Chemical Weapons
Better Management Tools Needed to Guide DOD's Stockpile Destruction Program Gao ID: GAO-04-221T October 30, 2003Since its inception in 1985,the Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-Demil) Program has been charged with destroying the nation's large chemical weapons stockpile. After years of planning and building new facilities, the program started destroying the stockpile in 1990. As of October 2003, the program had destroyed 26 percent of the 31,500-ton agent stockpile, and its total estimated cost to destroy the entire stockpile is more than $25 billion. This testimony summarizes GAO's September 2003 report and addresses the following issues: (1) the status of schedule milestones and cost estimates, (2) the impact of the current schedule on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines, (3) the challenges associated with managing the program, and (4) the status of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).
The Chem-Demil Program faces schedule delays and higher costs, but it has improved emergency preparedness in communities near the sites. In 2001, the Chem-Demil Program extended its schedule milestones and increased its cost estimates from $15 billion to about $24 billion. Since then nearly all sites have experienced delays,stemming from problems such as: plant safety issues,environmental requirements, approving emergency preparedness plans, and funding shortfalls. The program needs a risk management plan to mitigate problems affecting program schedules, costs, and safety. Program officials say the delays have raised the cost estimates by an additional $1.4 billion, to more than $25 billion as of September 2003. Based on current schedule slippages, GAO believes that costs will grow higher and further delays will occur. Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC's April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile and it risks not meeting the original 2007 deadline to complete destruction of the entire stockpile. Unless the program fixes the problems causing delays,the United States also risks not meeting CWC's deadline of 2012, if extended. The program has suffered from several long-standing management and organizational issues. The lack of sustained leadership has undercut decision-making authority and obscured accountability. The program's complex structure, with multiple lines of authority, has left roles and responsibilities unclear. It does not have an overarching, comprehensive strategy to guide and integrate its activities and monitor its performance. The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have helped state and local communities become better prepared to respond to chemical emergencies. Despite these gains, CSEPP costs are rising because some states have expanded their preparedness requests beyond the approved budgets. These requests amount to $88 million for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
GAO-04-221T, Chemical Weapons: Better Management Tools Needed to Guide DOD's Stockpile Destruction Program
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9 a.m. EST:
Thursday, October 30, 2003:
Chemical Weapons:
Better Management Tools Needed to Guide DOD's Stockpile Destruction
Program:
Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management:
GAO-04-221T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-221T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since its inception in 1985, the Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-
Demil) Program has been charged with destroying the nation‘s large
chemical weapons stockpile. After years of planning and building new
facilities, the program started destroying the stockpile in 1990. As
of October 2003, the program had destroyed 26 percent of the 31,500-
ton agent stockpile, and its total estimated cost to destroy the
entire stockpile is more than $25 billion.
This testimony summarizes GAO‘s September 2003 report and addresses
the following issues: (1) the status of schedule milestones and cost
estimates, (2) the impact of the current schedule on the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines, (3) the challenges associated with
managing the program, and (4) the status of the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).
What GAO Found:
The Chem-Demil Program faces schedule delays and higher costs, but it
has improved emergency preparedness in communities near the sites. In
2001, the Chem-Demil Program extended its schedule milestones and
increased its cost estimates from $15 billion to about $24 billion.
Since then nearly all sites have experienced delays, stemming from
problems such as: plant safety issues, environmental requirements,
approving emergency preparedness plans, and funding shortfalls. The
program needs a risk management plan to mitigate problems affecting
program schedules, costs, and safety. Program officials say the delays
have raised the cost estimates by an additional $1.4 billion, to more
than $25 billion as of September 2003. Based on current schedule
slippages, GAO believes that costs will grow higher and further delays
will occur. (See figure.)
Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC‘s
April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the stockpile and it
risks not meeting the original 2007 deadline to complete destruction
of the entire stockpile. Unless the program fixes the problems causing
delays, the United States also risks not meeting CWC‘s deadline of
2012, if extended.
The program has suffered from several long-standing management and
organizational issues. The lack of sustained leadership has undercut
decision-making authority and obscured accountability. The program‘s
complex structure, with multiple lines of authority, has left roles
and responsibilities unclear. It does not have an overarching,
comprehensive strategy to guide and integrate its activities and
monitor its performance.
The Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have helped state
and local communities become better prepared to respond to chemical
emergencies. Despite these gains, CSEPP costs are rising because some
states have expanded their preparedness requests beyond the approved
budgets. These requests amount to $88 million for fiscal years 2004
and 2005.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommended in its September 2003 report that the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Army develop an overall strategy and
implementation plan for the program and implement a risk management
approach, and DOD concurred.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-221T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Henry L. Hinton, Jr.
at (202) 512-4300 or hintonh@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing today on
the Department of Defense's (DOD) Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-
Demil) Program. Since its inception in 1985, this program has been
charged with destroying the nation's large chemical weapons stockpile,
second only to Russia's in terms of its size. After years of planning
and building new facilities, the program started destroying the
stockpile in 1990.
As you requested, my statement focuses on the following issues: (1) the
status of schedule milestones and costs at the sites, (2) the impact
that the current schedule may have on the Chemical Weapons
Convention[Footnote 1] (CWC) deadlines, (3) the challenges associated
with managing the program, and (4) an update on the status of the
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).
As of October 2003, the Chem-Demil Program had destroyed an estimated
8,210 tons (26 percent) of the total 31,500 tons of the original agent
stockpile stored at nine sites in the United States and the Pacific
Ocean at Johnston Atoll. Of the four sites that have begun agent
destruction operations, Johnston Atoll has destroyed all of its
stockpile; Tooele, Utah, has reduced its stockpile by about 44 percent;
Anniston, Alabama, has destroyed about 2 percent of its stockpile; and
Aberdeen, Maryland, has eliminated over 3 percent of its stockpile.
Current schedule estimates show that the Army will not complete
destruction of the entire stockpile until after the year 2012.
Since 1990, we have issued more than 25 reports on the Chem-Demil
Program. Nearly half of the reviews have raised questions about the
program's growing costs, its inability to meet its schedule milestones,
and its management weaknesses.
My testimony today draws heavily from our most recent report, which was
issued in September 2003.[Footnote 2] In summary, we found the
following:
* While the Chem-Demil Program has revised its schedule milestones and
increased its cost estimates several times, with the latest revision in
2001, the program still cannot meet them. According to current Army
schedules for destruction, five sites will miss their 2001 schedule
milestones, less than 2 years after they were reset. The other four
sites have not yet missed schedule milestones, but they too have
experienced delays. Most of the substantial delays have stemmed
from problems that DOD and the Army have been unable to anticipate
or influence. These include plant safety issues, difficulties in
meeting environmental permitting requirements, public concerns about
emergency preparedness plans, and funding shortfalls. Neither DOD nor
the Army has adopted a comprehensive risk management approach that
could help mitigate potential problems that affect program schedules,
costs, and safety by anticipating problems and developing mitigation
plans. Army officials told us they are now developing such an approach.
According to program officials, the delays that have occurred since the
2001 schedule revisions, along with the resolution of emergency
preparedness issues, have raised the program's cost estimates by
$1.4 billion, to a current total of more than $25 billion. We expect
this amount will grow substantially before the destruction of the
stockpile is complete if these delays continue.
* Because of schedule delays, the United States will not meet CWC's
April 2004 deadline to destroy 45 percent of the chemical stockpile.
The United States recently asked the governing body of the convention
for an extension beyond the April 2004 deadline. If the delays that the
program has experienced continue, the United States also risks not
meeting the 2007 deadline to destroy 100 percent of the stockpile.
Unless the Chem-Demil Program is able to fix the problems that have
caused these delays, the United States also risks not meeting CWC's
deadline, if extended to 2012, to destroy the entire stockpile. The CWC
allows extensions of up to 5 years to the 2007 deadline.
* Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the
organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program has suffered from
several long-standing and unresolved leadership, organizational, and
strategic planning issues. The program has lacked sustained leadership
at both the upper levels of oversight and at the program-manager level,
which undercuts decision-making authority and obscures
accountability.[Footnote 3] In addition, the program's complex
management structure, with multiple lines of authority within the Army
and the separation of program components among the Army, DOD, and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), has left roles and
responsibilities for the different parts of the program unclear. FEMA
manages the emergency preparedness program (CSEPP) for communities near
the storage sites. Finally, the absence of an overarching,
comprehensive strategy has resulted in a program without a clear road
map to closely guide and integrate all of its activities and monitor
its performance.
