Defense Management
Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command Gao ID: GAO-03-214 February 10, 2003The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) trains soldiers and develops doctrine and future warfighting concepts to fight the battles of today and tomorrow. As such, the Command has been designated as the lead in the Army's transformation from a Cold War-oriented force into a rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet the diverse challenges of the future. Concerns have been raised at congressional hearings about TRADOC's readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the context of Army transformation and associated funding priorities. GAO assessed the impact of budget, workload, and personnel changes, as well as ongoing transformation plans, on TRADOC's ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to the combat forces.
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC's workload has grown as a result of new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet those requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the Command's operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC allocated these and other operations money to support its highest mission priority--training--while other areas received less emphasis. The table below depicts the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed to perform its workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number of personnel the Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOC's personnel requirements. Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC has met its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, the Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas, such as developing training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC's monthly status reports, which show that the Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and attributed the low ratings primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two Army leadership panels concluded that TRADOC's training and development standards had deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and leader development programs were lacking. Several ongoing and planned Army initiatives may affect TRADOC's ability to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to reassess TRADOC's process for determining personnel requirements and ongoing efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant commands to warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing flexibility to shift funds from one mission area to another because the Army established the Installation Management Agency to manage its facilities. TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan that Command officials believe will increase TRADOC's efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements; however, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital issues associated with the plan are not yet clear.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
February 2003:
Defense Management:
Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its
Training and Doctrine Command:
GAO-03-214:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-214, a report to
Congressional Requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Army‘s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) trains
soldiers and develops doctrine and future warfighting concepts to fight
the battles of today and tomorrow. As such, the Command has been
designated as the lead in the Army‘s transformation from a Cold
War-oriented force into a rapidly deployable and responsive force
better able to meet the diverse challenges of the future. Concerns
have been raised at congressional hearings about TRADOC‘s
readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the context of
Army transformation and associated funding priorities. GAO
assessed the impact of budget, workload, and personnel changes,
as well as ongoing transformation plans, on TRADOC‘s ability to
perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to the combat
forces.
What GAO Found:
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC‘s workload has grown as a result
of new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet
those requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the
Command‘s operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC
allocated these and other operations money to support its highest
mission priority”training”while other areas received less emphasis. The
table below depicts the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed
to perform its workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number
of personnel the Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved
differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOC‘s
personnel requirements.
Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel
authorizations, TRADOC has met its training mission, but with
difficulty.
Moreover, the Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas,
such
as developing training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these
backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC‘s monthly status reports, which show
that the Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-
thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and
attributed
the low ratings primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two
Army leadership panels concluded that TRADOC‘s training and development
standards had deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and
leader development programs were lacking.
Several ongoing and planned Army initiatives may affect TRADOC‘s
ability to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to
reassess TRADOC‘s process for determining personnel requirements and
ongoing efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant
commands to warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing
flexibility to shift funds from one mission area to another because the
Army established the Installation Management Agency to manage its
facilities. TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan that Command
officials believe will increase TRADOC‘s efficiency and improve its
ability to meet mission requirements; however, the costs, benefits,
performance measures, and human capital issues associated with the plan
are not yet clear.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Army validate TRADOC‘s workload and
personnel requirements before further reducing the Command‘s
personnel authorizations, and ensure that the Command‘s
reengineering plan adequately addresses efficiency, effectiveness,
and human capital issues. In commenting on the report, the
Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations related
to TRADOC‘s reengineering but expressed various concerns about
other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall
actions would be taken.
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While Budget
Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload:
TRADOC‘s Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership
Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems:
Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Table 2: TRADOC‘s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities
(as of October 2002):
Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during
Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002):
Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active
Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001:
Figures:
Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations:
Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation:
Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area:
Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission
Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a
Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for
Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal
Years 1995-2001:
Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003:
Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002):
Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for
the Period January 2001 - February 2002:
Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
Abbreviations:
AMC: Army Materiel Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FORSCOM: Army Forces Command:
IMA: Installation Management Agency:
O&M: Operations and Maintenance:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
POI: Programs of Instruction:
TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command:
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February 10, 2003:
The Honorable Joel Heffley
Chairman
The Honorable Soloman P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force
into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet
the diverse challenges of the future. The far-reaching organizational
and operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every
element of the Army. The Army‘s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
has been designated the lead command for this transformation and, as
the architect of the Army‘s future, TRADOC has a key role in the
transformation process. TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that the
Army remains a modern and capable fighting force by developing
warfighting concepts and doctrine and by providing recruiting,
training, and associated support for military personnel. Like the
Department of Defense (DOD) and other Army commands, TRADOC incurred
significant decreases in its resources--particularly its personnel
resources--during the 1990s as the department took major steps to
reshape and reduce the size of its forces. Between fiscal years 1991
and 2001, Army active duty military personnel and civilian personnel
were reduced by about 33 percent and 42 percent, respectively. TRADOC
incurred similar reductions during this period.
Each year, senior Army officials must decide how to allocate resources
among competing priorities and programs within and among the Army‘s
operational and institutional forces. In recent years, the Army has
chosen to give priority to its operational or warfighting units and
accept a higher level of risk of mission failure in support
organizations such as TRADOC. At the same time, at congressional
hearings over the last few years, concerns have been raised about
TRADOC‘s readiness to perform its mission, particularly within the
context of Army transformation. At your request, we reviewed the
resources and workload assigned to the Command and its readiness to
carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to examine
(1) the Training and Doctrine Command‘s personnel, workload, and budget
trends since 1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on
the Command‘s ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained
soldiers to the combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned
that could have an effect on the Command‘s ability to perform its
mission.
In conducting this examination, we reviewed documents and interviewed
officials at Army Headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and
Forces Command. Our analysis of the trends in the Command‘s personnel
and budgetary resources focused primarily on fiscal years 1995 through
2001. A complete description of our methodology is shown in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC‘s workload has grown due to new
mission requirements and its budget has increased in selected areas,
its authorized personnel gradually decreased about 13 percent.
Specifically, the number of authorized personnel declined during this
period from about 63,000 to 55,000. The current authorization
represents about 70 percent of the personnel that the Command believes
are needed to perform its work (otherwise known as requirements), which
have ranged from about 75,000 to 79,000 personnel.[Footnote 1] The
reductions in authorized personnel were caused by a number of DOD and
Army decisions. Key among these were reductions mandated by force
structure reshaping decisions that began in the early 1990s, such as
’Quicksilver,“[Footnote 2] and other department initiatives that
occurred since 1995, such as reductions recommended by the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review.[Footnote 3] While TRADOC officials believe
that the Command‘s reported personnel requirements are accurate,
unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army Headquarters staff
over the accuracy of these requirements, particularly as they relate to
the use of contractors. Despite personnel reductions, the Command‘s
primary funding source--operations and maintenance funding--increased
about 23 percent (in constant dollars). However, at the Command‘s
discretion, funding for all of TRADOC‘s programs did not increase--
funding devoted to training increased about 13 percent, while funding
devoted to base operations decreased about 20 percent as the Command
reallocated limited resources to higher-priority missions. Also, a
large portion of the increased funding was directed to hiring contract
personnel to support new mission requirements such as Army
transformation to a lighter force. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001,
contractor support funding increased by about 38 percent, or about
$317 million, but this increase did not fully offset the loss of
personnel authorizations, according to Command officials.
Amid these reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC met its
highest mission priority, training, although not without some concerns
about quality from other Army organizations. The Command has had more
difficulty fully meeting other mission requirements--such as those
involving the development of training materials and doctrine--many of
which have sizeable workload backlogs. The effect of these workload
backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC‘s monthly status reports. Our
analysis of these status reports showed that the Command assigned the
lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during
fiscal year 2001 and into 2002, and it attributed the low ratings
primarily to the lack of personnel. The impact of these conditions has
been observed by organizations outside TRADOC. Two Army leadership
panels chartered by the Army Chief of Staff--one representing officers
and one representing noncommissioned officers--concluded in 2001 and
2002 that TRADOC‘s training and development standards had deteriorated
and that mechanisms for evaluating training and leadership development
programs were lacking. Officials with the Army Forces Command--a
primary customer of TRADOC services--have also expressed concern about
TRADOC‘s reduced capabilities, but the impact cannot be fully
quantified due to a lack of Army empirical data and analysis. Although
TRADOC does not have a formal process to obtain feedback on the quality
and relevance of the products provided to its customers, Forces Command
officials indicated that they believe the quality of TRADOC‘s
individual training programs and doctrine products has declined. For
example, they cite the lack of a training strategy to support
operational units‘ adoption of digital technology, as well as the
outdated condition of some doctrine used to guide tactics and
procedures in the field. On the other hand, Forces Command officials
noted that TRADOC‘s support for an element of the Army transformation-
-the Interim Brigade Combat Teams--had been good. Continuing
disconnects between mission requirements and resources could adversely
affect TRADOC‘s ability to carry out its mission and improve its
readiness posture in the future as it continues to address additional
transformation requirements, while also training and supporting the
current force.
Several ongoing and planned actions may affect the Command‘s ability to
perform its mission in the future; however, the overall outcome is
unclear at this time. In October 2002, a major Army Headquarters
initiative, already underway, began shifting budgetary resources and
about 10,000 personnel authorizations related to base operations away
from the Command to the new Army Installation Management Agency. This
reorganization will reduce TRADOC‘s mission requirements, but will also
eliminate base operations funds that, in the past, were used by the
Command as a source of training support; thus, in the future, the
Command will have less flexibility to shift funding among its primary
missions. Another Army Headquarters initiative is aimed at reassessing
the process used to determine personnel requirements for TRADOC and
other commands that support warfighting units, but the outcome is
uncertain because differences of opinion exist over TRADOC‘s
requirements and the extent to which its requirements have been offset
by contractor support. Also, the Army is conducting commercial
activities studies to identify opportunities to use in-house personnel
more efficiently and to contract some activities to an outside vendor.
Such studies are likely to lead to reduced personnel requirements in
the activities studied but would not necessarily free personnel for
assignment to other activities or mission areas where shortages exist.
