Force Structure
Review of B-1B Process Identifies Opportunity to Improve Future Analysis Gao ID: GAO-02-846 September 6, 2002The B-1B began operations in 1986 as a long-range heavy bomber designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Although the B-1B's nuclear mission was withdrawn in October 1997, the Air Force continues to rely on the B-1B to support conventional wartime missions. The B-1B has the largest payload of the Air Force's three bombers, and recent modifications have provided the capability to deliver near precision munitions. Future upgrades to the B-1B are expected to provide greater flexibility by enabling it to carry three different types of bombs simultaneously and eliminate some of its long-term survivability and maintainability problems by improving its radar warning systems, jamming ability, and other electronic countermeasures. In May 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense suggested retiring the entire B-1B fleet by October 2001. In June 2001, the Air Force proposed an alternative that reduced the B-1B fleet from 93 to 60 aircraft and consolidated them at two active duty locations instead of the three active duty and two National Guard locations that housed the aircraft. Congress delayed implementation of the fleet reduction until the Air Force completed a review of bomber force structure and provided a report on alternative missions and basing plans. The Air Force began consolidating the fleet in July 2002. GAO found that Air Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a reduction in B-1B bombers from 93 to 60 would affect the Department of Defense's ability to meet wartime requirements. Nor did they complete a comprehensive analysis of potential basing options to know whether they were choosing the most cost-effective alternative. A comparison of active and Guard units' missions, flying hour costs, and capabilities showed that active and Guard units were responsible for substantially the same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour costs and higher mission-capable rates than their active duty counterparts. Additionally, the Guard's B-1B aircrew members were generally more experienced, in terms of the number of hours flown, than the active duty B-1B aircrews because most Guard aircrew members served on active duty prior to joining the Air National Guard.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-02-846, Force Structure: Review of B-1B Process Identifies Opportunity to Improve Future Analysis
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United States General Accounting Office:
Report to the Honorable Max Cleland, U.S. Senate:
GAO:
September 2002:
FORCE STRUCTURE:
Review of B-1B Process Identifies Opportunity to Improve Future
Analysis:
Force Structure:
GAO-02-846:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Decision to Reduce and Consolidate the B-1Bs Based on Budget Concerns,
Military Judgment, and Incomplete Cost Estimates:
Guard B-1B Units Have Similar Missions, Lower Flying Hour Costs and Are
at Least as Capable as Active Units:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: B-1B Force Structure Before and After Consolidation:
Table 2: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B Flying
Hour Costs for Fiscal Years 1999-2001:
Table 3: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B
Depot-Level Reparables Cost per Flying Hour:
Table 4: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B
Consumable Supplies Cost per Flying Hour:
Table 5: Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B Pilot Experience
Levels:
Table 6: Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B Weapon Systems Officer
Experience Levels:
Figure:
Figure 1: Air National Guard and Active Duty B-1B Mission Capable Rates
(Fiscal Years 1999-2001):
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
Letter:
September 6, 2002:
The Honorable Max Cleland
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Cleland:
The B-1B began operations in 1986 as a long-range heavy bomber designed
primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Although the B-1B‘s nuclear
mission was withdrawn in October 1997,[Footnote 1] the Air Force
continues to rely on the B-1B to support conventional wartime missions.
The B-1B, equipped with three weapons bays, has the largest payload of
the Air Force‘s three bombers,[Footnote 2] and recent modifications
have provided the capability to deliver near precision munitions.
Future upgrades to the B-1B are expected to provide greater flexibility
by enabling it to carry three different types of bombs simultaneously
and eliminate some of its long-term survivability and maintainability
problems by improving its radar warning systems, jamming ability, and
other electronic countermeasure systems.
In May 2001, as part of a broader Department of Defense (DOD)
initiative to make funds available to further military transformation,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) suggested retiring the
entire B-1B fleet by October 2001. In June 2001, the Air Force proposed
an alternative that reduced the B-1B fleet from 93 to 60 aircraft and
consolidated them at 2 active duty locations instead of the 3 active
duty and 2 Air National Guard (Guard) locations that housed the
aircraft. Congress delayed implementation of the fleet reduction until
the Air Force completed a review of bomber force structure and provided
a report on alternative missions and basing plans.[Footnote 3] The
report was delivered to Congress on February 6, 2002, and after a 15-
day period, the Air Force had the authority to begin implementing the
fleet reduction and consolidation. The Air Force began consolidating
the fleet in July 2002.
In July 2001, you asked that we review the Air Force decision to reduce
and consolidate the B-1B fleet. Subsequent to your request, the Air
Force submitted the required report to Congress, and your office asked
that we document and analyze the process used to make the reduction and
consolidation decision so that the insights gained might assist those
who make force structure and basing decisions in the future. As agreed,
we determined what types of analysis DOD and the Air Force did of
wartime requirements and basing options before deciding on the number
of aircraft to retain and where to base them. Additionally, at your
request, we compared the missions, flying hour costs,[Footnote 4] and
selected capabilities of the various active and Air National Guard B-1B
units.
We reviewed documentation related to the B-1B force restructuring and
met with representatives of OSD, the Joint Staff, the Air Force, and
the Air National Guard to determine how the Air Force made its
decision. We obtained and analyzed data for flying hour costs and
mission capable rates for fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001 for all of
the B-1B units and obtained data on aircrew experience for both Air
National Guard and active duty aircrews. Additionally, we visited three
of the five B-1B units. We conducted our review from September 2001
through July 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. We discuss our scope and methodology in more detail
in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Air Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a
reduction in B-1B bombers from 93 to 60 would affect DOD‘s ability to
meet wartime requirements. Nor did they complete a comprehensive
analysis of potential basing options to know whether they were choosing
the most cost-effective alternative. Air Force officials explained that
their proposal to reduce the fleet from 93 to 60 was made in response
to an Office of the Secretary of Defense suggestion to eliminate the
entire B-1B fleet and to address significant funding shortages in the
B-1B modification program. Senior Air Force officials further explained
that they are comfortable with this decision because, based on their
military judgment, a smaller, fully modified B-1B fleet will provide
more capability than a larger fleet with no additional modifications.
