[Footnote 3] The policy states that
military and commercial airlift resources are equally important; that
DOD should determine which resources must be moved by the military and
which can be moved by commercial air carriers; and that commercial
carriers will be relied upon to provide airlift capability beyond the
capability of the military fleet. It also states that during peacetime,
DOD requirements for passengers and/or cargo airlift augmentation shall
be satisfied by the procurement of airlift from commercial air carriers
participating in the CRAF program.
Military airlift requirements are fulfilled by a mix of both military
and civilian aircraft. Currently, the military airlift fleet is
comprised of 82 C-17, 110 C-5, 468 C-130, and 69 C-141 aircraft. The
older C-141 aircraft are being phased out and replaced by additional
C-17 aircraft. There are also 54 KC-10 aircraft, which perform both
airlift and refueling missions. The CRAF program includes 927 cargo and
passenger aircraft from U.S. commercial air carriers.
CRAF participants are required to respond within 24 hours of activation
in the event of stage I (a regional crisis in which the Air Mobility
Command‘s (AMC) aircraft fleet cannot meet both deployment and other
traffic requirements simultaneously) or stage II (a major war that does
not warrant full national mobilization).[Footnote 4] Stage III--
multiple theater wars or a national mobilization--requires that total
CRAF airlift capability be made available to DOD within 48 hours of
activation. Aircraft used in stages I and II are also available in
subsequent stages. In the event of activation, AMC assumes mission
control, but the carriers continue to operate and support the aircraft
(support includes fuel, spare parts, and maintenance). Stage I was
activated for the first and only time on August 17, 1990, during
Operation Desert Shield. Stage II was activated on January 17, 1991,
for Operation Desert Storm. The total number of aircraft committed to
CRAF (see table 1) accounts for about 15 percent of all U.S.-owned
commercial aircraft forecasted for 2003. Appendix I lists the carriers
participating in the CRAF program as of October 2002 and the total
number of aircraft each has committed through stage III.
Table 1: Aircraft Committed to the CRAF Program by Stage and Type of
Aircraft (as of October 2002):
Stage I; Cargo: 31; Passenger: 47; Aeromedical[A]: 0; Total: 78.
Stage II[B]; Cargo: 95; Passenger: 171; Aeromedical[A]: 25; Total: 291.
Stage III[B]; Cargo: 271; Passenger: 610; Aeromedical[A]: 46; Total:
927.
Source: AMC data.
[A] Aeromedical aircraft evacuate critical casualties, transport
patients under medical supervision, and move medical crews and supplies
to the theater of operations.
[B] Includes aircraft from previous stages.
[End of table]
CRAF Participants Can Respond as Required:
More aircraft are committed to the CRAF program than are needed to
fulfill the wartime requirements established by the Mobility
Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05). There was a shortage of aeromedical
evacuation aircraft, but this has been recently eliminated. Program
participants stated that they would be capable of providing the needed
levels of aircraft and crews within the necessary time frames, even
with recent furloughs and with crewmembers that have National Guard or
Reserve commitments. A new mobility requirements study could see an
increase in the need for CRAF based on a change from the two major
theater war scenario to the new strategy of planning for a range of
military operations that was described in DOD‘s recent Quadrennial
Defense Review Report, issued in September 2001.[Footnote 5]
Under MRS-05‘s two major war scenario, the study assumed that both
military and CRAF aircraft were needed and that CRAF would be required
to move 20.5 million ton miles a day, or 41 percent of all military
bulk cargo deliveries. CRAF would also carry 93 percent of all
passengers and provide almost all aeromedical evacuation needs. In
fiscal year 2002, there were only 31 of the 40 B-767s required to be
available for conversion to aeromedical evacuation. However, commercial
carriers increased their commitment to 46 of these aircraft for fiscal
year 2003. Table 2 compares the requirements for a stage III CRAF
activation with commitments by program participants.