* Since our 2001 report,[Footnote 4] the Army and FEMA have helped
state and local communities become better prepared to respond to
chemical emergencies. Based on the states' self-assessments and FEMA's
reviews, all of the states with nearby chemical storage sites are
considered close to being fully prepared for emergency issues. However,
despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise because
some state and local communities have expanded their emergency
preparedness requests beyond their approved budgets, exceeding them by
$88 million for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, especially as they move
closer to agent operations phase. FEMA and the Army have implemented a
number of recommendations we made to improve technical assistance and
guidance, training, and compliance measures to assess preparedness.
Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Programís Inability to
Anticipate and Influence Issues:
Despite several revisions to schedule milestones since the program's
inception, the Chem-Demil Program still is unable to meet these
milestones because of unanticipated delays. Most incineration sites
have missed important milestones established in 2001. Delays at
Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Bluff have already resulted in their
missing the 2001 schedule milestones to begin chemical agent
destruction operations (operations phase).[Footnote 5] Johnston Atoll
has missed its schedule milestone for shutting down the facility
(closure phase).[Footnote 6] Although Tooele has not missed any
milestones since the 2001 schedule was issued, the site has undergone
substantial delays in destroying its stockpile primarily because of a
safety-related incident in July 2002. If additional delays occur at the
Tooele site, it could also exceed its next milestone as well. Table 1
shows the status of the incineration sites that will miss 2001 schedule
milestones.
Table 1: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration
Site:
Site: Anniston; Next schedule milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date
to begin next milestone: July 2002; Date to begin next phase[A]: Aug.
2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of months):
+13.
Site: Umatilla; Next schedule milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date
to begin next milestone: July 2003; Date to begin next phase[A]: Mar.
2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of months):
+8.
Site: Pine Bluff; Next schedule milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule
date to begin next milestone: Oct. 2003; Date to begin next phase[A]:
Apr. 2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of
months): +6.
Site: Johnston Atoll; Next schedule milestone: End of closure; 2001
schedule date to begin next milestone: Sept. 2003; Date to begin next
phase[A]: Nov. 2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no.
of months): +2.
Sources: DOD and the U.S. Army.
[A] Program manager's official estimates for Pine Bluff, Umatilla and
Johnston Atoll.
[End of table]
Many of the recent delays at the incineration sites have resulted from
operations incidents, from environmental permitting problems,
community protection concerns, and funding issuesóa trend that we
identified in previous reports on the program. Among the events that
have caused delays at incineration sites since 2001 are the following:
* Incidents during operations. At Tooele, a chemical incident involving
a plant worker who came into contact with a nerve agent while
performing routine maintenance led to the suspension of agent
destruction operations from July 2002 to March 2003. An investigation
attributed the incident to inadequate or poorly followed worker safety
procedures, and a corrective action plan, including an improved safety
plan, was instituted before operations resumed. Since operations
restarted in March 2003, Tooele has experienced several temporary
shutdowns.
* Environmental permitting. Several environmental permitting issues
have delayed the start of agent destruction operations at sites at
Umatilla and Anniston.[Footnote 7] At Umatilla, the delays stemmed from
several unanticipated engineering changes related to reprogramming
software and design changes that required permit modifications and to a
shutdown by state regulators because furnaces were producing an
unanticipated high amount of heavy metals during surrogate agent
testing. At Anniston, delays occurred because state environmental
regulators did not accept test results for one of the furnaces because
the subcontractor did not follow state permit-specified protocols.
* Community protection. Concerns about emergency preparedness for local
communities have led to additional delays at Anniston. These concerns
included the inadequacy of protection plans for area schools and for
special needs residents (e.g., elderly and disabled individuals) who
would have difficulty in an evacuation. Although we reported on this
issue in July 1996[Footnote 8] and again in August 2001, and a senior
DOD official identified it as a key concern in September 2001, the Army
had difficulty satisfactorily resolving the issue with key state
stakeholders. As a result, operations did not begin until August 2003.
