Defense Logistics
Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom
Gao ID: GAO-04-305R December 18, 2003
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is one of the largest logistics supply and support efforts that the U.S. military has ever undertaken. For example, of the $28.1 billion that the Department of Defense (DOD) has obligated for OIF, the services and the Defense Logistics Agency have reported that $14.2 billion is for operating support costs and $4.9 billion is for transportation costs. This operation required the movement of large numbers of personnel and equipment over long distances into a hostile environment involving harsh desert conditions. Congress asked us to study a number of issues related to logistics support to deployed forces. In April 2003, shortly after the onset of OIF, we began work that focused on DOD's accountability and control over supplies and equipment shipped to that theater of operation. Based on the early results of this work, we subsequently broadened our scope to include other logistical issues, such as the deployment of support units and the transportation of supplies and equipment.
Although major combat operations during the initial phases of OIF were successful, our preliminary work indicated that there were substantial logistics support problems in the OIF theater, as evidenced by (1) a backlog of hundreds of pallets and containers of materiel at various distribution points due to transportation constraints and inadequate asset visibility; (2) a discrepancy of $1.2 billion between the amount of materiel shipped to Army activities in the theater of operations and the amount of materiel that those activities acknowledged they received; (3) a potential cost to DOD of millions of dollars for late fees on leased containers or replacement of DOD-owned containers due to distribution backlogs or losses; (4) the cannibalization of vehicles and potential reduction of equipment readiness due to the unavailability of parts that either were not in DOD's inventory or could not be located because of inadequate asset visibility; (5) the duplication of many requisitions and circumvention of the supply system as a result of inadequate asset visibility; and (6) the accumulation at the theater distribution center in Kuwait of hundreds of pallets, containers, and boxes of excess supplies and equipment that were shipped from units redeploying from Iraq without required content descriptions and shipping documentation. For example, at the time we visited the center, we observed a wide array of materiel, spread over many acres, that included a mix of broken and usable parts that had not been sorted into the appropriate supply class, unidentified items in containers that had not been opened and inventoried, and items that appeared to be deteriorating due to the harsh desert conditions. We noted a number of factors that, in combination with other conditions, may have contributed to the logistics support problems we identified.
GAO-04-305R, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom
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Report to the United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Defense Logistics:
GAO-04-305R:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 18, 2003:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the
Effectiveness of Logistics Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is one of the largest logistics supply
and support efforts that the U.S. military has ever undertaken. For
example, of the $28.1 billion that the Department of Defense (DOD) has
obligated for OIF, the services and the Defense Logistics Agency have
reported that $14.2 billion is for operating support costs and $4.9
billion is for transportation costs. This operation required the
movement of large numbers of personnel and equipment over long
distances into a hostile environment involving harsh desert conditions.
You asked us to study a number of issues related to logistics support
to deployed forces. In April 2003, shortly after the onset of OIF, we
began work that focused on DOD's accountability and control over
supplies and equipment shipped to that theater of operation. Based on
the early results of this work, we subsequently broadened our scope to
include other logistical issues, such as the deployment of support
units and the transportation of supplies and equipment.
At the outset of this assignment, we agreed to keep you periodically
informed of the status of our work. On November 6, 2003, we provided
your office with a briefing on our preliminary observations of the
effectiveness of logistics activities during OIF. As we emphasized at
the briefing, these observations are based on the limited work we have
done to date. As requested, we are transmitting the briefing (enc. I)
in this report. In conducting our preliminary work, we relied on data
gathered through our visits and interviews with military logistics
personnel deployed to the theater of operations. We visited logistics
support activities in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, but we did not visit
activities in Iraq. We also met with senior officials at DOD and
military service headquarters and logistics support activities in the
United States and Europe. We also reviewed the military services' and
DOD's "after-action" reports, "lessons learned" studies, and other
similar documents. The scope of our work included all types of supplies
and equipment used during OIF, including such items as repair parts,
food, clothing, and construction material.
Although we have done some limited analysis, we have not verified all
of the data and plan to more fully address the issues identified in
this briefing in subsequent work. We expect to complete our work and
issue a report, including recommendations for executive action, during
2004. In addition, we are planning to provide DOD with a short letter
of inquiry concerning a serious condition we came across relating to
the return of materiel from units in the theater, which we believe
warrants DOD's immediate attention. A copy of the draft letter will be
provided to you, and the response from DOD will also be provided.
Summary:
Although major combat operations during the initial phases of OIF were
successful, our preliminary work indicated that there were substantial
logistics support problems in the OIF theater, as evidenced by:
* a backlog of hundreds of pallets and containers of materiel at
various distribution points due to transportation constraints and
inadequate asset visibility;
* a discrepancy of $1.2 billion between the amount of materiel shipped
to Army activities in the theater of operations and the amount of
materiel that those activities acknowledged they received;
* a potential cost to DOD of millions of dollars for late fees on
leased containers or replacement of DOD-owned containers due to
distribution backlogs or losses;
* the cannibalization of vehicles and potential reduction of equipment
readiness due to the unavailability of parts that either were not in
DOD's inventory or could not be located because of inadequate asset
visibility;
* the duplication of many requisitions and circumvention of the supply
system as a result of inadequate asset visibility; and:
* the accumulation at the theater distribution center in Kuwait of
hundreds of pallets, containers, and boxes of excess supplies and
equipment that were shipped from units redeploying from Iraq without
required content descriptions and shipping documentation. For example,
at the time we visited the center, we observed a wide array of
materiel, spread over many acres, that included a mix of broken and
usable parts that had not been sorted into the appropriate supply
class, unidentified items in containers that had not been opened and
inventoried, and items that appeared to be deteriorating due to the
harsh desert conditions.
We noted a number of factors that, in combination with other
conditions, may have contributed to the logistics support problems we
identified. Such factors include the following:
* Poor asset visibility. DOD did not have adequate visibility over all
equipment and supplies transported to, within, and from the theater of
operations in support of OIF. For example, although the U.S. Central
Command issued a policy requiring, whenever feasible, the use of radio
frequency identification tags to track assets shipped to and within the
theater, these tags were not used in a uniform and consistent
manner.[Footnote 1] In addition, units operating in the theater did not
have adequate access to, or could not fully use, DOD's logistics and
asset visibility systems in order to track equipment and supplies
because these systems were not fully interoperable and capable of
exchanging information or transmitting data over required distances.
Furthermore, DOD and military service personnel lacked training on the
use of radio frequency identification tags and other tracking tools,
which also adversely affected asset visibility.
* Insufficient and ineffective theater distribution capability. DOD did
not have a sufficient distribution capability in the theater to
effectively manage and transport the large amount of supplies and
equipment deployed during OIF. For example, the distribution of
supplies to forward units was delayed because adequate transportation
assets, such as cargo trucks and materiel handling equipment, were not
available within the theater of operations. The distribution of
supplies was also delayed because cargo arriving in shipping containers
and pallets had to be separated and repackaged several times for
delivery to multiple units in different locations. In addition, DOD's
lack of an effective process for prioritizing cargo for delivery
precluded the effective use of scarce theater transportation assets.
Finally, one of the major causes of distribution problems during OIF
was that most Army and Marine Corps logistics personnel and equipment
did not deploy to the theater until after combat troops arrived, and,
in fact, most Army personnel did not arrive until after major combat
operations were underway. In addition, logistics personnel were not
adequately trained in various logistics functions, such as operating
material handling equipment and managing theater distribution centers.
* Failure to apply "lessons learned" from prior operations. The failure
to effectively apply lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm and other military operations may have contributed to the
logistics support problems encountered during OIF. Our prior reports,
as well as DOD and military service after-action reports and other
studies of prior military operations, have documented some of the same
problems that appear to be occurring in OIF. For example, our September
1992 report concluded that accountability and asset visibility were
lost during Operation Desert Storm due to the lack of container
documentation and an inadequate transportation system to distribute
these supplies.[Footnote 2] DOD's April 1992 report to Congress on the
conduct of the Persian Gulf War reported that, in addition to a lack of
asset visibility and poor materiel distribution, the logistics effort
was weakened by the long processing time for supply requisitions, which
resulted in the loss of confidence and discipline in the supply system,
the abuse of the priority designation process, and the submission of
multiple requisitions.[Footnote 3] In addition, DOD's after-action
report from the more recent operation in Kosovo concluded that military
leaders had limited visibility over supplies because the communications
support needed to fuse data from multiple collection points was
inadequate.[Footnote 4] Based on the preliminary observations from our
current work, it appears that the same or similar problems continue to
exist in OIF.
* Other Logistics Issues. DOD and military service officials raised a
number of other logistics-related issues with us during our review.
Although these issues need to be explored further, they are included in
this report because they may have contributed to the recent logistics
problems. There were indications of the following:
* At times there were shortages of some spares or repair parts needed
by deployed forces. Military personnel we spoke with noted shortages of
items such as tires, tank track, helicopter spare parts, and radio
batteries. As a result, units resorted to cannibalizing vehicles or
circumventing normal supply channels to keep equipment in ready
condition.
* Army prepositioned equipment used for OIF was not adequately
configured to match unit needs. For example, parts inventories
contained in the prepositioned stocks were not sufficient to meet the
needs of the units that relied on them.
* DOD contractors used for logistics support during OIF were not always
effective. For example, we were told that some commercial shippers were
unable to provide "door-to-door" delivery of supplies to units in the
theater, as was required by their contracts.
* Physical security at ports and other distribution points in the
theater was not always adequate to protect assets from being lost or
taken by unauthorized personnel. For example, Army officials noted
cases where vehicles and expensive communications and computer
equipment had been lost from various distribution points in Kuwait.
Scope and Methodology:
In developing these issues for this briefing, we held discussions with
officials from key DOD and military service organizations responsible
for logistics support and materiel management policies and procedures
in the United States, Europe, and the OIF theater of operations in the
Middle East. Our audit work primarily focused on Army and Marine Corps
operations. In the theater of operations, we visited logistics support
activities in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, but we did not visit
activities in Iraq. We also reviewed policies, procedures, and
processes in place to maintain accountability and control over materiel
as it moved to, within, and from the theater of operations. In
addition, we reviewed lessons learned reports and other assessments of
logistics support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and
other military operations, including OIF. We performed our review from
April 2003 through December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Agency Comments:
In providing oral comments on the briefing slides, DOD representatives
from the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Supply Chain Integration) and other military logistics officials
stated that they generally concurred with the observations we
presented. They pointed out that the problems we identified were ones
that they were also familiar with and noted that DOD was already taking
a number of actions that address some of them. For example, they stated
that the Secretary of Defense has designated the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) as the Defense
Logistics Executive with the authority to address all logistics and
supply chain issues. In addition, the Secretary of Defense designated
the U.S. Transportation Command as a single distribution process owner
to address problems with the distribution process that hampered DOD's
ability to optimally support deployed forces. Finally, the DOD
representatives noted that, in October 2003, DOD issued a policy
directing the use of radio frequency identification technology as a
standard business process across the department to address visibility
problems.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees
that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We are
also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense and the Director,
Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be available at no
charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8365 or e-mail me at solisw@gao.gov. Key
contributors to this report were Kenneth Knouse, Cary Russell, Gerald
Winterlin, Jason Venner, Kenneth Daniell, Tinh Nguyen, and Nancy Benco.
Sincerely yours,
William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by William M. Solis:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Enclosure I:
[See PDF for images]
[End of section]
:
FOOTNOTES
[1] Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are used to track
shipping containers and pallets and their contents while in transit.
These tags identify what items are in a container or pallet and
continuously transmit that information through radio signals, which can
be read electronically using hand-held scanners or fixed interrogators
placed at various points along supply routes.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Lack of
Accountability Over Materiel During Redeployment, GAO/NSIAD-92-258
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992).
[3] Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final
Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: April 1992).
[4] Department of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action
Report: Report to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2000).