Table 2: Stage III CRAF Requirements and Commitments
(as of October 2002):
Cargo; Required: 120 wide-body equivalents[B]; Committed: 227 wide-body
equivalents[B].
Passenger; Required: 136 wide-body equivalents[B]; Committed: 276 wide-
body equivalents[B].
Aeromedical[A]; Required: 40 B-767 aircraft; Committed: 46 B-767
aircraft.
Source: AMC data.
[A] DOD requires only B-767 planes for the aeromedical evacuation
mission.
[B] A wide-body equivalent is a relative measure of carrying capacity
that is based on the capacity of one Boeing 747-100 aircraft, which AMC
planning factors estimate at about 90 tons of cargo or 360 passengers.
[End of table]
Officials from CRAF air carrier participants that we visited confirmed
that they would be able to provide the agreed levels of airlift
capacity within the necessary time frames and that the turmoil in the
airline industry after the attacks of September 11, 2001, would not
affect their ability to do so. The officials said they would also be
able to provide at least four flight crews per aircraft (crewmembers
must also be U.S. citizens), as they are required to do by AMC
Regulation 55-8. This is in spite of the fact that some carriers have
had to furlough pilots during the recent economic downturn and that
employees with National Guard or Reserve commitments cannot be included
in available crew lists. The same regulation requires that commercial
carrier personnel with military Reserve or National Guard commitments
not be considered in the cockpit crew-to-aircraft ratio. They can,
however, be used in CRAF carrier work until their military units have
alerted them of a recall to active duty. Officials from the carriers we
visited said they monitor their crewmembers‘ reserve commitments
carefully and usually maintain a higher crew-to-plane ratio than DOD
requires. For example, one carrier we visited operates with a crew-to-
plane ratio of 10 to 1, instead of the 4 to 1 DOD requires for CRAF
carriers. DOD also inspects carriers annually, and the inspectors have
been satisfied that the carriers could meet the crew-to-plane ratio.
Mobility Requirements Study Limited CRAF Contribution:
The MRS-05 did not consider CRAF‘s full capacity, and it set a ceiling
of 20.5 million ton miles on daily CRAF airlift requirements. According
to DOD officials, the study restricted CRAF cargo capacity to 20.5
million ton miles per day because DOD‘s airfields can accommodate only
a certain number of aircraft at the same time. Also, they stated that
using additional CRAF aircraft would reduce efficiency because of the
type of cargo CRAF is modeled to carry. They said that commercial
aircraft can take longer to unload than military aircraft and require
special material handling equipment to be available at an off-loading
base. Military aircraft, on the other hand, do not need specialized
loading equipment because they are high-winged and lower to the ground.
Figure 1: Loading a B-747 at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Furthermore, the MRS-05 did not consider the ability of the commercial
industry to carry different cargo sizes. The MRS-05 modeled CRAF
aircraft carrying only bulk cargo.[Footnote 6] According to Air Force
officials, the U.S. commercial cargo fleet has limited ability to carry
oversized cargo and no ability to carry outsized cargo.[Footnote 7]
They stated that it is difficult, from a planning perspective, to model
CRAF aircraft carrying oversized cargo because the models would need to
distinguish between the types of oversized cargo and the types of
aircraft. They also stated that using more CRAF capacity than the 20.5
million ton mile limit would flow more bulk cargo into a theater
instead of oversized and outsized unit equipment brought in by the
larger military aircraft.
In reality, however, commercial aircraft do carry some oversized cargo.
DOD is examining how much oversized equipment can be moved by CRAF so
that this capability can be included in future mobility studies. DOD‘s
Defense Planning Guidance, issued in August 2001, requires that
mobility requirements be reevaluated by 2004, and DOD officials believe
that future requirements will be higher because of the increased number
of possible scenarios included in the guidance. We believe that a study
that also takes into consideration excess CRAF capacity and the types
of cargo that CRAF can accommodate could provide a more realistic
picture of needs and capabilities. It could also mitigate some of the
concerns about airfield capacity and flow of cargo into a theater if
CRAF aircraft could move some of the oversized cargo. This could get
the larger cargo to a unit as it was needed, instead of bulk cargo,
which may not be as time-critical.
