Defense Space Activities
Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions Needed
Gao ID: GAO-03-379 April 18, 2003
In January 2001, the congressionally chartered Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization--known as the Space Commission--reported that the Department of Defense (DOD) lacked the senior-level focus and accountability to provide guidance and oversight for national security space operations. Congress mandated that GAO provide an assessment of DOD's actions to implement the Space Commission's recommendations. Thus, GAO (1) updated its June 2002 assessment of DOD's actions to address the Space Commission's recommendations, (2) ascertained progress in addressing other long- term management concerns, and (3) assessed the extent to which DOD has developed a results-oriented management framework for space activities.
Since June 2002 when we reported that DOD intended to implement 10 of the Space Commission's 13 recommendations to improve the management and organization of space activities and had completed implementation of 6, DOD has completed action on 3 more recommendations. The only action intended but not completed at the conclusion of our work is designation of the Air Force as the executive agent for DOD space programs. Most of the changes represent organizational actions to improve DOD's ability to manage space. For example, DOD has: (1) created a focal point for integrating DOD space activities by appointing the Under Secretary of the Air Force also as Director, National Reconnaissance Office; (2) realigned Air Force space activities under one command; and (3) created a separate position of Commander, Air Force Space Command, to provide increased attention to the organization, training, and equipping for space operations. It is too early to assess the effects of these organizational changes because new institutional roles, processes, and procedures are still evolving. DOD still faces challenges in addressing long-term management problems, such as increasing its investment in innovative space technologies, improving the timeliness and quality of acquisitions, and developing a cadre of space professionals. DOD has initiated some actions to address these concerns, such as increasing resources for research on space technology and developing a new acquisition process, and the services have begun some plans for developing space professionals. However, most planned actions are not fully developed or implemented. Further, DOD has not developed an overarching human capital strategy for space that would guide service plans to ensure all requirements for space professionals are met. DOD does not have a comprehensive, results-oriented management framework for space activities. The Air Force is developing some policies and guidance that could be part of a management framework for space activities. However, we did not have access to the draft documents to determine whether they will contain results-oriented elements--such as a strategy, performance goals and measures, and timelines--that will enable DOD to better focus its efforts and assess its progress in attaining its space goals. Further, no single department-level entity has been charged with providing oversight of the Air Force's management of its executive agent for space responsibilities to assess its progress in achieving space goals while ensuring that all services' requirements for space capabilities are fairly considered.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
GAO-03-379, Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions Needed
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-379
entitled 'Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated,
but Further Management Actions Needed' which was released on April 18,
2003.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products‘ accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
April 2003:
Defense Space Activities:
Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions
Needed:
GAO-03-379:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-379, a report to Congressional Committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
In January 2001, the congressionally chartered Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization”known
as the Space Commission”reported that the Department of Defense (DOD)
lacked the senior-level focus and accountability to provide guidance
and oversight for national security space operations. Congress
mandated that GAO provide an assessment of DOD‘s actions to implement
the Space Commission‘s recommendations. Thus, GAO (1) updated its June
2002 assessment of DOD‘s actions to address the Space Commission‘s
recommendations, (2) ascertained progress in addressing other long-
term management concerns, and (3) assessed the extent to which DOD has
developed a results-oriented management framework for space activities.
What GAO Found:
Since June 2002 when we reported that DOD intended to implement 10 of
the Space Commission‘s 13 recommendations to improve the management and
organization of space activities and had completed implementation of 6,
DOD has completed action on 3 more recommendations. The only action
intended but not completed at the conclusion of our work is designation
of the Air Force as the executive agent for DOD space programs. Most of
the changes represent organizational actions to improve DOD‘s ability
to manage space. For example, DOD has:
* created a focal point for integrating DOD space activities by
appointing the Under Secretary of the Air Force also as Director,
National Reconnaissance Office;
* realigned Air Force space activities under one command; and
* created a separate position of Commander, Air Force Space Command, to
provide increased attention to the organization, training, and
equipping for space operations.
It is too early to assess the effects of these organizational changes
because new institutional roles, processes, and procedures are still
evolving.
DOD still faces challenges in addressing long-term management problems,
such as increasing its investment in innovative space technologies,
improving the timeliness and quality of acquisitions, and developing a
cadre of space professionals. DOD has initiated some actions to
address these concerns, such as increasing resources for research on
space technology and developing a new acquisition process, and the
services have begun some plans for developing space professionals.
However, most planned actions are not fully developed or implemented.
Further, DOD has not developed an overarching human capital strategy
for space that would guide service plans to ensure all requirements for
space professionals are met.
DOD does not have a comprehensive, results-oriented management
framework for space activities. The Air Force is developing some
policies and guidance that could be part of a management framework for
space activities. However, we did not have access to the draft
documents to determine whether they will contain results-oriented
elements”such as a strategy, performance goals and measures, and
timelines”that will enable DOD to better focus its efforts and assess
its progress in attaining its space goals. Further, no single
department-level entity has been charged with providing oversight of
the Air Force‘s management of its executive agent for space
responsibilities to assess its progress in achieving space goals while
ensuring that all services‘ requirements for space capabilities are
fairly considered.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD develop a national security space strategic
plan tied to overall department goals and performance measures;
establish a strategic approach for space human capital; and designate a
department-level entity to provide space program oversight and assess
progress.
DOD agreed with these recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-379.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Raymond J. Decker at (202) 512-6020 or
deckerrj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Has Made Further Organizational and Management Changes to Implement
Space Commission Recommendations:
Progress in Addressing Long-Term Management Challenges Varies:
Space Program Lacks Results-Oriented Management Framework:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Status of Actions Taken to Implement Short-and
Mid-Term Space Commission Recommendations:
Appendix II: Time Line of Major Events in DOD‘s Implementation
of Space Commission Recommendations:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Elements of a Results-Oriented Management Framework:
Table 2: Status of DOD‘s Implementation of Space Commission
Recommendations as of January 2003:
Figure:
Figure 1: DOD‘s and the Air Force‘s Organization for National Security
Space, as of February 2003:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
NRO: National Reconnaissance Office:
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency:
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce
copyrighted materials separately from GAO‘s product.
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 18, 2003:
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The United States depends on space to underpin many national security
activities as well as for civil and commercial purposes. The Department
of Defense (DOD) employs space assets to support a wide range of
military missions to include intelligence collection; battlefield
surveillance and management; global command, control, and
communications; and navigation assistance. Commercial use of space
extends to activities in transportation, health, the environment,
communications, commerce, agriculture, and energy. However, the United
States‘ increasing national dependence on space-borne systems creates
new vulnerabilities that potential adversaries may seek to exploit.
Since the early 1990s, Congress has expressed concerns about DOD‘s
organization and management of space activities, in particular its
ability to fully exploit space in support of warfighting. In October
1999, Congress chartered the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization--known as the Space
Commission--to review the organization and management of national
security space activities and provide recommendations for improvement.