In addition, the Army has an initiative underway, known as ’Manning the
Force,“ which is transferring military personnel from the noncombatant
forces across the Army to warfighting forces to improve the Army‘s
combat readiness. This initiative, which continues through fiscal year
2003, is reducing the number of military personnel assigned to TRADOC;
however, the Command has not fully quantified the impact of this
specific initiative. Finally, TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan
that is intended to create a more streamlined and efficient command
structure, rely more heavily on technology, and better position the
Command to support current and future mission requirements. Command
officials believe the plan, once finalized and implemented, will
increase TRADOC‘s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission
requirements. However, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and
human capital issues associated with implementing the plan are not yet
clear. Also, the extent to which this effort will lead to
organizational consolidations and reductions in personnel requirements
remains unclear. These issues could take on more importance as the Army
continues its transformation efforts and, if not adequately addressed,
could place the Command at increased risk in its role as the Army‘s
architect of the future.
We are making recommendations for executive action to help the Command
address workload backlogs; better measure the quality of its products
and services; and ensure that its reengineering plan adequately
addresses efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues and is
properly resourced to support Army transformation. In commenting on a
draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendations related to
TRADOC‘s reengineering process but expressed various concerns about
other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions
would be taken.
Background:
The Army consists of both operational and institutional forces. The
institutional forces support such activities as training, supply, and
maintenance, and perform a broad range of noncombatant functions that
enable operational forces--combat and support units--to deploy and
fight in regional and theater wars. TRADOC is part of the Army‘s
institutional forces. The Command is viewed as the Army‘s ’architect of
the future“ because much of what it does is focused on identifying
future warfighting requirements and developing organizations, training
curriculum, doctrine, and people to fight the battles of tomorrow, as
well as those of today.
TRADOC‘s Responsibilities:
TRADOC carries out its mission at 26 schools and several training
centers located on 15 major installations throughout the continental
United States. (See fig. 1.) The Command also has 11 battle
laboratories, which support research and development activities
associated with weapon systems and combat operations. The schools and
battle laboratories specialize in developing and testing warfighting
capabilities such as air defense, armor, artillery, aviation, infantry,
and transportation. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was authorized
about 36,500 military personnel and 18,700 civilian personnel.
Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In general, TRADOC‘s overall mission focuses on five primary areas:
* Combat Development. Through its combat development mission, TRADOC
identifies needed capabilities and requirements for new and existing
weapon and battlefield management systems to improve warfighting
capabilities and responsiveness. The capabilities and requirements are
designed and incorporated into current and new weapon systems to
improve the Army‘s warfighting capabilities. As part of this effort,
TRADOC provides an Armywide focus on research and development
activities and conducts analysis and experimentation. The Command‘s
battle laboratories are heavily involved in the combat development
mission.
* Doctrine Development. TRADOC develops doctrine to address the
complete range of potential tactical and operational missions and
operating environments--from infantry operations to aviation--that
combat units might encounter. Doctrine establishes the tactics,
techniques, and procedures the combat units might use to carry out
their warfighting missions; it is essential for conducting warfare.
Much of the Army‘s doctrine is found in its field manuals, which number
more than 600. Doctrine developers write and update the field manuals,
as well as develop organizational structures for combat units.
* Training and Training Development. TRADOC‘s training and training
development mission is directed at developing competent soldiers,
capable leaders, and relevant training materials. TRADOC provides
soldiers with initial individual entry-level training. The Command also
provides advanced individual training, such as learning how to operate
a tank. As the training developer, TRADOC develops course material for
over 2,000 courses that support individual training. TRADOC also
develops training material for unit training, which takes place in the
combat units. In addition, through training development, TRADOC
certifies staff and faculty associated with its schools, develops a
distance-learning curriculum, and promotes continuing education for its
military personnel. During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC trained about
323,000 military and civilian personnel at its schools.
* Accessions/Recruiting. TRADOC is responsible for recruiting soldiers
for the Army. Recruiting activities are conducted throughout the United
States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and at U.S. facilities
in Germany and Asia. Recruiting is carried out by a TRADOC subcommand
called the Accessions Command, which was established in February 2002.
From the beginning of fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001,
accessions activities were carried out by the Army Recruiting Command,
the Cadet Command, and the Military Entrance Processing Command. These
commands are now components of the Accessions Command.
* Base Operations. TRADOC has historically maintained the school
buildings, barracks, roads, training ranges, and other structures used
to carry out its mission. Base support activities have included
facilities maintenance as well as equipment repair. However, in October
2002, base operations support across the Army was consolidated and
transitioning to a new Army agency called the Installation Management
Agency was begun. Like other Army commands, TRADOC will no longer have
direct responsibility for base operations. A large portion of the
TRADOC personnel and funding resources associated with base operations
is being transferred to the new agency.
TRADOC is also the lead command for Army transformation. This
transformation, which was announced in October 1999, is a plan to move
the Army‘s Cold War organization and equipment to a lighter, more
strategically responsive force to fill what the Army sees as a
strategic gap in its warfighting capabilities. The transformed force is
expected to be capable of responding to a broad range of operations--
from peacekeeping to regional conflicts to major theater wars. To
realize the transformation, the Army plans to develop new equipment,
revise its operating concepts and doctrine, build unit-level
organizations that can quickly adapt to changes in the intensity of a
given military operation, and change how it trains its soldiers and
leaders. Transformation will touch on all of TRADOC‘s mission areas
because TRADOC is heavily involved in developing requirements for
current and new equipment, revising doctrine, developing new
organizations, and training soldiers and leaders. As part of its
transformation responsibilities, TRADOC has already played a lead role
in developing and fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams--commonly
referred to as the Stryker brigades--which are being organized and
equipped to deploy nearly as quickly as light infantry units but with
more lethality and survivability.
Overview of TRADOC Funding:
In fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was provided a budget of about $3.2 billion
to carry out its mission.[Footnote 4] This total, however, does not
include funding to pay the Command‘s military personnel, who are paid
from funds that are centrally managed at Army Headquarters. Figure 2
depicts TRADOC‘s funding by appropriation.
Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The largest segment of the budget was comprised of Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) funding. It totaled approximately $2.9 billion, or
about 91 percent of TRADOC‘s total budget. Figure 3 shows how O&M
funding was allocated among TRADOC mission areas.
Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Training and base operations were allocated most of the O&M funding.
Funding for doctrine development is included in both combat
developments and training development.
TRADOC‘s O&M funding increased to about $3.5 billion for fiscal year
2002--about $600 million more than fiscal year 2001. A large portion of
the increase resulted from additional funding to support the global war
on terrorism.
TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While Budget
Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload:
Since at least fiscal year 1995, the number of personnel that TRADOC
has been authorized to accomplish its mission has been less than the
number of personnel that TRADOC officials believe are required. While
personnel requirements remained relatively steady between fiscal years
1995 and 2001, TRADOC‘s workload increased and its personnel
authorizations decreased as a result of DOD and Army efforts to reshape
and constrain the size of the in-house workforce. TRADOC and Army
Headquarters officials do not agree on the accuracy of TRADOC‘s
personnel requirements. As personnel authorizations decreased,
TRADOC‘s budget increased; however, the increase was not applied
uniformly across all of TRADOC‘s programs or mission areas. An
increasing percentage of the budget was shifted to the Command‘s
highest-priority mission area--training. In addition, a portion of the
budget increase was directed to new mission requirements related to
Army transformation. Because TRADOC did not have the in-house personnel
to address the new requirements, the Command increased its use of
contractors to satisfy some of the new mission requirements.
TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Are Down Despite Increasing Workload
and Associated Personnel Requirements:
Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC‘s personnel requirements, as identified
by the Command, have remained somewhat steady. Yet, its personnel
authorizations and the actual number of personnel on hand have
gradually declined by nearly 13 percent--from about 63,000 to 55,000--
to where they represent about 71 percent and 65 percent, respectively,
of the Command‘s personnel requirements. Table 1 details these
personnel trends.
Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
Requirements; 1995: 79,298; 1996: 77,069; 1997: 76,650; 1998[A]:
75,613; 1999[A]: 76,139; 2000[A]: 76,409; 2001: 78,255.
Authorizations; 1995: 63,139; 1996: 57,814; 1997: 57,700; 1998[A]:
56,814; 1999[A]: 55,852; 2000[A]: 54,659; 2001: 55,204.
Actual; 1995: 61,207; 1996: 57,036; 1997: 57,273; 1998[A]: 54,839;
1999[A]: 53,699; 2000[A]: 51,993; 2001: 50,936.
Authorizations as a percent of requirements; 1995: 80%; 1996: 75%;
1997: 75%; 1998[A]: 75%; 1999[A]: 73%; 2000[A]: 71%; 2001: 71%.
Actual as a percent of requirements; 1995: 77%; 1996: 74%; 1997: 75%;
1998[A]: 72%; 1999[A]: 71%; 2000[A]: 68%; 2001: 65%.
Actual as a percent of authorizations; 1995: 97%; 1996: 99%; 1997: 98%;
1998[A]: 97%; 1999[A]: 96%; 2000[A]: 95%; 2001: 92%.
Source: TRADOC.
[End of table]
[A] Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of
personnel requirements and authorizations, and actual personnel that
are associated with two TRADOC subcommands: the Recruiting Command and
Military Entrance Processing Command. (For additional information, see
app. I).
TRADOC also experienced a reduction in actual staffing levels between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001. As shown in table 1, the Command was
staffed at 77 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 1995 and at
only 65 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 2001. The table also
shows that the Command has experienced a decline in the number of
actual personnel assigned to the Command. According to TRADOC
officials, this shortfall in actual personnel provides an even clearer
indication that the Command‘s full workload cannot be accomplished. The
reductions in TRADOC‘s personnel authorizations were similar to those
of the Army overall, as well as for selected commands. See appendix II
for a comparison of TRADOC‘s personnel authorizations with those of
other selected major Army commands.
Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC‘s workload has grown due to the addition
of several new mission requirements. A number of these are associated
with supporting Army transformation requirements that began to emerge
after transformation plans were announced in 1999. The Command acquired
responsibility for conceptualizing and developing two new aspects of
the Army‘s fighting forces--the interim and objective forces--while
still retaining the responsibilities for supporting, modernizing, and
transforming the current force. These new responsibilities include
developing weapon systems requirements, combat and training doctrine,
and training courses to facilitate the transformation.
