Critical Infrastructure Protection
Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed Gao ID: GAO-02-781 August 30, 2002Government and private-sector entities rely on satellites for services such as communication, navigation, remote sensing, imaging, and weather and meteorological support. Disruption of satellite services, whether intentional or not, can have a major adverse economic impact. Techniques to protect satellite systems from unauthorized use and disruption include the use of robust hardware on satellites, physical security and logical access controls at ground stations, and encryption of the signals for tracking and controlling the satellite and of the data being sent to and from satellites. When using commercial satellites, federal agencies reduce risks by securing the data links and ground stations that send and receive data. However, federal agencies do not control the security of the tracking and control links, satellites, or tracking and control ground stations, which are typically the responsibility of the satellite service provider. It is important to the nation's economy and security to protect against attacks on its computer-dependent critical infrastructures (such as telecommunications, energy, and transportation), many of which are privately owned. In light of the nation's growing reliance on commercial satellites to meet military, civil, and private sector requirements, omitting satellites from the nation's approach to protecting critical infrastructure leaves an important aspect of our nation's infrastructures without focused attention.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
August 2002:
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed:
GAO-02-781:
GAO Highlights:
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed:
Highlights of GAO-02-781, a report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, United States Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Because the federal government relies on commercial satellites,
security threats leading to their disruption or loss would put
government functions (including communications and information
transmission) at significant risk. Accordingly, GAO was asked
to review, among other things, the techniques used by federal
agencies to reduce the risk associated with using commercial
satellite systems, as well as efforts to improve satellite system
security undertaken as part of federal efforts in critical
infrastructure protection.
What GAO Found:
Although federal agencies rely on commercial satellites, federal
customers do not dominate the commercial satellite market,
accounting for only about 10 percent of it. As a result, federal
customers generally have not influenced security techniques used
for commercial satellites. Federal agencies do reduce their risk
by securing those system components under their control”the data
links and communications ground stations”but most components are
typically the responsibility of the satellite service provider:
the satellite; the telemetry, tracking, and control links; and the
satellite control ground stations (see figure below). Some federal
agencies also mitigate risk by relying on redundant or backup
capabilities, such as additional satellite services.
In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 was issued to improve the
federal approach to protecting our nation‘s critical infrastructures
(such as telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, and
transportation) by establishing partnerships between private-sector
entities and the federal government. To date, the satellite industry
has not been included as part of this national effort. Further, federal
policy governing the security of satellite systems used by agencies
addresses only those satellites used for national security information
and pertains only to techniques associated with the links between
ground
stations and satellites or links between satellites. Without
appropriate
governmentwide policy to address the security of all satellite
components
and of non–national-security information, federal agencies may not, for
information with similar sensitivity and criticality, consistently (1)
secure data links and communication ground stations or (2) use
satellites
that have certain security controls that enhance availability.
Figure: Commercial Satellite System Showing Components Not Controlled
by
Government Agencies
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To ensure that these assets are protected from unauthorized access and
disruption, GAO recommends that steps be taken to promote the
appropriate
development and implementation of policy regarding the security of
satellite systems. GAO also recommends that commercial satellites be
identified as a critical infrastructure (or as part of an already
identified
one) in the national critical infrastructure protection strategy.
In commenting on a draft of this report, agencies included in our
review
concurred with our findings and recommendations. In addition, these
agencies and private-sector entities provided technical comments, which
were included in the report, as appropriate.
This is a test for developing highlights for a GAO report. The full
report,
including GAO‘s objectives, scope, methodology, and analysis is
available
at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-781. For additional information
about
the report, contact Robert Dacey (202-512-3317). To provide comments on
this test highlights, contact Keith Fultz (202-512-3200) or E-mail
HighlightsTest@gao.gov.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Security Techniques Are Available to Protect TT&C and Data Links,
Satellites, and Ground Stations:
Federal Satellite Users Can Reduce Risks Only in Certain Areas, and
National Policy Is Limited:
National CIP Initiatives Addressing Satellite Security Have Been
Limited:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
Tables :
Table 1: Civilian Agency Use of Commercial Satellites:
Table 2: Unintentional Threats to Commercial Satellite Systems:
Table 3: Intentional Threats to Commercial Satellite Systems:
Table 4: Security Techniques Available to Address Unintentional and
Intentional Threats:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key Components of a Satellite System:
Figure 2: Entities with CIP Responsibilities as Outlined byPDD 63:
Figure 3: Commercial Satellite System Showing Components Not Controlled
by Government Agencies:
Abbreviations:
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency:
CIAO: Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office:
CIP: critical infrastructure protection:
CNSS: Committee on National Security Systems:
DOD: Department of Defense:
EMP: electromagnetic pulse:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FCC: Federal Communications Commission:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
GPS: Global Positioning System:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
ISAC: information sharing and analysis center:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NCC: National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications:
NDIA: National Defense Industrial Association:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NSA: National Security Agency:
NSTISSP: National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems
Security Policy:
NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information Administration:
NTISSP: National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
Policy:
OSTP: Office of Science and Technology Policy:
PDD: Presidential Decision Directive:
RF: radio frequency:
TT&C: tracking, telemetry, and control:
Letter August 30, 2002:
The Honorable Susan Collins
Ranking Minority Member
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Collins:
Government and private-sector entities rely on satellites for services
such as communication, navigation, remote sensing, imaging, and weather
and meteorological support. Although the government owns satellites, it
also relies for certain services on satellites owned and operated by
commercial satellite service providers. For example, the Department of
Defense (DOD) typically relies on commercial satellites to fulfill its
communications and information transmission requirements for non-
mission-critical data and to augment its military satellite
capabilities. The importance of commercial satellites for DOD is
evident during times of conflict: according to a DOD study, commercial
communications satellites were used in 45 percent of all communications
between the United States and the Persian Gulf region during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm.[Footnote 1] Further, the federal government‘s
reliance on commercial satellites is expected to grow.
The commercial satellite industry is also a critical component of the
worldwide and national economy: the industry generated $85 billion in
revenue in 2000. Accordingly, disruption of satellite services, whether
intentional or not, can have a major adverse economic impact. One
indication of the importance of satellite services was provided in 1998
by the failure of the Galaxy IV satellite, which disrupted 80 to 90
percent of 45 million pagers across the United States for 2 to 4 days
and blocked credit card authorization at point-of-sale terminals (such
as gasoline pumps).
Satellites are vulnerable to various threats. Protecting satellite
systems against these threats requires attention to (1) the satellite;
(2) the satellite control ground stations, which perform tracking and
control functions to ensure that satellites remain in the proper orbits
and which monitor satellite performance; (3) the communications ground
stations, which process the data being sent to and from satellites; and
(4) communications links between satellites and ground stations--both
those that transmit the tracking and control information and those that
transmit the data. Security threats to any part of the system could put
government and commercial functions at significant risk. Accordingly,
at your request, we reviewed (1) what security techniques are available
to protect satellite systems from unauthorized use, disruption, or
damage; (2) how federal agencies reduce the risk associated with their
use of commercial satellite systems; and (3) what federal critical
infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts are being undertaken to address
satellite system security through improved government and private-
sector cooperation. To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed
technical documents, policy, and directives and interviewed pertinent
officials from federal agencies and the private sector involved in
developing, operating, maintaining, and protecting satellite systems.
Appendix I provides further details on our objectives, scope, and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
Techniques to protect satellite systems from unauthorized use and
disruption include the use of robust hardware on satellites, physical
security and logical access controls[Footnote 2] at ground stations,
and encryption of the signals for tracking and controlling the
satellite and of the data being sent to and from satellites. Commercial
satellite service providers stated that they provide some of these
security techniques to meet most of their customers‘ security
requirements and that they base their decisions on business objectives.
For example, commercial satellite providers stated that they use backup
satellites and redundant satellite features to ensure availability.
However, commercial satellite providers generally do not use the more
stringent techniques used in national security satellites for
protection against deliberate disruption and exploitation.
When using commercial satellites, federal agencies reduce risks by
securing the data links and ground stations that send and receive data.
However, federal agencies do not control the security of the tracking
and control links, satellites, or tracking and control ground stations,
which are typically the responsibility of the satellite service
provider. Further, although the federal government relies on commercial
satellites, federal customers make up only about 10 percent of the
commercial satellite market and accordingly have had limited influence
over security techniques employed by commercial satellite service
providers. To mitigate risk, some federal agencies also rely on
redundant or backup capabilities, such as additional satellite
services. Aspects of satellite system security have been addressed in
federal policy, but this policy is limited because it pertains only to
satellite and supporting systems that are used for national security
information, addresses only techniques associated with the links, and
does not have an enforcement mechanism. Without appropriate
governmentwide policy to address the security of all satellite
components and of non-national-security information, federal agencies
may not, for information with similar sensitivity and criticality,
consistently (1) secure data links and communication ground stations or
(2) use satellites that have certain security controls that enhance
availability. Recent initiatives by the Executive Branch have
acknowledged these policy limitations, but we are not aware of specific
actions to address them.
