Military Readiness
New Reporting System Is Intended to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed Gao ID: GAO-03-456 March 28, 2003The Department of Defense's (DOD) readiness assessment system was designed to assess the ability of units and joint forces to fight and meet the demands of the national security strategy. In 1998, GAO concluded that the readiness reports provided to Congress were vague and ineffective as oversight tools. Since that time, Congress added reporting requirements to enhance its oversight of military readiness. Therefore, the Chairman asked GAO to examine (1) the progress DOD made in resolving issues raised in the 1998 GAO report on both the unit-level readiness reporting system and the lack of specificity in DOD's Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress, (2) the extent to which DOD has complied with legislative reporting requirements enacted since 1997, and (3) DOD's plans to improve readiness reporting.
Since 1998, DOD has made some progress in improving readiness reporting--particularly at the unit level--but some issues remain. For example, DOD uses readiness measures that vary 10 percentage points or more to determine readiness ratings and often does not report the precise measurements outside DOD. DOD included more information in its Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress. But quality issues remain--in that the reports do not specifically describe readiness problems, their effects on readiness, or remedial actions to correct problems. Nor do the reports contain information about funding programmed to address specific remedial actions. Although current law does not specifically require this information, Congress could use it for its oversight role. DOD complied with most, though not all, of the legislative readiness reporting requirements enacted by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998-2002. For example, DOD (1) is now listing the individual units that have reported low readiness and reporting on the readiness of prepositioned equipment, as required by the fiscal year 1998 Act; (2) is reporting on 11 of 19 readiness indicators that commanders identified as important and that Congress required to be added to the quarterly reports in the fiscal year 1998 Act, but is not reporting on the other 8 readiness indicators; and (3) has not yet implemented a new comprehensive readiness reporting system as required in the fiscal year 1999 Act. As a result, Congress is not receiving all the information mandated by law. DOD issued a directive in June 2002 to establish a new comprehensive readiness reporting system that DOD officials said they plan to use to comply with the reporting requirements specified by Congress. The new system is intended to implement many of the recommendations included in a congressionally directed independent study for establishing such a system. However, the extent to which the new system will actually address the current system's shortcomings is unknown, because the new system is currently only a concept, and full capability is not scheduled until 2007. As of January 2003, DOD had not developed an implementation plan containing measurable performance goals, identification of resources, performance indicators, and an evaluation plan to assess progress in developing the new reporting system. Without such a plan, neither DOD nor the Congress will be able to fully assess whether the new system's development is on schedule and achieving desired results.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-456, Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
March 2003:
Military Readiness:
New Reporting System Is Intended to Address Long-Standing Problems, but
Better Planning Is Needed:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-456, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) readiness assessment system was
designed to assess the ability of units and joint forces to fight and
meet the demands of the national security strategy. In 1998, GAO
concluded that the readiness reports provided to Congress were vague
and ineffective as oversight tools. Since that time, Congress added
reporting requirements to enhance its oversight of military readiness.
Therefore, the Chairman asked GAO to examine (1) the progress DOD made
in resolving issues raised in the 1998 GAO report on both the unit-
level readiness reporting system and the lack of specificity in DOD‘s
Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress, (2) the extent to which
DOD has complied with legislative reporting requirements enacted since
1997, and (3) DOD‘s plans to improve readiness reporting.
What GAO Found:
Since 1998, DOD has made some progress in improving readiness reporting
”particularly at the unit level”but some issues remain. For example,
DOD uses readiness measures that vary 10 percentage points or more to
determine readiness ratings and often does not report the precise
measurements outside DOD. DOD included more information in its
Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress. But quality issues
remain”in that the reports do not specifically describe readiness
problems, their effects on readiness, or remedial actions to correct
problems. Nor do the reports contain information about funding
programmed to address specific remedial actions. Although current law
does not specifically require this information, Congress could use it
for its oversight role. DOD complied with most, though not all, of the
legislative readiness reporting requirements enacted by Congress in
the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998-2002.
For example, DOD
* is now listing the individual units that have reported low readiness
and reporting on the readiness of prepositioned equipment, as required
by the fiscal year 1998 Act;
* is reporting on 11 of 19 readiness indicators that commanders
identified as important and that Congress required to be added to the
quarterly reports in the fiscal year 1998 Act, but is not reporting on
the other 8 readiness indicators; and
* has not yet implemented a new comprehensive readiness reporting
system as required in the fiscal year 1999 Act.
As a result, Congress is not receiving all the information mandated by
law.
DOD issued a directive in June 2002 to establish a new comprehensive
readiness reporting system that DOD officials said they plan to use to
comply with the reporting requirements specified by Congress. The new
system is intended to implement many of the recommendations included
in a congressionally directed independent study for establishing such
a system. However, the extent to which the new system will actually
address the current system‘s shortcomings is unknown, because the new
system is currently only a concept, and full capability is not
scheduled until 2007.
As of January 2003, DOD had not developed an implementation plan
containing measurable performance goals, identification of resources,
performance indicators, and an evaluation plan to assess progress in
developing the new reporting system. Without such a plan, neither DOD
nor the Congress will be able to fully assess whether the new system‘s
development is on schedule and achieving desired results.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO made recommendations to improve readiness reporting and to develop
an implementation plan to allow DOD and the Congress to gauge progress
in developing DOD‘s new readiness reporting system. DOD did not agree
with our recommendations. After reviewing its comments, we modified
one recommendation but retained the others as originally stated.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-456.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal P. Curtin at (757)
552-8100 or curtinn@gao.gov.