In addition, a number of other DOD and Army decisions resulted in
TRADOC gaining new mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995
and 2001, the Command assumed responsibility for several smaller
commands and agencies, including the Army Recruiting Command, the
Military Entrance Processing Command, and the Army Management Staff
College.[Footnote 5] Each of these commands and agencies brought new
workload requirements with them. However, they also brought most of the
personnel authorizations associated with that workload.
The personnel requirements associated with the Command‘s major mission
areas, as identified by TRADOC, fluctuated only slightly between fiscal
years 1995 and 2001, as depicted in figure 4.
Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission
Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: The training component of TRADOC‘s training and training
development mission area has the single most personnel requirements and
is shown in the chart separately from the training development
component. The doctrine development mission area is included in the
figure, but TRADOC does not account for doctrine development personnel
separately. Instead, doctrine development personnel are accounted for
in the training development and combat developments mission areas.
As shown in figure 4, requirements in TRADOC‘s training mission area
ranged from about 35,000 to 37,000, with slight reductions between
fiscal years 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the personnel requirements for
the training development, combat development, and base operations
mission areas had some minor changes from year to year.
The reductions in personnel authorizations between fiscal years 1995
and 2001 forced TRADOC to set priorities among its mission areas to
ensure that it successfully performed its highest-priority function--
training. Figure 5 shows TRADOC‘s authorization allocations relative to
personnel requirements during this period. In comparison to the other
mission areas, training was authorized the highest percentage of
personnel authorizations in each year. Furthermore, training
authorization levels remained relatively steady, while those in the
base operations mission area were steadily reduced.
Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a
Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Several DOD and Army force structure decisions were responsible for a
large portion of TRADOC‘s personnel authorization reductions.
Throughout the 1990s, DOD implemented several force structure reshaping
initiatives--including those resulting from the 1997 Quadrennial
Defense Review--that were aimed at streamlining the military services.
Most of these initiatives directed across-the-board cuts in personnel
authorizations and often left the military services and their commands
to determine how to allocate the reductions. For example, one such
initiative--referred to as ’Quicksilver“--was implemented between
fiscal years 1991 and 1996 to reduce the Army‘s force structure to
create a balanced, versatile, smaller, more lethal, and more ready
force than existed in the late 1980s. As a result, the initiative
eliminated 3,134 civilian positions and 6,224 military positions at
TRADOC between fiscal years 1991 and 2001.
TRADOC officials expressed confidence in the accuracy of their reported
personnel requirements. They cite the validation of their requirements
determination process in 2001 by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency as
proof that their process produces valid requirements.[Footnote 6] Also,
representatives of the Manpower Analysis Agency stated that TRADOC‘s
personnel requirements determination process was based on a sound
methodology. However, unresolved differences remain between TRADOC and
Army Headquarters officials regarding the accuracy of the Command‘s
personnel requirements. Representatives of the Army‘s Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans question the methods and assumptions
used by TRADOC to link workload and personnel. More specifically, these
officials told us they believe that TRADOC does not accurately account
for work being done by contract personnel, and thus the difference
between the Command‘s requirements and authorizations is not as large
as it appears. They believe that contractors are filling the gap
between requirements and authorizations. However, these officials did
not provide any objective analysis to document the extent to which this
might be the case. Similarly, TRADOC officials did not have sufficient
data to show the extent to which they were relying on
contractors.[Footnote 7] However, according to TRADOC officials, the
Command‘s personnel requirements determination process appropriately
considers work being done by contractors. Although we did not
independently validate TRADOC‘s personnel requirements processes, our
discussions with knowledgeable officials and review of available
documentation indicated that their requirements analysis was based on a
rigorous multistep process and gave due consideration to the work being
performed by contractors. Furthermore, as discussed later in this
report, TRADOC frequently cited personnel shortfalls as a cause of low
readiness ratings.
TRADOC Received Budget Increases, but Additional Funds Benefited
Limited Areas:
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, TRADOC‘s O&M budget increased $544
million, or about 23 percent (expressed in constant fiscal year 2001
dollars). However, this increase in funding was not uniform across all
of TRADOC‘s mission areas or budget categories. For example, funding
for the base operations mission decreased by around $20 million, or
about 2 percent, while training mission funds increased by around $326
million, or about 36 percent. Over time, funding allocated to the
recruiting or accessions mission area increased by about $200 million,
or almost 100 percent. (See fig. 6.):
Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for
Fiscal Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Likewise, the increase in funding was not uniform across TRADOC budget
categories. For example, between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, funding in
the civilian personnel budget category decreased by $60 million, while
contract funding increased by $317 million. The decrease in civilian
personnel funding resulted from the loss of personnel authorizations.
During this period, an increasing percentage of the budget was shifted
from base operations accounts to the Command‘s highest priority
mission--training. This is shown in figure 7. This practice generally
left TRADOC in a position to conduct only minimal repair and
maintenance on its facilities.
Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal
Years 1995-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The largest increases in TRADOC‘s budget were directly related to
contracting and added mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years
1995 and 2001, the amount of funding spent on contracting increased by
38 percent, or about $317 million (in constant fiscal year 2001
dollars). According to TRADOC budget officials, a large portion of this
contract funding was used to support Army transformation initiatives.
They noted that in several instances the Army provided funding for
transformation-related activities but did not provide the associated
personnel authorizations. TRADOC did not have available in-house
personnel to address the new requirements, which effectively forced the
Command to contract for those activities. In fiscal year 2001, the
Command received $289 million related to new mission funding. Of that
total, $150 million, or 52 percent of new mission funding, was directly
associated with Army transformation and was used to acquire contractor
support. For example, contractors were used to develop doctrine and
training materials for the new Stryker brigades.
TRADOC‘s Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; Leadership
Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems:
Reductions in personnel authorizations, coupled with unchanged
personnel requirements, have affected TRADOC‘s ability to meet workload
requirements in some mission areas. The Command has been able to
perform its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, backlogs
of work exist in the training development, doctrine development, combat
development, and base operations mission areas. The Command‘s inability
to address its personnel shortages and workload backlogs are reflected
in its monthly readiness reports, which consistently show low readiness
levels throughout the Command. At the same time, TRADOC lacks a formal
process for obtaining customer feedback information to evaluate the
effectiveness of its mission and alert Army leaders to potential
problem areas. Two Army leadership panels completing their work in 2001
and 2002 identified concerns about TRADOC‘s ability to effectively
carry out its mission. Also, anecdotal evidence from U.S. Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM)--a major TRADOC customer--indicates that the quality
of TRADOC training provided to individuals has declined and confirms
that some doctrine is not up to date. Army transformation and other
potential future requirements will likely place new demands on TRADOC,
making it even more challenging for the Command to perform its mission
at its current resource levels.
TRADOC Performed Training Mission but Experienced Difficulty Meeting
Other Mission Workload:
Over the past several years TRADOC has been able to perform its
training mission, but officials noted some concerns about the quality
of the training. As shown in figure 8, the number of full-time
equivalent students per year--referred to as the training workload--
decreased significantly between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, primarily
as a result of DOD downsizing. Since approximately 1994 the training
workload has remained relatively steady, between 60,000 and 70,000
full-time equivalent students annually. Due to the high priority placed
on meeting the training workload, TRADOC ensures that the students
arriving at its schools receive timely scheduled training.
Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
However, officials located at both TRADOC Headquarters and the TRADOC
schools we visited expressed concern about a decline in quality in some
aspects of the training provided by the Command. They believe that the
Command does not have enough experienced training instructors to
provide the quality of training they would like. They noted that
personnel reductions have resulted in the loss of some of the corporate
knowledge necessary to develop training courses and doctrine
publications and that personnel who were once devoted solely to writing
doctrine are now asked to conduct training first and to write doctrine
as a secondary responsibility. Furthermore, they told us that the
decreasing number of personnel, coupled with increasing class sizes,
resulted in more students per instructor and less individual training
time.
Workload Backlogs Exist in Some Mission Areas:
Workload backlogs are evident in some of TRADOC‘s primary mission
areas. A training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout
the Command. Moreover, the combat development backlog is growing.
Finally, declining personnel and budgetary resources have affected the
Command‘s ability to carry out base operations.
TRADOC Has Training and Doctrine Development Backlogs:
According to TRADOC workload data, a training and doctrine development
backlog exists throughout the Command. Army training and doctrine
materials must complement one another so that soldiers are trained
according to current doctrine. However, as a result of an insufficient
number of training development personnel, TRADOC has not been able to
maintain the currency of its highest-priority training courses--
commonly referred to as programs of instruction (POI)--and associated
doctrine. TRADOC officials stated that to compensate for the shortage
of doctrine development personnel, the Command has used contractors in
some instances to write and revise doctrine publications. Even with the
use of contractors, backlogs continue.
TRADOC managers use a database to manage the Command‘s highest-priority
training and doctrine development workload. TRADOC leadership uses the
information contained in this database to make resource and workload
allocation decisions. Table 2, which shows data extracted from the
database, identifies the Army‘s top 13 training and doctrine
development priorities as understood by TRADOC. However, these top
priorities do not represent the entirety of the Command‘s training and
doctrine development workload. The work associated with these
priorities is expressed in terms of staff-years of work and staff-years
available to perform the work. As the table shows, TRADOC‘s available
personnel cannot complete the workload associated with these top
priorities--only 45 percent of the staff-years required for the top
priority training and doctrine development work were available,
indicating a significant shortfall in personnel available to do this
work.
Table 2: TRADOC‘s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities
(as of October 2002):
Priority ranking: 1; Workload categories: Contemporary operating
environment/force protection; Staff-years: 717.98.
Priority ranking: 2; Workload categories: Unit set fielding - 1st
Cavalry; Staff-years: 108.49.
Priority ranking: 3; Workload categories: Interim B\brigade combat
teams (Stryker brigades); Staff-years: 850.22.