However, the decision was not vetted through established DOD budget
processes that normally involve a wider range of participants and
generally allow more time for analysis of how proposed force structure
changes will affect DOD‘s ability to meet wartime requirements.
Furthermore, Air Force headquarters officials appear to have used an
inconsistent methodology and incomplete cost estimates when considering
options for basing the remaining aircraft. As a result, the Air Force
understated the potential savings for some options, and it lacks
assurance that the basing option selected, which consolidates the B-1Bs
in the active component, is the most cost-effective option available.
In the absence of standard guidance for analyzing basing alternatives,
similar problems could occur in the future.
Our comparison of active and Guard units‘ missions, flying hour costs,
and capabilities showed that active and Guard units were responsible
for substantially the same missions but Guard units had lower flying
hour costs and higher mission capable rates[Footnote 5] than their
active duty counterparts. For example, during fiscal years 1999 through
2001, the Guard‘s B-1B units averaged both lower flying hour costs and
higher mission capable rates than the active duty units, although the
gap between active and Guard mission capable rates narrowed in
fiscal year 2001. Additionally, the Guard‘s B-1B aircrew
members[Footnote 6] were generally more experienced, in terms of the
number of hours flown, than the active duty B-1B aircrews because most
Guard aircrew members served on active duty prior to joining the Air
National Guard.
To provide an analytical basis for future aircraft realignment
decisions, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to develop a methodology for assessing and
comparing the costs of active and reserve units when evaluating
potential basing options.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with our
recommendation that the Air Force develop a methodology for assessing
and comparing costs because the department believes that such a
methodology currently exists. However, DOD‘s written comments did not
describe the methodology or provide any evidence that such a
methodology exists and Air Force officials told us the Air Force does
not have a standard methodology. A detailed discussion of DOD‘s
comments and our response is included in the Agency Comments section of
this report.
Background:
In a March 1999 white paper[Footnote 7] detailing modernization plans
for the bomber fleet, the Air Force advised Congress that it needed 93
B-1Bs, including 70 combat-coded aircraft[Footnote 8] by the end of
fiscal year 2004, to meet DOD‘s strategy of being prepared to win two
nearly simultaneous major theater wars. In June 2001, the Air Force
proposed reducing the fleet from 93 to 60 aircraft and reducing the
number of combat-coded aircraft to 36. Table 1 compares the force
structure before and after OSD‘s June 2001 decision to reduce and
consolidate the B-1B fleet.
Table 1: B-1B Force Structure Before and After Consolidation:
Base: Active duty: Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; Before consolidation:
Number: 40 B-1Bs; Before consolidation: Type: 12 combat; 24
training[A]; 4 backup[B]; After consolidation: Number: 32 B-1Bs; After
consolidation: Type: 12 combat; 16 training; 2 test; 2 backup.
Base: Active duty: Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; Before
consolidation: Number: 26 B-1Bs; Before consolidation: Type: 18 combat;
6 training; 2 backup; After consolidation: Number: 26 B-1Bs; After
consolidation: Type: 24 combat; 2 backup.
Base: Active duty: Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho; Before
consolidation: Number: 7 B-1Bs; Before consolidation: Type: 6 combat; 1
backup; After consolidation: Number: 0 B-1Bs[C]; After consolidation:
Type: [Empty].
Base: Active duty: Edwards Air Force Base, California; Before
consolidation: Number: 2 B-1Bs; Before consolidation: Type: 2 test;
After consolidation: Number: 2 B-1Bs; After consolidation: Type: 2
test.
Air National Guard:
Base: Active duty: McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; Before
consolidation: Number: 9 B-1Bs; Before consolidation: Type: 8 combat; 1
backup; After consolidation: Number: 0 B-1Bs[C]; After consolidation:
Type: [Empty].
Base: Active duty: Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; Before
consolidation: Number: 9 B-1Bs; Before consolidation: Type: 8 combat; 1
backup; After consolidation: Number: 0 B-1Bs[C]; After consolidation:
Type: [Empty].
Base: Active duty: Total: 93 B-1Bs; Before
consolidation: Number: 93 B-1Bs; Before consolidation: Type: [Empty];
After consolidation: Number: 60 B-1Bs; After consolidation: Type:
[Empty].
[A] These aircraft are used to train newly qualified pilots as B-1B
pilots.
[B] Backup aircraft are located at each unit and are used when a
primary aircraft is not available.
[C] Units affected received new missions as discussed below.
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Combat Command.
[End of table]
Partly in response to concerns expressed by Members of Congress
about OSD‘s June 2001 decision to eliminate the B-1B mission at
Mountain Home, McConnell, and Robins Air Force Bases, the Air Force
identified and announced new missions for these locations in September
2001. Planning for the new missions is well underway, and the units are
expected to transition to their new missions in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2002. Mountain Home‘s current F-15E squadron will be
increased from 18 to 24 aircraft, and its 7 KC-135 tankers will be
relocated to the Air National Guard unit at McConnell Air Force Base.
The Air National Guard unit at McConnell will be redesignated as the
184th Air Refueling Wing and will have 10 KC-135R tankers. The Guard
unit at Robins Air Force Base will transition to the 116th Air Control
Wing and have 19 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
aircraft.
As you know, we have issued numerous reports on the B-1B bomber in
response to a variety of congressional concerns. In February 1998, for
example, we reported that the Air Force could save millions of dollars
without reducing mission capability by assigning more B-1Bs to the
reserve component.[Footnote 9] A list of related GAO products can be
found at the end of this report.
Decision to Reduce and Consolidate the B-1Bs Based on Budget Concerns,
Military Judgment, and Incomplete Cost Estimates:
The decision to reduce the B-1B force was not based on a formal
analysis of how a smaller B-1B force would impact DOD‘s ability to meet
wartime requirements. Air Force officials explained that their decision
to reduce the fleet from 93 to 60 was made in response to an OSD
suggestion to eliminate the entire B-1B fleet and to address
significant funding shortages in the B-1B modification program.
