Military Transformation
Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint Experimentation Program Gao ID: GAO-02-856 August 29, 2002The Department of Defense (DOD) considers the transformation of the U.S. military a strategic imperative to meet the security challenges of the new century. In October 1998, DOD established a joint concept development and experimentation program to provide the engine of change for this transformation. In the nearly 4 years since becoming the executive agent for joint concept development and experimentation, the Joint Forces Command has increased in participation of key DOD stakeholders--the military services, the combatant commands, and other organizations and agencies--in its experimentation activities. The Command has also expanded the participation of federal agencies and departments, academia, the private sector, and some foreign allies. No recommendations flowing from joint experimentation have been approved or implemented. Although the Joint Forces Command issued three recommendations nearly a year ago, they were not approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council because of confusion among the Joint Staff and the Joint Forces Command about a proposed change in guidance that required additional data be included when submitting these recommendations. Although DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance for joint experimentation, DOD and the Joint Forces Command are missing some key management elements that are generally considered necessary for successful program management.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-02-856, Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint Experimentation Program
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
August 2002:
Military Transformation:
Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD‘s Joint Experimentation Program:
Military Transformation:
GAO-02-856:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Participation in Joint Experimentation Continues to Evolve:
No Recommendations for Change Have Been Approved or Implemented:
Some Key Management Elements Are Missing:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Chronology of Key Events Important to Joint
Experimentation:
Appendix II: Additional Information on Joint Concept
Development and Experimentation Activities:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Organizations and Offices Contacted:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Organizations Involved in Joint Experimentation:
Table 2: First Three Recommendations Submitted by Joint Forces Command:
Table 3: Types of Activities and Experiments Associated with Joint
Experimentation:
Figures:
Figure 1: Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Process:
Figure 2: Involvement of Organizations in Preparing Joint
Experimentation Guidance and Campaign Plan:
Figure 3: Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Activities:
Letter:
August 29, 2002:
The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John W. Warner
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bob Stump
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense (DOD) considers the transformation[Footnote
1] of the
U. S. military a strategic imperative to meet the security challenges
of the new century. In October 1998, DOD established a joint concept
development and experimentation program to provide the engine of change
for this transformation. The U.S. Joint Forces Command, the executive
agent of the program, carries out experiments--with support from the
military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations-
-to explore and analyze new joint operational and organizational
concepts. The experiments can include studies and analyses,
conferences, workshops, seminars, war games, and simulated or live
field experiments.
On the basis of these experiments, the Joint Forces Command recommends
changes aimed at achieving significant improvements in joint
capabilities. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council[Footnote 2]
reviews the Command‘s recommendations, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is responsible for approving them. The Council also
oversees the implementation of approved recommendations. The cumulative
changes are expected to contribute to the way U.S. military forces are
transformed. In November 2001, DOD also created an Office of Force
Transformation to foster innovation and experimentation and assist the
Secretary of Defense to develop guidance and identify strategies and
policies for transformation.
Because of the central role DOD‘s joint experimentation program plays
in military transformation, we reviewed related activities to determine
whether changes are needed to improve the program‘s ability to focus on
future joint operations, military transformation, and the rapid
integration of results. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which
(1) the Joint Forces Command obtains participation from all relevant
sources in developing and conducting its experimentation activities;
(2) the recommendations flowing from the joint experimentation process
have been approved and implemented; and (3) the necessary management
elements are in place to foster program success. We are providing this
report to you because of your oversight responsibilities and interest
in military transformation issues.
Results in Brief:
In the nearly 4 years since becoming the executive agent for joint
concept development and experimentation, the Joint Forces Command has
increased the participation of key DOD stakeholders--the military
services, the combatant commands, and other organizations and agencies-
-in its experimentation activities. The Command has also expanded the
participation of federal agencies and departments, academia, the
private sector, and some foreign allies. The Command uses many
different ways to obtain input--including meetings, seminars,
workshops, video conferencing, E-mail, and the Internet--and integrates
the results of military operations, technology efforts, and other DOD
organizations‘ experiments into its activities. Although stakeholders
determine the extent of their involvement in joint experimentation
activities, many more organizations are in fact involved in the
planning and execution of this year‘s major field experiment than there
were in a similar experiment 2 years ago. Most DOD officials whom we
spoke with were generally satisfied with the way the Command reached
out to obtain their input, but many also believe more frequent contacts
with the Joint Forces Command would improve communications. Some
believe that the Command could do more to expand the participation of
non-DOD agencies and departments and allies and coalition partners, and
the Command is planning initiatives to do so, though this outreach
would involve broader agency-resource and national-security
considerations.
No recommendations flowing from joint experimentation have been
approved or implemented. Although the Joint Forces Command issued three
recommendations nearly a year ago, they were not approved by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council because of confusion among the Joint
Staff and the Joint Forces Command about a proposed change in guidance
that required additional data (on costs and timelines) be included when
submitting these recommendations. As a result, it is not clear when
these recommendations will contribute to military transformation. The
Command plans to re-submit the recommendations with the required data
later this year. However, at the time we concluded our review, the
official guidance on what information should accompany joint
experimentation recommendations had not been approved and issued. In
addition, although it is too early to assess how DOD integrates the
results of its experimentation into its plans, programs, and budgets,
several DOD officials expressed concern that the resource allocation
process may be too slow to provide rapid and timely funding for the
implementation of new concepts emerging from joint experimentation and
that other, more rapid resource mechanisms may be needed.
While DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance for
joint experimentation, DOD and the Joint Forces Command are missing
some key management elements that are generally considered necessary
for successful program management. DOD and the Joint Forces Command
thus lack the following very important management tools needed to carry
out their joint experimentation responsibilities:
* It is not yet clear what role the Office of Force Transformation will
have in joint experimentation and how it will coordinate its activities
with other DOD stakeholders. As a result, the Secretary of Defense may
not be effectively using this new office to interact with stakeholders
to foster and monitor joint experimentation as a means to advance DOD‘s
transformation agenda.
* DOD has not developed meaningful performance measures to assess joint
experimentation‘s contribution to the advancement of military
transformation. Therefore, DOD cannot gauge the progress of joint
experimentation efforts and of the program‘s overall contribution to
transformation.
* The Joint Forces Command does not have the strategic-planning tools
(a strategic plan with associated performance plans and reports) that
would allow it to clearly define what it is seeking to accomplish,
identify what strategy it will use to achieve desired results, and
finally measure how well it is succeeding in meeting results-oriented
goals and objectives.
We are making recommendations designed to improve the processes and the
management oversight and accountability for the joint concept
development and experimentation program and to clarify the role of the
Office of Force Transformation. In its comments on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with our recommendations and stated that our
findings provide a factual summary of the history and progress of joint
experimentation and identify the critical weaknesses currently being
addressed by DOD. It expects that a forthcoming Transformation Planning
Guidance or subsequent guidance documents will address the issues and
problems with the joint experimentation program identified in our
report.
Background:
The Joint Forces Command, in coordination with the Joint
Staff,[Footnote 3] the services, and other combatant commands and DOD
agencies, is responsible for creating and exploring new joint war-
fighting concepts, as well as for planning, designing, conducting, and
assessing a program of joint experimentation. The Command executed its
second large-scale field experiment, Millennium Challenge
2002,[Footnote 4] this year, and it plans another one in 2004 and
others every third year thereafter. These experiments are intended to
examine how well the concepts previously explored by the Command in
smaller venues will work when applied with the emerging concepts being
developed by the services and other combatant commands. For example,
Millennium Challenge 2002 tested how well
U.S. forces fared against a regional power with a sizable conventional
military force and so called ’anti-access“ capabilities--which can
include advanced surface-to-air missiles, antiship missiles and mines,
and chemical and biological weapons--and validated the results of
earlier experiments to develop the Command‘s ’rapid decisive“
operations concept. The aim of the experiment was to come up with
changes that can be made during the current decade. (App. I provides a
chronology of major events important to joint experimentation.):
Over the next several years, the Command‘s experimentation will focus
primarily on two concepts: one to develop a standing joint force
headquarters to improve joint command and control; another to conduct
more effective joint operations through ’rapid decisive“ operations.