It is important to our nation‘s economy and security to protect against
attacks on its computer-dependent critical infrastructures (such as
telecommunications, energy, and transportation), many of which are
privately owned. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 was issued
to improve the federal approach to protecting our nation‘s critical
infrastructures by establishing partnerships between private-sector
entities and the federal government. However, the satellite industry
has not been included as part of this national effort, and there are no
plans to include it. In addition, the July 2002 national strategy for
homeland security does not suggest that the satellite industry be
included in the approach to protecting our critical
infrastructures.[Footnote 3] In light of the nation‘s growing reliance
on commercial satellites to meet military, civil, and private-sector
requirements, omitting satellites from our nation‘s approach leaves a
critical aspect of our nation‘s infrastructures without focused
attention.
Because of the importance of the satellite industry to our nation, we
recommend that steps be taken to promote appropriate revisions to
existing policy and the development of new policy regarding the
security of satellite systems, to ensure that federal agencies
appropriately address the use of commercial satellites, including the
sensitivity of information, security techniques, and enforcement
mechanisms. In addition, we are recommending that commercial satellites
be identified as a critical infrastructure sector (or as part of an
already identified critical infrastructure sector) in the national CIP
strategy, to help ensure that these assets are protected from
unauthorized access and disruption.
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Department of Defense; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of Commerce; and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. The Departments of Defense and Commerce and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration concurred with our
findings and recommendations (see apps. II, III, and IV, respectively)
and provided technical comments that have been incorporated in the
report, as appropriate (some of these technical comments are reproduced
in the appendixes). We received technical oral comments from officials
from the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of
Commerce; Federal Aviation Administration, Department of
Transportation; Office of Management and Budget; and United States
Secret Service, Department of Treasury; in addition, we received
written and oral technical comments from five participating private-
sector entities. Comments from all these organizations have been
incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
Background:
Satellites provide many significant services, including communication,
navigation, remote sensing, imaging, and weather and meteorological
support. Satellites support direct radio communication and provide
television broadcast and cable relay services, as well as home
reception. Satellite services also support applications such as mobile
and cellular communication, telemedicine, cargo tracking, point-of-
sale transactions, and Internet access. Satellites also provide
redundancy and backup capabilities to ground-based communications, as
was demonstrated after the events of September 11, 2001, when
satellites provided critical communications while ground-based lines
were unavailable.
The commercial satellite industry includes manufacturers, the launch
industry, service providers, and ground equipment manufacturers.
Manufacturers design and build satellites, supporting systems, and
ground stations. The launch industry uses launch vehicles, powered by
rocket engines, to place satellites in orbit. Once commercial
satellites are in orbit, they are operated by service providers, who
lease available services. Commercial satellite service clients include
telecommunication companies, television networks, financial
institutions, major retailers, Internet service providers, and
governments. Some companies resell leased satellite services to their
clients. For example, major telecommunication companies sometimes
include satellite services in their product line. Ground equipment
manufacturers build and sell the items needed to use satellite
services, such as ground station hardware (antennas), data terminals,
mobile terminals (truck-mounted units), and consumer electronics
(satellite phones). For the year 2000, the commercial satellite
industry generated revenues of $85.1 billion:[Footnote 4] $17.2 billion
for satellite manufacturing, $8.5 billion for the launch
industry,[Footnote 5] $41.7 billion for satellite services, and $17.7
billion for ground equipment manufacturing,[Footnote 6] according to an
industry association.
Federal agencies also own and operate satellites. For example, the U.S.
military and intelligence communities have satellites to provide
capabilities for reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning of missile
launches, weather forecasts, navigation, and communications. In
addition, some federal civilian agencies own satellites that are used
for communications, scientific studies, and weather forecasting.
Further, federal agencies use commercial satellites for services such
as communications, data transmission, and remote sensing. For example,
DOD typically relies on commercial satellites to fulfill its
communications and information transmission requirements for non-
mission-critical data and to augment its military satellite
capabilities. The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)
reported in December 1998 that the government‘s overall use of
commercial satellites for communications and remote sensing is expected
to grow significantly because of increased communications requirements.
According to a DOD official, the department‘s reliance on commercial
satellites is expected to grow through 2020. After 2020, DOD officials
anticipate that commercial satellites will provide only surge capacity,
as additional military satellites are expected to be operational. In
addition to the U.S. military, several civilian government agencies
also rely on commercial satellite systems. Table 1 provides brief
descriptions of the use of commercial satellites by four civilian
agencies included in our review.
Table 1: Civilian Agency Use of Commercial Satellites:
Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Use of
commercial satellites: To serve as an alternative means of transmitting
launch commands and scientific data when there are geographical
limitations to terrestrial communications networks.
Agency: United States Secret Service; Use of commercial satellites: To
provide, on a limited basis, communications when other methods are not
available.
Agency: Federal Aviation Administration; Use of commercial satellites:
To transmit corrected Global Positioning System data to aircraft and
for remote location air traffic control communications.
Agency: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/
National Weather Service; Use of commercial satellites: To disseminate
imagery, graphic, and text data on weather conditions around the earth.
Source: Cited agencies.
[End of table]
Collectively, the federal government does not dominate the commercial
satellite market. According to commercial satellite industry officials,
the revenue provided to the satellite industry by the federal
government represents about 10 percent of the commercial satellite
market.
However, the importance of commercial satellites for government
operations is evident during times of conflict. For example, according
to a DOD study, commercial communications satellites were used in 45
percent of all communications between the United States and the Persian
Gulf region during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Further, during
operations in Somalia from December 1992 through March 1994, U.S.
military and commercial satellite coverage was not available, so
Russian commercial satellites were used. DOD currently reports
approximately 50 percent reliance on commercial satellites for wideband
services,[Footnote 7] which are leased through the Defense Information
Systems Agency‘s Commercial Satellite Communications Branch.[Footnote
8]
The commercial satellite industry is a global industry that includes
many foreign-owned corporations as well as partnerships between U.S.
and foreign corporations. As a result, the U.S. government depends on
foreign and international companies. For example, some commercial space
systems of foreign origin are used by the U.S. military for imagery and
communications support. NDIA reported that foreign ownership of
satellites is expected to grow and predicted that by 2010, 80 percent
of commercial communication satellite services could be provided by
foreign-owned companies. This globalization of the satellite industry
could affect the availability of commercial satellite systems to U.S.
government or commercial entities through frequency allocations,
tariffs, politics, and international law.
Satellites Operate through a System of Links and Ground Stations:
A satellite system consists of ground stations, tracking and control
links (commonly referred to as the tracking, telemetry, and control
(TT&C) links) and data links, and satellites. Figure 1 illustrates the
basic satellite system components.
Figure 1: Key Components of a Satellite System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
As the figure shows, two kinds of ground stations are associated with
satellites: control stations and communications stations. Control
stations perform tracking and control functions to ensure that
satellites remain in the proper orbits (commonly referred to by the
industry as ’station keeping“) and to monitor their performance.
Communications ground stations process imagery, voice, or other data
and provide, in many cases, a link to ground-based terrestrial network
interconnections.
The links between the two types of ground stations and the satellites
are referred to by their function: TT&C and data links. TT&C links
exchange commands and status information between control ground
stations and satellites. Data links exchange communications,
navigation, and imaging data between communications ground stations and
satellites. As shown in figure 1, links are also distinguished by the
direction of transmission: uplinks go from Earth to space, and
downlinks from space to Earth. Satellites can also communicate with
each other; these links are referred to as cross-links.
The final component of the system is the satellite. Every satellite has
a ’payload“ and a ’bus.“ The payload contains all the equipment a
satellite needs to perform its function, and it differs for every type
of satellite. For example, the payload for a weather satellite includes
cameras to take pictures of cloud formations, while the payload for a
communications satellite includes transponders to relay data (for
example, television or telephone signals).[Footnote 9] The bus carries
the payload and additional equipment into space and provides electrical
power, computers, and propulsion to the entire spacecraft. A satellite
can serve simply as a relay between a source and a destination (for
example, a communications satellite), or it can perform processing of
data and communicate the data to a communications ground station (for
example, an imaging satellite).
Satellite Systems Are Vulnerable to a Range of Threats:
Satellite systems face unintentional threats to all parts of the
system; such threats can be ground-based, space-based, and
interference-oriented. The probability of these threats occurring and
the difficulty of exploiting these vulnerabilities vary. Table 2
displays some of these threats and the vulnerable components.