March 2003
GAO-03-456:
Contents:
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Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Some Progress in Readiness Reporting, but Some Issues Remain:
DOD Has Not Fully Complied with All Legislative Requirements:
Lack of Implementation Plan Could Hinder Development of New Readiness
Reporting System:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and our Response:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD‘s Readiness Assessment Process, as of January 2003:
Figure 2: Timeline of Recommended, Required, and Planned Readiness
Reporting Changes Since 1994:
Abbreviations:
ACTD: Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration:
GSORTS: Global Status of Resources and Training System:
OUSD P&R: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 28, 2003:
The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) readiness assessment system was
designed to assess the ability of units and joint forces to fight and
meet the demands of the national security strategy. For more than a
decade ending in 1998, various audit and oversight organizations
questioned the thoroughness and reliability of DOD reports on the
readiness of U.S. forces. Since 1998, Congress has added reporting
requirements to enhance its oversight of military readiness. In doing
so, Congress expressed concern over contradictions between assessments
of military unit readiness in reports and observations made by military
personnel in the field.[Footnote 1]
DOD provides Congress a quarterly report that contains readiness
information from several sources: the unit-level readiness assessment
system; results of scenario-based assessments; and summaries of
information briefed to senior DOD officials. We reviewed DOD‘s
readiness assessment and reporting system in 1998 and concluded that
the readiness reports provided Congress offered a vague description of
readiness problems and remedial actions and therefore were not
effective as oversight tools.[Footnote 2]
Considering the concerns raised in our 1998 report, reporting
requirements added by Congress since 1998, and the new national
security strategy, you asked us to provide an updated assessment of
DOD‘s readiness reporting. As agreed with your office, we examined (1)
the progress DOD has made in resolving issues raised in our prior
report on both the unit level readiness reporting system and the lack
of specificity in the Department‘s Quarterly Readiness Reports to the
Congress, (2) the extent to which DOD has complied with legislative
reporting requirements enacted since 1997, and (3) DOD‘s plans to
improve readiness reporting. In conducting this analysis, we compared
current reported readiness data with legislative requirements and with
data reported in 1998. We also identified DOD initiatives for improving
readiness reporting. We conducted our review from June 2002 through
January 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. (For a complete description of our methodology, see app.
I.):
Results in Brief:
Since our 1998 report identifying limitations in readiness reporting,
DOD has made some progress in improving readiness reporting, such as
adding information on equipment cannibalization rates in its reports to
Congress. Some issues, however, remain. Although DOD has improved its
unit-level readiness reporting system, it still uses readiness measures
that vary 10 percentage points or more to determine readiness ratings
and often does not widely report the precise measurements outside DOD.
Since 1998, DOD has included more information in its Quarterly
Readiness Reports to the Congress, such as an annex presenting
equipment cannibalization rates. However, some degradation in these
reports has occurred. For example, DOD eliminated some previously
provided information--such as the joint force readiness assessments--
and the reports still contain very broad statements of readiness issues
and the remedial actions taken or planned to address readiness
problems. Even though some report annexes contain data, the data are
not adequately explained or related to the broad statements of
readiness issues mentioned in the reports. Also, the reports do not
contain information about funding that is programmed to address
specific remedial actions. Although this information is not required by
law, we believe it would be useful for Congress to understand the
significance of the information in these reports for use in its
oversight role.
DOD has complied with most, though not all, of the legislative
readiness reporting requirements enacted by Congress in the National
Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998-2002. For example, as
directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998, DOD is now reporting on the readiness of prepositioned equipment
and DOD is listing individual units that have reported low
readiness.[Footnote 3] For some provisions of the National Defense
Authorization Acts for the period we examined, DOD provided some of the
information specified in the acts. For example, DOD reports on some but
not all of the readiness indicators Congress, in the fiscal year 1998
act, required be added to the quarterly reports.[Footnote 4] For a few
requirements, DOD has yet to comply. For example, DOD has not
implemented a new readiness reporting system, which the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 required to be
implemented by April 1, 2000.[Footnote 5] As a result, Congress is not
receiving all the information mandated by law.
DOD‘s main effort to improve readiness reporting is to develop and
implement a new comprehensive readiness reporting system in response to
the aforementioned legislation. However, the system‘s completion is
still several years away. DOD issued a directive in June 2002 to
establish this new system.[Footnote 6] Officials from the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD P&R)
responsible for developing the system stated they plan to use the new
system to comply with the reporting requirements contained in the
National Defense Authorization Acts and that the new system is intended
to implement many of the recommendations included in a congressionally
directed independent study for establishing a comprehensive readiness
reporting system. However, the extent to which the new system will
actually address the current system‘s shortcomings is unknown. This is
because the new system is currently only a concept and full capability
is not scheduled until 2007--some 7 years after a new comprehensive
system was legislatively mandated to be implemented.[Footnote 7] As of
January 2003 DOD had not developed an implementation plan to assess
progress in developing the new reporting system. We believe that an
implementation plan containing measurable performance goals,
identification of resources, performance indicators, and an evaluation
plan could help DOD as well as the Congress assess whether the new
system‘s development is on schedule and achieving desired results.
We are making recommendations to improve readiness reporting and to
develop an implementation plan to allow DOD and the Congress to gauge
DOD‘s progress in developing its new readiness reporting system.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree with our
recommendation to improve readiness reporting, saying that the
quarterly reports are comprehensive and spending more time on the
report would be counterproductive. Although the quarterly reports
contain voluminous data, the reader cannot assess its significance
since the data are explained inadequately. However, between 1998 and
mid-2001, DOD did include an unclassified summary of issues for each
service in the quarterly reports addressing several topics, including
personnel and equipment. Since DOD has highlighted key issues in past
quarterly reports, we believe that improving these reports by again
including a summary that highlights key readiness issues would be
beneficial. In doing so, DOD could focus on the most critical issues
that are of greatest concern to the services. Therefore, we have
modified our recommendation that DOD improve the quality of readiness
reporting to focus on issues deemed to be critical by the Secretary and
the services, including analyes and planned remedial actions for each
issue.
DOD also did not agree with our recommendations to develop an
implementation plan for the new readiness system and to provide
Congress annual updates on the new system‘s development. DOD said that
it is developing better tools for assessing readiness and had
established milestones and expected outcomes. Thus, DOD believes that
further planning and providing an annual update to Congress is
unnecessary. Considering that Congress expressed concern about DOD‘s
lack of progress in developing a comprehensive system and that DOD does
not plan for the new system to be fully capable until 2007, we retained
these two recommendations. A detailed discussion of DOD‘s comments and
our response is contained in the body of this report.
Background:
DOD‘s readiness assessment and reporting system was designed to assess
and report on military readiness at three levels--(1) the unit level;
(2) the joint force level; and (3) the aggregate, or strategic, level.
Unit-level readiness is assessed with the Global Status of Resources
and Training System (GSORTS), which is an automated system that
assesses the extent to which military units possess the required
resources and training to undertake their wartime missions. To address
joint readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established
the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (now called the Joint Quarterly
Readiness Review or JQRR), that compiles readiness assessments from the
combatant commands, the combat support agencies, and the military
services. The Joint Staff and the services use these assessments to
brief DOD‘s leadership on the Senior Readiness Oversight Council--an
executive-level forum for monitoring emerging readiness issues at the
strategic level. The briefings to the council are intended to present a
view of readiness at the aggregate force level. From these briefings to
the council, DOD prepares a legislatively mandated quarterly readiness
report to Congress.[Footnote 8] Figure 1 provides an overview of DOD‘s
readiness assessment process.