CRAF Incentives May Be Losing Effectiveness:
One of the key stated incentives of the CRAF program--the ability to
bid on peacetime government business--may be losing its effectiveness
because DOD uses almost exclusively one type of aircraft, the B-747,
for its peacetime cargo missions. Over 94 percent, or 892, of 946 wide-
body missions flown by CRAF participants in the first 10 months of
fiscal year 2002 were carried out by B-747s, which accounted for only
38 percent of wide-body cargo aircraft committed to the CRAF program.
Some major CRAF participants who do not have B-747s have suggested that
they might reduce or end their participation in the program if they do
not receive any business in return for their commitment. This could
have a serious effect on the program‘s ability to meet future
requirements, especially if those requirements increase due to the
change in focus from two major theater wars to a range of military
operations outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review.
Only carriers that participate in the CRAF program can bid on peacetime
mobility business. Carriers can bid on a percentage of peacetime
business in direct proportion to their commitment to the program.
Participants earn mobilization value points, which are based on the
number and type of committed aircraft. In assigning mobilization value
points, DOD measures each volunteered passenger or cargo aircraft
against the capacity and airspeed of a B-747-100. Participants in the
aeromedical evacuation segment of CRAF receive double the mobilization
value points because of the significant reconfiguration their aircraft
(B-767s) must undergo. The points are used to determine how much
commercial business each participant can bid on out of the total, which
in fiscal year 2002 more than doubled to $1.28 billion from $572
million the previous year (see app. II for annual amounts since fiscal
year 1998).
Participants with 62 percent of the wide-body cargo aircraft committed
to CRAF are not able to bid on most peacetime cargo business because
they do not have B-747s. An AMC official said that most requests for
cargo aircraft require a 90-ton capacity, the same as that of a 747-
type aircraft but slightly more than those of other wide-body aircraft
such as the MD-11 (86 tons) or the DC-10 (75 tons). One carrier with
over 100 wide-body cargo planes smaller than B-747s committed to the
program (and accounting for 41 percent of all total mobilization value
points awarded to cargo carriers) received only about 4 percent of
peacetime cargo business in fiscal year 2002. By contrast, a carrier
committing 10 B-747 type aircraft (7 percent of total cargo points)
flew 37 percent of all peacetime cargo business.
AMC officials claim that they must use 90-ton capacity aircraft because
they need the flexibility and capacity to clear ports as quickly as
possible. The B-747 can carry more and larger cargo than other wide-
body aircraft because it has more capacity and larger doors. Officials
also noted that the B-747 can carry standard-sized bulk cargo pallets
that are the same size as those used by commercial industry, the
Defense Logistics Agency, and other DOD activities and contractors.
Standard pallets also fit aboard all military cargo aircraft. In order
to fit aboard other wide-body aircraft such as the DC-10 or the MD-11,
cargo handlers at military bases must disassemble and rebuild the
standard pallets to fit the aircrafts‘ lower profile (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: B-747 and MD-11 Cross-Section Views with Cargo Pallets:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Some cargo carrier officials said they could not bid on the amount of
peacetime business they believe they are entitled to based on their
CRAF participation. Consequently, they indicated that unless this
problem improves, they might reduce or end their participation at some
point in the future. AMC officials acknowledged that the requirements
from Operation Enduring Freedom, DOD‘s operation in Afghanistan,
amounted to the equivalent of a stage I activation. Activation was
avoided because CRAF participants volunteered the airlift capability
needed in fiscal year 2002. Although commitments to the CRAF program
currently exceed requirements, this situation could change if some
cargo carriers continue to be left out of the peacetime business and
eventually decide to reduce or terminate their participation in the
program. In our opinion, DOD cannot afford to lose CRAF participants,
particularly in view of a new mobility requirements study and a
potential increase in requirements.