Priority ranking: 4; Workload categories: Distance learning courseware;
Staff-years: 1,911.81.
Priority ranking: 5; Workload categories: Doctrine (field manuals,
joint and NATO pubs); Staff-years: 306.82.
Priority ranking: 6; Workload categories: Mission training plans;
Staff-years: 1,403.97.
Priority ranking: 7; Workload categories: Soldier training pubs; Staff-
years: 17.02.
Priority ranking: 8; Workload categories: TRADOC transformation; Staff-
years: 103.80.
Priority ranking: 9; Workload categories: Institutional digital
education plan; Staff-years: 84.00.
Priority ranking: 10; Workload categories: Interim division; Staff-
years: 187.18.
Priority ranking: 11; Workload categories: Individual training
requirements (POI, etc.); Staff-years: 1,326.19.
Priority ranking: 12; Workload categories: Total army training system
courseware; Staff-years: 35.17.
Priority ranking: 13; Workload categories: Warrior training support
packages; Staff-years: 265.43.
Priority ranking: Total staff-year requirements; Workload categories:
[Empty]; Staff-years: 7,318.08.
Priority ranking: Total staff-years available; Workload categories:
[Empty]; Staff-years: 3,294.00.
Priority ranking: Shortfall in
staff-years; Workload categories: [Empty]; Staff-years: (4,024.08).
[End of table]
Source: TRADOC.
Most of the Command‘s training and doctrine developers are focusing on
the top four priorities. TRADOC officials stated that the first and
fourth priorities are both being filled at nearly 100 percent of the
staff-years required, while attention given to other areas--such as
Mission Training Plans and TRADOC Transformation--varies.[Footnote 8]
Although many of the areas represented in table 2 have a component of
doctrine writing, priority number 5 is the area most directly related
to TRADOC‘s doctrine mission. TRADOC doctrine development officials
told us that the Command had enough personnel to complete about 40
percent of its existing doctrine development workload. A large portion
of this backlog involves field manuals, which have to be written,
reviewed periodically, and revised.[Footnote 9] In total, TRADOC is
responsible for more than 600 field manuals and publications, which
include joint operations with other military services and U.S. allies.
We calculated that as of January 2002 only about 33 percent of the
field manuals in the inventory were up to date. (See fig. 9.) The other
67 percent of the manuals required work, including the development of
at least 81 new publications, the review of 129 existing publications,
and the revision of 205 outdated publications. Of the 81 new
publications, 26 are directly related to the Stryker brigades and Army
transformation. Without updated field manuals, the Army‘s combat units
may not have the benefit of the tactics, techniques, and procedures
needed to help them better perform their missions in future conflicts.
Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Doctrine writing is one mission area that relies on contractors to
satisfy some workload requirements. For example, Fort Benning, which is
responsible for supporting the development and fielding of the Stryker
brigades, is using contractor personnel to develop doctrine for the new
brigades. In this particular situation, Fort Benning officials told us
that the contractor used retired military personnel with infantry
experience to help write the field manuals. The officials noted that
the retired military personnel being used by the contractor had
relevant experience needed for writing doctrine; however, they also
expressed concern that reduced personnel authorizations may eventually
shrink the pool of available retired military personnel with the
experience needed to fill the contract positions.
Combat Development Backlog Is Growing:
TRADOC is also experiencing growing workload backlogs in its combat
developments mission area. The backlogs include tasks required to
develop and analyze warfighting concepts and materiel requirements
related to force modernization and transformation, among other things.
According to TRADOC officials, the Command is responsible for about
46,200 combat development tasks per year. Those same officials noted
that the Command‘s workload backlog is growing at a rate of about 33
percent per year because the mission area does not have enough
personnel to address the large volume of tasks that needs to be
completed.
Declining Resources Affect TRADOC‘s Ability to Provide Base Operations:
TRADOC‘s base operations mission area, which involves activities like
logistics and the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of real
property, has also been affected by declining resources. TRADOC
officials told us that they frequently were able to provide only
emergency or minimal real property maintenance at installations between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001, due to insufficient personnel and funding.
Moreover, during that time, TRADOC shifted O&M funding from base
operations accounts to training accounts to ensure that the training
mission could be accomplished. This explains, in part, the backlog of
reported real property maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2001,
the funding level for the Command‘s base operations was set at about 70
percent of its workload requirements, thus TRADOC was able to make more
funding available for higher-priority mission areas, such as training.
Various TRADOC officials have also expressed concern about the
difficulty of staffing and maintaining training ranges. For example,
officials from both TRADOC and FORSCOM noted that the National Training
Center, which is used to conduct large-scale collective training
exercises, has not been adequately staffed to observe the training and
provide feedback to units involved in the exercises. As a result,
FORSCOM units have had to use their own personnel to augment National
Training Center personnel, particularly in the area of forward
observers; consequently, some FORSCOM combat personnel were not able to
participate fully in training exercises.
Readiness Reports Show Personnel Shortages and Effects:
TRADOC prepares a monthly status report that assesses the readiness of
most of its organizational units. These monthly reports are provided to
the Army Chief of Staff. Our review of these reports showed that a
majority of the Command‘s organizations were assigned the lowest
readiness rating throughout most of fiscal year 2001 and into fiscal
year 2002 and that 17 of TRADOC‘s 30 reporting units identified
personnel shortages as the primary reason for their lower readiness
status.[Footnote 10] TRADOC‘s readiness rating criteria call for a unit
to be rated low in the category of personnel if it has less than 70
percent of the personnel it requires. Figure 10 shows how the 30 units
included in the reports were rated.
Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for
the Period January 2001 - February 2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: GAO analysis of TRADOC monthly status reports.
A few units that did not report problems with personnel shortages had
other problems that caused them to report low readiness ratings. For
example, one reporting unit that was consistently at a C-4 rating
identified the lack of equipment on hand rather than insufficient
personnel as the reason for its low readiness ratings.
Unit commanders include written comments that accompany the readiness
ratings they provide on monthly readiness reports. The comments
highlight the types of problems being experienced and the effect those
problems have on the unit‘s mission performance. We reviewed the
comments for the period covered in figure 10, and the following quote
is representative of many of the comments that appeared in the monthly
reports:
[The] lack of personnel and funding, especially a very limited officer
presence, has put Combat, Doctrine and Training Development at risk
resulting in the use of outdated doctrine and training materials.—The
Operating Force has to compensate by developing what it needs on its
own.
According to our analysis, commanders most often reported the shortage
of doctrine, training, and combat developers as their top readiness
concern. For example, one comment stated that TRADOC needs funding for
400 permanent civilian training development positions to eliminate the
Command‘s large training development backlog. Another comment noted
that the 70 percent reduction in military and civilian training
developers severely degraded the Command‘s capability to maintain
current force training materials as well as support the evolving future
forces‘ requirements. Between January 2001 and January 2002, 28 units
reported a shortage of developers as a major concern at least once.
Other comments regarding the lack of personnel referred to reductions
in the required rank of soldiers that were filling supervisory/training
positions, thus assigning training responsibilities to less experienced
military personnel. Likewise, commanders noted that personnel
reductions had placed civilian personnel in positions for which they
were marginally qualified or not qualified at all.
DOD also reports on the readiness of the military services to perform
their respective training functions. This readiness assessment is
presented to Congress in the department‘s quarterly and annual
Institutional Training Readiness reports. Although TRADOC has
consistently reported a low overall readiness status, the quarterly
reports DOD provided to Congress generally showed Army institutional
training readiness at the C-1 and C-2 levels. The readiness reports
provided to Congress, however, only reflect the training portion of
TRADOC‘s mission and do not rate the Command‘s readiness to carry out
training, doctrine, and combat development. For example, the
department‘s annual Institutional Training Readiness Report for Fiscal
Year 2001, issued January 2002, showed TRADOC‘s institutional training
readiness to be either C-1 or C-2 for six of the seven training
categories assessed.[Footnote 11] The report did note, however, that
personnel and funding shortages caused some ratings to drop below C-1,
particularly in the flight training area. The report also noted that
TRADOC had to put other mission areas--combat, doctrine, and training
developments--at risk to meet its primary mission of training. In
addition, DOD‘s Institutional Training Readiness reports compare the
number of students projected to enter the training system and the
number that actually receive training. For this reason, the reports do
not provide a measure of training quality.
TRADOC Lacks Information to Evaluate Its Mission Effectiveness:
While TRADOC readiness reports show a significant degradation in
readiness--often attributed to resource constraints--the impact on its
ability to support operational forces is not well established and is
often limited to anecdotal concerns voiced by operational leaders.
TRADOC previously collected and evaluated such anecdotal information in
the form of feedback from its customers, but it does not currently have
the capability to do so. According to TRADOC officials, this capability
was eliminated in the early 1990s as part of the Command‘s response to
reduced personnel authorizations. Nevertheless, collecting feedback
from customers is a good management practice. The Government
Performance and Results Act[Footnote 12] as well as prior GAO reports
reference the need to obtain and analyze data related to the quality of
services provided by and to government organizations.[Footnote 13]
Obtaining feedback from customers is an important aspect of assessing
the quality of services. Without a systematic process to collect and
evaluate customer feedback information, the ability to plan and
prioritize workload based on customers‘ needs is hindered.
The Command decided in fiscal year 2002 to reestablish a quality
assurance program. According to TRADOC officials, the program‘s
objectives would be to (1) establish and maintain an organizational
structure within TRADOC to ensure the quality and standardization of
education/training across components; (2) ensure that all components
are trained to the same standard and trained to perform in a
contemporary operating environment;[Footnote 14] (3) ensure that
students can perform to training standards; and (4) ensure that
education/training meets the needs of the legacy, interim, and
objective forces. However, it is unclear how many resources TRADOC
would be able to allocate to this program and whether the program would
incorporate a customer feedback component.
Army Leadership Panels and FORSCOM Officials Believe the Quality of
TRADOC Products Has Declined:
Two recent Army training and leader development panels and various
FORSCOM officials indicate that the quality of TRADOC‘s products--such
as well-trained soldiers and adequate field manuals and training
materials--has declined. Also, officials at FORSCOM Headquarters and at
one of its major installations, Fort Hood, Texas, provided us with
anecdotal information about the quality of TRADOC‘s products that
reinforced the panels‘ observations.
During 2001 and 2002, two Army Training and Leader Development Panels-
-one representing officers and one representing noncommissioned
officers--raised issues about the quality of TRADOC‘s products. The
purpose of these panels, which were chartered by the Army Chief of
Staff, was to assess the quality of the Army‘s training and leader
development programs and identify areas needing improvement. In
particular, the panels were to determine the relevancy of existing
training and leader development programs to the needs of the future
forces. The first panel focused on evaluating training and leader
development efforts related to commissioned officers, and the second
panel focused on noncommissioned officers.
* The officer panel concluded that (1) TRADOC was not providing the
Army with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe
lack of training development resources; (2) TRADOC was not updating or
developing training and education products fast enough to support both
the current and future forces; (3) many of the foundational
publications and products related to standards-based training and
leader development were obsolete; and (4) mechanisms for evaluating
training and leader development programs were lacking. The panel made
the general observation that the Army‘s combat forces were evolving at
a pace that was not allowing the institutional training base to provide
up-to-date training and educational products.
* The noncommissioned officer panel presented similar but more detailed
conclusions than the officer panel. The panel noted, among other
things, that (1) more than 40 percent of Army military occupational
specialties did not have current manuals; (2) the Army training and
development standards had deteriorated since the early 1990s; and (3)
the Army‘s failure to keep its standards up to date since the Gulf War
had created a generation of senior noncommissioned officers that do not
know and are not executing the principles and processes of Army
training doctrine.
FORSCOM‘s observations complement the findings of the two Training and
Leader Development Panels. FORSCOM officials consistently noted that
soldiers graduating from TRADOC schools are not as well trained as they
once were because TRADOC no longer has the number of personnel it needs
to ensure comprehensive, quality training. Nor did they feel that
TRADOC had adequately developed or communicated a strategy for training
personnel on digital equipment like the new Army Battle Command System.
Moreover, they noted that some of the equipment being used for training
was not current, and thus the training being provided on those systems
was not properly preparing soldiers to operate the equipment that their
operational units were using. For example, they said that armor
officers were being trained on older versions of Abrams tanks at
TRADOC, while several operational units were already using newer
digitized versions. Several armor battalion commanders at Fort Hood
said that they had to frequently provide individual training to armor
officers coming from TRADOC‘s Armor School in order to familiarize the
officers with the digital equipment being used in battalion tanks.
Some FORSCOM officials also expressed concerns about the age of Army
doctrine publications, several of which are Cold War-era documents.
They noted that the lack of current doctrinal publications causes units
in FORSCOM to develop battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures
based on doctrinal foundations that do not reflect the current
operating environment. FORSCOM officials did note one exception to
their general observations about doctrine: they believed TRADOC had
provided both timely and quality doctrine development and related
support for the new Stryker brigades.
TRADOC Likely to Face Additional Workload Challenges as the Army‘s
’Architect of the Future“:
TRADOC‘s ability to meet its future responsibilities will likely be
challenged because the Command continues to acquire new mission
requirements that will continue to compound its already large workload
backlogs. For example, Army transformation requirements will continue
to place new demands on TRADOC over the next several years.[Footnote
15] Transformation will bring changes in equipment as the Army
modernizes existing equipment and transitions to the interim and
objective forces. This, in turn, will necessitate changes in operating
concepts, doctrine, and training.
The Army‘s plans, however, do not call for the total elimination of
current capabilities. While it is developing the objective force and
establishing the interim force, such as the Stryker brigades, the Army
plans to sustain, recapitalize (upgrade and rebuild), and modernize
many of the systems currently in use. For example, all of the Abrams
tanks currently in the Army‘s arsenal will eventually be equipped with
digital battlefield command systems as part of modernization and
transformation efforts and will remain in the arsenal until about 2031.
Maintaining and upgrading current capabilities will continue to place
demands on TRADOC‘s combat, doctrine, and training developments mission
areas.
Available budget data indicate that TRADOC could face increased funding
challenges as the Army proceeds with its transformation efforts and
continues to maintain its current weapon systems. We reported in May
2001 that the modernization and transformation of the current force
will require significantly more resources--current systems alone would
require substantial investment to sustain and modernize.[Footnote 16]
As we noted in the report, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) said on September 6, 2000,
that the Army would require
$23 billion to modernize its current forces during fiscal years 2002 to
2007, but projected that it would only have about $15.5 billion for
that purpose, a $7.5 billion shortfall. Given this magnitude of budget
shortfalls, without additional budgetary resources and improved
operating efficiencies, the Army will have to make trade-offs between
modernization initiatives and operational demands. Moreover, Army
Headquarters has not been persuaded to provide TRADOC with
significantly more resources, primarily because it does not have extra
resources available. Officials involved in prioritizing Army budgetary
resources stated that the Army simply had too many other, higher-
priority programs and requirements to satisfy before it could provide
TRADOC with additional funding.
Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain:
Both Army Headquarters and TRADOC have actions or plans in process that
could affect TRADOC, but it is unclear how these actions will affect
the Command‘s resource posture or its ability to perform its mission.
Armywide actions include the transfer of responsibility for base
operations away from all of its commands to a new Armywide
organization, a reassessment of the process used to determine personnel
requirements for TRADOC and the other institutional forces, and ongoing
commercial activities studies that may cause TRADOC to rely more on
contractors to support future operations. The Command is also losing
some military personnel to the combat forces as part of the Army‘s
’Manning the Force“ initiative. Finally, TRADOC is in the process of
developing a commandwide reengineering plan, which is intended to
streamline its organizational structure, make better use of information
technology, and be more responsive to the Army‘s combat forces. Issues
and questions related to these various initiatives remain unresolved or
unanswered.
Base Operations Mission Transferred to New Organization:
As part of its effort to transform, streamline its headquarters, and
improve resource management, the Army announced plans in October 2001
to create a new agency for managing all of its base operations
activities. The new agency, called the Installation Management Agency
(IMA), was activated in October 2002 and assumed management
responsibilities for base operations activities such as force
protection, logistics, public works, facilities maintenance, and morale
and welfare programs under one management organization.[Footnote 17]
The Army hopes to achieve several goals with IMA, which include
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of installation management
and allowing mission commanders to focus more on maintaining readiness.
The Army expects to transfer about 35,000 personnel authorizations and
about $8 billion in funding from various Army commands to IMA during
fiscal year 2003.
For fiscal year 2001, TRADOC had about 18,100 personnel requirements
and about 10,350 personnel authorizations for base operations. The Army
began to transfer personnel authorizations and associated funding from
TRADOC to IMA in October 2002. As many as 10,000 personnel may be
transferred, although the number had not been finalized. The personnel
authorizations to be transferred represent most of the authorizations
allocated to TRADOC‘s base operations mission area.
The loss of the base operations mission will result in TRADOC having
less flexibility to shift funding among its primary mission areas. In
the past, TRADOC has been able provide additional funding to its
higher-priority mission areas by taking some funds from base
operations. For example, in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the
Command moved $115 million,
$98 million, and $145 million, respectively, from investment accounts-
-which were primarily base operations accounts--to training
accounts.[Footnote 18] As a result, TRADOC was able to complete its
primary mission--training--at the expense of some base operations
activities, such as the maintenance and rehabilitation of facilities.
TRADOC officials told us they will no longer have the flexibility to do
this after base operations funding is reallocated to IMA.
Army Reassessing Process for Determining Institutional Force Personnel
Requirements:
The Army is reassessing the process it uses to determine personnel
requirements. Army regulations require that the institutional force‘s
personnel requirements be based on workload. A sound workload analysis
is needed to allocate personnel resources among institutional
organizations throughout the Army and to ensure that the highest-
priority functions and missions are funded first. Moreover, current law
specifies that civilian personnel are to be managed solely on the basis
of the workload required to carry out the functions and activities of
their respective military department and the funds made available to
the department.[Footnote 19] The law also requires the military
department secretaries to report annually on their compliance with the
provisions of this law.
However, the Army has had longstanding issues with its institutional
force personnel requirements, as documented in previously published GAO
and Army Audit Agency reports.[Footnote 20] Since early 1995, the Army
has developed plans and taken steps to improve the processes used to
develop personnel requirements for the institutional forces.
Nevertheless, we reported in May 2001 that the accuracy of the
personnel requirements for the Army‘s institutional forces was
questionable.[Footnote 21] We recommended that, among other things, the
Army use the results of Army Manpower Analysis Agency reviews to
improve the personnel requirements of the institutional forces.
While some progress to develop more accurate personnel requirements has
been made, the Army is still concerned about two primary problems: (1)
the validity of workload estimates and the resulting personnel
requirements and (2) the extent to which contractors are satisfying
workload requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Army did
not have accurate information about the size and use of the contractor
workforce. As a result, the Army was unable to report that it was
managing its civilian personnel solely on the basis of the workload
required to carry out the functions and activities of the department
during fiscal year 2002. A major issue involved the extent to which
contractors were meeting workload requirements. Although the Army
expends about one-third of its total obligation authority for
contractor support, its estimates of the number of contractor personnel
supporting the Army ranges from about 125,000 to 600,000.[Footnote 22]
Without accurate information about the contractor workforce, the Army
was not confident that its civilian personnel requirements were valid.
In 2002 the Army began an effort to identify the size of its contractor
workforce; this effort is still underway.