* Funding. Delays at Pine Bluff and Johnston Atoll occurred because
DOD redirected fiscal year 2002 destruction program funds to acquire
$40.5 million worth of additional emergency protection equipment for
Anniston. To cover this unfunded budget expense, the Army reduced
Pine Bluffís budget by $14.9 million and Johnston Atollís budget by
$25.1 million, leading to systemization and closure milestone
slippages, respectively, at these sites. Program officials told us that
the total cost of this schedule slip would ultimately be $116 million
due to the extended period before closure. The program is likely to
face unfunded requirements aprogramwide funding requests continue to
exceed budgeted amounts. As of October 2003, according to preliminary
estimates from FEMA, unfunded CSEPP requirements for all sites are
expected to amount to $39.4 million and $49.0 million for fiscal years
2004 and 2005, respectively.s:
Unlike the incineration sites, the two bulk-agent only sites, Aberdeen
and Newport, have experienced delays but have not breeched their
schedule milestones. In 2002, DOD approved using an alternative
technology (neutralization), instead of incineration, at these two
sites. This technology is expected to accelerate the rate of
destruction at these two sites. The Army estimated that this process
would reduce the scheduled end of operations at both sites by 5 years,
from 2008 to 2003 at Aberdeen and from 2009 to 2004 at Newport.
However, Aberdeen has encountered unanticipated problems with the
removal of residual agent from bulk containers and has extended its
planned completion date by 6 months, from October 2003 to March 2004.
In addition, Newport has faced construction delays and community
resistance to offsite treatment of waste byproducts. As a result of
these delays, Newport has extended its planned start date for agent
operations by 5 months, from October 2003 to February 2004.
At two sites, Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, no milestones
were set in the 2001 schedule because DOD had not yet selected a
destruction technology. DOD has now selected a destruction technology
for these sites, but it made decisions several months later than
estimated. More importantly, DOD has set initial schedule milestones
for these two sites that go beyond the extended April 2012 CWC
deadline. According to DOD officials, these milestones are preliminary
and will be reevaluated once contractors finish initial
facility designs.
The Chem-Demil Program has faced continued delays with the program
largely because DOD and the Army have not yet developed a risk
management approach to proactively anticipate and address potential
problems that could adversely affect program schedules, costs, and
safety. Such an approach could also leverage knowledge of potential
problems gained at other sites. Instead, according to a DOD official,
the program has used a crisis management approach, which has forced it
to react to, rather than control, issues. The program had drafted a
plan in June 2000 that was intended to address these issues. However,
according to a program official, this plan was never approved or
implemented because of a change in management in 2001.
The delays and schedule extensions[Footnote 9] have contributed
directly to program cost growth, according to program officials. As a
result, DOD's total program cost estimate grew from $15 billion to
$24 billion between 1998 and 2001. (See fig. 1.) Because of delays
encountered since the 2001 revisions, the Army is now in the process of
developing new milestones that will extend beyond those adopted in
2001. According to an Army official, the program will use events that
have occurred since 2001 in presenting new cost estimates to DOD for
preparation of the fiscal year 2005 budget submission. Program
officials told us that they estimate new costs had increased by
$1.4 billion as of October 2003, and this estimate is likely to rise
further as additional factors are considered.
Figure 1: Comparison of 1998, 2001, and 2003 Cumulative Program
Cost Estimates:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Schedule Delays Jeopardize Ability of Program to Meet CWC Deadlines:
Although the United States met the first two chemical weapons treaty
deadlines, the continuing delays jeopardize its ability to meet the
final two deadlines. (See table 2.) Since reaching the 2002 deadline to
destroy 20 percent of the stockpile in July 2001, the Chem-Demil
Program has been able to destroy only an additional 3 percent of the
stockpile. In order to meet the April 2004 CWC deadline to destroy 45
percent of the stockpile, the program would have to eliminate an
additional 22 percent of the stockpile within the next 6 months.
Because the program will likely not be able to achieve this rate of
destruction, the United States has asked for an extension of the 2004
deadline.
According to current destruction schedules, the United States will not
meet the 2007 deadline to eliminate 100 percent of the stockpile. As a
result, the United States will likely have to ask for an extension of
the 2007 deadline to complete the destruction of the entire stockpile.
The CWC allows extensions of up to 5 years beyond the 2007 deadline.
