Military Personnel
A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Improve Joint Officer Development Gao ID: GAO-03-548T March 19, 2003The Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD's military leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the law that address the development of officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD's ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act.
DOD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. It has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs, and it has not yet, within a total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint officer development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations--despite the fact that no significant operation can be conducted without reserve involvement. As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has promoted more officers with previous joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades that it did in fiscal year 1995. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. Furthermore, DOD is still not fully meeting provisions to promote mid-grade officers who are serving or who have served in joint positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of their peers who have not served in joint positions. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met more than 90 percent of its promotion goals for officers who served on the Joint Staff, almost 75 percent of its promotion goals for joint specialty officers, and just over 70 percent of its promotion goals for all other officers who served in joint positions. DOD has met provisions in the act that require it to develop officers in joint matters through education by establishing a two-phased joint professional military education program. The act, however, did not establish specific numerical requirements, and DOD has also not determined the number of officers who should complete the joint education. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers who were serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of the education. DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers and has not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with officers who hold a joint specialty designation. This number reached an all-time high in fiscal year 2001 when DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its 808 critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.
GAO-03-548T, Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Improve Joint Officer Development
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Total Force, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. a.m. EST:
Wednesday, March 19, 2003:
Military Personnel:
A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Improve Joint Officer Development:
Statement of Derek B. Stewart, Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management:
GAO-03-548T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-548T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Total
Force, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly engaged in
multiservice and multinational operations. Congress enacted the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in
part, so that DOD‘s military leaders would be better prepared to plan,
support, and conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to
implement provisions in the law that address the development of
officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD‘s
ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act.
What GAO Found:
DOD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint
matters. It has not identified how many joint specialty officers it
needs, and it has not yet, within a total force concept, fully
addressed how it will provide joint officer development to reserve
officers who are serving in joint organizations – despite the fact
that no significant operation can be conducted without reserve
involvement. As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has promoted more officers
with previous joint experience to the general and flag officer pay
grades that it did in fiscal year 1995. However, in fiscal year 2001,
DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to
promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. (See figure
below.) Furthermore, DOD is still not fully meeting provisions to
promote mid-grade officers who are serving or who have served in joint
positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of their peers
who have not served in joint positions. Between fiscal years 1995 and
2001, DOD met more than 90 percent of its promotion goals for officers
who served on the Joint Staff, almost 75 percent of its promotion
goals for joint specialty officers, and just over 70 percent of its
promotion goals for all other officers who served in joint positions.
DOD has met provisions in the act that require it to develop officers
in joint matters through education by establishing a two-phased joint
professional military education program. The act, however, did not
establish specific numerical requirements, and DOD has also not
determined the number of officers who should complete the joint
education. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers who
were serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of the
education. DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers and
has not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with officers
who hold a joint specialty designation. This number reached an all-
time high in fiscal year 2001 when DOD did not fill 311, or more than
one-third, of its 808 critical joint duty positions with joint
specialty officers.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. However, GAO
did recommend, in a report that it issued in December 2002
(GAO-03-238), that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness develop a strategic plan that links joint officer
development to DOD‘s overall mission and goals. DOD concurred with the
recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-548T.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Derek B. Stewart at
(202) 512-5140 or stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
March 19, 2003
Chairman McHugh and Members of the Subcommittee,
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Subcommittee to
discuss the implementation of legislative provisions addressing joint
officer development that are contained in the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.[Footnote 1] Prior to
1986, the Department of Defense (DOD) primarily operated under a
culture in which the four military services educated their officers in
service-specific matters, assigned their most talented officers to key
service positions, and promoted them to leadership positions within
their own service. This arrangement served DOD well when military
operations fell primarily within the capabilities of one of the
military branches. Given that DOD was increasingly moving toward
engaging in joint - multiservice and multinational - operations,
however, Congress recognized that cultural change was needed to move
DOD away from its service parochialisms toward interservice cooperation
and coordination. Congress also believed that DOD needed to better
prepare its military leaders to plan, support, and conduct joint
operations.
Toward that end, Mr. Chairman, the act has been hailed as landmark
legislation, given the significance of the cultural change that it was
designed to achieve, and DOD has, in fact, subsequently issued joint
vision statements that anticipate an armed force that will be ’fully
joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally,
and technically.“[Footnote 2] During the 16 years since the act‘s
passage, however, DOD has repeatedly sought legislative relief from the
act‘s provisions that address the development of officers in joint
matters and, although it has complied with many of these provisions, it
is still experiencing difficulties in implementing some of its joint
officer development programs and policies.