In November 2001, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[Footnote 5]
directed that the Command make development of the prototype
headquarters its highest near-term priority.[Footnote 6] Additionally,
the Command will develop a number of other concepts aimed at
specialized issues or operational problems to support the two primary
concepts.
Joint experimentation is a continuous process that begins with the
development of new operational and organizational concepts that have
the potential to improve significantly joint operations (see fig. 1).
The Joint Forces Command identifies new joint concepts including those
developed by other DOD organizations (such as the Joint Staff,
services, and combatant commands) and the private sector and tests them
in experiments that range from simple (workshops, seminars, war games,
and simulations) to complex (large-scale virtual simulations and ’live“
field experiments). Appendix II provides additional information on
joint experimentation program activities.
Figure 1: Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Process:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Forces Command.
[End of figure]
After analyzing experimentation data, the Command prepares and submits
recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for review
and, ultimately, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
approval.[Footnote 7] Before submitting them to the Council, however,
the Command submits its recommendations to the Joint Staff for
preliminary review and coordination. The recommendations are
distributed for review and comment to the Joint Staff directorates, the
military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD and federal
government organizations. The Council then reviews the recommendations
and advises the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on whether they
should be approved. The changes, if approved, provide the basis for
pursuing the capabilities needed to implement a specific operational
concept.
The Council is also responsible for overseeing the implementation of
the recommendations, but it can designate an executive agent, such as
the Joint Forces Command, to do so. The Council (or its designated
executive agent) is responsible for obtaining the resources needed to
implement the recommendations through DOD‘s Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System.[Footnote 8] The Council also assists the Chairman, in
coordination with the combatant commands, the services, and other DOD
organizations, to identify and assess joint requirements and priorities
for current and future military capabilities. The Council considers
requirements (and any proposed changes) for joint capabilities across
doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities.
The Department of the Navy‘s budget[Footnote 9] provides funding to the
Joint Forces Command for joint experimentation and other Command
missions.
In fiscal year 2002, the Command received from the Navy about
$103 million for its joint concept development and experimentation
program, and it planned to spend about half of this amount for
Millennium Challenge 2002. The Command has requested that the Navy
provide about $98 million for the program in fiscal year 2003. The
Command also provides some funds to the services, the combatant
commands, and other DOD organizations for efforts that support its
program activities. However, the services fund the operations and
support costs of forces participating in joint experimentation. Also,
the individual experimentation efforts of the services and the
combatant commands are funded from within their own budgets.
Participation in Joint Experimentation Continues to Evolve:
Since it first began joint experimentation, the Joint Forces Command
has broadened and deepened the inclusion of other DOD organizations,
federal agencies and departments, the private sector, and allies and
coalition partners in its process for capturing and identifying new
joint ideas and innovations. Organizations participating in joint
experimentation are generally satisfied with current opportunities for
their ideas to be considered, and many have increased their
participation in the program. However, the participation of different
stakeholders--the extent of which is determined by the stakeholder--
varies considerably and some would like more visits and contacts with
the Command. The Command is planning initiatives to increase
stakeholder participation in the future, particularly for federal
agencies and departments and key allies, but this increase will depend
on agency-resource and national-security considerations.
Participation Has Grown and Continues to Expand:
As the program gradually evolved, the Joint Forces Command solidified a
process to involve the military services, the combatant commands, and
other DOD organizations in the planning and execution of its joint
experimentation activities. Because future joint operations will
involve diplomatic, information, and economic actions, as well as
military operations, many DOD, federal, and private organizations and
governments participate and provide input into the joint
experimentation program (see table 1). The Joint Forces Command
functions as a facilitator to solicit and coordinate the involvement of
these organizations and incorporate their input, as appropriate, into
concept development and experimentation activities.
Table 1: Organizations Involved in Joint Experimentation:
Organizational area: DOD headquarters and support organizations;
Examples of organizations and government entities: * Office of the
Secretary of Defense; * Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint
Staff; * Office of Force Transformation; * Joint Advanced Warfighting
Program; * Defense Intelligence Agency; * National Defense University.
Organizational area: Military services; Examples of organizations and
government entities: * Army; * Navy; * Air Force; * Marine Corps.
Organizational area: Combatant commands; Examples of organizations and
government entities: * U.S. Central Command; * U.S. European Command; *
U.S. Pacific Command; * U.S. Southern Command; * U.S. Special
Operations Command; * U.S. Transportation Command; * U.S. Space
Command; * U.S. Strategic Command.
Organizational area: Federal agencies and departments; Examples of
organizations and government entities: * Department of State; *
Department of Justice; * Central Intelligence Agency.
Organizational area: Private sector; Examples of organizations and
government entities: * Academia; * Think tank groups; * Industry.
Organizational area: Allies and potential coalition partners; Examples
of organizations and government entities: * Some North Atlantic Treaty
Organization countries; * Australia.
Source: GAO interviews and DOD data.
[End of table]
Because the stakeholders determine the extent of their participation in
the program, it can vary considerably. However, Joint Forces Command
officials stated that participation by the services, the combatant
commands, and other DOD organizations has grown steadily since the
program was created and continues to grow, as participants become
increasingly aware of the strong emphasis that DOD leaders are placing
on experimentation. For example, in contrast to the first field
experiment
in 2000, which had limited involvement by the services, this year‘s
Millennium Challenge has seen the services more actively involved in
early planning, and their individual experiments better coordinated and
integrated into the field experiment. Our comparison of participation
in the Command‘s major field experiment in 2000 with plans for this
year‘s experiment found a significant increase in the diversity and
number of participating organizations and in the number of concepts and
initiatives proposed by these organizations. For example, the total
number of organizations participating in Millennium Challenge 2002 more
than doubled from the prior experiment in 2000 (from 12 to 29
organizations), and the total number of service initiatives increased
from 4 to 29.
The Command provides several ways for organizations to participate and
provide inputs: they can review program plans and strategies; attend
meetings, seminars, and workshops; take part in experimentation
activities; and use various communication tools such as E-mail,
Internet, and video conferencing. Additionally, the Command obtains
input from the various experimentation and research and development
organizations of the military services and of some combatant commands
and DOD organizations.[Footnote 10] The Command also considers the
results of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations
efforts,[Footnote 11] innovations, and recent military operations in
developing its program. For example, as a result of its operational
experiences in Kosovo, the U.S. European Command identified various
joint capability shortfalls in its recent list of Command priorities as
a means of guiding the Joint Forces Command in selecting focal areas
and activities for experimentation. Further, the Command is taking
steps to (1) align its experimentation activities with the schedules of
major service and combatant command exercises and (2) adjust its
program to allow for earlier consideration of new concepts proposed by
the services and the combatant commands in the input process. These
adjustments would improve synchronization of experiments with the
availability of forces and the training schedules of the services and
the combatant commands, allow for greater involvement of these entities
in the process, and increase the likelihood that joint requirements are
sufficiently considered early in the development of concepts.
