Defense Budget
Contingency Operations in the Balkans May Need Less Funding in Fiscal Year 2003 Gao ID: GAO-02-1073 September 27, 2002From the end of the Persian Gulf War in February 1991 through May 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported over $43.9 billion in incremental costs for its overseas contingency operations. These operations include the enforcement of no-fly zones, humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement operations, as well as combating terrorism beginning in fiscal year 2001. The majority of these costs were incurred in the Balkans and Southeast Asia. In fiscal year 2002, U.S. military forces are continuing to participate in a number of contingency operations, primarily in the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and a number of locations that involve combating terrorism. The military services received a combination of funding provided in the DOD appropriations act for fiscal year 2002 and money remaining in previously funded contingency fund accounts. The services also took steps to reduce costs in order to keep them in line with available funding. Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and DOD plan to reduce troop levels in the Balkans during fiscal year 2003, which may reduce funding needs during the year. In Europe, the Army anticipates an overall reduction of 1,160 troops during fiscal year 2003. Although a decline in troop strength does not necessarily correspond to an equal reduction in costs, given the large anticipated reduction in troop levels, there should be a decrease in estimated costs for fiscal year 2003. Since the fiscal year 2003 budget request was developed from an already reduced fiscal year 2002 appropriation level, any further reduction in fiscal year 2003 level would pose a funding challenge.
GAO-02-1073, Defense Budget: Contingency Operations in the Balkans May Need Less Funding in Fiscal Year 2003
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-02-1073
entitled 'Defense Budget: Contingency Operations in the Balkans May
Need Less Funding in Fiscal Year 2003' which was released on September
27, 2002.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products‘ accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
September 2002:
DEFENSE BUDGET:
Contingency Operations in the Balkans May Need Less Funding in
Fiscal Year 2003:
Defense Budget:
GAO-02-1073:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Balkans and Southwest Asia Funding for Fiscal Year 2002:
Plans to Further Reduce Balkans Force Levels May Reduce Fiscal Year
2003 Funding Needs:
Conclusion:
Agency Comments and Our Response:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Location of the Department of Defense‘s Major Contingency
Operations in Fiscal Year 2002:
Tables:
Table 1: Comparison of Services‘ Operation and Maintenance Budget
Estimates and Funding Provided for Southwest Asia Operations, Fiscal
Year 2002:
Table 2: Comparison of the Army in Europe‘s Budget Estimates for Fiscal
Years 2002 and 2003:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense
GAO: General Accounting Office
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCOTF: Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund:
September 27, 2002:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate:
From the end of the Persian Gulf War in February 1991 through
May 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported over $43.9 billion
in incremental costs for its overseas contingency operations.[Footnote
1] These operations include the enforcement of no-fly zones,
humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement operations, as well as
combating terrorism beginning in late fiscal year 2001. The majority of
these costs ($29.7 billion) were incurred in the Balkans (Bosnia and
Kosovo) and Southwest Asia. In fiscal year 2002, U.S. military forces
are continuing to participate in a number of contingency operations,
primarily in the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and a number of locations
that involve combating terrorism. Appendix I contains a map depicting
the location of DOD‘s operations for fiscal year 2002.
You asked us to review the administration‘s request for funding
overseas contingency operations. In response to your request, we
examined (1) the funding for continued operations in the Balkans and
Southwest Asia for fiscal year 2002 and (2) the outlook for funding
operations in the Balkans during fiscal year 2003.
To accomplish this review, we interviewed DOD and service officials who
are responsible for preparing budgets and estimating costs and force
levels. We also met with officials at the U.S. Mission to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to discuss force levels in the
Balkans.
Results in Brief:
The military services received a combination of funding provided in the
DOD appropriations act for fiscal year 2002 and money remaining in
previously funded contingency fund accounts. The services also took
steps to reduce costs in order to keep them in line with available
funding. The Army in Europe, which had the largest share of the Balkan
operations‘ costs, took a number of steps to reduce costs. Its
estimated costs for fiscal year 2002 fell by more than $500 million
between the time its original estimate was developed and July 2002.
