Nuclear Nonproliferation
U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Gao ID: GAO-02-989T July 30, 2002According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there have been 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials between 1993 and December 31, 2001. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across a country's border through a variety of means: they can be hidden in a car, train, or ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked across an unprotected border. U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal agencies--the Departments of Energy (DOE); State; and Defense (DOD); the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six agencies spent about $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. Assistance provided by six agencies includes installing radiation detection equipment, helping countries improve their ability to control the export of goods and technologies that could be used to develop nuclear weapons, and providing other equipment and training to improve countries' ability to prevent nuclear smuggling. Although an interagency group, chaired by the Department of State, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the six agencies do not always work in unison. The most troubling consequence of the lack of coordination is that DOE, State, and DOD have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at countries' border crossings. While U.S. assistance helps countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems exist with the installation, use, and maintenance of equipment which has undermined U.S. efforts. Customs relies on a three-part strategy to combat nuclear smuggling: training, targeting, and technology. Customs officials rely on radiation pagers--personal radiation detectors designed to be worn on a belt--as the primary equipment to detect nuclear material. However, DOE officials view the pagers as personal safety devices, not search instruments, and that they are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear material.
GAO-02-989T, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
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United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee
on Armed Services, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:30 p.m.
Tuesday, July 30, 2002:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
Statement of Ms. Gary L. Jones:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-02-989T:
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss our work on
U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. The threat presented by
nuclear smuggling is serious and poses national security concerns.
Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive
materials occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased in recent years.
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as of
December 31, 2001, there have been 181 confirmed cases of illicit
trafficking of nuclear materials since 1993. A significant number of
cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce
a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with
radioactive material”a ’dirty bomb“”to spread contamination over a wide
area. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across a country‘s border
through a variety of means: they can be hidden in a car; train; or
ship; carried in personal luggage through an airport; or walked
across an unprotected border.
In my testimony, I will address (1) the different U.S. federal programs
tasked with combating the international threat of illicit trafficking
in nuclear materials and the amount of U.S. funding spent on this
effort, (2) how well the U.S. assistance is coordinated among federal
agencies, (3) the effectiveness of the international
assistance”equipment and training”provided by the United States, and
(4) information about efforts to combat nuclear smuggling at U.S.
borders. My statement today is based on the results of our May 16,
2002, report on this subject [Footnote 1] and information we obtained
from the U.S. Customs Service in May and June 2002.
In summary, U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear
smuggling are divided among six federal agencies”the Departments of
Energy (DOE); State; and Defense (DOD); the U.S. Customs Service; the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Coast Guard. From
fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six agencies spent about
$86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet
Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling
nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of mass
destruction. The six agencies have provided a variety of assistance,
including installing radiation detection equipment, helping countries
improve their ability to control the export of goods and technologies
that could be used to develop nuclear weapons, and providing other
equipment and training to generally improve countries‘ ability to
prevent nuclear smuggling. In particular, DOE has installed radiation
detection monitors at eight border crossings and plans to install
similar equipment at close to 60 sites in Russia through its Second
Line of Defense program. The State Department has provided radiation
detection monitors, mobile vans equipped with radiation detectors, hand-
held detectors, and other assistance to about 30 countries. DOD has
also provided equipment and other assistance to about 20 countries.
With funds provided by State and DOD, the U.S. Customs Service, the
FBI, and the Coast Guard have provided a range of training and
equipment to border guards and law enforcement officials in numerous
countries.
Regarding coordination among the agencies, U.S. assistance is not
effectively coordinated and lacks an overall governmentwide plan to
guide it. Although an interagency group, chaired by the Department of
State, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the six agencies
that are providing the assistance do not always work in unison. The
most troubling consequence of the lack of coordination is that DOE,
State, and DOD have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation
detection equipment at countries‘ border crossings. As a result, some
countries‘ border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling
than others. Specifically, DOE is installing equipment at border sites
in Russia and DOD is installing equipment in another country that is
better able to detect weapons-usable material (highly enriched uranium
and plutonium), than the less sophisticated radiation detection
monitors the State Department has installed in other countries.
Concerning the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance, there is good news
and bad news to report. First, the good news. We found that U.S.
assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling of
nuclear and other radioactive materials.
