Defense Acquisitions
Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data Gao ID: GAO-03-329 March 31, 2003Making sure systems can work effectively together (interoperability) has been a key problem for the Department of Defense (DOD) yet integral to its goals for enhancing joint operations. Given the importance of being able to share intelligence data quickly, we were asked to assess DOD's initiative to develop a common ground-surface-based intelligence system and to particularly examine (1) whether DOD has adequately planned this initiative and (2) whether its process for testing and certifying the interoperability of new systems is working effectively.
DOD relies on a broad array of intelligence systems to study the battlefield and identify and hit enemy targets. These systems include reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, and ground-surface stations that receive, analyze, and disseminate intelligence data. At times, these systems are not interoperable--either for technical reasons (such as incompatible data formats) and/or operational reasons. Such problems can considerably slow down the time to identify and analyze a potential target and decide whether to attack it. One multibillion-dollar initiative DOD has underway to address this problem is to pare down the number of ground-surface systems that process intelligence data and upgrade them to enhance their functionality and ensure that they can work with other DOD systems. The eventual goal is an overarching family of interconnected systems, known as the Distributed Common Ground-Surface System (DCGS). To date, planning for this initiative has been slow and incomplete. DOD is developing an architecture, or blueprint, for the new systems as well as an overarching test plan and an operational concept. Although DCGS was started in 1998, DOD has not yet formally identified which systems are going to be involved in DCGS; what the time frames will be for making selections and modifications, conducting interoperability tests, and integrating systems into the overarching system; how transitions will be funded; and how the progress of the initiative will be tracked. Moreover, DOD's process for testing and certifying that systems will be interoperable is not working effectively. In fact, only 2 of 26 DCGS systems have been certified as interoperable. Because 21 of the systems that have not been certified have already been fielded, DOD has a greater risk that the new systems will not be able to share intelligence data as quickly as needed. Certifications are important because they consider such things as whether a system can work with systems belonging to other military services without unacceptable workarounds and whether individual systems conform to broader architectures designed to facilitate interoperability across DOD.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-329, Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
March 2003:
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS:
Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process
Intelligence Data:
GAO-03-329:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-329, a report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Making sure systems can work effectively together (interoperability)
has been a key problem for the Department of Defense (DOD) yet integral
to its goals for enhancing joint operations. Given the importance of
being able to share intelligence data quickly, we were asked to assess
DOD‘s initiative to develop a common ground-surface-based intelligence
system and to particularly examine (1) whether DOD has adequately
planned this initiative and (2) whether its process for testing and
certifying the interoperability of new systems is working effectively.
What GAO Found:
DOD relies on a broad array of intelligence systems to study the
battlefield and identify and hit enemy targets. These systems include
reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, and ground-surface stations that
receive, analyze, and disseminate intelligence data. At times, these
systems are not interoperable”either for technical reasons (such as
incompatible data formats) and/or operational reasons. Such problems
can considerably slow down the time to identify and analyze a potential
target and decide whether to attack it.
One multibillion-dollar initiative DOD has underway to address this
problem is to pare down the number of ground-surface systems that
process intelligence data and upgrade them to enhance their
functionality and ensure that they can work with other DOD systems. The
eventual goal is an overarching family of interconnected systems, known
as the Distributed Common Ground-Surface System (DCGS).
To date, planning for this initiative has been slow and incomplete. DOD
is developing an architecture, or blueprint, for the new systems as
well as an overarching test plan and an operational concept. Although
DCGS was started in 1998, DOD has not yet formally identified which
systems are going to be involved in DCGS; what the time frames will be
for making selections and modifications, conducting interoperability
tests, and integrating systems into the overarching system; how
transitions will be funded; and how the progress of the initiative will
be tracked.
Moreover, DOD‘s process for testing and certifying that systems will be
interoperable is not working effectively. In fact, only 2 of 26 DCGS
systems have been certified as interoperable. Because 21 of the systems
that have not been certified have already been fielded, DOD has a
greater risk that the new systems will not be able to share
intelligence data as quickly as needed. Certifications are important
because they consider such things as whether a system can work with
systems belonging to other military services without unacceptable
workarounds and whether individual systems conform to broader
architectures designed to facilitate interoperability across DOD.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD enhance its planning to include a detailed
migration plan and schedule. GAO also recommends that DOD take steps
needed to enforce its process and determine why the services are slow
to certify systems in order that it can implement controls and
incentives needed to spur compliance. DOD generally agreed with our
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-329.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robert Levin at (202)
512-4841 or levinr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Planning for Migration Effort Is Incomplete:
DOD‘s Process for Certifying Intelligence Systems As Interoperable Is
Not Working Effectively:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Table :
Table 1: Status of DOD‘s Joint Interoperability Certification
for Its Distributed Common Ground-Surface Systems as of December 10,
2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: Illustration of Equipment and Platforms That Need
to Be Interoperable:
Figure 2: Examples of Ground-Surface-Based Systems for Processing
Intelligence Data:
C4SIR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
DCGS: Distributed Common Ground-Surface System:
JITC: Joint Interoperability Test Command:
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Letter March 31, 2003:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a broad array of intelligence
systems to study the battlefield and to identify and hit enemy targets.
These systems include reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, and ground-
surface-based stations that receive, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence data. A key problem facing DOD is the inability of these
systems to operate effectively together for technical reasons (such as
incompatible data formats) and/or operational reasons. Such problems
can considerably slow the time involved with identifying and analyzing
a potential target and deciding whether to attack it, as well as
delivering an order to the war fighter in charge of the attack.
DOD recognizes this problem, and it has undertaken a range of
initiatives aimed at improving interoperability among all of its
systems. One multibillion-dollar initiative underway since 1998 is to
pare down the number of ground-surface systems that process
intelligence data and upgrade them to enhance their functionality and
to ensure that they are interoperable with other DOD systems. The
eventual goal is the migration to an overarching, interconnected family
of systems for processing intelligence data known as the Distributed
Common Ground-Surface System (DCGS). Given the importance of the DCGS
initiative to the war fighter, you asked us to assess (1) whether DOD
has adequately planned for these processing systems and (2) whether
DOD‘s process for testing and certifying the interoperability of the
systems is working effectively.
Results in Brief:
DOD has not completed plans for its initiative to pare down and enhance
its ground-surface-based systems for processing intelligence data. DOD
is developing an architecture, or blueprint, for the new systems, but
it has not yet formally identified which systems are to be involved in
the migration initiative; what the time frames will be for making
selections and modifications, conducting interoperability tests, and
integrating systems into the overarching system; how the transitions
will be funded; and how the success of the initiative will be tracked.
For example, DOD has not completed an overarching test plan that would
define when and how interoperability tests will be conducted. Given the
range of disparate interests among the services and the billions of
dollars involved, such plans are critical to ensuring that the
migration is adequately funded and managed.
Moreover, DOD‘s process for testing and certifying that ground-surface-
based processing systems will be interoperable is not working
effectively. In fact, only 2 of 26 DCGS systems have been certified as
interoperable. Because 21 of the systems that have not been certified
have already been fielded, there is greater risk that the systems
cannot share data as quickly as needed. Moreover, while certifications
are planned for 17 of the 26 systems, they are not planned for 7
others. The certification process is important because it considers
such things as whether systems can work with systems belonging to the
other military services without unacceptable workarounds or special
interfaces, whether they are using standard data formats, and whether
they conform to broader architectures designed to facilitate
interoperability across DOD. One reason why the process is not working
effectively is the incomplete planning discussed above, including the
lack of an overarching test plan. Other reasons cited by DOD officials
are that system managers are more focused on getting systems fielded
quickly and/or they do not want to fund the certification process, as
DOD requires them to do. Our work has also shown that the military
services focus more on meeting their own requirements when developing
new systems as opposed to requirements that would facilitate operating
jointly with other services.
We are making recommendations that DOD enhance its planning to include
a detailed migration plan and schedule. We are also recommending that
DOD take steps needed to enforce its certification process and
determine why the services are slow to certify their systems in order
that it can implement the controls and incentives needed to spur
compliance. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.
Background:
The military services and defense agencies, such as the National
Security Agency and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, collect
and use intelligence data--either in the form of photographic, radar,
or infrared images or electronic signals--to better understand and
react to an adversary‘s actions and intentions. This data can come from
aircraft like the U-2 or Global Hawk or satellites or other ground,
air, sea, or spaced-based equipment. The sensors that collect this data
are linked to ground-surface-based processing systems that collect,
analyze, and disseminate it to other intelligence processing facilities
and to combat forces. (See figures 1 and 2.) These systems can be large
or small, fixed, mobile, or transportable. For example, the Air Force
operates several large, fixed systems that provide extensive analysis
capability well beyond combat activities. By contrast, the Army and
Marine Corps operate smaller, mobile intelligence systems that travel
with and operate near combat forces.
Figure 1: Illustration of Equipment and Platforms That Need
to Be Interoperable:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Examples of Ground-Surface-Based Systems for Processing
Intelligence Data:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
A key problem facing DOD is that these systems do not always work
together effectively, thereby slowing down the time it takes to collect
data and analyze and disseminate it sometimes by hours or even days,
though DOD reports that timing has improved in more recent military
operations. At times, some systems cannot easily exchange information
because they were not designed to be compatible and must work through
technical patches to transmit and receive data. In other cases, the
systems are not connected at all. Compounding this problem is the fact
that each service has its own command, control, and communications
structure that present barriers to interoperability.
Among the efforts DOD has underway to improve interoperability is the
migration to a family of overarching ground-surface systems, based on
the best systems already deployed and future systems. DCGS will not
only connect individual systems but also enable these systems to merge
intelligence information from multiple sources. The first phase of the
migration effort will focus on connecting existing systems belonging to
the military services--so that each service has an interoperable
’family“ of systems. The second phase will focus on interconnecting the
families of systems so that joint and combined forces can have an
unprecedented, common view of the battlefield. DOD‘s Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence is leading this effort.
Successfully building a compatible ground-surface system is extremely
challenging. First, DOD is facing a significant technical challenge.
The ground-surface-based systems must not only have compatible
electronic connections, but also compatible data transfer rates and
data formats and vocabularies. At the same time it modifies systems,
DOD must protect sensitive and classified data and be able to make
fixes to one system without negatively affecting others. All of these
tasks will be difficult to achieve given that the systems currently
operated were designed by the individual services with their own
requirements in mind and that they still own the systems. Second,
sufficient communications capacity (e.g., bandwidth) must exist to
transmit large amounts of data. DOD is still in the early stages of
adding this capacity through its bandwidth expansion program. Third,
DOD must have enough qualified people to analyze and exploit the large
volumes of data modern sensors are capable of collecting. Lastly, DOD
must still address interoperability barriers that stretch well beyond
technical and human capital enhancements. For example, the services may
have operating procedures and processes that simply preclude them from
sharing data with other services and components, or they may have
inconsistent security procedures. Formulating and following common
processes and procedures will be difficult since the services have
historically been reluctant to do so.[Footnote 1]
Planning for Migration Effort Is Incomplete:
Given the multi-billion-dollar commitment and many technical and
operational challenges with the migration initiative, it is critical
that DOD have effective plans to guide and manage system development.
These would include such things as a comprehensive architecture,
migration plan, and investment strategy. However, even though it
initiated DCGS in 1998 and is fielding new intelligence systems, DOD is
still in the beginning stages of this planning. It is now working on an
enterprise architecture, a high level concept of operations for the
processing of intelligence information, and an overarching test plan,
and it expects these to be done by July 2003. DOD has not yet focused
on an investment strategy or on a migration plan that would set a
target date for completing the migration and outline activities for
meeting that date. By fielding systems without completing these plans,
DOD is increasing the risk that DCGS systems will not share data as
quickly as needed by the warfighter.
Planning Elements Essential to Success of DOD‘s Migration Effort:
Successfully moving toward an interoperable family of ground-surface-
based processing systems for intelligence data is a difficult endeavor
for DOD. The systems now in place are managed by many different
entities within DOD. They are involved in a wide range of military
operations and installed on a broad array of equipment. At the same
time, they need to be made to be compatible and interoperable. DOD‘s
migration must also fit in with long-term goals for achieving
information superiority over the enemy. Several elements are
particularly critical to successfully addressing these challenges. They
include an enterprise architecture, or blueprint, to define the current
and target environment for ground-based processing systems; a road map,
or migration plan to define how DOD will get to the target environment
and track its progress in doing so; and an investment strategy to
ensure adequate resources are provided toward the migration. Each of
these elements is described in the following discussions.
* Enterprise architecture. Enterprise architectures systematically and
completely define an organization‘s current (baseline) or desired
(target) environment. They do so by providing a clear and comprehensive
picture of a mission area--both in logical (e.g., operations,
functions, and information flows) terms and technical (e.g., software,
hardware, and communications) terms. If defined properly, enterprise
architectures can assist in optimizing interdependencies and
interrelationships among an organization‘s operations and the
underlying technology supporting these operations. Our experience with
federal agencies has shown that attempting to define and build systems
without first completing an architecture often results in systems that
are duplicative, not well integrated, and unnecessarily costly to
maintain and interface, and do not optimize mission
performance.[Footnote 2] DOD also recognizes the importance of
enterprise architectures and developed a framework known as the
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework for its
components to use in guiding efforts similar to DCGS. DOD‘s acquisition
guidance also requires the use of architectures to characterize
interrelationships and interactions between U.S., allied, and coalition
systems.[Footnote 3]
* Migration plan or road map. Given the size and complexity of DCGS, it
is important that the migration be planned in convenient, manageable
increments to accommodate DOD‘s capacity to handle change. At a
minimum, a plan would lay out current system capabilities, desired
capabilities, and specific initiatives, programs, projects, and
schedules intended to get DOD and the services to that vision. It would
also define measures for tracking progress, such as testing timeliness
and the status of modifications, roles and responsibilities for key
activities, and mechanisms for enforcing compliance with the migration
plan and ensuring that systems conform to technical and data standards
defined by the architecture. Such plans, or road maps, are often
developed as part of an enterprise architecture.
* Investment strategy. To ensure the migration is successfully
implemented, it is important to know what funds are available--for the
initial phases of migration, for interoperability testing, and for
transition to the target architecture. It is important as well to know
what constraints or gaps need to be addressed. By achieving better
visibility over resources, DOD can take steps needed to analyze its
migration investment as well as funding alternatives.
DOD Is Developing an Architecture:
DOD is in the process of developing an architecture for DCGS. It
expects the architecture to be completed by July 2003. As recommended
by DOD‘s C4ISR Architecture Framework, the architecture will include a
(1) baseline, or as-is, architecture and (2) a target, or to-be,
architecture. The architecture will also include a high-level concept
of operations.
The architecture will to also reflect DOD‘s future plans to develop a
web-based intelligence information network. This network would
substantially change how intelligence information is collected and
analyzed and could therefore substantially change DOD‘s requirements
for DCGS. Currently, ground-surface-based systems process intelligence
data and then disseminate processed data to select users. Under the new
approach, unprocessed data would be posted on a Web-based network;
leaving a larger range of users to decide which data they want to
process and use. DOD has started implementing its plans for this new
network but does not envision fully implementing it until 2010-2015.
In addition, DOD has created a DCGS Council comprised of integrated
product teams to oversee the migration. A team exists for each type of
intelligence (imagery, signals, measurement, and signature); test and
evaluation; and infrastructure and working groups to study specific
issues.
In tandem with the architecture, DOD has also issued a capstone
requirements document for the migration effort. This document
references top-level requirements and standards, such as the Joint
Technical Architecture with which all systems must comply. DOD is also
developing an overarching test plan called the Capstone Test and
Evaluation Master Plan, which will define standards, test processes,
test resources, and responsibilities of the services for demonstrating
that the systems can work together and an operational concept for
processing intelligence information.
Planning Gaps Raise Risks:
An enterprise architecture and overarching test plan should help ensure
that the ground-surface-based processing systems selected for migration
will be interoperable and that they will help to achieve DOD‘s broader
goals for its intelligence operations. But there are gaps in DOD‘s
planning that raise risks that the migration will not be adequately
funded and managed.
* First, the planning process itself has been slower than DOD officials
anticipated. By the time DOD expects to complete its architecture and
testing plan, it will have been proceeding with its migration
initiative for 4 years. This delay has hampered DOD‘s ability to ensure
interoperability in the systems now being developed and deployed.
* Second, DOD still lacks a detailed migration plan that identifies
which systems will be retained for migration; which will be phased out;
when systems will be modified and integrated into the target system;
how the transition will take place--how efforts will be prioritized;
and how progress in implementing the migration plan and architecture
will be enforced and tracked. Until DOD puts this in place, it will
lack a mechanism to drive its migration. Moreover, the DCGS Council
will lack a specific plan and tools for executing its oversight.
* Third, DOD has not yet developed an integrated investment strategy
for its migration effort that would contemplate what resources are
available for acquisitions, modifications, and interoperability
testing and how gaps in those resources could be addressed. More
fundamentally, DOD still lacks visibility over spending on its
intelligence systems since spending is spread among the budgets of
DOD‘s services and components. As a result, DOD does not fully know
what has already been spent on the migration effort, nor does it have a
means for making sure the investments the services make in their
intelligence systems support its overall goals; and if not, what other
options can be employed to make sure spending is on target.
DOD officials agreed that both a migration plan and investment strategy
were needed but said they were concentrating first on completing the
architecture, test plan, and the operational concept.
DOD‘s Process for Certifying Intelligence Systems As Interoperable Is
Not Working Effectively:
DOD has a process in place to test and certify that systems are
interoperable, but it is not working effectively for ground-surface-
based intelligence processing systems. In fact, at the time of our
review, only 2 of 26 DCGS systems have been certified as being
interoperable. The certification process is important because it
considers such things as whether systems can work with systems
belonging to other military services without unacceptable workarounds
or special interfaces, whether they are using standard data formats,
and whether they conform to broader architectures designed to
facilitate interoperability across DOD.
DOD‘s Process for Ensuring Interoperability:
DOD has placed great importance on making intelligence processing
systems interoperable and requires that all new (and many existing)
systems demonstrate that they are interoperable with other systems and
be certified as interoperable before they are fielded. DOD relies on
the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC, part of the Defense
Information Systems Agency) to certify systems. In conducting this
certification, JITC assesses whether systems can interoperate without
degrading other systems or networks or being degraded by them; the
ability of systems to exchange information; the ability of systems to
interoperate in joint environments without the use of unacceptable
workaround procedures or special technical interfaces; and the ability
of systems to interoperate while maintaining system confidentiality and
integrity. In doing so, JITC reviews testing already conducted as well
as assessments prepared by independent testing organizations. It may
also conduct some of its own testing. The results are then submitted to
the Joint Staff, who validate the system‘s certification. Systems are
generally certified for 3 years--after which they must be re-certified.
The certification is funded by the system owner--whether it is a
service or DOD agency. The cost depends on the size and complexity of a
system and generally requires 10 percent of funding designated for
testing and evaluation. Generally, certification costs are small
relative to the total cost of a system. The cost to certify the Army‘s
$95 million Common Ground Station, for example, was $388,000.
To help enforce the certification process, DOD asked 4 key officials
(the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence; the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation; and the Director, Joint Staff) in December 2000 to
periodically review systems and to place those with interoperability
deficiencies on a ’watch list.“ This designation would trigger a series
of progress reviews and updates by the program manager, the responsible
testing organization, and JITC, until the system is taken off the list.
Other DOD forums are also charged with identifying systems that need to
be put on the list, including DOD‘s Interoperability Senior Review
Panel, which is composed of senior leaders from the offices of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics;
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence; the Joint Staff; the Director for
Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation; the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation; and U. S. Joint Forces Command.
Most Systems Are Not Certified:
At the time of our review, only 2 of 26 DCGS systems had been certified
by JITC. Of the remaining 24 systems; 3 were in the process of being
certified; 14 had plans for certification; and 7 had no plans. (See
table 1.):
Table 1: Status of DOD‘s Joint Interoperability Certification
for Its Distributed Common Ground-Surface Systems
as of December 10, 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
Notes: The categories provided in the table assume the following
definition:
[A] Certified: 100 percent certification of all critical interfaces:
[B] In process: at least 1 critical interface has been tested and/or
certified:
[C] Planned: funding is available and test planning initiated:
[D] Not planned: No funding or agreement established for JITC testing:
[End of table]
Because 21 systems that have not been certified have already been
fielded, there is greater risk that the systems cannot share data as
quickly as needed. Some of the systems in this category are critical to
the success of other intelligence systems. For example, software
modules contained in the Army‘s tactical exploitation system are to be
used to build systems for the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force.
DOD officials responsible for developing intelligence systems as well
as testing them pointed toward several reasons for noncompliance,
including the following. Our previous work in this area has identified
the following similar reasons.[Footnote 4]
* Some system managers are unaware of the requirement for
certification.
* Some system managers do not believe that their design, although
fielded, was mature enough for testing.
* Some system managers are concerned that the certification process
itself would raise the need for expensive system modifications.
* DOD officials do not always budget the resources needed for
interoperability testing.
* The military services sometimes allow service-unique requirements to
take precedence over satisfying joint interoperability requirements.
* Various approval authorities allow some new systems to be fielded
without verifying their certification status.
DOD‘s interoperability watch list was implemented after our 1998 report
to provide better oversight over the interoperability certification
process. In January 2003, after considering our findings, DOD‘s
Interoperability Senior Review Panel evaluated DCGS‘s progress toward
interoperability certification and added the program to the
interoperability watch list.
Conclusions:
Making its intelligence systems interoperable and enhancing their
capability is a critical first step in DOD‘s effort to drive down time
needed to identify and hit targets and otherwise enhance joint military
operations. But DOD has been slow to plan for this initiative and it
has not addressed important questions such as how and when systems will
be pared down and modified as well as how the initiative will be
funded. Moreover, DOD is fielding new systems and new versions of old
systems without following its own certification process. If both
problems are not promptly addressed, data sharing problems may still
persist, precluding DOD from achieving its goals for quicker
intelligence dissemination. Even for the DCGS systems, which are
supposed to be interconnected over time, noncompliance with
interoperability requirements continues to persist. We believe DOD
should take a fresh look at the reasons for noncompliance and consider
what mix of controls and incentives, including innovative funding
mechanisms, are needed to ensure the interoperability of DCGS systems.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that an effective Distributed Common Ground-Surface System is
adequately planned and funded, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence to expand the planning efforts for
DCGS to include a migration plan or road map that at a minimum lays out
(1) current system capabilities and desired capabilities; (2) specific
initiatives, programs, projects and schedules to get DOD and the
services to their goal; (3) measures to gauge success in implementing
the migration plan as well as the enterprise architecture; and (4)
mechanisms for ensuring that the plan is followed.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence to develop an investment strategy to identify what funds
are available, both for the initial phases of the DCGS migration and
transition to the target architecture, and whether there are gaps or
constraints that need to be addressed.
To ensure that systems critical to an effective DCGS are interoperable,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps needed to enforce
its certification process, including directing the service secretaries
in collaboration with the Joint Staff, Acquisition Executives, and the
Joint Interoperability Test Command to (1) examine reasons the services
are slow to comply with its certification requirement and (2)
mechanisms that can be implemented to instill better discipline in
adhering to the certification requirement. If lack of funding is found
to be a significant barrier, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
consider centrally funding the DCGS certification process as a pilot
program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations to expand the planning efforts for DCGS to include a
migration plan and an investment strategy. It stated that it has
already funded both projects. DOD also strongly supported our
recommendation to take additional steps to enforce its certification
process and described recent actions it has taken to do so. DOD
partially concurred with our last recommendation to consider centrally
funding the certification process if funding is found to be a
significant barrier. While DOD supported this step if it is warranted,
DOD believed it was premature to identify a solution without further
definition of the problem. We agree that DOD needs to first examine the
reasons for noncompliance and consider what mix of controls and
incentives are needed to make the certification process work. At the
same time, because funding has already been raised as a barrier, DOD
should include an analysis of innovative funding mechanisms into its
review.
Scope and Methodology:
To achieve our objectives, we examined Department of Defense
regulations, directives, instructions as well as the implementing
instructions of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding
interoperability and the certification process. We visited the Joint
Interoperability Test Command in Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and obtained
detailed briefings on the extent that intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems, including DCGS systems, have been certified. We
visited and obtained detailed briefings on the interoperability issues
facing the Combatant Commanders at Joint Forces Command in Norfolk,
Virginia; Central Command in Tampa, Florida; and Pacific Command in
Honolulu, Hawaii, including a videoconference with U.S. Forces Korea
officials. We discussed the interoperability certification process and
its implementation with officials in the Office of the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation; the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. During
these visits and additional visits to the intelligence and acquisition
offices of the services, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and
the National Security Agency, we obtained detailed briefings and
examined documents such as the capstone requirements document involving
the status and plan to implement the ground systems strategy. We
conducted our review from December 2001 through February 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
:
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 7
days from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of
this report to the other congressional defense committees and the
Secretary of Defense. We will also provide copies to others on request.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were
Keith Rhodes, Cristina Chaplain, Richard Strittmatter, and Matthew
Mongin.
Sincerely yours,
R.E. Levin
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by R.E. Levin:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000:
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE:
Mr. Robert E. Levin:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Levin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, ’DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: Steps Needed To Ensure Interoperability
of Systems That Process Intelligence Data“ dated February 10, 2003,
(GAO Code 120115/GAO-03-329).
This response has been prepared by OASD (C3I)/ISR Programs as the
Primary Action Office after reviewing comments from the Collateral
Action Offices. The Department accepts and CONCURS with Recommendations
1, 2, and 3 and PARTIALLY CONCURS with Recommendation 4. Responses to
each recommendation are provided on the attached comment sheets.
In addition to responses to GAO recommendations, you will find a fifth
attachment that suggests changes to the body of the report in areas
that the Department feels are in error or require additional
information.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide this information and look
forward to further dialogue on this matter.
Sincerely,
Kevin P. Meiners:
Director, OASD (C3I)/ISR Programs:
Signed for Kevin P. Meiners:
Attachments: Comment Sheets (4) Suggested Change Matrix:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED FEBRUARY 10, 2003 GAO CODE 120115/GAO-03-329:
’DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: STEPS NEEDED TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF
SYSTEMS THAT PROCESS INTELLIGENCE DATA“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1:
The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence) to expand the planning efforts for Distributed Common
Ground/surface Systems (DCGS) to include a migration plan or roadmap
that, at a minimum, lays out: (1) current system capabilities and
desired capabilities, (2) specific initiatives, programs, projects and
schedules, to get DoD and the Services to their goal, (3) measures to
gauge success in implementing the migration plan as well as the
enterprise architecture, and (4) mechanisms for ensuring that the plan
is followed. (p. 18/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: CONCUR:
DoD COMMENTS:
A roadmap development effort has been identified as the objective
activity for the DoD‘s Architecture Development effort discussed on
pages 9 and 10 of the GAO report. The sequence of events of an
operational concept definition, architectural product creation, and
shortfalls analysis all lead to the generation of a roadmap that will
contain necessary policy, programmatic, and resource decision points
and migration paths. The roadmap activity is funded in FY 03 and is to
begin shortly.
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED FEBRUARY 10, 2003 GAO CODE 120115/GAO-03-329:
’DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: STEPS NEEDED TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF
SYSTEMS THAT PROCESS INTELLIGENCE DATA“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 2:
The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence) to develop an investment strategy to identify what funds
are available, both for the initial phases of the DCGS migration and
transition to the target architecture, and whether there are gaps or
constraints that need to be addresses. (p. 18 GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: CONCUR:
DoD COMMENTS:
As part of the roadmap activity planned for FY 03, the necessary
investments will be captured as part of the resource decision points
outlined in that roadmap.
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED FEBRUARY 10, 2003 GAO CODE 120115/GAO-03-329:
’DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: STEPS NEEDED TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF
SYSTEMS THAT PROCESS INTELLIGENCE DATA“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 3:
The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense take steps needed to
enforce its certification process, including directing the Service
Secretaries in collaboration with the Commander, Joint Interoperability
Test Command, to; (1) examine reasons the Services are slow to comply
with its certification requirement, and (2) examine mechanisms that can
be implemented to instill better discipline in adhering to the
certification requirement. (p. 18/GAO Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: CONCUR:
DoD COMMENTS:
The Department strongly supports this recommendation. This is evidenced
by recent activities to improve interoperability enforcement including
publication of DODD 4630.5 and DODI 4630.8, the Interoperability Senior
Review Panel (ISRP) review of DCGS, the DCGS Capstone Test & Evaluation
Master Plan (CTEMP), and the development of DCGS Compliance Level
criteria that will support Joint Interoperability Certification.
Successful implementation of the recommended steps will require the
Joint Staff, who promulgates CJCSI 6212.0113 and validates system JICs
from JITC, and the Service Acquisition Authorities that are key to
effective implementation by their System Program Managers, to
participate in the process.
The additional actions suggested under this recommendation are areas
that must be incorporated into the DCGS program to ensure migration and
transformation to the defined objective state captured in the DCGS
Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) and the DCGS architectural
products. All of these considerations and issues will be addressed in
the DoD DCGS roadmap activity. It will address not only materiel but
also policy and other non-materiel solutions.
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED FEBRUARY 10, 2003 GAO CODE 120115/GAO-03-329:
’DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: STEPS NEEDED TO ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY OF
SYSTEMS THAT PROCESS INTELLIGENCE DATA“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 4:
The GAO recommended that, if lack of funding is found to be a
significant barrier, the Secretary of Defense consider centrally
funding the DCGS certification process as a pilot program. (p. 18 GAO
Draft Report):
DoD RESPONSE: PARTIALLY CONCUR:
DoD COMMENTS:
While the GAO recommends centrally funding the DCGS certification
process as a pilot program if lack of funding is found to be a
significant barrier, the Department believes it is premature to
identify a solution without further definition of the problem. The
Department identified this problem and placed DCGS on the
Interoperability Watch List. This will result in increased emphasis. If
this proves to be insufficient, then a centrally funded effort may be
warranted.
[End of section]
(120115):
:
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time-
Critical Targets,
GAO-02-204R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2001).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO-02-
6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2002).
[3] Department of Defense, C4ISR Architect Framework (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 1997).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Joint/Military Operations:
Weaknesses in Department of Defense‘s Process for Certifying C4I
Systems‘ Interoperability, GAO/NSIAD 98-73 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
1998).
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