In January 2001, the Space Commission reported that DOD was not
properly organized to provide direction and oversight for national
security space operations. The commission‘s recommendations suggested
actions that could be implemented in the short-or mid-term to better
position national security space organizations and provide needed
flexibility to realize longer-term space goals. Thirteen of the Space
Commission‘s recommendations addressed actions DOD could implement to
improve coordination, execution, and oversight of DOD‘s space
activities. The Space Commission also identified some long-standing
management challenges, including insufficient investment in innovative
space technologies, a cumbersome acquisition process, and an inadequate
program to develop and maintain a cadre of space professionals for
leadership roles in all aspects of
space-related activities.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002,
Congress mandated that we provide an assessment in 2002 and 2003 of the
actions taken by the Secretary of Defense in implementing the Space
Commission‘s recommendations.[Footnote 1] Our June 2002 report stated
that DOD had completed or was in the process of implementing most of
the Space Commission recommendations.[Footnote 2] Our objectives for
this subsequent report were to (1) update the status of the actions DOD
has taken to implement the Space Commission‘s recommendations, (2)
ascertain the status of DOD‘s efforts to address long-term management
challenges, and (3) assess the extent to which DOD has developed a
results-oriented management framework for space activities that
includes critical elements to foster program success.
Results in Brief:
In response to the Space Commission‘s recommendations, DOD has taken
further steps to implement some organizational changes that have the
potential to improve its ability to manage space activities, but it is
too early to assess the effects of these and earlier changes DOD
announced because new institutional roles, processes, and procedures
are still evolving. Since June 2002, when we reported that DOD intended
to implement 10 of the commission‘s 13 recommendations and had
completed implementation of 6, DOD has completed action on 3 more
recommendations. The only action intended but not completed at the
conclusion of our work is designation of the Air Force as executive
agent[Footnote 3] for DOD space programs. Organizational changes
completed include creating a focal point for space by naming the Under
Secretary of the Air Force as Director, National Reconnaissance
Office,[Footnote 4] and charging this individual with responsibility
for integrating space activities across DOD as well as milestone
decision authority[Footnote 5] for major space acquisitions; creating a
separate position of Commander, Air Force Space Command, to provide
increased attention to the organization, training, and equipping for
space operations; and creating a mechanism to identify space spending
across the department.
DOD has taken some actions to address long-term management challenges,
but the extent of progress in identifying and implementing needed
actions has varied. For example, DOD plans to increase its budget for
space science and technology by 25 percent between fiscal years 2003
and 2007 and almost double it by 2009. However, the availability of
such funding in view of other departmental priorities is uncertain.
Further, the Air Force has a draft acquisition approach intended to
streamline the acquisition process and reduce the cost of building and
launching space systems, but the process has not been fully validated
and finalized. In addition, DOD and the services have not developed and
implemented human capital plans needed to build a cadre of space
professionals to lead space activities in the future. Specifically, DOD
lacks an overall human capital strategic approach for space that could
give guidance and facilitate development of individual service plans to
better manage space forces. Further, it has not established time frames
for completing such plans.
DOD has not yet developed a comprehensive results-oriented management
framework for space activities that includes critical elements to
foster future program success. As the executive agent for DOD space,
the Under Secretary of the Air Force has begun developing, in
collaboration with the other services and defense agencies involved in
space activities, a national security space strategy and a national
security space plan. According to officials in the office of the
executive agent for DOD space who are developing the strategy and plan,
the documents will set the goals of national security space activities,
identify approaches to achieve those goals, and provide input to the
Defense Planning Guidance [Footnote 6] which serves as a basis for
assessing whether the services‘ planned budgets fulfill national
security space priorities. The officials hope to finalize these
documents in early 2003. However, because these documents have not been
finalized and we were not provided access to draft plans, it is not
clear whether they address all the critical elements of a results-
oriented management framework--such as performance goals and measures.
Without a results-oriented management framework, DOD will not be able
to fully gauge its progress toward more effective national security
space activities. In conjunction with its fiscal year 2000 budget, DOD
developed a department-level performance report that specifies measures
for some performance goals, but the report did not include goals and
measures for space activities. In addition, no single entity in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense has oversight responsibility to
assess the Air Force‘s progress in effectively managing departmentwide
space activities and achieving associated performance goals and
measures. Until such plans and oversight are in place, DOD cannot be
assured that its investments will optimally support its current and
future requirements for space operations.
Accordingly, we are making recommendations to improve the management
oversight and accountability for space operations. DOD agreed or
partially agreed with our recommendations.
Background:
America‘s interests in space, according to the National Space Policy,
are to support a strong, stable, and balanced national space program
that serves our goals in national security, foreign policy, economic
growth, environmental stewardship, and scientific excellence. DOD
policy states that space--like land, sea, and air--is a medium within
which military activities shall be conducted to achieve national
security objectives. [Footnote 7]
The national security space sector is primarily comprised of military
and intelligence activities. The Air Force is DOD‘s primary procurer
and operator of space systems and spends the largest share of defense
space funds, annually averaging about 85 percent. The Army controls a
defense satellite communications system and operates ground mobile
terminals. The Navy operates several space systems [Footnote 8] that
contribute to surveillance and warning and is responsible for acquiring
the Mobile User Operations System, the next generation Ultra High
Frequency satellite communication system. The U.S. Strategic
Command[Footnote 9] is responsible for establishing overall operational
requirements while the services are responsible for satisfying these
requirements to the maximum extent practicable through their individual
planning, programming, and budgeting systems. The Air Force Space
Command is the major component providing space forces for the U.S.
Strategic Command. The NRO designs, procures, and operates space
systems dedicated to intelligence activities. The National Security
Space Architect develops and coordinates space architectures for future
military and intelligence activities. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Marine Corps, and other DOD agencies also participate in
national security space activities. The Office of National Security
Space Integration, which reports to the Under Secretary of the Air
Force and Director, NRO, facilitates integration of military and
intelligence activities and coordinates implementation of best
practices among agencies.
The management and organization of national security space programs and
activities has received continual congressional attention since the
early 1990s. In 1995, DOD responded to congressional concerns about the
lack of a coherent national security space management structure by
consolidating certain space management functions within a new Office of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space. However, in 1998,
under a defense reform initiative, DOD abolished this office and
dispersed the management functions among other DOD offices, primarily
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
The Space Commission[Footnote 10] noted that the United States has an
urgent interest in protecting the access to space and developing the
technologies and capabilities to support long-term military objectives.
It stressed the need to elevate space on the national security agenda
and examine the long-term goals of national security space activities.
The Space Commission provided a total of 16 recommendations, including
a call for presidential leadership to set space as a national security
priority and provide direction to senior officials. However, 13 of the
Space Commission‘s recommendations were directed at DOD and focused on
near-and mid-term management and organizational changes that would
merge disparate activities, improve communication channels, establish
clear priorities, and achieve greater accountability.
DOD Has Made Further Organizational and Management Changes to Implement
Space Commission Recommendations:
The Secretary of Defense directed a number of organizational changes to
improve leadership, responsibility, and accountability for space
activities within DOD in response to the Space Commission‘s report.
After some delays, most are complete or nearing completion, although it
is too early to assess the effects of these changes. The Space
Commission found that DOD‘s organization for space was complicated with
various responsibilities delegated to different offices within the
department. For example, the Space Commission determined that it was
not possible for senior officials outside DOD to identify a single,
high-level individual who had the authority to represent DOD on space-
related matters. Further, the commission noted that no single service
had been assigned statutory responsibility to ’organize, train, and
equip“ for space operations. The commission provided 13 recommendations
to DOD intended to improve the focus and accountability within the
national security space organization and management.