Representatives from 17 recipient countries told us that U.S.
assistance had provided needed equipment and training. Without U.S.
assistance, some countries would have neither radiation detection
equipment at their borders nor training. The bad news, however, is that
serious problems exist with the installation, use, and maintenance of
equipment which has undermined U.S. efforts. For example, about one-
half of the stationary radiation detection monitors provided to one
country in the former Soviet Union were never installed, and radiation
detection equipment provided by the State Department to Lithuania was
stored in the basement of the U.S. embassy for about 2 years because
the department and Lithuanian officials disagreed about whether an
existing power line was sufficient to operate the equipment or whether
a new one costing $12,600 was needed. These and other problems are
largely a result of the lack of oversight and follow-up by the agencies
providing the assistance. We can report, however, that U.S. officials
are trying to correct some of these problems by, among other things,
stationing full-time advisers in countries receiving U.S. assistance.
Concerning efforts to combat nuclear smuggling at U.S. borders, Customs
Service officials told us that since September 11, 2001, antiterrorism
efforts, including detecting nuclear smuggling, have become a top U.S.
Customs Service priority. Customs relies on a three-part strategy to
combat nuclear smuggling: training, targeting, and technology. Customs
officials told us that they rely on radiation pagers”personal radiation
detectors designed to be worn on a belt”as the primary equipment to
detect nuclear material. Since fiscal year 1998, Customs has deployed
about 4,200 pagers among its approximately 7,500 inspectors and plans
to make the pagers standard equipment for every inspector. Most experts
we talked to agree that radiation detection pagers are a useful tool in
a layered system that includes various kinds of radiation detection
equipment. However, DOE officials told us that they view the pagers as
personal safety devices, not search instruments, and that the pagers
are not designed to detect weapons-usable nuclear material. In addition
to the pagers, Customs plans to purchase about 400 portal monitors over
the next couple of years.
Background:
Over the past decade, the United States has paid increased attention to
the threat that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material in the
countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, could be
stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists or countries seeking
weapons of mass destruction. Several cases of illicit trafficking in
nuclear material in Germany and the Czech Republic in the early to mid-
1990s underscored the proliferation threat. The United States responded
to the threat by providing assistance to increase security at numerous
nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia,
to prevent weapons-usable material from being stolen. This effort
is considered the first line of defense against potential theft or
diversion of nuclear materials. [Footnote 2]
Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials in
medicine and industry; in commodities that are sources of naturally
occurring radiation, such as fertilizer; and in nuclear materials that
could be used in a nuclear weapon. The capability of the equipment to
detect nuclear material depends on many factors, including the amount of
material, the size and capacity of the detection device, and whether
the material is shielded from detection. Detecting actual cases of
illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is complicated
because one of the materials that is of greatest concern”highly
enriched uranium”is among the most difficult materials to detect
because of its relatively low level of radioactivity. In contrast,
medical and industrial radioactive sources, which could be used in a
radiological dispersion device, are highly radioactive and easier to
detect. Because of the complexities of detecting and identifying
nuclear material, customs officers and border guards who are
responsible for operating detection equipment must also be trained in
using handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm,
identify false alarms, and respond to cases of nuclear smuggling.
Six Federal Agencies Spent About $86 Million to Help Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling:
U.S. assistance efforts, which consist primarily of providing equipment
and training to combat nuclear smuggling and other materials that could
be used in weapons of mass destruction, are divided among six federal
agencies: DOE, DOD, State, the Customs Service, the FBI, and the Coast
Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the agencies
spent about $86 million in about 30 countries, including all of the
countries of the former Soviet Union and numerous countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. Providing radiation detection equipment is one of
the many types of U.S. assistance. The United States has provided
portal monitors (stationary equipment designed to detect radioactive
materials carried by pedestrians or vehicles) and smaller, portable
radiation detectors at border crossings in many countries of the former
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. This equipment, which is
installed at car and truck crossings, railroad crossings, seaports, and
airports, serves two purposes: deterring smugglers from trafficking in
nuclear materials and detecting cases of actual smuggling. Other
equipment ranges from hand tools for taking apart and searching
different compartments of a vehicle for hidden contraband to boats and
vehicles for conducting patrols. Similarly, training provided ranges
from hands-on instruction on using the equipment and conducting
searches to high-level technical exchanges on establishing the legal
and regulatory basis for preventing illicit trafficking and trade in
sensitive goods that could be used in a nuclear weapon.