Unless the program fixes the problems that are causing schedule delays,
the United States also risks not meeting this deadline, if extended to
2012.
Table 2: CWC Deadlines:
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 1; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2000; Date United States met deadline: September 1997.
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 20; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2002; Date United States met deadline: July 2001.
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 45; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2004; Date United States met deadline: Will not meet.
Required percentage of agent destroyed: 100; Deadlines for destruction:
April 29, 2007; Date United States met deadline: Will not meet.
Sources: CWC and U.S. Army.
[End of table]
Long-standing Management and Organizational Weaknesses Hamper
Program Progress:
Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the
organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program continues to falter
because several long-standing leadership, organizational, and
strategic planning weaknesses remain unresolved. The lack of sustained
leadership has undercut decision-making authority and obscured
accountability. The program's complex structure, with many lines of
authority, has left roles and responsibilities unclear. Finally, the
program lacks an overarching, comprehensive strategy to guide and
integrate its activities and monitor performance.
Leadership Shifts Affect Continuity in Decision Making:
The Chem-Demil Program's lack of sustained leadership above the program
level is underscored by the multiple shifts in oversight
responsibilities that have occurred three times between DOD and the
Army during the past two decades. The most recent change took place in
2001 when oversight responsibility for the program shifted back to
DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense. Table 3 summarizes the
changes.
Table 3: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and
the Army, 1986-Present:
Year: 1986; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD designates the Army
as the executive agent for the Chem-Demil Program.
Year: 1994; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD makes the program a
major defense acquisition program and oversight is elevated to control
cost and schedule increases and to raise program visibility.
Year: 1998; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD delegates decision-
making authority to the Army, primarily as part of its overall effort
to reduce responsibilities and staffing of its offices.
Year: 2001; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD reinstates its
position as the program's top decision maker. According to DOD, this
was done to streamline decision making, which is consistent with the
cost of the program and national and state interest in the safe and
timely destruction of the stockpile.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
These shifts in oversight responsibilities affected the continuity of
program decision making and obscured accountability. As a different
office assumed major decision authority, the program's emphasis
shifted and initiatives that had been started were often not completed.
For example, when the Army had oversight responsibility for the
program, it established a memorandum of understanding with FEMA to
clarify each of their roles and responsibilities related to
CSEPP.[Footnote 10] However, after DOD assumed the program's oversight
responsibilities in 2001, DOD did not follow the protocols for
coordination that had been established in the memorandum, according to
FEMA and DOD officials. As a result, DOD provided funds for emergency
preparedness items without having adequate plans for distribution,
which delayed the process. This shift in oversight responsibilities
from the Army to DOD also left state and local community officials and
other stakeholders uncertain as to the credibility of federal
officials. According to FEMA and Army officials, coordination between
the two agencies has improved in the last few months and efforts are
being made to repair relationships with community and state
stakeholders.
Similar problems have also occurred within the Army as program
leadership has changed. Three different officials at the Assistant
Secretary level have held senior leadership positions since December
2001. In addition, five officials have served as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Chem-Demil) during that time.[Footnote 11] From
April 2002 to February 2003, the program manager's position remained
vacant for nearly 1 year, before being filled. However, after only 4
months, the program manager resigned and the Army named a replacement.
Frequent shifts in key leadership positions have led to several
instances where the lack of continuity affected decision making and
obscured accountability. For example, in June 2002, a program official
promised to support future funding requests for emergency preparedness
equipment from one community, but his successor did not fulfill this
promise. Other communities viewed the agreement with one community as
an opportunity to substantially expand their own funding requests. The
lack of sustained leadership makes it unclear who is accountable when
program commitments are made and not fulfilled. Moreover, when key
leaders do not remain in their positions to develop the needed long-
term perspective on program issues and effectively implement program
initiatives, it is difficult to maintain program progress and ensure
accountability for leadership actions.