This reduction was achieved through decisions to reduce the amount of
personnel and equipment in both Bosnia and Kosovo and other cost-
cutting measures, including reductions in contract costs under the
Army‘s Balkan Support Contract through improved contract management and
oversight. In the Balkans, the Air Force--which had the second largest
share of costs in the Balkans--reduced its expected costs by
$49 million, bringing costs to within $2 million of the funding
provided. In Southwest Asia, the services continue to estimate costs
above available funding. The Air Force and the Navy will each have to
absorb about $11 million in costs while the Army will have to absorb
less than $1 million within their respective overall fiscal year 2002
appropriation for operation and maintenance (which funds these costs).
These amounts represent less than 1 percent of those appropriations.
Both NATO and DOD plan to reduce troop levels in the Balkans during
fiscal year 2003, which may reduce funding needs during the year. The
Army in Europe anticipates an overall reduction of 1,160 troops during
fiscal year 2003. The Army in Europe‘s fiscal year 2003 cost estimate
of $1.251 billion is based on a troop strength of 6,140 soldiers. This
estimate is slightly higher than the Army in Europe‘s fiscal year 2002
cost estimate of $1.227 billion, which was based on 7,300 troops. Army
in Europe officials recognize that their $1.251 billion estimate for
fiscal year 2003 is too high and are working on a revised estimate.
Army headquarters has told the Army in Europe to expect $1.059 billion
in funding. Army in Europe officials have told us--and we agree--that a
decline in troop strength does not necessarily correspond to an equal
reduction in costs, but given the large anticipated reduction in troop
levels, we would expect a decrease in estimated costs for fiscal year
2003. According to the Army, the fiscal year 2003 budget request was
developed from an already reduced fiscal year 2002 appropriation level
and that any further reduction in the fiscal year 2003 level would pose
a funding challenge. Army headquarters and Army in Europe officials are
working to narrow the difference between the planned funding level and
estimated costs.
In official oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
the facts presented in our report. However, the Army noted that its
fiscal year 2003 budget proposal is already constrained and expressed
concern that the report suggests that the Army plans to migrate any
available contingency operations funds to cover other Army budget
needs. We are not suggesting that the Army plans to migrate any
available Balkan funds. However, since Balkan funding is included in
the Army‘s overall operation and maintenance budget, should savings
from reduced troop levels materialize in excess of the Army‘s Balkan
budget needs, any such savings could be used to address other needs
within the Army‘s operation and maintenance budget. A detailed
discussion of DOD‘s comments and our response is contained in the body
of this report.
Background:
During fiscal year 2002, U.S. military forces participated in a number
of contingency operations, and Congress appropriated funds to cover
DOD‘s costs. Contingency operations for fiscal year 2002 included
efforts to combat terrorism as well as contingency operations in the
Balkans and Southwest Asia. Operations in these latter two areas
accounted for 17 percent of DOD‘s reported contingency costs for
fiscal year 2002 through May 2002, the latest available data. The bulk
of the costs have been incurred in combating terrorism.
In the Balkans, the United States was first engaged in Bosnia and then
in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo. U.S. involvement in Bosnia began
in July 1992 as part of humanitarian relief efforts. Then, in April
1993, the United States began to participate in NATO‘s enforcement of a
no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of United Nations
peacekeeping. In December 1995, the United States deployed military
personnel in and around Bosnia to assist in implementing the General
Framework Agreement (also known as the ’Dayton Agreement“). Since then,
the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Bosnia has steadily
declined from about 18,000 troops in February 1996 to about
2,500 troops in July 2002.
In March 1999, the United States provided military forces in support of
NATO‘s combat operations against Yugoslavia following the failure of
peace talks and escalating violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
Combat operations officially ended on June 20, 1999. With Yugoslavia‘s
acceptance of a peace plan and the United Nations‘ endorsement of a
plan, the United States began providing troops for the NATO-led Kosovo
force, whose mission is peace enforcement in Kosovo. The United States
is currently providing 5,000 troops as part of the NATO force. In
addition, the United States has about 400 troops in the Republic of
Macedonia to operate a staging base for U.S. troops entering and
departing Kosovo. From the inception of operations through May 2002,
Balkan costs have totaled $19.5 billion.
U.S. forces have been involved in enforcing the no-fly zone over parts
of Iraq since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The U.S. force
involved has on average comprised about 20,000 troops, many of them
Navy and Marine Corps personnel deployed on ships. Beginning in
December 1998, the United States conducted low-level air strikes
against Iraq, first in support of the United Nations‘ weapons of mass
destruction inspection efforts and then in response to Iraqi attempts
to target allied aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones. From the
inception of operations through May 2002, Southwest Asia costs have
totaled $10.2 billion.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. military
forces began military operations to combat terrorism. These operations
fall into two categories--defense of the United States and overseas
operations, principally in Central Asia to date. More than 148,000
military personnel were involved in these operations as of July/
August 2002. Through May 2002, DOD‘s reported costs for these efforts
totaled $11.1 billion.