Participating organizations also provide input during the annual
preparation of two key joint experimentation-program documents:
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff‘s guidance on joint
experimentation and the Joint Forces Command‘s Joint Concept
Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan[Footnote 12] (see fig.
2). Each year the Chairman provides guidance to the Joint Forces
Command to use in developing its Campaign Plan for joint concept
development and experimentation. The basis for the Chairman‘s guidance
is derived from several sources, including strategy and planning
documents, studies, and other assessments.[Footnote 13] Additionally,
key DOD stakeholders, including the Chairman‘s Joint Warfighting
Capability Assessment teams[Footnote 14] and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, provide input to the Joint Staff to use in
developing the Chairman‘s guidance. The Joint Forces Command uses this
guidance, with additional input from DOD stakeholders, in preparing its
Campaign Plan, which is the primary vehicle for synchronizing its joint
experimentation activities and coordinating resources. The Command also
solicits and considers input for the Campaign Plan from some other
federal agencies and departments, academia, private sector, and allies.
After review and endorsement by the combatant commands, the services,
and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Chairman approves the
Campaign Plan.
Figure 2: Involvement of Organizations in Preparing Joint
Experimentation Guidance and Campaign Plan:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command.
[End of figure]
Stakeholders Generally Satisfied but Point to Some Possible
Improvements:
Officials at the military services, the combatant commands, and other
DOD organizations we talked with said they were generally satisfied
with the opportunities for input provided by the Joint Forces Command.
At the same time, DOD stakeholders have taken various actions to
increase their participation. Some, however, would like more contacts
and communication with the Command. The Command is responding with some
initiatives.
Each service, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Special Operations Command, the
U.S. Space Command, as well as some DOD and federal agencies (such as
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the National Security
Agency) have assigned liaison officers at the Joint Forces
Command.[Footnote 15] However, officials at the Central, Pacific, and
Southern Commands stated that their staffing levels currently do not
allow them to devote personnel in this role. Combatant command
officials indicated that the frequency and number of meetings,
conferences, and other events held at the Joint Forces Command often
make it difficult for their organizations to attend. The officials
believe that as a result, the views and positions of their
organizations are not always fully captured in some discussions and
deliberations. Some of the combatant commands have or are planning to
establish their own joint experimentation offices. Officials from the
Pacific and Special Operations Commands stated that although their
respective joint experimentation offices are largely focused on
supporting their own experimentation efforts, the offices provide a
cadre of staff who can better coordinate and participate more
consistently in the Joint Forces Command‘s joint experimentation
program. For example, Pacific Command officials said that their own
experimentation efforts to improve the command of joint operations over
the past few years have contributed to joint experimentation by
providing significant insights for the Joint Forces Command‘s
development of the standing joint-force headquarters concept. Central
Command and Southern Command officials said their Commands have plans
to establish similar offices soon.
While satisfied with their participation and their ability to provide
input into the program, officials at some combatant commands believe
that a number of things could be done to improve the program, assuming
resources are available. They believe that the Joint Forces Command
could increase its visits to and participation in combatant-command
activities. Some of the officials also believe that if the Joint Forces
Command assigned liaison officers to their commands, the Command would
obtain first-hand knowledge and a better appreciation of the various
commands‘ individual requirements. These officials believe that such a
presence at their commands would demonstrate the Joint Forces Command‘s
commitment to joint experimentation and would allow for interaction
with staff throughout their commands. The Joint Forces Command does not
favor doing this because of the cost and the difficulty in providing
the staff necessary to fulfill this role. Officials at the Pacific,
Central, and Southern Commands also believe that some level of funding
should be provided to the combatant commands for their use in
supporting individual command and the Joint Forces Command
experimentation efforts. Combatant command officials stated that
currently, funds from other command activities must be diverted to
support these efforts.
Out of concern about the need to improve communications and
participation in joint experimentation planning, the Joint Forces
Command is planning some initiatives such as the following:
* It plans to create a virtual planning-center site for joint
experimentation on its Intranet to provide DOD stakeholders with easily
accessible weekly updates to information on planned experiments;
participants; goals and objectives; and ongoing experimentation by the
Joint Forces Command, the services, the combatant commands, and DOD
agencies. It plans to develop the requirements for the site during fall
2002 and to initiate the project soon after.
* It established Project Alpha--a ’think-tank“ group--in early 2002 to
provide another source of input and outputs. The project will interface
with researchers throughout DOD, Department of Energy national
laboratories, private industry, and academia to find cutting-edge
technologies for inclusion in service and joint experimentation.
This relationship will provide an opportunity for the Joint Forces
Command to leverage the work of these organizations and similarly, for
these organizations to gain a better understanding of and include their
work in the joint experimentation program.
Expanding Interagency and Foreign Participation in Experimentation
Events Is Being Considered:
As the joint experimentation program matured, participation by non-DOD
federal agencies and departments gradually increased. Participation,
however, depends upon the agencies‘ desire to be involved and their
available resources. Lack of involvement could lead to missed
opportunities. And participation by allies and coalition partners has
been limited by security concerns.
The Joint Forces Command‘s input process allows individual federal
agencies and departments, such as the Departments of State and Justice,
to participate in joint experimentation events as they choose.
Interagency participation is improving, according to Command officials.
For example, federal agencies and departments are participating in
Millennium Challenge 2002 to assist the Command in developing its
standing joint-force headquarters concept.
However, resource and staffing constraints prevent some agencies and
departments from taking part in experiments. For example, according to
a Joint Forces Command official, the Department of Transportation and
the Central Intelligence Agency decided not to send representatives to
Millennium Challenge 2002 because of staffing constraints. Not only
could non-DOD agencies provide important insights and contributions to
joint operations, but also some important opportunities could be missed
if these agencies do not consistently participate in joint
experimentation events.
While federal agencies and departments are beginning to increase their
role in joint experimentation, several service and combatant command
officials we spoke with believe that greater involvement is needed
because of the role these organizations are likely to have in future
joint operations. For example, these non-DOD federal agencies and
departments would provide support (economic, diplomatic, and
information actions) to
U.S. military forces in their conduct of operations aimed at defeating
an adversary‘s war-making capabilities--support that is critical to
implementation of the Joint Forces Command‘s rapid decisive operations
concept.
Several DOD (service, combatant command, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and other DOD organizations) officials we spoke with believe
that the Joint Forces Command should explore ways to boost the
participation and involvement of allies and coalition partners in joint
experimentation. Joint Forces Command officials agree and believe that
such cooperation would foster a better understanding of allied
perspectives, allow the Command to leverage concept development work,
expand available capabilities, and facilitate the development of
multinational capabilities. The Command recently created a
multinational concept-development and experimentation site on its
Intranet to facilitate the involvement of allies and coalition partners
in joint experimentation. However, some DOD officials believe that the
Joint Forces Command should do more because future U.S. military
operations will likely be conducted with other countries. The officials
stress that other nations‘ military personnel should be included in
experiments to develop new operational concepts, if these concepts are
to be successful. Joint Forces Command officials pointed out, however,
that the participation and involvement of other countries are often
constrained by restrictions on access to sensitive security
information. For example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries
only participated as observers in Millennium Challenge 2002 because of
security information restrictions. The Command, however, plans to
develop ways to better handle these restrictions to allow greater
participation by other nations in its next major field experiment in
2004.
No Recommendations for Change Have Been Approved or Implemented:
Nearly 4 years after the program was established, only three
recommendations have flowed from the joint experimentation program, and
none of them have been approved. Confusion about proposed changes in
guidance regarding the information required for submitting these
recommendations has partly delayed their approval. At the time we
concluded our review, official guidance on what information should
accompany joint experimentation recommendations had not been approved.