Program Management Structure Remains Complex:
As our 2003 report documents, the Army recently reorganized the
program. But this change in management structure has not streamlined
the program's complex organization nor clarified roles and
responsibilities. The establishment of the Chemical Materials Agency
(CMA) in January 2003 has left the Director reporting to two different
senior Army organizations, which is one more than under the previous
structure. This divided reporting approach is still not fully
developed, but has the potential to adversely affect program
coordination and accountability. The reorganization has also divided
the responsibility for various program phases between two offices
within CMA. One organization, the Program Manager for the Elimination
of Chemical Weapons, will manage the first three phases (design,
construction, and systemization) for each site, and a newly created
organization, the Director of Operations, will manage the final two
phases (operations and closure). This reorganization changes the
cradle-to-grave management approach that was used to manage sites
in the past and has blurred responsibilities for officials who
previously provided support in areas such as quality assurance and
safety. Moreover, the reorganization did not address two program
components--Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program and
community-related CSEPP. DOD will continue to manage ACWA separately
from the Army, as congressionally directed. In addition, the Army will
continue to manage CSEPP jointly with FEMA.
Program Lacks Strategy and Implementation Plan:
While DOD and the Army have issued numerous policies and guidance
documents for the Chem-Demil Program, they have not developed an
overarching, comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide
the program and monitor its progress. This is contrary to the
principals that leading organizations embrace to effectively implement
and manage programs. Some key aspects of an approach typically used to
effectively manage programs include promulgating a comprehensive
strategy that includes a clearly stated mission, long-term goals, and
methods to accomplish these goals. An implementation plan that includes
annual performance goals, measurable performance indicators, and
evaluation and corrective action plans is also important. According to
DOD and Army officials, the Chem-Demil Program has relied primarily on
guidance and planning documents related to the acquisition
process.[Footnote 12] However, in response to our recent recommendation
that they prepare such a strategy and plan, DOD stated that it is in
the initial stages of doing so and estimates completion in fiscal year
2004.
Emergency Preparedness Program Is Improving, but Costs Are Rising:
Since our 2001 report, the Army and FEMA have assisted state and
local communities to become better prepared to respond to chemical
emergencies. Based on the states' self-assessments and FEMA's reviews,
all 10 states with chemical storage sites located within them or nearby
are now considered close to being fully prepared to respond to a
chemical emergency. This is a marked improvement from the status we
reported in 2001[Footnote 13] when 3 states reported that they were far
from being prepared. Now, 6 of the 10 states are reporting that their
status is fully prepared and the remaining 4 are close to being fully
prepared. However, these statuses are subject to change because the
states and communities themselves can revise or expand their agreed-
upon emergency preparedness needs. They can make these changes because
the "maximum protection" concept that governs CSEPP is open to
interpretation. As a result, they can appear to be less prepared than
before. For example, Oregon certified that it was fully prepared, but
now has requested additional emergency equipment. This request has
changed Oregon's self-reported preparedness status from fully prepared
to incomplete.
Despite these accomplishments, CSEPP costs continue to rise because,
according to Army and FEMA officials, state and local communities may
add to their emergency requirements beyond approved requests. Army and
FEMA officials explain that the states often identify and expand their
requirements, especially as destruction facilities move closer to the
start of the operations phase. For example, the states of Colorado,
Alabama, and Oregon have all requested funds for infrastructure,
including roads and bridges. In June 2002, Oregon certified that its
community readiness was adequate and recommended permit approval to
allow test burns at Umatilla. Since that time, Oregon has asked for
additional emergency preparedness support that exceeds its CSEPP
budget. This request follows a pattern of substantially increasing
funding requests at the start of the operations phase, as occurred at
Anniston in 2001 when it received $40.5 million for additional CSEPP
items. Programwide, new requirements continue to exceed approved CSEPP
funding levels. FEMA has little control over the additional funding
requests made by the states. As of October 2003, FEMA had identified
$39.4 and $49.0 million in unfunded requirements for fiscal years 2004
and 2005, respectively. (See table 4.):
Table 4: CSEPP Unfunded Requirements (UFR) for Fiscal Years 2004 and
2005, as of October 2003:
Dollars in millions.
Alabama; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 21.0; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 41.9;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 21.0; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 19.7; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 36.7; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 17.0.
Arkansas; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 16.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 24.7;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 7.8; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 3.6; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 13.1; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 9.6.
Colorado; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 3.1; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 2.8;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.3; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 2.5; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 4.5; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 1.9.
Confederated Tribes; FY2004 unfunded requirements:
FY2004 funded: 0.2; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements:
3.7; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 3.5; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 0.2; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 0.9; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 0.7.