Table 2: Unintentional Threats to Commercial Satellite Systems:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD and GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Ground stations are vulnerable to damage or destruction by natural
terrestrial threats such as earthquakes, floods, thunderstorms,
lightning, dust storms, heavy snows, tropical storms, tornadoes,
corrosive sea spray, and salt air. In addition, they could also be
affected by natural conditions and environmental hazards, such as air
pollution and adverse temperature environments, as well as power
outages.
Satellites are physically vulnerable to space-based environmental
anomalies resulting from natural conditions and man-made artifacts.
Space-based threats include solar and cosmic radiation and related
phenomena, solar disturbances, temperature variations, and natural
objects (meteoroids and asteroids). In addition, the growing number of
satellites is contributing to the problem of space ’junk“ (spacecraft
and debris). As of May 2002, DOD identified over 9,000 man-made objects
in space, including active satellites. As additional satellites are
developed and deployed, DOD officials stated that the threat of
collisions caused by the proliferation of satellites and accompanying
debris could increase.
Links are vulnerable both to natural conditions (in space and in the
atmosphere) and to congestion. Links can be severely degraded by the
effects of solar activity and atmospheric and solar disturbances. Both
orbital and spectral congestion are a threat to links (as well as to
satellites).[Footnote 10] Such congestion may restrict the future use
of potential orbits and frequencies and cause unintentional
interference to satellite services. According to one commercial service
provider, satellite service providers worldwide work together to
resolve interference problems, which are common. In addition,
commercial satellite interference is regulated both internationally and
nationally. The International Telecommunication Union specifies
interference resolution policies and procedures, including those for
harmful interference.[Footnote 11] Further, within the United States,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)[Footnote 12] has the
capability to track the location of interference, at a service
provider‘s request. Also, service providers told us that they could
locate and identify unintentional or unauthorized users through a
technique called triangulation. Once an unauthorized user is located, a
commercial service provider can jam that user‘s signal if the user
cannot be persuaded to stop using the satellite. However, according to
industry officials, typically an unauthorized user would be identified,
located, and contacted through a combination of industry and government
resources before such jamming would be needed.
In addition, satellite systems are vulnerable to many forms of
intentional human attacks that are intended to destroy ground stations
and satellites or interfere with the TT&C links, data links, and cross-
links. According to DOD and the private sector, the probability of
these threats occurring and the difficulty of exploiting these
vulnerabilities vary. Table 3 shows some of these intentional threats.
Table 3: Intentional Threats to Commercial Satellite Systems:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
All types of ground stations are potentially vulnerable to threats of
physical attack and sabotage. These threats could target all satellite
ground components, including launch facilities, command and control
facilities, and supporting infrastructures.
Space-based threats to satellites are proliferating as a result of the
growing availability of technology around the world. According to DOD,
potential space-based weapons include interceptors, such as space mines
and orbiting space-to-space missiles, and directed-energy weapons.
Directed-energy weapons include ground-based, airborne, and space-
based weapons that use laser energy to damage or destroy satellite
services, and nuclear weapons that generate nuclear radiation and
electronic pulses, resulting in direct damage to the orbital
electronics by the primary and secondary effects of a detonation.
Ground stations, links, and supporting communications networks are all
vulnerable to cyber attacks. Potential cyber attacks include denial of
service, malicious software, unauthorized monitoring and disclosure of
sensitive information (data interception), injection of fake signals or
traffic (’spoofing“), and unauthorized modification or deliberate
corruption of network information, services, and databases. For
example, malicious software (such as computer viruses) can be
(1) implanted into computer systems during development or inserted
during operations; (2) used to manipulate network protocols, deny data
or service, destroy data or software, and corrupt, modify, or
compromise data; and (3) used to attack processor-controlled
transmission equipment, control systems, or the information being
passed.
Links are particularly susceptible to electronic interference threats
capable of disrupting or denying satellite communications. These
threats include spoofing and jamming. A spoofer emits false, but
plausible, signals for deception purposes. If false commands could be
inserted into a satellite‘s command receiver (spoofing the receiver),
they could cause the spacecraft to tumble or otherwise destroy itself.
It is also feasible to insert false information or computer viruses
into the terrestrial computer networks associated with a space system,
either remotely or through an on-site connection. Such an attack could
lead to space system degradation or even complete loss of spacecraft
utility.
A jammer emits noise-like signals in an effort to mask or prevent the
reception of desired signals and can be used to disrupt uplinks,
downlinks, and cross-links. An uplink jammer attempts to inject noise
or some other signal into the targeted satellites‘ uplink receivers. In
general, an uplink jammer must be roughly as powerful as the emitter
associated with the link being jammed.
Downlink jamming attempts to inject noise or some other signal directly
into earth terminal receivers. The targets of downlink jammers are
ground-based satellite data receivers, ranging from large fixed ground
sites to handheld Global Positioning System (GPS) user terminals. Since
downlink jammers have a range advantage over the space-based emitters,
they can often be much less powerful. Downlink jamming is generally
easier to accomplish than uplink jamming, since very low-power jammers
are often suitable. Since a downlink may be received by multiple earth
terminals, it is often more difficult to jam more than a few earth
terminals through downlink jamming than through uplink jamming,
especially if the receiver terminals are dispersed across a significant
geographical area.
A cross-link jammer attempts to inject noise or some other signal
between two satellites communicating directly with each other. Because
it is considered the most complex and difficult approach to satellite
jamming, according to a DOD document,[Footnote 13] cross-link jamming
is considered a lower probability threat than uplink and downlink
jamming.
Satellite Vulnerabilities Have Led to Disruptions:
Satellite services have been disrupted or denied as a result of system
vulnerabilities. Below is a list of satellite-related incidents that
have been publicly reported in which services were interrupted
unintentionally or intentionally because of satellites‘
vulnerabilities to jamming and equipment failure:
* In April 1986, an insider, working alone under the name ’Captain
Midnight“ at a commercial satellite transmission center in central
Florida, succeeded in disrupting a cable network‘s eastern uplink feed
to the Galaxy I satellite. Although this event was a minor annoyance,
it had the potential for disrupting services to satellite users.
* Starting in 1995, MED-TV, a Kurdish satellite channel, was
intentionally jammed (and eventually had its license revoked) because
its broadcasts promoted terrorism and violence.
* In 1997, while a GPS transmitter was being tested on the ground, it
unintentionally interfered with the GPS receivers of a commercial
aircraft in the area. The plane temporarily lost all of its GPS
information.
* In 1997, Indonesia intentionally interfered with and denied the
services of a commercial satellite belonging to the South Pacific
island kingdom of Tonga because of a satellite orbital slot dispute.
* In 1998, the failure of PANAMSAT‘s Galaxy IV satellite, attributable
to an on-board processor anomaly, disabled 80 to 90 percent of 45
million pagers across the United States for 2 to 4 days, leaving
approximately 70 percent of a major oil company‘s customers without the
ability to pay for services at the pump.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy Addresses Information
Security of Key Sectors:
Recognizing that our nation‘s critical infrastructures, including
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, and
satellites, are the foundation of our economy, national security, and
quality of life, in October 1997 the President‘s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection issued a report recommending several measures
to achieve a higher level of protection of critical infrastructures.
These measures included industry cooperation and information sharing,
the creation of a national organization structure, a revised program of
research and development, a broad program of awareness and education,
and reconsideration of laws related to infrastructure protection. The
report also described the potentially devastating implications of poor
information security from a national perspective. The report stated
that a comprehensive effort would need to ’include a system of
surveillance, assessment, early warning, and response mechanisms to
mitigate the potential for cyber threats.“[Footnote 14]
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, issued in 1998 to improve the
federal government‘s approach to critical infrastructure protection
(CIP), describes a strategy for cooperative efforts by government and
the private sector to protect critical computer-dependent operations.
The directive called on the federal government to serve as a model of
how infrastructure assurance is best achieved, and it designated lead
agencies to work with private-sector and government entities. To
accomplish its goals, PDD 63 designated and established organizations
to provide central coordination and support, including:
* the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), an interagency
office that is housed in the Department of Commerce, which was
established to develop a national plan for CIP on the basis of
infrastructure plans developed by the private sector and federal
agencies; and:
* the National Infrastructure Protection Center, an organization within
the FBI, which was expanded to address national-level threat
assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation
and response.
To ensure coverage of critical sectors, PDD 63 also identified eight
private-sector infrastructures and five special functions; information
and communication is one of the eight infrastructures identified.
Further, the directive designated lead federal agencies to work with
the private-sector entities. For example, Commerce is the lead agency
for the information and communication sector (the responsible
organization within Commerce is the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration), and the Department of Energy is the lead
agency for the electrical power industry. Similarly, for special
function areas, DOD is responsible for national defense, and the
Department of State is responsible for foreign affairs.