In addition, several DOD officials expressed concern that the process
used to review and approve recommendations, the same as that used for
major acquisition programs, may not be the most appropriate for a
program whose aim is to integrate changes quickly. However, the
officials could not pinpoint any specific impasses in the approval
process. The DOD officials are also concerned about potential delays in
the integration of new concepts because of the lengthy DOD resource
allocation process.
Concerns Raised about the Delays in Approving Recommendations:
The Joint Forces Command submitted one recommendation to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 2001 and two more in November
2001 (see table 2). At the time we ended our review, none of the
recommendations had been approved. The recommendations to improve the
planning and decision-making capabilities of joint forces and provide
better training for personnel conducting theater missile defense
operations were based on analyses of results of experiments carried out
in the first 3 years of joint experimentation. Inputs included two
major experiments: Millennium Challenge 2000 (live field experiment in
August-September 2000) and the Unified Vision 2001 (virtual simulation
experiment in May 2001). The first recommendation was submitted for
review just 3 months after the end of the last experiment.
Table 2: First Three Recommendations Submitted by Joint Forces Command:
Recommendation: Collaborative environment and collaborative tools;
Description: Develop deployable Internet-like tools to improve the
collaborative planning and decision-making capabilities of joint
forces.; Changes required[A]: * Joint doctrine; * Training; *
Leadership and education; * Personnel; Date submitted for review:
August 18, 2001.
Recommendation: Joint intelligence preparation of the battle space;
Description: Develop objectives to train and exercise joint forces on
intelligence requirements for preparing the battle space, with a focus
on theater missile defense.; Changes required[A]: * Joint doctrine; *
Training; * Leadership and education; Date submitted for review:
November 1, 2001.
Recommendation: Theater missile defense and time-critical targeting
team training; Description: Develop a training course to improve the
effectiveness of teams involved in theater missile defense and time-
critical targeting activities.; Changes required[A]: * Training; *
Leadership and education; * Personnel; * Facilities; Date submitted for
review: November 1, 2001.
[A] Recommendations can propose changes be made to doctrine,
organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and/or facilities.
Source: Joint Forces Command.
[End of table]
According to a Joint Staff official, however, approval of the
recommendations has been delayed because Joint Forces Command and Joint
Staff officials were confused about proposed changes in guidance.
In May 2001, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council proposed new
guidance, which would require that information on costs and timelines
be included in joint experimentation recommendations. Prior guidance
did not require such information. Although the recommendations went
through preliminary review by the Joint Staff, the omission was not
caught until the recommendations were to be scheduled for review by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Joint Forces Command officials
told us that they were not aware of the change in guidance until that
time. When we ended our review, Joint Forces Command officials were
working with the Joint Staff to assess how much data could be prepared
and when. Command officials said that the recommendations will be
resubmitted in fall 2002 together with other recommendations emerging
from Millennium Challenge 2002. As a result, no recommendations have
yet been reviewed or approved. Also, at the time we ended our review,
the draft guidance on joint experimentation recommendations had not
been approved and issued. This guidance will become especially
important because joint experimentation is expected to produce new
recommendations more rapidly as the program matures.
The requirement for costs and timeline data is consistent with that of
recommendations for major weapon-system-acquisition programs. However,
joint experimentation officials at the Joint Forces Command believe
that requiring this type of information on joint-experimentation
recommendations may not be appropriate because (1) these
recommendations are generally intended to convince decision makers to
develop particular joint capabilities, not specific weapon systems;
(2) the new requirement may slow the preparation of future
recommendations; and (3) it will be difficult to provide accurate
estimates of costs and timelines for recommendations that span further
into the future. It is too early to determine whether these concerns
are valid.
Concerns Raised about the Process for Funding Implementation of
Recommendations:
Some DOD officials were also concerned that the system currently used
to allocate resources to implement joint-experimentation
recommendations--DOD‘s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System--
may not be the most efficient because it usually takes a long time to
review, approve, and provide funding in future budgets.
A recommendation approved in 2002, for example, would not be
incorporated into DOD‘s budget until 2004 or even later. This delay
could result in missed opportunities for more rapid implementation.
A Joint Staff official told us that the Joint Staff and the Joint
Forces Command recently adjusted the timing of events to better align
the joint experimentation process with the Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System. Additionally, DOD established a special fund for the
Joint Forces Command to use as a temporary funding source to speed up
the implementation of certain critical or time-sensitive
recommendations.
This source will provide early funding for implementation until funding
is provided through DOD‘s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
However, Joint Forces Command and other DOD officials believe other
ways to implement new joint capabilities within the framework of
existing budget and oversight practices may need to be considered.
Some Key Management Elements Are Missing:
DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance on its goals,
expectations, and priorities for the joint experimentation program.
Nevertheless, the management of joint experimentation is missing a
number of key elements that are necessary for program success: some
roles and responsibilities have not yet been defined; current
performance measures are not adequate to assess progress; and the Joint
Forces Command lacks strategic planning tools for the program.
Guidance More Clearly Defined:
DOD officials stated that the joint experimentation program had
difficulty in its first years because guidance was evolving and was not
specific: DOD‘s transformation goals were not adequately linked to
transformation efforts, and roles and responsibilities were not clearly
defined.[Footnote 16] Over time, the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided more specific
guidance on the goals and expectations for joint experimentation and
its contribution to DOD‘s transformation efforts. Guidance for joint
experimentation has evolved gradually over the program‘s nearly 4-year
life span, partly because of shifting defense priorities and lack of
clarity about the roles of various DOD stakeholders. Roles and
responsibilities have also matured with the program.[Footnote 17]
The Secretary of Defense‘s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
Report[Footnote 18] established six transformation goals, which include
improving
U.S. capabilities to defend the homeland and other bases of operations,
denying enemies sanctuary, and conducting effective information
operations. According to DOD officials, the Secretary of Defense‘s most
recent planning guidance tasked the Joint Forces Command to focus its
experimentation on developing new joint operational concepts for these
goals. To begin meeting these goals, the Chairman has also provided the
Joint Forces Command with clarifying guidance that identified specific
areas for the Command to include in its experimentation, such as the
development of a standing joint-force headquarters concept and of a
prototype to strengthen the conduct of joint operations. The Command
has reflected this new guidance in its latest Joint Concept Development
and Experimentation Campaign Plan. Additionally, the Secretary of
Defense reassigned the Command‘s geographic responsibilities to focus
it more clearly on its remaining missions, particularly transformation
and joint experimentation.
DOD officials at both headquarters and the field believe that the
recent guidance begins to provide a better framework for the Joint
Forces Command to establish and focus its joint experimentation
efforts.
Some officials, however, believe that future guidance should further
clarify the link between joint experimentation and DOD priorities and
the required resources necessary to support joint experimentation. DOD,
in its comments to a draft of this report, stated that it expects the
Transformation Planning Guidance--currently being prepared by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense--will establish the requirements
necessary to link experimentation to changes in the force.
Role of Office of Force Transformation Is Not Clear:
While roles and responsibilities for DOD organizations are now broadly
defined, the new DOD Office of Force Transformation‘s role in joint
experimentation and its relationship to other stakeholders have not yet
been clearly established. The Office‘s charter or terms of reference
have not been released. DOD plans to issue a directive later this year
that will include a charter and description of the Office‘s authorities
and responsibilities. However, there is still uncertainty about the
extent of authority and involvement the Office will have in the joint
experimentation program and the Office‘s ability to link the program
with DOD‘s overall transformation efforts. Joint Forces Command and
other DOD officials consider having a transformation advocate in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense as a beneficial link between the
Joint Forces Command‘s, the services‘, and the combatant commands‘
joint experimentation programs and DOD‘s overall transformation agenda.