As we reported in our June 2002 assessment, the Secretary of Defense
decided to implement 10 of the Space Commission‘s 13 recommendations
while opting to take alternative actions for the remaining 3.[Footnote
11] In a May 8, 2001, letter to the defense and intelligence oversight
committees, the Secretary stated that the department would not
implement the Space Commission‘s recommendation to create an Under
Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence, and Information.[Footnote
12] DOD also did not seek legislation to give the Air Force statutory
responsibility to organize, train, and equip space forces, as
recommended. Rather, the Secretary said the department would address
these organizational and leadership issues with alternative actions.
For example, DOD elected not to create a new office to integrate
military and intelligence research efforts, deciding instead to
increase coordination among existing offices. At the time of our last
report, DOD had completed action to implement six of the
recommendations, and four were in the process of being implemented. DOD
has now completed action on three more, with actions on the remaining
recommendation still in progress. See appendix I for information on the
status of each of the Space Commission‘s 13
DOD-specific recommendations.
To address some of the Space Commission‘s specific recommendations as
well as additional opportunities that the department identified for
improving the organization and management of its space activities, the
Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum in October 2001 that directed
actions to:
* assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as Director, NRO;
* designate the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Air Force
Acquisition Executive[Footnote 13] for Space;
* delegate program milestone decision authority for DOD space major
defense acquisition programs and designated space programs to the Under
Secretary through the Secretary of the Air Force;
* realign the Office of the National Security Space Architect to report
to the Director, NRO (who is also the Under Secretary of the Air Force)
and make the Architect responsible for ensuring that military and
intelligence funding for space is consistent with policy, planning
guidance, and architectural decisions;
* designate the Secretary of the Air Force as DOD executive agent for
space with redelegation to the Under Secretary of the Air Force;
* assign the Air Force the responsibility for organizing, training,
equipping, and providing forces as necessary for the effective
prosecution of offensive and defensive military operations in space;
* realign Air Force headquarters and field commands to more closely
integrate space acquisitions and operations functions; and:
* assign responsibility for the Air Force Space Command to a four-star
officer other than the Commander of the U.S. Space Command (now merged
with U.S. Strategic Command) and North American Aerospace Defense
Command to provide dedicated leadership to space activities.
By appointing the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Director,
NRO, and the Air Force acquisition executive for space, as well as
designating the Under Secretary DOD‘s executive agent for space, the
Secretary of Defense provided a focal point for DOD space activities.
The Space Commission recommended the designation of a single person as
Under Secretary of the Air Force; Director, NRO; and Air Force
acquisition executive for space to create a senior-level advocate for
space within DOD and the Air Force and represent space in the Air
Force, NRO, and DOD planning, programming, and budgeting process. In
addition, the authority to acquire space systems for the Air Force and
NRO is intended to better align military and intelligence space
acquisition processes. In explaining the rationale for this change,
senior DOD officials told us that the barriers between military and
intelligence space activities are diminishing because of the current
need to support the warfighter with useful information from all
sources. In an effort to improve space acquisitions and operations,
joint Air Force and NRO teams have been working to identify the best
practices of each organization that might be shared, according to Air
Force and NRO officials. These teams have recommended what they believe
to be 37 best practices to the Under Secretary of the Air Force in the
areas of acquisition, operations, launch, science and technology,
security, planning, and programming. Joint efforts to identify best
practices are continuing in the areas of requirements, concepts of
operation, personnel management, financial management, and test and
evaluation.
The Space Commission recommended formal designation of the Air Force as
executive agent for space with departmentwide responsibility for
planning, programming, and acquisition of space systems, and the
Secretary of Defense stated in his October 2001 memorandum that the Air
Force would be named DOD executive agent for space within 60 days.
However, the directive formally delineating the Air Force‘s new roles
and responsibilities and those of the other services in this area has
not been finalized. Air Force officials said they hoped it would be
finalized in early 2003. Until the directive designating the Air Force
as executive agent for DOD space is signed, the Air Force cannot
formally assume the executive agent duties that the Space Commission
envisioned. In the meantime, the Air Force has begun to perform more
planning and programming duties. During the delay in the formal
delegation of authority, the Air Force and other services and defense
agencies have begun collaborating on space issues in accordance with
the Secretary‘s intent. After the directive is released, the executive
agent for space expects to be tasked to develop an implementation plan
that will articulate processes and procedures to accomplish DOD‘s space
mission.
The Air Force has realigned its headquarters to support the Air Force
Under Secretary‘s efforts to integrate national security space
activities and perform new duties as the executive agent for DOD space.
The Under Secretary of the Air Force has established an Office of
National Security Space Integration to implement the executive agent
duties across DOD, coordinate the integration of service and
intelligence processes and programs, develop streamlined national
security space acquisition processes, and lead the development of a
management framework for space activities. Although this office is
located within the Air Force and NRO, it will consist of members from
all the services and some defense agencies. Figure 1 shows DOD‘s and
the Air Force‘s new organization for supporting national security space
activities.
Figure 1: DOD‘s and the Air Force‘s Organization for National Security
Space, as of February 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Also in response to a Space Commission recommendation, the Air Force
reorganized its field commands to consolidate the full range of space
activities--from concept and development, to employment and sustainment
of space forces--within the Air Force Space Command. To consolidate the
acquisition and operations functions, the Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Center[Footnote 14] was separated from the Air Force Materiel
Command and became part of the Air Force Space Command. According to
the Commander, Air Force Space Command, the consolidation of these
functions in the same command is unique and should improve
communications while exposing personnel to both acquisition and
operations. According to Air Force officials, this new arrangement will
enable space system program managers who have been responsible for
acquiring space systems--such as the Global Positioning System--to help
generate new concepts of operations. Conversely, the arrangement will
also enable space system operators to develop a better understanding of
the acquisitions processes and acquire new skills in this area.
To provide better visibility of DOD‘s and the Intelligence Community‘s
level and distribution of fiscal and personnel resources, as the Space
Commission recommended, DOD and the Intelligence Community developed a
crosscutting or ’virtual“ major force program[Footnote 15] by
aggregating budget elements for space activities across DOD and the
Intelligence Community. This virtual space major force program
identifies and aggregates space-related budget elements within DOD‘s 11
existing major force programs. According to DOD officials, having a
crosscutting major force program for space activities is logical
because space activities span multiple program areas, such as strategic
forces and research and development. The space major force program
covers spending on development, operation, and sustainment of space,
launch, ground, and user systems, and associated organizations and
infrastructure whose primary or secondary missions are space-related.
DOD included the space major force program in its Future Years Defense
Program[Footnote 16] for fiscal years 2003 to 2007 and identified $144
billion in space spending planned for this period. The Under Secretary
of the Air Force said he used the virtual major force program to
facilitate examination of the services‘ space program plans and
budgets.
The Secretary of Defense tasked the National Security Space Architect
with reporting on the consistency of space programs with policy,
planning, and architecture decisions. During the spring and summer of
2002, the Architect led the first annual assessment of the programs
included in the space virtual major force program and some related
programs. Teams of subject matter experts from DOD, Intelligence
Community, and civilian agencies involved in space programs reviewed
the services‘ and Intelligence Community‘s proposed budgets for future
space spending to identify capabilities gaps and redundancies while
evaluating whether budget requests adhered to departmental policy and
guidance. The Architect provided the classified assessment results to
the Under Secretary, as well as the Secretary of Defense, the Director
of Central Intelligence, and other senior DOD and Intelligence
Community leaders, to support decision-making on space programs during
the fiscal year 2004 budget review.