Furthermore, the decision was not vetted through established DOD budget
processes that normally involve a wider range of participants and
generally allow more time for analysis of proposed changes. Senior Air
Force officials believe, based on their military judgment, that the
decision will not adversely affect DOD‘s ability to implement the
national security strategy. With regard to the Air Force‘s analysis of
basing alternatives, a lack of Air Force guidance led Air Force
officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and
Programs to develop their own methodology to determine where to base
the reduced B-1B fleet. These officials did not document their
methodology at the time the decision was made and could not replicate
the calculations used to make the basing decision. However, our review
of documents prepared (at our request) after the decision was made
suggests the Air Force used an inconsistent methodology and incomplete
costs when estimating the savings generated from the consolidation. As
a result, it is not clear whether they chose the most cost-effective
alternative.
Decision to Reduce the B-1B Fleet Was Based on Budget Considerations
Rather than Requirements Analysis:
In May 2001, as it considered changes to the fiscal year 2002 DOD
budget previously submitted to Congress by the prior administration,
senior OSD officials suggested eliminating the entire B-1B fleet that
had experienced long-standing survivability and reliability problems.
OSD officials in offices such as the Program Analysis and Evaluation
did not undertake any analysis of the impact of the proposed B-1B
retirements on the Air Force‘s ability to meet war-fighting
requirements. At that time, the OSD Comptroller estimated that
eliminating the B-1B would save approximately $4.5 billion in fiscal
years 2002 through 2007. The savings would be achieved by eliminating
the B-1Bs from both the active and Guard fleets and canceling the B-1B
modernization program, according to an official in the Comptroller‘s
office.
Acknowledging that it lacked sufficient funding to complete planned
upgrades to all 93 aircraft, but at the same time believing that some
B-1Bs should be retained, the Air Force proposed reducing the size of
the fleet from 93 to 60 and reinvesting the savings in upgrades to the
remaining 60 aircraft. According to the Secretary of the Air Force and
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the proposal was budget-driven.
The Chief of Staff told us that if the Air Force reduced the number of
aircraft to 60, it would have sufficient funds to upgrade the remaining
aircraft to make them more usable in combat. The Air Force did no
formal analysis of the impact of a smaller B-1B fleet on its ability to
meet current and future war-fighting requirements when it proposed this
reduction. Senior Air Force leaders told us that they are comfortable
with the proposed reduction because they believe that 60 upgraded
aircraft will provide significantly more capability in terms of
effectiveness, survivability, and maintainability than is available
today. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) included the
reduction in the amended 2002 DOD budget request after discussions with
the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
The decision to reduce the number of B-1Bs was not fully vetted through
the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Under established
DOD procedures, the service sends its budget to the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) where issue area experts review it.
Potential changes in the form of draft program budget decisions are
circulated to the services, the Joint Staff, the Director of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, and various assistant secretaries of defense
who are in a position to evaluate the impact of the potential budget
decisions on the national military strategy and the objectives of the
Secretary of Defense. Their comments are provided to the Comptroller
who considers them, finalizes the program budget decision, and forwards
it to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for signature. According to an
official in the Comptroller‘s office, in this instance, the Comptroller
approved the program budget decision that reduced and consolidated the
B-1B fleet after discussions with the Secretary of Defense and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. A draft program budget decision was not
circulated to the Office of the Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation, the Joint Staff, or the Air Force according to
representatives of these offices.
Air Force officials told us they were surprised when senior OSD
officials decided to implement the B-1B fleet reduction in June 2001.
While Air Force officials recommended reducing the fleet, they did not
know that the recommendation was to be included in the fiscal year 2002
amended budget until just a few days before OSD officials transmitted
the budget to Congress and made it public. These same officials told us
that they were also surprised that the consolidation was to be
implemented by October 1, 2001. They believed that they needed about 1
year to implement the decision.
As a result of the short time frame between the OSD decision to
implement the Air Force‘s proposal to reduce and consolidate the B-1Bs
and the release of the amended fiscal year 2002 budget, Air Force
officials told us the Air Force did not have time to:
* determine if the Guard units would get new missions and identify
those missions or:
* meet with Members of Congress from the affected states to explain the
decision.
The decision to reduce the fleet and complete the consolidation by
October 1, 2001, concerned Members of Congress. As a result, Congress
delayed implementation until the Air Force completed a review of bomber
force structure and provided information on alternative missions and
basing plans.[Footnote 10] According to the legislation, the Air Force
could begin implementing the fleet reduction and consolidation 15 days
after providing the required report to Congress. The report was
delivered to Congress in February 2002. Among other things, the report
provided a summary of the (1) Air Force‘s reasons for reducing the B-1B
fleet, (2) follow-on missions for the affected units, and (3) details
of the B-1B modernization program. The Air Force began relocating and
retiring B-1Bs in July 2002.
The Air Force Used Incomplete Cost Data When Deciding Where to Base the
Remaining B-1Bs:
Air Force officers in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
and Programs said they considered a number of basing options before
recommending that the remaining aircraft be consolidated at two active
duty bases. However, they did not document the options considered at
the time the decision was made and could not provide a comprehensive
list of options considered. In early 2002, at our request, they
prepared a paper that outlined some of the options they believed were
considered. According to the paper, the Air Force considered options
that would have consolidated the aircraft at:
* two active bases and one Guard base,
* one Guard base and one active base, or:
* two active duty bases.
The option selected continues to house B-1Bs at two active duty
bases--26 at Ellsworth Air Force Base and 32 at Dyess Air Force
Base.[Footnote 11] According to Air Force officials, they selected this
option because they believed it was the most cost-effective option
available. Specifically, they believed they would achieve significant
economies of scale by consolidating the aircraft at the two largest
B-1B bases, which were located in the active component.
Air Force headquarters staff told us they had no written guidance or
directives to assist them when they completed the cost analysis for
assessing where to locate the aircraft, and the officers at Air Force
headquarters responsible for evaluating basing options said they
received no guidance from their senior leaders. Consequently, they
developed their own approach for determining where the B-1Bs should be
retained. The Air Force did not document its methodology at the time
the consolidation decision was made but attempted to reconstruct it in
early 2002 at our request. At that time, however, Air Force officials
were unable to replicate the savings estimates they had developed or
provide a complete explanation of the methodology used to make the
basing decision.