Within budget and appropriations accounts, operation and maintenance
costs account for the majority of all contingency operations costs. In
fiscal years 2000 and 2001 combined, operation and maintenance costs
accounted for 87 percent of the total; military personnel costs
accounted for the remaining 13 percent. During fiscal year 2002 through
May 2002, operation and maintenance costs accounted for 65 percent of
the total; military personnel costs accounted for the balance of the
costs.[Footnote 2] Operation and maintenance funds are used for a
variety of purposes, including the transportation of personnel, goods,
and equipment; unit operating support costs; and intelligence,
communications, and logistics support. Military personnel accounts fund
the pay and allowances of mobilized reservists as well as special
payments or allowances for all qualifying military personnel, such as
Imminent Danger Pay and Family Separation Allowance.
The method for funding operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia
changed in fiscal year 2002. Prior to fiscal year 2002, Congress
appropriated funds both directly to the services‘ appropriations
accounts and to the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund
(OCOTF).[Footnote 3] DOD transferred funds in the OCOTF to the
services‘ appropriations accounts as operations unfolded during the
year. Any funds remaining in the fund at the end of the fiscal year
were carried over to the next fiscal year. We reported in May 2002 that
limited guidance and oversight, combined with a lack of cost-
consciousness, contributed to some questionable expenditures of
contingency funds.[Footnote 4] Beginning in fiscal year 2002, DOD
proposed that the funding for its Southwest Asia operations be provided
directly to the services‘ appropriations accounts. Congress not only
directly appropriated funds to the services‘ appropriations accounts
for the U.S. operations in Southwest Asia, but directly appropriated
funds for the operations in the Balkans as well. Congress also
significantly reduced funding for contingency operations to encourage
the services to spend funds more efficiently and effectively.
In the case of new, expanded, or otherwise unfunded operations, costs
are not budgeted in advance. DOD must use funds appropriated for other
activities that are planned for later in the fiscal year. If these
funds are not replenished through supplemental appropriations or the
reprogramming of funds from other sources, the services have to absorb
the costs within their regular appropriations.
Balkans and Southwest Asia Funding for Fiscal Year 2002:
The military services received a combination of funding provided by the
DOD appropriations act for fiscal year 2002 and funds that remained in
the OCOTF. For Balkan operations, the amount that Congress appropriated
was $650 million less than the amount requested in the President‘s
budget. For Southwest Asia operations, requested funding was included
in the military services‘ overall accounts. The services collectively
received about $24 million less in funding than they had estimated was
needed. In response to the reduction in funding, the military services
took steps to reduce costs in order to keep costs in line with
available funding, although they will have to absorb some costs related
to operations in both the Balkans and Southwest Asia. The proportion of
costs that will have to be absorbed represents less than 1 percent of
each of the services‘ appropriation for operation and maintenance.
Cost Cutting Played an Important Role in Managing Balkan Costs:
The services took important cost-cutting steps to meet reduced funding
levels in fiscal year 2002. Funding for Balkan operations was reduced
by $650 million in fiscal year 2002 and was appropriated directly into
the services‘ military personnel and operation and maintenance
accounts. The services were generally funded at the amounts requested
for military personnel and less than requested for operation and
maintenance.[Footnote 5] The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its
report on DOD‘s appropriations for fiscal year 2002, suggested that
providing funds directly into the services‘ accounts would lead to
better accountability and the elimination of redundant and questionable
costs.[Footnote 6] Subsequently, Congress appropriated funds for
contingency operations directly into the services‘ accounts as part of
their base programs.
The Army, which had the largest share of Balkan costs, received the
largest funding reduction. Within the Army, the Army in Europe, which
is responsible for paying the bulk of the Balkan operations‘ costs,
started fiscal year 2002 with a large gap between its estimated cost
and the funding that the Department of the Army told it to expect.
Specifically, prior to the beginning of fiscal year 2002 (in
July 2001), the Army in Europe estimated that its Balkan operations
would cost $1.458 billion, but it was told to expect funding of
$1.152 billion with a promise of an additional $150 million later in
fiscal year 2002.