Figure 1: DOD‘s Readiness Assessment Process, as of January 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
We have issued several reports containing recommendations for improving
readiness reporting. In 1994, we recommended DOD develop a more
comprehensive readiness system to include 26 specific readiness
indicators.[Footnote 9] In 1998, we reported on shortcomings in DOD‘s
readiness assessment system. At that time, we stated GSORTS‘
limitations included lack of precision in measurements, late reporting,
subjective input, and lack of standardization. Secondly, we reported
that while the Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress accurately
reflected briefs to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council, they lacked
specific details on deficiencies and remedial actions and thus did not
meet the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 482 (b). DOD concurred with our
recommendation that the Secretary of Defense take steps to better
fulfill the legislative reporting requirements under 10 U.S.C. 482 by
providing (1) supporting data on key readiness deficiencies and (2)
specific information on planned remedial actions. Finally, we reported
that deficiencies identified as a result of the Joint Monthly Readiness
Reviews remained open because the solutions require funding over the
long term. In 2002, we issued a classified report on DOD‘s process for
tracking the status of deficiencies identified in the Joint Monthly
Readiness Reviews. We made recommendations to improve DOD‘s deficiency
status reporting system and for DOD to develop funding estimates for
correcting critical readiness deficiencies. In its comments, DOD
generally agreed with the report‘s findings and recommendations.
Some Progress in Readiness Reporting, but Some Issues Remain:
Although DOD has made progress in resolving readiness reporting issues
raised in our 1998 report, we found that some of the same issues still
exist today. For example, DOD has added information to its Quarterly
Readiness Reports to the Congress (hereafter referred to as the
quarterly reports). However, we found that the reports still contain
vague descriptions of readiness problems and remedial actions. Even
though some report annexes contain detailed data, the data as presented
are not ’user friendly“--it is largely unevaluated and is not linked to
readiness issues mentioned in the report plus the report text does not
explain how the data relates to units‘ readiness. Thus, as we reported
in 1998, these reports do not specifically describe readiness problems
or remedial actions as required under 10 U.S.C. 482 (b). We believe
that this kind of information would be useful for Congress to
understand the significance of the information in these reports for use
in its oversight role.
Some Improvements in Unit-Level Reporting, but Some Issues Unchanged
Since 1998:
DOD has improved some aspects of its unit-level reporting system, the
Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). For example,
in 1998 GSORTS‘ data were maintained in multiple databases and data
were not synchronized. As of September 2002, the data are reported to a
central site, and there is one database of record. Also in 1998, U.S.
Army GSORTS review procedures delayed submission of Army data, and all
the services‘ data entry was manual. As of September 2002, Army
reporting procedures require reporting consistent with GSORTS‘
requirements, and all the services have automated data entry, which
reduces errors. In 1998, combat units only reported on readiness for
wartime missions. As of September 2002, combat units report on assigned
mission readiness in addition to wartime mission readiness.
Conversely, DOD has not resolved some issues we raised in 1998. For
example, readiness ratings are still reported in broad bands and actual
percentages of required resources are not externally reported. These
issues remain because the manual specifying readiness reporting rules
has not changed in these areas.[Footnote 10] The manual‘s definition of
readiness levels for personnel has not changed since our 1998 report--
it still defines readiness levels in bands of 10 percentage points or
more and does not require external reporting of actual percentages. For
example, the highest personnel rating can range from 90 percent to 100
percent, and there is no requirement to report the actual percentage
outside of DOD. We have also reported that GSORTS does not always
reflect training and equipment deficiencies. For example, we reported
in April and June 2002 that readiness data do not reflect the effect of
training range restrictions on unit readiness.[Footnote 11] We have
also reported that GSORTS does not include whether a unit‘s chemical/
biological equipment is usable.[Footnote 12]
In commenting on our analysis, the OUSD P&R office responsible for
readiness reporting stated that it recognized the imprecision of the
current measurements. According to that office, an effort to develop
the planned new readiness reporting system, which is discussed later in
this report, includes working with the DOD components to enhance and
expand readiness reporting.
Some Information Added to Quarterly Reports Since 1998, but Other
Information Eliminated:
Since our 1998 report, the quarterly reports improved in some areas,
but degraded in others. Although some information was added, we found
that some of the same quality issues remain--namely, that the reports
do not specifically describe readiness problems, their effects on
readiness, or remedial actions.
DOD has added information to the quarterly reports in response to
legislative direction. For example, DOD added information on the
services‘ cannibalization rates.[Footnote 13] Also, DOD added annual
reports on infrastructure and institutional training
readiness.[Footnote 14] However, some information was eliminated from
the quarterly reports. For example, the law requires results of joint
readiness reviews to be reported to Congress.[Footnote 15] DOD included
these results until the July-September 2001 Quarterly Readiness Report
to the Congress. Since that report, four quarterly reports have been
issued without the joint force assessments. Defense officials
responsible for readiness reporting said that the joint readiness
reviews were not included because the scenarios were based on the
former national security strategy of two major wars. The officials
stated they plan to include results from the joint readiness reviews in
future reports.
In commenting on our analysis the OUSD P&R office responsible for
readiness reporting stated that it continues to seek better ways to
provide concise, quality information.
Quarterly Reports Do Not Adequately Explain Readiness Issues:
As we reported in 1998, we found that the quarterly reports still
contain broad statements of readiness issues and remedial actions,
which are not supported by detailed examples and are not related to
data in the reports‘ annexes. Among other things, the law requires the
quarterly reports to specifically describe each readiness problem and
deficiency as well as planned remedial actions.[Footnote 16] The
reports did not specifically describe the nature of each readiness
problem or discuss the effects of each on unit readiness. Also, the
reports included only broad statements of remedial actions that lacked
details on timelines, objectives, or funding requirements. For example,
one report said that the Air Force continued to experience shortages in
critical job skills that affected the service‘s ability to train. The
report did not refer the reader to data in annexes showing training
readiness ratings; it did not state which skills were short, which
training was not accomplished, or whether this shortage had or was
expected to affect units‘ readiness ratings. Further, the report did
not explain the remedial actions taken or planned to reverse the skill
shortage, how long it would take to solve this problem, or what funding
was programmed to implement remedial actions. Defense readiness
officials agreed, stating that information in the quarterly reports is
summarized to the point that there are no details on readiness
deficiencies, remedial actions, or funding programmed to implement
remedial actions. We believe the Congress needs this type of
information to understand the significance of the information reported.