It is too early to assess the effects of DOD‘s organizational changes
for its space programs because new institutional roles, processes, and
procedures are still evolving, and key documents are not yet finalized.
According to DOD officials, some delays in implementing the
recommendations can be attributed to the time needed to select and
confirm the pivotal senior leadership for national security space, and
for the new leaders to direct changes in processes and procedures. For
example, the Senate confirmed the Under Secretary of the Air Force on
December 7, 2001, and new directorates within his office were
established on April 15, 2002, to begin national security space
integration and acquisition activities. Similarly, DOD created a
separate four-star position of Commander, Air Force Space Command,
separating the command of the Air Force Space Command from the
Commander, U.S. Space Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command.
However, the new Commander, Air Force Space Command, did not assume
command until April 19, 2002. Developing policy and guidance to
implement organizational changes took longer than the 30 to 120 days
specified in the Secretary of Defense‘s memorandum of October 18, 2001
(see app. II for a time line of major events in the reorganization).
For example, the directive that would designate the Air Force as
executive agent for DOD space is still in draft over a year after the
memorandum.
Progress in Addressing Long-Term Management Challenges Varies:
As DOD‘s efforts to build a more coherent organizational structure for
managing national security space activities near completion, the
department‘s progress in addressing long-term management challenges has
varied. DOD increased funding for space science and technology
activities in fiscal year 2004 and plans future increases. Also the
department is drafting a new acquisition process for space systems that
is intended to reduce the time to develop and acquire space systems,
but the process has not been fully tested and validated. Finally, DOD
has not established a human capital strategy to develop and maintain a
cadre of space professionals that will guide the space program in the
future, and none of the services has developed and implemented its own
space cadre plans or established time frames for completing such plans.
Increased Investment in Space Research and Technology Planned:
Between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, DOD plans to increase its budget
for space science and technology by almost 25 percent, from about
$975 million in 2003 to over $1.2 billion in 2007. In addition, DOD
plans by 2009 to spend over $1.8 billion for space science and
technology, or almost two times the fiscal year 2003 budget. According
to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), the Space Commission‘s report‘s emphasis on increased
investment in space-based technology was the impetus for significant
increases in space research and development funding over the next 5
years--from $235 million in fiscal year 2003 to $385 million by fiscal
year 2007 as shown in the fiscal year 2004 President‘s budget request.
Under current plans, DARPA will receive most of these funds. The
Director said that over the years the agency‘s concentration on space-
based technologies varied and that just prior to the Space Commission
report, ongoing space efforts were at a low point. The Director also
said that investments in space are consistent with the agency‘s charter
to solve national-level technology problems, foster
high-risk/high-payoff military technologies to enable operational
dominance, and avoid technological surprise. Innovative space
technology studies currently underway, including the ’Responsive
Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch“ and ’Orbital Express“
efforts,[Footnote 17] are a direct result of the Space Commission
report. The Air Force is the next largest recipient of increased
funding for space research and engineering with an expected budget
increase of more than $89 million between 2003 and 2007. The Army and
the Navy have smaller shares of space-related research funding and,
according to service officials, project small budget increases. DOD
recently completed a departmentwide assessment of space science and
technology that it intends to use to direct the priorities of future
research. However, whether planned funding increases will become
available in view of other departmental priorities is uncertain.
Draft Space Acquisition Process Not Validated:
DOD is taking steps it hopes will streamline the acquisition process
and reduce the time it takes to acquire space-based systems required by
the national security space community. The Air Force has developed a
new space system acquisition decision process designed to shorten time
frames for technical assessments and facilitate faster decision-making.
This approach will establish key decision points based on program
maturity and provide more oversight earlier in the development of
complex satellite technology. It will also reduce the number of
independent cost estimates performed at each key decision point from
two to one[Footnote 18] and employs a full time, dedicated independent
assessment team to perform technical reviews in less time at each
decision point. Having milestone decision authority, the Under
Secretary of the Air Force determines whether major space systems
should proceed to the next phase of development. The Under Secretary
serves as chair of the Defense Space Acquisitions Board, which oversees
the new acquisition process.[Footnote 19] However, the guidance for
executing acquisition procedures is still in draft,[Footnote 20] and
the draft acquisition process is still being validated. DOD has used
the new process for milestone decisions on three space systems--the
National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System,
the Mobile User Objective System, and the latest generation of Global
Positioning System satellite vehicles--that had been started under the
previous acquisition system. Officials said that the process had been
successful in that it enabled the Air Force to make better and faster
decisions by identifying problems early that needed to be resolved
before the system proceeded into the next development phase. The Space
Based Radar promises to be the first system to begin the acquisition
process under the new system.
Early identification of potential problems is essential in the
acquisition process, particularly in regard to issues such as design
stability, sufficient funding, requirement stability, realistic
schedules, and mature technology. As we have previously reported, DOD
programs, including some space programs, have experienced problems when
these elements have not been sufficiently addressed.[Footnote 21] For
example, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program
continued to move through the acquisition process despite frequent
changes to its requirements and experienced cost overruns and schedule
delays.[Footnote 22] The Space Based Infrared systems also experienced
increased cost and schedule delays.[Footnote 23] Congress has
repeatedly expressed concerns about the cost overruns and schedule
delays of these defense space programs and expected that any changes
underway to reduce decision cycle time for space programs should not
detract from the ability of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council[Footnote 24] to provide
meaningful oversight of space programs. Consequently, in the National
Defense Authorization Act for 2003 (section 911(b)), Congress directed
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to maintain oversight of space
acquisitions and submit a detailed oversight plan to Congress by March
15, 2003. [Footnote 25]
DOD and Services Lack a Strategic Approach to Build and Maintain Cadre
of Space Professionals:
DOD does not have a strategic approach for defense space personnel that
could better guide the development of the individual services‘ space
cadre plans to support the department‘s strategic goals.[Footnote 26]
The Space Commission noted that from its inception the defense space
program has benefited from world-class scientists, engineers, and
operators, but now many experienced personnel are retiring and the
recruitment and retention of qualified space personnel is a problem.
The net effect of a workforce that is not balanced by age or experience
puts at risk the orderly transfer of institutional knowledge. Further,
the commission concluded that DOD does not have the strong military
space culture--including focused career development and education and
training--it needs to create and maintain a highly trained and
experienced cadre of space professionals who can master highly complex
technology as well as develop new concepts of operation for offensive
and defensive space operations. In October 2001, the Secretary of
Defense directed the military services[Footnote 27] to draft specific
guidance and plans for developing, maintaining, and managing a cadre of
space professionals to provide expertise within their services and
joint organizations.[Footnote 28] However, the Secretary did not direct
development of a departmentwide space human capital strategy to ensure
that national security space human capital goals, roles,
responsibilities, and priorities are clearly articulated so that the
service implementation plans are coordinated to meet overall stated
requirements.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force have each produced initial guidance on
developing and managing their own space professionals.[Footnote 29]
However, none of these provide details about how the individual service
will proceed with developing and implementing plans for addressing
service and joint force requirements in future years, or time frames
for implementing space cadre management plans. The services‘ plans are
still being developed, and we were not afforded access to the draft
plans to assess their completeness and viability nor were we given firm
estimates of when they might be completed and implemented. However,
service officials told us that planning to date has focused on the
military officer corps and has not included the enlisted or civilian
personnel who also support space operations. In conjunction with space
cadre planning, the services outlined some initiatives to increase
space education for all military personnel, but these have not been
fully implemented. While each service has separately begun planning to
build and maintain a service space cadre, the services have not yet
begun to coordinate their plans across DOD to ensure a shared direction
and time frames. The Under Secretary of the Air Force said that other
areas of space operations, such as acquisitions, have taken priority
but that he plans to devote more attention to this area to achieve
greater progress.