Furthermore, some cargo carriers stated that the CRAF B-747s are not
flying with full loads and claimed that it would be less expensive to
use smaller wide-body aircraft with lower per-mile costs. We obtained
mission data and found that almost half of the 892 CRAF missions flown
on B-747s in the first 10 months of fiscal year 2002 did not use all
available space or weight capacities. These loads might have fit on
smaller wide-body aircraft, which would have cost less to fly. B-747
aircraft are more expensive than other wide-body aircraft, such as the
MD-11, which have lower per-mile operation costs. See table 3 for a
cost comparison by plane type for a round-trip flight from Dover Air
Force Base to Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany.[Footnote 8]
Table 3: Cost Comparison by Aircraft Type:
Aircraft type: B-747; Capacity: 90 tons; Trip cost: $200,356.
Aircraft type: MD-11; Capacity: 86 tons; Trip cost: $191,451.
Aircraft type: DC-10; Capacity: 75 tons; Trip cost: $166,963.
Source: AMC data.
[End of table]
Over 40 percent of these recent missions flown by B-747s did not
utilize all the available pallet positions and carried less than 55.7
tons. In fiscal year 2002, AMC officials used the 55.7-ton mark as a
breakeven point--the point at which the per-pound cost that the
customer pays to have the cargo shipped equals the B-747‘s per-mile
cost that AMC pays the carrier to fly the mission. We were unable to
determine whether a smaller, more economical aircraft could have been
used for these missions because, at the time we requested the data, DOD
was not obtaining data on cargo volume. However, it has since begun to
accumulate this information, which will help determine whether aircraft
are flying at full capacity.
Military port handlers assured us that DOD‘s use of B-747 aircraft
during peacetime would not decrease their capability to build and load
different types of pallets on other types of aircraft, which AMC data
show account for 62 percent of the CRAF wide-body cargo fleet, during
wartime. They stated that they ’frequently“ build pallets and can use
available templates for nonstandard shapes. When we questioned how
effectively they could do this in the very first and most urgent phases
of a conflict, they stated that during wartime, supplies such as
ammunition and food are delivered in pallets that can be loaded
directly aboard smaller wide-body planes. According to port officials,
loading aircraft is easily accomplished once the pallets are built.
Another incentive for passenger air carriers to participate in the CRAF
program is annual government air passenger business under the General
Services Administration‘s City Pairs program. General Services
Administration officials said that passenger air carriers have
expressed dissatisfaction because they believe the program is too
restrictive and does not allow them to manage aircraft capacity to
generate the highest profit. However, the 2003 contract includes some
changes that program officials believe will resolve many of the
carriers‘ concerns.
Conclusions:
The upcoming reevaluation of mobility requirements may increase the
need for CRAF in the future. However, the last study did not consider
some factors--such as the ability of commercial aircraft to carry
different sized cargo--that, if included, could provide more accurate
and realistic requirements. The last study also set a ceiling on the
amount of cargo carried by CRAF that provided the needed flow of cargo
into a theater and that DOD‘s infrastructure could process efficiently.
This figure needs to be revalidated so that the next mobility
requirements study can provide decision makers accurate and helpful
information on true needs and capabilities.
There are strong indications that some major program participants are
dissatisfied with their share of a key CRAF incentive, the opportunity
to bid on peacetime mobility business, because DOD uses almost
exclusively only one type of aircraft for peacetime cargo missions. If
they are unable to see some benefit from the incentive program, some
participants might reduce or end their participation in the program.