Although some of the quarterly report annexes contain voluminous data,
the data are not adequately explained or related to units‘ readiness.
The law does not mandate specific explanations of these ’readiness
indicators,“ but we believe it is essential for Congress to understand
the significance of the information in these reports for use in its
oversight role. For example, DOD is required to report on the
maintenance backlog.[Footnote 17] Although the report provides the
quantity of the backlog, it does not explain the effect the backlog had
on readiness. Specifically, the report did not explain whether units‘
readiness were affected because maintenance was not accomplished when
needed. In addition, DOD is required to report on training commitments
and deployments.[Footnote 18] The Expanded Quarterly Readiness Report
to Congress Implementation Plan dated February 1998 stated that ’either
an excessive or a reduced level of commitment could be an indicator of
potential readiness problems.“ However, OUSD P&R did not define what
kind of ’readiness problems“ this data may indicate would occur as a
result of ’excessive or reduced“ levels of training and deployments,
such as degraded equipment or training. The data reported are the
amount of training away from home station and the amount of
deployments. However, these data are not explained or related to a
unit‘s equipment or training ratings. Further, criteria have not been
established to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable levels
of the training and deployment data reported. As a result, the reader
does not know whether the data reported indicate a problem or the
extent of the problem. In commenting on our analyses, OUSD P&R
acknowledged ’the Department would be better served by providing more
information as to how various data relates to readiness.“:
Generally, the quarterly reports also do not contain information on
funding programmed to implement specific remedial actions. For example,
one quarterly report included the statement that budgets were revised
’to address readiness and capabilities issues,“ but no examples were
provided. Also, the report lacked statements explaining how this
’budget revision“ would improve readiness. Although not required by
law, we believe it would prove useful for Congress to understand how
DOD addresses specific readiness problems.
In commenting on our analysis, OUSD P&R officials stated that they
would continue to work with the services to provide more fidelity with
the information presented in the quarterly report annexes. However,
they also said that detailed examples require significant staff effort
throughout DOD and that the added time for more detailed analysis could
render the report a historical document. They further said that
complete information would certainly be desired and agreed it is
important for the Congress to understand the significance of the
information in the quarterly reports for use in its oversight role.
DOD Has Not Fully Complied with All Legislative Requirements:
DOD has complied with most, but not all, of the readiness reporting
requirements added by Congress in the National Defense Authorization
Acts for Fiscal Years 1998 through 2002.[Footnote 19] Congress added
readiness reporting requirements out of concern over contradictions
between assessment of military unit readiness in official readiness
reports and observations made by military personnel in the
field.[Footnote 20] In a review of these acts, we identified both
recurring readiness reporting requirements that were added to existing
law and one-time reporting requirements related to military readiness.
We compared current readiness reporting to the requirements in these
acts to make an overall judgment on the extent of compliance. We did
not develop a total count of the number of reporting requirements
because the acts included a series of sections and subsections that
could be totaled in various ways. Because DOD is not reporting on all
the requirements added over the past several years, the Congress is not
receiving all the information mandated by law.
DOD Is Complying with Most of the New Requirements:
Our analysis showed that DOD has complied with most of the requirements
added in the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998-
2002. For example, DOD took the following actions in response to
legislative requirements:
* DOD is now reporting on the readiness of prepositioned equipment and
is listing individual units that have reported low readiness as
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998.[Footnote 21]
* DOD is reporting on infrastructure and institutional training
readiness as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999.[Footnote 22]
* DOD contracted for an independent study of requirements for a
comprehensive readiness reporting system and submitted the study report
to the Congress as required by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000.[Footnote 23]
* DOD has added quarterly information on the military services‘
cannibalization rates as required by the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2001.[Footnote 24]
DOD Is Not Reporting on All Items Required:
DOD is reporting on some, though not all, of the items Congress
required be added to the quarterly readiness reports. For example, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 required 19
specific items be reported that are consistent with our previously
cited 1994 report on readiness reporting.[Footnote 25] The 1994 report
included a list of 26 readiness indicators that DOD commanders said
were important for a more comprehensive assessment of readiness. A 1994
DOD-funded study by the Logistics Management Institute found that 19 of
the 26 indicators could help DOD monitor critical aspects of readiness.
The 19 items listed in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1998 are very similar to those identified in the 1994
Logistics Management Institute study. DOD is reporting on 11 of the 19
items and is not reporting on the other 8. The eight items are (1)
historical personnel strength data and trends, (2) personnel status,
(3) borrowed manpower, (4) personnel morale, (5) operations tempo, (6)
training funding, (7) deployed equipment, and (8) condition of
nonpacing equipment[Footnote 26] as required in the Act.[Footnote 27]
In an implementation plan setting forth how it planned to comply with
reporting on the 19 items, which was also required by the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,[Footnote 28] DOD stated
that it would not report on these eight indicators for the following
reasons:
* Deployed equipment was considered part of the status of prepositioned
equipment indicator.
* Historical personnel strength data and trends were available from the
annual Defense Manpower Requirements Report.
* Training funding and operations tempo were believed to be represented
adequately in the budget requests as flying hours, steaming days, or
vehicle miles and were not considered good measures of readiness
output.
* Personnel strength status was considered to be part of the personnel
rating, but DOD agreed to investigate other ways to evaluate the effect
of service personnel working outside the specialty and grade for which
they were qualified.
* Borrowed manpower data was only captured in a limited sector of the
deployable force and may not be meaningful until a better method is
developed to capture the data.
* Personnel morale had no existing data sources.
* The condition of nonpacing equipment had no reasonable measurement to
use as an indicator.
Notwithstanding the reasoning that DOD stated, these eight indicators
continue to be required by law, and we saw no indication in our work
that DOD is working to develop data for them.
Also, DOD is not complying with some of the requirements in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Examples are
as follows:
* The act required DOD to establish and implement a comprehensive
readiness reporting system by April 2000.[Footnote 29] As of January
2003, DOD had not implemented a new system, and officials said it is
not expected to be fully capable until 2007 or 7 years later than
required.