Space Program Lacks Results-Oriented Management Framework:
The Department of Defense has produced some policies and guidance to
implement its space program, but it has not completed a comprehensive
strategy or an implementation plan to guide the program and monitor its
results. DOD is in the process of developing some elements of a
results-oriented management framework, such as a national security
space strategy, an annual national security space plan, and a directive
formalizing the Air Force‘s role as an executive agent for space.
According to officials in the Office of National Security Space
Integration responsible for developing the strategy and plan, these
documents along with the annual assessment of the services‘ space
budget proposals will enable the executive agent for DOD space to track
the extent to which resources are supporting national security space
priorities. Officials also said that as executive agent for space, the
Air Force plans to report on its progress to officials in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense although the content and process that will be
used is still being developed. However, DOD did not provide us drafts
of the national security space strategy and plan or the executive agent
directive; therefore, we could not assess whether these documents
comprise a results-oriented management framework or specifically how
DOD will provide department-level oversight of the Air Force‘s
activities as executive agent for space.
Management principles embraced in the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993[Footnote 30] provide agencies at all levels with a
framework for effectively implementing and managing programs, and shift
the program management focus from measuring program activities and
processes to measuring program outcomes. Table 1 more fully describes
these principles and their critical elements.
Table 1: Elements of a Results-Oriented Management Framework:
Principle: Define the program‘s overall purpose, mission, and intent
(i.e., strategy).; Critical elements: * Long-term goals--typically
general in nature that lay out what the agency wants to accomplish in
the next
15 years.; * Approaches--general methods the agency plans to use to
accomplish
long-term goals.; * External factors--factors that may significantly
affect the agency‘s ability to accomplish goals.
Principle: Describe detailed implementation actions as well as
measurements and indicators of performance (i.e., performance plan).;
Critical elements: * Performance goals--stated in objective measurable
form.; * Resources--a description of the resources needed to meet the
performance goals.; * Performance indicators--mechanisms to measure
outcomes of the program.; * Evaluation plan--means to compare and
report on program results vs. performance goals.; * Corrective actions-
-a list of actions needed to address or revise any unmet goals.
Source: GAO.
Note: Management principles contained in the Government Performance and
Results Act.
[End of table]
:
These principles and critical elements, when combined with effective
leadership, can provide a results-oriented management framework to
guide programs and activities at all levels. These management tools are
designed to provide the agencies, Congress, and other decisionmakers a
means to understand a program‘s evolution and implementation as well as
to determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired results.
DOD has established some elements of a results-oriented management
framework for space programs that are embedded in various directives,
guidance, and instructions. For example, the Sept. 30, 2001,
Quadrennial Defense Review forms the backbone for the development and
integration of DOD‘s missions and strategic priorities, and details six
operational goals including one to enhance the capability and
survivability of U.S. space systems. DOD views the review as its
strategic plan, in compliance with Government Performance and Results
Act requirements, and, as such, the review forms the foundation from
which DOD‘s results-oriented performance goals are identified and
progress is measured. Additionally, the September 1996, National Space
Policy prepared by the White House National Science and Technology
Council provides broad guidance for civil, commercial, national
security, and other space sectors.
Although DOD‘s space goals are linked to the overall national military
policies, DOD has not developed all elements of a management framework
to effectively manage DOD‘s space operations or measure their progress.
The Office of National Security Space Integration is in the process of
developing a national security space strategy and plan that will set
out priorities to guide planning and budgeting across the department
and better integrate military and intelligence space activities. The
strategy and plan will form a roadmap for achieving space goals in the
near-and mid-term, according to an official developing these documents.
These documents will be key to setting research, development, and
operational goals and integrating future space operations in the
military and intelligence communities. According to National Security
Space Integration Office officials, the national security space
strategic plan will be linked to the overarching National Space Policy
and existing long-range space strategies and plans such as those of the
NRO, National Security Space Architect, and the military services.
These officials told us that the national security space strategy and
plan and the annual assessment by the National Security Space Architect
of whether the services‘ budgets are consistent with policy, planning
guidance, and architectural decisions, will be key components of their
space management approach. However, officials said that they have not
yet determined performance goals and measures to assess program
implementation progress and ascertain whether program initiatives are
achieving their desired results. Until such plans are finalized, DOD
cannot be sure that it is investing its resources in the best way
possible to support current and future requirements for space
operations. National Security Space Integration Office officials said
they hope to release the national security space strategy and plan in
early 2003, but they did not provide us a copy of the draft strategy or
plan. Therefore, we could not determine the extent to which these
documents contain all the key elements of a results-oriented management
framework.
A framework to lead and manage a space program effectively requires a
program-specific strategy and performance plan to implement actions.
However, to date DOD has not established specific space objectives that
are linked to overall program goals and resource requirements, nor has
it established specific performance goals or other mechanisms to
measure program outcomes. In its 2000 Annual Report to the President
and Congress, DOD provided a performance plan for achieving its annual
performance goals,[Footnote 31] but it did not include performance
goals and measures for space activities in that report.
Without a results-oriented management plan, linked to higher-level
strategies, the services do not have clearly defined space objectives
and milestones to guide their initiatives, nor does DOD have a
mechanism to ensure successful accomplishment of integrated efforts
without gaps and duplications. For example, lacking an integrated
national security space strategy and plan, the services developed their
fiscal year 2004-09 program budget plans without clearly defined
objectives and milestones for space activities. In addition, the
National Security Space Architect‘s assessment of defense and
intelligence space programs‘ planned budgets for fiscal years 2004-
2009, was complicated by the lack of an integrated overall strategy
with performance measures. Instead, the Architect relied on multiple
policies, studies, architectures, and guidance to identify overall
effectiveness goals. Without an overall space strategy, including
results-oriented goals and performance measures, DOD cannot fully gauge
its progress toward increasing the effectiveness of national security
space activities.
Moreover, it is not clear which DOD office will be responsible for
assessing the efficacy of the Air Force as executive agent for space or
evaluating progress in achieving performance goals, once they are
established. Witnesses before the Space Commission expressed concerns
about how the Air Force would treat space activities and the extent to
which it would fully address the requirement that it provide space
capabilities to the other services. Several organizations within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense participate in ongoing oversight of
space activities, including Offices of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence); the Under
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); and the Under Secretary of
Defense (Policy); and the Director (Program Analysis and Evaluation).
While each office has oversight responsibilities for different aspects
of space activities, no one office is charged with ensuring that the
Air Force‘s space program is having the desired results. DOD‘s guidance
on executive agents specifies that the principal assistant(s) in the
Office of the Secretary should assess executive agents‘ performance no
less frequently than every 3 years, although it does not specify the
mechanism to be used for the assessment.[Footnote 32] According to DOD
officials, the principal assistants for the executive agent for space-
-the Air Force--are the offices named above, and the issue of how the
progress of the Air Force as executive agent should be assessed is
being discussed, and the process and content by which the national
security space program will be independently evaluated or whether one
office will be designated to lead such an independent evaluation has
not been decided. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD said
that currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence has responsibility to establish policy
and provide direction to the DOD components on command, control,
communications and intelligence-related space systems and serves as the
primary focal point for staff coordination within DOD and other
government agencies. However, it is not clear from the comments whether
this office will be tasked with oversight of activities of the Air
Force as executive agent for DOD space.
Conclusions:
DOD has charged the Air Force with leadership responsibilities for
space activities and has taken some actions that have the potential to
improve its management ability. While DOD plans to increase investment
in technology, has developed a new acquisition strategy, and has
directed the services to begin some initial planning on the national
security space cadre issue, more remains to be done to meet these long-
term management challenges critical to success in national security
space activities. In the area of creating a space cadre, however, DOD
lacks an overall human capital strategic approach to manage the space
forces, leaving the services at risk of developing human capital plans
that do not meet the overall national security space needs of the
department. Moreover, no time frames have been established for
developing coordinated plans. Furthermore, the department does not have
a complete results-oriented management framework to assess the results
of the changes in its organization and processes and gauge its progress
toward achieving its long-term goals in the future. Therefore, the
services and Intelligence Community continue to develop national
security space programs based on their own requirements without the
benefit of overarching guidance on national security space goals,
objectives, and priorities. Also, in its fiscal year 2000 performance
report that accompanied its budget, the department did not include
performance goals and measures for space activities, which would be a
mechanism to highlight program progress and signal the relative
importance of national security space activities. Although the Under
Secretary of the Air Force, as DOD‘s focal point for space, is
responsible for leading the implementation of the national security
space strategy and plan, questions have been raised about the extent to
which the Air Force will fairly address the needs of the other services
and defense agencies. Furthermore, DOD has not specified an oversight
mechanism at the Secretary of Defense level to periodically assess the
progress of the Air Force in achieving the department‘s goals for space
activities and in addressing the requirements of the other services and
defense agencies. Without such oversight, it will be difficult for DOD
to know whether the changes made are having the desired results of
strengthening national security space activities.
Recommendations for Executive Actions:
To improve the management of national security space activities, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions:
* require the executive agent for DOD space, in conjunction with the
services, to establish a departmentwide space human capital strategy
that includes goals and time lines to develop and maintain a cadre of
military and civilian space professionals;
* require the executive agent for DOD space to develop a comprehensive
management framework for space activities that includes a results-
oriented national security space strategy tied to overall department-
level space goals, time lines, and performance measures to assess space
activities‘ progress in achieving national security space goals;
* include performance goals and measures for space activities in DOD‘s
next departmentwide performance report; and:
* designate an oversight entity in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to periodically assess the progress of DOD‘s executive agent in
achieving goals for space activities.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to review, and as
necessary, adjust service cadre plans to ensure they are linked to the
department‘s space human capital strategy when completed.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In its comments on our draft report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations to establish a departmentwide space human capital
strategy; develop a management framework for space activities that
includes a results-oriented national security space strategy tied to
overall department-level space goals, time lines, and performance
measures; include goals and measures for space activities in the
department‘s next performance report; and designate an oversight entity
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to assess the progress of
DOD‘s executive agent in achieving goals for space activities. In its
comments, DOD stated that it is already in the process of developing
strategies and plans to address the issues of strategic planning--
including goals, time lines, and performance measures--and developing
space professional personnel. DOD partially agreed with our
recommendation that the military services‘ space cadre plans be linked
to the department‘s space human capital strategy when completed,
stating that the services are already drafting separate plans that will
be synchronized and linked to an overall national security space plan,
and that the services should not wait to complete their own plans. We
agree that development of an overall plan can logically take place
concurrently with service planning and have reworded our recommendation
accordingly. The intent of our recommendation to develop an overall
human capital strategy and service plans that are appropriately linked
to the overall strategy is to ensure that the services and defense
agencies provide adequate training to meet service and defensewide
requirements. Furthermore, with an integrated approach, the service
plans should offer training programs that minimize duplication of
effort and reduce critical gaps of coverage to effectively create and
maintain a capable space cadre across the department. DOD‘s comments
are included in this report in appendix III. DOD also provided
technical clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Our scope and methodology are detailed in appendix IV. We performed our
work from June 2002 to February 2003 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Contacts and staff
acknowledgements are listed in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the
Navy, and the Air Force; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; the Director, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (202) 512-6020 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report.
Raymond J. Decker, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Status of Actions Taken to Implement Short-and Mid-Term
Space Commission Recommendations:
The Secretary of Defense agreed with the Space Commission‘s finding
that the Department of Defense (DOD) needed a new and comprehensive
national security space management approach to promote and protect
U.S. interests in space. In a May 8, 2001, letter to the leaders of the
defense and intelligence oversight committees, the Secretary informed
Congress that he would take actions to improve DOD‘s management
structure and organization for national security space actions. These
actions largely represented organizational and management changes the
Space Commission recommended to improve DOD‘s focus on national
security space activities and better coordinate military and
intelligence space activities.
We reported in June 2002 that DOD had implemented or was in the process
of implementing 10 of the 13 recommendations the Space Commission
directed to it. At that time, DOD had completed action on six
recommendations and was in the process of implementing four others. The
Secretary of Defense chose not to implement three of the commission‘s
recommendations and instead opted to (1) establish a focal point for
space within the Air Force rather than create an Under Secretary of
Defense for Space, Information, and Intelligence; (2) increase the Air
Force‘s responsibilities by department directive rather than requesting
legislative change; and (3) direct existing organizations to conduct
innovative space research and development rather than create a new
organization to do so.
As table 2 shows, DOD has implemented or is nearing implementation of
these 10 recommendations. DOD has completed actions to implement three
recommendations that were categorized as ’in process“ in our June 2002
report, as designated by the arrows in the table. Only the
recommendation that the Air Force be named executive agent for DOD
space remains to be finalized. However, the Air Force has taken on more
leadership responsibilities over the last year based on a memorandum
that expressed the Secretary‘s intent to have the Air Force become the
DOD executive agent for space.
Table 2: Status of DOD‘s Implementation of Space Commission
Recommendations as of January 2003:
Space Commission recommendation: The Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence should meet regularly to address
national security space policy, objectives, and issues.; No action
intended: [Empty]; In progress: [Empty]; Completed: Yes.
Space Commission recommendation: Secretary of Defense should establish
an under secretary of defense for space, intelligence, and
information.[A]; No action intended: Yes; In progress: [Empty];
Completed: [Empty].
Space Commission recommendation: Secretary of Air Force should assign
responsibility for the command of Air Force Space Command to a four-
star officer other than the commander, U.S. Space Command and North
American Aerospace Defense Command.; No action intended: [Empty]; In
progress:; Yes; Completed: Yes.