Illinois; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 0.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 0.8;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.1; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 0.8; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 0.7; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 0.0.
Indiana; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 3.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 4.7;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 0.8; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 2.3; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 6.0; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 3.7.
Kentucky; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 4.3; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 5.3;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 1.0; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 3.7; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 4.4; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 0.7.
Maryland; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 2.3; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 1.5;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.8; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 1.8; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 2.0; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 0.2.
Oregon; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 5.7; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 12.4;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 6.7; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 4.5; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 13.9; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 9.4.
Utah; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 funded:
5.6; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 5.6; FY2004
unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 0.0; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 funded: 7.1; FY2005 unfunded requirements: FY2005
requirements: 7.0; FY2005 unfunded requirements: FY2005 UFRs: -0.1.
Washington; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 5.9; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 5.8;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: -0.1; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 3.1; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 5.3; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 2.2.
FEMA support; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 18.7; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 18.7;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 0.0; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 22.6; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 26.5; FY2005 unfunded requirements:
FY2005 UFRs: 3.9.
Total; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004
funded: 88.5; FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 requirements: 127.9;
FY2004 unfunded requirements: FY2004 UFRs: 39.4; FY2005
unfunded requirements: FY2005 funded: 72.0; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 requirements: 120.9; FY2005 unfunded
requirements: FY2005 UFRs: 49.0.
Source: FEMA data.
[End of table]
In our August 2001 report, we recommended that the Army and FEMA
(1) provide technical assistance, guidance, and leadership to the three
states (Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky) with long-standing emergency
preparedness issues to resolve their concerns; (2) provide all states
and their communities with training and assistance in preparing budget
and life-cycle cost estimates and provide guidance and plans on
reentry; and (3) establish specific measures of compliance with the
benchmarks to more evenly assess performance and to correctly identify
requirements. The Army is continuing to provide assistance to CSEPP
states and communities as requested by FEMA. FEMA now participates more
often in local community CSEPP activities and sponsors an annual CSEPP
conference in an effort to improve its working relationships. FEMA
has also provided software to simplify development of CSEPP financial
reporting documents and has published a Reentry and Recovery Workbook.
The workbook fills a void in state and local guidance for emergency
responders to follow in the event of a chemical emergency. Lastly, FEMA
expanded its capability assessment readiness tool to assist local
communities in quantifying benchmark scores.
Agencies' Actions to Implement Prior GAO Recommendations:
We recommended in our September 2003 report that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the
Army, to (1) develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for
the chemical demilitarization program and (2) implement a risk
management approach that anticipates and influences internal and
external factors that could adversely impact program performance. DOD
concurred with our recommendations. It said that it was in the initial
stages of developing an overall strategy and implementation plan and
estimated that it would be completed in fiscal year 2004. It also said
that CMA will review the progress of an evaluation of several
components of its risk management approach within 120 days and then
that DOD would evaluate the results and determine any appropriate
action. In our 2001 report, we recommended that the Army and FEMA make
improvements to the program, and they have implemented those
recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-4300. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
include Donald Snyder, Rodell Anderson, Bonita Oden, John Buehler,
Nancy Benco, and Mike Zola.
FOOTNOTES
[1] In April 1997, the United States Senate ratified the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention. S. Res. 75, April 24, 1997.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Sustained
Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to
Guide DOD's Destruction Program, GAO-03-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
5, 2003).
[3] Upper level refers to the offices of the assistant secretary or
above in the Departments of the Army and Defense.
[4] Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing
States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).
[5] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, all three of these sites
were in the systemization phase; thus, their next milestone was to
begin agent destruction operations.
[6] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, agent destruction
operations had been completed and its next milestone was to complete
closure of the facility.
[7] We have reported on permitting delays in Chemical Weapons And
Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/NSIAD-
97-18 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 1997).
[8] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile:
Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses,
GAO/NSIAD-96-150 (Washington, D.C: July 23, 1996).
[9] Schedule extensions are caused largely by actual destruction rates
being lower than planned.
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army
Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies, GAO-01-850
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).
[11] This position is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Elimination of Chemical Weapons).
[12] Acquisition programs establish program goals for cost, schedule,
and performance parameters over the program's life cycle.
[13] GAO-01-850.