According to DOD‘s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Office
of Force Transformation, created in November 2001, is to play a role in
fostering innovation and experimentation and should have an important
responsibility for monitoring joint experimentation and for providing
the Secretary of Defense with policy recommendations.
An Office of Force Transformation official told us that the Office will
be an advocate for transformation and will help develop guidance and
make recommendations on transformation issues to the Secretary of
Defense (the Office provided comments on the Secretary‘s annual
planning guidance and developed instructions for the services on
preparing their first transformation road maps).
The Office has also decided to take a cautious approach in carrying out
its mission because of possible resistance from other DOD
organizations, the same official said. The Office plans to offer its
assistance to DOD organizations in their transformation efforts and
attempt to influence their thinking on key issues, rather than
asserting itself directly into their efforts, for example by funding
military use of existing private-sector technology to act as a
surrogate for evaluating possible concepts, uses, and designs.
Joint Forces Command officials stated that as of May 2002, they had had
only limited discussions with the Office and had not established any
working agreements on how the Office would participate in the joint
experimentation program.
The Office of Force Transformation has only recently assembled its
staff and is beginning to plan its work and establish contacts within
DOD and with other organizations. The Office‘s budget for fiscal years
2002 and 2003 is about $18 million and $35 million, respectively.
Current Performance Measures Are Not a Useful Assessment Tool:
DOD‘s performance measures (or metrics) for assessing joint
experimentation--by measuring only the number of experiments carried
out--do not provide a meaningful assessment of the program‘s
contribution toward meeting its performance goal for military
transformation because they are only quantitative. Consistent with good
management practices and in order to effectuate the purposes of the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,[Footnote 19] federal
agencies devise results-oriented metrics that provide an assessment of
outcomes or the results of programs as measured by the difference they
make. In its fiscal year 2000 performance report,[Footnote 20] the most
recent it has issued, DOD described the performance indicators for the
joint experimentation program in terms of the number of experiments
conducted against a target goal for the prior, current, and following
fiscal years. In fiscal year 2000, DOD exceeded its target number of
experiments and did not project any shortfalls in meeting its target in
the next fiscal year. Although this measure does provide a quantitative
assessment of experimental activity, it does not provide a meaningful
method for assessing how joint experimentation is helping to advance
military transformation.
An Office of the Secretary of Defense official stated that DOD
recognizes that better performance measures are needed for assessing
how joint experimentation advances transformation and for two other
metrics currently used to assess its military transformation
goal.[Footnote 21] The official stated that developing such measures is
a challenge because joint experimentation does not easily lend itself
to traditional measurement methods. For example, most programs consider
a failure as a negative event, but in joint experimentation, a failure
can be considered as a success if it provides insights or information
that is helpful in evaluating new concepts or the use of new
technologies.
An Office of the Secretary of Defense official told us that the RAND
Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses recently completed
studies to identify possible performance measures for assessing the
progress of transformation. DOD is evaluating them and is preparing the
Transformation Planning Guidance to provide more specific information
on the priorities, roles, and responsibilities for executing its
transformation strategy. The same official stated that the new guidance
will include a discussion of the types of performance measures needed
for assessing transformation progress or will assign an organization to
determine them. In either case, measures will still need to be
developed and implemented. DOD plans to issue the new guidance later in
2002 but has not determined how new performance measures would be
incorporated into its annual performance report.
Joint Forces Command‘s Program Lacks Strategic Planning Tools:
The Joint Forces Command has not developed the strategic planning
tools--a strategic plan, an associated performance plan, and
performance-reporting tools--for assessing the performance of the joint
experimentation program. Strategic planning is essential for this type
of program, especially considering its magnitude and complexity and its
potential implications for military transformation. Such planning
provides an essential foundation for defining what an organization
seeks to accomplish, identifies the strategy it will use to achieve
desired results, and then determines--through measurement--how well it
is succeeding in reaching results-oriented goals and achieving
objectives. Developing strategic-planning tools for the joint
experimentation program would also be consistent with the principles
set forth in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which
is the primary legislative framework for strategic planning in the
federal government.
The Joint Forces Command prepares an annual Joint Concept Development
and Experimentation Campaign Plan that broadly describes the key goals
of its program, the strategy for achieving these goals, and the planned
activities. However, a February 2002 progress report, prepared by the
Joint Forces Command‘s Joint Experimentation Directorate, on the
development of the Directorate‘s performance management system
indicated that one-fourth of those organizations providing
feedback[Footnote 22] on the Campaign Plan believed that the Plan lacks
specificity in terms of the program‘s goals and objectives and an
associated action plan that outlines the activities to be carried out
in order to achieve those goals. Officials we spoke with at the
military services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Forces Command
all cited the need for more specific and clearer goals, objectives, and
performance measures for the program.
In the progress report, the Command acknowledged the benefits of
strategic planning and the use of this management tool to align its
organizational structure, processes, and budget to support the
achievement of missions and goals. The report proposed that the Command
develop a strategic plan, possibly by modifying its annual Campaign
Plan, and subsequently prepare a performance plan and a performance
report. Command officials indicated that the basic requirements of a
strategic plan could be incorporated into the
Campaign Plan, but they were unsure, if such an approach were taken,
whether the changes could be made before the annual Campaign Plan is
issued later this year. Similarly, the Joint Forces Command has had
difficulty in developing specific performance measures for joint
experimentation. A Command official stated that the Command has tried
to leverage the performance measures developed by other organizations
like itself, but found that there is widespread awareness throughout
the research and development community, both within and outside DOD,
that such measures are needed but do not exist. Additionally, a Joint
Forces Command official stated that whatever metrics the Command
develops must be linked to its mission-essential tasks for joint
experimentation and that the Command is currently developing these
tasks. At the time we ended our review, the Command had identified six
broad areas for which specific metrics need to be developed. These
included quality of life, customer relationships, and experimentation
process management.
Conclusions:
After nearly 4 years, the Joint Forces Command‘s process for obtaining
inputs for the development and execution of DOD‘s joint experimentation
program has become more inclusive. However, questions continue about
whether the program is the successful engine for change envisioned when
it was established. Since the program‘s inception, only three
recommendations have flowed from experimentation activities and their
review, approval, and implementation have been delayed from confusion
over a change in guidance that required additional information be
included in the recommendations. As a result, no recommendations for
change have been approved or implemented to date. To the extent that
the draft guidance on what should be submitted with joint
experimentation recommendations can be officially approved and issued,
future recommendations could be submitted for approval and
implementation more quickly. Underscoring the need to finalize the
guidance is the anticipated recommendations to be made after this
year‘s major field experiment, Millennium Challenge 2002.
The lack of strategic planning for joint experimentation deprives the
Joint Forces Command of necessary tools to effectively manage its
program. Implementation of strategic planning at the Joint Forces
Command would create a recurring and continuous cycle of planning,
program execution, and reporting and establish a process by which the
Command could measure the effectiveness of its activities as well as a
means to assess the contributions of those activities to the
operational goals and mission of the program. Such planning could also
provide a tool--one that is currently missing--to identify strengths
and weaknesses in the development and execution of the program and a
reference document for the effective oversight and management of the
program. Performance measures developed under the Command‘s strategic
planning could provide the standard for assessing other experimentation
efforts throughout DOD, which are also lacking such metrics.