Our review of the documentation provided to us by Air Force officials
in early 2002 suggests the Air Force may have used an inconsistent
methodology and incomplete costs when estimating potential savings for
various basing options. According to Air Force officials, for options
that stationed aircraft at both active and Guard locations, the
potential savings estimates were based solely on the anticipated
reductions in the cost of flying hours that would result from the
smaller B-1B force. Other operations and maintenance costs[Footnote 12]
that would have been saved by reducing the number of B-1Bs or
eliminating a B-1B unit were not included in the estimates for these
options. Such costs include depot maintenance, travel, and contractor
logistics support. However, for options that stationed the aircraft at
active bases only and eliminated both Guard units, Air Force officials
included the projected flying hour savings from the smaller fleet and
the Guard‘s B-1B nonflying hour operations and maintenance costs in the
savings estimates. Air Force officials could not explain why they
estimated the cost savings in this manner. However, they noted that
while they obtained complete operations and maintenance data for the
Guard units, they did not obtain similar data for the active units.
Using this methodology, the Air Force estimates for options that
included a mix of active and Guard units understated the savings that
could result from reducing and consolidating the fleet.
Air Force officials said they considered other factors when they
assessed the basing options. One factor was the impact that the
consolidation might have on the individual B-1B bases. Air Force
officials told us that they realized that they would have to select an
option that included Ellsworth Air Force Base because, without the
B-1B, Ellsworth would have no mission and the Air Force had no
authority to close the base. A second factor was the need to avoid
generating requirements for construction of new facilities since this
would reduce the potential savings from the consolidation and might
require the Air Force to seek construction funds from Congress. Several
other factors that could have been considered but were not include:
actual flying hour costs, mission capable rates, and aircrew experience
levels for the active and Guard units. According to Air Force
officials, the Air Force did not consider these factors because they
believed the active and Guard units had similar capabilities.
Guard B-1B Units Have Similar Missions, Lower Flying Hour Costs and Are
at Least as Capable as Active Units:
In comparing their assigned missions, flying hour costs, mission
capable rates, aircrew experience, and operational readiness
inspections, we found that Guard units (1) were assigned responsibility
for substantially the same types of missions as their active duty
counterparts, (2) had lower flying hour and higher mission capable
rates during fiscal years 1999-2001, and (3) had more experienced
crewmembers than the active duty units in terms of hours flown. We also
found that active and Guard units received similar scores in their most
recent operational readiness inspections.
Guard and Active Duty B-1B Units Have Similar Missions:
With the exception of an additional 24 hours to recall and mobilize
Guard personnel prior to deployment, the kinds of missions assigned
to Guard B-1B units and their active duty counterparts are
substantially the same. For example, the Guard and active duty units
have similar wartime mission responsibilities, and each of the B-1B
units is assigned to support either Central or Pacific theater
commanders during wartime. Additionally, during peacetime, both active
and Guard B-1B units are scheduled to be available to meet ongoing
contingency operation needs for 90 days every 15 months under the Air
Force‘s Aerospace Expeditionary Force concept.[Footnote 13] In the
past, however, the two Guard B-1B units have worked together to support
operational requirements during this period so that each unit is
responsible for a 45-day period rather than the full 90-day period,
which places less strain on volunteer Guardsmen and their employers.
Guard Flying Hour Costs Are Lower:
We compared the flying hour costs between active duty and Guard B-1B
units for fiscal years 1999-2001 and found that Guard costs averaged
about 27 percent lower than active duty costs. The Air Force calculates
flying hour costs by dividing the cost of fuel and parts by the number
of hours each unit flies the aircraft. Specifically, the Air Force
considers the cost of:
* aviation fuel, oil, and lubricants;
* depot-level reparables, which are expensive parts that can be fixed
and used again, such as hydraulic pumps, navigational computers,
engines, and landing gear; and:
* consumable supplies, which are inexpensive parts, such as nuts,
bolts, and washers, which are used and then discarded.
Table 2 shows the cost per flying hour for active and Air National
Guard B-1B units for fiscal years 1999-2001.
Table 2: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B Flying
Hour Costs for Fiscal Years 1999-2001:
Active duty; FY 1999: $14,163; FY 2000: $13,426; FY 2001: $15,818; 3-
year average: $14,486.
Air National Guard; FY 1999: 10,194; FY 2000: 10,997; FY 2001: 10,478;
3-year average: 10,530.
Difference; FY 1999: $3,969; FY 2000: $2,428; FY 2001: $5,340; 3-year
average: $3,956.
Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding.
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data provided by the Air Combat Command, the
Air National Guard Bureau, and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and
Mountain Home Air Force Bases.
[End of table]
Our analysis showed that the Guard‘s lower cost per flying hour was due
in large part to its significantly lower costs for depot-level
reparables (see table 3). The Guard attributed its lower reparables
costs to the higher experience levels of its maintenance personnel.
Apprentice mechanics in the Guard averaged over 10 years of military
experience compared to slightly more than 2 years of military
experience among apprentice active duty mechanics. Officials said that
more experienced maintenance personnel are often able to identify a
problem part and fix it at the unit, when appropriate, instead of
purchasing a replacement part from the Air Force supply system.
Table 3: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B
Depot-Level Reparables Cost per Flying Hour:
Active duty; FY 1999: $9,110; FY 2000: $9,219; FY 2001: $9,928; 3-year
average: $9,436.
Air National Guard; FY 1999: 5,704; FY 2000: 7,058; FY 2001: 5,271; 3-
year average: 5,992.
Difference; FY 1999: $3,406; FY 2000: $2,161; FY 2001: $4,656; 3-year
average: $3,444.
Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding.
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data provided by the Air Combat Command, the
Air National Guard Bureau, and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and
Mountain Home Air Force Bases.
[End of table]
Our analysis also showed that the lower costs of consumables in the
Guard also contributed to the lower flying hour costs[Footnote 14] (see
table 4). Guard officials said that they are able to keep the costs of
consumables down because their experienced maintenance crews are often
able to isolate, identify, and fix malfunctioning parts without pulling
multiple suspect parts off the aircraft. As a result, fewer consumable
supplies are used.
Table 4: Comparison of Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B
Consumable Supplies Cost per Flying Hour:
Active duty; FY 1999: $1,776; FY 2000: $1,819; FY 2001: $1,998; 3-year
average: $1,869.
Air National Guard; FY 1999: 1,160; FY 2000: 1,558; FY 2001: 1,324; 3-
year average: 1,334.
Difference; FY 1999: $616; FY 2000: $261; FY 2001: $674; 3-year
average: $536.
Note: Numbers may not calculate due to rounding.
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data provided by the Air Combat Command, the
Air National Guard Bureau, and Dyess, Ellsworth, Robins, McConnell, and
Mountain Home Air Force Bases.
[End of table]
Flying hour costs represent only a portion of the overall costs of
operating and maintaining B-1B bombers. Costs such as pilot training,
test equipment, and depot maintenance are not included in the flying
hour cost. As we noted earlier, the Air Force did not consider these
costs or the historical flying hour costs detailed previously when it
made its basing decision.
Guard B-1B Units Report Higher Mission Capable Rates:
The Guard‘s reported mission capable rates were higher than the active
duty‘s reported rates between fiscal year 1999 and 2001. The Air Force
designates a weapon system as mission capable when it can perform at
least one of its assigned combat missions. The mission capable rate
specifically measures the percentage of time a unit‘s aircraft are
available to meet at least one of its missions. On average, the Guard
units‘ B1-B fleet was available between 62 and 65 percent of the time
during fiscal years 1999 through 2001. During those same years, the
active duty mission capable rate performance averaged between 52 and 60
percent (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Air National Guard and Active Duty B-1B Mission Capable Rates
(Fiscal Years 1999-2001):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of data provided by the Air Combat Command; the
116th Bomb Wing, Robins Air Force Base; and the 184th Bomb Wing,
McConnell Air Force Base.
[End of figure]
According to Air Combat Command officials, the active duty units‘
mission capable rate gain in fiscal year 2001 was primarily due to (1)
increased aircraft availability following completion of an extensive
modification program and (2) improvements in the Air Force‘s inventory
of spare parts.
In the 2 years prior to fiscal year 2001, both active and Guard B-1Bs
underwent extensive modifications at the depot that improved the
aircraft‘s survivability and equipped the aircraft with more advanced
munitions. During this time, large portions of the B-1B fleet were at
the depot for extended periods. According to Air Combat Command
officials, active duty B-1B units experienced reduced mission capable
rates because maintaining a normal operating tempo with fewer aircraft
required each aircraft to be flown more frequently and resulted in more
wear and tear to each aircraft. However, the Guard units‘ mission
capable rates were less affected. Both Air Combat Command and Guard
unit officials agreed that during this time the higher experience
levels of Guard maintenance personnel and the Guard‘s lower operating
tempo lessened the impact of having large portions of the fleet at the
depot on the Guard units‘ mission capable rates. The Air Force
completed most of these modifications by the end of fiscal year 2000,
and the gap between the active and Guard mission capable rates narrowed
in fiscal year 2001.
According to Air Combat Command officials, the overall shortage of
spare parts experienced by the Air Force during the late 1990s also
negatively affected the active duty B-1B units‘ mission capable rates
prior to fiscal year 2001.[Footnote 15] Although increased funding led
to an improvement in the spare parts inventory by fiscal year 1999, it
took about 12 to 24 months for the improvements to be reflected in the
units‘ reported mission capable rates according to Air Staff officials.
According to Guard officials, Guard B-1B units were less affected by
the shortage of spare parts because their more experienced maintainers
could sometimes repair rather than replace problematic components.
Guard B-1B Aircrews Are Generally More Experienced Than Their Active
Duty Counterparts:
The Air National Guard‘s B-1B pilots and weapon systems officers are
generally more experienced than their active duty counterparts. The
Air Force designates aircrew members as ’experienced“ based on the
total number of flying hours they have accumulated both overall and in
the B-1B.[Footnote 16] A crewmember‘s experience level determines the
amount of training (i.e., flying hours and sorties) he or she is
required to complete each year, which, in turn, drives the unit‘s
overall flying hour program. For example, units with a higher number of
inexperienced aircrew members would require a higher allocation of
flying hours to meet training requirements each year.
In comparing the Guard and active B-1B aircrew experience levels, we
found that the majority of Air National Guard pilots were designated as
experienced. However, this was not the case for pilots assigned to
active operations squadrons at Dyess and Ellsworth. Table 5 shows the
percentage of experienced pilots by unit location.
Table 5: Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B Pilot Experience
Levels:
Unit location: Active units: Dyess; Number assigned: 56; Number
designated
experienced: 22; Percent experienced: 39.
Unit location: Active units: Ellsworth; Number assigned: 66; Number
designated
experienced: 30; Percent experienced: 45.
Unit location: Active units: Mountain Home; Number assigned: 23; Number
designated experienced: 12; Percent experienced: 52.
Air National Guard units:
Unit location: Active units: McConnell; Number assigned: 29; Number
designated
experienced: 25; Percent experienced: 86.
Unit location: Active units: Robins; Number assigned: 33; Number
designated
experienced: 24; Percent experienced: 73.
Note: Data shown are for operations units only; information for
training and test units is excluded. The three training and test units
each were staffed with 100-percent experienced pilots.
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Combat Command,
the 184th Bomb Wing, and the116th Bomb Wing.
[End of table]
Many of the Guard pilots also had other flying experience that enhanced
their ability to pilot the B-1B. For example, many had prior active
duty flying experience or flew other aircraft for the Guard. This
experience contributed to the pilots‘ overall qualifications, thereby
permitting them to be designated as experienced more quickly than their
active duty counterparts.
The picture was similar for the B-1B‘s weapon systems officers. For
example, more than 80 percent of the Air National Guard‘s weapons
system officers were considered experienced, while in the active
Air Force only about 40 percent were considered experienced. Like the
Guard pilots, most of the Guard‘s weapon systems officers also had
experience flying other military aircraft that enhanced their ability
in the B-1B. Table 6 shows the percentage of experienced weapon systems
officers by unit location.
Table 6: Active Duty and Air National Guard B-1B Weapon Systems Officer
Experience Levels:
Active units:
Unit location: Active units: Dyess; Number assigned: 54; Number
designated experienced: 20; Percent experienced: 37.
Unit location: Active units: Ellsworth; Number assigned: 61; Number
designated experienced: 25; Percent experienced: 41.
Unit location: Active units: Mountain Home; Number assigned: 22; Number
designated experienced: 10; Percent experienced: 45.
Air National Guard units:
Unit location: Active units: McConnell; Number assigned: 33; Number
designated experienced: 29; Percent experienced: 88.
Unit location: Active units: Robins; Number assigned: 31; Number
designated experienced: 29; Percent experienced: 94.
Note: Data shown are for operations units only; information for
training and test units is excluded. The three training and test units
each were staffed with 100-percent experienced weapon systems officers.
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Air Force‘s Air Combat
Command, 184th Bomb Wing, and 116th Bomb Wing.
[End of table]
Operational Readiness Inspections Yielded Similar Ratings for Active
and Guard B-1B Units:
The Air Force conducts periodic inspections of each of its operational
units to evaluate the unit‘s readiness to perform its wartime mission.
The readiness inspections, conducted by the Air Combat Command
Inspector General staff, are intended to create a realistic environment
for evaluating the units‘ sustained performance and contingency
response. The bomb units are evaluated in four major areas: initial
response, employment, mission support, and ability to survive and
operate in a hostile environment. The Guard B-1B units scored as high
or higher than did the active duty units in the most recent readiness
inspections. Specifically, the B-1B bomb units at two active locations
(Dyess and Ellsworth) and one Guard location (McConnell) each received
excellent ratings overall in their most recent inspections. The
Inspector General completed an inspection of Robins‘ initial response
capabilities in July 2001 and rated the unit as excellent. However, the
Inspector General did not complete its inspection of the three
remaining areas since the Air Force had already decided to remove the
B-1Bs from Robins. Additionally, the Mountain Home wing, which includes
B-1Bs, had not undergone an operational readiness inspection at the
time of our review.
Conclusions:
Major decisions involving force structure need to be supported by solid
analysis to document that a range of alternatives has been considered
and that the decision provides a cost-effective solution consistent
with the national defense strategy. DOD‘s Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting process establishes a consultation process for civilian and
military leaders to use in reviewing alternatives to the services‘
current force structure. However, the decision to reduce the B-1B did
not fully adhere to this process because key offices such as the Office
of Program Analysis and Evaluation and the Joint Staff did not have an
opportunity to review and comment on the proposal and conduct analysis
before it was approved. Moreover, although Air Force and OSD officials
are comfortable with the decision, based on their military judgment,
neither the Air Force nor OSD conducted any formal analysis to provide
data on how a range of B-1B force size alternatives would impact DOD‘s
ability to meet potential wartime requirements. By following its
established budget process more closely in the future and allowing
experts from various offices to review and analyze force structure
proposals, DOD could provide better assurance to Congress that future
force structure decisions are well-supported and are in the nation‘s
long-term interest.
In addition, the lack of an established Air Force methodology for
assessing the costs associated with potential basing options led
officials to use incomplete costs when estimating the projected savings
for some of the basing options considered. By focusing solely on flying
hour costs for some basing options, Air Force officials did not
consider other operations and maintenance savings that a reduction in
the number of aircraft or the number of B-1B units would generate. As a
result, the Air Force may have understated the cost savings of the
options that retained B-1Bs in both the Air National Guard and the
active components. A more structured cost estimating methodology would
ensure that that the Air Force considers all appropriate costs in
calculating the savings for future aircraft realignments.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To provide an analytical basis for future aircraft realignment
decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretary of the Air Force to develop a methodology for assessing and
comparing the costs of active and reserve units so that all potential
costs are fully considered when evaluating potential basing options and
making future basing decisions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree with
our recommendation that the Air Force develop a methodology for
assessing and comparing costs to evaluate basing options because it
believes that such a methodology exists. Furthermore, DOD believes that
the Air Force used a methodology that considered all costs as well as
noncost factors when it made its basing decision and that cost-
effectiveness, while an important criterion, should not be the sole
consideration in making basing decisions. DOD‘s comments are included
in this report as appendix II.
After we received DOD‘s comments, we asked the department to provide
documentation describing its methodology for comparing active and
reserve unit costs. DOD referred us to the instruction that outlines
its Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. This instruction
describes DOD‘s process for developing the department‘s overall plans
and budget; however, it does not identify a methodology for assessing
and comparing the costs associated with active and reserve units. DOD
also noted that the Air Force‘s Total Ownership Cost database
encompasses all cost factors related to active and reserve costs and
ensures that any comparison of active and reserve units is done
equitably. During our audit work, we assessed whether the Total
Ownership Cost database could be used to compare total operations costs
for B-1Bs located at Guard and active duty units. We determined,
however, that not all indirect costs for B-1B units in the Guard were
included in the database, making it impossible to compare the operating
costs of Guard and active units equitably. Therefore, we are retaining
our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Air Force to develop a methodology.
In commenting on our presentation of flying hour costs, DOD
acknowledged the Guard‘s lower flying hour costs, but it stated that
including additional costs would result in more comparable flying hour
costs for Guard and active duty units. DOD suggested using the direct
and indirect costs included in the Air Force‘s Total Ownership Cost
database to calculate flying hour costs. In conducting our analysis of
flying hour costs, we relied on the Air Force‘s definition. The Air
Force defines flying hour costs as the cost of fuel, depot-level
reparables, and consumable parts divided by the number of hours flown.
The Air Force does not include other costs such as software maintenance
costs, contractor support costs, or military personnel costs when it
calculates the cost per flying hour. DOD is correct when it states that
there are other costs associated with operating a B-1B and our report
recognizes that fact.
In commenting on our analysis of active and Guard mission capable
rates, DOD noted that the difference between active and Guard mission
capable rates is not solely attributable to the experience level of
Guard personnel. The department also noted that the Guard operates
newer model B-1B aircraft while the active duty units operate older
model aircraft and identified this as a factor contributing to lower
active duty rates. While we recognize that the oldest aircraft in the
fleet (1983 and 1984 models) are concentrated in the active units at
Dyess Air Force Base, our analysis shows that those aircraft constitute
only about one-third (33 percent) of Dyess‘ fleet and only about one-
fifth (or 20 percent) of the active B-1B fleet overall. Active units at
Ellsworth and Mountain Home operate newer 1985 and 1986 model aircraft-
-the same models as those operated by the two Guard units. While
aircraft age may have some effect on mission capable rates, we do not
believe, based on our analysis, that this effect is significant for the
B-1B force.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force, and interested congressional committees.
We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http:/
/www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions on this report or wish to
discuss these matters further, please call me on 202-512-4300. Key
contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Henry L. Hinton, Jr.:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine what types of analyses the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the Air Force did of wartime requirements and basing options before
deciding on the number of aircraft to retain and where to base them, we
obtained and analyzed the only contemporaneous documents that were
available from the Air Force--a briefing presented to the Secretary and
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on the fleet reduction and
consolidation and a memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force to
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) outlining the Air Force‘s
proposal to reduce and consolidate the fleet. Additionally, because the
Air Force had no documents explaining its methodology for evaluating
the various basing options it considered, we asked the Air Force, in
early 2002, to document its methodology. The Air Force provided us with
a statement explaining the methodology; however, it was unable to
provide us with the cost figures used to estimate the savings. As a
result, we could not verify the savings estimates that the Air Force
attributed to each option.
To supplement our document review, we interviewed several Air Force
officials who were located in the Washington, D.C., area to determine
what role each may have played in the decision to reduce the fleet and
consolidate it at two bases. The officials were the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Air Force; the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, U.S.
Air Force; the former Director of the Air National Guard; and the
Assistant for Operational Readiness, Air National Guard. We also spoke
with officials responsible for overseeing the B-1B program in the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, U.S. Air
Force, Washington, D.C, to determine if any analysis of current and
future wartime requirements had been completed prior to the decision.
We also had numerous meetings with officials in the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, who were responsible for
developing the basing options and estimating the savings that would
result for each option to discuss their methodology and the decision
process. We also met with representatives of the Air Combat Command at
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to determine if they had any role in
the decision to either reduce the number of B-1Bs or consolidate them
at two active duty bases. Finally, we met with representatives of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Director, Program,
Analysis, and Evaluation; and the Joint Staff to determine if they had
completed any analysis of the Office of Secretary of Defense suggestion
to eliminate the B-1B fleet or the Air Force‘s proposal to reduce the
fleet. In addition, we reviewed the 1999 and 2001 Air Force bomber
white papers and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to gather insight
on current and future B-1B wartime requirements and copies of
congressional testimonies by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force to document DOD‘s rationale for making the
B-1B decision.
To compare the flying hour costs and the capabilities of the various
active and Air National Guard B-1B units, we collected and analyzed
flying hour cost data for fiscal years 1999-2001 from the five B-1B
units. To verify the data from these sources, we collected and analyzed
cost data for the same years from the Air Combat Command; the Air Force
Cost Analysis Agency, Washington, D.C.; and the Directorate of
Logistics, Air National Guard, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. We
also collected and analyzed (1) mission capable rate data for fiscal
years 1999-2001 from the Air Combat Command and the two Guard units and
(2) collected and analyzed data on aircrew and maintenance crew
experience from the Air Combat Command and the Air National Guard
Bureau. To determine if there were significant differences in active
and Guard units‘ wartime missions, we reviewed the wartime taskings of
all five B-1B units. To compare the units‘ participation in peacetime
activities, we reviewed documents provided by officials at the Air
Expeditionary Force Center, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. We
reviewed and compared the operational readiness inspections for the
bomb wings located at Dyess, Ellsworth, and McConnell Air Force Bases
and the partial operational readiness inspection for the bomb wing at
Robins Air Force Base. The Inspector General staff completed an
inspection of Robins‘ initial response capabilities in July 2001 but
did not complete its inspection of the three remaining areas since the
Air Force had already decided to remove the B-1Bs from Robins. The wing
at Mountain Home had not undergone an operational readiness inspection
at the time we completed our review. Our work also included visits to
three B-1B units to interview officials and obtain documents: 184th
Bomb Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; 7th Bomb Wing, Dyess Air
Force Base, Texas; and 116th Bomb Wing, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
August 20, 2002:
Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities Management U.S. General
Accounting Office:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hinton:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report GAO-02-846, ’FORCE STRUCTURE:
Analysis Limited in Decision to Reduce and Consolidate B-1B Fleet,“
dated July 15, 2002 (GAO Code 350117). The Department appreciates the
opportunity to comment on the draft report.
The Department does not concur with the recommendation that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a
methodology for assessing and comparing the cost of active and reserve
units when evaluating potential basing options, as the Department
already
has an existing methodology. The Department agrees that standard
guidance
contributes to finding the most cost-effective option. The Department
asserts
however, that the Air Force used a methodology that encompasses all
costs
and factors, not just cost effectiveness, as the sole criterion.
It is true that the Air National Guard‘s flying hour costs are lower
than the active duty force‘s when solely based on the cost of fuel,
depot-level repairables, and consumables. However, flying hour costs
are more comparable when the perspective is broadened to include
related costs such as contractor support and software maintenance
support. The SAF/FMC Air Force Total Ownership Cost database accounts
for direct and indirect costs associated with operating the B-1. The
database indicates the Guard‘s flying hour related costs are higher
than the active duty costs in the areas of base operating support and
military personnel. Additionally, the database reveals the principal
difference between their flying hour costs is software maintenance
expenses paid exclusively by the active duty force. When these expenses
are distributed equitably across the units, the costs per flying hour
become virtually equal.