* The act also required DOD to develop implementing regulations for the
new readiness reporting system.[Footnote 30] DOD had not developed
implementing regulations as of January 2003.
* The act required DOD to issue regulations for reporting changes in
the readiness of training or defense infrastructure establishments
within 72 hours.[Footnote 31] Although DOD has provided some guidance,
officials stated they have not issued regulations because no mechanism
exists for institutional training or defense infrastructure
establishments to report changes and because these entities are not
part of an established readiness reporting system.
In commenting on our analyses, DOD officials acknowledged ’the
Department is not in full compliance“ and stated that they plan to
achieve compliance with the new readiness reporting system under
development. OUSD P&R officials said that the shortfalls in reporting
are unwieldy under the current system; OUSD P&R intends to correct
these shortfalls when the new system is functional. However, as noted
above, DOD does not plan to implement its new system until 2007. As of
January 2003, DOD also had not targeted incremental improvements in
readiness reporting during the period in which the new system is being
developed. Until then, Congress will receive less readiness information
than it mandated by law.
Lack of Implementation Plan Could Hinder Development of New Readiness
Reporting System:
DOD issued a directive in June 2002 to establish a new readiness
reporting system. The Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness is to oversee the system to ensure the accuracy,
completeness, and timeliness of its information and data, its
responsiveness, and its effective and efficient use of modern practices
and technologies. Officials in the OUSD P&R readiness office
responsible for developing the new system said that they plan to use
the new system to comply with the requirements in the National Defense
Authorization Acts and to address many of the recommendations contained
in a congressionally directed independent study. However, as of January
2003, there are few details of what the new system would include.
Although the new system may have the potential to improve readiness
reporting, as of January 2003, it is only a concept without detailed
plans to guide development and monitor implementation. As a result, the
extent to which the new system will address existing shortcomings is
unknown.
DOD Directive Establishes a New Readiness Reporting System:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 required
DOD to establish a comprehensive readiness reporting system.[Footnote
32] In doing so, the Congress expressed concern about DOD‘s lack of
progress in developing a more comprehensive readiness measurement
system reflective of operational realities. The Congress also noted
that past assessments have suffered from DOD‘s inability to create and
implement objective and consistent readiness reporting criteria capable
of providing a clear picture to senior officials and the
Congress.[Footnote 33] Subsequently, the August 2001 Defense Planning
Guidance for Fiscal Years 2003-2007 called for the development of a
strategic plan for transforming DOD readiness reporting.
In June 2002, DOD issued a directive establishing the Department of
Defense Readiness Reporting System.[Footnote 34] The system will
measure and report on the readiness of military forces and the
supporting infrastructure to meet missions and goals assigned by the
Secretary of Defense. All DOD components will align their readiness
reporting processes in accordance with the directive.
The directive assigns oversight and implementing responsibility to the
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The
Undersecretary is responsible for developing, fielding, maintaining,
and funding the new system and scenario assessment tools. The
Undersecretary--in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Services, Defense Agencies, and Combatant Commanders--is to issue
implementing instructions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Service Secretaries, the commanders of the combatant commands, and
the heads of other DOD components are each assigned responsibilities
related to readiness reporting.
OUSD P&R established a timetable to implement the new readiness
reporting system. OUSD P&R plans to achieve initial capability in 2004
and reach full capability in 2007. OUSD P&R officials involved in
developing the system said that they have been briefing the concept for
the new reporting system since October 2002. As of January 2003 these
officials stated that they are continuing what they have termed the
’concept demonstration“ phase, which began in October 2002. This phase
consists of briefing various offices within DOD, the Joint Staff, and
the services to build consensus and refine the new system‘s concept.
These officials also said that the new system will incorporate many,
but not all, of the recommendations contained in a legislatively
mandated independent study of readiness reporting, which concluded that
improvements were needed to meet legislatively mandated readiness
reporting requirements and included numerous recommendations for what a
new system should include.[Footnote 35] For example, the study
recommended that (1) DOD report on all elements essential to readiness,
such as depots, combat support agencies, and Defense agencies; (2)
reporting should be in terms of mission essential tasks; and (3) DOD
should measure the capability to carry out the full range of National
Security Strategy requirements--not just a unit‘s wartime mission.
An Implementation Plan Would Help Gauge Program Progress:
We believe that successfully developing and implementing a large-scale
effort, such as DOD‘s new readiness reporting system, requires an
implementation plan that includes measurable performance goals,
identification of resources, performance indicators, and an evaluation
plan. As discussed earlier, full implementation of DOD‘s new readiness
reporting system is several years away, and much remains to be done. In
January 2003 the OUSD P&R office responsible for developing the new
system said that the new readiness reporting system is a large endeavor
that requires buy-in from many users and that the development of the
system will be challenging. This office also wrote that it had just
been given approval to develop the new readiness reporting system, was
targeting development of an implementing instruction in the March 2003
time frame, and had not developed an implementation plan to assess
progress in developing and implementing the new reporting system. The
directive establishing the new reporting system requires the
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in collaboration
with others, to issue implementing instructions for the new system.
DOD has experienced delays in implementing smaller readiness
improvements than envisioned in the new readiness reporting system. One
such effort involved development of an interface to query the existing
readiness data base (GSORTS). In a July 2002 report, the DOD Inspector
General reported that the planned implementation of this interface
slipped 44 months, or just over 3.5 years.[Footnote 36] Also, history
has shown it takes DOD time to make changes in the readiness reporting
system. As illustrated in figure 2, DOD began reporting on specific
readiness indicators 4 years after it agreed with GAO recommendations
to include them in readiness reporting (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Timeline of Recommended, Required, and Planned Readiness
Reporting Changes Since 1994:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Other DOD development efforts recognize the need for effective planning
to guide development. For example, DOD is working to transform military
training as directed by the Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years
2003-07. A March 2002 Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training
developed by a different office within OUSD P&R discusses a training
transformation road map with major tasks subdivided into near-, mid-,
and long-term actions. The plan includes a list of near-term actions to
be completed by October 2003 and definition of mid-and long-term
actions in a comprehensive implementation plan that will identify
specific tasks, responsibilities, timelines, resources, and methods to
assess completion and measure success. The May 2002 Defense Planning
Guidance update for fiscal years 2004-2009 directs OUSD P&R, working
with other DOD components, to develop a comprehensive program to
implement the strategic training transformation plan and provide it to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense by April 1, 2003.