To facilitate private-sector participation, PDD 63 also encouraged
creation of information sharing and analysis centers (ISACs) that could
serve as a mechanism for gathering, analyzing, and appropriately
sanitizing and disseminating information to and from infrastructure
sectors and the federal government through the FBI‘s National
Infrastructure Protection Center.[Footnote 15] Although most of the
ISACs are operated by private-sector organizations, the
telecommunications ISAC is operated by a government entity, the
National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), which is
part of the National Communications System.[Footnote 16] In September
2001, we reported that six ISACs within five infrastructures had been
established to gather and share information about vulnerabilities,
attempted intrusions, and attacks within their respective
infrastructure sectors and to meet specific sector objectives.[Footnote
17] In addition, at that time, we reported that the formation of at
least three more ISACs for various infrastructure sectors was being
discussed. Figure 2 displays a high-level overview of several
organizations with CIP responsibilities, as outlined by PDD 63.
Figure 2: Entities with CIP Responsibilities as Outlined by PDD 63:
[See PDF for image]
Source: CIAO.
[End of figure]
The most recent federal cyber CIP guidance was issued in October 2001,
when President Bush signed Executive Order 13231, Critical
Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age, which continues many
PDD 63 activities by focusing on cyber threats to critical
infrastructures and creating the President‘s Board on CIP to coordinate
cyber-related federal efforts. The Special Advisor to the President for
Cyberspace Security chairs the board.
In July 2002, the President issued a national strategy for homeland
security that identifies 14 industry sectors, including the 8
identified in PDD 63. The additional 6 are agriculture, food, defense
industrial base, chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal and
shipping, and national monuments and icons.[Footnote 18]
Current Space Policy Addresses Aspects of Federal Uses of Commercial
Satellites:
The U.S. national space policy provides goals and guidelines for the
U.S. space program, including the use of commercial satellites. In
February 1991, the President issued National Space Policy Directive 3,
which requires U.S. government agencies to use commercially available
space products and services to the fullest extent feasible.
Presidential Decision Directive 49, dated September 19, 1996, provides
goals for the U.S. space program and establishes space guidelines. For
example, a guideline regarding the commercial space industry stated
that U.S. government agencies shall purchase commercially available
space goods and services to the fullest extent feasible, and that,
except for reasons of national security or public safety, they shall
not conduct activities with commercial applications that preclude or
deter commercial space activities. Neither the National Space Policy
Directive 3 nor PDD 49 specifically addresses the security of satellite
systems used by federal agencies. However, PDD 49 states that critical
capabilities necessary for executing space missions must be ensured.
Security of satellite systems has been addressed in policy documents
issued by the National Security Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security Committee (recently renamed the Committee on National
Security Systems). The initial policy was set forth in National Policy
on Application of Communications Security to U.S. Civil and Commercial
Space Systems, National Telecommunications and Information Systems
Security Policy (NTISSP) No. 1 (June 17, 1985), which governed the
protection of command and control uplinks for government-used
satellites other than military. This policy, which applies to space
systems launched 5 years from the policy date (June 17, 1985), limits
government and government contractor use of U.S. civil and commercial
satellites to those systems using accepted techniques to protect the
command and control uplinks.
In January 2001, a new policy governing satellite system security was
issued, superseding NTISSP No. 1: National Information Assurance (IA)
Policy for U.S. Space Systems, National Security Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP) No. 12. NSTISSP No. 12,
which focuses on systems used for U.S. national security information,
aims to ensure that information assurance[Footnote 19] is factored into
’the planning, design, launch, sustained operation, and deactivation of
federal and commercial space systems used to collect, generate,
process, store, display, or transmit and receive such information.“ The
policy also includes a provision addressing commercial imagery
satellites that may be used to satisfy national security requirements
during periods of conflict or war. The policy states that approved U.S.
cryptographies shall be used to provide confidentiality for (1) command
and control uplinks, (2) data links that transmit national security
information between the ground and the space platforms, (3) cross-links
between space platforms, and
(4) downlinks from space platforms to mission ground or processing
centers.[Footnote 20]
Security Techniques Are Available to Protect TT&C and Data Links,
Satellites, and Ground Stations:
A range of security techniques is available for protecting satellite
systems: for example, using encryption on TT&C and data links, using
robust parts on the satellites, and applying physical and cyber
security controls at the ground stations. The application of these
techniques varies across federal agencies and the private sector.
Commercial satellite service providers typically use some of these
security techniques to meet most of their customers‘ security
requirements, and they base their decisions on business objectives.
Generally, the military applies more stringent security techniques to
their satellites than do civilian agencies or the private sector. Table
4 provides an overview of security techniques by satellite system
component.
Table 4: Security Techniques Available to Address Unintentional and
Intentional Threats:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Various Techniques Can Protect TT&C and Data Links:
Techniques to protect satellite links include the use of encryption,
high-power radio frequency (RF) uplinks, spread spectrum
communications, and a digital interface unique to each satellite.
Commercial satellite service providers, federal satellite owners and
operators, and customers stated that they typically use at least one of
these techniques. Usually, only the military uses spread spectrum
techniques.
Both TT&C and data links can be protected by encryption: generally, for
TT&C links, the tracking and control uplink is encrypted, while the
telemetry downlink is not. Encryption is the transformation of ordinary
data (commonly referred to as plaintext) into a code form (ciphertext)
and back into plaintext, using a mathematical process called an
algorithm. Encryption can be used on data to (1) hide information
content, (2) prevent undetected modification, and (3) prevent
unauthorized use.
Different levels of encryption provide different levels of protection,
including encryption approved by the National Security Agency (NSA)
that is used for national security information. NSTISSP No. 12 requires
approved U.S. cryptographies on TT&C and data links for U.S. space
systems transmitting national security information. For satellite
systems transmitting non-national-security information, there is no
policy that security is required for the links, but satellite service
providers and federal satellite owners and operators included in our
review stated that they protect tracking and control uplinks with
encryption. However, NSA officials stated that not all commercial
providers‘ tracking and control uplinks are encrypted. Concerning the
data links, customers are responsible for determining whether they are
encrypted or not. Most commercial satellite systems are designed for
’open access,“ meaning that a transmitted signal is broadcast
universally and unprotected.
A second security technique for links is the use of high-power RF
uplinks: that is, a large antenna used to send a high-power signal from
the ground station to the satellite. To intentionally interfere with a
satellite‘s links, an attacker would need a large antenna with a
powerful radio transmitter (as well as considerable technical
knowledge). Two of the commercial providers we talked to stated that
they use high-power RF uplinks as part of their satellite security
approach. According to one commercial provider, most satellite
operators use high-power RF uplinks for TT&C connections to block
potential unauthorized users‘ attempts to interfere with or jam the
TT&C uplink.
A third technique for protecting links is the use of spread spectrum
communication, a technique used by the military and not normally
implemented by commercial providers. Spread spectrum communication is a
form of wireless communication in which the frequency of the
transmitted signal is deliberately varied and spread over a wide
frequency band. Because the frequency of the transmitted signal is
deliberately varied, spread spectrum communication can provide security
to links because it increases the power required to jam the signals
even if they are detected. Spread spectrum communication is primarily
used to optimize the efficiency of bandwidth within a frequency range,
but it also provides security benefits.[Footnote 21]
Finally, TT&C links can be protected by the use of a unique digital
interface between the ground station and the satellite. According to
one commercial satellite service provider, most commercial providers
use a unique digital interface with each satellite. Tracking and
control instructions sent from the ground station to the satellite are
encoded and formatted in a way that is not publicly known. Officials
from the commercial satellite vendor stated that even if an attacker
were successful in hacking one satellite, the unique interface could
prevent the attacker from taking control of an entire fleet of
satellites. In addition, communication with the digital interface to
the tracking and control links requires high transmission power, so
that an attacker would need a large, powerful antenna.
Satellites Can Be Protected through Hardening and Redundancy:
Satellites can be protected by (1) ’hardening,“ through designs and
components that are built to be robust enough to withstand harsh space
environments and deliberate attacks, and (2) the use of redundancy--
backup systems and components. Commercial satellite service providers
and federal civilian owners and operators told us that they do not
harden their satellites to the extent that the military does.
Commercial providers, federal civilian owners and operators, and the
military use varying degrees of redundancy to protect their satellites.
As satellites rely increasingly on on-board information processing,
hardening is becoming more important as a security technique. Hardening
in this context includes physical hardening and electronic-component
hardening. Satellites can be hardened against natural environmental
conditions and deliberate attack, and to ensure survivability.[Footnote
22] Most hardening efforts are focused on providing sufficient
protection to electronic components in satellites so that they can
withstand natural environmental conditions over the expected lifespan
of the satellite, which could be nearly 15 years. For hardening against
deliberate attacks, some techniques proposed include the use of
reflective surfaces, shutters, and nonabsorbing materials. According to
commercial satellite providers, commercial satellites are not normally
hardened against non-natural nuclear radiation because it is too
costly. The drawback of hardening is the cost and the manufacturing and
operational burdens that it imposes on satellite manufacturers and
providers.