In early 2002, concerned about the accuracy of its personnel
requirements and the widening gap between personnel requirements and
authorizations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
within Army Headquarters initiated a study of the requirements
determination process for all of the commands that comprise the
institutional forces.[Footnote 23] The intent of the study was twofold-
-to arrive at a process that produces valid requirements and to
strengthen the role of Army leadership components in the review and
approval of the requirements. Among other things, the study team
proposed in August 2002 that personnel requirements simply be adjusted
downward so that they would equal personnel authorizations. This
proposal applied to TRADOC even though its personnel requirements
determination process had previously been certified as valid by the
Army‘s Manpower Analysis Agency. The proposed change in the process was
expected to pressure the commands that comprise the institutional force
to rejustify their respective personnel requirements and give Army
Headquarters more control over the process. However, the commands, as
well as some Headquarters offices, opposed the proposal for several
reasons. They believed that it did not (a) acknowledge valid
requirements processes that were already in place; (b) acknowledge
existing workload backlogs in excess of resource levels, which makes
areas of risk more visible to senior managers; (c) acknowledge the role
the commands play in validating requirements; and (d) comply with
legislative requirements to manage personnel requirements solely on the
basis of workload. As a result of the commands‘ concerns, the proposal
has been abandoned. However, the study team continues to seek out other
options for strengthening senior Army managers‘ control over the
process and to identify potential new policy guidance related to the
personnel requirements determination process for institutional forces.
The follow-on study is not expected to be completed until sometime
during fiscal year 2003.
Commercial Activity Studies Likely to Reduce Personnel Requirements and
Authorizations:
Studies conducted as part of the Army‘s commercial activities program
will likely lead to some reduction in personnel authorizations at
TRADOC. To help meet DOD force reshaping and downsizing goals, the Army
established a goal for TRADOC to study about 13,600 positions under
Office of Management Budget Circular A-76. One goal of the A-76 studies
is to identify commercial functions that could be performed more
efficiently, either by a streamlined in-house workforce or a contract
with the private sector. In either case, the required number of
personnel authorizations would likely be reduced--either because the
in-house workforce would become more efficient and would not require as
many staff or because the function would no longer be performed by
current federal employees. However, these studies by themselves will
not free personnel for assignment to other mission areas where
shortages exist.
Most of TRADOC‘s commercial activity studies were initiated in fiscal
years 1997 and 1999. Because studies generally take from 2 to 4 years
to complete, TRADOC did not begin to implement decisions until fiscal
year 2001. As of November 2002, decisions on 39 of the 57 studies had
been made. Decisions implemented thus far resulted in a majority of the
activities under study going to private-sector contractors. Remaining
decisions will not be made until sometime in fiscal year 2003. Table 3
shows the status of the studies.
Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during
Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002):
Studies announced; 1997: 13; 1999: 44; Total: 57.
Total positions to be studied; 1997: 4,833; 1999: 3,999; Total:
8,832.
Civilian; 1997: 4,709; 1999: 2,043; Total: 6,752.
Military; 1997: 124; 1999: 1,956; Total: 2,080.
Studies completed; 1997: 13; 1999: 26; Total: 39.
Positions retained in-house; 1997: 935; 1999: 1,429; Total: 2,364.
Positions to contract; 1997: 3,898; 1999: 423; Total: 4,321.
Source: TRADOC.
[End of table]
The studies reviewed a number of commercial activities; however, most
of the larger studies fell within the base operations mission area and
involved the logistics and public works functions. Because TRADOC‘s
base operations mission was transferred to IMA beginning in October
2002, the Command will not be affected in the future by most of these
studies. Of TRADOC‘s remaining primary mission areas, training and
training support will be most affected by some of the smaller
commercial activities studies that are currently underway.
In addition to the above studies that are nearing completion, the Army
announced plans in October 2002 to further study all of its functions
that do not necessarily require military personnel to perform. If these
plans are carried out, Army officials estimate that as many as 150,000
personnel authorizations Armywide could be eliminated as work shifts to
the private sector. To what extent this will affect TRADOC remains to
be seen.
Further, although commercial activity studies can reduce TRADOC‘s
personnel requirements and improve operating efficiencies, they can
increase the Command‘s budget requirements when their outcome results
in military positions being replaced by civilian or contractor
personnel. In these instances, the Army plans to reallocate the
military positions to other needs. However, the increase in budgetary
requirements occurs because the Command must budget for the cost of its
civilian personnel and contractors, which are paid from O&M funds. They
no longer have the benefit of the military personnel who were paid by
Army Headquarters from centrally managed funds. These additional costs
are referred to as ’military buy-back“ costs. In September 2001, TRADOC
estimated that its military buy-back costs would be about $44 million,
$90 million, and $92 million for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004,
respectively.
’Manning the Force“ Initiative Is Reducing TRADOC‘s Military
Authorizations:
The Army‘s ’Manning the Force“ initiative was announced in fiscal year
2000 and is intended, in part, to transfer military personnel from the
institutional to the operational forces to improve the readiness of
combat forces. This initiative will continue at least through fiscal
year 2003. Initially, TRADOC expected to lose about 1,400 military
personnel to the combat units as a result of the ’Manning the Force“
initiative. Since a lack of military personnel is already contributing
to workload backlogs and low readiness reports, the initiative is not
likely to improve TRADOC‘s ability to reduce backlogs and improve
readiness. Furthermore, the loss of authorized military personnel will
not free funds for the Command because, as discussed above, military
personnel are not paid from TRADOC‘s O&M funds.
However, TRADOC officials were not able to identify the number of
military personnel that either have been or will be sent to the combat
units as a result of the ’Manning the Force“ initiative. They explained
that several initiatives affecting the number of military personnel
assigned to TRADOC, such as ’Quicksilver,“ were already underway when
the ’Manning the Force“ initiative began.
TRADOC‘s Plan to Reengineer the Command Is Still Evolving:
TRADOC has begun developing a plan to overhaul its structure and
processes, and that plan is still evolving. TRADOC officials believe
that the Command must reengineer or overhaul its structure and
processes to ensure that it continues to support the combat forces‘
readiness and Army transformation. They believe that an overhaul is
needed because (1) the rapid pace of change related to transformation
is stressing the systems and processes associated with combat,
doctrine, and training development;
(2) the current procedures are too resource-intensive; (3) the weapon
systems requirements determination process does not respond to the
needs of the combat forces in a timely manner; and (4) the cost of
maintaining TRADOC‘s current organizational structure cannot be
sustained.
In May 2002 the Command received approval from the Army Chief of Staff
to develop a reengineering plan. Its draft plan, referred to as the
TRADOC Transformation Operational and Organizational Plan, is linked to
Armywide plans that provide overall strategic direction--the 2002 Army
Modernization Plan and the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. The
TRADOC plan is based on two primary goals: (1) streamline the Command‘s
organization and processes and (2) make better and more extensive use
of information technology. The Command‘s staff is also in the process
of updating policies and regulations to support the reengineering
effort.
Although TRADOC‘s draft plan has not been finalized, the Command is
considering the following organizing concepts to help it achieve its
goals:
* Implement new teaming and partnering arrangements. TRADOC is
considering establishing new teaming and partnering arrangements across
organizational boundaries to better focus its resources on key mission
areas. Command officials believe that this approach will maximize
personnel resources and expertise across the Command to produce better
products and eventually result in more effective partnership
arrangements. As part of this organizing concept, the role of TRADOC
Headquarters will evolve from program management to the integration of
functions and organizations within TRADOC.
* Establish a Combined Arms Command. TRADOC is considering establishing
a subcommand, notionally being referred to as a Combined Arms Command.
This command will focus on training and leader development. Most of
TRADOC‘s educational institutions will be placed under this
organization, which will oversee the activities of the schools.
* Centralize development for training materials, doctrine, and combat
systems. TRADOC is considering centralizing development activities as a
by-product of its adoption of a standard schoolhouse model (as
discussed in the following point). Responsibility for training
development, doctrine development, and combat development for the
future force would be shifted from the current 26 schools to six
primary battlefield mission areas associated with future combat
operations--maneuver, maneuver support, maneuver sustainment, fires,
command and control, and special purpose forces. Development of each of
these primary battlefield mission areas would be under the command of a
general officer. In addition, each primary battlefield mission area
would be supported by a battle laboratory. The six battlefield areas
would report to the Combined Arms Center, leaving the individual
schools to become more focused on the primary mission of training
soldiers. TRADOC believes doing this would help the command become more
efficient and effective.
* Readopt the standard schoolhouse model. After TRADOC was established
in the 1970s, it established school houses/training centers (infantry,
armor, artillery, etc.) that followed a standard model in the way they
were organized and staffed. As resources became more constrained, the
schools were given more flexibility to organize in a manner that suited
the commanders‘ needs and, theoretically, would make the best use of
TRADOC resources. Management became more decentralized. TRADOC is
considering a move away from the decentralized management approach and
back to a standard schoolhouse model. In addition, the schools would be
clustered or organized under the primary battlefield mission areas
associated with future combat operations.
* Refocus battle laboratories and centralize their management. The
command‘s 11 battle laboratories are currently aligned with TRADOC‘s
schools. For example, an armor battle laboratory is part of the armor
school at Fort Knox, and the infantry battle laboratory is part of the
infantry school at Fort Benning. TRADOC is considering centralizing the
management of six laboratories and refocusing them on the six primary
battlefield mission areas discussed above. TRADOC believes realigning
the laboratories, along with creating new teaming and partnering
arrangements, will better focus its resources on broader issues, such
as Army transformation.
* Use distance learning more extensively. Distance learning is expected
to become an integral part of the Command‘s training curriculum.
Implementation of this concept has been underway for some time at
TRADOC. In general, it allows soldiers to complete computer-based
training courses or selected modules of a course at their permanent
duty location rather than traveling to a TRADOC facility to complete
the course. TRADOC expects to develop at least 525 distance learning
courses by 2010.
TRADOC officials also believe that better and more extensive use of
information technology is just as important as the organizational
changes it is considering. These officials state that information
technology will be the basic building block of the reengineering
effort. TRADOC officials believe the Command has to address mission
requirements more quickly with fewer resources. They also believe
improved processes built on the latest technology will allow TRADOC and
its customers to share data and develop products--such as doctrine,
training materials, and operational requirements documents--in a timely
manner.
At the time we completed our review of TRADOC, the Command had not yet
developed costs and benefits associated with the reengineering plan,
and it was not clear to what extent the reengineering effort would
result in organizational realignments or consolidations that might
reduce personnel requirements. TRADOC officials told us that an
analysis of costs and benefits would take place and be incorporated
into an implementation plan after the reengineering concepts and
organizing principles were agreed to within the Army. The analysis is
to be completed by mid-fiscal year 2003.