Since the directive for creating a new readiness reporting system
established broad policy with no specifics and since DOD has not
developed an implementation plan, the extent to which the new system
will address the current system‘s shortcomings will remain unknown
until the new system is fully capable in 2007. Until then, readiness
reporting will continue to be based on the existing system.
Commenting on its plans for the new system, OUSD P&R said that it is in
the process of creating an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
(ACTD) structure for the new system and will produce all necessary
planning documents required within the established ACTD process.
However, this process is intended to provide decision makers an
opportunity to understand the potential of a new concept before an
acquisition decision. We do not believe the ACTD process will
necessarily result in an implementation plan to effectively monitor
development and assess whether the new system is being implemented on
schedule and achieving desired results.
DOD‘s ACTD guidelines state the principal management tool for ACTDs is
a management plan, which provides a top-level description of the
objectives, critical events, schedule, funding, and measures of
evaluation for the project. We reported in December 2002 that these
guidelines contain advice and suggestions as opposed to formal
directives and regulations.[Footnote 37] DOD‘s guidelines state that
the ACTD should plan exercises or demonstrations to provide an adequate
basis for utility assessment. We also reported in December 2002 that
DOD lacks specific criteria to evaluate demonstration results, which
may cause acquisition decisions to be based on too little knowledge.
Therefore, we still believe an implementation plan is necessary since
the ACTD process does not require a detailed implementation plan and
does not always include specific criteria to evaluate effectiveness.
Conclusions:
While DOD has made some improvements in readiness reporting since 1998,
some of the same issues remain unresolved today. Although DOD is
providing Congress more data than in 1998, the voluminous data are
neither evaluated nor explained. The quarterly reports do not link the
effects of ’readiness issues“ or deficiencies to changes in readiness
at the unit level. Also, as in 1998, the reports contain vague
descriptions of remedial actions not linked to specific deficiencies.
Finally, the quarterly reports do not discuss funding that is
programmed to implement specific remedial actions. As a result, the
information available to Congress is not as effective as it could be as
an oversight tool.
Even though DOD directed development of a new readiness reporting
system, it has not yet developed an implementation plan identifying
objective and measurable performance goals, the resources and personnel
needed to achieve the goals, performance indicators, and an evaluation
plan to compare program results with goals, and milestones to guide
overall development of the new readiness system. Even though the new
system may have the potential to improve readiness reporting, without
an implementation plan little assurance exists that the new system will
actually improve readiness assessments by the time full capability is
planned in 2007. Without such a plan, it will also remain difficult to
gauge progress toward meeting the 2007 target date. This concern is
reinforced in light of the (1) years-long delays in implementing other
readiness reporting improvements and (2) the deficiencies in existing
reporting that OUSD P&R plans to rectify with the new system.
Furthermore, without an implementation plan neither senior DOD
leadership nor the Congress will be able to determine if the resources
spent on this system are achieving their desired results.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the information available to Congress for its use in its
oversight role, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
OUSD P&R to improve the quality of information contained in the
quarterly reports. Specifically, we recommend that DOD‘s reports
explain (in the unclassified section) the most critical readiness
issues that are of greatest concern to the department and the services.
For each issue, we recommend that DOD‘s reports include:
* an analysis of the readiness deficiencies, including a clear
explanation of how the issue affects units‘ readiness;
* a statement of the specific remedial actions planned or implemented;
and:
* clear statements of the funding programmed to implement each remedial
action.
To be able to assess progress in developing the new readiness system,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the OUSD P&R to
develop an implementation plan that identifies:
* performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable;
* the cost and personnel resources needed to achieve the goals,
including an identification of the new system‘s development and
implementation costs in the President‘s Budget beginning in fiscal year
2005 and Future Years Defense Plan;
* performance indicators to measure outcomes;
* an evaluation plan to compare program results with established goals;
and:
* milestones to guide development to the planned 2007 full capability
date.
To assist Congress in its oversight role, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense give annual updates to the Congress on the new
readiness reporting system‘s development to include:
* performance measures,
* progress toward milestones,
* comparison of progress with established goals, and:
* remedial actions, if needed, to maintain the implementation schedule.
Agency Comments and our Response:
In written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in
appendix II, the Department of Defense did not agree with our
recommendations.
In response to our recommendation that DOD improve the quality of
information contained in its quarterly readiness reports, DOD said that
the Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress is one of the most
comprehensive and detailed reports submitted to the Congress that
discusses serious readiness issues and ways in which these issues are
being addressed. DOD further stated that the department presents
briefings on specific readiness issues to the Congress and that
spending more time and resources expanding the existing written report
would be counterproductive.
We recognize that the Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress
contain voluminous data. However, as discussed in this report, we found
that the quarterly reports‘ annexes are large and mostly consist of
charts or other data that are not adequately explained and are not
related to units‘ readiness. In some cases, criteria have not been
established to enable the reader to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable levels of the data reported. As a result, the reader
cannot assess the significance of the data because it is not at all
clear whether the data reported indicate a problem or the extent of the
problem. Considering that the quarterly reports contain inadequately
explained data and that much of the information is not ’user friendly,“
we continue to believe the quality of information in the quarterly
reports can be improved. In fact, we reviewed all the quarterly reports
provided to Congress since 1998 and found that through the January-June
2001 report[Footnote 38] the reports did include an unclassified
summary of readiness issues for each service addressing four topics--
personnel, equipment, training, and enablers (critical units or
capabilities, such as specialized aircraft, essential to support
operations). However, the reports did not include supporting data or a
discussion of remedial actions. Since that time, these summaries have
been eliminated from the quarterly reports. For example, the
unclassified narrative of the last two reports available at the time we
performed our work--January-March 2002 and April-June 2002--were less
than two pages long and neither discussed readiness issues nor ways in
which these issues are being addressed. One report discussed the new
readiness reporting system, and the other discussed a review of seven
environmental laws. Given that DOD has highlighted key issues in the
past, we believe that improving the quarterly reports would be
beneficial if DOD were to focus on the most critical readiness issues
that are of greatest concern to the services and includes supporting
data and a discussion of remedial actions. Therefore, we have modified
our recommendation that DOD improve the quality of readiness reporting
to focus on readiness issues deemed to be critical by the Secretary and
the military services and to provide more detailed data and analyses of
those issues and the remedial actions planned for each one.