Additionally, the discrepancy between their mission capable rates is
not solely attributable to the experience level of the Guard
maintenance personnel. The report correctly takes into consideration
the Guard‘s lower operations tempo. Lastly, the Guard has been
operating all newer model B-1 aircraft, while the active duty force has
been responsible for the older model aircraft.
In the final determination, basing decisions must be made with many
factors involved, one of which is cost effectiveness. In this case, the
Department is convinced the Air Force weighed all costs and factors
appropriately, then made the correct decision. The report should not
focus on the importance of flying hour costs, at the exclusion of all
other factors.
Glenn F. Lamartin Director:
Strategic and Tactical Systems:
Signed by an offical for Glenn F. Lamartin:
Enclosure:
GAO CODE 350117/GAO-02-846:
’FORCE STRUCTURE: ANALYSIS LIMITED IN DECISION TO REDUCE AND
CONSOLIDATE B-1B FLEET“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to develop a methodology for
assessing and comparing the costs of active and reserve units so that
all potential costs are fully considered when evaluating potential
basing options and making future basing decisions. (p. 14/GAO Draft
Report):
DoD RESPONSE: Non concur. The Department agrees that standard guidance
contributes to finding the most-cost-effective option. It is the
Department‘s assertion however, that cost effectiveness is not the sole
criterion for basing options. The report should not focus on the
importance of flying hour costs, at the exclusion of all other factors.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402
Carole Coffey (202) 512-5876:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Sharron Candon, Judith Collins,
Penney Harwell, Jane Hunt, Ken Patton, and Carol Schuster made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to the Reserves Could Save
Millions without Reducing Mission Capability. GAO/NSIAD-98-64.
Washington, D.C.: February 26, 1998.
Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would
Reduce Planned Spending. GAO/NSIAD-96-192. Washington, D.C.: September
30, 1996.
Embedded Computers: B-1B Computers Must Be Upgraded to
Support Conventional Requirements. GAO/AIMD-96-28. Washington, D.C.:
February 27, 1996.
B-1B Conventional Upgrades. GAO/NSIAD-96-52R. Washington, D.C.:
December 4, 1995.
B-1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B-1B Operational
Readiness Assessment. GAO/NSIAD-95-151. Washington, D.C.:
July 18, 1995.
Air Force: Assessment of DOD‘s Report on Plan and Capabilities for
Evaluating Heavy Bombers. GAO/NSIAD-94-99. Washington, D.C.:
January 10, 1994.
Strategic Bombers: Issues Relating to the B-1B‘s Availability and
Ability to Perform Conventional Missions. GAO/NSIAD-94-81. Washington,
D.C.: January 10, 1994.
The U.S. Nuclear Triad: GAO‘s Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization
Program. GAO/T-PEMD-93-5. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 1993.
Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex,
Time-Consuming, and Costly. GAO/NSIAD-93-45. Washington, D.C.:
February 5, 1993.
Strategic Bombers: Need to Redefine Requirements for B-1B Defensive
Avionics System. GAO/NSIAD-92-272. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1992.
Strategic Bombers: Updated Status of the B-1B Recovery Program. GAO/
NSIAD-91-189. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 1991.
Strategic Bombers: Issues Related to the B-1B Aircraft Program. GAO/
T-NSIAD-91-11. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 1991.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] According to the Department of Defense‘s 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review, DOD no longer maintains plans to reconstitute the B-1Bs‘
nuclear capability.
[2] The Air Force‘s bomber fleet consists of the B-1B, B-2, and B-52.
[3] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-107, Sec. 1032, 115 Stat. 1012, 1215-16 (2001).
[4] The Air Force calculates flying hour costs by dividing the cost of
fuel and repair parts by the number of hours the aircraft is flown.
[5] The Air Force designates a weapon system as mission capable when it
can perform at least one of its assigned combat missions. The mission
capable rate measures the amount of time an aircraft is available to
complete at least one of its assigned missions.
[6] The B-1B requires four aircrew members, including the pilot, the
copilot, and the offensive and defensive weapon systems officers.
[7] U.S. Air Force, White Paper on Long Range Bombers (Washington,
D.C., Mar. 1, 1999).
[8] Combat coded means that the aircraft is fully equipped and funded
to perform all wartime missions.
[9] We presented six options for placing more B-1Bs in Air National
Guard units and estimated that implementing our proposed options could
produce savings ranging from $87.1 million to $235.3 million in fiscal
years 1999-2003. We also recommended that the Secretary of the Air
Force prepare a plan to place more B-1Bs in the reserve component. In
its response to our report at that time, DOD stated that it had the
right mix of B-1Bs in the active and reserve components and that it did
not plan to move more B-1Bs to the reserve component at that time. See
U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Bombers: Moving More B-1s to
the Reserves Could Save Millions without Reducing Mission Capability,
GAO/NSIAD-98-64 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998).
[10] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-107, Sec. 1032, 115 Stat. 1012, 1215-16 (2001).
[11] The remaining two aircraft will be used for developmental testing
and will be located at the Air Force‘s test facility at Edwards Air
Force Base. According to Air Force officials, these aircraft will be
altered to such a degree that it is unlikely that they will ever be
used in a nontest environment.
[12] The Air Force‘s operations and maintenance appropriation provides
funds for the day-to-day operations of the Air Force. In addition to
funds for fuel and aircraft repair parts, this account pays for items
such as travel, office supplies, contractor support, communications,
computers, and utilities and provides funds to pay Air Force civilian
employees.
[13] The Air Force‘s Aerospace Expeditionary Force was designed to help
manage commitments to theater commanders and reduce the deployment
burden. Active duty and Guard B-1B units usually meet their commitments
in on-call status at their home station.
[14] The cost of aviation fuel did not contribute significantly to the
difference in cost per flying hour between active duty and Guard B-1B
units, as these costs were very similar between the B-1B units. Both
active duty and Guard units pay about the same price for aviation fuel,
oil, and lubricants.
[15] According to Air Staff officials, the spare parts shortage
affected all aircraft during
1991-2000.
[16] The same requirements are applied to both active duty and Guard
aircrew members.
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