This could cause difficulties in meeting requirements at a time when
participation in peacetime business or CRAF activation is crucial. DOD
needs to study ways to expand the use of smaller wide-body aircraft to
ensure an equitable distribution of the peacetime business and
determine whether smaller wide-body aircraft could carry out a higher
proportion of its peacetime missions as efficiently as, and possibly
more economically as, the B-747 does.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that:
* the reevaluation of mobility requirements mandated by the Defense
Planning Guidance include a more thorough study of CRAF capabilities,
to include the types of cargo CRAF can carry and how much CRAF aircraft
can land and be unloaded and serviced at military bases, and:
* the Air Mobility Command determine whether smaller wide-body aircraft
could be used as efficiently and effectively as the larger B-747-type
planes to handle the peacetime cargo business that DOD uses as an
incentive for CRAF participants.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. However, DOD believed it would be more appropriate to
ensure that ongoing study efforts be given greater emphasis and require
that any resulting reports specifically address our issues. We agree
that these studies could address our first recommendation concerning a
more thorough study of CRAF capabilities. In a subsequent discussion, a
DOD official stated that DOD intends to perform an additional study
that would address the second recommendation.
DOD‘s comments are presented in their entirety in appendix III.
Scope and Methodology:
We used the MRS-5, DOD regulations, and discussions with officials at
the U.S. Transportation and U.S. Air Mobility Commands, located at
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, to establish the aircraft and time
frame requirements for the CRAF program. We obtained and reviewed data
from and interviewed officials at the U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.
Air Mobility Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and
representatives of six CRAF participants, which represent about
38 percent of the total CRAF aircraft commitment, to conclude whether
the participants could respond to an activation with the required
number of aircraft and crews and in the required time frame.
We also interviewed representatives of six CRAF participants,
representing both passenger and cargo air carriers, to determine
whether the incentives used to attract and retain program participants
are effective. For clarification on the incentives and how they are
used, we referred to DOD regulations and interviewed officials at the
U.S. Transportation Command, the U.S. Air Mobility Command, and the
General Services Administration. We analyzed AMC mission data to
determine the capacity at which aircraft were flying. We met with
officials at the 436th Aerial Port Squadron at Dover Air Force Base to
discuss cargo and aircraft loading.
We conducted our review between January and October 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
appropriate congressional committees, and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
(757) 552-8100. See appendix III for major contributors.
Sincerely yours,
Neal P. Curtin
Director, Defense Capabilities
and Management:
igned by Neal P. Curtin:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Participants and Total
Number of Aircraft Committed at Stage III as of October 2002:
Table:
Passenger carriers: Alaska Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 42.
Passenger carriers: America West; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 10.
Passenger carriers: American Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 100.
Passenger carriers: American Trans Air; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 62.
Passenger carriers: Champion Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 7.
Passenger carriers: Continental Airlines; Number of aircraft committed
at stage III as of October 2002: 120.
Passenger carriers: Delta Air Lines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 37.
Passenger carriers: Frontier Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 2.
Passenger carriers: Hawaiian Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 4.
Passenger carriers: Miami Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 6.
Passenger carriers: Midwest Express; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 2.
Passenger carriers: North American Airlines; Number of aircraft
committed at stage III as of October 2002: 4.
Passenger carriers: Northwest Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 55.
Passenger carriers: Omni Air International; Number of aircraft
committed at stage III as of October 2002: 5.
Passenger carriers: Southwest Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 22.
Passenger carriers: Spirit Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 19.
Passenger carriers: Sunworld International; Number of aircraft
committed at stage III as of October 2002: 1.
Passenger carriers: United Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 96.
Passenger carriers: US Airways; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 9.
Passenger carriers: World Airways; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 7.
Number of aircraft committed at stage III as of October 2002: Passenger
carriersAirborne Express: [Empty].
Passenger carriers: Airborne Express; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 3.
Passenger carriers: Air Transport International; Number of aircraft
committed at stage III as of October 2002: 13.
Passenger carriers: Arrow Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 10.
Passenger carriers: Atlas Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 32.
Passenger carriers: DHL Airways; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 16.
Passenger carriers: Evergreen International; Number of aircraft
committed at stage III as of October 2002: 15.