DOD did not agree with our recommendations that it (1) develop an
implementation plan with, among other things, performance goals that
are objective, quantifiable, and measurable and (2) provide annual
updates to the Congress on the new readiness reporting system‘s
development. DOD said that it had undertaken an initiative to develop
better tools for assessing readiness and that it intended to apprise
Congress on its efforts to develop tools for readiness assessment. DOD
further stated that the effort to improve readiness reporting is in its
infancy, but that it has established milestones, cost estimates,
functional responsibilities, and expected outcomes. DOD believes that
further planning and a prescriptive annual update to the Congress is
unnecessary.
We agree that the new readiness reporting system may have the potential
to improve readiness reporting. However, as discussed in this report,
the directive establishing the new system contains very broad, high-
level statements of overall functional responsibilities and outcomes,
but no details on how these will be accomplished. Further, DOD has
established two milestones--initial capability in 2004 and full
capability in 2007. DOD does not have a road map explaining the steps
needed to achieve full capability by 2007, which is seven years after
Congress mandated a new system be in place. In addition, as discussed
earlier in this report, DOD has experienced delays in implementing much
smaller readiness improvements. While DOD has undertaken an initiative
to develop better tools for assessing readiness and intends to
routinely and fully apprise the Congress on its development efforts,
tools are the mechanics for evaluating readiness data. As such, tools
are not the same thing as the comprehensive readiness reporting system
mandated by Congress that DOD has said will include new metrics and
will evaluate entities within DOD that currently do not report
readiness. Considering that Congress expressed concern about DOD‘s lack
of progress in developing a comprehensive system, that developing and
implementing DOD‘s planned new system is scheduled to take 4 more
years, and that delays have been experienced in earlier efforts to make
small improvements in readiness reporting, we continue to believe that
it is important for DOD to develop an implementation plan to gauge
progress in developing and implementing the new readiness reporting
system and to provide annual updates to the Congress. Such a plan would
be consistent with DOD‘s approach to other major initiatives such as
transforming training. We have therefore retained these two
recommendations.
DOD also provided technical corrections and we have modified the report
where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services; the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services; other
interested congressional committees; Secretary of Defense; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to others on request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (757) 552-
8111 or by E-mail at curtinn@gao.gov. Major contributors to this report
were Steven Sternlieb, Brenda Waterfield, James Lewis, Dawn Godfrey,
and Herbert Dunn.
Sincerely yours,
Neal Curtin
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Neal Curtin:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in
resolving issues raised in our prior report concerning both the unit
level readiness reporting system and the lack of specificity in DOD‘s
Quarterly Readiness Reports to the Congress, we met with DOD officials
and reviewed regulations and quarterly reports. Specifically, we met
with officials of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness (OUSD P&R) responsible for readiness reporting,
the Joint Staff, and the military services to discuss their individual
progress in each of these areas. To assess progress regarding unit
level readiness reporting, we reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff manual governing this system and the related service
implementing instructions to determine if these documents had changed
since our 1998 report or if the manual and service instructions
continued to allow reporting in the same manner as reflected in our
earlier report. Through a comparison of the current and prior
documents, discussions with pertinent officials, and our analysis, we
determined whether the readiness reporting issues we raised in 1998 had
been resolved. We also reviewed the content of quarterly reports to
assess their quality and usefulness, and assess whether the problems we
reported in 1998 had been rectified. We discussed our analysis with
OUSD P&R officials and provided them with our analyses in order that
they could fully consider and comment on our methodology and
conclusions. We did not assess the accuracy of reported readiness data.
To determine the extent to which DOD has complied with legislative
reporting requirements enacted since our prior report, we compared a
complete listing of these requirements to DOD‘s readiness reporting.
First, we identified the legislatively mandated readiness reporting
requirements enacted since our 1998 report. To accomplish this, we
reviewed the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1998-
2002 to list the one-time and recurring reporting requirements related
to military readiness. We also requested congressional staff and OUSD
P&R to review the list, and officials from both offices agreed it was
accurate. We did not develop a total count of the number of reporting
requirements because the acts included a series of sections and
subsections that could be totaled in various ways. Once we obtained
concurrence that this listing was complete and accurate, we compared
this list to current readiness reporting to make an overall judgment on
the extent of compliance.
To assess how DOD plans to improve readiness reporting, we reviewed the
June 2002 DOD directive establishing a new readiness reporting system
and a progress update briefing on the new system. We also obtained
readiness briefings from each of the services, OUSD P&R, and Joint
Staff officials. We performed several electronic searches of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) electronic Web site to determine
the status of readiness reporting. To assess how smoothly other
readiness improvements progressed, we reviewed DOD audit reports. We
discussed our findings with OUSD P&R officials and worked proactively
with them in conducting our analyses. Specifically, we provided them
drafts of our analyses for their comments and corrections.
We conducted our review from June 2002 through January 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
MAR 21 2003:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
Mr. Neal P. Curtin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U. S. General Accounting
Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Curtin:
This is the Department of Defense response to the General Accounting
Office draft report, MILITARY READINESS: New Reporting System Is
Intended to Address Longstanding Problems, but Better Planning Is
Needed,“ (GAO-03-456/GAO Code 350222).
We have reviewed the draft report and do not concur with the
recommendations. We also note a number of errors and will forward our
technical corrections separately.
We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on this report.
Sincerely,
Joseph J. Angello, Jr. Director
Readiness Programming and Assessment:
Signed by Joseph J. Angello, Jr.:
Attachment:
--GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED FEBRUARY 18, 2003 GAO CODE 350222/GAO-03-
456:
’MILITARY READINESS: New Reporting System Is Intended to Address
Longstanding Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: To improve the information available to Congress for
its use in its oversight role, the GAO recommended that the Secretary
of Defense direct the OUSD P&R to improve the quality of information
contained in the quarterly reports. Specifically, the GAO recommended
that DoD‘s reports include:
* analyses of readiness deficiencies, including a clear explanation of
how the deficiency affects units‘ readiness;
* a statement of the specific remedial actions planned or implemented
for each deficiency; and:
* clear statements of the funding programmed to implement each remedial
action. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: We cannot agree with this recommendation. The Quarterly
Readiness Report to Congress is one of the most comprehensive and
detailed reports submitted to the Congress on a routine basis. The
latest report was 289 pages, covering numerous readiness indicators,
pressing readiness issues, meeting summaries, and unit readiness
trends. Our reports routinely discuss serious readiness issues within
the Department of Defense and ways in which these issues are being
addressed. This recommendation calls for the report to capture
readiness ’deficiencies,“ how these deficiencies affect unit readiness,
and the resource implications to fix them. Given the Department has
roughly 10,000 units reporting readiness information, this tasking is
clearly infeasible. The Department does, however, routinely present
detailed and timely briefings on specific readiness issues and concerns
to the Congress. For example, our recent quarterly reports included
issues and actions associated with the Global War on Terror and
potential follow-on operations; preparedness for Chemical Biological
defense; and the management of low density/high demand assets. Spending
more time and resources expanding the existing written report would be
counterproductive, and ultimately provide less timely and meaningful
information to Congress.
