Reserve Forces
DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between Reservists and Their Employers Gao ID: GAO-02-608 June 13, 2002Following the 1991 Gulf War, reservists and employers flooded the government with questions and complaints concerning the reemployment rights of reservists who had been away from their jobs during the war. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 grants service members reemployment rights following military duty and addresses the rights and responsibilities of both reservists and their employers. Despite increases in operations since 1992, the average operational tempo of reserves department-wide increased only slightly between 1992 and 2001--from 43 to 46 days a year. Normal required training periods accounted for the bulk of this total. Several factors hamper Department of Defense (DOD) outreach efforts to both employers and reservists. DOD lacks complete information on who the reservists' employers are, and it has viewed the Privacy Act as a constraint that prevents it from requiring reservists to provide this information. DOD relies on volunteers in the field to carry out many of its outreach activities. However, these volunteers do not always report their contacts with reservists and employers, and, as a result, DOD does not know the full extent of problems that arise and has no assurance that its outreach activities are being implemented consistently. Although DOD has an active program in place to address problems that arise between reservists and their civilian employers, no such program is in place to deal systematically with issues that arise between students and their educational institutions. DOD has not fully analyzed existing data on reservists' operational tempo and recruiting and retention trends on an ongoing basis to determine how deployments might be affecting reservists and their employers. GAO surveys and discussions with reservists and employers further suggest that DOD's activities to enhance reserve-employer relations are not as effective as they could be.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-02-608, Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between Reservists and Their Employers
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Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2002:
RESERVE FORCES:
DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between Reservists and
Their Employers:
GAO-02-608:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Average Operational Tempos Have Not Appreciably Increased, but Some
Reservists Have Been Affected Disproportionately:
DOD‘S Management of Relations Between Reservists and Their Employers
Could Be Improved:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Operational Tempos of the Reservists We Surveyed:
Appendix III: Selected Allegations of Problems with Employers or
of Exceptional Benefits Provided by Employers to Reservists:
Appendix IV: Some Key Provisions from the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA):
Appendix V: Guard and Reserve Member Survey:
Appendix VI: Employer Survey:
Appendix VII: Characteristics of Employers That Responded to Our
Survey:
Appendix VIII: Reserve Recruiting--Goals and Annual Accessions (1992-
2001):
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Reservists on Duty to Support the War on Terrorism, March 19,
2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: Average Annual Operational Tempo within Six Reserve
Components, 1992-2001:
Figure 2: Reserve Buildup to Support the War on Terrorism:
Figure 3: Declines in Department of Labor Cases:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ESGR: Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve:
USERRA: Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act:
June 13, 2002:
The Honorable Max Cleland
Chairman
The Honorable Tim Hutchinson
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Personnel
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
Following the 1991 Gulf War, reservists and employers flooded the
government with questions and complaints concerning the reemployment
rights of reservists who had been away from their jobs during the war.
Subsequently, Congress passed the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994.[Footnote 1] The act grants service
members reemployment rights following military duty and addresses the
rights and responsibilities of both reservists and their employers.
Since the passage of the act, reservists have been increasingly called
upon to serve in a variety of contingency operations, including
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, where many have served 6 months
or more. The current mobilization for the war on terrorism is adding to
this increased tempo and is expected to last a long time. Maintaining
employers‘ continued support for their reservist employees will be
critical if the Department of Defense (DOD) is to retain experienced
reservists in these times of longer and more frequent deployments.
Concerned that frequent or long deployments could adversely affect
recruiting and retention in the reserves, you asked us to study the
issues and challenges surrounding the increased use of reserve forces.
In particular, you cited the need for the DOD to pay special attention
to reservists‘ civilian careers and other responsibilities to ensure
the long-term health of the reserves. As agreed with your offices, we
(1) determined how increases in military operations have affected
’operational tempos“[Footnote 2] of the reserve components and
individual reservists and (2) assessed relations between reservists and
their civilian employers, focusing specifically on the Defense
department‘s outreach efforts designed to improve these important
relationships.
This report focuses on the more than 870,000 ’selected“ reserve members
who generally attend 12 weekends and 2 weeks of training each year (for
a total of about 38[Footnote 3] days). Unless specified otherwise, the
terms ’reserves“ and ’reservists“ both refer to the collective forces
of the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the Army Reserve,
the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force
Reserve.[Footnote 4] To gain first-hand information on how deployments
might be affecting reservists and their employers, we surveyed 1,608
reservists from 22 units that were among the highest tempo units in the
reserve components, and we surveyed 111 employers of the units‘
reservists. We also held focus group discussions with reservists who
had recently deployed. Additional information on our scope and
methodology, including the units we surveyed and visited, is in
appendix I.
The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and
Reserve[Footnote 5] serves as DOD‘s focal point in managing the
department‘s relations with reservists and their civilian employers.
Its small, full-time, paid staff in Virginia and 4,100 volunteers
throughout the country are responsible for a number of different
outreach activities. Two specific functions of these personnel are to
1) educate reservists and employers concerning their rights and
responsibilities and 2) mediate disputes that may arise between the
reservists and their employers.
Results in Brief:
Despite increases in operations since 1992, the average operational
tempo of reserves department-wide increased only slightly between 1992
and 2001--from 43 to 46 days a year. Normal required training periods
accounted for the bulk of this total. Average operational tempos
fluctuated for all components over the period but did not appreciably
increase, with the exception of the Air Reserve components whose tempos
have historically been the highest. Tempos increased from 54 to 65 days
in the Air National Guard. Although component averages have not
increased appreciably, all the components contain some individual
reservists who are in units or occupations that have been affected
disproportionately. For example, during the past 3 years, operational
tempos within the Army National Guard averaged between 40 and 44 days
per year, but hundreds of National Guard members from units in Texas,
Georgia, and Virginia were deployed to Bosnia for 6 months or more.
Hundreds more from other units are scheduled to participate in future
6-month deployments. Moreover, reservists in the fields of aviation,
special forces, security, intelligence, psychological operations, and
civil affairs have experienced operational tempos two to seven times
higher than those of the average reservists in their services. The war
on terrorism has added to the operational tempos in all the reserve
components, and on March 19, 2002, more than 95,000 reservists were on
duty. Many of these reservists had been mobilized for
6 months or more. In contrast, only about 35,000 reservists were on
duty supporting worldwide military operations during an average day in
fiscal year 2000.
Several factors hamper DOD‘s outreach efforts to both employers and
reservists.
* DOD lacks complete information on who the reservists‘ employers are,
and it has viewed the Privacy Act[Footnote 6] as a constraint that
prevents it from requiring reservists to provide this information.
Because information is incomplete, DOD cannot inform all employers of
their rights and obligations, cannot identify all exemplary employers
for recognition, and cannot carry out effective outreach activities.
* DOD relies on volunteers in the field to carry out many of its
outreach activities. However, these volunteers do not always report
their contacts with reservists and employers, and, as a result, DOD
does not know the full extent of problems that arise and has no
assurance that its outreach activities are being implemented
consistently.
* Although DOD has an active program in place to address problems that
arise between reservists and their civilian employers, no such program
is in place to deal systematically with issues that arise between
students and their educational institutions. Because students make up
an estimated one-third of all reservists, it is important that such
issues as lost tuition, credits, and educational standing be addressed
more directly.
* DOD has not fully analyzed existing data on reservists‘ operational
tempo and recruiting and retention trends on an ongoing basis to
determine how deployments might be affecting reservists and their
employers. More analysis of such data would enable DOD to better
identify emerging problems and formulate outreach activities to address
them.
Our surveys and discussions with reservists and employers further
suggest that DOD‘s activities to enhance reserve-employer relations are
not as effective as they could be. DOD has conducted hundreds of
briefings each year for both reservists and employers. However, in
discussions and responses to our surveys, a sizable number of the
employers and reservists indicated that they were unsure of their
rights and responsibilities under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act, and some had never been briefed on their
rights and responsibilities. And, while the majority of reservists told
us that they believed their employers complied with legal requirements,
some reservists in every one of our focus group discussions alleged
that their rights had been violated (see app. III). Both employers and
reservists claimed that frequently they were not given 30-days‘ advance
notice of deployments, and some employers wanted the right to verify
reserve duty under 30 days on a case-by-case basis. All of these
findings suggest that some changes may be needed in the management of
reservist-employer relations.
We are making several recommendations designed to enhance DOD‘s
management of relations between reservists and their employers. Among
others, these recommendations are directed at seeking more complete
information on employers, more systematic reporting of contacts with
reservists and employers in the field, and a more formalized program
for addressing the needs of students.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD fully concurred with five
of our seven recommendations and partially concurred with another
recommendation concerning advance issuance of orders. We modified that
recommendation to address the Department‘s concerns. DOD did not concur
with our recommendation to analyze the effects of a legislative
provision on reservists. However, we continue to believe that the
information in this report supports the need for such an analysis.
Background:
The reserves are an all-volunteer force of about 1.3 million that makes
up almost half the total military force,[Footnote 7] and more than one-
half of the total force in the Army. Since the end of the Cold War,
there has been a shift in the way reserve forces have been used.
Previously, reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that
would supplement active forces during a major war. Today, reservists
not only supplement but also replace active forces in military
operations and exercises worldwide. In fact, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has stated that no significant operation can be conducted without
reserve involvement.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has overall
supervisory responsibility for matters that involve reserve components,
and he serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the
Secretary of Defense on reserve component matters. The Assistant
Secretary oversees activities of the National Committee for Employer
Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR). Established in 1972 by
President Nixon, the ESGR manages activities aimed at maintaining and
enhancing employers‘ support for the reserves. Among its goals is that
of informing reservists and their employers of their respective rights
and responsibilities, as military duties can disrupt both the workplace
and the private lives of reservists.
The ESGR has a small, full-time paid staff in headquarters and
approximately 4,100 volunteers organized into 54 local committees, one
for each state and one each for Guam, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands. These staff provide reservists and
employers with information and counseling concerning their rights and
responsibilities. The ESGR uses a few of its full-time staff and about
200 trained volunteers from local committees to serve as mediators,
called ombudsmen, when disputes arise between reservists and their
employers.
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
1994[Footnote 8] addresses employee rights related to their involuntary
and voluntary military service and covers both active duty military and
reservists. The act applies to military service performed during basic
training, weekend drills, and annual training, as well as deployments
related to national emergencies. Among other things, the law requires
that service members be promptly reemployed upon returning from
military duty, generally in the same position, and be given the same
raises, seniority rights, benefits, and promotions they would have
received if they had remained at their jobs. They must also be
permitted to use accrued vacation before the beginning of their
military service and cannot be forced to use vacation time (instead of
unpaid leave) for military service. Upon return from military duty,
service members must be provided with continued health benefits,
without waiting periods or exclusions. The law also prohibits hiring
discrimination on the basis of past, current, or future military
obligations.
Average Operational Tempos Have Not Increased Appreciably, but Some
Reservists Have Been Affected Disproportionately:
Despite increases in operations since 1992, the average operational
tempo of reserves department-wide increased only slightly from 1992
through 2001. Average operational tempos fluctuated for all components
over this period but did not appreciably increase except for the Air
Force components whose tempos have historically been the highest. But
while average operational tempo in the reserves has not increased
appreciably, individual reservists in certain units and occupations in
all reserve components have been affected disproportionately. The war
on terrorism has led to major increases in reserve participation. About
35,000 reservists were on duty supporting worldwide military operations
during an average day in fiscal year 2000, compared with over 95,000
supporting the war on terrorism on March 19, 2002.
Tempos of Most Components Have Increased Only Slightly:
Between fiscal years 1992 and 2001, reserve operational tempos
increased by about 5 percent, from an average of 43.4 to 45.6 days per
year. [Footnote 9] Regular reserve training declined slightly over the
period but still accounted for the bulk of the reserve tempo, with
annual training periods averaging 11.2 days and regular drill periods
averaging 18.8 days per person in fiscal year 2001.[Footnote 10]
However, ’other“ reserve tempo (primarily support to overseas missions
and exercises) increased almost 37 percent over the period, to about 16
days per person in fiscal year 2001.
Tempo increases were greatest in the Air Reserve components, which have
historically had the highest tempos. Over this period, average
operational tempos rose from 54 to 65 days a year in the Air National
Guard. Air Force Reserve tempos rose from 55 days in 1992 to 65 days in
1999, before they began declining. The increases resulted partly from a
shift that placed more lift and refueling capabilities in the reserve
components and thus required them to provide more support to the Air
Force‘s active forces. Average operational tempos fluctuated in the
other reserve components, but most changes from one year to the next
were 3 days or fewer in either direction. (See fig. 1.):
Figure 1: Average Annual Operational Tempo within Six Reserve
Components, 1992-20[Footnote 11]01:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs data.
[End of figure]
Some Units and Reservists Have Been Affected Disproportionately:
Component-wide averages do not reflect the wide differences in the
operational tempos of individual reservists in certain units and
occupations in all of the reserve components. While the Air Force seeks
to spread its high operational tempos as evenly as possible (relying on
reservists to volunteer regularly for deployments of 30 days or less),
the other components deploy some reservists for 6 or more months, while
typically keeping the rest of their forces on 38-or 39-day annual
training schedules. For example, hundreds of Army National Guard
soldiers have participated in each of the past three peacekeeping
rotations to Bosnia, and hundreds more are scheduled to participate in
future 6-month deployments. Personnel in the fields of aviation,
special forces, security, intelligence, psychological operations, and
civil affairs have experienced operational tempos that are two to seven
times higher than those of the average reservist. Over the past few
years, all the civil affairs groups in the Army and Marine Corps
Reserves have supported lengthy Balkans operations. In fact, between
1998 and 2001, eight members of the Marine Corps Civil Affairs Group
that we visited deployed to the Balkans twice--
7 to 9 months in Bosnia and an additional 6 months to Kosovo. Appendix
II lists other examples of high tempos in the units we visited.
Training requirements also contribute to the high tempos of some
occupational specialties and units. For example, most Air Force Reserve
and Air National Guard pilots spend at least 87 days on active duty
each year in order to maintain their proficiency. During the year
before an overseas deployment or major training exercise, ground forces
may also face extremely high training requirements. For example,
members of the 49th Armored Division (Texas Army National Guard)
averaged 108 days of training prior to their 270-day mobilization to
Bosnia.
The War on Terrorism Has Increased All Tempos:
Between September 2001 and March 2002, operational tempos increased
significantly for all of DOD‘s reserve components due to the partial
mobilization[Footnote 12] in effect to support operations Noble Eagle
and Enduring Freedom, the domestic and overseas operations associated
with the war on terrorism. Table 1 shows the numbers of reservists on
duty on March 19, 2002, when DOD‘s weekly report figures
peaked.[Footnote 13] In numerical terms, the Army and the Air National
Guards had the most people on duty. However, in percentage terms, the
Coast Guard Reserve and the Air National Guard have been the most
heavily utilized components. The 95,060 reservists on duty March 19,
2002, represent a significant increase over the 35,000 reservists who
were on duty supporting worldwide military operations during an average
day in fiscal year 2000. Most reservists supporting operations Noble
Eagle and Enduring Freedom were federally mobilized under involuntary
orders. Complete data is not yet available on how long reservists are
serving in these operations, but as of March 2002 many had already been
mobilized for 6 months.
Table 1: Reservists on Duty to Support the War on Terrorism, March 19,
2002:
Component: Army National Guard; Reservists on duty[A]: 25,984;
Percentage of component‘s reserve force[B]: 7.
Component: Air National Guard; Reservists on duty[A]: 24,752;
Percentage of component‘s reserve force[B]: 23.
Component: Air Force Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 14,136; Percentage
of component‘s reserve force[B]: 10.
Component: Army Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 13,703; Percentage of
component‘s reserve force[B]: 4.
Component: Naval Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 9,827; Percentage of
component‘s reserve force[B]: 5.
Component: Marine Corps Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 4,788;
Percentage of component‘s reserve force[B]: 5.
Component: Coast Guard Reserve; Reservists on duty[A]: 1,870;
Percentage of component‘s reserve force[B]: 15.
Component: Total; Reservists on duty[A]: 95,060; Percentage of
component‘s reserve force[B]: 7.
[A] Figures include personnel on duty for airport security, volunteers,
and those mobilized for state and federal missions, as well as for
training directly related to the war on terrorism.
[B] Percentages are based on reserve force of 1.3 million rather than
on drilling reserve population of 870,000.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
[End of table]
Component-level figures again do not reflect the impact on some
specialties and units. The Naval Reserve, for example, has deployed
only about 5 percent of its total force, but deployed almost all of its
reservists in the master-at-arms and 9545 (security) fields.[Footnote
14]
Figure 2 shows that the majority of reservists supporting operations
related to the war on terrorism have been involuntarily called to duty
under the partial mobilization that went into effect in September 2001.
Even if the mobilized force declines in size, the mobilization could
have considerable long-term effects on reserve operational tempos
because it allows DOD to activate reservists involuntarily for as long
as 2 years. Between the end of the Gulf War and September 2001,
reservists who were involuntarily mobilized to support operations in
the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and elsewhere had been called to duty
under Presidential Reserve Call-ups, which limit duty to a maximum of
270 days.
Figure 2: Reserve Buildup to Support the War on Terrorism:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
[End of figure]
DOD‘S Management of Relations Between Reservists and Their Employers
Could Be Improved:
Good relations between reservists and their employers are important,
because deployments can be disruptive to employers, and difficulties,
if not resolved, could lead some reservists to abandon military
service. Yet, DOD has been hampered in managing its activities aimed at
enhancing relations between reservists and their employers because it
lacks complete information on who the employers are. We found that both
reservists and employers are experiencing a variety of problems, yet
DOD may be unaware of the full extent of problems because reservists
and employers do not always contact the ESGR for help, and volunteer
ombudsmen in the field do not always report contacts that are made.
Furthermore, because the ESGR is not specifically tasked with helping
student reservists, their unique problems are not being fully
identified and addressed. Finally, the department has not fully
analyzed information that could help identify actions needed to improve
relations between reservists and their employers.
Incomplete Information on Employers Has Hampered DOD‘s Outreach
Activities:
Although DOD recognizes that employer support is crucial to the health
of its reserve forces and has taken steps to improve this support, its
outreach efforts are hampered because it cannot identify all of its
reservists‘ employers. Recent efforts to have reservists voluntarily
report the names of their employers have met with only limited success.
DOD has not required reservists to report the names of their employers
in the belief that doing so would be inconsistent with the Privacy Act.
[Footnote 15] However, a reexamination of this position may be
warranted because collecting such information would appear to be
central to the ESGR‘s mission.
DOD does not have complete information on employers:
There is no complete listing of the civilian employers of DOD‘s reserve
members. At various times, reserve units, the reserve components, the
services, and DOD have attempted to compile lists of the civilian
employers of their reservists. However, none of these lists were
comprehensive, and the limited lists that were assembled were generally
not kept up to date.[Footnote 16] For example, to prepare for a survey
in 1999, DOD assembled a list of 13,752 employers of its reserve
members. However, when DOD officials provided us with a copy of the
list in 2001, they acknowledged that this list was incomplete[Footnote
17] and that it had not been updated since it was first assembled.
The lack of a complete and up-to-date list of employers has hampered
the ESGR‘s ability to conduct outreach efforts. For example, the ESGR
conducts a ’boss lift“ program, which takes employers to reservists‘
training or deployment sites to increase employers‘ appreciation of the
work reservists do, as well as an employer award program. We found that
some units have conducted multiple boss lifts and have given out scores
of employer awards, while other units have had no contact with ESGR
representatives and have not given out any awards or conducted any boss
lifts.
Voluntary reporting has not yielded complete list of employers:
In 2001, DOD created a data base to collect employer information from
reservists being mobilized, but the data base is incomplete. Reservists
are being asked to supply information voluntarily. On May 14, 2002, the
data base contained data on fewer than 11,000 employers, although more
than 73,000 reservists had been mobilized to support the war on
terrorism.
DOD has been reluctant to mandate that reservists provide information
about their civilian employers due to Privacy Act concerns. The Privacy
Act limits the amount and type of personal information that the
government can collect from individuals, stating that organizations may
keep records of such information only ’as is relevant and necessary“
for them to accomplish their missions. DOD officials told us that if
the requirements of the Privacy Act could be satisfied, they would
support the mandatory collection of employer information.
Knowing who the employers of its reservists are and how to contact them
would appear to be information that the ESGR needs in order to carry
out its mission. The ESGR was established to enlist the support of
employers in encouraging employee and citizen participation in the
Guard and Reserve. The responsibilities of the NCESGR/ESGR, listed in
DOD Directive 1250.1,[Footnote 18] include taking actions to:
* operate a proactive program that ensures employers‘ understanding of
the role of the reserves;
* encourage compliance with USERRA;
* prevent, resolve, and reduce employer problems and misunderstandings
through informational services and mediation;
* solicit feedback on employer attitudes and opinions regarding
participation in the reserves and recommend programs or initiatives to
enhance and sustain employer support;
* recognize employers who are supportive of their reservist employees;
and:
* enhance contact and cooperation between local reserve commanders and
employers.
Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense has stated that the Guard and
Reserve need the complete support of our nation‘s employers to
accomplish their missions. We believe that a complete list of all
reservists‘ civilian employers would therefore be both relevant and
necessary if the ESGR is to effectively accomplish the purpose for
which it was created.
Despite Extensive Briefings, Some Reservists And Employers Are Unsure
of Their Rights And Responsibilities:
DOD conducts hundreds of annual briefings to inform reservists and
their employers about their rights and responsibilities under USERRA.
In addition to these briefings and other outreach efforts, several DOD
Internet sites explain the law or contain links that direct people to
the law or explanations of the law.[Footnote 19] Despite DOD‘s efforts,
we found that a sizable number of reservists and employers were unsure
about their rights and responsibilities.
Employers. Because DOD does not know all the employers of its
reservists, it cannot inform them directly of their rights and
responsibilities. A 1999 employer survey by DOD found that 31 percent
of respondents were not aware of any laws protecting reservists. Twelve
percent of the 111 respondents in our employer survey said that they
were unaware of USERRA‘s requirements--despite the fact that their
employees were in the reserve components‘ most highly deployed units.
Most reserve unit commanders we interviewed estimated that at least
one-fourth of employers do not understand the law‘s requirements. The
importance of identifying all employers was demonstrated during one of
DOD‘s most successful outreach efforts, a recent airline symposium. At
that symposium, a major airline representative stated that the success
of previous symposiums was demonstrated by the fact that his airline
’is now in compliance with the law.“ He stated that previously his
airline was violating the law because it was unaware of the law‘s
requirements. This airline is now widely recognized as an exemplary
employer of reservists.
Most private-sector employers and state and local governments are also
apparently unaware of another very important option: they may request
that some of their workers be listed as ’key employees“ who cannot be
mobilized.[Footnote 20] On the other hand, federal agencies, which
employ about 10 percent of reservists, are well aware of the option and
designated 824 of their own employees in that category in 1999. But
even after September 11, 2001, only a handful of non-government
employers had made similar requests, possibly indicating that most
employers are (or were until very recently) unaware of this option.
Reservists. While most reservists in the high operational tempo units
we visited knew that a reemployment law existed, many were unfamiliar
with their specific rights and responsibilities, and a number of
reservists in our focus group discussions said they had never even
heard of USERRA. The ESGR attempts to provide an annual briefing for
all reserve members on their rights and responsibilities under the law,
but the ESGR acknowledges that the program is not yet reaching all
reservists. On September 20, 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense
(Personnel and Readiness) issued guidance to the services stating that
all mobilization orders should include a reference to the ESGR‘s toll-
free telephone number and Web site so that reservists can contact the
ESGR if they have questions regarding their employment/reemployment
rights.
Extent of Reservist and Employer Problems Is Not Well Understood:
We found that reservists and employers alike have experienced problems
associated with military service. At every unit we visited, we found
some reservists who alleged that their employer had not complied with
USERRA, and we found that the problems of student reservists, who
represent an estimated one-third of the reserve force, are not being
fully addressed. Among other things, employers complained about not
receiving sufficient advance notice of deployments and of being unable,
under certain conditions, to verify their employees‘ military duty.
Yet the ESGR is not keeping track of all the times that reservists or
employers try to contact the organization for help, and its system of
volunteer mediators is not reporting all cases consistently. Therefore
the ESGR cannot know the extent of problems or what actions may be
needed to improve the effectiveness of its outreach and mediation
efforts.
Reservists at every unit visited reported difficulties:
Most of the reservists we spoke with said that their employers complied
with USERRA provisions,[Footnote 21] and some even said that their
employers had provided benefits above and beyond the requirements of
the law.[Footnote 22] However, at every focus group in every unit we
visited, some reservists had complaints about their employers. Some
said that their supervisors were hostile toward their reserve duty and
had actively encouraged them to leave the reserves. Others alleged
employer misconduct that, if confirmed, would be a clear violation of
the law.[Footnote 23] Allegations included being denied required
medical benefits, being forced to use vacation time for military duty,
and being fired. In one unit, more than 30 percent of the members we
surveyed claimed to have had problems with their employers when they
returned from an extended deployment to Bosnia.[Footnote 24] For
example, one said she was fired, and another claimed he had to reapply
for his job.
Reserve officials, reservists, and employers all commented that even in
companies with good policies to support reservist employees, reservists
can face front-line supervisors who do not always comply with the
policies. One reservist told us that despite working for a major
corporation that has received numerous ESGR awards, he was placed on
probation after returning from a 9-month Bosnia mobilization. Appendix
III provides examples of the types of problems cited by reservists in
our focus groups, as well as the benefits provided by some exemplary
employers.
Students experience unique problems:
Student reservists, who make up a sizeable portion of the reserve
force, have a special set of problems because there is no federal
statute to protect them against loss of tuition, housing fees, or
academic credit when they are mobilized. In addition, DOD Directive
1250.1 (which lays out the responsibilities of the ESGR) does not
expressly task the ESGR with mediating disputes between reservists and
their schools. Yet up to one-third of all reservists may be students,
according to DOD officials. And our survey of 1,608 reservists from
high operational tempo units found that 22 percent of them were
students.[Footnote 25]
After the partial mobilization in September 2001, the Servicemembers
Opportunity Colleges[Footnote 26] volunteered to mediate any disputes
that arose between student reservists and their schools. However, a
senior official from the organization told us that as of January 9,
2002, they had handled only 24 cases. None of the student reservists
who had voiced concerns at our focus groups had contacted the
organization. Reservists may simply be unaware of the organization,
because, unlike the ESGR, it does not have a comprehensive network of
volunteers to reach out to reservists. While student reservists who
become aware of the organization are likely to use its Web site to
obtain information, some may be reluctant to rely on it to
independently mediate disputes with educational institutions because
the organization is a consortium of national higher education
associations.
Because the ESGR has not been specifically tasked with addressing
student reservists‘ problems, it has not established a program to deal
systematically with concerns that arise. A student‘s occupation is not
directly comparable to that of an employee, and therefore questions
inevitably arise about the specific protections that might be
reasonably afforded to students. Some states have laws that offer
student reservists the option of obtaining tuition refunds when they
are called to active duty or completing their course work following
their military duty.[Footnote 27] Such protections come at a cost to
educational institutions and therefore require careful study.
Employers also reported difficulties:
Information from our employer survey[Footnote 28] as well as our
discussions with employers highlighted several problems linked to
reservists‘ military service.
Advance notice. Many employers are not receiving adequate advance
notice prior to their reservist employees‘ departure for military duty.
USERRA requires that employers receive written or oral advance
notification but does not specify how far in advance it should be given
and does not require notification if ’military necessity“ or other
relevant circumstances prevent giving notice.
Although the law does not specify a timeframe for advance notice of
employers, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs has emphasized the need to provide orders well in advance of
deployments,[Footnote 29] in part so that employers could be notified
promptly. In 1999, DOD had identified inadequate employer notification
as one of the problems it needed to address. And the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has warned that ’unjustifiably
late notification may harm the working relationship between
(reservists) and their civilian employers.“ Yet in spite of repeated
memoranda from the Assistant Secretary, advance notification continues
to be a problem, and the services have not consistently met the 30-day
advance notification goal. On September 13, 2000, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness approved a recommended change to
a DOD directive that would have tasked the services with monitoring the
timeliness of advance notifications. However, as of January 2002 the
directive had not been updated to reflect the recommended change, and
DOD still had no validated data to measure the extent of the advance
notice problem. [Footnote 30]
In discussions with us and in their survey responses, reservists and
employers cited cases in which notification was given much less than 30
days in advance. While some reservists told us that they have been able
to provide their employers with sufficient advance notice, many told us
that they themselves did not receive their orders until a few days--or
in some cases, just hours--before deploying. The commanding general
told us that one unit in his Bosnia task force had not received its
orders until after it had arrived in Bosnia. Sixty-eight of 111
employers who responded to our survey said that they typically receive
less than 30 days‘ advance notice, and 31 of them said that they
typically receive notification 7 days or less in advance.
Verification. Employers cannot verify their employees‘ attendance at
military duties that last 30 days or less. USERRA gives employers the
right to request verification for periods of duty that are 31 days or
longer, but some employers believe they should have the right to
request documentation for lesser periods if they think their employees
are not being honest about their duty commitments. According to
employers, some units and reservists do provide documentation for
military duty of less than 31 days, but others do not, even when asked
to do so. Employers noted that they do not want to be flooded with
orders for every weekend duty, they simply want to be able to verify
duty in the few cases where they suspect an employee might abuse the
system. During the airline symposium, senior reserve component
officials expressed a willingness to work with employers to try and
minimize or eliminate cases where reservists ’abuse their employers“ by
volunteering for non-critical reserve duties at times that are
particularly inconvenient for the employer.
Costs and disruptions. Reservist employees often cost employers more
than those who are not reservists because many employers must pay
overtime premiums to their remaining workers who do the work of
deployed reservists. Other employers provide pay or benefits to
deployed reservists while also providing pay and benefits to temporary
workers who replace the deployed reservists. In addition, pre-
deployment training can cause major disruptions to work schedules, and
the early, unexpected return of a reservist can add to costs if both
the reservist and the substitute must be paid.[Footnote 31]
Small employers. DOD and service officials said that small employers
are most affected by their employees‘ reserve duties. A firm of four
people that loses one of its workers to military service has lost 25
percent of its work force. These losses can be especially hard if the
reservists perform a key role within the company (for example, if the
reservist is the company‘s only bookkeeper or salesperson). DOD‘s 1999
survey of employers excluded firms with fewer than five employees.
However, as noted, DOD does not have a complete or up-to-date list of
employers and therefore does not actually know how many employers have
fewer than five employees. Our survey of 1,608 reservists found that
only 5 percent worked for companies with fewer than five people.
However, our survey included only reservists from high operational
tempo units and is therefore not projectable to all
reservists.[Footnote 32]
Not all problems are being reported:
ESGR officials told us that the caseloads of its ombudsmen, who help
mediate disputes between reservists and their employers, have been
rising, but they also acknowledged that the ESGR does not have an
accurate count of all cases because of incomplete reporting.[Footnote
33] In fiscal year 2001, the ESGR reported 11,500 cases, but this
figure includes both an accurate count of cases handled by a few full-
time paid ombudsmen at headquarters and a much less accurate count of
cases handled by hundreds of part-time volunteers in the field.
Reporting by volunteers has been sporadic, and some field offices have
gone an entire year without reporting any cases at all. The ESGR, in
other words, does not have a complete or accurate way of tracking and
reporting all contacts made with employers and reservists who are
seeking help.[Footnote 34]
The current system, which relies largely on part-time volunteers in the
field, does not ensure complete reporting. This is because ESGR
volunteers--by virtue of the fact that they are volunteering their
services in their limited spare time--cannot reasonably be expected to
document every single contact. Moreover, volunteers are not always
available to field telephone inquiries. Although many reservists said
positive things about ESGR‘s volunteers, others said that they had not
contacted the ESGR because the volunteers were hard to reach, and a few
who had reached the ombudsmen said that they were not helpful. ESGR
officials told us they plan to set up a new system that would
eventually route all telephone calls to the ESGR to a central office.
The system would ensure that all calls are answered, either by the
full-time headquarters staff or by local volunteers (during their
office hours). However, the details of this plan, including funding,
timelines, and responsibilities, have not been worked out.
Disputes that cannot be resolved by the ESGR are referred to the
Department of Labor. Figure 3 shows that the number of cases (relative
to the number of reservists) handled annually by Labor has generally
declined since fiscal year 1995. The actual number of cases referred to
the Department of Labor declined from 1,069 in fiscal year 1995 to 724
in fiscal year 2001.
Figure 3: Declines in Department of Labor Cases:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.
[End of figure]
Several reasons could account for the drop, including a tight labor
market that forced employers to be more accommodating and a larger
number of cases resolved by the ESGR.
Data That Could Enhance Program Management Has Not Been Analyzed:
DOD collects a variety of information on reserve recruitment,
retention, and deployments. But it has not combined this information to
examine the possible effects of high operational tempos on the reserves
or to identify actions that might be needed to address problems in
employee-reservist relations. A surprise problem is that some
reservists want to deploy more and are unable to do so because of
certain barriers.
Of specific concern is the effect that high operational tempos may have
on reserve retention. DOD recently conducted a survey of 75,000
reservists. Once analyzed, it should provide some information on why
reservists stay in or leave the reserves. Several studies have
attempted to identify a possible link between operational tempo and
retention, but they focused on the active forces and came to different
conclusions. However, in October 2000, for the first time, DOD began
collecting operational tempo data on each individual reservist. An
analysis of the data might shed new light on whether operational tempos
are affecting retention rates for reservists in specific occupational
specialties.
Our data, when combined with DOD‘s recruiting data, shows that reserve
recruiting bears close scrutiny. Although the reserve components
generally had good recruiting years during the recession in 2001, the
Marine Corps Reserve was the only component that consistently reached
its goals in each of the last 5 years.[Footnote 35] Two other trends
are emerging: (1) more people without prior military experience are
joining the reserves and (2) our survey indicates that these new
recruits
are less inclined to stay in the reserves over the long term. The
number
of soldiers from the active forces who joined the selected reserves
dropped from 59.1 percent in fiscal year 1999 to 49.6 percent in fiscal
year 2001. Our survey of reservists in high tempo units, though not
projectable, showed wide differences in the career intentions of prior
service and non-prior service reservists. About 73 percent of
reservists who had served 4 or more years on active duty intended to
stay in the reserves for 20 years or more, but only about 54 percent of
those without prior active duty service intended to stay for a full 20-
year career. If this difference in attitudes were true across the
reserve force, the shift to non-prior-service recruiting would lead to
higher recruiting requirements in the future, as fewer reservists
remain in the reserves for full 20-year careers.
One unexpected finding of our study was that a significant number of
reservists in the highly deployed units we surveyed have wanted to
deploy even more. However, the services have been discouraged from
deploying these individuals by the effects of recent
legislation,[Footnote 36] which requires that service members who are
deployed for 401 or more days in a rolling
730-day (2-year) period receive a $100 high-deployment per diem
allowance.[Footnote 37]
Sixteen percent of the reservists who responded to our survey said that
they chose to join their unit because of the unit‘s high operational
tempo; of these, half said operational tempo was the ’main“ reason they
joined their unit. During our focus group discussions, a number of
reservists said that they had enjoyed their operational deployments and
were anxious to return to overseas missions, such as those in the
Balkans, because they felt they were ’making a difference.“ Others said
that they would have extended their tours to the Balkans, had this been
an option, and several even said that they had offered to forgo the
$100-per-day high-deployment allowance just to be able to deploy again.
These reservists had been told that the law did not allow the payments
to be waived.
Prior to the enactment of the high-deployment legislation, some active
service members who were not anxious to deploy had experienced
deployment rates above the 400-day threshold. On the other hand, the
reserve components had limited involuntary deployments of their members
even prior to the legislation, and generally the only reservists who
spent more than 400 of 730 days deployed were volunteers. Even before
the payment requirement was suspended following the attacks of
September 11, the services‘ extreme reluctance to pay the high-
deployment per diem allowance had prevented some reservists with
considerable overseas mission experience from being able to
deploy.[Footnote 38] When the suspension on the requirement is lifted,
some reservists who want to deploy may not be able to, and some who do
not want to deploy may be forced to take their places.
Information on these types of trends needs to be monitored and
analyzed, in conjunction with retention and deployment data, to provide
a better understanding of the effects that deployments may be having on
reserve forces. Using these multiple data sources on a continuing basis
could also help the ESGR better decide whether additional actions may
be needed to assist reservists and their employers.
Conclusions:
To effectively manage activities aimed at enhancing relations between
reservists and their employers, DOD must be able to communicate
directly with these reservists‘ employers. However, DOD‘s management of
these activities has been hampered by incomplete information on who
these employers are. Recent efforts requesting that reservists
voluntarily provide employer information have yielded only partial
information. As a result, DOD cannot inform all employers of their
rights and obligations, cannot identify the best employers for
recognition, cannot carry out effective outreach activities, and cannot
implement proactive public affairs campaigns. DOD has opted for a
voluntary reporting system in the belief that requiring reservists to
provide information on their employers may violate the Privacy Act.
Determining whether the mandatory collection of such information is
necessary and relevant to the ESGR‘s mission is the first step in
improving the quality of information in DOD‘s employer data base.
The ESGR has an active program to address problems that arise between
reservists and their civilian employers. However, to date, there is no
federal statute to protect students, who make up an estimated one-third
of all reservists, against loss of tuition, credits, and educational
standing due to unexpected or extended deployments. Such difficulties
could discourage this portion of DOD‘s force from joining and remaining
in the reserves. The directive, which spells out the ESGR‘s mission and
responsibilities, is silent with respect to outreach programs to
address difficulties student reservists may encounter. Therefore, DOD
may need to amend the ESGR‘s mission and responsibilities to more
expressly include students so that the ESGR‘s outreach activities will
better serve the needs of all reservists. More study is needed to
determine what legal or other protections might be reasonably afforded
to student reservists, because a student‘s occupation is not directly
comparable to that of an employee and because educational institutions
would be affected by such changes in different ways than civilian
employers.
The ESGR‘s volunteer ombudsmen are providing important contributions to
the ESGR‘s mission; however, they are not always available to field
telephone calls from reservists and employers and do not always report
their outreach efforts. As a result, the ESGR cannot determine the
magnitude or effectiveness of its mediation and outreach efforts and
cannot determine whether its programs are being implemented in ways
that are fair and transparent to all employers. The ESGR‘s tentative
plans to move to a system whereby calls are handled centrally might
yield more complete and accurate information regarding complaints,
conflicts, and allegations so that they can be addressed promptly and
consistently. Even with a different system for fielding calls,
volunteers could continue to contribute to the ESGR‘s mission as they
have in the past, but with fewer administrative responsibilities.
DOD recognizes that extended deployments can have a disruptive effect
on both reservists and their employers and has emphasized the
importance of providing sufficient advance notification of deployments
to both parties. DOD has made several attempts over the last few years
to achieve its goal of issuing orders 30 days in advance of deployments
so that reservists can notify their employees promptly. Despite these
efforts, advance notification continues to be a problem, and the
services have not complied consistently with the 30-day goal. Although
there will always be cases in which the 30-day goal cannot be met due
to the exigencies of military crises, a better understanding of why the
goal is not being met would help the services know what they can do to
reduce the incidence of insufficient advance notification.
Additionally, giving employers the right to verify military duty
lasting less than 31 days, as some employers desire, appears to be a
reasonable accommodation that could be granted without undue hardship
on the part of DOD or reservists.
The legislation that was intended to provide service members additional
compensation for lengthy deployments has had the unintentional effect
of penalizing a number of experienced reservists who want to deploy
more than 400 days during a 2-year period. The requirements of the
legislation are currently suspended, and reservists are free to
volunteer as often as they like without the services having to pay them
an extra $100 per day for service in excess of 400 days. However, the
provisions of the legislation will go back into effect after the
current partial mobilization ends. Allowing the services to use
volunteers without paying the high-deployment per diem allowance could
help minimize the negative effects and hardships associated with
involuntary mobilizations and contribute to the long-term health of the
reserve force.
A great deal of information has been regularly collected on reserve
force deployments, operational tempos, recruiting, retention, and prior
active-duty service, and additional survey and individual tempo data
has recently been collected. Using this full range of data on an
ongoing basis could help DOD identify trends and gain a better
understanding of the reasons why reservists leave the reserves and why
active-duty service members choose not to enter the reserves. This
information could assist the ESGR in better formulating its outreach
activities to employers.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to (1) increase the scope and effectiveness of DOD‘s outreach
programs, (2) promote good relations between reservists and their
employers or schools, and (3) increase an understanding of the effects
of high operational tempos on reservists, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, take the following actions:
* Reexamine the provisions of the Privacy Act and determine whether
requiring reservists to report information about their civilian
employers is consistent with the act. If a positive determination is
made, the Secretary should require all reserve personnel to provide the
Defense Manpower Data Center with the name, full address, and telephone
number of their civilian employer, and update this information
promptly, as necessary.
* Add students as a target population to the mission and
responsibilities of the ESGR, study in depth the problems related to
deployments that student reservists have experienced, and determine
what actions the ESGR might take to help students and their educational
institutions.
* Direct the ESGR to promptly finalize and implement its plans to have
all calls to ombudsmen routed through a single toll-free number and
central processing station.
* Direct the services to determine how many orders are not being issued
30 days in advance of deployments, and why. We recognize that it will
not be possible to achieve the 30-day goal in all cases. Once the
causes are clearly identified, the Secretary should direct the services
to take the necessary corrective actions and periodically assess
progress toward fuller compliance with the goal.
* Develop a policy so that reserve units will provide employers, upon
request, with verification of military service periods lasting less
than 30 days.
* Analyze the effects of the high-deployment per diem statutory
provision on reservists, taking into account that deployment patterns
for reservists are different from those of active duty members, and
that virtually no reservists have been forced to deploy involuntarily
for more than 400 days over a 730-day period; if warranted, propose
changes to this statutory provision.
* Analyze, on an ongoing basis, departmental data on trends in the
reserves for use in formulating outreach activities to employers.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
with our recommendations. The Department specifically concurred with
our recommendations on 1) collection of employer information, 2) the
needs of student reservists, 3) ombudsmen‘s assistance, 4) verification
of service lasting less than 30 days, and 5) the use of data and trend
analyses to formulate outreach activities.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation concerning the timely
issuance of orders. It agreed that it is important to issue orders in a
timely fashion and said that its ’objective“ is to establish a policy
requiring that orders be issued 30 days in advance, unless operational
requirements dictate otherwise. It further stated that ’there is merit
to studying reasons why the Reserve components sometimes miss this (30-
day) goal“ and said it has encouraged the services to review their
processes and establish metrics for internal management purposes.
However, it did not concur with the need for the services to report
quarterly progress toward achieving that goal, stating that this would
create a ’further“ administrative burden on those involved with the
order-writing process.
We believe that if DOD formalizes its 30-day goal as planned, and if
the services 1) review their internal processes to determine why the
goal has been missed and 2) establish advance notification metrics for
internal management purposes, the intent of our recommendation will
have been met, and routine reporting may be unnecessary. However, since
DOD acknowledges that late orders are a recurring problem, despite
several memos from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs stressing the importance of this issue, we believe it
is important that sufficient attention be given to a clear
identification of the reasons why units have not been able to comply
more fully with the 30-day goal. A better understanding of the reasons
is essential to identify corrective actions that need to be taken. In
view of DOD‘s stated actions, we have modified our recommendation by
dropping a quarterly reporting requirement and replacing it with a
requirement to periodically assess the services‘ progress toward fuller
compliance with the 30-day goal.
DOD did not concur with our recommendation to analyze the effects of
the high-deployment per diem provision on reservists and, if warranted,
to propose changes to the provision. It stated that when the policy was
issued, senior leadership made a specific determination to include the
reserve components, and it further suggested that it may be better to
expand reserve participation in operational support missions. Although
the determination to include reserve components in the policy may have
been valid at the time the policy was issued, we believe that this
decision should be reexamined in light of currently available
information. For example, we found no cases in which the policy
prevented or even limited ’excessive“ burdens being placed on
reservists, even though DOD states that the objective of the policy is
’to prevent excessive (temporary duty) burdens being placed on any
active or Reserve member.“ And the services‘ reluctance to pay the
high-deployment per diem allowance may result in reservists being
called up involuntarily when others were willing to serve additional
time voluntarily. In units in short supply and heavy demand, some who
could be called involuntarily may have already served extensively. As
we noted in our report, involuntary and repeated call-ups could
adversely affect reserve retention rates. Therefore, we continue to
believe that DOD needs to further analyze the effects of the high-
deployment per diem provision on reserve members and determine whether
changes need to be made.
DOD also provided technical comments that we incorporated as
appropriate. DOD‘s comments are reprinted in appendix IX.
We performed our work between December 2000 and April 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of
the Air Force. This report will also be made available on GAO‘s home
page at www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3958. Others making key contributions to this
report are included in appendix X.
Carol Schuster
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Carol Schuster:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report is issued in response to a request from the Personnel
Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, which asked GAO to
review issues and challenges surrounding the increased use of reserve
forces. As agreed with your offices, we (1) determined how increases in
military operations have affected operational tempos of the reserve
components and individual reservists and (2) assessed relations between
reservists and their civilian employers, focusing specifically on the
Defense department‘s outreach efforts designed to improve these
important relationships.
To determine how increases in military operations have affected
operational tempos of the reserve components and individual reservists,
we collected and analyzed deployment data and identified areas where
tempos were high or increasing. We then analyzed available retention
data to see if any of the data followed the same patterns as deployment
data.[Footnote 39] We discussed the observed trends with top-level
reserve officials throughout the Department of Defense. Meetings were
held with Deputy Assistant Secretaries and other officials from the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/
RA), the National Guard and Reserve General Officer Advisors to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with headquarters
representatives from each of DOD‘s six reserve components.
Specifically, we met with four reserve component commanders--the
Directors of the Naval Reserve and the Air National Guard, both located
in Arlington, Virginia; the Chief of the Air Force Reserve in the
Pentagon; and the Director of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve Affairs
Division in Quantico, Virginia--and their staffs. We also met with key
officials from the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and the
Office of the Director of the Army National Guard, both located in
Arlington, Virginia.[Footnote 40]
To assess the Department of Defense‘s management of activities aimed at
promoting employers‘ support of their reservist employees, we contacted
officials from the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard
and Reserve (ESGR) in Arlington, Virginia, and local ESGR officials in
California, Colorado, Ohio, Louisiana, Texas, and Wyoming. We obtained
the information that DOD had collected on reservists‘ civilian
employers and reviewed ESGR award data, as well as its data concerning
employer problems. We also reviewed and analyzed data from the 1994 and
1997 Air Force Reserve Employer Support Surveys and the1999 Reserve
Employer Survey commissioned by OASD/RA. We attended ESGR briefings and
award ceremonies and the July 2001 and March 2002 symposiums between
the airlines and the reserve components. We also asked high tempo units
if they had any unit initiatives to reach out to their reservists‘
civilian employers.
To gain firsthand information from reservists and employers on how
deployments had affected them, we collected deployment data and
identified reserve units and personnel that had recently experienced
high operating tempos. These included units within each of DOD‘s six
reserve components. We did not randomly sample DOD‘s 1.3 million
reservists to determine the effects of increased tempos due to the cost
and time involved and because DOD had recently conducted a random
survey of 75,000 reservists on related issues.
Because each service has a different mission and uses its reservists
very differently, we developed a survey[Footnote 41] to provide some
baseline data for all the high tempo reservists we visited. Our visits
were scheduled during normal drill weekends, and generally all
reservists who were present at the drills were surveyed. In total 1,608
reservists were surveyed. Although our survey responses are not
projectable to the total reserve population, all of DOD‘s reserve
components were represented in the responses, as were different
geographic locations throughout the country.[Footnote 42] The events of
September 11, 2001, made it impossible to complete all planned visits;
however, some of the units that we had planned to visit distributed our
surveys to their reservists even though we were not able to attend
their monthly drills.
A list of the units and higher headquarters that we surveyed and
visited follows:
Units: 404th Civil Affairs Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve), Fort Dix, New
Jersey.
Units: 13th Psychological Operations Battalion (U.S. Army Reserve),
Arden Hills, Minnesota.
Units: 249th Signal Battalion (Texas Army National Guard), Mineral
Wells, Texas.
Units: 629th Military Intelligence Battalion (Maryland Army National
Guard), Laurel, Maryland.
Units: 48th Enhanced Infantry Brigade (Georgia Army National Guard),
Macon, Georgia.
Units: 648th Engineer Battalion (Georgia Army National Guard), Douglas,
Georgia.
Units: USS Wadsworth (FFG-9) (U.S. Naval Reserve), San Diego,
California.
Units: USS Curts (FFG-38) (U.S. Naval Reserve), San Diego, California.
Units: VP-65 Patrol Squadron (U.S. Naval Reserve), Point Mugu,
California.
Units: Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 59 (U.S. Naval Reserve), Fort
Worth, Texas[1].
Units: 4th Civil Affairs Group (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve), Naval
District Washington, Anacostia Annex, District of Columbia.
Units: Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452 (U.S. Marine Corps
Reserve), Stewart Air National Guard Base, New York[1].
Units: Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234 (U.S. Marine Corps
Reserve), Fort Worth, Texas.
Units: 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marines (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve), San
Bruno, California[1].
Units: 336th Air Refueling Squadron (U.S. Air Force Reserve), March Air
Reserve Base, California.
Units: 729th Airlift Squadron (U.S. Air Force Reserve), March Air
Reserve Base, California.
Units: 187th Airlift Squadron (Air National Guard), Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Units: 163rd Security Forces Squadron (Air National Guard), March Air
Reserve Base, California.
Units: 196th Aerial Refueling Squadron (Air National Guard), March Air
Reserve Base, California.
Units: 112th Fighter Squadron (Air National Guard), Swanton, Ohio[1].
Units: 180th Security Forces Squadron (Air National Guard), Swanton,
Ohio[1].
Units: 180th Maintenance Squadron (Air National Guard), Swanton,
Ohio[1].
[1] Command staff provided written answers to GAO questions, and unit
personnel completed surveys, but we did not personally interview
personnel from these units.
[End of table]
Higher Headquarters Commands: U.S. Army Special Operations Command,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Higher Headquarters Commands: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Higher Headquarters Commands: 29th Infantry Division (Light) (VA Army
National Guard), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Higher Headquarters Commands: 49th Armored Division (TX Army National
Guard), Camp Mabry, Texas.
Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Reserve Force, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Surface Reserve Force, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Air Reserve Force, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
Higher Headquarters Commands: Reserve Intelligence Area Four (U.S.
Naval Reserve), San Diego, California.
Higher Headquarters Commands: Naval Air Reserve Point Mugu, California.
Higher Headquarters Commands: Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, Reserve Affairs Division (U.S. Marine Corps Reserve),
Quantico, Virginia.
Higher Headquarters Commands: 452nd Air Mobility Wing (U.S. Air Force
Reserve), March Air Reserve Base, California.
Higher Headquarters Commands: 446th Airlift Wing (U.S. Air Force
Reserve), McChord Air Force Base, Washington.
Higher Headquarters Commands: Headquarters California Air National
Guard, Sacramento, California.
Higher Headquarters Commands: 153rd Airlift Wing (Air National Guard),
Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Higher Headquarters Commands: 163rd Air Refueling Wing (Air National
Guard), March Air Reserve Base, California.
Higher Headquarters Commands: 180th Fighter Wing (Air National Guard),
Swanton, Ohio.
[End of table]
During our unit visits, we also held focus group discussions with
reservists who had recently deployed. The discussions centered on
reservists‘ relationships with their civilian employers, the types of
support that the reservists had received during their deployments, and
steps that could be taken to improve support during future deployments.
However, we also discussed ways that DOD and the services could improve
their support to reservists.
To gain the perspective of reservists‘ employers, we contacted the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and held discussions with local employers in
Austin, Texas; Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas; and Los Angeles, California.
We also met with representatives from the major passenger and cargo
airlines at the 2001 Military/Airline Symposium in Dallas, Texas, and
the 2002 symposium in Crystal City, Virginia. We also reviewed the
results of OASD/RA‘s 1999 employer survey and reviewed ESGR data on
model employers and employer problems. In addition, we mailed a survey
to 359 employers of the reservists we visited. Because neither
DOD[Footnote 43] nor any of the services had a complete and reliable
data base with the names and addresses of their reservists‘ civilian
employers, we obtained employer names and addresses during our unit
visits and mailed them our survey. These employers were not randomly
selected; therefore, our results are not projectable to all employers.
However, those surveyed included both small and large employers;
federal, state, and local government entities; and private-sector
firms.[Footnote 44]
We conducted our review from December 2000 through April 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Operational Tempos of the Reservists We Surveyed:
We surveyed 1,608 reservists from high tempo units (appendix I contains
a list of the units we visited and contains additional details on our
survey methodology). Of the 1,608 reservists we surveyed:
* 1,308 were ’traditional“ drilling reservists,
* 202 were Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) or other full-time reserve
members,
* 20 left the question about the nature of their reserve service blank,
and:
* 78 were Military Technicians who were required to be ’drilling“
military members of their units in order to maintain their full-time
civilian positions with the units.
Question #15 of our survey asked reservists to fill in the number of
days they had spent on reserve duty between September 2000 and August
2001 (the start of our unit visits). Of the 1,308 traditional
reservists that we surveyed:
* 712 performed more than the normally expected level of duty (39
days),
* 476 performed between 1 and 39 days of duty,[Footnote 45] and:
* 120 left the question blank or performed no duty during the
designated period.[Footnote 46]
In response to survey question #15, 1,188 traditional reservists said
that they had duty. The table below summarizes their responses.
[See PDF for image]
[A] Adds to more than 100 percent due to rounding.
[End of table]
We also asked the reservists to tell us about their duty in the 2
previous years. Forty-four of the 1,308 ’traditional“ reservists said
that they averaged at least 180 days of duty per year over the entire
3-year period. Another 253 reservists said they spent 180 days or more
on duty during 1 or 2 of the 3 years. About one-third of the reservists
we surveyed had spent at least 90 days on duty during 1 year during the
period from September 1998 through August 2001.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Selected Allegations of Problems with Employers or of
Exceptional Benefits Provided by Employers to Reservists:
During our focus group discussions with reservists from high
operational tempo units, a number of reservists cited problems they
allegedly had with their employers as a result of their recent military
service. (Many of these reservists had recently deployed overseas, but
the reservists were not all deployed at the same time or for the same
length of time.) Some alleged that their employers, while not breaking
the law, had acted in ways that, if true, violated the spirit of
USERRA. Yet a number of reservists also told us of ways in which their
employers went out of their way--and beyond the requirements of the
law--to support them. Reservists we interviewed worked for both public
and private employers and in firms of all sizes, from Fortune 500
companies with more than 100,000 employees to firms with a handful of
employees.
It should be noted that we did not verify the statements made to assess
their accuracy, and we did not follow up with the Department of Labor
or the ESGR to determine whether or how problems were resolved.
Appendix IV contains a summary of some of the provisions of USERRA, in
layman‘s language.
Examples of Problems Identified by Reservists:
Many of the examples below, if true, may have been violations of the
law; others are examples of questionable practices; still others are
examples of the hostile work environments that some reservists face.
* One Army National Guard member said he was placed on 90-day
probation, lost his seniority, was denied the annual raise that went
into effect during his absence, and lost vacation time and other
benefits.
* One Army National Guard member alleged that she was denied a raise,
bonuses, vacation time, and the right to purchase 600 shares of company
stock after her deployment.
* One Army National Guard member was told he would have to reapply for
his job. He did, but after waiting 4 months for a response, he found
work elsewhere.
* One Army National Guard member said the company for which she had
worked for 13 years laid her off in her absence as part of a downsizing
and subtracted 1 week of vacation time and 3 personal days of leave.
* One Army National Guard member who worked for a defense contractor
said she was denied a raise and some accrued leave.
* One Army National Guard member said he was demoted, lost his title
and his office, was given menial tasks, and was denied a raise.
* One Army National Guard member said she was fired. Her supervisor
told her that the work she was contracted to perform was finished and
that there was nothing left for her to do.
* One Army National Guard member alleged that his employer denied him a
pay raise that he was due.
* One Army National Guard member said that although the company
president was very supportive of her military obligations, her
supervisor was not. The supervisor apparently told her she was passed
over for promotion and did not receive a raise because she had not
performed at the same level as others, due to her absence.
* One Army National Guard member who works for the federal government
said he was denied a raise and was passed over for promotion because he
had been away on deployment.
* One Army National Guard member said his employer canceled his health
benefits.
* One Army National Guard member said he was fired immediately upon
giving his employer advance notice of his deployment. The employer, a
religious organization, allegedly told the reservist that USERRA does
not apply to religious institutions.
* One Army National Guard member said he was fired, allegedly for
missing a deadline while he was on deployment.
* One Army National Guard member said he was told he no longer had a
job because his employer had hired someone else during his absence.
* One Army National Guard member had to wait 30 days to have his health
benefits reinstated when he returned to his job.
* One Army National Guard member said his employer took away 2 personal
holidays because he had been unable to use them during deployment.
* One Army National Guard member said he was denied a Christmas bonus
that was given to all full-time workers.
* One Army National Guard member said he was denied a raise. He was
deployed for 270 days, and when he returned, there were only 6 days
left in the evaluation cycle. His employer told him that 6 days is not
enough to use as a basis for a rating, and therefore did not approve a
raise.
* One Army Reserve member said he was fired before his deployment,
shortly after he attended a 2-week training session and a 3-week
exercise.
* One Army Reserve member said he was denied vacation time and was
warned he would be fired if he remained in the reserves.
* One Army Reserve member said he had to reapply for his health
insurance benefits and faced a waiting period before coverage resumed.
* One Army Reserve member who works for a government agency said he was
not allowed to contribute to his Thrift Savings Plan while deployed and
’had trouble“ returning to his job and lost some status.
* One Army Reserve member was told that because the company‘s health
care provider had changed during his absence, there would be a
probationary period before his health coverage would become effective.
* One Air Force Reserve member said he was fired, adding that his
district manager made it known that he did not like the idea of reserve
participation.
* One Air Force Reserve member was denied a request to take 1 paid day
of leave before and after a weekend drill and said she was forced to
take unpaid leave instead. She was also told that she would have to
take leave for all future reserve duty that conflicted with her job.
* One Air National Guard member stated that he lost dental insurance
coverage.
* One Air National Guard member said he was removed from the promotion
list several times because of the time that he spent on reserve duty.
* One Air National Guard member said his employer unfairly terminated
him and actively discourages participation in the reserves.
* One Air National Guard member who worked for a local law enforcement
agency said he was fired, and that his department head deliberately
transferred or ’drove out“ reservists.
* One Naval Reserve member said he was fired just before being
deployed.
* One Marine Corps Reserve member said that when she told her new
employer at a federal agency that she wanted to join the reserves, her
supervisor warned her it would not be a good idea to join the reserves
during her probationary period.
* One Air National Guard member said that the probationary period at
his job is longer for reservists and that being in the reserves is a
setback for promotion consideration.
* One Army National Guard member who worked for a defense contractor
said that her supervisor and co-workers treated her with hostility. In
addition, she said that she was given limited and less desirable tasks
as a result of her reserve duty.
* One Army National Guard member said his supervisor asked him whether
he had volunteered or had been ordered to active duty. The reservist
believed that his supervisor would have fired him, had he volunteered.
* One Army National Guard member said that although his supervisor was
very familiar with agency policy, someone in the personnel department
was not. As a result, he was charged leave for his military duty.
* One Army National Guard member said that his supervisor constantly
harasses him, asking ’When are you planning to leave the Guard?“:
* One Army Reserve member said his employer offered him a promotion on
the condition that he not deploy to Bosnia.
* Two Air National Guard members who worked for a local law enforcement
agency said they were ’reproached“ by their supervisors as a result of
their military duties and questioned regarding their ’loyalty“ to the
department.
* One Air National Guard member, on return to his job, was assigned to
night shift duty. His supervisor told him that the change was
temporary.
* One Air Force Reserve member said his employer has a policy of
denying employees the ability to ’bid“ for jobs if they are deployed
for more than 179 days.
Examples of Additional Benefits Provided by Employers:
Many employers provide additional pay, as well as benefits that exceed
the requirements of USERRA. The following examples, cited by service
members, illustrate some of these benefits.
* A Fortune 500 company that employs some 100,000 people provided an
Army National Guard member with differential pay and health and life
insurance coverage while on deployment.
* A company with roughly 400 employees provided an Army National Guard
member with differential pay.
* Another company provided an Army National Guard member differential
pay based on his years of experience.
* An educational institution offered a teacher who is also in the Army
National Guard differential pay during the duration of his deployment.
* An oil company offered one of its Army National Guard employees
differential pay during his deployment.
* One company provided an Army National Guard member with health care
coverage and full salary for 90 days during a deployment.
* A state education board offered to pay 4 months salary to an Army
National Guard member during deployment.
* A telecommunications company paid 100 percent of an Army National
Guard member‘s health care premiums during a deployment that exceeded
30 days.
* A Fortune 500 company paid an Army Reserve member his full salary
during deployment.
* A large corporation notified an Army Reserve member of a promotion
opportunity and held the position open for 3 months, until the
reservist returned from deployment. The company also provided extended
leave after deployment and sent care packages and letters during the
deployment.
* A large accounting and consulting firm provided 4 weeks‘ paid
vacation, 2 weeks‘ pay for annual training, and 2 weeks of differential
pay to a Marine Corps Reserve member during deployment.
* A medium-sized law firm provided a Marine Corps Reserve member 1
month‘s salary and 2 weeks of paid vacation.
* One company provided a Marine Corps Reserve member with health
insurance coverage and 1 month‘s salary during a deployment.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Some Key Provisions from the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA):
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994,
enacted October 13, 1994 (Public Law 103-353 codified in Title 38 U.S.
Code, Chapter 43, sections 4301-4333), addresses employee rights after
involuntary and voluntary military service. The law covers both active
duty military members and reservists and applies following basic
training, weekend drills, and annual training, as well as during times
of national emergency. This appendix summarized only those provisions
of USERRA that are referred to in the report and does not attempt to
discuss these provisions in detail.
* Advance notice. The law requires that service members provide their
employers with advance notice of military service. Notice may be either
written or oral. It may be provided by the employee or by an
appropriate officer of the branch of the military in which the employee
will be serving. However, no notice is required if military necessity
prevents the giving of notice, or it is otherwise impossible or
unreasonable to give notice.
* Duration of service. To retain reemployment rights, cumulative
absences for military service may not exceed 5 years with respect to
the particular employer relationship for which a person seeks
reemployment. However, many military absences do not count against this
limit. Therefore, it is very unlikely for reservists to exceed the 5-
year limitation unless they accept voluntary orders for extended active
duty periods. The following are some of the types of duty that do not
count against the 5-year limitation:
* required training for Reserve and National Guard members, such as
annual training and weekend drills;
* duty during a war or national emergency;
* duty under involuntary orders during a domestic emergency or national
security related situations;
* service by volunteers who are ordered to active duty in support of a
’critical mission or requirement“ in times other than war or national
emergency and when no involuntary call-up is in effect; and:
* federal service by members of the National Guard called into action
by the president to suppress an insurrection, repel an invasion, or to
execute the law of the United States.
* Reporting back to work. Time limits for returning to work generally
depend on the duration of a person‘s military service.[Footnote 47]
* Service of 1 to 30 days - After returning from duty, service members
must report back by the beginning of the first regularly scheduled work
period on the first full calendar day and the expiration of 8 hours.
If, due to no fault of the employee, timely reporting back to work
would be impossible or unreasonable, the employee must report back to
work as soon as possible.
* Service of 31 to 180 days - Service members must submit an
application for reemployment no later than 14 days after the completion
of their military service. If submission of a timely application is
impossible or unreasonable, the application must be submitted as soon
as possible.
* Service of 181 or more days - Service members must submit an
application for reemployment no later than 90 days after the completion
of their military service.
The reporting or application deadlines are extended for up to 2 years
for persons who are hospitalized or convalescing because of a
disability incurred or aggravated during the period of military
service. Such 2-year period shall be extended for the minimum time
required to accommodate circumstances beyond the person‘s control. If
the person fails to report to work or to apply for reemployment within
the required time limits, the person will be subject to the employer‘s
rules governing unexcused absences.
* Documentation upon return. An employer has the right to request that
a person who is absent for a period of service of 31 days or more
provide documentation showing that the person‘s reemployment is timely,
and that the person has not exceeded the 5-year service limitation and
the person‘s separation from service was other than disqualifying under
38 U.S.C. §4304. If a person does not provide satisfactory
documentation because it is not readily available or does not exist,
the employer still must promptly reemploy the person.
* Placement of eligible persons in a job.
* Service of 1 to 90 days - The Service members shall be promptly
reemployed in the following order of priority: (A) in the position the
person would have held had the person remained continuously employed so
long as the person is qualified for the job or can become qualified
after reasonable efforts by the employer to qualify the person; or (B)
in the position of employment in which the person was employed on the
date of the beginning of the service in the uniformed services, only if
the person is not qualified to perform the duties of the position
referred to in subparagraph (A) after reasonable efforts by the
employer to qualify the person. Employers do not have the option of
offering other jobs or equivalent seniority, status, and pay.
* Service of 91 or more days - In addition to the priority above, if a
person cannot become qualified for the positions in (A) or (B) above,
then in any other position of lesser status and pay, but that most
nearly approximates the above positions (in that order) that the
employee is qualified to perform with full seniority.
* Seniority and non-seniority rights. Reemployed service members are
entitled to the seniority-based rights and benefits that they would
have attained with reasonable certainty if they had remained
continuously employed. Additionally, departing service members must be
treated as if they are on a leave of absence. Consequently, while they
are away they must be able to participate in any rights and benefits
that are available to other employees who are on nonmilitary leaves of
absence. If there are different types of nonmilitary leave, the service
members must be accorded the most favorable type of leave.
* Vacation pay. Service members must be permitted to use any vacation
they had accrued before the beginning of their military service,
instead of unpaid leave. However, service members cannot be forced to
use vacation time for military service.
* Health benefits. Health benefit continuation is provided for persons
who are absent from work to serve in the military. Service members may
continue their health coverage for up to 18 months after their absences
begin or for their periods of service (plus the time allowed to apply
for reemployment), whichever is shorter. The premiums that an employee
can be charged depend on the length of the employee‘s absence.
* Military service of 30 days or less - Service members cannot be
charged more than the normal employee share of any premium.
* Military service of 31 days or more - Service members can be charged
up to 102 percent of the full (employee and employer) premium for the
coverage.
No waiting periods or exclusions can be imposed upon reinstated
employees who would have maintained their health coverage if they had
not been absent for military service.
* Discrimination. The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of
uniformed service status. Employment discrimination because of past or
future military obligations is prohibited.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Guard and Reserve Member Survey:
[See PDF for image]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Employer Survey:
[See PDF for image]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Characteristics of Employers that Responded to Our
Survey:
We received 111 responses to the survey we sent to 359 employers of
reservists in the high tempo units included in our analysis. This
response rate was much lower than anticipated for several reasons.
First, after we had mailed our survey to the employers, all U.S. Postal
Service mail deliveries to GAO were suspended due to anthrax concerns.
Second, we did not include any surveys that arrived after March 29,
2002. Finally, because survey responses were anonymous, we could not
conduct phone surveys with employers who had not responded to the mail
survey. Because we did not survey a random sample of reservists‘
employers, the results of our survey are not projectable to all
employers. However, the responses came from a variety of different
types and sizes of employers as summarized below. These organizations:
* Represented employers of different sizes--from 4 to 41,810 employees:
Responses to Survey Question #5.
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
* Had different numbers of reservist employees--from 0 to 763:
Responses to Survey Question #8.
[See PDF for image]
Note: figures add to 101% due to rounding.
[End of table]
* Represented all sectors of the economy:
* Federal Government Agencies (7):
* State and Local Governments (31):
* Manufacturing Firms (11):
* Professional/Technical Organizations (13):
* Marketing Firms (3):
* Service Providers (25):
* Other (21):
* Health Care Providers:
* Mining Firms:
* Banks:
* Construction Firms:
* Churches/Religious Organizations:
* Transportation Providers:
* Non-profit Institutions:
* Came from at least 12 different states and the District of Columbia:
* Alabama (1):
* California (16):
* District of Columbia (2):
* Kansas (1):
* Maryland (6):
* Minnesota (1):
* North Carolina (2):
* New Jersey (2):
* New York (5):
* Texas (6):
* Utah (1):
* Virginia (17):
* Wyoming (12):
Note: To help protect the anonymity of respondents, the surveys did not
ask the respondents for their names or locations. However, the
respondents were asked to separately mail a post card that indicated
the employer had completed the survey. The information on the location
of the respondents came from the post cards, not from the surveys.
Unfortunately, we received only72 post cards to go with the 111
surveys.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Reserve Recruiting--Goals and Annual Accessions (1992-
2001):
FY92; Goal; ARNG: 65,233; USAR: 59,700; USNR: 17,887; USMCR: [Empty];
ANG: 10,376; USAFR: 10,423; DOD Total: 163,619.
FY93; Goal; ARNG: 68,177; USAR: 50,600; USNR: 19,537; USMCR: 10,140;
ANG: 10,454; USAFR: 10,592; DOD Total: 169,500.
FY94; Goal; ARNG: 69,710; USAR: 46,500; USNR: 13,144; USMCR: 11,122;
ANG: 10,325; USAFR: 10,434; DOD Total: 161,235.
FY95; Goal; ARNG: 60,649; USAR: 47,732; USNR: 13,660; USMCR: 11,748;
ANG: 8,496; USAFR: 12,578; DOD Total: 154,863.
FY96; Goal; ARNG: 61,793; USAR: 50,179; USNR: 16,850; USMCR: 10,388;
ANG: 11,000; USAFR: 7,090; DOD Total: 157,300.
FY97; Goal; ARNG: 59,262; USAR: 47,935; USNR: 16,950; USMCR: 10,063;
ANG: 9,996; USAFR: 9,702; DOD Total: 153,908.
FY98; Goal; ARNG: 56,638; USAR: 47,940; USNR: 15,329; USMCR: 10,174;
ANG: 8,004; USAFR: 10,874; DOD Total: 148,959.
FY99; Goal; ARNG: 56,958; USAR: 52,084; USNR: 20,455; USMCR: 9,464;
ANG: 8,520; USAFR: 11,791; DOD Total: 159,272.
FY00; Goal; ARNG: 54,034; USAR: 48,461; USNR: 18,410; USMCR: 9,341;
ANG: 10,080; USAFR: 9,624; DOD Total: 149,950.
FY01; Goal; ARNG: 60,252; USAR: 34,910; USNR: 15,250; USMCR: 8,945;
ANG: 11,808; USAFR: 8,051; DOD Total: 139,216.
FY92; Accessions; ARNG: 71,700; USAR: 67,342; USNR: 17,864; USMCR:
[Empty]; ANG: 11,606; USAFR: 10,533; DOD Total: 179,045.
FY93; Accessions; ARNG: 67,360; USAR: 50,255; USNR: 18,367; USMCR:
10,216; ANG: 9,163; USAFR: 10,908; DOD Total: 166,269.
FY94; Accessions; ARNG: 61,248; USAR: 47,412; USNR: 13,006; USMCR:
11,236; ANG: 9,177; USAFR: 11,464; DOD Total: 153,543.
FY95; Accessions; ARNG: 56,711; USAR: 48,098; USNR: 13,701; USMCR:
12,043; ANG: 8,351; USAFR: 9,757; DOD Total: 148,661.
FY96; Accessions; ARNG: 60,444; USAR: 46,187; USNR: 16,820; USMCR:
12,566; ANG: 9,958; USAFR: 7,566; DOD Total: 153,541.
FY97; Accessions; ARNG: 63,495; USAR: 47,153; USNR: 17,106; USMCR:
10,744; ANG: 9,986; USAFR: 8,383; DOD Total: 156,867.
FY98; Accessions; ARNG: 55,401; USAR: 44,212; USNR: 14,986; USMCR:
10,213; ANG: 8,744; USAFR: 8,877; DOD Total: 142,433.
FY99; Accessions; ARNG: 57,090; USAR: 41,784; USNR: 15,715; USMCR:
9,565; ANG: 8,398; USAFR: 7,518; DOD Total: 140,070.
FY00; Accessions; ARNG: 61,260; USAR: 48,596; USNR: 14,911; USMCR:
9,465; ANG: 10,730; USAFR: 7,740; DOD Total: 152,702.
FY01; Accessions; ARNG: 61,956; USAR: 35,622; USNR: 15,344; USMCR:
9,117; ANG: 10,258; USAFR: 8,826; DOD Total: 141,123.
FY92; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 109.9%; USAR: 112.8%; USNR: 99.9%; USMCR:
[Empty]; ANG: 111.9%; USAFR: 101.1%; DOD Total: 109.4%.
FY93; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 98.8%; USAR: 99.3%; USNR: 94.0%; USMCR:
100.7%; ANG: 87.7%; USAFR: 103.0%; DOD Total: 98.1%.
FY94; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 87.9%; USAR: 102.0%; USNR: 99.0%; USMCR:
101.0%; ANG: 88.9%; USAFR: 109.9%; DOD Total: 95.2%.
FY95; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 93.5%; USAR: 100.8%; USNR: 100.3%; USMCR:
102.5%; ANG: 98.3%; USAFR: 77.6%; DOD Total: 96.0%.
FY96; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 97.8%; USAR: 92.0%; USNR: 99.8%; USMCR:
121.0%; ANG: 90.5%; USAFR: 106.7%; DOD Total: 97.6%.
FY97; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 107.1%; USAR: 98.4%; USNR: 100.9%; USMCR:
106.8%; ANG: 99.9%; USAFR: 86.4%; DOD Total: 101.9%.
FY98; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 97.8%; USAR: 92.2%; USNR: 97.8%; USMCR:
100.4%; ANG: 109.2%; USAFR: 81.6%; DOD Total: 95.6%.
FY99; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 100.2%; USAR: 80.2%; USNR: 76.8%; USMCR:
101.1%; ANG: 98.6%; USAFR: 63.8%; DOD Total: 87.9%.
FY00; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 113.4%; USAR: 100.3%; USNR: 81.0%; USMCR:
101.3%; ANG: 106.4%; USAFR: 80.4%; DOD Total: 101.8%.
FY01; Goal Achievement; ARNG: 102.8%; USAR: 102.0%; USNR: 100.6%;
USMCR: 101.9%; ANG: 86.9%; USAFR: 109.6%; DOD Total: 101.4%.
ARNG--Army National Guard:
USAR--United States Army Reserve:
USNR--United States Naval Reserve:
USMCR--United States Marine Corps Reserve:
ANG--Air National Guard:
USAFR--United States Air Force Reserve:
[End of table]
In fiscal year 2001, five of DOD‘s six reserve components achieved
their recruiting goals. While this is a significant accomplishment,
recruiting results of the recent past indicate that recruiting figures
should continue to be scrutinized closely. The fiscal year 2001 success
did not come without a cost. In recent years the services have had to
increase the size of their recruiting forces, expand their bonus
programs, increase their education incentives, and increase their
advertising budgets. In addition, the nation was in a recession in
2001.
While recruiting goals are important, the services and reserve
components view recruiting within the context of their programmed end
strengths. If retention is better than expected in a particular year,
then the reserve components may achieve their desired end strengths
without achieving their recruiting goals. This was the case for the Air
National Guard in fiscal year 2001; it achieved only 82 percent of its
recruiting goal, but achieved 100.4 percent of its end
strength.[Footnote 48]
While end strengths are more important than recruiting figures in the
short term, a service or component that consistently misses its
recruiting goals is likely to eventually suffer long term consequences,
regardless of its end strength position. A component that repeatedly
misses its recruiting goals will need to continue retaining a higher-
than-average percentage of recruits during subsequent years or it will
eventually become out of balance, with too many senior personnel and
not enough junior personnel. Over time, increasing numbers of personnel
at the senior levels make it more difficult for those people to be
promoted. Decreased promotion rates tend to lead to increased attrition
rates, which would lead to end strength problems if a component were
already having problems meeting its recruiting goals.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Defense:
See comment after this appendix.
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:
Ms. Carol R. Schuster:
Director, Defense Capabilities Management U.S. General Accounting
Office Washington, D. C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Schuster:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report GAO-02-608, ’RESERVE FORCES: DoD
Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations Between Reservists and Their
Employers,“ dated May 1, 2002 (GAO Code 702099). This office
appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the draft GAO
report and offers the following comments and concerns.
Although the audit began in December 2000, much of the analysis was
accomplished during a time of turbulence in the DoD as the War on
Terrorism had increased operational tempos for the Reserve components.
In this regard, the GAO acknowledges that the events of September 2001
limited their survey responses, and the face-to-face interviews of
Reserve component members focused on only a small cross section of high
usage units and are admittedly not projectable to the entire Reserve
force.
While in general concurrence with the recommendations, this office has
concerns with the specific tracking and reporting requirements in
recommendation number four concerning the timely issuance of orders.
While there is merit to studying reasons why the Reserve components
sometimes miss this goal, the requirement for reporting would create a
further administrative burden on those engaged in the order issuance
process. However, the Department has encouraged the components to
review their processes and establish metrics for internal management
purposes. We will continue in our overall efforts to improve the
timeliness of receipt of mobilization and deployment orders by Reserve
component members.
We also have concerns with recommendation number six. The Department
made a specific recommendation, in coordination with the Reserve
components senior leadership, to include the RCs in this aspect of the
High Deployment policy:
Suggested technical changes for clarification and accuracy have been
provided separately to the GAO staff.
The DoD comments to the draft report recommendations are provided in
the enclosure.
Sincerely,
Craig W. Duehring Principal Deputy:
Signed by Craig W. Duehring:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO CODE 702099/GAO-02-608:
’RESERVE FORCES: DOD ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER MANAGE RELATIONS BETWEEN
RESERVISTS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, reexamine the provisions of the Privacy Act and determine
whether requiring Reservists to report information about their civilian
employers is consistent with the act. If a positive determination is
made, the Secretary should require all Reserve personnel to provide the
Defense Manpower Data Center with the name, full address, and telephone
number of their civilian employer, and update this information
promptly, as necessary. (Page 27/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. OSD/RA will again contact the Department‘s
Privacy Act point of contact for a determination. If a favorable
determination is made, development and implementation of DoD and
service policies and procedures will ensure comprehensive population of
the employer support database will be attained.Follow-up procedures
will also be developed to ensure the database is promptly updated in
the event of employer change.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, add students as a target population to the mission and
responsibilities of the ESGR, study in depth the problems related to
deployments that student Reservists have experienced, and determine
what actions the ESGR might take to help students and their educational
institutions. (Page 27/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. During strategic planning, ESGR identified
students and educational institutions as a target customer group.
However, without additional resources ESGR can only provide limited
information and mediation for Guard and Reserve students.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, direct the ESGR to promptly finalize and implement its plans
to have all calls to ombudsmen routed through a single toll-free number
and central processing station. (Page 27/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Implementation of this recommendation is nearly
complete. ESGR plans also call for the eventual development of a call
center to increase capability and further take advantage of this
concept.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, direct the Services to determine how many orders are not being
issued 30 days in advance of deployments, and why. We recognize that it
will not be possible to achieve the 30-day goal in all cases. Once the
causes are identified, the Secretary should direct the Services to take
the necessary corrective actions and to report quarterly to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs on the progress
achieved in reducing the number of cases. (Page 27/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. Instituting a repetitive reporting
requirement would create a further administrative burden on those who
are currently involved in the orders issuance process. We are
continuing to strongly emphasize the importance of the thirty-day order
window. We also have encouraged the components to review their
processes and establish metrics for internal management purposes.
Finally, we are hopeful that the new personnel system, DIMHRS, will
make this goal more feasible. The OSD objective is to establish, in
DoDI 1235. 10, Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the
Ready Reserve, a policy requiring issuance of orders 30-days in
advance, unless operational requirements dictate otherwise.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, develop a policy so that Reserve units will provide employers,
upon request, with verification of military service periods lasting
less than 30 days. (Page 27/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur.The Department will investigate development and
implementation of such a policy. However, any such policy should only
be required if the verification of military service is ’upon request“
from the employer.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, analyze the effects of the high-deployment per diem statutory
provision on Reservists, taking into account that deployment patterns
for Reservists are different from those of Active Duty members, and
that virtually no Reservists have been forced to deploy involuntarily
for more than 400 days over a 730-day period; if warranted, propose
changes to this statutory provision. (Page 27/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Non concur. The Department made a specific determination,
in coordination with the Reserve components senior leadership, to
include the RCs in this aspect of the High Deployment Policy. The
objective of this aspect of the High Deployment Policy is to prevent
excessive TDY burdens being placed on any Active or Reserve member. If
the RC, as a force provider to Combatant Commanders, have long term
requirements to fill, it may be better that more personnel be asked to
participate in such operational support.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense in
conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs, analyze, on a ongoing basis, departmental data on trends in
the Reserve components for use in formulating outreach activities to
employers. (Page 27/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. As stated in recommendation 1 the successful
development of the Employer Support Database will greatly enhance the
Department‘s outreach activities.
Comment: In view of DOD‘s stated Actions, we have modified our
recommendation by dropping a quarterly reporting requirement and
replacing it with a requirement to periodically assess the services‘
progress toward fuller compliance with the 30-day goal.
[End of section]
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gwendolyn Jaffe (202) 512-4691:
Acknowledgments:
James Bancroft, Larry Bridges, Herbert Dunn, Jack Edwards, Michael
Ferren, J. Kris Keener, Stefano Petrucci, Irene Robertson, and Matthew
Sakrekoff also made significant contributions to the report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. 103-353, October 13, 1994, 38 U.S.C. §§4301-4333.
[2] In this report, operational tempo refers to the total days
reservists spend participating in normal drills, training, and
exercises, as well as domestic and overseas operational missions.
[3] Some reserve components expect their members to perform 38 days of
duty each year, while other components expect 39. The difference
largely centers on how the components view travel to annual training.
Some count it as part of the training, and others authorize an ’extra“
day for travel.
[4] Coast Guard Reserve figures have been included when available from
DOD. However, we did not include the Coast Guard Reserve in our focus
groups since it comes under the Department of Transportation in time of
peace and reverts to the Department of the Navy only in wartime or when
directed by the president.
[5] The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and
Reserve is sometimes abbreviated NCESGR, but throughout this report we
use the more common ESGR abbreviation to include both the headquarters
and volunteer field staff of the organization.
[6] 5 U.S.C. §552a.
[7] The 1.3 million figure excludes members of the retired reserve.
[8] See note 1.
[9] It should be noted that the operational tempo during our 1992
baseline year already exceeded the 38 or 39 days of training that
reservists are normally expected to attend each year.
[10] Average training figures can fall below 38 days per year for a
number of reasons. Personnel who retire or leave the reserves during
the year may attend only a few days of training before leaving. Some
training may also be waived for a certain period of time following a
reservist‘s return from a long deployment. Finally, some reservists may
not attend training as expected.
[11] These figures exclude full-time Guard and Reserve members and new
members who have not yet completed their basic military and technical
skills training.
[12] A ’partial“ mobilization permits the President to mobilize ready
reserve units and individuals (up to 1 million reservists) for as long
as 2 years, while presidential reserve
call-ups, such as those for operations in the Balkans and Southwest
Asia were limited to
270 days.
[13] Coast Guard participation peaked on October 4, 2001, when 21.5
percent of the Coast Guard Reserve members were on active duty.
[14] About 5,000 of the Naval Reserve personnel who were mobilized went
to force security positions.
[15] 5 U.S.C. §552a.
[16] Most of the reserve units we visited did not maintain employer
lists. A few had assembled lists when they were deployed, but they did
not keep them up to date after their deployments.
[17] In 1999 the reserve components had almost 880,000 members who
participated in regular training.
[18] National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
(NCESGR),
August 17, 1999.
[19] www.esgr.org is one of these web sites.
[20] 32 CFR 44.5(b)(1).
[21] Appendix IV includes additional details on the specific provisions
of the act that relate to this report.
[22] Since the partial mobilization in September 2001, many employers
have increased their benefits to reservists. However, many changes are
temporary and apply only to reservists who are specifically called to
support the war on terrorism. Of the 111 employers who responded to our
survey, 60 said they provide health benefits beyond those required by
the law, 28 said that they make up the difference for employees who are
paid less in the military than they are on their civilian jobs, and 19
said that they provide employees with full pay for at least part of the
time that they are gone on military duties.
[23] We did not verify the allegations, and some reservists were
unaware that the alleged employer misconduct might constitute a
violation of the law.
[24] We visited this unit in the field and were able survey 32 members
between firing exercises. However, more than triple that number
deployed to Bosnia.
[25] Appendix V contains a copy of the survey we distributed to
reservists in high tempo units.
[26] The Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges is a consortium of
national higher education associations and more than 1,500 colleges.
The organization helps to coordinate postsecondary educational
opportunities for service members through voluntary programs that are
funded by the military services.
[27] At the time of our review, three states (Arkansas, New Jersey, and
Texas) had laws providing such protection. And many new recruits
without prior military experience have joined the reserves in recent
years to obtain funding for education.
[28] Appendix VI contains a copy of the survey, and appendix VII
contains a profile of the employers that responded to the survey.
[29] The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs has suggested that 30 days‘ advance notification is a
reasonable goal, and the services had agreed to this goal in September
2000.
[30] The recommended change was to DOD Directive 1235.10, ’Activation,
Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve,“ July 1, 1995.
[31] Companies also derive benefits from hiring reservists. In
responding to DOD‘s 1999 survey, 72 percent of the employers surveyed
agreed or strongly agreed with the following statement: ’The training
and experience received by a National Guard or Reserve employee makes
that person a more valuable employee to my company.“ Only 10 percent
disagreed or strongly disagreed.
[32] Within our survey group, 1,102 reservists had full-time jobs and
100 had part-time jobs. The remaining 406 were unemployed or did not
respond to the question about their employment (see question 10 on the
survey in app. V). Of the 1,202 workers, only 60 said they worked for
firms with 5 or fewer employees. (See question 11 on the survey in app.
V.)
[33] Because the ESGR figures are incomplete, we cannot verify whether
its caseload is increasing. A case can range from a single telephone
call in which a question is answered to extensive mediation efforts.
[34] The ESGR does have accurate data from its Web site, which was
established in fiscal year 1997 to provide information to both
reservists and employers. In fiscal year 1998 the site had an average
of 200 inquiries per week, but the number rose to an average of 5,000
per week in early 2001. In October 2001 Web inquiries rose to 42,000
per week before leveling off at about 14,000, per week in 2002. Most
visitors to the site view the USERRA law or download the site‘s list of
frequently asked questions.
[35] See appendix VIII for additional details concerning recruiting
goals and annual accessions.
[36] Pub. L. 106-65, Oct. 5, 1999, §586, which amended Part II of
subtitle A of title 10, U.S.C. by inserting a new chapter, ’Chapter 50-
-Miscellaneous Command Responsibilities.“
[37] 37 U.S.C. §436.
[38] Because the legislation went into effect on October 1, 2000, and
was temporarily suspended 373 days later, on October 8, 2001, no
service member has yet been paid a high-deployment per diem allowance.
[39] Both deployment and retention figures were available, but in many
cases the figures were aggregated differently, which made it difficult
to compare trends. Much of the available deployment data showed
mobilization and demobilization dates for task force organizations but
did not show what portion of the personnel in a particular unit
deployed. Available attrition data was captured for traditional
military units, divisions, wings, squadrons, battalions etc., but not
for mission task force organizations.
[40] We did not meet with officials from the Department of
Transportation‘s U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. However, we did obtain
background information from DOD concerning Coast Guard reservists who,
while comprising only about 1 percent of the nation‘s total reserve
force, perform a number of key safety and security missions both at
home and abroad.
[41] Appendix V contains a copy of the survey. We had planned to
compare the results of our high tempo survey to the results of DOD‘s
survey of 75,000 randomly selected reservists. However, the results of
DOD‘s survey had not been finalized when we ended our audit work in
March 2002.
[42] A good portion of our work was conducted in Texas and California,
the two states with the largest reserve populations. There are over
110,000 selected reserves in those two states.
[43] Following the events of September 11, 2001, DOD encouraged the
services to collect employer information from mobilized reservists for
future input into an automated data base. By November 6, 2001, the on-
line data base was fully functional and the services and individual
reservists were able to enter data through the Defense Manpower Data
Center Web site. However, by May 14, 2002, more than 73,000 reservists
had been mobilized and the data base contained fewer than 11,000
employer records.
[44] Appendix VII contains a copy of the survey, and appendix VIII
provides additional details about the employers who responded to the
survey.
[45] Some of the reservists with low duty levels were not in the
reserves in September 2000 and joined part-way through the period
covered by our question (September 2000 to August 2001).
[46] Some reservists joined the reserves between the cut-off date for
our question (August 2001) and the times when we distributed our last
surveys (during a unit visit in January 2002).
[47] With the exception of fitness-for-service examinations.
[48] The Air National Guard uses projected retention rates to set an
annual recruiting goal that will lead to its desired end strength. It
does not adjust this recruiting goal throughout the year. Therefore,
when retention was better than expected in 2001, the Air National Guard
made a conscious decision to recruit less than its goal in order to
achieve its desired end strength.
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