Space Commission recommendation: Secretary of Defense should end the
practice of assigning only Air Force flight-rated officers to position
of commander, U.S. Space Command and North American Aerospace Defense
Command.; No action intended: [Empty]; In progress: [Empty]; Completed:
b.
Space Commission recommendation: Air Force should realign headquarters
and field commands to more effectively organize, train, and equip for
prompt and sustained space operations.; No action intended: [Empty]; In
progress:Yes; Completed: Yes.
Space Commission recommendation: Air Force Space Command should be
assigned responsibility for providing resources to execute space
research, development, acquisition, and operations.; No action
intended: [Empty]; In progress: [Empty]; Completed: Yes.
Space Commission recommendation: Amend title 10 U.S.C. to assign the
Air Force responsibility to organize, train, and equip for air and
space operations.[C]; No action intended: Yes; In progress: [Empty];
Completed: [Empty].
Space Commission recommendation: Secretary of Defense should designate
the Air Force as DOD‘s executive agent for space.[D]; No action
intended: [Empty]; In progress: Yes; Completed: [Empty].
Space Commission recommendation: Assign the Under Secretary of the Air
Force as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.; No action
intended: [Empty]; In progress: [Empty]; Completed: Yes.
Space Commission recommendation: Designate the Under Secretary of the
Air Force as the Air Force acquisition executive for space.[E]; No
action intended: [Empty]; In progress: [Empty]; Completed: Yes.
Space Commission recommendation: Secretary of Defense and Director of
Central Intelligence should create a research, development, and
demonstration organization to focus on innovative space research and
development.[F]; No action intended: Yes; In progress: [Empty];
Completed: [Empty].
Space Commission recommendation: Secretary of Defense should direct the
Defense Advanced Research Products Agency and service laboratories to
undertake development and demonstration of innovative space
technologies.; No action intended: [Empty]; In progress:; Yes;
Completed: Yes.
Space Commission recommendation: Secretary of Defense should establish
a Major Force Program for Space.[G]; No action intended: [Empty]; In
progress: [Empty]; Completed: Yes.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Secretary of Defense opted to establish a focal point for space in
the Under Secretary of the Air Force.
[B] This recommendation no longer applies as the U.S. Space Command has
been disestablished and its missions transferred to the new U.S.
Strategic Command.
[C] DOD opted to increase Air Force responsibility for organizing,
equipping, and training for space operations without requesting
legislative change. In August 2002, it revised its directive
promulgating the functions of the department and its major components
(Directive 5100.1) to reflect all services‘ responsibilities to
organize, train, and equip space forces.
[D] The executive agent is a term used to indicate a delegation of
authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the
Secretary‘s behalf. The exact nature and scope of the authority
delegated may vary. It may be limited to providing administration and
support or coordinating certain functions or extend to direction and
control over specified resources for specified purposes.
[E] The acquisition executive is the individual charged with overall
acquisition management responsibilities within his or her organization.
[F] This organization was not established.
[G] A major force program is an aggregation of related budget items
that can be used to track resources that support a macro-level combat
or support mission.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Time Line of Major Events in DOD‘s Implementation of Space
Commission Recommendations:
Date: January 11, 2001; Event: Space Commission report published.
Date: May 8, 2001; Event: Secretary of Defense sent letter to Congress
detailing intended actions.
Date: Oct. 1, 2001; Event: Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center
realigned from Air Force Materiel Command to Air Force Space Command.
Date: Oct. 18, 2001; Event: Secretary of Defense issued memorandum
directing actions and time lines for implementing selected Space
Commission recommendations.
Date: December 13, 2001; Event: Under Secretary of the Air Force sworn
in, after confirmation by the Senate, and appointed Director, National
Reconnaissance Office, by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Date: January 2, 2002; Event: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics) promulgated policy memorandum directing DOD
research community to undertake research and demonstration of
innovative space technologies and systems.
Date: February 7, 2002; Event: Under Secretary of the Air Force
designated to be Air Force Acquisition Executive for space.
Date: February 14, 2002; Event: Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) delegated milestone decision
authority for DOD major space programs to the Secretary of the Air
Force with authority to redelegate to the Under Secretary of the Air
Force.
Date: February 2002; Event: ’Virtual“ major force program for space
included in DOD‘s Future Years Defense Program.
Date: April 19, 2002; Event: Commanding general assumed command of the
Air Force Space Command separate from U.S. Space Command and North
American Aerospace Defense Command.
Date: June 26, 2002; Event: GAO interim assessment of the status of
DOD‘s reorganization of space activities.
Date: August 2002; Event: National Security Space Architect space
program assessment.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000:
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE:
Mr. Raymond J. Decker:
Director, Defense Capabilities & Management Team U.S. General
Accounting Office:
441 G. Street N. W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
March 20, 200:
Dear Mr. Decker:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) report, …DEFENSE SPACE ACTIVITIES:
Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions
Needed‘, dated February 19, 2003 (GAO Code 350200).‘:
In general, the Department concurs with the findings in the report, but
offers several recommended changes to enhance accuracy. Specific
comments are attached.
Sincerely,
Patricia S. Gamble:
Signed by Patricia S. Gamble:
Acting Director: Space Programs ODASD(C3ISR, Space & IT Programs):
cc: DoD IG:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 19, 2003 (GAO CODE 350200):
’DEFENSE SPACE ACTIVITIES: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES INITIATED, BUT
FURTHER MANAGEMENT ACTIONS NEEDED“:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION l: Require the Under Secretary of the Air Force, in
conjunction with the services, to establish a department wide space
human capital strategy that includes goals and timelines to develop and
maintain a cadre of military and civilian space professionals:
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The DoD and Services are already laying the
ground-work for a National Security Space (NSS) space human capital
strategy that will be synchronized with separate Service plans, also in
development, to develop and maintain a cadre of military and space
professionals.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Require the Under Secretary of the Air Force to
develop a comprehensive management framework for space activities that
includes a results-oriented national security space strategy tied to
overall department-level space goals, timelines, and performance
measures to assess space activities‘ progress in achieving national
security space goals:
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. A comprehensive management framework for space
activities that includes inherent performance measures and reporting
mechanisms are being developed.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Include performance goals and measures for space
activities in DoD‘s next department wide performance report:
DoD RESPONSE: Concur.
RECOMMENDATION 4: Designate an oversight entity in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense to periodically assess the progress of DoD‘s
executive agent in achieving goals for space activities.
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Currently, ASD (C31) has responsibility to
establish policy and provide direction to the DoD Components on C31-
related space systems and serves as the primary focal point for staff
coordination within the DoD, with other Government Departments and
Agencies.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to develop service space cadre
plans linked to the department‘s space human capital strategy when
completed.
DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. Recommend changing …develop Service
cadre planes:
linked to‘ to …review and, as necessary, adjust Service cadre plans to
ensure linkage to‘. The DoD and Services are already drafting separate
space cadre plans that will be synchronized and linked to an overall
National Security Space human capital strategy. Cadre plans underway
now are necessarily focused on service-unique career issues but do not
preclude further coordination to meet Departmental goals and
opportunities. The Services should not wait until a Department-wide
space human capital strategy is developed to complete their individual
plans.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology:
To update the status of actions the Department of Defense (DOD) has
taken to implement the Space Commission‘s recommendations, we
identified and monitored changes in DOD‘s organization and management
of space by reviewing DOD and service briefings and internal department
directives and memoranda that identified issues and directed
initiatives for improving management of space activities. We held
discussions with officials from the Offices of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) and the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) to
discuss department guidance on implementing the recommendations and
implementation activities. To identify actions the services took to
improve management of space activities, we reviewed documentation of
implementation actions and held discussions with Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps officials. Offices represented were the Under
Secretary of the Air Force; the National Security Space Architect; the
Air Force Space Command; the Air Force Space and Missile Systems
Center; the 14th Air Force; the Army Space and Missile Defense Command;
the Naval Network and Warfare Command; and Headquarters Marine Corps.