We also inquired about development of performance measures to gauge the
progress of the reengineering effort and a human capital plan to
support the effort. Ideally, a reengineering effort such as the one
being undertaken by TRADOC is guided by an overall strategic framework,
which sets out the strategic goals to be attained and performance
measures to be used to measure and report progress toward reaching the
goals. Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act requires
DOD to develop a strategic framework to improve its performance. In
addition, it is important for DOD and its components to align their
human capital policies with their strategic goals.[Footnote 24] A human
capital plan that supports or is integrated with an overall strategic
plan can help align the policies and identify the necessary workforce
size and skills mix and where those skills need to be deployed. When
the right personnel are on board and provided the training, technology,
structure, incentives, and accountability to work effectively, the
likelihood of organizational success will be increased.
We found that TRADOC recognized the need for performance measures but
had not yet developed them. We also found that the Command has not
developed a human capital plan to support the reengineering effort;
however, it has identified the elements needed for a human capital
plan, which is to be completed during fiscal year 2003. Thus far, the
effort addresses civilian personnel and how the Command can better cope
with the civilian personnel reductions it has incurred; it does not
address workforce issues associated with military personnel or
contractors, which, in a broad sense, are also part of the Command‘s
human capital. Given the personnel downsizing that TRADOC has
experienced and its potentially increasing reliance on contractors to
meet its workload, a human capital plan could help the Command
thoroughly assess its personnel requirements and integrate them into
the reengineering effort.
Conclusions:
Although TRADOC‘s budget has increased in recent years, the Command has
experienced reductions in personnel authorizations that have challenged
it to fully meet its workload in most mission areas. TRADOC data
indicate that its primary problems relate to personnel shortages, and
its readiness reports indicate that more than two-thirds of its units
were not ready to perform their missions due primarily to a lack of
personnel. Most of the training workload is getting done, but a
significant amount of mission work associated with training material,
doctrine, and combat developments is not. In addition, TRADOC does not
know how well it is accomplishing its mission because it does not have
a process in place to obtain systematic feedback from its customers on
the quality and relevance of its training and doctrine. Without this
type of information, the Army and TRADOC are not in a sound position to
fully assess the Command‘s mission effectiveness, which could lead to
inefficient allocation of resources and ranking of requirement
priorities. Army Headquarters officials are aware of some of TRADOC‘s
difficulties, but, operating within existing resource constraints,
officials have had to make difficult choices and allocate resources to
higher Army priorities.
However, issues related to TRADOC‘s personnel and workload could take
on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts
and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased
risk in its role as the Army‘s architect of the future. TRADOC is
currently developing a plan to reengineer its mission areas. The extent
to which this effort could lead to organizational consolidations and
reduced personnel requirements remains to be seen. A broad assessment
of TRADOC‘s workload requirements and backlogs in conjunction with its
reengineering plans would help it set its future direction. Because the
Command‘s reengineering effort is still evolving, the Army and TRADOC
have an opportunity to establish a plan based on a strategic framework
for addressing resource and mission requirements, human capital,
reengineering costs, and performance measures.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that TRADOC retains sufficient resources to carry out all of
its missions in an effective and efficient manner--supporting current
forces as well as the transformation effort--we recommend that the
Secretary of the Army direct the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs) to work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, as part of their personnel and force management
oversight responsibilities, to examine TRADOC‘s workload requirements,
the adequacy of TRADOC‘s resources, and TRADOC‘s mission performance as
it finalizes plans for its reengineering efforts. In doing this, action
is needed to:
* reassess TRADOC‘s backlog of current work and future work
requirements across all mission areas to ensure that all personnel
requirements are identified and validated before further reducing
TRADOC‘s personnel authorizations;
* develop a human capital plan in conjunction with TRADOC‘s
reengineering plan that addresses issues associated with the mix and
skills of civilian, military, and contractor personnel;
* establish performance measures to gauge progress and identify the
costs and benefits associated with the reengineering effort; and:
* develop a feedback system so TRADOC is acquiring the best information
possible about the quality and relevance of the products and services
it provides to its customers.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Program Integration) stated that the department agreed with
the recommendations related to TRADOC‘s reengineering process without
elaborating on planned actions, but expressed various concerns about
the recommendations related to reassessing TRADOC‘s personnel
requirements and developing a customer feedback system--leaving unclear
what overall actions would be taken. The department‘s written comments
are reprinted in Appendix III.
DOD interpreted our recommendation to reassess TRADOC‘s backlog of
current workload and personnel requirements before further reducing
TRADOC‘s personnel authorizations as a recommendation to fence TRADOC‘s
current work force, and it cited resource constraints and competing
demands as making it impractical to do so. Further, the department‘s
response expressed concern that our report did not quantify the
resources required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine,
and combat developments. Our recommendation was not intended to be
taken in isolation or to suggest an absolute fencing of TRADOC
personnel, but rather to encourage a reassessment of workload and
personnel requirements as part of TRADOC‘s ongoing reengineering
effort. Likewise, our intent was not to quantify the resources required
to remedy the backlogs of work in the various areas noted. That effort
can best be done by the Army in the context of a number of
considerations. From our perspective, the Army and TRADOC have several
options if they are to effectively deal with reported shortfalls in
personnel related to workload requirements. The options include
identifying functions and activities that may no longer be required,
identifying opportunities to reduce personnel requirements or
reallocate resources through its reengineering efforts, obtaining
additional resources, or some combination of these. Given that TRADOC‘s
reengineering effort is still underway, and we understand that TRADOC‘s
new commander has recently directed his staff to focus on the potential
for reducing workload requirements, it remains unclear what changes in
resource requirements will ultimately be necessary. Given the resource
constraints identified by TRADOC commanders in their monthly readiness
reports, we continue to believe it appropriate that TRADOC reassess its
work requirements as part of its reengineering efforts.
Concerning our recommendation for developing a customer feedback
system, DOD commented that existing informal feedback mechanisms help
evaluate TRADOC‘s support to its customers. It indicated they would
evaluate our recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits, and
likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes. DOD also noted that
it would evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve
product relevance and customer responsiveness as part of the TRADOC
reengineering process. Separately, DOD expressed concern that our
report did not quantify the impact of shortcomings noted in our report
on operational force readiness. Our assessment of impact was, aside
from information contained in TRADOC‘s readiness reports, more
qualitative in nature based on the results of internal Army studies and
our limited discussions with leaders in the Army‘s Forces Command.
Given the nature of the concerns identified, we continue to believe
that the Army could benefit from a more formal feedback system, one
that, if appropriately designed, could be useful to the Army in better
determining how well TRADOC supports the operational readiness of the
combat forces. Absent such a system, it will be more difficult to fully
assess the impact of the shortcomings noted in our report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov. Other GAO contacts and
staff acknowledgments are identified in appendix IV.
Signed by Barry W. Holman:
Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
As requested by the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on
Readiness, we examined the workload, funding levels, and personnel
resources at the Army‘s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Our
review was structured to determine if the Command was adequately
resourced to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were
to examine (1) TRADOC‘s personnel, budget, and workload trends since
1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Command‘s
ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to
combat forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an
effect on the Command‘s ability to perform its mission.
To determine the extent to which TRADOC has experienced budget,
personnel, and workload changes over the past several years, we met
with Army Headquarters and TRADOC budget, personnel, operations, and
training officials. Pertinent budget, personnel, and workload
documentation/data were obtained and analyzed to determine the
magnitude of the changes. We focused our analyses primarily on
documentation from fiscal years 1995 through 2001 because we were able
to obtain more complete information for these years. Fiscal year 2002
budget data had not been finalized at the time we completed our
analysis. We also examined relevant DOD and Army senior leader
guidance, including the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Army
Transformation Campaign Plan, TRADOC mid-year budget reviews, and
TRADOC command plans. We also discussed the allocation of Army
personnel among its commands resulting from the Total Army Analysis
process. We identified the primary TRADOC mission areas--combat
development, doctrine development, training and training development,
accessions (more commonly referred to as recruiting), and base
operations--and structured our analysis of budget, personnel, and
workload data around these mission areas. Our analysis of budget data
was limited to budgetary obligations for the fiscal years we reviewed.
Our analysis of personnel data compared the differences in required,
authorized, and available personnel for fiscal years 1995 through 2001.
We also discussed and reviewed available documentation pertinent to the
process used by TRADOC to develop and validate its personnel
requirements. We held discussions and reviewed documentation with
TRADOC, Army Manpower Analysis Agency, and Army Force Management
Support Agency representatives. The documentation included
mathematical models and studies completed by TRADOC to develop manpower
estimating criteria. We also compared the changes in TRADOC‘s civilian
and military authorizations with those of the total active Army and two
of the Army‘s largest commands--Army Materiel Command and Forces
Command--to put the personnel changes into an overall Army context. We
also identified the changes in budgetary resources allocated to
TRADOC‘s mission areas for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. Because
aspects of TRADOC‘s accessions mission were added to its
responsibilities in fiscal year 1998 and subsequently eliminated from
its responsibilities, we excluded the accessions mission when we
analyzed the trends in personnel and workload. This included personnel
requirements, which averaged about 12,400 for fiscal years 1998 through
2000, and personnel authorizations, which averaged about 11,900 for
this 3-year period. The analyses that excluded the accessions mission
are noted, where appropriate, in the report.
To determine the effect of personnel and budget changes on the
Command‘s ability to perform its mission, we met with officials from
TRADOC and Forces Command Headquarters and several of their
installations. At TRADOC Headquarters we discussed and obtained
documentation related to the Command‘s ability to measure mission
effectiveness. This included reviewing the Command‘s monthly readiness
reports for the period November 2000 through April 2002 for all of its
schools and training facilities; these reports are provided to the Army
Chief of Staff each month. We also compared TRADOC‘s readiness reports
with DOD‘s Institutional Training Readiness reports issued during the
same period to identify similarities and/or differences between the
two; the Institutional Training Readiness reports are provided to
Congress annually. At the TRADOC facilities we visited--the armor
school, the air defense school, and the infantry school--we discussed
the resources available to support the facilities‘ workload. We also
identified examples of impacts that resulted from resource shortages
and obtained information about how the facilities were measuring their
mission effectiveness. At Forces Command Headquarters and one of its
heavy armor installations, Fort Hood, we discussed the quality of
soldiers coming out of TRADOC schools and requested available data that
measured the quality of TRADOC products--trained soldiers, doctrine,
and training support materials. We also reviewed numerous reports and
analyses of agencies and groups that have examined TRADOC--such as RAND
Corporation, TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Defense Science Board--to
obtain any additional observations and findings not revealed during our
review of TRADOC.
