Army Stryker Brigades
Assessment of External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation Plan Gao ID: GAO-03-484R March 25, 2003We are reviewing the Army's plans for deploying and sustaining Stryker brigades. We plan to complete our review and report the results in June 2003. In the meantime, the Army will be conducting an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade from late April through May 2003 as required by law. The purpose of this letter is to bring attention to issues concerning the adequacy of the Army's proposed operational evaluation plan. The operational evaluation is intended to facilitate an understanding of the initial brigade's overall capabilities. The evaluation was first directed by the conference report accompanying the 2001 defense authorization act. Subsequently, Congress included the requirement in Section 113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002, which provides that (1) the Secretary of the Army is to evaluate the brigade's execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios, (2) the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) must approve the Army's operational evaluation plan before the evaluation may be conducted, and (3) the Secretary of Defense is to certify to Congress that the results of the operational evaluation indicate that the Stryker brigades design is operationally effective and operationally suitable. In this letter, we address the adequacy of the Army's operational evaluation plans for assessing the Stryker brigades' external logistics support--that is, the personnel, equipment, and services that will augment these brigades. Stryker brigades are organized and equipped to deploy rapidly and to execute early-entry operations immediately on arrival--potentially, into remote areas of the world. By design, Stryker brigades do not have the capability to sustain operations in this type of environment beyond several days or to perform other than minor vehicle repair and equipment maintenance. Thus, the brigades require the assistance of external logistics support for essential supply and maintenance services. Integrating external logistical support with the brigades' limited support structure is therefore a key concept of the Stryker brigades' organizational and operational design and is essential to effectively supporting and sustaining these brigades in combat.
According to the Army's plans, external logistical support will not be formally assessed during the operational evaluation. Instead, the Army is planning to conduct separate, informal assessments of some external support concepts, but information about the scope and methodology for these assessments is not included in the operational evaluation plan that the Army will be submitting to DOT&E for its required review and approval. As a result, DOT&E will not have all of the information it needs from the Army to determine whether the operational evaluation will be conducted in a way that demonstrates that the brigades' design is both operationally effective and operationally suitable. Specifically, DOT&E will not be in a position to know whether the first brigade will be sufficiently assessed during the operational evaluation nor will it be able to determine whether the results can provide a complete understanding of the brigade's overall capabilities. This lack of information could hamper the ability to certify the results of the operational evaluation. The Army does not believe that external support should be included as a formal part of the operational evaluation because the people and processes that provide it are not a part of the brigade's organization. Accordingly, we are making recommendations to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation regarding documentation of Army plans for assessing external logistics support during the operational evaluation and reporting on results of the external support assessment.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-484R, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation Plan
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March 28, 2003:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense:
Subject: Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistics
Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of
the Army‘s Operational Evaluation Plan:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
We are reviewing the Army‘s plans for deploying and sustaining Stryker
brigades. We plan to complete our review and report the results in June
2003. In the meantime, the Army will be conducting an operational
evaluation of the first Stryker brigade from late April through May
2003 as required by law. The purpose of this letter is to bring to your
attention issues concerning the adequacy of the Army‘s proposed
operational evaluation plan.
The operational evaluation is intended to facilitate an understanding
of the initial brigade‘s overall capabilities. The evaluation was first
directed by the conference report accompanying the 2001 defense
authorization act.[Footnote 1] Subsequently, Congress included the
requirement in Section 113 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2002,[Footnote 2] which provides that:
the Secretary of the Army is to evaluate the brigade‘s execution of
combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats and
operational scenarios,
the Department of Defense‘s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) must approve the Army‘s operational evaluation plan before the
evaluation may be conducted, and:
the Secretary of Defense is to certify to Congress that the results of
the operational evaluation indicate that the Stryker brigade‘s design
is operationally effective and operationally suitable.[Footnote 3]
In this letter, we address the adequacy of the Army‘s operational
evaluation plans for assessing the Stryker brigades‘ external logistics
support--that is, the personnel, equipment, and services that will
augment these brigades.[Footnote 4] As you know, Stryker brigades are
organized and equipped to deploy rapidly and to execute early-entry
operations immediately on arrival--potentially, into remote areas of
the world. By design, Stryker brigades do not have the capability to
sustain operations in this type of environment beyond several days or
to perform other than minor vehicle repair and equipment maintenance.
Thus, the brigades require the assistance of external logistics support
for essential supply and maintenance services. Integrating external
logistical support with the brigades‘ limited support structure is
therefore a key concept of the Stryker brigades‘ organizational and
operational design and is essential to effectively supporting and
sustaining these brigades in combat.
Because the Army is ready to go forward with its plans for the
operational evaluation and because of your requirement to certify the
results, we are sending this letter to you with recommendations for
DOT&E.
Results in Brief:
According to the Army‘s plans, external logistical support will not be
formally assessed during the operational evaluation. Instead, the Army
is planning to conduct separate, informal assessments of some external
support concepts, but information about the scope and methodology for
these assessments is not included in the operational evaluation plan
that the Army will be submitting to DOT&E for its required review and
approval. As a result, DOT&E will not have all of the information it
needs from the Army to determine whether the operational evaluation
will be conducted in a way that demonstrates that the brigades‘ design
is both operationally effective and operationally suitable.
Specifically, DOT&E will not be in a position to know whether the first
brigade will be sufficiently assessed during the operational evaluation
nor will it be able to determine whether the results can provide a
complete understanding of the brigade‘s overall capabilities. This lack
of information could hamper your ability to certify the results of the
operational evaluation. The Army does not believe that external support
should be included as a formal part of the operational evaluation
because the people and processes that provide it are not a part of the
brigade‘s organization.
Accordingly, we are making recommendations to the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation regarding documentation of Army plans
for assessing external logistics support during the operational
evaluation and reporting on results of the external support assessment.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
generally concurred with our assessment and recommendations and
outlined actions to address the concerns named in the report.
Background:
The operational evaluation is to be accomplished through observation of
several training events and exercises that the brigade will undergo.
The principal events include a deployment of the brigade from its home
station at Fort Lewis, Washington, in late April 2003, to the Army‘s
Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and
surrounding areas, where the brigade will undergo combat exercises
through the end of May 2003. The brigade will conduct multiple combat
missions and operations during these exercises that will be evaluated
to determine its operational readiness and combat effectiveness.
The brigade that is undergoing the operational evaluation is the first
of six Stryker brigades the Army plans to form through 2008. Organizing
and equipping Stryker brigades is the first phase of the Army‘s plans
to transform all of its forces into a more strategically responsive
force that could more rapidly deploy and effectively operate in all
types of military operations.
Army Not Evaluating External Support
as Part of the Operational Evaluation:
The Army is not planning to evaluate external support as a formal part
of the operational evaluation. The Stryker brigades‘ support structure
is limited by design and lacks the capability to sustain combat
operations beyond several days. After that, the brigade is totally
dependent upon augmentation in the form of external logistics support
for replenishment of supplies and much of the vehicle and equipment
maintenance for the brigade. The Army plans to informally assess some
of these external support organizations and processes; but its plans
for informally assessing external support are not documented for DOT&E
review.
Stryker Brigades Are Designed to Have Limited
Internal Support Capabilities:
Integrating external logistical support with the brigades‘ limited
internal capabilities is essential to effectively supporting and
sustaining Stryker brigades. Rapid deployability and sustainability are
core operational capabilities the Army envisions:
for Stryker brigades. To achieve the envisioned rapid deployability and
to be adequately sustained in an early entry, austere environment, the
brigades are dependent upon external supporting organizations for
replenishment after its initial supplies are exhausted. The brigades--
by design--do not have the level of supply and transportation support
personnel or the necessary equipment to move and distribute the fuel,
water, and other materiel it would need for extended operations.
Instead of stockpiling inventories of ammunition, spare parts, and
other supplies--as a heavy mechanized brigade would do--Stryker
brigades are to sustain themselves in extended combat operations by
having these items delivered from numerous locations, such as Army
depots and theater support bases, where they will be stored and
configured for rapid shipment and distribution to the brigade. External
logistics support personnel and equipment are needed to configure,
transport, and distribute these supplies to the brigades.
External logistics support is also needed to enhance the brigades‘
limited ability to perform essential support functions such as
maintenance, supply, and transportation services. The brigades‘ support
battalion, as currently designed, has only about one third of the
maintenance support capability of the current support structure of an
Army heavy brigade. It does not have sufficient numbers of maintenance
personnel or the capability to sustain operations without the
assistance of external support organizations and resources.
The brigades are also heavily reliant upon external support provided by
contractors to service and maintain its newly fielded Stryker medium-
armored vehicles and complex digital command, control, communications,
and computer equipment. Contractor logistics support will be needed to
support the Stryker vehicles and digital systems at least until these
systems are fully fielded. Because of their importance to the brigades
in combat operations, the Army, through contractor logistics support,
must be able to adequately maintain and support these systems anywhere
in the world. External support personnel and management processes are
needed to coordinate the work of the numerous contractor personnel that
will be supporting the brigades.
Assessment of First Stryker Brigade‘s External Support
Will Be Informal and Separate from the Operational Evaluation:
The Army‘s draft plan for the operational evaluation lists the
augmentation forces--including external logistical support--that are
necessary ’enablers“ for the brigade, but the draft plan states that
these enablers will not be assessed during the operational evaluation.
Army officials told us that current plans are to replicate and
informally assess--to the extent possible--the processes and
organizations that will provide external logistical support to the
brigade; however, these plans are not documented and will not be
available to DOT&E for its review. Officials responsible for preparing
the Army‘s operational evaluation plan told us that external support
should not be evaluated as a formal part of the operational evaluation
because the personnel and processes that provide it are not a part of a
Stryker brigade‘s organization.
Without information about the Army‘s plans for assessing external
logistical support, DOT&E will not be able to determine whether the
brigade will be sufficiently assessed during the operational
evaluation. For example, without knowing the scope and the methodology
the Army plans to use for informally assessing external support, DOT&E
would not be able to determine whether the operational evaluation
results can be used to draw sound conclusions about the brigades‘
overall capabilities. The effectiveness of the brigades cannot be
understood apart from their external logistical support because the
brigades‘ organizational design and concepts of operations are reliant
upon the effectiveness of the external organizations and processes that
are needed to support the brigades. If external support is not
thoroughly evaluated, the results from the operational evaluation will
not provide a complete understanding of the first brigade‘s overall
capabilities and not confirm that the brigade‘s design is operationally
effective and operationally suitable. These results would form the
basis of the Secretary of Defense‘s certification.
Conclusions:
If evaluation plans for the external support concepts embodied in the
brigades‘ organizational design are not documented, DOT&E will have
incomplete information to determine the sufficiency of the Army‘s plans
for the operational evaluation. Lacking credible results from the
operational evaluation, the Secretary of Defense would have
insufficient information, we believe, with which to reach judgments
regarding the operational effectiveness and the operational suitability
of the brigades‘ design.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation not
approve the Army‘s operational evaluation plan until the Army provides
DOT&E with
(1) documentation of how it will assess external logistics support
during the operational evaluation, to include the methodology that will
be used for the assessment and (2) assurance that the results of the
assessment will be included in the Army‘s final report on the
operational evaluation.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense
generally concurred with our assessment and recommendations and
outlined actions to address the concerns named in the report.
Additionally, the Army briefed us on its plans to address our concerns.
In responding to our recommendation that the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation not approve the Army‘s operational evaluation plan
until the Army provides his office with documentation of how it will
assess external logistics support, the Department concurred and noted
that the operational evaluation plan must include details on the
evaluation of external, reach-back logistics. The Department stated
that both the operational evaluation plan and the operational execution
plan will be reviewed for adequacy once received.
The Department also concurred with our recommendation that the Army‘s
final operational evaluation report should include results from the
evaluation of logistics reach-back. The Department said that the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation would have personnel on-
site during the execution of the operational evaluation who will be
prepared to provide comment on the Army‘s final report.
Department of Army officials briefed us on their plans to assess
external logistics support, including the data collection and analysis
methodology it will use. Army officials also told us that they will
submit the plan to DOT&E for its review and approval. Further, the
officials assured us that the results of the assessment will be
included in the Army‘s final report on the operational evaluation. If
the Army executes its plan as now envisioned, it will meet the intent
of our recommendations.
Enclosure II contains the full text of the Department‘s comments.
Scope and Methodology:
To obtain information on plans for evaluating the first Stryker
brigade‘s external support concepts, we interviewed officials from the
Army‘s Forces Command responsible for the operational evaluation; I
Corps officials at Fort Lewis, Washington, responsible for planning and
executing the operational evaluation; DOD‘s Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, which is required by law to review the
Army‘s operational evaluation plan; and the Office of the Deputy Under
Secretary of the Army for Operations Research, the Army‘s lead agent
for the operational evaluation.
We analyzed Army information on the organizational design and
operational concepts for Stryker brigades to gain an understanding of
the logistics challenges of supporting and sustaining the brigades. We
reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Army‘s staff
elements responsible for operations and plans, logistics, and force
development. We also met with representatives and reviewed documents
from the Army‘s Tank-automotive and Armaments Command and Combined Arms
Support Command to learn about support and sustainment options for the
Stryker brigades. In addition, we interviewed staff from the Army
Training and Doctrine Command‘s Brigade Coordination Cell and garrison
commands at Fort Lewis for information relating to support and
sustainment plans for the first two Stryker brigades.