RECOMMENDATION 2: To be able to assess progress in developing the new
readiness system, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the OUSD P&R to develop an implementation plan that identifies:
* performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable;
* the cost and personnel resources needed to achieve the goals,
including an identification of the new system‘s development and
implementation costs in the President‘s Budget beginning in fiscal year
2005 and Future Years Defense Plan;
* performance indicators to measure outcomes;
* an evaluation plan to compare program results with established goals;
and:
* milestones to guide development to the planned 2007 full operational
capability date. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: We cannot concur with this recommendation. The Department
has undertaken an initiative to develop better tools for assessing the
readiness of our military forces and supporting infrastructure to meet
the threats facing our nation. This effort is in its infancy, but we
have established milestones, cost estimates, functional
responsibilities, and expected outcomes. We also have detailed plans
for specific information technology requirements and progress
indicators. More detailed and voluminous planning on top of the current
planning is unproductive and unnecessary for this effort.
RECOMMENDATION 3: To assist Congress in its oversight role, the GAO
recommended that the Secretary of Defense provide annual updates to the
Congress on the new readiness reporting system‘s development to
include:
* performance measures,
* progress toward milestones,
* comparison of progress with established goals, and:
* remedial actions, if needed, to maintain the implementation schedule.
(p. 23/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: We disagree with this recommendation. The Department
intends to routinely and fully apprise the Congress on our effort to
develop tools supporting readiness assessment. A prescriptive ’annual“
update is neither necessary nor warranted for this effort.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Public Law 105-261, Oct. 17, 1998; H.R. Rep. No. 105-532, at 281
(1998); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-736, at 644 (1998).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Reports to
Congress Provide Few Details on Deficiencies and Solutions, GAO/
NSIAD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 1998).
[3] 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(d)(7)(B) and (e)(added by section 322 of Pub.L.
105-85, Nov. 18, 1997).
[4] 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(d)(added by section 322 of Pub. L. 105-85, Nov.
8, 1997).
[5] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117 (added by Pub.L. 105-261, sec.373(a)(1), Oct.
17, 1998 and as amended by Pub.L. 106-65, sec. 361(d)(2), Oct. 5,
1999.)
[6] Department of Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), DOD
Directive 7730.65, June 3, 2002.
[7] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117 note.
[8] DOD is required under 10 U.S.C. sec. 482 to submit a quarterly
readiness report to Congress. Under 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(b), each report
is to specifically describe (1) each readiness problem and deficiency
identified; (2) planned remedial actions; and (3) the key indicators
and other relevant information related to each identified problem and
deficiency. The quarterly reports provided to Congress are to be based
on readiness assessments provided during that quarter to any DOD body
that has responsibility for readiness oversight and whose membership
includes at least one civilian officer in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense at the level of Assistant Secretary or higher; by senior
civilian and military officers of the military departments and
commanders of the unified and specified commands; and as part of any
regularly established process of periodic readiness reviews for the
Department of Defense as a whole.
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: DOD Needs to
Develop a More Comprehensive Measurement System, GAO/NSIAD-95-29
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1994).
[10] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.02, Global
Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS), (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 2000).
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Training: DOD Lacks a
Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges,
GAO-02-614 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2002); and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but
Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525, (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 30, 2002).
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense:
Units Better Equipped, but Training and Readiness Reporting Problems
Remain, GAO-01-27, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2000); and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems, GAO/NSIAD-96-103,
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1996).
[13] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117(c)(7).
[14] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117(c)(2) and (3).
[15] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117(d) and (e). Also as explained in footnote 8, 10
U.S.C. sec. 482(c), requires that the quarterly reports be based on
readiness assessments provided during that quarter as part of certain
senior-level readiness assessments for DOD as a whole.
[16] 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(b).
[17] 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(d)(6)(A).
[18] 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(d)(4)(D).
[19] Our review of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002 (Pub.L. 107-107, Dec. 28, 2001) disclosed no new readiness
reporting requirements.
[20] Pub.L. 105-261, Oct. 17, 1998; H.R. Rep. No. 105-532, at 281
(1998); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-736, at 644 (1998).
[21] See note 3.
[22] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117(c)(2), (3), and (5).
[23] Pub.L. 106-65, sec. 361(a) and (c), Oct. 5, 1999.
[24] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117(c)(7).
[25] 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(d)(added by Pub.L. 105-85, sec. 322(a)(1), Nov.
18, 1997). The Act included seven ’readiness indicators,“ each of which
included from one to five specific reportable items, for a total of 19
specific items.
[26] Nonpacing equipment is equipment not reported in GSORTS but
nevertheless necessary for mission accomplishment.
[27] 10 U.S.C. sec. 482(d)(1)(A) and (B), 2(B), 3(A), 4(B) and (C),
5(A) and (E).
[28] Pub.L. 105-85, sec. 322(b), Nov. 18, 1997.
[29] Pub.L. 105-261, sec. 373(b) and (c), Oct. 17, 1998 as amended by
Pub.L. 106-65, sec. 361(d)(2), Oct. 5, 1999.
[30] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117(f).
[31] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117 (b)(2)and(f).
[32] 10 U.S.C. sec. 117(a).
[33] Public Law 105-261, Oct. 17, 1998; H.R. Rep. No. 105-532, at 281
(1998); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-736, at 644 (1998).
[34] See note 6 above.
[35] This study was directed by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000. Pub.L. 106-65 sec. 361(a), Oct. 5, 1999.
[36] Department of Defense Inspector General, Information Technology:
Global Command and Control System Readiness Assessment System Output
Tool, D-2002-133 (Washington, D.C: July 24, 2002).
[37] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Factors
Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations
GAO-03-52 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2002).
[38] The January-June 2001 report covered two quarters.
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