2002 Update of the 155mm Lightweight Howitzer
Gao ID: GAO-02-898R July 24, 2002This report describes the schedule, cost, and technical status of the 155mm Lightweight Howitzer program. The Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office directs this program's development, with a British company as the prime contractor. Since GAO's April 2000 report (See GAO-01-603R), all key milestones have slipped because a 2-year low-rate initial production phase has been added to provide production representative howitzers for operational testing. Correspondingly, the full-rate production decision has slipped from September 2002 to October 2004. Since April 2001, total program cost estimates have increased from $1,209.0 million to $1,365.2 million, principally as the result of the large number of design modifications resulting from developmental testing and restructuring the program to add a low-rate initial production phase. In addition, the costs for the towed artillery digitization increased by $51 million. Technical problems--such as the durability of the optical fire control, bore sight retention, and accuracy--have been addressed through design changes. However, some of these changes have not yet been tested, and the Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Activity has yet to review test data that the program office believes shows the howitzer has met accuracy requirements. Additional information is being collected for the upcoming decision on whether the program should enter low-rate initial production. This includes (1) the final results from the operational assessment, (2) the results from planned testing of the strength and accuracy of the first pilot production howitzer, and (3) an assessment from independent contractors on production readiness and the cost of complete production of the howitzer.
GAO-02-898R, 2002 Update of the 155mm Lightweight Howitzer
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-02-898R
entitled '2002 Update of the 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer' which was
released on July 24, 2002.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
GAO-02-898R:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 24, 2002:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
The Honorable Peter G. Fitzgerald:
The Honorable Richard Durbin:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Lane Evans:
The Honorable James A. Leach:
The Honorable Jim Nussle:
House of Representatives:
Subject: 2002 Update of the 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer:
In July 2000 and April 2001, we issued reports to you and several other
members of Congress describing the schedule, cost, and technical status
of the 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer program. [Footnote 1] The 155 mm
Lightweight Howitzer is expected to replace the M-198 towed howitzer.
The Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office is
directing this program‘s development, with BAE Systems (BAE), a British
company, as the prime contractor.
This report responds to your request of February 27, 2002, that we
continue to monitor and report on this program due to your continued
concerns about its schedule, cost, and technical difficulties and the
program‘s readiness for low-rate initial production.
Results in Brief:
Since our April 2001 report, all key milestones have slipped in large
part because a 2-year low-rate initial production phase has been added
to the program to provide production representative howitzers for
operational testing. Correspondingly, the full-rate production decision
has slipped from September 2002 to October 2004. The initial fielding
of the howitzer by the Marine Corps has slipped to March 2005 or 8
months. The initial fielding of the howitzer by the Army has slipped to
August 2006, or 17 months.
Since our April 2001 report, total program cost estimates have
increased from $1,209.0 million to $1,365.2 million, an increase of
$156.2 million. This increase is principally the result of the large
number of design modifications resulting from developmental testing and
restructuring the program to add a low-rate initial production phase.
In addition, the costs for the towed artillery digitization (TAD)
increased by about $51 million because (1) the complexity of developing
the software and integrating TAD with the howitzer was underestimated,
(2) the amount of planned testing has been increased, and (3) the TAD
development contract was placed under BAE.
Technical problems-such as the durability of the optical fire control,
bore sight retention, and accuracy-cited in our April 2001 report and
more recently raised by the services‘ testing organizations have been
addressed through design changes. However, some of these changes have
not yet been tested, and the Marine Corps Operational Test and
Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA) has yet to review test data that the
program office believes shows the howitzer has met accuracy
requirements.
Additional information is being collected for the upcoming decision on
whether the program should enter low-rate initial production. Such
information includes (1) the final results from the operational
assessment; (2) the results from the program office‘s planned testing
of the strength and accuracy of the first pilot production howitzer;
and (3) an assessment from independent contractors on production
readiness and the cost to complete production of the howitzer.
The Department of Defense provided written comments that were technical
in nature to a draft of this report. We incorporated those comments as
appropriate.
Background:
The 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer is intended to be a lighter, more
transportable, and mobile weapon for strategic and tactical movements.
Weapon performance requirements include a maximum weight of 10,500
pounds (about 5,500 pounds less than the M-198 towed howitzer it is to
replace) and reduced time to place the weapon in a firing position
compared with current weapons.
The Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office directs
the Lightweight Howitzer development program. The Army will assume
program management responsibilities for the Lightweight Howitzer
program upon completion of deliveries to the Marine Corps. The Army
plans to buy 273 guns and the Marines plan to buy 377, which is less
than their earlier plan to buy 413, due to the deletion of a
requirement to store howitzers in caves in Norway and other fielding
changes.
BAE is the Lightweight Howitzer prime contractor. Cannon barrels are
being produced at the U.S. Army‘s Watervliet Arsenal under a separate
contract and are to be provided as government-furnished equipment. The
howitzer will eventually incorporate TAD, an onboard, precision, self-
locating, and electronic aiming system. Until May 2002, General
Dynamics was developing TAD under a separate contract for the Army. As
part of the most recent program restructuring General Dynamics is now
producing TAD under a subcontract for BAE.
BAE has subcontracted about 70 percent of the howitzer‘s production to
the U.S. contractors listed in table 1.
Table 1: Major U.S. Subcontractors for the 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer:
Subcontractor/location: Rotek Inc., Florence, Kentucky;
Subcontracted component/activity: Traverse rack.
Subcontractor/location: Wegmann, Lynchburg, Virginia;
Subcontracted component/activity: Elevation assembly.
Subcontractor/location: Pacific Castparts Corp., Portland, Oregon;
Subcontracted component/activity: Titanium castings.
Subcontractor/location: Pacific Cast Technologies, Albany, Oregon;
Subcontracted component/activity: Titanium castings.
Subcontractor/location: Howmet Castings, Whitehall, Michigan;
Subcontracted component/activity: Titanium castings.
Subcontractor/location: Hydro-Mill, Inc., Chatsworth, California;
Subcontracted component/activity: Body assembly.
Subcontractor/location: Major Tool and Machine, Inc., Indianapolis,
Indiana;
Subcontracted component/activity: Stabilizers, spades.
Subcontractor/location: Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois;
Subcontracted component/activity: Breach operating load tray system[A].
Subcontractor/location: RTI International Metals, Inc., Niles, Ohio;
Subcontracted component/activity: Titanium.
Subcontractor/location: Seiler Instruments and Mfg., St. Louis,
Missouri;
Subcontracted component/activity: Optical Fire Control.
[A] BAE plans to offer this work to the Rock Island Arsenal for pilot
production gun 2 and low-rate initial production but only if the Army
can reduce the Arsenal‘s overhead rate enough to bring them into the
competitive price range. For pilot production gun 1, BAE and Mitchell
Aerospace of Canada are producing this assembly.
Source: Lightweight 155 mm Howitzer Joint Program Office.
[End of table]
Program Schedule Continues to Slip:
Since we last reported on this program in April 2001, the program
schedule for all key milestones dates has slipped for the howitzer
because of inclusion of a low-rate initial production phase. [Footnote
2]
In June 2001, the MCOTEA [Footnote 3] briefed the joint program office
and advised them that the developmental guns were inappropriate for
operational test and evaluation because they did not consider the
developmental howitzers to be production representative. While the
program office believed that the last four developmental guns would be
production representative and had planned to use them for operational
test and evaluation, MCOTEA told the program office that a production
representative howitzer must:
* be produced and assembled by contractors and subcontractors using
components, manufacturing processes, and materials specified for the
fielded system, and;
* incorporate all engineering change proposals, system improvements and
modifications resulting from analysis of developmental testing and
operational assessment data to correct deficiencies in order to meet
the requirements in the joint operational requirements document.
MCOTEA did not believe that the developmental howitzers met these
criteria because they were produced in Great Britian exclusively by BAE
and not built on the U.S. production line by U.S. subcontractors, and
do not include all of the engineering changes resulting from
developmental testing, including incorporation of castings. U.S.
subcontractors are currently producing two pilot production howitzers
to reduce production readiness risks related to establishing a U.S.
production line. These guns also will be the first to include all of
the design changes resulting from developmental and operational
assessment testing and the first to be built with castings. Although
these guns will be produced on U.S. production lines, MCOTEA does not
believe these howitzers will be production representative because they
will be given special handling and attention atypical of usual
production line processes. Therefore, MCOTEA does not consider them
suitable for operational testing. However, the Joint Program Office
plans to test the first pilot production howitzer, which is scheduled
for completion in July 2002. The Army Test and Evaluation Command will
independently observe and assess the testing of the pilot production
gun and provide the results of their assessment to MCOTEA, which will
brief the results to the milestone decision authority, who will
consider the results in making the low-rate initial production decision
in October 2002.
In October 2001, in response to MCOTEA‘s concerns, the Joint Program
Office restructured the program to provide production representative
weapons for operational test and evaluation. The restructuring added
low-rate initial production in place of full-rate production (Milestone
C) and slipped the schedule for full-rate production by just over 2
years, as shown in table 2. In addition, the testing of the first
production article was delayed by 4 months, and the initial fielding of
this system by the Marine Corps and the Army was delayed an additional
8 months and 17 months, respectively.
Table 2: Comparison of Key Program Milestones:
Key milestones: Production Decision: Low Rate (Milestone C);
December 1998 schedule: Not scheduled;
December 2000 schedule: Not scheduled;
April 2002: Oct. 2002[A];
Months delayed, December 1998 – December 2000 schedule: N/A;
Months delayed, December 2000 – April 2002 schedule: N/A.
Key milestones: Production Decision: Full Rate;
December 1998 schedule: Sept. 2001[B];
December 2000 schedule: Sept. 2002;
April 2002: Oct. 2004;
Months delayed, December 1998 – December 2000 schedule: 12;
Months delayed, December 2000 – April 2002 schedule: 25.
Key milestones: Production Contract Award: Low Rate;
December 1998 schedule: Not scheduled;
December 2000 schedule: Not scheduled;
April 2002: Nov. 2002;
Months delayed, December 1998 – December 2000 schedule: N/A;
Months delayed, December 2000 – April 2002 schedule: N/A.
Key milestones: Production Contract Award: Full Rate;
December 1998 schedule: Oct. 2001;
December 2000 schedule: Oct. 2002;
April 2002: Nov. 2004;
Months delayed, December 1998 – December 2000 schedule: 12;
Months delayed, December 2000 – April 2002 schedule: 25.
Key milestones: First Production Article Qualification Testing;
December 1998 schedule: Jan. 2003;
December 2000 schedule: Dec. 2003;
April 2002: Apr. 2004;
Months delayed, December 1998 – December 2000 schedule: 11;
Months delayed, December 2000 – April 2002 schedule: 4.
Key milestones: Marine Corps Initial Fielding[C];
December 1998 schedule: Nov. 2003;
December 2000 schedule: July 2004;
April 2002: Mar. 2005;
Months delayed, December 1998 – December 2000 schedule: 8;
Months delayed, December 2000 – April 2002 schedule: 8.
Key milestones: Army Initial Fielding[D];
December 1998 schedule: Mar. 2005;
December 2000 schedule: Mar. 2005;
April 2002: Aug. 2006;
Months delayed, December 1998 – December 2000 schedule: 0;
Months delayed, December 2000 – April 2002 schedule: 7.
[A] This is to be a decision on low-rate initial production; the full
rate production decision is scheduled for October 2004.
[B] In July 2000, the program office had slipped this date to March
2002.
[C] Marine Corps initial fielding is defined to be about 38 guns for a
battalion from both I & II Marine Expeditionary Force.
[D] Army initial fielding is defined to be about six guns to support a
troop battery in a light-division.
Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office.
[End of table]
Program Cost Estimates Continue to Increase:
The most recent program office cost estimates, as of April 2002, show
the total costs for the development and production of the howitzer and
TAD program to be $1,365.2 million”an increase of $156.2 million from
the program office‘s February 2001 estimate of $1,209.0 million.
[Footnote 4] Details of these cost increases are shown in table 3.
Table 3: Increases in Estimated Development and Production Costs of the
Howitzer and Towed Artillery Digitization (Then-year dollars in
millions):
Program: US Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer RDT&E;
February 2001: $162.8;
April 2002: $178.5;
Cost increase from February 2001 to April 2002: $15.7.
Program: US Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer and Towed Artillery
Digitization Upgrade Production;
February 2001: $543.0;
April 2002: $621.0;
Cost increase from February 2001 to April 2002: $78.0.
Program: Army Towed Artillery Digitization Upgrade RDT&E;
February 2001: $52.3;
April 2002: $103.6;
Cost increase from February 2001 to April 2002: $51.3.
Program: Army Lightweight Howitzer and Towed Artillery Digitization
Upgrade Production;
February 2001: $450.9;
April 2002: $462.1;
Cost increase from February 2001 to April 2002: $11.2.
Program: Total;
February 2001: $1,209.0;
April 2002: $1,365.2;
Cost increase from February 2001 to April 2002: $156.2.
Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office.
[End of table]
The cost of the howitzer developmental program funded by the Marines
increased from $162.8 million to $178.5 million or an increase of $15.7
million. This increase includes $6 million for extending the program by
2 years, $4.5 million for testing of the pilot production guns, $2
million for operational testing, $1.5 million for program management,
and $1 million for in-house systems engineering.
The cost of the howitzer and the TAD production program funded by the
Marines increased from $543 million to $621 million, an increase of $78
million. More than half of this increase, about $43 million, was for
about 1,000 design modifications that have been made to the howitzer
during development. The cost increase also includes about $28 million
in other program costs including inflation due to program extension as
well as $7 million for increases in the costs of cannon barrels
produced by the Watervliet Arsenal.
The cost of the TAD developmental program funded by the Army increased
from $52.3 million to $103.6 million, an increase of $51.3 million.
According to a program official, TAD development costs increased
because (1) the complexity of developing the software and integrating
TAD with the howitzer was underestimated, (2) the amount of planned
testing has been increased, (3) the gun was hardened, and (4) the TAD
development contract was placed under BAE. Thus, the costs associated
with these activities are higher than originally planned. The
acquisition of TAD has been restructured. First, to centralize the
development and integration of the howitzer and TAD, the Army‘s
development contract with General Dynamics for TAD has been moved under
BAE, the prime contractor for the howitzer. Second, TAD is being funded
and developed in two blocks. The current program includes the funding
for the development and production of the block 1. The block 1 digital
fire control is to be capable of automatically determining gun
location, accurately aiming and pointing the gun, providing navigation
instructions, digital communications, and providing directions for gun
emplacements. About 10 percent of the software required to complete TAD
will be needed for block 1 while the remaining 90 percent will support
block 2. When funded and developed, Block 2 of TAD is to provide the
gun with greater digital communication connectivity and allow onboard
technical computation of firing data that will ultimately increase
accuracy through integration of individual propellant temperatures and
individual gun muzzle velocity measurement systems.
The cost of the TAD and howitzer production program funded by the Army
increased from $450.9 million to $462.1, or by $11.2 million. This
increase is primarily the result of the numerous design modifications
made to the howitzer during development and increases in the cost of
the cannon barrels produced by the Watervliet Arsenal.
Technical Problems Being Addressed, but Testing Is Still Ongoing:
The program office believes that all technical problems that MCOTEA and
we identified have been addressed. In our April 2001 report, we
identified a number of technical problems impacting the performance of
the 155 mm gun, all of which the program office had resolved or was
attempting to resolve through design changes. More recently, MCOTEA
identified a number of technical issues that it believed would
jeopardize the successful completion of the operational test and
evaluation of the 155 mm gun if not resolved. According to MCOTEA, the
program office has addressed all but one of the issues identified by
MCOTEA, primarily through design changes, some of which have been
tested while others have yet to be tested. The one issue still
outstanding relates to the accuracy of the gun.
In our April 2001 report, we focused on seven technical problems: (1)
insufficient spade size, (2) flexure of the saddle assembly causing
accuracy and bore sight retention problems, (3) faulty titanium welding
processes, (4) spade cracking, (5) faulty spade latch, (6) spade damper
that did not operate well in all soil types, and (7) durability of the
optical fire control. According to the program office, design changes
had been incorporated to correct these problems although not all had
been field tested when we issued our report.
During our current review, we focused on the nine issues that MCOTEA
believed would jeopardize the successful completion of operational test
and evaluation on the 155 howitzers. These issues were (1) bore sight
retention, (2) accuracy, (3) durability of the optical fire control,
(4) spades, (5) design stability, (6) production representative
howitzers, (7) compressed test schedule, (8) weapon balance, and (9)
logistics demonstration schedule and products.
MCOTEA told us that the program office has resolved all of their
concerns except accuracy through design changes, additional or planned
testing, and the addition of a low-rate initial production phase to
provide production representative howitzers for operational testing and
evaluation.
According to the program office, the objective accuracy requirement for
the 155 mm howitzer is 1 mil using the TAD Block I inertial measurement
system to do the electronic aiming and pointing; that is, the gun‘s
barrel and optical sight must always be pointed within 1 mil of the
same direction. [Footnote 5] The accuracy requirement for the gun
without TAD is 3 mils. However, the initial developmental guns were so
flexible that after the guns were elevated or moved from side to side,
the guns lost bore sight retention, with the barrels and optical sights
in some cases differing by 12 to 13 mils of pointing in the same
direction. In addition, thermal effects caused the optical sights to
move relative to the barrel, causing the gun to lose bore sight.
The program office has made a series of design changes to the howitzer
that has improved its accuracy. For example, the parts of the gun
holding the cannon barrel have been stiffened, which has reduced the
flexure allowed by the lightweight titanium and insulation has been
added to mitigate the thermal effects. These and other changes have
increased the accuracy level to within 3 mils. During December 2001,
February 2002, and April 2002, Yuma Proving Grounds conducted three
separate accuracy tests with a developmental gun. A contractor for the
Army Test and Evaluation Command observed and determined the results of
the three tests. The gun failed to meet the 3-mil accuracy requirement
for the first test because a reconditioned fire control unit was used.
However, a new fire control unit was installed on the gun prior to the
second test and the gun met the 3-mil accuracy requirement for last two
tests. The program office has made other design changes that are to be
incorporated into the pilot production guns and that they believe will
further improve the gun‘s accuracy. For example, a titanium balancer
post (mounting point for the optical sight) is to be substituted for
the existing aluminum post on pilot production gun 2 to further reduce
flexure.
MCOTEA told us that their concerns related to accuracy will not be
resolved until after they have assessed (1) the developmental test data
that the program office believes confirms the accuracy of the
developmental guns at 3 mils and (2) the Army Test and Evaluation
Command‘s report on its observations and assessment of the Joint
Program Office‘s testing of the first pilot production gun for accuracy
and strength of design. These tests on the first pilot production gun
are scheduled to occur starting in August 2002.
Additional Information Being Collected for Low-Rate Initial Production
Decision:
While progress has been made in addressing technical problems
identified as part of developmental testing, additional information is
being collected for the upcoming decision on whether the program should
enter low-rate initial production. The milestone decision authority--
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition--intends to factor in the final results from the
operational assessment, the planned testing of the pilot production
gun, and the independent contractor assessments of production readiness
and costs.
To determine the readiness of the program to enter low-rate initial
production in October 2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition-the milestone decision authority-
established the following criteria:
* Complete an independent production readiness assessment and present
the results to the Acquisition Coordination Team.
* Submit an independently validated research, development, testing, and
evaluation, and production cost estimate 30 days prior to the Milestone
C decision meeting.
* Provide the milestone decision authority with test results confirming
the strength of design of the Pilot Production gun per the
International Test Operating Procedure for Artillery.
To demonstrate the first criterion, the program office told us that it
has contracted with the Best Manufacturing Practices Center to complete
an independent readiness assessment. According to the program office,
BAE and its subcontractors are currently producing two pilot production
guns (the first gun is to be completed by July 2002); the intent of
this production is to demonstrate production readiness. The Center will
assess the adequacy of production facilities and equipment put in place
by BAE and each subcontractor to produce the pilot production guns. The
Center will also assess the skill levels of production personnel and
the processes and controls being used to ensure production takes place
in accordance with specifications and other requirements.
To meet the second criterion, the program office told us that it has
contracted with the Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC) to independently compile a research, development, test, and
evaluation and production cost estimate for completing the program.
According to the program office, SAIC plans to develop the cost
estimate by loading program office cost data into its own cost models.
The Army and Navy cost analysis centers are to verify SAIC‘s cost
estimate.
To address the third criterion, the program office will test the first
pilot production gun for accuracy and strength of design. This testing
is to be independently observed and assessed by the Army Test and
Evaluation Command and reported to MCOTEA, which is to brief the
results to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In addition, the
Assistant Secretary is to consider the results of the operational
assessment in determining whether the program is ready for low-rate
initial production.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of Defense provided written comments that were generally
technical in nature on a draft of this report. We incorporated those
comments as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine progress in meeting program schedule and cost estimates, we
interviewed officials of the program office, Picatinny Arsenal,
Picatinny, New Jersey, and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed data. These
data include key acquisition milestones dates, acquisition schedules,
and budget requirements program funding documents. We compared these
data to information previously provided by program office officials. We
also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology; the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, and Technology; the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; and the Marine Corps
Operational Test and Evaluation Activity, Quantico, Virginia.
In examining technical difficulties affecting the program, in addition
to meeting with and obtaining information, including test reports, from
program office officials listed above, we held discussions with MCOTEA
and ATEC representatives performing the testing, and observed a test
firing session of the howitzer at 29 Palms, California.
To determine readiness for entry in to low-rate initial production, we
reviewed the Department‘s low-rate initial production criteria,
discussed this issue with program office and testing officials, and
reviewed the program office‘s entrance criteria.
We conducted our work from March through June 2002 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards and generally relied
upon agency-provided data.
Unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we
plan no further distribution of this letter until 30 days after the
date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this letter
to the Secretary of Defense; Secretary of the Navy; Commandant of the
Marine Corps; Secretary of the Army; Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will also make
copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO's Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions, or need additional information, please call
me at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this letter are Jim
Solomon, Ted Baird, Joe Dewechter, and Gary Middleton.
Signed by:
R. E. Levin:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
[End of section]
Enclosure 1:
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
July 22, 2002:
Mr. Robert E. Levin:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Levin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, "2002 Update of the 155mm Lightweight Howitzer," dated June 27,
2002 (GAO Code 120146/GAO-02-898R). While the draft report does not
make any recommendations, the DoD desires to provide general and
specific comments which, if accepted, would improve the technical
accuracy of the draft report. These comments are provided in the
enclosure.
The DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Signed by: [Illegible] for:
Glenn F. Lamartin:
Director:
Strategic and Tactical Systems:
Enclosure: as stated:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Status Update of the New 155 mm
Lightweight Howitzer, GAO-01-603R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2001) and
Defense Acquisitions: Howitzer Program Experiencing Cost Increases and
Schedule Delays, GAO/NSIAD-00-182 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2000).
[2] According to DOD Directive 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, low-rate initial production is intended to result
in completion of manufacturing development in order to ensure adequate
and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the minimum
quantity necessary to provide production configured or representative
articles for initial operational test and evaluation, establish an
initial production base for the system; and permit an orderly increase
in the production rate for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate
production upon successful completion of operational (and live-fire,
where applicable) testing. Directive 5000.2, para. 4.7.3.3.4.1.
[3] Both MCOTEA and the Army Test and Evaluation Command are
participating in the independent testing of the 155 mm gun; however,
MOCTEA has been designated as the lead tester and in this role
represents the views of both test activities when presenting briefings
and other information regarding the testing of the 155 mm gun.
[4] We reported in April 2001 that the program office‘s total cost
estimate, as of February 2001, was $1,250.2 million. This estimate
included $492.1 million for the estimated production of the Army‘s
howitzers and TAD. However, the program office told us recently that
they had overstated this cost by $41.2 million, thus the cost they
should have provided to us for inclusion in our April 2001 report was
$450.9 million. Therefore, we are using $450.9 million as the baseline
for this report and are adjusting the total cost estimate accordingly.
[5] A mil is short for ’milliradian“, which is an angular measurement
that is 1/1000th of a radian. A radian is 57.3 degrees of the arc of a
circle; 17.7 mils equal 1 degree.
[End of section]
GAO‘s Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO‘s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO‘s Web site [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov] contains abstracts and fulltext files of current
reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older products. The
Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents using
key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,
including charts and other graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as ’Today‘s Reports,“ on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select ’Subscribe to daily E-mail
alert for newly released products“ under the GAO Reports heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