The lack of a meaningful performance measure for assessing the
contribution of the joint experimentation program to advance
DOD‘s transformation agenda limits the usefulness and benefit of this
management tool to assist congressional and DOD leaders in their
decision-making responsibilities. Establishing a ’meaningful“ joint
experimentation performance measure for its annual performance report
would provide congressional and DOD leadership a better assessment of
the program‘s contribution and progress toward advancing
transformation. Such a metric would also be consistent with the intent
of the Results Act to improve the accountability of federal programs
for achieving program results. Because the role and relationships of
the Secretary of Defense‘s new Office of Force Transformation have not
yet been clarified, the Secretary may not be effectively using this
office in DOD‘s transformation efforts. This office, if given
sufficient authority, could provide the Secretary with a civilian
oversight function to foster and monitor the joint experimentation
program to ensure that it is properly supported and provided resources
to advance the DOD‘s overall transformation agenda. Rectifying these
shortcomings is critical in view of the importance that DOD has placed
on joint experimentation to identify the future concepts and
capabilities for maintaining U.S. military superiority.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the management of DOD‘s joint experimentation program, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to:
* approve and issue guidance that clearly defines the information
required to accompany joint experimentation recommendations for the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council‘s review and approval and:
* require the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command to
develop strategic planning tools to use in managing and periodically
assessing the progress of its joint experimentation program.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense:
* develop both quantitative and qualitative performance measures for
joint experimentation in DOD‘s annual performance report to provide a
better assessment of the program‘s contribution to advancing military
transformation and:
* clarify the role of the Office of Force Transformation and its
relationship to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
Forces Command, and other key DOD stakeholders in DOD‘s joint
experimentation program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments from DOD on a draft of this report, which
are included in their entirety as appendix III. DOD agreed with our
recommendations and indicated that it expects that a forthcoming
Transformation Planning Guidance and subsequent guidance will be
responsive to them by clarifying roles and missions across DOD,
implementing recommendations for changes, and establishing clear
objectives. We believe such strategic guidance from the Secretary of
Defense could provide a significant mechanism for better linking and
clarifying the importance of the joint experimentation program with
DOD‘s transformation agenda. DOD also provided technical comments to
the draft that were incorporated in the report where appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command obtains input
from stakeholders and other relevant sources in developing and
conducting its joint experimentation activities, we reviewed an array
of documents providing information about participants in joint
experimentation, including guidance and other policy documents,
position papers, fact sheets, reports, and studies of the military
services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and other DOD
organizations.
We also reviewed Joint Forces Command plans and reports. Additionally,
we made extensive use of information available on public and DOD
Internet web sites. To assess the change in participation by various
stakeholders over time, we compared the differences in the numbers of
participating organizations and initiatives provided by these
organizations between the Joint Forces Command‘s first two major field
experiments in 2000 and 2002 (Millennium Challenge 2000 and Millennium
Challenge 2002). We conducted discussions with officials at five
combatant commands, the Joint Staff, the military services, and other
DOD organizations, such as the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program and
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Appendix IV lists the
principal organizations and offices where we performed work. At the
Joint Forces Command, we discussed with joint experimentation officials
the process for soliciting and incorporating inputs for joint
experimentation from the military services and the combatant commands.
We also attended conferences and other sessions hosted by the
Joint Forces Command to observe and learn about joint experimentation
participants and their contributions and coordination. For example, we
attended sessions for the Command‘s preparation of its annual Joint
Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan and planning for
this year‘s Millennium Challenge experiment. With officials from each
of the services and the combatant commands, we discussed perceptions of
the effectiveness of coordination and participation in joint
experimentation. We also obtained observations about participants‘
involvement from several defense experts who track joint
experimentation and military transformation. Although we did not
include a specific assessment of the individual experimentation efforts
of the services and combatant commands, we did discuss with service and
command officials how their efforts were coordinated and integrated
into joint experimentation. We also did not determine the extent that
individual inputs obtained from various participating organizations
were considered and incorporated into the joint experimentation
program.
To determine the extent to which recommendations flowing from the joint
experimentation process have been approved and implemented, we reviewed
and analyzed data that tracked the progress of the first three joint
experimentation recommendations submitted by the Joint Forces Command.
We also obtained and analyzed relevant guidance and held discussions
with Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, and Office of the Secretary of
Defense officials on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process
for reviewing and approving joint experimentation recommendations. We
also discussed issues relating to implementation of joint
experimentation recommendations through DOD‘s Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System.
To assess whether key management elements, such as policy,
organization, and resources, were in place for the program, we
conducted a comprehensive review of current legislative, policy,
planning, and guidance documents and reports and studies. We used the
principles laid out in the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993 as an additional benchmark for assessing the adequacy of
performance measures established for the program and of tools used to
manage the program. We also discussed the status and evolution of joint
experimentation oversight and management, including office roles and
responsibilities and joint experimentation metrics, with officials at
the Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, the services, the combatant
commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Force
Transformation, and other DOD organizations. Several defense experts
who follow joint experimentation and military transformation discussed
with us joint experimentation oversight and management and gave us
their impressions regarding current joint experimentation management
practices.
Our review was conducted from October 2001 through May 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact Richard G. Payne at (757) 552-8119 if you or your staff
have any questions concerning this report. Key contacts and
contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Managing Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Henry L. Hinton, Jr.:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Chronology of Key Events Important to Joint
Experimentation:
Date: May 1996; Event: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
Joint Vision 2010.; Relevance to joint experimentation: This vision of
future war fighting provides a conceptual template for the Department
of Defense‘s (DOD) transformation efforts across all elements of the
armed forces.
Date: May 1997; Event: DOD‘s Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review
issued.; Relevance to joint experimentation: Report discussed the
importance of preparing for future national security challenges. It
concluded that DOD needed to institutionalize innovative
investigations, such as war-fighting experiments, to ensure future
concepts and capabilities are successfully integrated into the forces
in a timely manner.
Date: May 1998; Event: Secretary of Defense designated Commander in
Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command,[A] as executive agent for joint
experimentation.; Relevance to joint experimentation: The Secretary of
Defense tasked the Joint Forces Command to design and conduct joint
war-fighting experimentation to explore, demonstrate, and evaluate
joint war-fighting concepts and capabilities.
Date: April 1998; Event: Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
established.; Relevance to joint experimentation: DOD established the
program at the Institute for Defense Analyses to serve as a catalyst
for achieving the objectives of Joint Vision 2010 (and later Joint
Vision 2020). To that end, the program is to develop and explore
breakthrough operational concepts and capabilities that support DOD‘s
transformation goals.
Date: October 1998; Event: Joint Forces Command assumed responsibility
as the executive agent for joint experimentation.; Relevance to joint
experimentation: Joint concept development and experimentation program
initiated.
Date: June-August 1999; Event: Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
conducted the first joint experiment for Joint Forces Command.;
Relevance to joint experimentation: An experiment--J9901--that
investigated approaches for attacking critical mobile targets.
Experiment allowed the Joint Forces Command to begin its learning
process on how to conduct joint experimentation.
Date: September 1999; Event: Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on DOD Warfighting Transformation issued.; Relevance to joint
experimentation: Report proposed several recommendations to promote
military transformation.
Date: June 2000; Event: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
Joint Vision 2020.; Relevance to joint experimentation: Updated vision
statement described the joint war-fighting capabilities required
through 2020.
Date: August-September 2000; Event: Millennium Challenge 2000 major
field experiment conducted.; Relevance to joint experimentation: The
first major field experiment coordinated by the Joint Forces Command
among the services and other stakeholders.
Date: April 2001; Event: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
updated Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan.; Relevance to joint
experimentation: Guidance described the process for generation,
coordination, approval, and implementation of recommendations emerging
from joint experimentation and defined the roles and responsibilities
of DOD stakeholders.