Passenger carriers: FEDEX Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 111.
Passenger carriers: Gemini Air Cargo; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 16.
Passenger carriers: Lynden Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 3.
Passenger carriers: Northern Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 2.
Passenger carriers: Northwest Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 12.
Passenger carriers: Omni Air International; Number of aircraft
committed at stage III as of October 2002: 2.
Passenger carriers: Polar Air Cargo; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 16.
Passenger carriers: Southern Air; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 4.
Passenger carriers: UPS Airlines; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 11.
Passenger carriers: World Airways; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 5.
Number of aircraft committed at stage III as of October 2002: Passenger
carriersDelta Air Lines: [Empty].
Passenger carriers: Delta Air Lines; Number of aircraft committed at
stage III as of October 2002: 35.
Passenger carriers: US Airways; Number of aircraft committed at stage
III as of October 2002: 11.
Source: Air Mobility Command.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Department of Defense Commercial Airlift Contracts:
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses commercial carriers for two
different kinds of peacetime airlift moves: The first (called fixed
buy) is a set contract for ’channel flights“ made on a regular weekly
schedule from U.S. bases to fixed points across Atlantic and Pacific
routes. The second (called expansion buys) includes airlift bought
after the start of the fixed buy contract to support exercises,
contingencies, special airlift assignment missions, and growth in
channel requirements. From fiscal years 1992 through 1997, DOD
contracts for commercial passenger and cargo business averaged over
$611 million a year. From fiscal years 1998 through 2001, contracts
increased to an average of almost $640 million a year. In fiscal year
2002, contracts increased significantly to almost $1.3 billion, which
Air Mobility Command officials attributed to missions flown in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom, the operation in Afghanistan. (See table
4.):
Table 4: DOD Contracts for Commercial Airlift, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Dollars in millions.
Passenger; [Empty]; Type of buy: Fixed; [Empty]; Fiscal year: 1998:
$158.31; Fiscal year: 1999: $158.58; Fiscal year: 2000: $159.89; Fiscal
year: 2001: $182.33; Fiscal year: 2002: $339.57.
[Empty]; Type of buy: Expansion; [Empty]; Fiscal year: 1998: 175.15;
Fiscal year: 1999: 176.40; Fiscal year: 2000: 181.69; Fiscal year:
2001: 179.68; Fiscal year: 2002: 187.67.
Cargo; [Empty]; Type of buy: Fixed; [Empty]; Fiscal year: 1998: 187.28;
Fiscal year: 1999: 162.08; Fiscal year: 2000: 96.23; Fiscal year: 2001:
173.5; Fiscal year: 2002: 165.31.
[Empty]; Type of buy: Expansion; [Empty]; Fiscal year: 1998: 111.07;
Fiscal year: 1999: 204.91; Fiscal year: 2000: 192.57; Fiscal year:
2001: 36.9; Fiscal year: 2002: 587.89.
Miscellaneous; [Empty]; Type of buy: [Empty]; [Empty]; Fiscal year:
1998: 14.50; Fiscal year: 1999: 17.70; Fiscal year: 2000: [Empty];
Fiscal year: 2001: [Empty]; Fiscal year: 2002: [Empty].
Total; [Empty]; Type of buy: [Empty]; [Empty]; Fiscal year: 1998:
$646.49; Fiscal year: 1999: $710.70; Fiscal year: 2000: $629.38; Fiscal
year: 2001: $572.44; Fiscal year: 2002: $1,280.45.
Source: Air Mobility Command.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
DEC 9, 2002:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
Mr. Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Curtin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, ’MILITARY READINESS: Civil
Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned but Incentives May Need
Revamping“, dated November 8, 2002 (GAO-03-278).
The draft report recognizes that DoD, in partnership with the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), can respond to an emergency or war with the
required number of aircraft and crews and within the required
timeframe. However, the GAO draft report questions whether the
incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the program
might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives in the
future. The question of CRAF incentives is subject to annual review and
discussion, not only between the AMC and USTRANSCOM staffs, but also
with CRAF carrier participants.