DOE has two assistance programs: the Second Line of Defense program and
the International Export Control Program (IECP). The Second Line of
Defense program focuses on providing radiation detection equipment to
Russia. DOE had spent $11.2 million through fiscal year 2001 to install
70 portal monitors at eight sites in Russia, including a Moscow
airport. DOE has identified close to 60 sites in total in Russia where
it plans to install portal monitors over the next decade at a cost of
about $50 million. IECP is designed to help countries of the former
Soviet Union control the export of goods and technologies that could be
used in the development of nuclear weapons and had spent $22 million on
this effort through fiscal year 2001. Whereas the Second Line of
Defense program focuses on the nuclear material needed to manufacture a
nuclear bomb, the IECP focuses on other high-technology components
needed for a bomb, such as equipment for enriching uranium. DOE also
spent $1.8 million to support State and DOD programs to combat nuclear
smuggling.
State spent $11.4 million through two programs”the Nonproliferation
Disarmament Fund (NDF) and the Export Control and Related Border
Security Assistance program. Through NDF, State spent $8.5 million to,
among other things, install portal monitors in countries other than
Russia, provide handheld radiation detectors, including radiation
pagers, and mobile vans equipped with X-ray machines and radiation
detectors. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
program spent $2.7 million, which included funding for mobile vans for
Russia and Poland. It also spent $0.2 million on a program (implemented
by Customs) to provide radiation detection equipment as part of its
assistance to strengthen Georgia‘s overall border infrastructure and
security against any type of crime, including nuclear smuggling.
DOD has provided assistance under two programs: the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program and the International Counterproliferation
program. The CTR program spent $16.3 million to assist five countries.
Assistance included providing pedestrian portal monitors (to screen
people) and handheld radiation detectors. In addition, CTR funds have
been used to install portal monitors in one country. As part of the
International Counterproliferation program, DOD spent $10.2 million to
provide Customs and FBI training and equipment in 17 countries of the
former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe.
Customs, FBI, and the Coast Guard have implemented programs with
funding from State and DOD. Customs was the largest recipient of funds,
spending $11.1 million to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs has
provided training and equipment to customs agencies and border guards
in close to 30 countries. The equipment includes radiation pagers as
well as other high- and low-tech tools for conducting searches and
detecting sensitive goods and materials, such as fiber-optic scopes for
examining fuel tanks for contraband. Training includes providing
assistance in operating the mobile vans equipped with radiation
detectors, providing hands-on instruction for using equipment, and
teaching techniques for investigating smuggling operations. In addition
to equipment and training, Customs has stationed 22 full-time advisers
covering 25 countries on behalf of State to help implement and
coordinate the U.S. assistance.
FBI and the Coast Guard have also played a role in combating nuclear
smuggling. FBI spent $0.4 million in DOD funds to train and equip law
enforcement agencies to investigate and respond to actual seizures of
smuggled nuclear or other material. Training included seminars for high-
level officials and courses on conducting investigations and managing a
crime scene where a seizure has taken place. Equipment provided as part
of the training included HAZMAT suits to make handling seized material
safer, evidence collection and sampling kits, chemical detection
equipment, and radiation pagers. The Coast Guard spent $1.6 million in
funds received from State to interdict smuggled nuclear material.
Assistance to one country includes providing two boats with spare parts
and stationing an in-country Coast Guard adviser.
U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated
Approach:
The six agencies that are providing assistance to combat nuclear
smuggling have not effectively coordinated their activities, and there
is no overall governmentwide plan to guide their efforts. The most
troubling consequence has been that DOE, State, and DOD are pursuing
separate approaches to improving countries‘ border crossings, leaving
some countries more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.
Specifically, the results of our review showed that DOE and DOD have
installed more sophisticated portal monitors at border sites in Russia
and another country and State has installed less sophisticated portal
monitors in other countries. In addition, DOD‘s Cooperative Threat
Reduction program in the mid-1990s provided less sophisticated portal
monitors to still another country in the former Soviet Union. The more
sophisticated portal monitors detect two types of radiation: gamma and
neutron. The less sophisticated equipment installed by State and under
DOD‘s CTR program detects only gamma radiation. The ability to detect
neutron radiation translates into a greater ability to detect weapons-
usable plutonium.
State Department officials said they used less sophisticated portal
monitors because of their lower cost and the difficulty many countries
would have in maintaining more sophisticated equipment. Because of the
different circumstances existing in each country, State officials said
that radiation detection assistance should be tailored to individual
country needs. However, the Director of State‘s Office of Export Control
Cooperation and Sanctions said that the department is reevaluating its
approach, including installing better equipment where appropriate.
The three agencies have also pursued different approaches to providing
handheld radiation detection equipment. With funding from DOD and
State, Customs has provided foreign customs organizations and border
guards with radiation detection pagers. In contrast, DOE‘s Second Line
of Defense program provides larger handheld detectors but not radiation
detection pagers. State and Customs officials pointed out that pagers
are a useful part of a radiation detection system at border crossings
and essentially represent one tool in the toolbox to combat nuclear
smuggling.
Although the agencies coordinate their assistance through an
interagency group chaired by State, we believe these efforts have been
inadequate. No one agency is in charge of the overall U.S. effort to
provide assistance and, consequently, the agencies have implemented
their programs without always coordinating through the interagency
group. The absence of a strong focal point for this assistance has led,
not surprisingly, to differing views about the appropriate role that
each agency should play in this effort. For example, while State sees
itself as the agency that leads the coordination effort, a DOD official
said that State does not have the necessary expertise to manage the
overall U.S. effort. In contrast, DOE officials told us that State
should have a lead role in coordination and diplomatic support.
However, DOE officials questioned whether State and DOD are the
appropriate agencies for installing portal monitors in countries other
than Russia.
There were also coordination problems within individual agencies. For
example, although State provides its radiation detection assistance
through DOE, the DOE office that works with State is completely
separate from the Second Line of Defense program. A Second Line of
Defense program official told us that his program office and the other
office do not communicate with each other. This official believes that
the two offices should be merged, and we recommended in our report that
a consolidation occur, preferably under the Second Line of Defense
program.
U.S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling but
Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts:
U.S. assistance has, in general, strengthened the ability of numerous
countries throughout the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe to deter and detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and
maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S. efforts.
Officials from 17 countries receiving U.S. assistance to combat nuclear
smuggling told us that the assistance had provided much needed
radiation detection equipment and training. According to officials from
several countries, U.S.-supplied portal monitors installed at border
crossings and handheld detection equipment represent the only
assistance of this type that their countries have received. In
countries that we visited during our fieldwork, including Russia, we
observed that the equipment was working and was being used for the
purposes intended. In fact, Russian customs officials told us that
equipment funded by DOE had helped accelerate Russia‘s plans to improve
border security. This is a daunting challenge, given the fact that
Russia has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14 countries, including
North Korea, and is in close geographical proximity to Afghanistan,
Iran, and Iraq.
Despite the benefits of the assistance, we found numerous problems with
various types of radiation detection equipment that has been provided
by DOD, State, and Customs. According to officials from these agencies
and a DOE office responsible for installing portal monitors in some
countries, U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling has lacked
effective follow-up to ensure that equipment delivered was properly
maintained and used for the purposes intended. Several officials told
us that funding for maintenance of the equipment and training on how to
use it has been inadequate, because of the U.S. practice of delivering
the equipment without making provisions for follow-on support.
Examples of the problems we found with U.S.-supplied equipment”some of
which we derived from discussions with U.S. program officials and
representatives of countries receiving U.S. assistance”include the
following.
* About half of the pedestrian portal monitors provided to one country
in the former Soviet Union were never installed or are not operational.
Officials from this country told us that they were given more equipment
than they could use.
* Portal monitors delivered to Lithuania were stored in the U.S.
embassy basement for about 2 years because the State Department and the
Lithuanian border organization disagreed about whether an existing
power supply was sufficient to operate the equipment or a new one
costing $12,600 was needed.
* Equipment worth about $80,000 could not be given to Estonia as part
of a DOD/FBI training program because an agreement governing the
release of such equipment had not been finalized. The equipment was
placed in an embassy garage for about 7 months before it was
transferred to Estonia in December 2001.
* A portal monitor furnished by the State Department to Bulgaria was
installed on an unused road. Plans are under way to relocate the
equipment.
* Mobile vans equipped with radiation detection equipment (which cost a
total of $900,000) provided to two countries have limited utility
because they cannot be operated effectively in cold climates and are
very fuel-inefficient. Officials from one country told us that the van
provided to them is stored in a shipping crate at customs‘
headquarters.
Another problem is that in many cases, countries that have received
U.S. radiation detection equipment are not systematically providing
information about nuclear materials detected by U.S.-supplied
equipment. As a result, it is difficult to determine the overall impact
and effectiveness of the equipment.
Actions are being taken to correct these problems. In the past 2 years,
the State Department has placed full-time advisers in many of the
countries receiving U.S. assistance to improve program effectiveness.
These advisers, generally retired Customs officials, are responsible
for, among other things, inventorying equipment, determining how it is
being used, including assessing its effectiveness. State is also using
the advisers to improve equipment sustainability and facilitate routine
equipment maintenance and repair.
Other factors also affect U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling,
such as corruption in countries‘ border organizations and the amount of
territory that requires protection. According to officials from several
recipient countries, corruption is a pervasive problem within the ranks
of border security organizations. In addition, because of the large
expanses of territory, including borders that are not clearly marked,
numerous recipient country officials told us that it is impossible to
secure every border crossing. Furthermore, every country has ’green“
borders”territory that is not patrolled or regulated by border security
personnel. These areas are very attractive to smugglers in general.
Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling at U.S. Borders:
Since September 11, 2001, antiterrorism efforts, including detecting
nuclear smuggling, have become a top U.S. Customs Service priority.
While Customs is employing a three-pronged approach to this effort,
which focuses on training, targeting, and technology, it has no overall
strategic plan to guide its efforts. In the area of training, by the
end of fiscal year 2002, Customs plans to train up to 140 inspectors of
its approximately 7,500 inspectors to detect nuclear material. This
specialized training is being conducted in cooperation with DOE‘s
national laboratories. In addition, according to Customs, approximately
5000 Customs personnel have received training in familiarization and
identification of materials and components associated with the
development and deployment of nuclear weapons and radiological devices.
Regarding targeting, Customs uses data from importers and exporters; an
automated system that screens manifest information; and its Office of
Border Security to target incoming and outgoing shipments for further
inspection. However, Customs officials told us that one of its greatest
needs is better information to more accurately target shipments.
In the area of technology, Customs officials told us that it relies
primarily on radiation detection pagers to detect nuclear material.
Since fiscal year 1998, Customs has deployed about 4,200 pagers among
its approximately 7,500 inspectors. Customs plans to make the radiation
detection pagers standard equipment for every inspector and expects to
purchase over 4,000 additional pagers to complete deployment by
September 2003. Every inspector will have his or her own pager.
However, radiation detection pagers have limitations. DOE officials
told us that they do not view pagers as search instruments, but rather
as personal safety devices that have a limited range and are not
designed to detect weapons-usable material. Customs officials told us
that the radiation detection pagers were initially purchased as
personal protection devices. However, post September 11, 2001, the
pagers will be used as radiation detection equipment. According to U.S.
officials, pagers are more effectively used in conjunction with other
radiation detection equipment, such as portal monitors.
Customs has also deployed over 200 radiation detectors on mobile X-ray
van and other X-ray equipment to screen small packages. Regarding
portal monitors, Customs plans to install them at every U.S. land, air,
and sea port of entry, but so far only one has been deployed as a
demonstration project. According to Customs officials, the plan is to
purchase about 400 portal monitors. About half of the monitors will be
purchased in this fiscal year and the remainder will be purchased in
fiscal year 2003.
These purchases are a step in the right direction and are designed to
get radiation detection equipment to U.S. borders quickly. However,
Customs does not have a comprehensive strategic plan to guide its
overall efforts. Such a plan, at a minimum, would assess
vulnerabilities and risks; identify the complement of radiation
detection equipment that should be used at each type of border entry
point”air, rail, land, and sea”and whether the equipment could be
immediately deployed; identify longer-term radiation detection
equipment needs; and develop measures to ensure that the equipment is
adequately maintained. However, it is not enough to simply deploy
equipment. Customs personnel must be effectively trained in radiation
science, the use of the equipment, and identifying and responding to
alarms. The strategic plan would need to identify total costs, annual
budgetary needs, and timeframes for all these activities. The plan
would provide for an integrated, systematic approach to Customs
antiterrorism efforts and provide the basis for setting priorities and
for coordinating efforts with other federal, state, and local agencies
that would be involved in these activities. While Customs officials
told us that they developed the elements of a plan, including schedules
to purchase equipment and train personnel, these elements have not yet
been integrated into a comprehensive strategic plan. Although we are
not making a formal recommendation to Customs to develop such a plan,
we will monitor Customs‘ progress toward the development of its
strategic plan.
Madam Chairman this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gary Jones
at (202) 512-3841. Gene Aloise, Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis also made
key contributions to this testimony.
[End of testimony]
Footnotes:
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S.
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426, (Washington, D.C.:
May 16, 2002).
[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Security of Russia‘s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements
Needed, GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001).
[End of section]
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