The use of high-quality space parts is another approach to hardening.
Although all parts used in satellites are designed to withstand natural
environmental conditions, some very high-quality parts that have
undergone rigorous testing and have appreciably higher hardness than
standard space parts are also available, including those referred to as
class ’S“ parts. These higher quality space parts cost significantly
more than regular space parts--partly because of the significant
testing procedures and more limited number of commercial providers
manufacturing hardened parts. According to an industry official, high-
quality space parts are used by the military and are generally not used
on commercial satellites.
Commercial satellite providers stated that they also use redundancy to
ensure availability, through backup satellites and redundant features
on individual satellites. Backup satellites enable an organization to
continue operations if a primary satellite fails. One provider stated
that it would rather spend resources on backup satellites than on
hardening future satellites or encrypting the TT&C and data links. The
provider also expressed the view that a greater number of smaller, less
costly satellites provides greater reliability than is provided by few
large satellites, because there is more redundancy. According to an
industry consulting group, backup satellites, which include in-orbit
and on-ground satellites, are part of commercial satellite providers‘
security approaches. When backup satellites are used, they are commonly
kept in orbit; keeping backup satellites on the ground is possible, but
it has the disadvantage that the system cannot immediately continue
operations if the primary satellite fails. According to one provider,
it could take 4 to 6 months to launch a backup satellite stored on the
ground.
In addition, individual satellites can be designed to have redundant
parts. For example, a commercial satellite provider told us that
redundant processors, antennas, control systems, transponders, and
other equipment are frequently used to ensure satellite survivability.
Another example is that satellites could have two completely separate
sets of hardware and two paths for software and information; this is
referred to as having an A-side and a B-side. In general, this
technique is not used on commercial satellites, according to an
industry official.
Ground Stations Can Be Protected Primarily by Physical Security
Controls:
Techniques to protect ground stations include physical controls as well
as logical security controls, hardening, and backup ground stations.
Ground stations are important because they control the satellite and
receive and process data. One provider stated that providing physical
security measures to ground stations is important because the greatest
security threat to satellite systems exists at that location.
Locations of ground stations are usually known and accessible; thus,
they require physical security controls such as fencing, guards, and
internal security. One provider emphasized the importance of performing
background checks on employees. Civilian agencies also stated that they
protected ground stations through various physical security controls:
ground stations are fenced, guarded, and secured inside with access
control devices, such as key cards.
The commercial satellite service providers included in our review
stated that they did not protect their ground stations through
hardening; this technique is primarily used by the military.[Footnote
23] Similarly, most civilian agencies we talked to do not harden their
ground stations. A ground station would be considered hardened if it
had protective measures to enable it to withstand destructive forces
such as explosions, natural disasters, or ionizing radiation.
Commercial satellite providers and federal agency satellite owners and
operators also may maintain off-line or fully redundant ground stations
to ensure availability, which can be used if the primary ground station
is disrupted or destroyed. Off-line backup ground stations may not be
staffed or managed by the same company, or on a full-time basis. In
addition, off-line backup ground stations are not necessarily designed
for long-term control of satellites. On the other hand, one commercial
service provider stated that it maintained fully redundant, co-primary,
geographically separated ground stations that are fully staffed with
trained operators, gated with restricted access, and capable of long-
term uninterruptible power. In addition, these ground stations
periodically alternated which satellites they were responsible for as a
training exercise. They also operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
and monitored each other.
Federal Satellite Users Can Reduce Risks Only in Certain Areas, and
National Policy Is Limited:
To mitigate the risk associated with using commercial satellites,
federal agencies focus on areas within their responsibility and
control: data links and communication ground stations. According to
federal agency officials, agencies reduce risks associated with using
commercial satellites by (1) protecting the data‘s authentication and
confidentiality with encryption, (2) securing the data ground stations
with physical security controls and backup sites, and (3) ensuring
service availability through redundancy and dedicated services. Federal
agencies rely on commercial satellite service providers to provide the
security techniques for the TT&C links, satellites, and satellite
control stations. However, federal agency officials stated that they
were unable to impose specific security requirements on commercial
satellite service providers. Further, federal policy governing the
security of satellite systems used by agencies is limited because it
addresses only those satellites used for national security information,
pertains only to techniques associated with the links between ground
stations and satellites and between satellites (cross-links), and does
not have an enforcement mechanism. Without appropriate governmentwide
policy to address the security of all satellite components and of non-
national-security information, federal agencies may not, for
information with similar sensitivity and criticality, consistently (1)
secure data links and communication ground stations or (2) use
satellites that have certain security controls that enhance
availability. Recent initiatives by the Executive Branch have
acknowledged these policy limitations, but we are not aware of specific
actions to address them.
Agencies Provide Encryption to Protect Data:
For critical data, agencies primarily use different types of encryption
to reduce the risk of unauthorized use or changes. For example, the
military services use encryption to protect most data communicated over
satellites--either commercially owned or military. DOD officials stated
that the military services use the strongest encryption algorithms
available from the NSA for the most sensitive information--national
security information. For non-national-security information, the
military services use less strong encryption algorithms, according to
DOD officials. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
also uses NSA-provided encryption for critical operations, such as
human mission communications (that is, for space shuttle missions).
Using NSA encryption requires encryption and decryption hardware at the
data‘s source and destination, respectively. The use of this hardware
requires agencies and satellite service providers to apply special
physical protection procedures--such as restricting access to the
equipment and allowing no access by foreign nationals. For the next
generation of government-owned weather satellites, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. military plan to use
an NSA-approved commercial encryption package that will avoid the need
for special equipment and allow them to restrict the data to authorized
users with user IDs and passwords. In addition, NOAA will be able to
encrypt broadcast weather data over particular regions of the world.
According to NASA and NOAA officials, some agency data do not require
protection because the risk of unauthorized use or changes is not
significant or because the information is intended to be available to a
broad audience. For example, NASA uses satellites to provide large
bandwidth to transmit scientific data from remote locations. According
to NASA officials, the agency does not protect the transmission of
these data because they are considered academic in nature and low risk.
In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) does not encrypt
links between control centers or between control centers and aircraft,
because the data on these links go from specific air traffic control
centers to specific aircraft. According to FAA officials, if the
transmissions were required to be encrypted, every aircraft would have
to acquire costly decryption equipment. Further, according to National
Weather Service officials, the service does not protect the weather
data transmitted over commercial satellites because the service
considers it important to make this information widely available not
only to its sites but also to government agencies, commercial partners,
universities, and others with the appropriate equipment.
Agencies Provide Physical Security for Communications Ground Stations:
Federal agencies also control the security of the data ground stations
that send and receive data over satellites. To protect these ground
stations, federal officials stated that they use physical security
techniques, such as those discussed earlier. They protect their
facilities and equipment from unintentional and intentional threats
(such as wind, snow, and vandalism). For example, according to FAA
officials, in certain locations, FAA has hardened remote satellite
ground stations against high wind and cold weather conditions. In
addition, NOAA officials stated that many of their antennas are
hurricane protected. Further, federal officials stated that they
perform background checks on personnel. NOAA officials stated that they
perform background checks on satellite technicians to the secret
clearance level. Federal officials also stated that their ground
stations are further protected because they are located on large,
protected federal facilities. For example, military ground stations can
be located on protected U.S. or allied military bases. Also, National
Weather Service officials stated that the service‘s primary
communications uplink is located on a highly secured federal site.
Further, according to DOD officials, personnel are expected to protect
the satellite equipment provided to them in the field. Agencies also
had backup communications sites that were geographically separated,
including being on different power grids. For example, according to an
official, the National Weather Service‘s planned backup communications
uplink site will be geographically separated from the primary site and
will be on a secured federal site.
Agencies Attempt to Ensure Availability through Redundancy and
Dedicated Services:
Federal agencies also reduce the risk associated with using commercial
satellites by having redundant telecommunications capabilities. For
example, for the program that provides Alaska‘s air traffic control,
FAA relies on two satellites to provide backup capacity for each other.
In addition to this redundancy, FAA has requested its commercial
satellite service provider to preferentially provide services to FAA‘s
Alaska air traffic control system over other customers carried on the
same satellites. Another FAA program provides primary communications
capabilities in remote locations and has redundant satellite capacity
that can be used if the primary satellite fails. The National Weather
Service is another example. The service uses redundancy to ensure the
availability of satellite services that broadcast weather data to its
160 locations by contracting for priority services that include
guarantees of additional transponders or, if the satellite fails, of
services on other satellites. In addition, the service plans to own and
operate a backup communications center that is geographically separated
from the primary site. The service performs monthly tests of the backup
site‘s ability to provide the communications uplink to the commercial
satellites.
Agencies Do Not Control All Aspects of Security and Have Limited
Ability to Influence Availability and Security Requirements:
Federal agencies rely on the commercial satellite service provider‘s
security techniques for the TT&C links, satellites, and satellite
control ground stations. Figure 3 graphically depicts the areas not
controlled by federal agencies.
Figure 3: Commercial Satellite System Showing Components Not Controlled
by Government Agencies:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
To mitigate the risk associated with not controlling aspects of
commercial satellite security other than protecting the data links and
communications ground stations, federal agencies attempt to specify
availability[Footnote 24] and reliability[Footnote 25] requirements,
but they acknowledge having had limited influence over security
techniques employed by commercial satellite service
providers.[Footnote 26] Federal officials stated that they are usually
constrained by the availability and reliability levels that can be
provided by their telecommunications service providers. For example,
for one program, an FAA contract requires 99.7 percent availability in
recognition of the satellite service provider‘s limitations, though the
agency typically receives 99.8 percent. However, FAA would prefer
99.999 percent availability on this program‘s satellite communications,
which is similar to the reliability level being received from
terrestrial networks that FAA uses where available. According to one
FAA official, greater satellite reliability could be gained by having
multiple satellite service providers furnish communications over the
same regions, but this approach is too costly.
Although maintaining established or contracted reliability levels
generally requires that service providers maintain some level of
security, federal officials stated that their agencies cannot usually
require commercial satellite service providers to use specific security
techniques. Commercial satellite service providers have established
operational procedures, including security techniques, some of which,
according to officials, cannot be easily changed. For example, once a
satellite is launched, additional hardening or encryption of the TT&C
link is difficult, if not impossible. Some service providers offer the
capability to encrypt the command uplinks. According to FAA officials,
FAA is in the process of performing risk assessments, in compliance
with its own information systems security policies, on the commercial
services (including satellite services) that it acquires. Based on
these risk assessments, FAA officials plan to accredit and certify the
security of the agency‘s program that relies on commercial satellites.
Existing Federal Policy Concerning Commercial Satellite Security Is
Limited:
Federal policy governing agencies‘ actions regarding the security of
commercial satellite systems is limited, in that it (1) pertains only
to satellites used for national security purposes, (2) addresses
security techniques associated with links only, and (3) does not have
an enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance. Although the
Executive Branch has recently acknowledged these policy limitations, we
are not aware of specific actions to address them.
NSTISSP No. 12, the current policy governing satellite system security,
applies only to U.S. space systems (U.S. government-owned or
commercially owned and operated space systems) that are used for
national security information and to imagery satellites that are or
could be used for national security purposes during periods of conflict
or war. It does not apply to systems that process sensitive, non-
national-security information. Issued by the National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (now the
Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS)), NSTISSP No. 12 has as
its primary objective ’to ensure that information assurance is factored
into the planning, design, launch, sustained operation, and
deactivation of U.S. space systems used to collect, generate, process,
store, display, or transmit/receive national security information, as
well as any supporting or related national security systems.“ NSTISSP
No. 12 also suggests that federal agencies may want to consider
applying the policy‘s information assurance requirements to those space
systems that are essential to the conduct of agencies‘ unclassified
missions, or to the operation and maintenance of critical
infrastructures.
In addition to having a focus only on national security, the policy is
further limited in that it addresses security techniques only for the
links. It does not include physical security requirements for the
satellites or ground stations. Specifically, for satellite systems to
which it applies, NSTISSP No. 12 states that approved U.S.
cryptographies shall be used to provide confidentiality for the (1)
command and control uplinks, (2) data links that transmit national
security information between the ground and the space platforms, (3)
cross-links between space platforms, and (4) downlinks from space
platforms to mission ground or processing centers.
Also, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure agency compliance
with the policy. According to one NSA official on the CNSS support
staff, enforcement of such policies has always been a problem, because
no one has the authority to force agencies‘ compliance with them.
According to some agency officials, agencies typically do not test
their service providers‘ implementation of security procedures.
According to the federal and commercial officials involved in our
study, no commercial satellite is currently fully compliant with
NSTISSP No. 12, and gaining support to build compliant systems would be
difficult. According to commercial satellite industry officials, there
is no business case for voluntarily following the NSTISSP No. 12
requirements and implementing them in the satellites and ground
stations, including networks that are currently being developed.
Commercial satellite service providers also raised concerns about the
impact of NSTISSP No. 12 on their future commercial satellite systems.
Several officials stated that if compliance were required, it would
significantly increase the complexity of managing the satellites,
because encryption key management is cumbersome,[Footnote 27] and
appropriately controlling access to the hardware is difficult in global
companies that have many foreign nationals. Also, commercial satellite
service providers stated that encrypting the TT&C links could increase
the difficulty of troubleshooting, for example, because the time it
takes to encrypt and then decrypt a command could become significant
when a TT&C problem arises. Other issues raised that make NSTISSP No.
12 difficult to implement include the following:
* Some satellite service providers view compliance with it as not
necessary for selling services to the government, since in the past
agencies have used satellites that did not comply with prior security
policy. For example, DOD has contracted for services on satellites that
were not compliant with the previous and existing policy for various
reasons. However, at times, noncompliant satellites have been DOD‘s
only option.
* Commercial clients will likely be unwilling to pay the additional
cost associated with higher levels of encryption. Significant costs
would include licensing agreements and redesigning hardware for new
encryption technologies.
* Satellite industry officials stated that their experience shows that
encryption does not really provide much greater security than other
techniques that protect TT&C and data links.
Notwithstanding the above issues, in response to the policy‘s
limitations, DOD officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
stated that the department had started drafting a policy that would
require all commercial satellite systems used by DOD to meet NSTISSP
No. 12 requirements. This draft policy includes a waiver process
requiring prior approval before any satellite system could be used that
did not meet the security requirements. If approved, this policy would
apply only to DOD. DOD officials are anticipating that this policy will
be approved by the end of 2002.
In addition to DOD‘s efforts, a CNSS official stated that a draft
policy was developed to address the lack of national policy or guidance
for the assurance of non-national-security information. Although this
policy was broad in scope, covering many aspects of information
assurance, this official stated that satellite security could be
included in its scope. However, this official also stated that the
CNSS‘s efforts ended in April 2002 when it sent the draft policy to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
consideration, because the CNSS lacks authority in the area of non-
national-security information. In transmitting the draft policy to the
Director, OMB, the CNSS Chair encouraged the development of this policy
as a first step in establishing a national policy addressing the
protection of information technology systems that process sensitive
homeland security information, as well as information associated with
the operation of critical infrastructures. According to an OMB
official, the draft policy is valuable input for future policy
decisions related to protecting government information.
Recognizing that space activities are indispensable to our national
security and economic vitality, on May 8, 2002, the President‘s
National Security Advisor sent a memorandum to top cabinet officials
stating that she plans to recommend that the White House initiate a
review of U.S. space policies that have been in place since 1996. To
date, we are not aware of specific actions taken in response to the
draft policy sent to OMB and the National Security Advisor‘s
memorandum.
Without appropriate governmentwide policy to address the security of
all satellite components and of non-national-security information,
federal agencies may not, for information with similar sensitivity and
criticality, consistently (1) secure data links and communication
ground stations or (2) use satellites that have certain security
controls that enhance availability. As a result, federal agencies risk
losing needed capabilities in the event of the exploitation of
satellite system vulnerabilities.
National CIP Initiatives Addressing Satellite Security Have Been
Limited:
PDD 63 was issued to improve the federal approach to protecting our
nation‘s critical infrastructures by establishing partnerships between
private-sector entities and the federal government. Although this
directive addressed the satellite vulnerabilities of GPS and led to a
detailed vulnerability assessment, the satellite industry has not
received focused attention as part of this national effort. Given the
importance of commercial satellites to our nation‘s economy, the
federal government‘s growing reliance on them, and the dependency of
many other infrastructures on satellites, not including them in our
national CIP approach creates the risk that these critical components
of our information and communication infrastructure may not receive
needed attention.
Both PDD 63 and the report of the President‘s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (October 1997) addressed satellite
vulnerabilities of the GPS and made several recommendations to the
Secretary of Transportation, including to fully evaluate these
vulnerabilities and actual and potential sources of interference to the
system. In August 2001, the John A. Volpe Transportation Systems Center
issued a report that includes an assessment of the vulnerabilities of
the GPS; analysis of civilian aviation, maritime, and surface uses;
assessment of the ways that users may be affected by short-or long-term
GPS outages; and recommendations to minimize the safety and operational
impacts of such outages.[Footnote 28] One overarching finding was that
because of the increasing reliance of transportation on GPS, the
consequences of loss of the signal could be severe in terms of safety
and of environmental and economic damage to the nation.
Despite the focused attention on GPS, other aspects of the satellite
industry have not received national attention. In PDD 63, commercial
satellites were not identified as a critical infrastructure (or as part
of one), and thus are not specifically included as part of our nation‘s
approach to protecting critical infrastructures. Further, PDD 63 does
not explicitly include the commercial satellite industry as part of the
information and communications infrastructure sector, nor does the
newly issued national strategy for homeland security. Although there
have been discussions about expanding the coverage of individual
sectors (particularly since the events of September 11, 2001), National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) officials
stated that there are no specific plans to build better partnerships
with satellite builders and operators as part of their efforts. CIAO
officials also told us that there are no specific plans to include
commercial satellite companies in current national efforts. However,
CIAO added that some of the current infrastructure sectors may address
satellites in their plans for industry vulnerability assessments and
remediation, since some of these infrastructures rely on satellites for
communications or other functions, such as tracking shipments or
trucks, or monitoring the condition of equipment. The
telecommunications ISAC reiterated NTIA‘s and CIAO‘s comments that
there are no specific plans to include satellites in national CIP
efforts. The ISAC for the telecommunications sector, recognized by the
President‘s National Security Council in January 2000, is the National
Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), which is operated by
the National Communications System. As such, NCC is responsible for
facilitating the exchange of information among government and industry
participants regarding computer-based vulnerability, threat, and
intrusion information affecting the telecommunications infrastructure.
Also, the center analyzes data received from telecommunications
industry members, government, and other sources to avoid or lessen the
impact of a crisis affecting the telecommunications infrastructure.
Since its recognition as an ISAC, NCC membership has expanded beyond
traditional telecommunications entities to include some aerospace
companies such as Boeing and Raytheon, but the ISAC does not
specifically focus on commercial satellites.
Officials from one of the satellite service providers told us that they
would endorse an ISAC-like forum to discuss vulnerabilities to
commercial and military satellites. In July 2002, we recommended that
when developing the strategy to guide federal CIP efforts, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security, and the Special Advisor to the
President for Cyberspace Security ensure, among other things, that the
strategy includes all relevant sectors and defines the key federal
agencies‘ roles and responsibilities associated with each of these
sectors.[Footnote 29] Given the importance of satellites to the
national economy, the federal government‘s growing reliance on them,
and the many threats that face them, failure to explicitly include
satellites in the national approach to CIP leaves a critical aspect of
the national infrastructure without focused attention.
Conclusions:
Commercial satellite service providers use a combination of techniques
to protect their systems from unauthorized use and disruption,
including hardware on satellites, physical and logical controls at
ground stations, and encryption of the links. Although this level of
protection may be adequate for many government requirements, commercial
satellite systems lack the security features used in national security
satellites for protection against deliberate disruption and
exploitation.
Federal agencies reduce the risk associated with their use of
commercial satellites by controlling the satellite components within
their responsibility--primarily the data links and communication ground
stations. But the satellite service provider is typically responsible
for most components--the satellite, TT&C links, and the satellite
control ground stations. Because federal agencies rely on commercial
satellite service providers for most security features, they also
reduce their risk by having redundant capabilities in place. However,
national satellite protection policy is limited because it pertains
only to satellite systems that are used for national security
information, addresses only techniques associated with the links, and
does not have an enforcement mechanism. Recent initiatives by the
Executive Branch have acknowledged these policy limitations, but we are
not aware of specific actions taken to address them.
Satellites are not specifically identified as part of our nation‘s
critical infrastructure protection approach, which relies heavily on
public-private partnerships to secure our critical infrastructures. As
a result, a national forum to gather and share information about
industrywide vulnerabilities of the satellite industry does not exist,
leaving a national critical infrastructure without focused attention.
Recommendations:
We recommend that in pursuing the draft policy submitted to OMB for
completion and the recommended review of U.S. space policies, the
Director of OMB and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs review the scope and enforcement of existing security-
related space policy and promote the appropriate revisions of existing
policies and the development of new policies to ensure that federal
agencies appropriately address the concerns involved with the use of
commercial satellites, including the sensitivity of information,
security techniques, and enforcement mechanisms.
Considering the importance of satellites to our national economy, the
government‘s growing reliance on them, and the threats that face them,
we recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and the
Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security consider
recognizing the satellite industry as either a new infrastructure or
part of an existing infrastructure.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Communications,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Space and Information
Technology Programs), Department of Defense; the Chief of the Satellite
Communications and Support Division, United States Space Command,
Department of Defense; the Chief Financial Officer/Chief Administrative
Officer, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of
Commerce; and the Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Departments of
Defense and Commerce and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration concurred with our findings and recommendations (see
apps. II, III, and IV, respectively) and provided technical comments
that have been incorporated in the report, as appropriate (some of
these technical comments are reproduced in the appendixes).
We also received technical oral comments from officials from the
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of Commerce;
Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation; Office
of Management and Budget; and United States Secret Service, Department
of Treasury; in addition, we received written and oral technical
comments from five participating private-sector entities. Comments from
all these organizations have been incorporated into the report, as
appropriate. We did not receive comments from the Special Advisor to
the President for Cyberspace Security.
As we agreed with your staff, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of
this report to other interested congressional committees and the heads
of the agencies discussed in this report, as well as the private-sector
participants. The report will also be available on GAO‘s website at
www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about matters discussed in this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-3317 or contact Dave Powner, Assistant
Director, at (303) 572-7316. We can also be reached by E-mail at
daceyr@gao.gov and pownerd@gao.gov, respectively. Contributors to this
report include Barbara Collier, Michael Gilmore, Rahul Gupta, Kevin
Secrest, Karl Seifert, Hai Tran, and Jim Weidner.
Sincerely yours,
Robert F. Dacey
Director, Information Security Issues:
Signed by Robert F. Dacey:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to determine (1) what security techniques are
available to protect satellite systems from unauthorized use,
disruption, or damage; (2) how federal agencies reduce the risks
associated with their use of commercial satellite systems; and (3) what
federal critical infrastructure protection efforts are being undertaken
to address satellite system security through improved government/
private-sector cooperation. To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed
technical documents, policy documents, and directives, and we
interviewed pertinent officials from federal agencies and the private
sector involved in manufacturing and operating satellites and providing
satellite services.
To determine what security techniques are available to protect
satellite systems from unauthorized use, disruption, or damage, we
reviewed technical documents and policy, such as NSTISSP No. 12 and
various other sources, and we interviewed pertinent federal officials
from the Department of Defense (DOD); the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), including the Goddard and Marshall Space Flight Centers; the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); the National
Security Agency (NSA); and the Department of Treasury‘s United States
Secret Service. The DOD organizations whose documentation we reviewed
and whose officials we interviewed included the Air Force; the Army;
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence; the Cheyenne Mountain Air Force
Station; the Defense Information Systems Agency; the National Security
Space Architect; the Navy; and the U.S. Space Command. In addition, we
reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from private-sector
organizations that manufacture and operate satellite systems, including
Intelsat, Lockheed Martin, Loral Space & Communications, Ltd. (Loral
Skynet and Loral Space Systems groups), Northrop Grumman TASC, the
Satellite Industry Association, and W.L. Pritchard & Co., L.C. We
identified these organizations through relevant literature searches,
discussions with organizations, and discussions with GAO personnel
familiar with the satellite industry. We did not develop an all-
inclusive list of security techniques, but we attempted to establish
the most commonly used of the security techniques available.
To determine how federal agencies reduce the risks associated with
their use of commercial satellite systems, we identified and reviewed
relevant federal policy, including National Security
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee policies
and applicable federal agency policies, such as the FAA‘s Information
Systems Security Program Handbook. We also reviewed documentation and
interviewed federal officials from DOD, FAA, NASA, NSA, and NOAA. In
addition, in meetings with commercial service providers holding
government contracts, we discussed any special requirements placed on
commercial service providers by federal agencies.
To determine what federal critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
efforts were being undertaken to address satellite system security, we
reviewed various orders, directives, and policies, such as Executive
Order 13231 and PDD 63. In addition, we interviewed pertinent federal
officials from the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, National
Communications System/National Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications, and National Telecommunications and Information
Administration. Further, in interviews with commercial service
providers, we discussed their involvement in national CIP-related
activities.
We performed our work in Washington, D.C.; Bedminster, New Jersey;
Colorado Springs, Colorado; and Palo Alto, California, from December
2001 through June 2002, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of
security techniques being used by federal agencies and the private
sector, or of the techniques used by federal agencies to reduce the
risks associated with their use of commercial satellite systems.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000:
Mr. Robert Dacey:
Director Information Security Issues US General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Dacey;
This is the DoD response to the GAO draft report ’CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More
Fully Addressed“, dated June 25, 2002 (GAO Code 310142).