To address the reduced funding, the Army in Europe took a number of
steps to reduce costs. We previously reported that the Army in Europe
in April 2001 provided us with its revised cost estimate for
fiscal year 2002, which reflected as much as a $284 million decline in
costs from DOD‘s initial budget estimate because of a variety of
factors. The reduction reflected a reduction in the amount of personnel
and equipment in both Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as declines in other
costs, including those for contractors and airlift services in Kosovo.
Additional troop and heavy-equipment reductions, and improved contract
management and oversight of the Army‘s Balkan Support Contract, allowed
the Army in Europe in July 2002 to further reduce its fiscal year 2002
estimate for Balkan operations by $231 million from its July 2001
estimate for fiscal year 2002. This included action on our previous
report finding involving the Army in Europe‘s counting airlift costs
twice--directly paying the Air Force for airlift charges and including
transportation costs on travel orders.[Footnote 7] Army in Europe
officials stated that correcting this double obligation of airlift
billing charges reduced costs.
The remaining $75 million difference between the Army in Europe‘s
July 2002 estimate of $1.227 billion and the $1.152 billion in funding
it had initially been told to expect will have to be covered by using
funds planned for other activities within existing Army programs. In
early September 2002, an Army headquarters budget official told us that
the Army was still working to identify a source for the needed funds.
The Army‘s Forces Command, which is responsible for Army units and
facilities in the continental United States and Puerto Rico, also
started fiscal year 2002 with a large gap between its estimated cost
and the funding the Department of the Army told it to expect.
Specifically, Forces Command‘s original fiscal year 2002 estimate for
Balkan operations was $169 million, but it was told to expect funding
of $65.7 million. By February 2002, Forces Command had reduced its
estimate to $116.3 million on the basis of its cost experience. In
August 2002, Forces Command told us that it would reduce its costs to
the $65 million in available funding as a result of continued analysis
of initial estimates and actual costs.
The Air Force, which had the second largest share of Balkan costs,
received $51 million less than its estimated costs of about
$174 million. In August 2002, the Air Force told us that it had reduced
its cost estimate for fiscal year 2002 by $49 million. This brought the
estimate closer to available funding. One example of cost reduction
involves the Air Force in Europe, which told us that its cost estimate
had fallen by about $6 million as a result of savings achieved from
consolidating U-2 aircraft operations and closing San Vito Air Base in
Italy.
Services Will Have to Absorb Some Southwest Asia Costs:
In fiscal year 2002, funds for Southwest Asia operations were also
appropriated directly into the military services‘ accounts as part of
their base programs, and traditionally any shortfall in funding would
have to be absorbed by the services. The services received less funding
than they had originally estimated in costs, but the gap was not as
great as that for the Balkans. Within the estimates, costs for military
personnel were funded as requested, but funding for operation and
maintenance was below the estimates, as shown in table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of Services‘ Operation and Maintenance Budget
Estimates and Funding Provided for Southwest Asia Operations, Fiscal
Year 2002:
Dollars in millions.
Service: Army; Original estimate: $249.5; Funding provided:
$207.4; Current estimate: $208.3; Difference between
funding and current estimate: ($.9).
Service: Air Force; Original estimate: 657.5;Funding provided:
636.1; Current estimate: 646.9; Difference between funding and
current estimate: (10.8).
Service: Navy; Original estimate: 232.0; Funding provided:
220.1; Current estimate: 232.0; Difference between funding and
current estimate: (11.9).
Source: Developed by GAO from DOD‘s data.
[End of table]
The services continue to estimate costs above available funding and in
the past have had to absorb these costs within their overall operation
and maintenance budget. The Army has reduced its estimated shortfall to
less than $1 million, and the Air Force has reduced its estimated
shortfall to $10.8 million. The Navy continues to estimate costs at its
original level and so continues to have a shortfall of $11.9 million.
The shortfalls represent less than 1 percent of the services‘ operation
and maintenance appropriations for fiscal year 2002.[Footnote 8]
Plans to Further Reduce Balkans Force Levels May Reduce Fiscal Year
2003 Funding Needs:
Both NATO and DOD plan to reduce troop levels in the Balkans during
fiscal year 2003, which may reduce funding needs to support Balkan
operations during the year. The military services included funding for
the Balkans in their base program funding input for the President‘s
fiscal year 2003 budget, which was submitted to Congress in February
2002. According to the budget justification data provided with the
President‘s budget, the Army stated that there would be a $32.1 million
decrease for Balkan operations, reflecting reductions in supplies,
fuel, equipment, and contract support. The Air Force included an
increase of $18.8 million for operations in Bosnia, including Operation
Joint Forge (peacekeeping in Bosnia) and Operation Deliberate Forge
(enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia).