Date: April 2001; Event: Transformation Study Report: Transforming
Military Operational Capabilities issued.; Relevance to joint
experimentation: Study conducted for the Secretary of Defense to
identify capabilities needed by U.S. forces to meet the twenty-first
century security environment. Made several recommendations directed at
improving joint experimentation.
Date: May 2001; Event: Joint Forces Command conducted Unified Vision
2001 experiment.; Relevance to joint experimentation: A major joint
experiment--largely modeling and simulation--conducted to refine and
explore several war-fighting concepts, such as ’rapid decisive“
operations.
Date: August 2001; Event: Secretary of Defense‘s planning guidance
issued.; Relevance to joint experimentation: Required studies by
defense agencies and the Joint Staff to develop transformation road
maps and a standing-joint-force headquarters prototype.
Date: September 2001; Event: DOD‘s Quadrennial Defense Review Report
issued.; Relevance to joint experimentation: The report established
priorities and identified major goals for transforming the Armed Forces
to meet future challenges. It called for new operational concepts,
advanced technological capabilities, and an increased emphasis on joint
organizations, experimentation, and training.
Date: November 2001; Event: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
issued joint experimentation guidance.; Relevance to joint
experimentation: The guidance directed the Joint Forces Command to
focus its near-term experimentation on developing a standing joint
force headquarters prototype.
Date: November 2001; Event: Office of Force Transformation
established.; Relevance to joint experimentation: Office assists the
Secretary of Defense in identifying strategy and policy, and developing
guidance for transformation.
Date: April 2002; Event: Unified Command Plan 2002 issued.; Relevance
to joint experimentation: Plan reduced the number of missions assigned
to the Joint Forces Command to allow the Command to devote more
attention to its remaining missions such as joint experimentation.
Date: May 2002; Event: Secretary of Defense‘s planning guidance
issued.; Relevance to joint experimentation: The guidance directed the
Joint Forces Command to develop new joint concepts that focus on the
six transformation goals set forth in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report.
Date: July-August 2002; Event: Joint Forces Command conducted
Millennium Challenge 2002.; Relevance to joint experimentation: Second
major field experiment conducted to culminate a series of experiments
to assess ’how“ to do rapid decisive operations in this decade.
[A] In October 1999, the U.S. Atlantic Command was redesignated as the
U.S. Joint Forces Command.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Additional Information on Joint Concept Development and
Experimentation Activities:
The Joint Forces Command uses various types of assessment activities to
develop, refine, and validate joint concepts and associated
capabilities.
As shown in figure 3, the Command begins to move through the five joint
concept development phases by conducting workshops, seminars, and war
games to develop information and identify possible areas to explore in
developing new concepts and associated capabilities and then uses
simulated or live experiment events to confirm, refute, or modify them.
These activities vary in scale and frequency, but each activity becomes
larger and more complex. They can involve a small group of retired flag
officers and academics, up to 100 planners, operators, and technology
experts, or several thousand in the field. Near the end of the process,
the Command will conduct a large-scale simulation experiment (such as
Unified Vision 2001), followed by a major field experiment (such as
Millennium Challenge 2002). The process continuously repeats itself to
identify additional new concepts and capabilities.
Figure 3: Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Activities:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Joint Forces Command.
[End of figure]
Table 3 provides additional information about the characteristics,
scale, and frequency of these and other associated activities and
experiments.
Table 3: Types of Activities and Experiments Associated with Joint
Experimentation:
Type of activities and experiments: Workshop; Characteristics: Brief,
intense experimentation program used to discover and generate concepts.
Participants identify focus areas and research topics. Workshops are
conducted live and may have virtual components. Subject matter experts
participate.; Scale and frequency: Small scale
Many each year.
Type of activities and experiments: Seminar; Characteristics:
Discussion forums used to discover and define problem boundaries, pose
solutions, and exchange information. Seminars are conducted live, and
may have virtual components. Subject matter experts participate.; Scale
and frequency: Small scale
Many each year.
Type of activities and experiments: War game; Characteristics: An
event, using simulated and emulated systems, centering on the
interaction of two or more opposing forces depicting a possible or
actual scenario. Identifies key variables in an experiment; refines
concepts and assesses alternatives.; Scale and frequency: Scale varies
One or more each year.
Type of activities and experiments: Limited objective experiment;
Characteristics: An event, limited in scope, that permits participants
to see how specific, focused ideas or concepts will work in a given
context and works with supporting elements of the integrating concept.
It confirms or refines experiments and is primarily virtual or
simulated. May include workshops, seminars, and war games.; Scale and
frequency: Small scale
Varies (6 in 2001).
Type of activities and experiments: Leveraged event; Characteristics:
Service or other organization‘s event in which the Joint Forces Command
and its partners share lessons learned. The event may involve the use
of live forces in a theater scenario.; Scale and frequency: Scale
varies
Frequency varies.
Type of activities and experiments: Spiral; Characteristics: A group of
smaller events and meetings requiring live participants; concepts are
refined and plans are made for larger live Joint Forces Command
experiments.; Scale and frequency: Small to medium scale
A few each year.
Type of activities and experiments: Major simulation experiment;
Characteristics: A constructive, virtual, or live experiment that makes
extensive use of models and simulation to provide detailed information
on the expected outcomes of an event or sequence of events. It may use
live and/or simulated participants.; Scale and frequency: Large scale
Not more than one every 2 years.
Type of activities and experiments: Major field experiment;
Characteristics: Integrates several smaller, previous events.
Determines how effectively the concepts previously explored in smaller
experiments will operate when integrated with the concepts of the other
services and combatant commands. It validates concepts and requires
live participants as well as simulated opponents.; Scale and frequency:
Large scale
Not more than one each year.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000:
POLICY:
August 8, 2002:
Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hinton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-02-853, ’Military Transformation: DOD Actions Needed to
Better Manage Its Joint Experimentation Program,“ (GAO code 350120).
DoD concurs with the report and the GAO‘s overall assessment. The
enclosure contains the Department‘s response to GAO recommendations.
The Department provided the GAO separately the substantive and general
comments with supporting rationale.
In general, the Department believes that the GAO findings are
thoroughly researched and accurately reflect both the history and the
progress that the Department has made towards improving the joint
experimentation process. The report is fair and balanced in that it
acknowledges the scope of the task of transformation and the critical
importance of the supporting experimentation process. The Department is
aggressively pursuing actions that will transform our military forces.
Roles and responsibilities for implementing the Department‘s
transformation strategy, including joint experimentation, will be
clarified in the Department‘s Transformation Planning Guidance,
currently in staffing.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the
draft GAO report.