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the subject GAO report. We
have reviewed the report and concur with its recommendations.
There are two statements in the report that are not fully accurate and
should be changed. Specifically on page 29 of the report, it states
’DoD officials stated that only one military satellite constellation is
compliant with NSTISSP No. 12“. This statement is in error. However,
the details of DoD compliance to NSTISSP No. 12 for the various
military constellations are complex and go beyond the scope of the
report. Therefore, we recommend that the statement be deleted. The
second statement, on page 17 of the report, states that Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 49, does not address security of satellite
systems. The PDD does address security of satellite systems in some
respects; for instance Section III paragraphs 4 and 5 talk about
assuring critical capabilities for space missions. Therefore, we
recommend that the statement be rewritten to state that portions of the
Directive need to be revisited.
We thank GAO for working with the Department on this report, and commit
to support beneficial initiatives to improve security of commercial
satellite security that may follow.
Sincerely,
Dr. Michael S. Frankel:
DASD(C3ISR, Space & IT Programs):
Signed By Dr. Michael S. Frankel:
[End of section]
UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND:
MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. General Accounting Office ATTN: Mr. Dave Powner:
1244 Speer Blvd, Suite 116 Denver, Colorado 80204:
FROM: US SPACE COMMAND/J6:
250 S. Peterson Boulevard, Suite 116 Peterson AFB CO 80914-3050:
SUBJECT: GAO Job 310142 (Draft Study and Memo dated, 26 Jun 02):
1. In accordance with the GAO memo dated 26 Jun 02, USSPACECOM reviewed
the Draft GAO Study ’Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial
Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed“ and has four
substantive comments at enclosure 1.
2. The GAO study provides an accurate assessment of DoD‘s Critical
Infrastructure Protection concerning commercial satellite security.
3. The recommendation of including U.S. commercial satellites in the
national CIP strategy is a proactive way of ensuring DoD and the US
Government consider commercial satellites and their infrastructure are
part of the overall national CIP. However, the industry may be
reluctant to invest in the different forms and levels of protection
without monetary incentive by the US Government.
4. Our point of contact is MAJ Thomas J. Mahoney at (719) 554-9783.
JOHN S.HAVEN II:
Colonel (S), USAF:
Chief, Satellite Communications and
Support Division:
Signed by JOHN S.HAVEN II:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Commerce:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER/CHIEFF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER:
Mr. Dave Powner Assistant Director Financial Markets and Community
Investment US General Accounting Office 441 G Street, N.W. Washington,
DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
Enclosed is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration‘s
response to the draft report CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:
Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully Addressed (GAO-02-
781). We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments.
Enclosure:
Sincerely,:
Sonya G. Stewart:
Signed by Sonya G. Stewart:
US. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE COMMENTS ON DRAFT GAO REPORT ENTITLED
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: Commercial Satellite Security
Should Be More Fully Addressed:
GAO-02-781.
July 2002:
NOAH COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) REPORT
ENTITLED - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: Commercial Satellite
Security Should Be More Fully Addressed, Audit Report Number GAO-U2-
781:
EDITORIAL. COMMENTS:
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) agree that
the information provided by the GAO concerning the agency‘s actions to
safeguard its satellite communications activities is accurate as
reported. The following are a few specific editorial comments intended
only to enhance the information provided by the National Weather
Service:
Page 7, Table 1, NOAA/NWS - Under ’Use of commercial satellites‘; the
table should read ’To disseminate imagery, graphic, and text data on
weather conditions around the earth.“:
Page 25, continuing paragraph, last sentence - After the phrase ’but
also to“, please add ’other Government agencies, commercial partners,
universities, and others...“ Delete the word ’anyone.“:
Page 25, first full paragraph, last sentence - Please insert the work
’uplink“ between communications and site.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Office of the Administrator Washington, DC 20546-0001:
July 30, 2002:
Mr. Robert F. Dacey Director:
United States General Accounting Office Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Dacey:
NASA has reviewed the GAO Draft Report ’CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully
Addressed“ (GAO-02-781), and thanks you for the opportunity to review
this report. We concur with the GAO recommendations with the comments
shown in the enclosure.
Cordially,:
Michael D. Christensen Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions:
Signed by Michael D. Christensen:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] National Air Intelligence Center, Threats to U.S. Military Access
to Space, Document 1422-0989-98 (Wright Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio).
[2] Logical access controls involve the use of computer hardware and
software to prevent or detect unauthorized access by requiring users to
input user identification numbers (IDs), passwords, or other
identifiers that are linked to predetermined access privileges.
[3] Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002).
[4] All revenues include payments made to subcontractors.
[5] The amount for launch services includes revenues from both
government-owned and commercially owned payloads.
[6] The manufacturing indicators include amounts from commercial
companies manufacturing for both government and commercial customers.
[7] Wideband encompasses data rates greater than 64 kilobits per
second.
[8] The Defense Information Systems Agency‘s Commercial Satellite
Communications Branch is responsible for leasing commercial satellite
services for DOD.
[9] A transponder is an automatic device that receives, amplifies, and
retransmits a signal on a different frequency.
[10] The greatly increasing number of commercial and military
communications systems worldwide, including the growing number of
satellites, is putting a high demand on certain frequency spectra.
Orbital/spectral congestion may restrict the future use of potential
orbits and frequencies, further complicate and lengthen host nation
approval and landing rights processes, and require more sophisticated
systems in terms of frequency agility, antennas, bandwidth-efficient
modulation, and so forth to maximize flexibility. Such flexibility
minimizes future risks arising from changes in spectrum allocation and
the electromagnetic environment.
[11] The International Telecommunication Union is an international
organization within the United Nations system in which governments and
the private sector work together to coordinate the operation of
telecommunication networks and services and advance the development of
communications technology.
[12] The Federal Communications Commission is an independent U.S.
government agency. The FCC was established by the Communications Act of
1934 and is charged with regulating interstate and international
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The
FCC‘s jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
U.S. possessions.
[13] Department of Defense, Advanced Military Satellite Communications
Capstone Requirements (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Apr. 24, 1998).
[14] Report of the President‘s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America‘s Infrastructures
(October 1997).
[15] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing National
Capabilities, GAO-01-323 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2001) for our
latest report on the progress of the National Infrastructure Protection
Center.
[16] In 1963, the National Communications System was established by
presidential memorandum as a federal interagency group responsible for
national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications. These
responsibilities include planning for, developing, and implementing
enhancements to the national telecommunications infrastructure, which
now includes the Internet, to achieve effectiveness in managing and
using national telecommunication resources to support the federal
government during any emergency.
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected
Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 20, 2001).
[18] Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (July 2002).
[19] Information assurance refers to information operations intended to
protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring
their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and
nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction
capabilities.
[20] Approved U.S. cryptographies are hardware, firmware, or software
implementations of algorithms that have been reviewed and approved by
the National Security Agency, the purposes of which are to provide
authentication or confidentiality for national security information or
systems.
[21] Two desired outcomes of using spread spectrum communications as a
security technique are low probability of intercept and low probability
of detection, which increase the difficulty of detecting and jamming
signals. These outcomes, although not mentioned by entities in our
review, require that the transmission occur in quick, random bursts to
make it harder to detect, and that the signal is narrowed to make it
harder to intercept. In contrast, most commercial satellites have a
wide beam and continuous coverage, so that as many customers as
possible can be covered by a limited number of satellites, thus driving
up return on investment.
[22] Survivability is the property of a system, subsystem, equipment,
process, or procedure that provides a defined degree of assurance that
the named entity will continue to function during and after a natural
or man-made disturbance, as for example a nuclear burst.
[23] Hardening of ground stations includes robust physical security
features like blast resistant physical structures and radomes to
protect antennas.
[24] Availability is the ratio of the total time a service is being
used during a given interval to the length of the interval. For
example, a service provider may state that its services will be
available 99.99 percent over a year, which amounts to 53 minutes of
accumulated outages for all causes over the course of the year.
Additional decimal places, such as 99.999 percent, represent greater
levels of availability. Federal Telecommunications Standards
Committee, Telecom Glossary 2000 (Feb. 2, 2001).
[25] Reliability is the probability that a service will perform its
required function for a specified period of time under stated
conditions. Federal Telecommunications Standards Committee, Telecom
Glossary 2000 (Feb. 2, 2001).
[26] Security is one of many factors that affect satellite availability
and reliability. Others include weather and power outages.
[27] A key is a special value associated with an encryption algorithm
that is used for coding and decoding.
[28] John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center,
Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infrastructure Relying
on the Global Positioning System: Final Report (Aug. 29, 2001).
[29] U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More Coordinated and
Comprehensive Approach to Address Information Attacks, GAO-02-474
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002).
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