Since February 2002, when the President‘s budget was submitted,
NATO has agreed to reduce force levels, which could reduce costs. In
the spring of 2002, NATO approved a reduction in total multinational
force troop strength in Bosnia to approximately 12,000 troops. This is
a decline of about 4,700 from the approximately 16,700 troops that were
stationed there as of July 23, 2002. The reduction is scheduled for
completion by December 2002. NATO also approved a reduction in
multinational troop strength in Kosovo to approximately 29,000 troops.
This is a decline of about 3,800 from the approximately 32,800 troops
that were stationed in Kosovo as of July 23, 2002. These changes will
occur between August 2002 and June 2003. NATO has not made any
decisions regarding troop reductions by donor countries. However,
officials at the U.S. Mission to NATO told us that they expected
U.S. force levels to decline as part of the overall reduction and that
U.S. forces would remain at about 15 percent of the total NATO force.
On the basis of the overall troop strength reduction, we estimate that
this could translate into a reduction of about 1,269 U.S. military
personnel during fiscal year 2003.
The Army in Europe was directed by the U.S. European Command[Footnote
9] to reduce troop levels in the Balkans to levels slightly below those
envisioned by our pro rata estimate of the U.S. share of the NATO-
directed reduction. However, on the basis of July 2002 information that
we were provided with, the reduction does not appear to have lowered
anticipated costs. As shown in table 2, the overall reduction totals
1,160 troops (from 7,300 to 6,140 troops) and is to take place between
September and November 2002. It also includes a reduction in heavy
equipment, such as tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and helicopters.
The Army in Europe‘s budget estimate for its Balkan operations is
$1.251 billion in fiscal year 2003 and is based on the reduced troop
level. The decision to reduce force levels was made after submission of
the President‘s budget for the fiscal year 2003 appropriation for DOD.
The budget estimate for fiscal year 2003 is slightly higher than the
Army in Europe‘s July 2002 estimate of its fiscal year 2002 costs.
However, the cost estimate for fiscal year 2002 is based on higher
troop levels.
Table 2: Comparison of the Army in Europe‘s Budget Estimates for Fiscal
Years 2002 and 2003:
Dollars in billions.
Fiscal year: 2002; End of year troop level: 7,300; Budget estimate:
$1.227.
Fiscal year: 2003; End of year troop level: 6,140; Budget estimate:
1.251.
Source: Developed by GAO from the Army in Europe‘s data.
[End of table]
In discussing the budget estimate with Army in Europe officials, we
were told that they recognize that their $1.251 billion estimate for
fiscal year 2003 is too high and that they are working on a revised
estimate. These officials believe that their estimate for fiscal year
2003 will fall below their estimate for fiscal year 2002. To complete
their revised estimate, they are working with their planners on the
timing of any troop reduction, the impact that the reduction will have
on the number of base camps, whether any offsetting contracts will need
to be awarded to maintain some mission capability, and the support and
overhead that can be eliminated. Army in Europe officials told us--and
we agree--that a decline in troop strength does not necessarily
correspond to an equal reduction in costs. However, given the large
anticipated reduction in troop levels, we would expect a decrease in
estimated costs for fiscal year 2003.
Regarding funding, Army headquarters has told the Army in Europe to
expect $1.059 billion in funding. Army headquarters and Army in Europe
officials are working to narrow the difference between the planned
funding level and estimated costs. An Army headquarters budget
official told us that the fiscal year 2003 budget request was developed
from the already reduced fiscal year 2002 appropriation level and that
any further reduction in the fiscal year 2003 level would pose a
funding challenge.
Conclusion:
Reductions in the number of troops in the Balkans, to the extent not
reflected in the President‘s budget for fiscal year 2003, have the
potential to reduce costs for fiscal year 2003 below the requested
funding level. Army officials believe that their fiscal year 2003
budget proposal is already constrained. However, to the extent that
savings are realized from reduced troop levels, we believe any such
savings could relieve that constraint or make additional funds
available for other Army budget needs if Congress appropriates the full
amount requested by the President.