To identify Army actions taken or planned that might have an effect on
the Command‘s ability to perform its mission, we met with Army
Headquarters officials and TRADOC officials to discuss past, current,
or future initiatives that could affect the resources TRADOC will have
available to carry out its mission. During these discussions, we
obtained documentation and testimonial evidence regarding several
initiatives. These included the Command‘s commercial activities
program, the Armywide Transformation of Installation Management
initiative, and the Command‘s plan to reengineer itself. We analyzed
the impact of the commercial activities program, which is being carried
out under OMB‘s Circular A-76 process, on TRADOC‘s budget and personnel
since fiscal year 1995. We determined the number of positions announced
for competition, the number of positions awarded to contractors, and
the number of positions retained by TRADOC‘s in-house workforce. We
also discussed the scope and implementation schedule for the Army‘s
Transformation of Installation Management initiative, which is an
Armywide program that is moving base operations and support from
garrison commanders to a new agency called the Army Installation
Management Agency. Finally, we discussed the status of plans to
reengineer TRADOC, which involves organizational streamlining and
better use of information technology.
We communicated regularly with Department of the Army and TRADOC
officials during the analysis process to ensure that our analysis
appropriately considered their views, and we conducted work at the
following locations:
* Army Headquarters, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia;
* TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
* Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky;
* Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas;
* Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia;
* Forces Command Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Georgia;
* 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas;
* Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and:
* Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
We conducted our review from September 2001 through October 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions:
Since the early 1990s, the Army‘s civilian and military personnel
authorizations have been significantly reduced as DOD reshaped and
reduced the size of its institutional and operational forces. Overall,
the Army‘s authorizations for civilian and active duty military
personnel have been reduced by about 41.5 percent and 33.8 percent,
respectively, since fiscal year 1991.[Footnote 25] The following
figures show the reductions for the Army and three of its largest
commands: TRADOC; the Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which provides
unit training for combat forces; and the Army Materiel Command (AMC),
which is responsible for acquiring and supporting weapon systems.
Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.
Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected
Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.
As shown by these figures, all three commands realized significant
reductions in civilian personnel. Table 4 summarizes the reductions
that occurred from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2001.
Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active
Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001:
Active Army; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 153,200;
Civilian personnel: Percent: -41.5; Military personnel: Number of
reductions: 245,400; Military personnel: Percent: -33.8.
TRADOC; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 13,515; Civilian
personnel: Percent: -41.9; Military personnel: Number of reductions:
13,549; Military personnel: Percent: -27.1.
FORSCOM; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 10,056; Civilian
personnel: Percent: -36.4; Military personnel: Number of reductions:
28,694; Military personnel: Percent: -12.4.
AMC; Civilian personnel: Number of reductions: 41,561; Civilian
personnel: Percent: -45.5; Military personnel: Number of reductions:
5,915; Military personnel: Percent: -79.5.
Source: Army.
[End of table]
Note: GAO analysis of Army data.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
Mr. Barry W. Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management United States General
Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Holman:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO, draft
report, DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission
Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command, dated
December 13, 2002 (GAO Code 350113).
We support the recommendations that suggest improvements to the Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) re-engineering process, but take
specific issue with the report‘s recommendation that no further
reduction of TRADOC‘s military or civilian personnel occur until this
review is completed. We do not believe it appropriate to fence TRADOC‘s
current work force mix or resourcing based on the data supplied in the
draft report alone. Further, resource constraints and competing
demands, particularly the global war on terrorism, make it impractical
for the Army to fence TRADOC authorization levels until process
improvements have been implemented.
We are also concerned that the report does not quantify the resources
required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, and combat
developments, nor does it quantify the impact of those backlogs on
operational force readiness. The report acknowledges that contractors
may be mitigating some doctrine-writing workload, but forces Army G-3,
rather than TRADOC as claimant for additional resources, to quantify
the magnitude of that offset.
In addition, the report cites the absence of processes for systematic
customer feedback on the quality and relevance of TRADOC‘s products.
Although there‘s always room for improvement, existing informal
feedback mechanisms help evaluate TRADOC‘s support to its customers. We
plan to evaluate the GAO recommendations in terms of the costs,
benefits and likely accuracy of more formal reporting processes.
Further, we will evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further
improve product relevance and customer responsiveness during the TRADOC
business process re-engineering effort.
My point of contact is Colonel Sid Evans of the Requirements
Directorate, (703) 695-0813, sidney.evans@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by Jeanne B. Fites:
Jeanne B. Fites Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program
Integration):
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
James E. Fuquay, (937) 258-7963:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, James Hatcher, Nancy Lively,
Travis Masters, Debra McKinney, Robert Preston, and R.K. Wild made key
contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Throughout this report, we refer to personnel requirements and
personnel authorizations. Personnel requirements refer to the number of
personnel, both civilian and military, deemed necessary by TRADOC to
support its workload. Personnel authorizations refer to the number of
personnel an organization, in this case TRADOC, is allowed to hire.
Personnel authorizations are often less than requirements because of
budget constraints.
[2] ’Quicksilver“ was an Army initiative intended to reduce its force
structure and create a more balanced, versatile, lethal, smaller, and
ready force.
[3] The Quadrennial Defense Review analyzes military strategy for U.S.
forces.
[4] We focused primarily on TRADOC‘s fiscal year 2001 budget because
the Command had not yet received its final 2002 budget authorization at
the time we conducted a significant portion of our analysis.
[5] TRADOC also assumed responsibility for the Army Civilian Training
Education Development Student Detachment, the Army Aeronautical
Services Agency, and the Army Nuclear Chemical Agency.
[6] The Army Manpower Analysis Agency is assigned responsibility for
overseeing and certifying the Army requirements determination processes
used by Army commands. The Manpower Analysis Agency reports to the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs).
[7] During fiscal year 2002, the Army began collecting information to
identify the size of its contractor workforce.
[8] TRADOC does not track actual staff-year data. However, officials
were confident that the Contemporary Operating Environment/Force
Protection and the Distance Learning Courseware priorities were filled
to 100 percent. They identified other areas that have received
resources, but could not provide a measure of the level of resourcing
for these areas.
[9] The Army doctrine development (field manual development) cycle has
six phases:
(1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5)
print and dissemination, and (6) implementation and evaluation. This
process may take from 18 to 24 months to complete. The length of time
varies depending on whether a field manual is being newly written or
revised, the scope and complexity of the material, the extent of the
staffing/review required, and the level of approval authority required.
[10] Readiness ratings are based on specific criteria related to
personnel levels, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and
training. The ratings are measures of a unit/component‘s ability to
perform its mission. A C-1 rating represents the highest readiness
position, denoting that the mission can be fully performed. Conversely,
a C-4 rating represents the lowest readiness position, denoting that
the mission cannot be accomplished.
[11] The seven categories of institutional training that were assessed
were (1) recruiting,
(2) one-station unit training, (3) officer acquisition, (4) initial
skill training, (5) skill progression training, (6) functional
training, and (7) flight training.
[12] The Government and Performance and Results Act requires federal
agencies to set strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the
degree to which the goals are met. Its intent is to focus agencies more
on results, service delivery, and program outcomes (P.L. 103-62, 1993).
[13] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Improving
Customer Feedback Program Could Enhance DLA‘s Delivery of Services,
GAO-02-776 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2002); Tax Administration: IRS
Faces Challenges in Measuring Customer Service, GAO/GGD-98-59
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 1998); and Federal Prison Industries:
Limited Data Available on Customer Satisfaction, GAO/GGD-98-50
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 1998).
[14] According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 02-
8, Operation Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, the
contemporary operational environment is the overall operational
environment that exists today and in the near future, out to the year
2020. The range of threats during this period extends from smaller,
lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to
larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more
conventional, symmetrical ways.
[15] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army
Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces
Major Challenges,
GAO-02-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001).
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisition: Army
Transformation Faces Weapon Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311
(Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001).
[17] IMA is comprised of a headquarters located in the Washington, D.C.
area and seven regional offices--four located within the continental
United States and one each in Hawaii, Germany, and Korea.
[18] The investment accounts included funds for (a) infrastructure
sustainment, rehabilitation, and modernization; (b) facility
reduction; (c) integrated training management; and (d) combat
developments.
[19] The legislative requirements are set out in 10 U.S.C. Section 129;
the annual reports are to be completed by February 1 of each year.
[20] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army‘s
Efforts to Improve Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few
Results, GAO/NSIAD-98-65 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998) and U.S.
Army Audit Agency, Managing Workload, Organizations and Staffing, HQ
94-751 (Alexandria, Va.: June 23, 1994).
[21] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Projected
Requirements for Some Army Forces Not Well Established, GAO-01-485
(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001).
[22] The estimate is based on a study sponsored by the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), which was completed
in March 2002. The Assistant Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) is
responsible for Army personnel policies.
[23] The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for
conducting the Total Army Analysis, which determines the allocation of
personnel resources among the operational and institutional forces.
Within Operations and Plans, the Force Management Division has had a
long-standing role in determining personnel allocations for the Army‘s
combat forces. The Force Management Division was the sponsor of this
study and believes it needs to be more involved in allocating personnel
authorizations to the institutional forces. The Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans also receives TRADOC‘s monthly status reports on
readiness.
[24] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-
Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington,
D.C.: September 2000, Version I); U.S. General Accounting Office, Human
Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the Departments of Defense
and State, GAO-01-565T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2001); and U.S.
General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed
to Help Maintain Momentum of DOD‘s Strategic Human Capital Planning,
GAO-03-237 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002).
[25] The totals do not include members of the Army Reserve and National
Guard.
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