Sincerely,
Christopher J. Lamb:
Deputy Assistant Secretary For Plans and Resources (Acting):
Signed by Christopher J. Lamb:
w/enclosure:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED JULY 11, 2002 (GAO CODE 350120):
’MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: DOD ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER MANAGE ITS JOINT
EXPERIMENTATION PROGRAM“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION l: To improve the management of DoD‘s joint
experimentation program, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to:
*approve and issue guidance that clearly defines the information
required to accompany joint experimentation recommendations for the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council‘s review and approval; and:
*require the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command to
develop strategic planning tools to use in managing and periodically
assessing the progress of its joint experimentation program. (p. 27/GAO
Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with the problems identified. The Transformation
Planning Guidance (TPG), currently in the staffing process, or
subsidiary guidance documents identified in the TPG, will address and
clarify both the JROC process issue and the requirement for the
implementation of strategic planning tools at JFCOM.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
develop both quantitative and qualitative performance measures for
joint experimentation in DoD‘s annual performance report to provide a
better assessment of the program‘s contribution to advancing military
transformation. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with the recommendation. The Transformation
Planning Guidance, currently in the staffing process, or subsidiary
guidance documents identified in the TPG, will address this issue by
directing JFCOM to revise its Concept Development and Experimentation
Campaign Plan.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
clarify the role of the Force Transformation Office and its
relationship to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
Forces Command, and other key DoD stakeholders in DoD‘s joint
experimentation program. (p. 27/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with the recommendation. The report discusses
several problems and issues with the joint experimentation program. In
general these relate to the need to clarity of roles and missions
across DOD, the implementation of change recommendations, the necessity
for strategic management tools, and the requirement for meaningful
performance measures. The Transformation Planning Guidance will address
these issues by clarifying roles and missions across the Department,
implementing change recommendations, and establishing clear
objectives. When coordinated and implemented, the TPG will ensure that
all stakeholders are prepared to respond positively to the observations
and recommendations listed in the GAO report.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Organizations and Offices Contacted:
Washington, D.C., Area:
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics:
* Joint Advanced Warfighting Program:
* Defense Advanced Research Project Agency:
* Office of Force Transformation:
The Joint Staff:
* Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate:
* Joint Vision and Transformation Division:
* Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Directorate:
* Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate:
Department of the Army:
* Directorate of Training:
* Directorate of Integration:
* Directorate for Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine:
Department of the Navy:
* Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare
Requirements and Programs:
* Marine Corps Combat Development Command:
Department of the Air Force:
* Wargaming and Experimentation Division:
Other Organizations:
* Booz Allen Hamilton:
* The Carlyle Group:
* Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments:
* Hicks & Associates, Inc.
Honolulu, Hawaii, Area:
* U.S. Pacific Command:
* Joint Experimentation Division:
* Intelligence Architecture and Systems Division:
* Exercise Division:
* Regional Strategy and Policy Division:
U.S. Pacific Fleet:
* Joint Experimentation Office:
U.S. Army Pacific:
* Internal Review Office:
U.S. Pacific Air Forces:
* Operational Requirements:
Marine Forces Pacific:
Miami, Fla., Area:
U.S. Southern Command:
* Future Operations:
* Programs and Resources Directorate:
* Office of Analysis and Simulations:
Newport, R.I., Area:
Navy Warfare Development Command:
Norfolk, Va., Area:
U.S. Joint Forces Command:
* Joint Experimentation Directorate:
* Joint Integration and Interoperability Directorate:
Department of the Army:
* Training and Doctrine Command:
* Army Joint Venture Directorate:
* Army Audit Agency:
Department of the Air Force:
* Air Combat Command:
* Air Force Experimentation Office:
Joint Forces Staff College:
Tampa, Fla., Area:
U.S. Central Command:
* Futures Division:
* Exercise Division:
U.S. Special Operations Command:
Special Operations Requirements and Resources:
* Joint Experimentation Division:
* Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics:
* Intelligence and Information Operations:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Sharon L. Pickup (202) 512-9619
Richard G. Payne (757) 552-8119:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individuals named above, Carol R. Schuster,
Mark J. Wielgoszynski, John R. Beauchamp, Kimberley A. Ebner,
Lauren S. Johnson, and Stefano Petrucci made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD states that transformation of the military ’results from the
exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts and
capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of
organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging
strategic and operational challenges and opportunities and that render
previous methods of conducting war obsolete or subordinate.“
[2] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council
that assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying
and assessing the priorities for joint military requirements to achieve
current and future military capabilities. Chaired by the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Council is comprised of a senior
officer from each of the military services. Representatives from other
DOD entities, such as the combatant commands and the Joint Staff, serve
in an advisory role to the Council.
[3] The staff that assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
executing the Chairman‘s responsibilities.
[4] Millennium Challenge 2002 focuses on how the U.S. military can use
its current and
near-term capabilities differently in this decade. It will involve the
U.S. Special Operations Command and forces from all the services.
Another major field experiment--Olympic Challenge--is planned for 2004.
[5] The Unified Command Plan, April 30, 2002, assigns the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for providing overarching
guidance on joint experimentation.
[6] The Command is directed to develop this prototype headquarters by
2004 and make it available for implementation by the regional combatant
commands during fiscal year 2005. The headquarters will provide
uniform, standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and
technical system requirements, with the ability to move expertise among
commands.
[7] We recently reported on the status of actions taken by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council‘s oversight and the joint requirements process,
including establishing procedures for submitting recommendations
stemming from joint experimentation to the Council. See U.S. General
Accounting Office, Defense Plans: Status of DOD‘s Efforts to Improve
Its Joint Warfighting Requirements Process, GAO-02-100R (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 9, 2001).
[8] The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System is designed to
assist the Secretary of Defense in making choices about the allocation
of resources among a number of competing or possible programs and
alternatives to accomplish specific national security objectives. The
objective of the system is to provide the optimal mix of forces,
equipment, and support that can be achieved within fiscal constraints.
[9] DOD Directive 5100.3, Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and
Subordinate Joint Commands, Nov. 15, 1999, designates the Navy as the
executive agent responsible for arranging for the program-funding of
the Joint Forces Command‘s activities, including the joint
experimentation program.
[10] Participating organizations would include each of the services‘
experimentation programs, service battle labs and supporting research
and development organizations, DOD organizations such as Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency and Joint Advanced Warfighting
Program, and federally funded research and development organizations
such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, the RAND Corporation, and
the Center for Naval Analysis.
[11] DOD initiated the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
program to determine the extent to which a given mature technology will
improve military capabilities before entering the normal acquisition
process and, by using mature technology, reduce the length of time to
develop and acquire weapon systems.
[12] The Campaign Plan provides the structure for executing
experimentation and outlines the Joint Forces Command‘s objectives,
methods, and events to achieve those objectives. The most recent
Campaign Plan is: U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Concept
Development and Experimentation Campaign Plan Fiscal Years 2002-2007
(Norfolk, Va.: 2002).
[13] Examples of these sources include the President‘s National
Security Strategy, the Secretary of Defense‘s annual defense planning
guidance, and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff‘s Joint Vision
and National Military Strategy.
[14] Teams of DOD war-fighting and functional-area experts appraise
various aspects of joint war fighting within their respective areas.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff uses the teams‘ assessments
to develop guidance and to support decision making.
[15] Additionally, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia
have each assigned a liaison officer at the Joint Forces Command.
[16] We have pointed this difficulty out in prior transformation-
related reports. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military
Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and Focused,
GAO-01-853 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2001) and U.S. General Accounting
Office, Military Transformation: Army Has A Comprehensive Plan for
Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges, GAO-02-96
(Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 16, 2001).
[17] The roles and responsibilities for most DOD organizations are
broadly defined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, Apr. 15,
2001.
[18] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C.: 2001).
[19] Pub.L. 103-62, sec. 2(b), Aug. 3, 1993, sometimes referred to as
the Results Act.
[20] Department of Defense, Government Performance and Results Act:
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report (Washington,
D.C.: 2001). As of August 2002, DOD did not submit a performance report
to the Congress for fiscal year 2001.
[21] DOD‘s fiscal year 2000 performance report included three metrics
for assessing its transformation of U.S. military forces performance
goal: joint experimentation, procurement spending, and defense
technology objectives.
[22] DOD organizations providing comments to the draft Campaign Plan
included various offices and activities of the Army, the Navy, the Air
Force, the Marine Corps, the
U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Strategic Command, the U.S.
Southern Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. European
Command.
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