Our review was conducted from May 2002 through February 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
:
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking
Members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; Subcommittee on
Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations; House Committee on Armed
Services; and Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on
Appropriations. It will also be available at no charge on GAO‘s Web
site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on
the matters discussed in this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-
8365, or my Assistant Director, Lee Furr, at (202) 512-5426. Key
contributors to this report are listed in enclosure III.
Sincerely yours,
William M. Solis, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by William M. Solis:
Enclosures:
Enclosure I:
SECTION 113 PUBLIC LAW 107-107 PROVISIONS:
PERTAINING TO OPERATIONAL EVALUATION:
’(h) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION.--(1) The Secretary of the Army shall
conduct an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade combat
team. The evaluation shall include deployment of the team to the
evaluation site and team execution of combat missions across the full
spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios.
’(2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be
conducted until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
Defense.
’(i) LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND
DEPLOYMENT OF IBCTs.--(1) The actions described in paragraph (2) may
not be taken until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the
Secretary of Defense--:
Reports.“(A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation
carried out under subsection (h); and:
Certification.“(B) certifies to Congress that the results of that
operational evaluation indicate that the design for the interim brigade
combat team is operationally effective and operationally suitable.
’(2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions:
’(A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those
necessary for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams.
’(B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United
States.
’(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph
(1) to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary--:
’(A) determines that the deployment is in the national security
interests of the United States; and:
’(B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver
together with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver.“:
[End of section]
Enclosure II:
Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500:
MAR 14 2003:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, ’ARMY STRYKER BRIGADES: Assessment of External Logistics
Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of
the Army‘s Operational Evaluation Plan,“ dated February 21, 2003 (GAO
Code 350323).
The Department generally concurs with the report. Detailed DoD comments
on the draft GAO recommendations are provided in the enclosure. The DoD
appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Beckett, Principal Assistant:
Signed by Allen W. Beckett:
Attachment As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 21, 2003 GAO-03-484R/GAO CODE 350323:
’ARMY STRYKER BRIGADES: ASSESSMENT OF EXTERNAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT SHOULD
BE DOCUMENTED FOR THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED REVIEW OF THE ARMY‘S
OPERATIONAL EVALUATION PLAN“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation not approve the Army‘s operational evaluation plan
until the Army provides his office with documentation of how it will
assess external logistics support during the operational evaluation, to
include the methodology that will be used for the assessment. (Page 7/
Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: DOD concurs with the GAO assessment that the Operational
Evaluation (OE) Plan must include details on the evaluation of
external, reachback logistics. In conditionally approving the Stryker
Brigade Combat Team Operational Evaluation (OE) Plan submitted by U. S.
Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Department of the Army noted the ’use of
Reachback ... must be evaluated“ to include logistics. DOD fully
expects the updated Operational Evaluation (OE) Plan will include
provisions for the assessment of logistics reach-back. Both the OE
Evaluation Plan and OE Execution Plan will be reviewed for adequacy
once received in mid-March 2003 timeframe. DOT&E will additionally have
personnel onsite during the execution of the OE who will be prepared to
provide comment on the Army‘s final report.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation not approve the Army‘s operational evaluation plan
until the Army provides his office with assurance that the results of
the assessment will be included in the Army‘s final report on the
operational evaluation. (Page 7/Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: DOD concurs with GAO that the Army‘s final OE report
should include results from the evaluation of logistics reach-back.
[End of section]
Enclosure III:
GAO STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:
Acknowledgments Key contributors to this report include, Kevin Handley,
Karyn Angulo, Pat Seaton, Frank Smith, and Susan Woodward.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] House Report 106-945 (Oct. 6, 2000), page 673.
[2] Public Law 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001). See enclosure I for relevant
excerpts from Section 113.
[3] Operational effectiveness is generally defined as the overall
degree of mission accomplishment of an item tested; operational
suitability is the degree to which an item can be placed in use with
consideration given to factors that include logistic supportability.
[4] Stryker brigades rely on reach-back operations--a concept of
reaching in all directions to obtain intelligence, planning and
sustainment. Reach-back may include obtaining division, corps or
theater-level logistical support. Reach-back may also include obtaining
logistical support from contractors, joint or host nation sources.