DoD concurs with GAO‘s recommendations; however, rather than direct
unrelated new studies on these issues, we believe it would be more
appropriate to ensure that ongoing study efforts be given greater
emphasis and require that any resulting reports specifically address
the GAO issues.
The detailed DoD comments addressing the report are provided in
enclosure 1. The DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the GAO
draft report.
Sincerely,
Earl B. Boyanton, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary (Transportation Policy):
Signed by Earl B. Boyanton, Jr.:L
Enclosure:
GAO-03-278/GAO CODE 350148:
’MILITARY READINESS: CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET CAN RESPOND AS PLANNED BUT
INCENTIVES MAY NEED REVAMPING“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct that the reevaluation of mobility requirements mandated by the
Defense Planning Guidance include a more thorough study of CRAF
capabilities, to include the types of cargo CRAF can carry and how much
CRAF aircraft can land and be unloaded and serviced at military bases.
(Page 13/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. CRAF aircraft are not built to a single standard
and these differences impact modeling CRAF capabilities when evaluating
mobility requirements. Differences include door sizes, floor strengths,
internal configurations and tie-down requirements. Differences in
construction preclude the guarantee that a specific piece of cargo will
fit on a specific CRAF aircraft. Additionally, MRS -05 was used as a
data source. It should be noted that this study is a near exclusive
view of lift requirements outside the CONUS and doesn‘t address the
total requirement. Two Defense Planning Guidance directed studies, the
Operational Availability study and the Advance Mobility Concepts study,
are currently considering CRAF cargo factors.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct that Air Mobility Command determine whether smaller wide-body
aircraft could be used as efficiently and effectively as the larger B-
747-type planes to handle the peacetime cargo business that DoD uses as
an incentive for CRAF participants. (Page 13/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The GAO sampling period was the first ten months
of fiscal year 2002. This coincided with support for Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM. During this period, CRAF was considered flying under wartime
business rules even though it wasn‘t. activated. An imbalance, while
smaller, exists in peacetime and is due to the need to balance the
readiness requirements of the organic fleet, impact on aerial port
operations, time definite delivery and the CRAF commitment. Some offset
is realized by allowing free transfer of mobilization value points,
which determine business entitlement, between CRAF members and within
teaming arrangements. Within teaming arrangements, the large scheduled
carriers, including those flying MD-11/DC-10 aircraft, are reimbursed
for transferring their business entitlement to smaller charter
carriers.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
William C. Meredith (202) 512-4275:
Ann Borseth (202) 512-5222:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Lawrence E. Dixon, Patricia Lentini,
Stefano Petrucci, and Kenneth Patton made key contributions to this
report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The total capacity expressed in terms of number of passengers and/
or weight/cubic displacement of cargo that can be carried at any one
time to a given destination by available military airlift.
[2] National Security Decision Directive 280, June 24, 1987.
[3] Executive Order No. 10219, 16 Federal Register 1983 (Feb. 28,
1951).
[4] AMC Regulation 55-8, para. 2.18.
[5] Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, September
30, 2001.
[6] Bulk cargo is cargo that can be loaded on a standard pallet without
exceeding any of its usable dimensions. A standard pallet is 84 inches
long by 104 inches wide by 96 inches high.
[7] Outsized cargo is cargo that exceeds the capabilities of the C-130
and C-141B aircraft and requires the use of a C-5 or a C-17 aircraft.
It is cargo that is more than 810 inches long by 117 inches wide by 105
inches high in any direction. Oversized cargo is any single item that
exceeds any one of the dimensions of a standard pallet, but can be
loaded on a C-141, C-130, or KC-10 aircraft.
[8] CRAF participants are paid at a predetermined per-mile rate based
on the type of aircraft flying the mission. The per-mile rate is paid
regardless of the weight carried on the mission.
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