Agency Comments and Our Response:
In official oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
the facts presented in our report. However, the Army noted that its
fiscal year 2003 budget proposal is already constrained and expressed
concern that the report suggests that the Army plans to migrate any
available contingency operations funds to cover other Army budget
needs. We noted in the report that the Army‘s fiscal year 2003 budget
request was developed from the already reduced fiscal year 2002
appropriation level. We further noted that the Army believes that any
further reduction in the fiscal year 2003 level would pose a funding
challenge. We have concluded that to the extent savings are realized
from reduced troop levels, any such savings could relieve that
constraint or make additional funds available for other Army budget
needs. We agree that to the extent savings are realized from reduced
troop levels it could and should relieve any overall Balkan budget
constraints for fiscal year 2003. We are not suggesting that the Army
plans to migrate any available Balkan funds. However, since Balkan
funding is included in the Army‘s overall operation and maintenance
budget, should savings from reduced troop levels materialize in excess
of the Army‘s Balkan budget needs, any such savings could be used to
address other needs within the Army‘s operation and maintenance budget.
Scope and Methodology:
To examine funding for Balkan and Southwest Asia operations in
fiscal year 2002, we obtained records and conducted interviews at the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as at the Departments of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. We used the data obtained to compare
original budget estimates, funding provided, and more current budget
estimates. To ascertain steps taken to reduce costs, we held
discussions with and reviewed data provided by officials in the
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
To examine the outlook for funding operations in the Balkans during
fiscal year 2003, we (1) reviewed the President‘s fiscal year 2003
budget request and supporting budget documentation and (2) obtained
budget estimates from key service elements involved in Balkan
operations, particularly the Army in Europe. We obtained information on
any changes in force levels planned for fiscal year 2003 from both the
Army in Europe and the U.S. Mission to NATO. We then compared the force
levels used in preparing the President‘s budget request for fiscal year
2003 with any subsequent decisions to reduce force levels since the
President‘s budget was submitted to Congress.
We visited the following locations during our review:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Washington, D.C.
* Department of the Army, headquarters, Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga.
* U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg, Germany.
* Department of the Air Force, headquarters, Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Air Force Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
* Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
* Department of the Navy, headquarters, Washington, D.C.
* U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium.
We performed our work from February through September 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller); and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Copies of this report will also be made available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please call me on
(757) 552-8100. Principal contributors to this report were Steve
Sternlieb, Donna Rogers, Frank Bowen, and Shamik Ghosh.
Sincerely yours,
Neal P. Curtin
Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Neal P. Curtin:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Location of the Department of Defense‘s Major Contingency
Operations in Fiscal Year 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Developed by GAO from the Department of Defense‘s data.
[End of figure]
FOOTNOTES
[1] ’Incremental costs“ means those directly attributable costs that
would not have been incurred if it were not for the operation. It
should be recognized that DOD‘s financial systems capture total
obligations only and that the services use various management
information systems to identify incremental obligations and to estimate
costs. Although we use the term ’costs“ throughout this report as a
convenience, we are actually referring to DOD‘s obligation of funds.
[2] Military personnel costs represented a larger share of the overall
costs in fiscal year 2002 because of the large number of reservists
(more than 75,000) activated to combat terrorism.
[3] OCOTF was established by the DOD appropriations act for fiscal year
1997 to meet operational requirements in support of emerging
contingency operations without disrupting approved program execution or
force readiness. The OCOTF later became a ’no year“ transfer account in
order to provide additional flexibility to meet operational
requirements by transferring the funding to the military components on
the basis of actual budget execution experience as events unfold during
the year of execution.
[4] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Budget: Need to
Strengthen Guidance and Oversight of Contingency Operations Costs, GAO-
02-450 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2002).
[5] Subsequently the Office of the Secretary of Defense transferred
$51.4 million from the OCOTF to the Army to cover higher reserve
military personnel costs because of a decision to use more reserve
soldiers in the Balkans.
[6] S. Rep. No. 107-109 at 53 (2001).
[7] See GAO-02-450.
[8] In the Fiscal Year 2002 Appropriation Act (P.L. 107-117), the Air
Force was appropriated $26 billion for operation and maintenance; the
Army, $22.3 billion; and the Navy, $26.9 billion.
[9] The European Command is the combatant command responsible for
Balkan operations.
GAO‘s Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO‘s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO‘s Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as ’Today‘s Reports,“ on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select ’Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly
released products“ under the GAO Reports heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street NW,
Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.
General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.
20548:
