Military Transformation
The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades
Gao ID: GAO-04-188 December 12, 2003
The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades, into lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces. Because Stryker brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an evaluation of the design, to include deployment of the brigade and execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The act also required the Secretary of Defense to certify that the evaluation results indicate the design is both operationally effective and suitable. As one in a series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of Defense met legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both the operational effectiveness and suitability of the brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's performance was during the evaluation, and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues identified during the evaluation.
The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the plan's approval from the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and from April through May 2003, the brigade deployed to the evaluation sites and conducted combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats--from major theater of war to security and stability operations. In September 2003, OSD certified to Congress that the brigade design is both operationally effective and suitable. The Army has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq. The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell that used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the brigade's performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and submitted a report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design as operationally effective and operationally suitable. The commander noted that performance difficulties were due to an accelerated fielding schedule and inadequate training time. The U.S. Forces Command endorsed the report. GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the brigade's performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade could perform as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities. The brigade's strengths were its ability to conduct combat missions, including deployment using different transportation modes and the ability to use the Stryker vehicle's speed and agility. The weaknesses related to staff planning, digital system usage, sustainment, and executing company-level combat missions. Contractors were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded that the primary cause of the weaknesses was insufficient training proficiency. The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational evaluation issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely training related, although some were related to design or equipment. The brigade, in preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted additional training to address the issues the Army and GAO identified. The brigade's training performance indicates that these issues are being mitigated. The Army is addressing the training and equipment issues for the first Stryker brigade; however, it has deferred some critical issues that have implications for future brigades.
Recommendations
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GAO-04-188, Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades
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entitled 'Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues
Remain for Future Brigades' which was released on December 12, 2003.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
December 2003:
Military Transformation:
The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade
Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades:
GAO-04-188:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-188, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades,
into lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces. Because
Stryker brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal year 2002
National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an
evaluation of the design, to include deployment of the brigade and
execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential
threats. The act also required the Secretary of Defense to certify
that the evaluation results indicate the design is both operationally
effective and suitable.
As one in a series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored
the evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of
Defense met legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both
the operational effectiveness and suitability of the brigade‘s
design, (3) what the brigade‘s performance was during the evaluation,
and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues identified during the
evaluation.
What GAO Found:
The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the
legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an
operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the
plan‘s approval from the Department of Defense Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation; and from April through May 2003, the brigade
deployed to the evaluation sites and conducted combat missions across
the full spectrum of potential threats”from major theater of war to
security and stability operations. In September 2003, OSD certified to
Congress that the brigade design is both operationally effective and
suitable. The Army has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq.
The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell
that used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the
brigade‘s performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and
submitted a report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design
as operationally effective and operationally suitable. The commander
noted that performance difficulties were due to an accelerated
fielding schedule and inadequate training time. The U.S. Forces
Command endorsed the report.
GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the
brigade‘s performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade
could perform as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its
capabilities. The brigade‘s strengths were its ability to conduct
combat missions, including deployment using different transportation
modes and the ability to use the Stryker vehicle‘s speed and agility.
The weaknesses related to staff planning, digital system usage,
sustainment, and executing company-level combat missions. Contractors
were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded that the primary cause of
the weaknesses was insufficient training proficiency.
The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational
evaluation issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely
training related, although some were related to design or equipment.
The brigade, in preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted
additional training to address the issues the Army and GAO identified.
The brigade‘s training performance indicates that these issues are
being mitigated. The Army is addressing the training and equipment
issues for the first Stryker brigade; however, it has deferred some
critical issues that have implications for future brigades.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that OSD direct the Army to complete all mitigation
efforts and apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the brigade
design to future Stryker brigades. In commenting on a draft of this
report, OSD concurred with the recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-188.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker
Brigade:
Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter Experts
to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's Design:
Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the
Operational Evaluation:
Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational Evaluation
Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for Future Brigades:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107-107 Concerning Limitations
on Army Transformation Actions:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and
Operational Capabilities by Critical Tasks:
Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks:
Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to
Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks:
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key
Operational Capabilities:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern
California Logistics Airfield:
Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training
Center:
Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles,
Louisiana:
Figure 4: Road March:
Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip:
Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at Geronimo
Forward Landing Strip:
Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint Readiness
Training Center:
Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon:
Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center:
Figure 10: Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center:
Abbreviations:
FBCB2: Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 12, 2003:
Congressional Committees:
During fiscal year 2003, the Army continued to transform its force to
one that is lighter, more rapidly deployable, and able to effectively
operate in various environments and across the full spectrum of threats
from small-scale contingencies to a major theater of war. Two of six
planned Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are currently undergoing the
Army's initial transformation efforts--one brigade, which has been
deployed to Iraq, and another brigade, which is co-located at Fort
Lewis, Washington. The brigades are an entirely new organizational
design, and questions have arisen regarding their combat effectiveness.
In the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 1]
Congress required:
* the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of the
brigade that includes deployment of the brigade to the evaluation site
and brigade execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of
potential threats and operational scenarios;
* the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
Defense to approve the operational evaluation plan; and:
* the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on the
operational evaluation.
The statute further limited deployment of the brigade and procurement
of vehicles beyond the third brigade until 30 days after the Secretary
of Defense submits the report and certifies that the results of the
operational evaluation indicate that the design for the Stryker Brigade
Combat Team is operationally effective[Footnote 2] and operationally
suitable.[Footnote 3] (See appendix I for the statutory provisions
concerning these limitations on Army transformation actions.):
On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored
and assessed the Army's efforts to conduct an operational evaluation of
the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team --the Third Brigade of the Second
Infantry Division --as required by the fiscal year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act. Our objectives were to assess (1) whether
the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met
legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both the
operational effectiveness and the operational suitability of the
brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's performance was during the
operational evaluation, and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues
identified during the operational evaluation.
In our assessment of the Army's Stryker brigade operational evaluation,
we reviewed the Army's operational evaluation plan and its associated
execution plan, and we observed the exercises held at the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We observed the deployment of
the Stryker brigade, as well as execution of certain combat missions.
Upon completion of the operational evaluation and the Army's
compilation of its data sources, we reviewed and analyzed the Army's
database that consisted primarily of evaluator comments to assess the
brigade's performance. (See appendix II for the full text of the scope
and methodology.) We are providing this report, another in a planned
series related to Army transformation, to you because of your
committees' oversight responsibility. Related GAO products concerning
transformation are listed at the end of this report.
Results in Brief:
The Army and OSD met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year
2002 National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan and
conducted an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; it
obtained the plan's approval from the Department of Defense Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation;[Footnote 4] and OSD submitted a report
to Congress and certified the results of the operational evaluation.
The Army conducted a deployment to the operational evaluation site from
Fort Lewis, Washington, to the National Training Center and onto the
Joint Readiness Training Center; these deployments incorporated various
methods, including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. The Army's
operational evaluation, held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 2003,
included the conduct of combat missions across the full spectrum of
potential threats, to include scenarios in a major theater war
environment as well as security and stability operations. Finally, on
September 17, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense certified that the
operational evaluation's results indicated that the initial Stryker
brigade's design is operationally effective and operationally suitable.
The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational
parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities.
The organizational parameters and operational characteristics were the
essential elements in assessing both the operational effectiveness and
the operational suitability of the first Stryker brigade's design. In
doing so, the Army established a control cell that developed a data
collection plan, analyzed the results, and wrote an operational
evaluation report. The Army used independent evaluators trained in
Stryker brigade doctrine to monitor and observe the brigade's
performance. The evaluators provided subjective commentary as to how
the brigade performed in accordance with key organizational parameters
and key operational characteristics. The data were compiled and
analyzed, and a report was submitted to the I Corps commander. The I
Corps commander assessed the report's findings and determined that the
brigade's design is operationally both effective and suitable, but
noted that the brigade had experienced difficulties in demonstrating
some of the key operational capabilities. The difficulties were
primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding schedule and a lack of
adequate training time. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command,
endorsed the report's findings.
Based on our observation of events and analysis of the data collected
in accordance with the Army's plan, the brigade demonstrated that it
could perform as designed, but it did not consistently demonstrate its
capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths
were illustrated by the brigade's ability to deploy using different
transportation systems and the individual unit's ability to take
advantage of the speed, agility, and maneuverability of the Stryker
vehicle. With regard to weaknesses, the brigade had difficulties in (1)
mastering staff operations, which reduced the ability of the brigade to
use all of its assets as intended; (2) using its digital systems, which
resulted in inconsistent and incomplete maintenance of a common
operating picture; (3) conducting supply operations, which challenged
the brigade to sustain itself; and (4) executing company-level combat
missions, which reduced its overall combat power. Additionally,
contractors were used ineffectively because units used them improperly
or did not provide the support necessary to ensure their effective use
in providing maintenance support to the brigade. Our analysis of the
data concluded that insufficient training proficiency was the primary
cause of these weaknesses, thus inhibiting the brigade from achieving a
full demonstration of its capabilities.
The Army has developed a plan that when fully implemented will mitigate
most issues identified in the operational evaluation, and the plan
addresses the weaknesses we identified from our analysis of the
evaluation results. However, the plan does not fully address design and
equipment issues that have implications for future brigades. The Army's
immediate focus in implementing the plan was to resolve issues relating
to training and equipment that affected the brigade's ability to deploy
to Iraq and defer the remaining issues for future consideration, some
of which have implications for the future brigades. To mitigate the
training issues and to prepare for deployment to Iraq, I Corps
developed and implemented training events, including a command post
exercise to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that
emphasized platoon and company unit operations. Observer-controllers
from the Joint Readiness Training Center observed the brigade's
performance during these events, provided feedback, and conducted
informal after-action reviews focusing on lessons learned from
Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the training, the brigade commander and
senior Army officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation
told us that they had no reservations regarding the brigade's
proficiency or ability to deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq.
However, one design issue that has not been completely addressed that
has implications for the current and future brigades involves the
current vehicle of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer--it
is not as mobile or as survivable as the Stryker vehicle used by the
reconnaissance squadron commander. The mitigation plan includes a
short-term solution for the initial brigade of shifting a Stryker from
elsewhere for the operations officer but no long-term solution.
Regarding equipment, one equipment issue involved the fact that not all
Stryker vehicles have the digital system called Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). This system increases a commander's
ability to position troops and conduct combat operations. The issue is
that only one-half of the Stryker vehicles in each infantry platoon
currently have the FBCB2 system. The mitigation plan calls for
procuring a sufficient number of FBCB2 systems for the initial Stryker
brigade, but the plan does not address if FBCB2s will be procured to
equip all Stryker vehicles in the future brigades. All identified
issues --training, design, and equipment --and the related mitigation
efforts provide valuable lessons learned for future brigades.
We are recommending that, to assist the Stryker brigade's
transformation efforts, the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary
of the Army to develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on
those issues not addressed prior to deploying the brigade and apply, as
applicable, adjustments made to the training, equipment, and design of
the brigade to future Stryker brigades.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the department concurred with
our recommendations.
Background:
The Army continues to transform its forces toward its goal to be more
strategically responsive and to dominate across the full spectrum of
military operations --from small-scale contingencies to a major theater
war. The transformation efforts, which began in 1999, attempted to
balance lethality, mobility, and survivability with the capabilities
required for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a
reduced in-theater footprint. The Army chose an armored wheeled
vehicle, designated as the Stryker, as its primary combat platform and
began to transform six existing brigades to Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams. The Third Brigade of the Second Infantry Division was selected
as the initial Stryker Brigade Combat Team.
According to the Army, the core qualities of the new brigade design are
high mobility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; an
ability to achieve decisive action through the use of dismounted
infantry that is supported by organic direct and indirect fire
platforms; and an enhanced situational understanding of the
battlefield. As an early-entry force, the brigade is expected to have
sufficient built-in combat power to conduct immediate combat operations
upon arrival in theater if required. Also, the brigade was designed to
accept additional forces that can expand the core tasks and functions
that already reside within the brigade or that execute tasks that do
not reside within the brigade (e.g., adding armor, field artillery, air
defense, additional engineers, or aviation). The brigade was also
designed to adopt a new training regimen that allows a faster
deployment to any type of contingency; in contrast, current Army units
receive an alert for a mission, train for the mission-specific
requirements, and then deploy.
Congress has supported the Army's transformation efforts, but since the
Stryker brigade is an entirely new design, members of the Senate and
House Committees on Armed Services agreed that the Army must conduct an
evaluation that indicated that the brigade's design is operationally
effective and operationally suitable. The requirement for an
operational evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act. For the evaluation, the Army modified an
existing training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at
Fort Polk, Louisiana, and added a data collection apparatus, a
deployment schedule, and an additional training event at the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The Army uses training
exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National
Training Center to increase the combat proficiency of its units and to
identify training deficiencies that need to be addressed. The training
exercises are conducted under stressful conditions against an opposing
force emulating combat scenarios anticipated in war. By Army
regulation, training deficiencies identified during the rotations and
subsequent retraining are not indicators of unit failure. The Army
conducted the evaluation from April through May 2003.
The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker
Brigade:
The Army and OSD met the requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act to, respectively, plan and conduct an
operational evaluation of the Stryker brigade and certify the
evaluation results. The Army met the requirements by (1) obtaining
approval of the evaluation plan by the Department of Defense Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation, (2) deploying the brigade to the
evaluation site, and (3) conducting combat missions across the full
spectrum of potential threats. The act also made additional vehicle
procurement and brigade deployment contingent upon a certification that
the brigade's design is operationally effective and operationally
suitable. OSD has provided the certification to Congress.
The Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
approved the Army's operational evaluation plan on March 28, 2003. The
Army's primary objective was to comply with the legislation by
assessing the initial Stryker brigade's design for operational
effectiveness and operational suitability according to the unit's
organizational and operational concept and its current modified table
of organization and equipment. A secondary objective was to conduct a
readiness assessment[Footnote 5] of the unit's ability to conduct
combat operations according to Army doctrine.
The Army deployed to the operational evaluation site when it conducted
a multimodal movement from Fort Lewis to the National Training Center,
Fort Irwin, and onto the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk,
Louisiana. The operational evaluation was held from April 1, 2003,
through May 28, 2003. To accomplish these strategic and operational
moves, the Army used various methods, including rail, sea, air, and
ground movements. Due to current world military operations and the
limited number of available aircraft, the Army was restricted from
moving the entire brigade combat team by air.
During the operational evaluation, the brigade conducted combat
missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The
evaluation's scope included the brigade field training exercise at the
National Training Center and a certification exercise during a Joint
Readiness Training Center rotation. The evaluation was constructed so
that the brigade conducted a series of combat missions against an
opposing force in both major theater of war and small-scale contingency
environments. For example, the scenario at the National Training Center
was optimized for the higher end of combat where the brigade conducted
operations against mechanized forces. At the Joint Readiness Training
Center, the brigade's mission was optimized for small-scale
contingencies where the brigade conducted operations in noncontiguous
areas and in complex urban terrain. Throughout the operational
evaluation's events, the brigade was augmented with aviation, military
police, and armor.
On August 19, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army forwarded a
memorandum requesting that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress
the operational evaluation report prepared by the Army following the
evaluation and certify that the results of the evaluation indicate that
the Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division's design is operationally
effective and operationally suitable. The Deputy Secretary of Defense,
on September 17, 2003, certified to Congress that the results of the
operational evaluation indicated the design for the initial Stryker
brigade is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The Army
has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq.
Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter Experts
to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's Design:
The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational
parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities.
The Army also established an Operational Evaluation Control Cell
(Control Cell) to coordinate the assessment activities and used subject
matter experts and observers as independent evaluators to assess the
operational effectiveness and suitability of the brigade.
According to the Army, the key organizational parameters and
operational capabilities were the essential elements in assessing the
brigade's design for operational effectiveness and operational
suitability. The mission training plans provided the tasks, conditions,
and standards to assess operational readiness as defined by the key
operational capabilities. The eight key organizational parameters are:
* achieve balance between capabilities for strategic responsiveness and
requirements for battle-space dominance,
* balanced full spectrum utility,[Footnote 6]
* reduced sustainment requirements,
* minimize the brigade's personnel and logistical footprint,
* commonality of vehicular platforms,
* reach-back,
* embedded unit-based capabilities, and:
* internetted combined arms to company-team level.
The nine key operational capabilities are:
* mobility,
* dismounted assault and the close fight,
* enhanced situational understanding and information superiority,
* holistic force protection and survivability,
* lethality,
* force effectiveness,
* reach/reach-back,
* joint/multinational/interagency interoperability, and:
* full spectrum flexibility and augmentation.
The key organizational parameters and operational capabilities are
defined by the brigade's organizational and operational concept
document of June 2000.[Footnote 7]
The evaluation linked these key characteristics to the brigade's six
critical training requirements and then to the brigade's mission
training plans. Army planners had determined that for an effective
operational evaluation, the events must focus on 10 specific brigade
level tasks extracted from the brigade mission training plans.
Appendixes III, IV, and V illustrate the evaluation's integration of
key organizational parameters and operational capabilities, mission
training plans, and critical training requirements. (See appendix VI
for the definition of key organizational parameters and operational
capabilities.):
The Army established a Control Cell to manage the activities needed to
conduct the evaluation. Participants included individuals from the I
Corps staff, the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade
Coordination Cell, the Army Test and Evaluation Command,[Footnote 8]
and a team of contractors. The Control Cell developed an execution plan
and provided it to the Department of Defense Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation for review.
During development of the operational evaluation execution plan, the
Department of the Army provided additional guidance to Forces Command
and directed that the evaluation also assess the ability of the Stryker
brigade to receive logistical support from echelon above brigade
support elements. Initially, the Army had planned to informally assess
this capability. However, after we recommended to the Secretary of
Defense[Footnote 9] that external logistics support be an element of
the evaluation, the Army included this in its execution plan. To
address these concerns, the Control Cell's execution plan included an
evaluation of the echelon above brigade support elements, including the
logistics concepts such as contractor support, reach-back, and
configured loads. Real-world events limited the number of assets
available to allow for continuous aerial resupply, so the Control Cell
compensated by using limited aerial resupply and, when aircraft were
not available, used notional aerial resupply that included the use of
time delays to replicate transport time. For both types of resupply,
the echelon above brigade elements would distribute supplies in
configured loads to the Stryker brigade for disbursement.
Prior to the conduct of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell
instructed and certified subject matter experts[Footnote 10] from
proponent schools and observer-controllers from the training centers as
primary data collectors. The instruction familiarized the data
collectors on the Stryker brigade organization, capabilities and
doctrine, and the combat training centers' rules of engagement and
safety guidelines. Officials from the Army's Test and Evaluation
Command provided instruction on data collection procedures and use of
data collection tools such as personal digital assistants.
Additionally, the Control Cell formed a team composed of members of the
Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade Coordination Cell that also
collected data throughout the operational evaluation.
Data collected for the operational evaluation included observations and
comments from subject matter experts, observer-controllers, and team
members from the Brigade Coordination Cell. These observations and
comments occurred while the data collectors observed the brigade's
performance during the various combat missions. Additional data sources
included after-action reviews, surveys, and key personnel interviews.
The Army's Operational Test Command also retrieved digital
instrumentation data. All of these data sources were retrieved every 24
hours and validated by officials of the Army's Operational Test Command
and the Control Cell. The Control Cell established a review group to
authenticate the data and develop initial insights based on
observations that emerged as the events progressed.
Upon completion of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell
analyzed all the data sources and submitted a report of its findings to
the I Corps commander. The I Corps commander concluded that the brigade
had met or adequately met each of the requirements associated with the
key organizational parameters and key operational capabilities. The
Army defined "adequately met" as the brigade's design was operationally
effective and operationally suitable but had some deficiencies, or
issues. The report was submitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces
Command, who endorsed the report's findings. Although the I Corps
commander assessed the brigade's design as operationally both effective
and suitable, the operational evaluation report noted that the Stryker
brigade experienced difficulties in demonstrating some of the key
operational capabilities, which were primarily attributed to an
accelerated fielding schedule and a lack of adequate training time.
Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the
Operational Evaluation:
Based on our observations of the brigade's performance at the two
combat training centers and our analysis of data collected during the
evaluation, the brigade performed as designed but did not consistently
demonstrate its capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses.
In certain areas, the Stryker brigade demonstrated its strengths,
including both the ability to conduct strategic and operational
deployments and to maneuver about the battlefield using the Stryker
vehicle. The operational evaluation also demonstrated weaknesses in the
areas of staff planning, usage of digital systems, sustainment of the
brigade, and established company-level combat procedures. Civilian
contractors were also used ineffectively to support the units. Our
analysis indicated that the Stryker brigade's training proficiency was
the primary cause of these weaknesses.
Stryker Brigade Demonstrated That It Is Deployable:
Our observations and analysis of the data indicated that the Stryker
brigade demonstrated the ability to conduct strategic and tactical
deployments using different transportation systems such as rail,
ground, and various sea vessels and aircraft. Upon arrival at each
destination, the brigade showed the ability to reassemble into a combat
configuration in a timely manner. Once reconfigured, units of the
Stryker brigade also demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate
combat operations. It should be noted, however, that while the tactical
deployment of the Stryker vehicle by C-130 aircraft was demonstrated,
the Army has yet to demonstrate under various environmental conditions,
such as air temperature and airfield altitude, just how far Stryker
vehicles can be tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft.
The brigade used commercial air, rail, and ground transportation to
move personnel and equipment from Fort Lewis to Fort Irwin. While at
the National Training Center, we observed the brigade conduct a
tactical movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its
personnel, supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft from
Southern California Logistics Airfield to an austere desert airfield on
Fort Irwin about 70 miles away. (Figure 1 shows a Stryker vehicle being
loaded at the Southern California Logistics Airfield, and figure 2
shows the Stryker exiting from a C-130 aircraft at the National
Training Center.) Upon landing, the infantry company unloaded the
vehicles from the aircraft, reconfigured them for combat missions, and
moved onward to a staging area. All Stryker variants could reconfigure
into combat capable modes within their designated time standard, except
the medical variant. Based on our observation of the event, we agree
with the Army that the insufficient crew size was the reason why the
medical variant, with its extra external boxes, could not be
reconfigured within the time standard. However, if the brigade had
trained to reconfigure the Stryker variants, this situation would have
been apparent and should not have occurred.
Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern
California Logistics Airfield:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training
Center:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Stryker brigade demonstrated strategic movement when it deployed
brigade elements by rail, sealift, and C-17 aircraft from the National
Training Center to a staging area located at Chennault Industrial
Airpark, located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Two battalion equipment
sets moved by Fast Sealift Ship from San Diego, California, to Lake
Charles Seaport, while a third battalion's equipment, including all
current Stryker variants, moved by C-17 aircraft from Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, to a staging area at the England Air Park in Alexandria,
Louisiana. (Figure 3 shows a Stryker being unloaded from a Fast Sealift
Ship.) Elements of the Stryker brigade that unloaded at the Lake
Charles Seaport moved to the Chennault Industrial Airpark and then
conducted a road march to the Joint Readiness Training Center to begin
combat operations. We observed the staging area as the brigade
assembled and prepared for its road movement to the training center.
Figure 4 shows the road march to the training center.
Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles,
Louisiana:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Road March:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Tactical deployment was demonstrated when C-17 aircraft transported an
infantry company from Lake Charles to Geronimo forward landing strip,
an austere dirt airfield at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The C-
17 aircraft landed at the forward landing strip, and the infantry
company demonstrated the ability to quickly unload its vehicles and
personnel by moving to the tactical assembly area in about 10 minutes.
(Figure 5 shows a C-17 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) A
Stryker infantry company also demonstrated the ability to travel into
combat operations in a C-130 aircraft. (Figure 6 shows the loading of
an infantry company and its vehicles onto C-130 aircraft at Geronimo
forward landing strip.) The Stryker infantry company--consisting of 21
Strykers and 5 other trucks and trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days of
food, water, ammunition, and fuel to support the company--traveled from
Geronimo to Essler airfield using 7 C-130s flying 25 sorties over a
distance of about 100 miles. Upon landing at the Essler airfield, the
company moved to a tactical assembly area and onward to conduct a
combat operation.
Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at Geronimo
Forward Landing Strip:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Its Ability to Quickly Maneuver about the
Battlefield:
The Stryker vehicle demonstrated speed, agility, and extensive
maneuverability during the execution of the brigade's combat missions
during the operational evaluation. Because of its maneuverability, the
Stryker vehicle allowed individual units to react and move around the
battlefield much more quickly than light and mechanized infantry units,
allowing individual units to accomplish tasks in minutes compared to
hours. When used properly, the Stryker vehicle enabled the brigade to
outmaneuver and overpower opposing forces. The performance of the
Stryker brigade at both training centers indicated that with its
vehicles, it could move faster as compared to both conventional and/or
nonmotorized infantry as well as infantry units equipped with the
Bradley fighting vehicle.
At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Stryker vehicle performed
well in urban areas and in wooded terrain. (Figure 7 shows the Stryker
maneuvering in wooded terrain.) The speed of the vehicle enabled the
infantry companies to quickly arrive in urban areas, giving them the
ability to surprise the enemy and overcome urban objectives. The attack
on the "town" of Shugart-Gordon illustrated that the Stryker was able
to move quickly using a route that included very restrictive terrain.
(Figure 8 shows the town of Shugart-Gordon.) The Stryker easily moved
through the rough terrain and made it to the objective, giving the
company commander the ability to rapidly transport soldiers during the
assault. The speed of the Stryker allowed one particular company to
arrive at the objective early and surprise the enemy. In another
instance, the capabilities of the vehicle allowed Stryker units to
rapidly pursue and decisively engage unconventional forces that were
more mobile than U.S. Army light infantry units. The Stryker vehicles'
speed allowed the infantry units to fix and destroy the enemy, despite
the enemy's efforts to leave the battlefield.
Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint Readiness
Training Center:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
At the National Training Center, the Stryker vehicle demonstrated its
ability to accelerate quickly and maneuver over the desert terrain to
deliver infantry personnel to their objective. Our analysis shows that
the Stryker vehicle moved more quickly and much quieter than the
opposing forces' vehicles, giving the brigade a substantial tactical
advantage over the enemy. When operating in extremely rugged and steep
terrain, the Stryker did lose some of its mobility advantage and had
difficulty in maneuvering as quickly as the opposing forces' vehicles.
Despite the loss of this advantage, the Stryker vehicle was nonetheless
mobile enough to allow a company to quickly reposition and destroy a
platoon of guerrilla forces running through rough terrain. The
Stryker's speed enabled the infantry unit to quickly move into its
attack position after changes in the battlefield. Because of this
speed, the vehicle potentially provides a commander more time to react
since less time is spent moving from one location to another.
Brigade's Staff Performance Was Inconsistent:
On the basis of our analysis of the data, as a collective organization,
the brigade staff[Footnote 11] was unable to consistently perform in
accordance with Army doctrine, hindering the ability of the Stryker
brigade to first fully see and then understand the battle space. Staff
processes, both the integration of the entire staff and those internal
to specific sections, affected the ability of the brigade to produce
and execute synchronized plans. The Stryker brigade did display the
ability to integrate and collect information, but not consistently. The
observer-controllers generally identified training time as the primary
cause for the weaknesses.
Army doctrine prescribes a manner in which staffs should develop battle
plans. This military decision-making process requires incorporation of
all staff elements in a collective effort to synchronize all of the
brigade's assets. Although the brigade staff gained experience and
improved by going through the process over the course of the
evaluation, they did not consistently integrate all of the staff
sections and key subsections, including information operations, fire
support, and intelligence. Because all of these assets were not
incorporated into the planning process, the brigade had difficulty in
using its capabilities according to doctrine.
The Stryker brigade displayed the ability to integrate information from
multiple sources. However, managing the flow of the information and
disseminating it throughout the brigade was difficult. For example, the
brigade Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron
provided more information than the brigade staff could process. Because
the staff's proficiency level to manage the information was low, the
ability to analyze and present a common operational picture was
reduced.
The staff's performance affected all units within the brigade.
Commanders were not given well-developed planning products, including
an accurate initial picture of the enemy and the enemy's anticipated
actions, as well as tools that enabled the application of all of the
brigade's organic combat capability. Although they were still able to
conduct combat missions, the brigade did not perform to the best of its
capabilities.
Synchronization of the brigade's intelligence collection effort was
inconsistent. Unlike traditional Army units, the Stryker brigade has a
very robust intelligence collection capability that includes unique
tools such as unmanned aerial vehicles; nonlethal effects capabilities
such as civil affairs, psychological operations, and legal personnel;
and a Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron.
Because the efforts were not synchronized, intelligence collection
assets were not consistently used in an efficient manner, resulting in
areas not being observed or other areas receiving redundant coverage.
Also, the reconnaissance squadron sometimes operated independently of
the brigade's guidance, resulting in a failure to obtain needed
information.
Using the Digital Systems Proved Difficult for the Brigade:
The operational evaluation demonstrated that the brigade had not
mastered the use of its digital systems. The proper use and employment
of the various digital systems increase the commanders' ability to
position troops and conduct combat operations. However, our analysis
shows that a combination of either not using established procedures or
not having established procedures, as well as a lack of familiarity
with the systems, prevented full exploitation of the systems'
capabilities.
During the evaluation, a lack of familiarity with the systems and a
lack of standardized procedures contributed to the brigade's inability
to fully maximize the capabilities of its digital systems. Brigade
leaders and staff struggled with acquiring data and interpreting it in
a timely manner. If the staff had properly used the various digital
systems, the commanders' ability to position troops and conduct combat
operations would have been increased.
Digital systems were not available for all elements of the brigade,
including augmenting units. Not all staff sections and subsections
possessed the FBCB2 system,[Footnote 12] hindering staff planning
operations. At the platoon level, only the platoon leader and platoon
sergeant Stryker vehicles are equipped with the FBCB2 system. Further,
when infantry personnel dismount, they have no direct digital
connectivity to the FBCB2 system. As a result, the non-FBCB2-equipped
Stryker vehicles and dismounted infantry did not possess the same level
of situational awareness that Stryker vehicles equipped with the FBCB2
system did. Additionally, augmenting units such as armor and aviation
did not arrive with the FBCB2 system, so the brigade attached a liaison
element equipped with the system. Because the augmenting units did not
have the system, the Stryker brigade had to provide analog control
measures so that the augmenting unit would know the brigade's plan.
The FBCB2 system was not consistently updated to provide a current view
of the battle space. Although the FBCB2 system automatically tracks the
location of vehicles equipped with the system, enemy positions and the
location of friendly dismounted infantry must be entered manually.
While this capability exists, updating this information was not
consistently done.
The brigade did not consistently use predesignated formats in the FBCB2
system, affecting the information flow into other systems. To
communicate with the Army Battle Command System, the FBCB2 system has a
predesignated message format. Units found these formats cumbersome and
opted instead to use either analog means or the free-text feature in
the system. Not using the predesignated format made updating the other
systems inefficient, because operators had to transfer information from
the free text into the Army Battle Command System. Additionally,
because free text did not automatically update the information in the
other systems, the view of the battle space was inaccurate.
Not using the information available in the FBCB2 system was also an
issue. For example, there were several instances where individual
Stryker vehicles and an entire Stryker unit conducted movement through
a minefield that had been entered into the system. These movements
either delayed combat operations or resulted in casualties. Another
example was movement of unit vehicles down a route that was congested.
The system provided the unit information that the route was congested;
yet the driver ignored the information and moved down the route.
Sustaining the Brigade Was Challenging:
During the evaluation, the brigade experienced difficulties in
conducting supply operations because components within the brigade did
not or were unable to follow the established procedures. Support to the
Stryker brigade is distribution based, meaning that instead of keeping
supplies on hand, the brigade is designed to receive a near-continuous
flow of anticipated supplies through the supply chain. The areas of the
supply chain assessed were the organic sustainment provided by the
brigade support battalion and the external logistics support provided
by the echelon above brigade. Because these two support areas are
linked, supply requests from the brigade impact the ability of the
echelon above brigade elements to provide the necessary anticipatory
logistics. Conversely, incorrect supplies sent from the echelon above
brigade elements to the brigade affected the ability of the brigade to
distribute supplies to its units. When units made proper requests, the
process worked correctly. However, the inability to make proper
requests affected the ability of the entire supply chain to provide
support to the brigade.
Difficulties in maintaining a flow of supplies began at the individual
unit level and affected the entire logistics flow. We determined
through our analysis of the observer-controller comments that units had
difficulty adapting to the just-in-time system. Commanders were
uncomfortable maintaining supplies below 50 percent of their full
operational requirement and, during those situations, often placed
emergency resupply requests to the brigade support battalion. Units
also had difficulty using the digital systems to request resupply
because they lacked familiarity with the systems, connectivity issues
impeded performance, or reporting formats did not adequately address
their logistics needs. While the units were able, at times, to adopt
work-around solutions, the effect was a disruption of the intended flow
of supplies.
The brigade support battalion struggled to perform its dual function of
acting as a conduit for its requests and the distribution point for
supplies between the echelon above brigade support structure and the
brigade. One difficulty faced by the support battalion was the need to
reconfigure supplies received from the echelon above brigade support
structure. Unit supply requests did not adequately reflect its needs;
therefore, the anticipatory loads sent from the echelon above brigade
support structure did not contain the correct supplies in the correct
amounts and configurations. As a result, the brigade support battalion
had to reconfigure the supplies it had available as well as those that
it had received. Supply distribution occurred as available, as opposed
to a set schedule, resulting in the support battalion having
insufficient transportation assets to deliver all needed supplies in a
timely manner. Figure 9 shows the brigade support battalion at the
National Training Center.
Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The brigade also had difficulty providing supplies to units when the
support battalion was moving to a new location. The evaluation showed
that when stationary, the support battalion successfully established
alternate supply points for brigade units. (Figure 10 shows an example
of an alternate supply point at the National Training Center.) However,
when the support battalion moved, the brigade did not adequately
provide for alternate distribution points. Had this issue been
addressed, the brigade would have had the ability to adequately supply
its units during the support battalion's relocation.
Figure 10: Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Stryker Companies Had Problems Executing Combat Missions:
Although Stryker companies were able to exercise and achieve some
degree of success conducting combat operations at both training
centers, many of their capabilities were not consistently used. Areas
of concern included tracking dismounted infantry, performance of
antitank systems, and challenges linking fire support elements to the
artillery battalion. Our analysis of the data showed that limited
training time and a lack of standard operating procedures contributed
to the companies' inability to consistently use their combat
capabilities. Placing more emphasis on the planning and rehearsal of
operations, as well as developing and practicing internal tactics,
techniques, and procedures, could mitigate these deficiencies.
Tracking dismounted infantry was an area of concern. Dismounted
infantry squads do not carry digital systems, so units can only
maintain awareness of dismounted infantry locations by entering reports
from analog systems into digital systems. Uncertainty about the
location of dismounts hindered the ability of companies to use their
mortars, reducing the overall application of their combat power.
Despite the inability to track dismounts noted in observer-controller
comments, one unit at the National Training Center was able to rapidly
update the location of dismounts into the digital systems by using a
process it had developed, indicating that this issue can be corrected.
Performance of antitank systems had mixed results. At the National
Training Center, observer-controller comments were overwhelmingly
supportive of the Javelin system, noting how it provided the dismounted
infantry the capability to destroy armored forces. However, at the same
time, observer-controllers at both training centers expressed concerns
that the brigade antitank company and the organic mobile gun system
platoon, consisting of a substitute Stryker antitank system, were not
positioned properly to optimize their capability. The cause for this
was attributed to a lack of situational understanding.
Fire support elements, the link between infantry units and the field
artillery battalion, also faced challenges in requesting and delivering
brigade-level indirect fires. At both training centers, brigade units
were not using their digital capabilities. Instead of using the
digitized artillery command, control, and communication system, fire
supporters were using radios and plain text messages on the FBCB2
system to call for fires, which required soldiers at the receiving end
of the request to enter the information manually and increased the time
to deliver fires. Observer-controllers at both training centers
identified contributing factors such as a lack of a detailed digital
standard operating procedure for fire supporters and the lack of
familiarity and experience with the digitized artillery command and
control system.
Contractors Were Not Always Used Effectively:
Although in most instances contractor contributions were positive, our
analysis identified instances where the contractors were used
ineffectively because units used them improperly or did not provide the
support necessary to ensure their effective use.
Unit personnel perform regularly scheduled routine maintenance on their
vehicles and equipment systems according to Army standardized
maintenance manuals and unit operating procedures. However, the Stryker
brigade requires a significant use of contractors to maintain and
repair the unit's newest systems, such as the Stryker vehicles and
their remote weapon systems, and the digitized FBCB2 system. Use of
contractors to maintain and repair the Army's newest systems is not
unique to the Stryker brigade. For example, we previously reported that
the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Iraq with around 60 contractors
to support the division's digitized equipment.[Footnote 13] Within the
Stryker brigade, contractors are placed in combat repair teams and
generally co-located with the individual battalions and in sections
within the brigade support battalion with the primary mission of
maintaining specific systems according to the support contract awarded.
The brigade is to provide the contractors with necessary support,
including rations, water, and equipment items such as night vision
goggles and protective clothing.
During the evaluation, contractors assigned to the battalion combat
repair teams responded quickly to maintenance issues. These personnel
were commended for their ability to quickly fix damaged Stryker
vehicles and for reducing the amount of time a vehicle was unavailable
to the unit for combat operations. As a result of the contractors'
responsiveness, some units relaxed their emphasis on unit-level
maintenance and became overly dependent on the contractors. In
analyzing the data, we found instances where contractors were used
ineffectively. For example, we found that some units bypassed standard
Army maintenance procedures and requested contractor support to conduct
maintenance that should have been conducted by the unit's organic
maintenance personnel.
We also noted that transporting the contractors to support the
reconnaissance squadron proved difficult because the squadron was
spread across the battlefield and was responsible for the largest
operational area. The brigade placed contractors in combat repair teams
that were, in turn, attached to the individual battalions. The
battalions are responsible for the contractors' security, logistics,
and transportation. The location of the combat repair teams on the
battlefield determines the ability of the contractors to get quickly to
where they are needed.
Also, contractors could not be used in some instances because the
brigade did not provide the contractors with night vision goggles,
impeding their ability to move to units during periods of limited
visibility. Additionally, protective clothing and equipment for the
contractors were not provided, which precluded the contractors from
performing their responsibilities after chemical attacks. The
mitigation plan addresses those issues relating to not using
contractors effectively.
Insufficient Training Proficiency Primary Reason for Operational
Evaluation Weaknesses:
Our analysis of the data collected during the operational evaluation
indicated that the brigade's training proficiency was insufficient to
fully demonstrate the brigade's entire capabilities across the full
spectrum of combat missions. The comments from the observer-controllers
and subject matter experts confirmed this conclusion because their
comments generally identified training as a major contributor to the
identified weaknesses. Moreover, the Army's final operational
evaluation report identified training as a limitation of the
operational evaluation. The brigade had never trained as a brigade-
sized unit until it reached the National Training Center and only three
of six battalions had undergone an external evaluation prior to the
rotation. According to the Army, the Stryker brigade needed 15 weeks of
unit training after receiving its last vehicles and this did not occur.
In fact, the brigade was still receiving Stryker variants at the end of
the National Training Center exercise.
In May 2002,[Footnote 14] we reported that Fort Lewis training
officials would have preferred a full 6 months to train after receiving
most of the new Stryker vehicles. This also did not occur. Most
brigades in the Army begin training for their deployment to a combat
training center, such as the National Training Center, 4 to 6 months
ahead of time. We also reported that the need to train Stryker brigade
soldiers in digital systems was posing a challenge because the
brigade's design requires digitization to maintain the critical
situational awareness capability. These systems use sophisticated
technology that allows the soldiers to achieve superior battlefield
information enabling them to engage the enemy long before coming into
contact. Our analysis of the operational evaluation concludes that 1
year later, the brigade still had not mastered the use of its digital
systems.
Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational Evaluation
Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for Future Brigades:
The Army is implementing a risk management plan to mitigate most issues
identified in the operational evaluation, which generally correspond
with the weaknesses we identified. The Army concluded that the issues
were largely training related, but it also identified a few as design
or equipment related. Although the Army developed, and is implementing,
a plan that will mitigate most of the identified issues, the Army's
immediate focus was to resolve those training and equipment issues that
affected the brigade's ability to deploy to Iraq. It deferred for
future consideration the remaining issues and decisions that have
implications for the future brigades.
Based on its analysis of the operational evaluation report, the Army
first developed a matrix that assigned a risk level to issues and
determined whether issues would preclude the Stryker brigade from a
scheduled deployment or could be addressed in the future. It then
developed a mitigation plan to address all issues identified.
To mitigate the identified training issues and to prepare for the
brigade's deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented an 8-
week modular predeployment training event that included a command post
exercise to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that
emphasized platoon and company operations. The training addressed four
general issues identified from the operational evaluation:
* Army Battle Command System interoperability and connectivity,
* staff operations and synchronization,
* application of doctrine in unit operations, and:
* subordinate unit specific training.
Furthermore, the command post and field training post exercises were to
ensure that the brigade:
* was proficient in stability and support operation tasks as specified
by the combatant commander,
* validated the interoperability of newly fielded systems and
equipment,
* validated the integration of newly assigned soldiers and leaders and
attached units such as the assigned aviation task force,
* exercised the staff planning and battle command process using the
digital and communications systems to refine the staff planning
process,
* exercised distributed logistics in a complex environment, and:
* exercised force protection and accountability of contractors on the
battlefield.
To help the brigade achieve the training objectives, U.S. Forces
Command provided observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training
Center to provide feedback and conduct informal after-action reviews
focused on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A senior
training center official stated that 40 to 50 percent of the observer-
controllers had participated in the operational evaluation segment held
at the Joint Readiness Training Center. During the command post
exercise, the observer-controllers viewed the planning and execution of
the brigade and battalion staffs, and during the field training
exercise, they viewed the conduct of assigned company-level combat
missions.
After completing the training, the brigade commander assessed the
brigade as fully trained to perform its combat tasks. The brigade
commander concluded the brigade was:
* completely retrained on those issues identified from the operational
evaluation with a focus on applicability to planned missions in Iraq
and:
* fully prepared to deploy.
After the training events were completed, we discussed the brigade's
level of training and readiness with the brigade commander and senior
Army officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation. All
reported no reservations regarding the proficiency of the brigade and
its ability to deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. One senior
training official opined that the Stryker brigade is as well trained as
any unit he has observed and that the unit can operate in any threat
environment. Moreover, the issues the Army identified in its risk
management matrix and exercised during its predeployment training
addressed the weaknesses we identified in our observations and analysis
of the operational evaluation. The brigade's performance indicates that
the issues and weaknesses are being mitigated.
However, the Army is not fully addressing the potential brigade design
and the brigade equipment issues identified from the operational
evaluation, which were not included in the predeployment training,
although the issues have implications for future brigades. According to
the Army staff, the issues that were nondeployment related are still
under consideration. One identified design issue that has both
deployment and long-term implications was associated with the mobility
and survivability of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer.
Currently, this staff officer's mobile command post is a High Mobility
Multi-Wheeled Vehicle. The operational evaluation concluded that the
operations officer could not sustain the mobility pace of the
reconnaissance commander and the commander's Stryker vehicle. The
evaluation also concluded that the threat requires armored protection
for this key individual. The short-term solution is to consider
providing a Stryker vehicle to the operations officer from brigade
maintenance spares or other sources, such as another unit in the
brigade. The mitigation plan includes no long-term solution, including
purchasing additional Strykers. This issue is being considered through
normal Army processes to determine a long-term solution that may affect
requirements for future brigades.
An equipment issue that is not addressed in the mitigation plan, but
has implications for future brigades, is that not all Stryker vehicles
are equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. Only
two of the four Stryker vehicles in each platoon are currently equipped
with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The operational
evaluation concluded that all infantry platoon Stryker vehicles need to
be equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The
Army had previously recognized the need because the brigade's modified
table of organization and equipment currently authorizes the equipment.
However, the Army's mitigation plan calls for procuring sufficient sets
for only the initial Stryker brigade; it does not address plans for the
follow-on brigades.
Conclusions:
The operational evaluation provided the Army its first opportunity to
exercise and evaluate the capabilities of the Stryker brigade as a
whole. By completing the evaluation and certifying the design, the Army
and OSD met the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2002. However, as the results of the operational
evaluation illustrated, issues with the brigade's training, design, and
equipment exist. The training issues arose because operating with a new
unit design requires time to develop skills, which the accelerated
fielding schedule did not allow. In preparation for deployment to Iraq,
the Army mitigated most of these training issues, but it deferred
resolution of some design and equipment issues and their respective
decisions for future consideration. It is important that all issues be
resolved, including those that affect future brigades, such as
provision of Stryker vehicles for reconnaissance squadron operations
officers and procurement of FBCB2 systems and other digitized equipment
for the infantry platoons' Stryker vehicles. Passing on lessons learned
from the operational evaluation provides the Army the opportunity to
ease the transformation process for future Stryker brigades by ensuring
that the units have the proper training and all necessary equipment. As
we have stated previously, taking action now to address such issues and
passing on the remedies learned could enhance the chances that future
brigade formations will be accomplished smoothly.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams' transformation efforts, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the
Army to:
* develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues
not addressed prior to deploying the brigade and:
* apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the training, design, and
equipment of the brigade to future Stryker brigades.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions the Army is
taking in implementing them.
In responding to our recommendation that the Army develop a plan to
complete mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to
deploying the brigade, the department stated that the Army has
developed and is executing plans for the various issues identified in
the operational evaluation and that once the armor installation is
completed in November-December 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have
completed all of the mitigation efforts identified in our report.
With regard to our recommendation that adjustments made to the
training, design, and equipment of the first brigade are applied, as
applicable, to future brigades, the department concurred that
adjustments were necessary and would be applied to future Stryker
brigades. The department stated the Army had created a Third Brigade,
Second Infantry Division deployment team, comprised of representatives
from across the Army, and that its scope included material requirements
for the First Brigade, Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division (the Army's next
Stryker brigade) and future Stryker brigades. Regarding proposed
changes to the Stryker brigade's structure, the Army is reviewing
possible design changes through its Documentation Assistance and Review
Team to determine the appropriate solution. The department states that
the Army will use this same process regarding issues identified from
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The department also commented that the Army
designated Fort Lewis, Washington, as the Army's Center of Excellence
responsible for concept development, lessons learned, and the source
for technical and tactical expertise for future Stryker brigades and to
assist the Army in distributing lessons learned from the Stryker
brigades.
Appendix VII contains the full text of the department's comments.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Acting Secretary of the Army, and the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions about this report, please call me at (202)
512-8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Leo
B. Sullivan, Robert Ackley, Timothy A. Burke, M. Jane Hunt, and Jim
Melton.
William M. Solis:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by William M. Solis:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107-107 Concerning Limitations
on Army Transformation Actions:
Public Law 107-107-Dec. 28, 2001:
SEC. 113. LIMITATIONS ON ACQUISITION OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND
DEPLOYMENT OF INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.
(h) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION - (1) The Secretary of the Army shall
conduct an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade combat
team. The evaluation shall include deployment of the team to the
evaluation site and team execution of combat missions across the full
spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios.
(2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be conducted
until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense.
(i) LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND
DEPLOYMENT OF IBCTs. - (1) The actions described in paragraph (2) may
not be taken until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the
Secretary of Defense -:
(A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation carried
out under subsection (h); and:
(B) certifies to Congress that the results of that operational
evaluation indicate that the design for the interim brigade combat team
is operationally effective and operationally suitable.
(2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions:
(A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those
necessary for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams.
(B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United
States.
(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph
(1) to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary -:
(A) determines that the deployment is in the national security
interests of the United States; and:
(B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver
together with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether the Army's conduct of the Stryker brigade's
operational evaluation met the legislative requirements, we focused our
efforts on understanding the operational evaluation plan and its
implementation. We obtained and analyzed the Army's operational
evaluation plan and its associated execution plan. We interviewed
officials and analysts involved in both the design and evaluation of
the plan from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the
Secretary of the Army; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army
Forces Command; Army Training and Doctrine Command; Army Test and
Evaluation Command; and I Corps, Fort Lewis. We held discussions with
the Commanders of the Operations Groups at the National Training Center
and the Joint Readiness Training Center to discuss their perspective
regarding the operational evaluation.
To determine how the Army conducted the operational evaluation, we used
information from the Army's operational evaluation plan and execution
plan and monitored the conduct of the operational evaluation. We
reviewed the training procedures and attended the training sessions for
the data collectors and subject matter experts administering the
training events at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness
Training Center. We also reviewed the data collection, transfer, and
validation processes. We attended nightly briefings that were provided
to the I Corps leadership from officials of each of the two training
centers. We observed various training activities such as an attack at
the National Training Center and the tactical movements by ground and
air deployments at the Joint Readiness Training Center, as well as
other events such as the commander's combined arms rehearsal prior to
the brigade moving to the training site at the Joint Readiness Training
Center.
To assess the brigade's performance during the operational evaluation,
we evaluated information from the Army's data collectors and from our
visits to the two training centers to observe training events. For the
deployment portion of the evaluation, we observed various deployment
events including the loading and unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-
130 aircraft at the National Training Center; the brigade staging area
at Lake Charles, Louisiana; and the unloading of Stryker vehicles from
C-17 aircraft at the Joint Readiness Training Center. We also observed
the loading of a Stryker company's personnel, vehicles, and supplies
into C-130 aircraft as the personnel conducted intratheater movement to
a different training area at the Joint Readiness Training Center.
Because of their doctrinal expertise and the fact that they provide
feedback to all Army units that go through the training centers, we
monitored transmissions and attended meetings held by observer-
controllers and operations officials at both training centers. During
these meetings, discussions were held regarding the performance of the
brigade and any difficulties the brigade was experiencing. To gain
perspective on the Army's analytical process, we attended and
participated in scheduled insight meetings that discussed the training
events and observations that occurred over the previous 24 hours. We
also discussed the evaluation events with officials from the Army's
Test and Evaluation Command, as well as representatives from the
Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and
the Institute for Defense Analysis.
We obtained and analyzed the database that the Army used to draw its
conclusions. Using the database, we determined that the most direct
commentary on the Stryker brigade's performance of its individual key
operating capabilities came from observer-controller comments. We
reviewed the comments as grouped by the individual operational
capabilities and, after identifying the most salient issues, developed
seven themes that incorporated all nine of the key operating
capabilities. These themes are ability of the Stryker brigade to
deploy, mobility of the Stryker vehicle, brigade and battalion staff
performance, use of digital systems, employment of the new sustainment
concept, execution of combat missions, and contractor support.
Regarding the Army's actions to mitigate the identified operational
evaluation training deficiencies, we reviewed the training methodology
developed to overcome the deficiencies and held a discussion with
senior Army officials regarding the brigade's operational readiness. We
did not observe the activities conducted during the command post
exercise or the field training exercise. However, we discussed the
results of the exercises with senior Army officials.
Our review was performed from October 2002 to October 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and Operational
Capabilities by Critical Tasks:
Key Organizational Parameters:
Balance between Strategic Responsiveness and Battle Space Dominance;
Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Balanced Full Spectrum Utility; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct
Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense &
Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade:
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Reduced Sustainment Requirements; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes;
Conduct Battle Command: No; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense &
Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade:
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Minimize Personnel and Logistical Footprint; Deploy/Redeploy by Air:
Yes; Conduct Battle Command: No; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the
Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Commonality of Vehicular Capabilities; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes;
Conduct Battle Command: No; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the
Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Reach-back; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes;
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes;
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Embedded Unit-based Capabilities; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes;
Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense
& Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade:
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Internetted Combined Arms to Company Team Level; Deploy/Redeploy by
Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes;
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Key Operational Capabilities:
Mobility; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes;
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes;
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight; Deploy/Redeploy by Air:
No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the
Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority;
Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Holistic Force Protection and Survivability; Deploy/Redeploy by Air:
Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the
Brigade: No; Protect the Force: Yes.
Lethality; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes;
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes;
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Force Effectiveness; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle
Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive
Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the
Force: Yes.
Reach-back; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes;
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes;
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Joint/Multinational/Interagency/Inter-operability; Deploy/Redeploy by
Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes;
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation; Deploy/Redeploy by Air:
Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the
Brigade: No; Protect the Force: Yes.
Source: U.S. Army.
X = annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Critical Training
Task List (CTTL).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks:
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Establish a Digital Command Post; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes;
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Urban Operations; Deploy/Redeploy
by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes;
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct a Tactical Road March; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct an Attack; Deploy/Redeploy by
Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes;
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct a Defense; Deploy/Redeploy by
Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes;
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Area Security Operations; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Plan Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Operations; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct
Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense &
Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade:
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Command and Control of
Operations; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes;
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes;
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Sustain the Force; Deploy/Redeploy by
Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes;
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Strategic Deployment; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: No; Area Presence:
No; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes.
Source: U.S. Army.
X = annotates central tasks represented by the 10 essential mission
training plan tasks.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to
Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Army.
X= annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Mission Training
Plan Essential task.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key
Operational Capabilities:
The Stryker brigade's organizational and operational concept document
defines the unit's essential organizational characteristics, or
parameters, that the brigade was evaluated against. The document also
defines the unit's essential operational characteristics, or
capabilities, that the brigade was evaluated against.
The eight key organizational parameters are defined below.
* Achieve Balance Between Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness and
Requirements for Battle-Space Dominance: The organization must balance
deployability, sustainability, and its in-theater personnel footprint
against its combat requirement for lethality, mobility, and
survivability. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team must approach the
deployability standards of a light brigade while arriving with the
punch and staying power approaching that of a mechanized formation.
* Balanced Full Spectrum Utility: The Stryker brigade is deliberately
optimized for early entry small-scale contingencies, but it also is
required to be prepared to participate as a "guarantor combat force" in
stability and support operations to permit peacekeeping and stability
forces to carry out their missions in a secure environment. Similarly,
the Stryker brigade must be prepared to fight as a component within a
division or corps structure in a major theater of war.
* Reduced Sustainment Requirements: The Stryker brigade must have
sustainment requirements well below that of a heavy force.
* Minimize Brigade's Personnel and Logistical Footprint: There is an
imperative for expanding the combat elements and reducing the support
capabilities. Strategic deployability and demand reduction must be
enhanced, while maintaining a robust combat capability.
* Commonality of Vehicular Platforms: A common platform for combat,
combat support, and combat service support echelons enables
deployability, demand reduction, and sustainment efficiency. Common
platforms must also be highly mobile and capable of intratheater
deployment by C-130 aircraft.
* Reach-back: To enable the Stryker brigade to maintain a deployable
structure with a minimized logistics footprint, it must be able to
reach-back and access those functions that can be accomplished by
higher-echelon or out-of-theater organizations. It is both an
organizational and operational principle.
* Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities: Military intelligence, signal,
engineer, antitank, artillery, and combat service support elements have
been tailored specifically to the unique requirements of the unit's
mission set. For the Stryker brigade, analysis demonstrates that
mission capabilities are best enhanced if they are embedded within the
unit's organic organization. Attaching divisional elements to a Stryker
brigade unnecessarily enlarges the brigade's deployment requirements
and theater footprint and introduces different vehicle types and
equipment sets into the structure, violating the principle of
commonality and increasing sustainment and infrastructure
requirements.
* Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level: An operational
analysis for the Stryker brigade indicates that, within the environment
of complex/urban terrain, force effectiveness is best enhanced and the
requirement for responsive mutual support is best satisfied through
internetted combined arms to company-team level, i.e., to a degree
beyond traditional practice.
The nine key operational capabilities are defined below.
* Mobility:
* Strategic - Organized, equipped, and configured to support a goal of
deploying the brigade in 96 hours from first wheels up. (Ninety-six
hours was originally a requirement.):
* Operational - Capable of intratheater lift by ground/sea or by U.S.
Air Force family of tactical aircraft. (Concept document specifies C-
130 aircraft.):
* Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight: Achieves tactical decision by
means of combined arms at the company/team level focused on dismounted
assault, supported by direct fires, and on the integration of mortars,
artillery, mobility support, and joint fires/effects.
* Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority: This
is the fundamental force enabler across all Stryker brigade battlefield
operating systems and the foundation of risk mitigation with respect to
brigade vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of armor protection.
* Holistic Force Protection and Survivability: Overall, the Stryker
brigade must meet force protection challenges through the holistic
application of a variety of capabilities, including early warning;
situational understanding; avoidance of surprise; deception; rapid
mobility; signature control; nontemplateable operations; avoidances of
enemy fires; mutual support; use of cover and concealment; and
implementation of innovative tactic, techniques, and procedures.
* Lethality: The Stryker brigade possesses a robust array of direct and
indirect fire systems to shape the battle space and achieve decision in
the close fight inherent within complex and urban terrain, greater than
current light brigades.
* Force Effectiveness: Although the Stryker brigade must have the
capability to achieve/maintain information superiority, it will not
always enjoy combat platform superiority. The Stryker brigade will
offset the platform limitations of its medium-weight platforms through
the holistic integration of all other capabilities, particularly the
internetted actions of the combined arms company teams.
* Reach/Reach-back: The capability of the Stryker brigade to exploit a
multitude of nonorganic resources to accomplish its assigned missions.
The Stryker brigade executes reach-back on a routine, deliberate basis
as a combat power and sustainment multiplier in five primary areas:
fires and effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis,
force protection, and sustainment.
* Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability: The Stryker
brigade will benefit from exploiting the knowledge and capabilities
residing within multinational forces; U.S. interagency organizations
operating in the theater; and other international, local,
nongovernmental, and private organizations involved in the crisis,
conflict, or instability.
* Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation: The Stryker brigade will
have the requisite capabilities to achieve decision in conjunction with
the joint fight in low-end contingencies such as current operations in
the Balkans. If conditions escalate, requiring additional capabilities
that do not reside within the Stryker brigade, it will receive
augmentation. The Stryker brigade may participate in major theater of
war operations as a subordinate element within a division. Again,
adjustments to the task organization, including augmentation, will be
required in a major theater of war environment.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U. S. General Accounting Office:
Washington, D. C. 20548-0001:
Dear Mr. Solis:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office draft report GAO-04-188, "MILITARY TRANSFORMATION:
The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade
Design Evaluation But Issues Remain for Future Brigades," dated October
23, 2003 (GAO Code 350347).
We appreciate the opportunity to review this draft report and concur
with its recommendations.
Sincerely,
Joseph J. Angello, Director:
Signed by Joseph J. Angello:
Readiness Programming & Assessment:
Attachment:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED October 23, 2003 GAO CODE 350347/GAO-04-188:
"MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements
for First Stryker Future Brigades Design Evaluation But Issues Remain
for Future Brigades":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: To assist the Stryker brigade combat teams'
transformation efforts, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan that
completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to
deploying the brigade. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Army has
developed and is in the process of executing mitigation plans for the
various issues identified in the final Operational Evaluation Report.
Several of the issues as stated in the GAO Report were training related
and were addressed and corrected with the completion of the Stryker
Brigade's training plan in October 2003. Once the armor installation is
completed in November-December 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have
completed all of the mitigation efforts identified in the GAO report.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of Army to apply, as applicable, adjustments made
to the training, design, and equipment of the brigade to future Stryker
brigades (p. 22/GAO Draft Report.):
DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs that adjustments needed to be made to the
training, design, and equipment of the future Stryker brigades. To that
end, the 3rD Brigade 2"a Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT) Deployment Tiger Team, a team comprised of representatives from
across the Army, has expanded its scope to include the materiel
requirements for 1/25 SBCT deployment, as well as all future SBCTs. In
addition, many of the proposed changes to the SBCT structure are
currently being reviewed through the Documentation Assistance and
Review Team (DART) process. For example, the issue associated with the
STRYKER vehicles for the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition (RSTA) Operations Officer and Troop was introduced in the
DART process in September 2003. The Army is reviewing this possible
shortcoming in design to determine the appropriate solution. The Army
also plans to use the DART process to review future issues identified
through the OIF deployment. In June 2002, Ft Lewis, Washington was
designated as the Army's Center of Excellence for concept development,
lessons learned and source for technical and tactical expertise for
future interim (Stryker) force units. This function will assist the
Army in distributing the training lessons learned based on the
experiences of 3/2 and 1/25 SBCT.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army
Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3
Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily
Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.
Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should
Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's
Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2003.
Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2002.
Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.:
November 16, 2001.
Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems
Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Section 113, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002, P. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).
[2] Operational effectiveness is determined by the brigade's ability to
successfully accomplish full spectrum missions as well as, or better
than, current forces. This requires the capability to achieve decisive
action through close combat, centered primarily on dismounted infantry
assault.
[3] Operational suitability is determined if the brigade's design
supports the tasking of the brigade to the type of missions and
environments that the brigade's concept document indicates is
appropriate for it. This requires organizing and equipping the force to
provide high strategic, operational, and tactical mobility.
[4] The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense concerning operational testing,
including assessments of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability of the items tested.
[5] The readiness assessment was based on the evaluation of the mission
training plan and the associated critical tasks. These tasks were
evaluated as Go/No Go based on defined standards.
[6] This refers to the brigade's capability in the full spectrum of
combat. See appendix III.
[7] The organizational and operational concept document provides a
detailed framework for the definition of fundamental operational
precepts, capabilities, and organizational constructs. The concept
document is the basis for the development of mission training plans,
training strategies and support packages, evaluation plans, and field
manuals.
[8] The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army's independent
operational test activity and is responsible for overall management of
the Army test and evaluation programs.
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment
of External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the
Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation
Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).
[10] Subject matter experts are usually commissioned officers and
noncommissioned officers who have extensive experience with the studied
equipment, recent unit experience, and a background as a trainer or in
training development.
[11] Brigade and battalion staffs are generally organized into
sections. These sections are numbered S-1 through S-6 and represent
functions such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil
affairs, and signal operations.
[12] FBCB2 is a digitized system that uses sophisticated information
technology that allows Stryker brigade personnel to achieve superior
battlefield information enabling them to engage the enemy long before
coming into contact.
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Operations: Contractors
Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately
Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).
[14] U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army
Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat
Teams, GAO-02-442 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2002).
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