Mr. Chairman, in our recently issued report to you on joint officer
development, we recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan that will
link joint officer development to DOD‘s overall mission and
goals.[Footnote 3]
My statement today will address (1) the need for DOD to develop this
strategic plan, (2) the successes and limitations that DOD has
experienced in promoting officers who have previous joint experience,
and (3) the challenges DOD has experienced in educating its officers in
joint matters and then filling key positions with officers who have the
requisite joint education and experience.
Summary:
A significant impediment affecting DOD‘s ability to fully realize the
cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has
not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters.
For example, DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers
it needs and, at the time of our review, DOD had not yet, within a
total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint officer
development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations
- despite the fact that no significant operation can be conducted
without reserve involvement. In addition, the four services have
emphasized joint officer development to varying degrees.
As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has, in response to the requirements of the
act, promoted more officers with previous joint experience to the
general and flag officer pay grades than it did in fiscal year 1995.
However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in
lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these
senior pay grades. Furthermore, DOD has made progress, but it is still
not fully meeting provisions to promote mid-grade officers (majors,
lieutenant colonels, and colonels in the Air Force, Army, and Marine
Corps and lieutenant commanders, commanders, and captains in the Navy)
who are serving or who have served in joint positions at rates not less
than the promotion rates of their peers who have not served in joint
positions. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met more than 90
percent of its promotion goals for officers who served on the Joint
Staff, almost 75 percent of its promotion goals for joint specialty
officers, and just over 70 percent of its promotion goals for all other
officers who served in joint positions.
DOD has met provisions in the act that require it to develop officers
in joint matters through education by establishing a two-phased joint
professional military education program. The act, however, did not
establish specific numerical requirements, and DOD has also not
determined the number of officers who should complete the joint
education program. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers
who were serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of
the education. DOD has also increasingly relied on allowable waivers
and has not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with
officers who hold a joint specialty designation. This number reached an
all-time high in fiscal year 2001 when DOD did not fill 311, or more
than one-third, of its
808 critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers.
In a letter dated January 28, 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness concurred with our recommendation that DOD
develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD‘s
overall mission and goals.
Background:
The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was, in part, to reorganize DOD
into a more unified military structure. Within that act, Congress
included several provisions that specifically address the promotion of
officers serving in joint positions, the education of officers in joint
matters,[Footnote 4] and their assignment to joint organizations. The
act also established a joint specialty officer designation for officers
who are specifically trained in and oriented toward joint
matters.[Footnote 5] Although the act contains a number of specific
requirements, Congress also provided DOD with flexibility in meeting
the requirements by granting it waiver authority when it can
demonstrate justification.[Footnote 6] DOD approves waivers on a case-
specific basis. These waivers apply to a number of the provisions,
including (1) the methods for designating joint specialty officers, (2)
the posteducation assignments for joint specialty officers, (3) the
assignment of joint specialty officers to critical joint duty
positions, and (4) the promotions of officers to the general and flag
officer pay grades.
Moreover, Congress has issued follow-on reports and made changes to the
law in subsequent legislation. For example, a congressional panel on
military education issued a report in April 1989 that contained
numerous recommendations regarding joint professional military
education.[Footnote 7] Among other things, this panel recommended that
the services‘ professional military education schools teach both
service and joint matters and that the student body and faculty at each
of the service schools include officers from the other services. DOD
has implemented these recommendations. Most recently, Congress amended
the law regarding the promotion criteria for officers being considered
for promotion to the general and flag officer pay grades.[Footnote 8]
The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a requirement that officers must
have served in a joint position prior to being selected for these
promotions. The amendment, contained in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, will require most officers
being considered for appointment to this grade after September 30,
2007, to complete the joint education program as well.
DOD uses a number of multiservice and multinational commands and
organizations to plan and support joint matters. Since passage of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, officers serving in these commands and
organizations have overseen a number of joint and multinational
military operations that range from humanitarian assistance and
peacekeeping to major operations such as Operation Desert Storm and
ongoing operations in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2001, DOD had a total
of 9,146 joint positions. Of these positions, 3,400 positions, or 37
percent, were allocated to the Air Force; 3,170 positions, or 35
percent, were allocated to the Army;
2,004 positions, or 22 percent, were allocated to the Navy; and
572 positions, or 6 percent, were allocated to the Marine Corps.
Officers in pay grades O-4 (majors in the Air Force, Army, and Marine
Corps and lieutenant commanders in the Navy) and above can receive
credit for joint experience when they serve in the Joint Staff, joint
geographic and functional commands, combined forces commands, and
defense agencies. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has the
authority to award joint credit to officers for serving in certain
joint task force headquarters staffs.[Footnote 9] DOD has developed a
joint duty assignment list that includes all active duty positions in
pay grades O-4 and above in the multiservice organizations that are
involved in or support the integrated employment of the armed forces.
DOD‘s policy places limits on the number of positions in the defense
agencies and other jointly staffed activities that can be included on
the list.
DOD uses a two-phased approach to educate officers in joint matters. It
incorporated the first phase of the program into the curricula of the
services‘ intermediate-and senior-level professional military
education schools.[Footnote 10] DOD offers the second phase of the
program at the National Defense University‘s Joint Forces Staff College
in Norfolk, Virginia. This phase is designed to provide officers with
the opportunity to study in a truly joint environment and to apply the
knowledge they gained during the first phase of their joint education.
DOD also offers a combined program that includes both phases at the
National Defense University‘s National War College and Industrial
College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C.
Lack of a Strategic Approach Is Contributing to DOD‘s Difficulties to
Fully Respond to the Act‘s Intent:
A significant impediment affecting DOD‘s ability to fully realize the
cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has
not taken a strategic approach that establishes clear goals for officer
development in joint matters and links those goals to DOD‘s overall
mission and goals. This lack of an overarching vision or strategy may
continue to hamper DOD‘s ability to make continued progress in this
area. A well-developed human capital strategy would provide a means for
aligning all elements of DOD‘s human capital management, including
joint officer development, with its broader organizational objectives.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act not only defined new duty positions and
educational requirements but also envisioned a new culture that is
truly oriented toward joint matters. Moreover, DOD‘s Joint Vision 2020
portrays a future in which the armed forces are ’fully joint:
intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and
technically.“ The key question, today, is how does DOD best seize the
opportunity to build on current momentum. In April 2002, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense issued the Military Personnel Human Resource
Strategic Plan to establish military priorities for the next several
years. The new military personnel strategy captures DOD leadership‘s
guidance regarding aspects of managing human capital, but the
strategy‘s linkage to the overall mission and programmatic goals is not
stated. DOD‘s human capital strategy does not address the vision cited
in Joint Vision 2020. DOD‘s human capital approach to joint officer
development - if it were linked to its overall mission - would
emphasize individuals with the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed
to function in the joint environment.
DOD, for example, has not fully assessed how many joint specialty
officers it actually needs. The number of joint specialty officers has
decreased by almost 60 percent over the years, from just over 12,400
joint specialty officers in fiscal year 1990 to approximately 4,900
joint specialty officers in fiscal year 2001, yet DOD has a significant
backlog of officers who, although otherwise qualified, have not been
designated as joint specialty officers. Moreover, without knowing how
many joint specialty officers it needs, DOD‘s joint professional
military education system may not be structured or targeted properly.
For example, without first defining how many officers should be joint
specialty officers - all officers, most officers, or only those needed
to fill joint positions - DOD has not been able to determine the number
of joint professional military graduates it needs. DOD does not know if
the total number of available seats is sufficient to meet its needs or
if it will need to explore alternatives for providing joint education
to greater numbers of officers.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that the Secretary of Defense should
establish personnel policies for reserve officers that emphasize
education and experience in joint matters.[Footnote 11] However, at the
time of our review, the Secretary of Defense had not yet, within a
total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint officer
development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations
- despite the fact that no significant operation can be conducted
without reserve involvement. Providing education in joint matters to
reservists has become increasingly important since 1986, given that DOD
has increasingly relied on reservists in the conduct of its mission.
Further, with 1.2 million reservists in seven components, they
represent almost half of our nation‘s total force. When the act was
enacted, reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that
would supplement active forces during a major war. In addition, the
current mobilization for the war on terrorism is adding to this
increased use and is expected to last a long time. We interviewed
officers at several joint organizations and found that reservists are
serving in positions at all levels from the Chief of Staff at one
command down to the mid-grade officer positions. Moreover, DOD has
identified 2,904 additional positions that it will fill with reservists
when it operates under mobilized conditions.
Moreover, data suggest that the four services continue to struggle to
balance joint requirements against their own service needs and vary in
the degree of importance that they place on joint education,
assignments, and promotions. The Air Force, for example, has been able
to send a higher percentage of its officers to a joint position after
the officers attend a joint professional military education school. In
fiscal year 2001, 44 percent of Air Force officers serving in joint
positions had previously attended a joint professional military
education school. In contrast, 38 percent of Army officers and 33
percent of Navy and Marine Corps officers serving in joint positions
had attended a joint professional military education school prior to
their joint assignments.
DOD Is Promoting Officers with Joint Experience with Mixed Results:
The Goldwater-Nichols Act set a requirement that officers must complete
a full tour of duty in a joint assignment, or receive a waiver, prior
to being selected for appointment to the general and flag officer pay
grade.[Footnote 12]
DOD‘s reliance on good-of-the-service waivers,[Footnote 13] in
particular, to promote officers who had not previously served in joint
positions is one indicator of how DOD is promoting its general and flag
officers. The service secretaries request use of this waiver authority
when they believe they have sound justification for promoting an
officer who (1) has not completed a full tour of duty in a joint
position and (2) does not qualify for promotion through one of the
other four specific waivers. We analyzed the extent to which DOD has
relied on this waiver category to promote its senior officers because
these waivers apply most directly to the population of general and flag
officers who are likely to be assigned to senior leadership positions
in joint organizations.
DOD approved 185 good-of-the-service waivers, representing 11 percent
of the 1,658 promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades,
between fiscal years 1989 and 2001. Specifically, DOD approved 10 or
more good-of-the-service waivers each year between fiscal years 1989
and 1998 and only 3 to 7 waivers in fiscal years 1999 through 2001. The
Secretary of Defense has paid particular attention to this waiver
category and, in 2000, established a policy that restricts the use of
good-of-the-service waivers to 10 percent of total promotions to the
general and flag officer pay grades each year.[Footnote 14] In the 2
years since the Secretary of Defense issued limitations on the use of
these waivers, DOD has used them in about
5 percent of its promotions. Our analysis of general and flag officer
promotions showed that, between fiscal years 1995 and 2000, the Marine
Corps used good-of-the-service waivers to promote 19 percent of its
officers to brigadier general. The Army used this waiver authority for
17 percent of its promotions, and the Navy used the authority for
13 percent of its promotions. In contrast, the Air Force only requested
one good-of-the-service waiver during that time period.
For most appointments to the general and flag level made after
September 30, 2007, officers will have to meet the requirements
expected of a joint specialty officer.[Footnote 15] This means that
most officers, in addition to completing a full tour of duty in a joint
position, will also have to complete DOD‘s joint education program as
well.[Footnote 16] Our analysis of the 124 general and flag officers
promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 officers, or
47 percent, had not fulfilled the joint specialty officer requirements.
These 58 officers included 18 of 43 officers promoted in the Air Force,
18 of
40 officers promoted in the Army, 19 of 33 officers promoted in the
Navy, and 3 of the 8 officers promoted in the Marine Corps.
We also analyzed DOD‘s use of the four additional waiver categories. As
of fiscal year 2001, DOD has been promoting more officers who had the
requisite joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades
than it did in fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2001, however, DOD
still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to
promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. Figure 1 shows
that the percentage of officers who were selected for promotion to the
general and flag officer pay grades, and who had previous joint
experience, rose from 51 percent in fiscal year 1995 to 80 percent in
fiscal year 1999. Figure 1 also shows, however, that DOD experienced
slight increases in the use of waivers in fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
Figure 1: Percentage of Officers Promoted to General or Flag Rank with
Joint Experience between Fiscal Years 1995 and 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
DOD has made progress, but is still not fully meeting provisions to
promote mid-grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels
in the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps and lieutenant commanders,
commanders, and captains in the Navy) who are serving or who have
served in joint positions at rates not less than the promotion rates of
their peers who have not served in joint positions. The Goldwater-
Nichols Act established promotion policy objectives for officers
serving in pay grades O-4 and above who (1) are serving on or have
served on the Joint Staff,
(2) are designated as joint specialty officers, and (3) are serving or
have served in other joint positions.
DOD has been most successful in meeting the promotion objective set for
officers assigned to the Joint Staff. The act established an
expectation that officers who are serving or have served on the Joint
Staff be promoted, as a group, at a rate not less that the rate of
officers who are serving or have served in their service headquarters.
[Footnote 17] Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this
objective 92 percent of the time.
The act further established an expectation that joint specialty
officers, as a group, be promoted at a rate not less than the rate of
officers who are serving or have served in their service
headquarters.[Footnote 18] Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met
this promotion objective 74 percent of the time. Where DOD did not meet
its promotion objective was somewhat random, and we were not able to
attribute problem areas to specific pay grades or services. This
standard has been temporarily reduced, and, through December 2004, DOD
is required to promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate
not less than the rate for other officers in the same service, pay
grade, and competitive category. We also compared the promotion rates
of joint specialty officers against this lower standard and found that,
with few exceptions, DOD would have met this standard between fiscal
years 1988 and 2001.
DOD has made less significant improvement in meeting its promotion
objective for officers assigned to other joint organizations.[Footnote
19] The act established an expectation that officers who are serving or
have served in joint positions be promoted, as a group, at a rate not
less than the rate for all officers in their service.[Footnote 20]
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective 71 percent
of the time. With few exceptions during the last
7 years, all services met the promotion objective for their officers
being promoted to the O-5 pay grade who are assigned to other joint
organizations. However, the services have had significant difficulty
meeting the promotion objectives for their officers being promoted to
the O-6 pay grade. For example, the Navy has failed to meet this
objective for its O-6 officers since fiscal year 1988, and the Army has
only met this promotion objective twice - in fiscal years 1995 and 2001
- since fiscal year 1988. The Air Force has generally met this
objective for its officers at the O-6 pay grade, but it has not met
this objective in the past 4 years. Conversely, the Marine Corps had
difficulty in meeting this promotion objective for its officers at the
O-6 pay grade between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, but it met this
objective in every year until fiscal year 2001.
Positive Actions Taken, but Gaps Remain in Education and Assignments:
One of the provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DOD to
develop officers, in part, through education in joint matters.[Footnote
21] Accordingly, DOD has defined joint education requirements in terms
of a two-phased program in joint matters. Furthermore, the Secretary of
Defense is required to educate sufficient numbers of officers so that
approximately one-half of the joint positions are filled at any time by
officers who have either successfully completed the joint professional
education program or received an allowable waiver to complete the
education after their assignment.[Footnote 22] The act, however, did
not identify a specific numerical requirement and, similarly, DOD has
not established numerical goals concerning the number of officers who
should complete joint professional military education.
According to DOD data, only one-third of the officers serving in joint
positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint
education program. This is due, in large part, to space and facility
limitations at the National Defense University Schools that provide the
second phase. Although DOD assigns approximately 3,000 active duty
officers to joint positions each year, the three schools, collectively,
have about 1,200 seats available for active duty officers.
Furthermore, the Joint Forces Staff College, from which most officers
receive the second phase, is currently operating at 83 percent of its
906-seat capacity. Moreover, the number of unfilled seats at the Joint
Forces Staff College has risen significantly in recent years, from a
low of 12 empty seats in fiscal year 1998 to a high of 154 empty seats
in fiscal year 2001. DOD officials cited pressing needs to assign
officers to the increasing number of military operations as the major
reason for these vacancies. A Joint Staff officer responsible for joint
education expressed concern about the services‘ ability to fill seats
in the future due to the ongoing war on terrorism.
Logistics, timing, and budget issues are also making it difficult for
officers to attend the second phase of the joint education program. The
Joint Forces Staff College offers the second phase three times during
the year and, by law, may not be less than 3 months.[Footnote 23] The
Joint Forces Staff College can only accommodate approximately 300
students in each
3-month term and does not have the space to receive all of the service
professional military education school graduates at the same time.
Given that, officers can report to their joint position after
completing the first phase and subsequently attend the second phase on
a temporary duty basis at some point during their assignment. However,
officers and senior leaders at the sites we visited told us that their
joint commands cannot afford a 3-month gap in a position due to
pressing schedules and workload demands. Officers serving on the Joint
Staff told us that a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
instituted a policy that the Joint Staff would not send officers to the
Joint Forces Staff College - or to any other training lasting more than
30 days - after they reported to the Joint Staff for duty. DOD
officials confirmed this and explained that the former chairman
instituted this policy with the expectation that the services would
send their officers to the second phase of the education before sending
them to their Joint Staff assignments. The services, however, are still
not sending all officers to the second phase before they assign
officers to the Joint Staff. In addition to logistics and timing
issues, related budget issues exist. When an officer attends the second
phase en route to a joint command, the officer‘s service pays the
expenses associated with sending the officer to the Joint Forces Staff
College. When the officer attends the program midtour, the joint
organization pays the expenses.
In addition, considerable variation exists among the services in terms
of the number of officers each service sends to the Joint Forces Staff
College. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that
the seats be allocated among the services in accordance with the
distribution of service positions on the joint duty assignment list.
The percentage of seats reserved for each service at the school does,
in fact, reflect the distribution on the list. However, while the Air
Force filled almost 98 percent and the Marine Corps 91 percent of their
allocated seats in academic year 2001, the Army filled only 77 percent
of its seats and the Navy filled only 67 percent of its seats.
Moreover, vacancy rates for the Army and the Navy have, for the most
part, increased between academic years 1996 and 2001.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as amended, further requires DOD to
designate at least 800 joint positions as critical joint duty
positions[Footnote 24] - positions where the duties and
responsibilities are such that it is highly important that officers
assigned to the positions are particularly trained in, and oriented
toward, joint matters. DOD has met this requirement and has designated
808 positions as critical joint duty positions. However, DOD is also
required to place only joint specialty officers in these positions
unless the Secretary exercises his waiver authority.[Footnote 25] DOD
has increasingly used its waiver authority to meet this requirement.
The percentage of critical joint duty positions that were filled by
officers other than joint specialty officers steadily increased from 9
percent in fiscal year 1996 to 38 percent in fiscal year 2001. This
number reached an all-time high in fiscal year 2001, when DOD did not
fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint duty positions
with joint specialty officers. In addition, DOD has left other critical
joint duty positions vacant. The percentage of unfilled critical joint
duty positions has steadily increased from 8 percent in fiscal year
1989 to 22 percent in fiscal year 2001. Therefore, only 331 positions,
or 41 percent, of the 808 critical joint duty positions were filled by
joint specialty officers in fiscal year 2001.
The services fill these critical joint duty positions with officers who
have both the joint specialty designation and the appropriate primary
military skill, any additional required skills, and pay grade. However,
when (1) no joint specialty officer with the other requisite skills is
available for assignment (e.g., pay grade and military occupation) or
(2) the best-qualified candidate is not a joint specialty officer, a
waiver must be approved to fill the position with an otherwise
qualified officer. Service and Joint Staff officials explained DOD‘s
inability to fill a critical position with a joint specialty officer
may be due to the fact that the critical joint duty position
description may not reflect the commander‘s needs at the time the
position is filled. These officials told us that the most frequently
cited reason for requesting an allowable waiver was because the
commander believed that the best-qualified officer for the position was
not a joint specialty officer.
In addition, DOD‘s population of joint specialty officers may not be
sufficient to meet this requirement. By fiscal year 1990, DOD had
designated just over 12,400 officers, who already had the joint
education and experience, as joint specialty officers. However, DOD
experienced a 56 percent decrease in its joint specialty officers
between fiscal years 1990 and 1997 and has experienced moderate
decreases in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. By fiscal year 2001, DOD had
approximately 4,900 designated joint specialty officers. Officials on
the Joint Staff attributed the decreases in the early years to the fact
that the attrition of officers who received the designation in fiscal
year 1990 has exceeded the number of new designations of joint
specialty officers. DOD officials also projected that they would need
to designate approximately 800 new joint specialty officers each year
to maintain its current population. Our review of data since fiscal
year 1990 found that DOD only met this projection in fiscal years 1998,
1999, and 2001. Figure 2 shows the number of new designations of joint
specialty officers each year and the total number of joint specialty
officers for fiscal years 1990 through 2001.
Figure 2: Number of Officers Designated Annually as Joint Specialty
Officers and Total Number of Joint Specialty Officers for Fiscal Years
1990 through 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Officials told us that DOD has been selective in nominating and
designating officers for the joint specialty because of the promotion
objectives specified in the law. Officials noted that as a result, the
population of joint specialty officers has been small. The act requires
the services to promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate
not less than the rate of officers being promoted who are serving on,
or have served on, the headquarters staff of their service.[Footnote
26] This higher promotion standard is applied to joint specialty
officers from the time they receive the joint specialty designation
until they are considered for or promoted to pay grade O-6. DOD sought
relief from this provision and, in December 2001, Congress reduced the
standard for 3 years. During this 3-year period, the services are to
promote joint specialty officers at a rate not less than the promotion
rates of all other officers being promoted from the same military
service, pay grade, and competitive category. Currently, about 2,700
officers meet the joint specialty officer qualifications but have not
been designated, and DOD, given this change in the law, is in the
process of designating these officers. Once they are designated, DOD
will have a population of about 7,600 joint specialty officers.
In a letter dated January 28, 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness concurred with our recommendation that DOD
develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD‘s
overall mission and goals.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee may
have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Derek B. Stewart at
(202) 512-5140 (e-mail address: Stewartd@gao.gov) or Brenda S. Farrell
at (202) 512-3604 (e-mail address: Farrellb@gao.gov). Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony included David E. Moser and
Ann M. Ulrich.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Pub. L. 99-433, Oct. 1, 1986.
[2] Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020,
Washington, D.C.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Joint Officer
Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed,
GAO-03-238 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2002).
[4] Congress defined joint matters as those matters relating to the
integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters
relating to national military strategy, strategic planning and
contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations
under unified command. 10 U.S.C. sec. 668.
[5] There are four methods for an officer to be selected for the joint
specialty: (1) An officer completes joint professional military
education and subsequently serves in a joint position; (2) An officer
who has a military occupational specialty, which is a critical
occupational specialty involving combat operations, serves in a joint
position and then completes the joint professional military education
program; (3) An officer serves in a joint position and then completes
the joint professional military education, provided the Secretary of
Defense determines a waiver is in the interest of sound personnel
management; and (4) An officer completes two joint assignments and the
Secretary of Defense waives the joint education requirement. A
numerical limitation on the last two waivers is specified in the law.
10 U.S.C. sec. 661.
[6] 10 U.S.C. secs. 619a (b), 661 (c)(3) and (d)(2)(C), 663 (d).
[7] Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, April 21, 1989.
[8] Pub. L. 107-107, Div. A, Title V, sec. 525 (a), (b), Dec. 28, 2001.
[9] 10 U.S.C. sec. 664 (i).
[10] These schools include the Air Command and Staff College and the
Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama; the Army Command and General
Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas; the Army War College in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania; the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the Marine
Corps War College in Quantico, Virginia; and the College of Naval
Command and Staff and the College of Naval Warfare in Newport, Rhode
Island.
[11] 10 U.S.C. sec. 666.
[12] The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for (1)
officers when the selection is necessary for the good of the service;
(2) officers with scientific and technical qualifications for which
joint requirements do not exist; (3) medical officers, dental officers,
veterinary officers, medical service officers, nurses, biomedical
officers, chaplains, or judge advocates; (4) officers who had served at
least 180 days in a joint assignment at the time the selection board
convened and the officers‘ total consecutive service in joint duty
positions within that immediate organization is not less than 2 years,
and (5) officers who served in a joint assignment prior to 1987 that
involved significant duration of not less than 12 months. 10 U.S.C.
sec. 619a (b).
[13] 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (b)(1).
[14] Secretary of Defense memorandum dated July 6, 2000.
[15] 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (a)(2).
[16] The existing waiver authority remains unchanged by the amendments
made to 10 U.S.C. sec. 619a (a) by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Pub. L. 107-107, Div A, Title V, sec. 525,
Dec. 28, 2001.
[17] The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that ’officers who are serving
on, or have served on, the Joint Staff are expected, as a group, to be
promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for
officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive
category who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff
of their armed force.“ 10 U.S.C. sec 662 (a) (1).
[18] The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that ’officers who have the joint
specialty are expected, as a group, to be promoted at a rate not less
than the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade
and competitive category who are serving on, or have served on, the
headquarters staff of their armed force.“ 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (a)(2).
[19] This category excludes officers who have served on the Joint Staff
and joint specialty officers.
[20] The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that ’officers who are serving
in, or have served in, joint duty assignments (other than officers
covered in paragraphs (1) and (2)) are expected, as a group, to be
promoted to the next higher grade at a rate not less than the rate for
all officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive
category.“ 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (a) (3).
[21] 10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (c).
[22] 10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (b) and (d).
[23] 10 U.S.C. sec. 663 (e).
[24] The act originally required the Secretary to designate no fewer
than 1,000 critical joint duty positions, but the act was amended in
1996 by Public Law 104-106 section 501(a) to reduce the number to 800.
10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (d)(2)(A).
[25] 10 U.S.C. sec. 661 (d)(2)(B) and (C).
[26] 10 U.S.C. sec. 662 (a)(2).