Sites visited included the Pentagon, Washington, D.C; Peterson Air
Force Base and Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado;
Los Angeles Air Force Base, Los Angeles, California; and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, Lompoc, California. The National Reconnaissance Office
provided written answers to questions we submitted.
To determine progress in addressing some of the long-term space
management challenges, we discussed challenges DOD, the Space
Commission, other experts, and our previous reports have identified
with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Army;
the Air Force; the Navy; the National Security Space Architect; the
U.S. Strategic Command; the U.S. Northern Command; the Joint Staff; and
outside experts. Given time and resource limitations, we focused our
work on three of the many long-term management challenges to DOD‘s
space program--investing in science and technology, improving the
timeliness and quality of space acquisitions, and building and
maintaining a cadre of space professionals. To assess progress in
investing in technology, we reviewed documentation and held discussions
with officials from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; the
Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering; the Office of
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology);
Naval Network and Warfare Command; the Naval Research Laboratory; and
the Air Force Research Laboratory. To assess progress in implementing
its acquisition
initiatives, we reviewed documentation and discussed the initiatives
with officials representing the Office of the Under Secretary of the
Air Force and the Air Force Space Command. In addition, we discussed
education and training initiatives with officials from the Air Force
Space Command; Air University; Air Force Academy; the Army Space and
Missile Defense Command; Army Command and General Staff College; the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; the Naval Academy; the Naval
Postgraduate School; and Headquarters Marine Corps.
To assess whether DOD had a management framework that will foster the
success of its improvement efforts, we reviewed departmental plans and
strategies that set organizational goals and discussed oversight and
management activities--including setting strategic goals, developing
measures of progress, and planning time lines--with senior DOD and
service officials from offices that have major responsibilities for
managing space activities, including the Offices of Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), the
Under Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force Space Command. We
used the principles embodied in the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 as criteria for assessing the adequacy of DOD‘s management
framework to effectively manage and oversee the space program.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Raymond J. Decker (202) 512-6020:
Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the names above, Margaret Morgan,
MaeWanda Micheal-Jackson, Robert Poetta, and R.K. Wild made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] P.L. 107-107, section 914.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Space Activities: Status of
Reorganization,
GAO-02-772R (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2002).
[3] The executive agent is a term used to indicate a delegation of
authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the
Secretary‘s behalf. The exact nature and scope of the authority
delegated may vary. It may be limited to providing administration and
support or coordinating certain functions or extend to direction and
control over specified resources for specified purposes. The DOD
directive that will define the scope of authority in this instance has
not yet been formally approved.
[4] The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) designs, builds and
operates the nation‘s reconnaissance satellites. NRO provides products
to DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency, among others.
[5] The milestone decision authority is the individual designated to
approve entry of an acquisition program into the next phase of the
acquisition process.
[6] The Defense Planning Guidance, issued by the Secretary of Defense,
provides goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal
constraints, for the development of military departments‘ and defense
agencies‘ budgets.
[7] Fact Sheet: National Space Policy-the White House, National Science
& Technology Council (Sept. 19, 1996); and DOD Directive 3100.10 (July
9, 1999).
[8] Navy operated space systems include the Ultra High Frequency
Follow-on, WindSat Ocean Surface Wind Vector Measurements from Space,
and Navy Space Surveillance System. The Naval Space Surveillance System
will be transferred to the Air Force.
[9] The U.S. Space Command merged with the U.S. Strategic Command on
October 1, 2002. The combined command is responsible for space
operations, information operations, computer network operations, and
strategic defense and attack.
[10] The present Secretary of Defense led the Space Commission prior to
his nomination to his current position.
[11] GAO-02-772R.
[12] The National Defense Authorization Act of 2003 (P.L. 107-314,
section 901) authorized DOD to create an Under Secretary for
Intelligence. The responsibilities for this new position have not yet
been released.
[13] The acquisition executive is the individual charged with overall
acquisition management responsibilities within his or her organization.
[14] The Space and Missile Systems Center designs and acquires all Air
Force and most DOD space systems.
[15] A major force program is a budget mechanism by which DOD
aggregates related budget items to track resources that support a
macro-level combat or support mission, such as strategic forces or
general purpose forces.
[16] DOD‘s Future Years Defense Program is the official document that
summarizes the force levels and funding associated with specific
programs. It presents estimated appropriation needs for the budget year
for which funds are being requested from Congress and at least
4 years following it.
[17] ’Responsive Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch“ is an effort
to provide quick and economic launch capabilities for micro-size
satellites; ’Orbital Express“ is an effort to demonstrate the
feasibility of refueling, upgrading, and extending the life of on-orbit
spacecraft.
[18] The new process will require a cost estimate from the program
office and an estimate led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense‘s
Cost Accounting Improvement Group.
[19] The Defense Space Acquisitions Board is composed of
representatives of the military services and defense agencies invited
by the Under Secretary.
[20] National Security Space Acquisition Policy 03-01.
[21] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Space Operations:
Planning, Funding, and Acquisition Challenges Facing Efforts to
Strengthen Space Control, GAO-02-738 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23,
2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better
Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System
Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999); U.S.
General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and
Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO-01-288
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2001); U.S. General Accounting Office,
Defense Acquisition: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program
Outcomes, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 1999); and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Capturing Design and
Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes,
GAO-02-701 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002)
[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Risks Remain
for the AEHF Satellite Communications System, GAO-03-63 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 31, 2003).
[23] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Space Based
Infrared System-Low at Risk of Missing Initial Deployment Date,
GAO-01-6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001).
[24] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is composed of senior
military officers from each service and makes recommendations to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on programmatic alternatives,
tradeoffs, risks, bill-payers, and effectiveness.
[25] P.L. 107-314.
[26] In prior reports and testimony, we identified strategic human
capital management planning as a governmentwide high-risk area and a
key area of challenge. See Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks: Department of Defense, GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 2003).
[27] The Commander, Air Force Space Command, is charged with managing
career development and education and training within the Air Force,
which contains the majority of space professionals.
[28] As we reported previously, DOD also lacks a strategic approach to
manage joint officer requirements. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a
Strategic Approach Is Needed, GAO-03-238 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19,
2002).
[29] Planning for the space personnel in the U.S. Marine Corps will be
included in the Navy‘s space cadre planning.
[30] P.L. 103-62.
[31] Cohen, William S., Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, Appendix I (Washington, D.C.: 2000). The 2000 Performance
Plan was the last one DOD produced.
[32] DOD Directive 5100.88 (Sept. 3, 2002).
GAO‘s Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO‘s commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO‘s Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as ’Today‘s Reports,“ on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select ’Subscribe to daily E-mail alert for newly
released products“ under the GAO Reports heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street NW,
Room LM Washington,
D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.
General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.
20548: