DOD Civilian Personnel
Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce Gao ID: GAO-03-472 April 30, 2003Between 1987 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) downsized the civilian workforce in 27 key industrial facilities by about 56 percent. Many of the remaining 72,000 workers are nearing retirement. In recent years GAO has identified shortcomings in DOD's strategic planning and was asked to determine (1) whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement a depot maintenance strategic plan, (2) the extent to which the services have developed and implemented comprehensive strategic workforce plans, and (3) what challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning.
DOD has not implemented our October 2001 recommendation to develop and implement a DOD depot strategic plan that would delineate workloads to be accomplished in each of the services' depots. The DOD depot system has been a key part of the department's plan to support military systems in the past, but the increased use of the private sector to perform this work has decreased the role of these activities. While title 10 of the U.S. code requires DOD to retain core capability and also requires that at least 50 percent of depot maintenance funds be spent for public-sector performance, questions remain about the future role of DOD depots. Absent a DOD depot strategic plan, the services have in varying degrees, laid out a framework for strategic depot planning, but this planning is not comprehensive. Questions also remain about the future of arsenals and ammunition plants. GAO reviewed workforce planning efforts for 22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 ammunition plants, which employed about 72,000 civilian workers in fiscal year 2002. The services have not developed and implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian workforce in DOD industrial activities to meet future requirements. While workforce planning is done for each of the industrial activities, generally it is short-term rather than strategic. Further, workforce planning is lacking in other areas that the Office of Personnel Management guidance and high-performing organizations identify as key to successful workforce planning. Service workforce planning efforts (1) usually do not assess the competencies; (2) do not develop comprehensive retention plans; and (3) sometimes do not develop performance measures and evaluate workforce plans. Several challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning for the viability of its civilian depot workforce. First, given the aging depot workforce and the retirement eligibility of over 40 percent of the workforce over the next 5 to 7 years, the services may have difficulty maintaining the depots' viability. Second, the services are having difficulty implementing multiskilling--an industry and government best practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the workforce--even though this technique could help depot planners do more with fewer employees. Finally, increased training funding and innovation in the training program will be essential for revitalizing the aging depot workforce.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-472, DOD Civilian Personnel: Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's Civilian Industrial Workforce
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Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
April 2003:
DOD Civilian Personnel:
Improved Strategic Planning Needed to Help Ensure Viability of DOD's
Civilian Industrial Workforce:
GAO-03-472:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-472, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Between 1987 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) downsized the
civilian workforce in 27 key industrial facilities by about 56 percent.
Many of the remaining 72,000 workers are nearing retirement. In recent
years GAO has identified shortcomings in DOD‘s strategic planning and
was asked to determine (1) whether DOD has implemented our prior
recommendation to develop and implement a depot maintenance strategic
plan, (2) the extent to which the services have developed and
implemented comprehensive strategic workforce plans, and (3) what
challenges adversely affect DOD‘s workforce planning.
What GAO Found:
DOD has not implemented our October 2001 recommendation to develop and
implement a DOD depot strategic plan that would delineate workloads to
be accomplished in each of the services‘ depots. The DOD depot system
has been a key part of the department‘s plan to support military
systems in the past, but the increased use of the private sector to
perform this work has decreased the role of these activities. While
title 10 of the U.S. code requires DOD to retain core capability and
also requires that at least 50 percent of depot maintenance funds be
spent for public-sector performance, questions remain about the future
role of DOD depots. Absent a DOD depot strategic plan, the services
have in varying degrees, laid out a framework for strategic depot
planning, but this planning is not comprehensive. Questions also remain
about the future of arsenals and ammunition plants. GAO reviewed
workforce planning efforts for 22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and
2 ammunition plants, which employed about 72,000 civilian workers in
fiscal year 2002.
The services have not developed and implemented strategic workforce
plans to position the civilian workforce in DOD industrial activities
to meet future requirements. While workforce planning is done for each
of the industrial activities, generally it is short-term rather than
strategic. Further, workforce planning is lacking in other areas that
OPM guidance and high-performing organizations identify as key to
successful workforce planning. Service workforce planning efforts (1)
usually do not assess the competencies; (2) do not develop
comprehensive retention plans; and (3) sometimes do not develop
performance measures and evaluate workforce plans.
Several challenges adversely affect DOD‘s workforce planning for the
viability of its civilian depot workforce. First, given the aging depot
workforce and the retirement eligibility of over 40 percent of the
workforce over the next 5 to 7 years, the services may have difficulty
maintaining the depots‘ viability. Second, the services are having
difficulty implementing multiskilling”an industry and government best
practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the
workforce”even though this technique could help depot planners do more
with fewer employees. Finally, increased training funding and
innovation in the training program will be essential for revitalizing
the aging depot workforce.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the DOD complete revisions to core policy,
promulgate a schedule for completing core computations, and complete
depot strategic planning; develop a plan for arsenals and ammunition
plants; develop strategic workforce plans; and coordinate the
implementation of initiatives to address various workforce challenges.
DOD concurred with 7 of our 9 recommendations; nonconcurring with two
because it believes the proposed National Security Personnel System,
which was submitted to Congress as a part of the DOD transformation
legislation, will take care of these problems. We believe it is
premature to assume this system will (1) be approved by Congress as
proposed and (2) resolve these issues.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-472.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Derek Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or
stewartd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Lacks Strategic Planning to Guide Future Planning for
Industrial Activities:
Services' Efforts to Develop Industrial Workforce Plans
Vary and Generally Lack Some Key Planning Elements:
A Number of Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic Workforce Planning:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services' Depots:
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots' Short-Term Workforce Plans:
Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of Service Depots' Short-Term Workforce
Planning Efforts:
Table 2: Civilian Personnel in Industrial Facilities Eligible to
Retire:
Figures:
Figure 1: Location of 27 Key DOD Industrial Activities:
Figure 2: Collection of Various Maintenance and Manufacturing
Activities Performed in Selected Industrial Activities:
Figure 3: Office of Personnel Management's Workforce Planning Model:
Abbreviations:
ALC: Air Logistics Center:
DOD: Department of Defense:
OPM: Office of Personnel Managment:
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United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2003:
The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The manufacture and support of military weapons involves a vast array
of industrial capability some of which is in the private sector and
some of which is in the public sector. The part in the public sector
centers around 27 key Department of Defense (DOD) industrial
facilities, including 22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2
government-owned and-operated ammunition manufacturing
plants.[Footnote 1] The civilian workforce in these activities was
reduced by about 56 percent between 1987 and 2002--from about 163,000
to about 72,000 employees. The workforce reduction occurred as a result
of downsizing initiatives, the increased use of the private sector for
logistics support activities, and other factors. Because seniority was
a major factor in determining which workers would be retained and
little new hiring has occurred in most of these activities, the result
of downsizing is that more than 7,000 civilian employees, or about
12 percent of the remaining workforce, are currently eligible to retire
and about 43 percent will be eligible to retire by 2009. This has
created a human capital management challenge for DOD. In addition,
DOD's challenge is exacerbated by the war on terrorism and other
critical military operations while it also is undertaking significant
transformation initiatives and addressing initiatives to further
streamline its operations, including responding to further
downsizing mandates.
In recent years, we have emphasized the importance of strategic
planning in DOD for establishing and achieving key mission
objectives.[Footnote 2] We have also identified specific deficiencies
in DOD's planning for depot maintenance operations. For example, in
October 2001, we reported that DOD had no overall plan that tied
investments in depot maintenance facilities and equipment with future
workloads[Footnote 3] and, in turn, with human capital needs. At that
time we recommended that DOD, among other actions, develop a strategic-
-or long-term--plan for depot maintenance that addressed human capital
needs and the specific actions necessary to meet them.
This report looks specifically at the strategic workforce planning for
the 27 previously mentioned DOD industrial facilities. Concerned about
DOD's apparent lack of a plan for its depot workforce and the potential
implications of these deficiencies, you asked that we determine:
* whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and
implement strategic plans for depot maintenance;
* the extent to which the services have developed and implemented
strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot workforce to
meet future requirements; and:
* what challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning for the
long-term viability of its civilian depot workforce.
As part of our work, we reviewed DOD's and the services' existing
strategic and other workforce plans for these activities. We visited
18 maintenance depots, three arsenals, and two ammunition manufacturing
plants and obtained data from 4 additional maintenance depots we did
not visit.
Results in Brief:
DOD has not implemented our prior recommendation to develop and
implement a departmentwide depot strategic plan that would delineate
future workloads to be accomplished in each of the services'
maintenance depots, and the services efforts to develop comprehensive
depot strategic plans vary. Although recognition and maintenance of
depots' core capabilities and their workforces are key to the continued
viability of the depot system, DOD's increased use of the private
sector in recent years has decreased the role of DOD's maintenance
depots and raised questions about their long-term future role that have
not been addressed by a comprehensive strategic plan. Uncertainties
also exist about the future role of DOD arsenals and ammunition plants.
Depot officials said that it is difficult to develop a depot strategic
plan with so many uncertainties about how the military depots will be
used in the future. However, title 10 of the U.S. Code provides
direction regarding the role of the depots and the allocation of depot
maintenance work between the public and private sectors, and it
dictates a continuing role for a level of DOD depot maintenance
capability. The lack of a strategic plan may have serious implications
because without forethought to shape the future of the depots and their
workforces, the future capability of the two for performing work is
questionable. Absent a departmentwide plan, the services' efforts to
develop comprehensive depot strategic plans vary. For example, the
Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have developed depot plans, but the
Army plan has been suspended, the Air Force plan does not address one
depot nor identify specific new work, and the Marine Corps plan has not
been approved and has no approval schedule. While the Navy has not
developed a strategic depot plan, two of the Navy components--the
shipyard and aviation communities--have begun strategic
planning efforts.
The services have also not developed and implemented strategic
workforce plans that will position the civilian industrial workforce to
meet future requirements. Except for the Air Force, the services
industrial activities' workforce plans are mostly short-term rather
than strategic. The plans are also lacking in other areas that Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance and high-performing
organizations identify as key to successful workforce planning.
Specifically, they (1) usually do not assess the competencies needed
for current and future workforces; (2) do not develop comprehensive
retention plans that identify employees critical to accomplishment of
organizational goals, develop an infrastructure to assist workers in
becoming long-term assets of the organization, or provide meaningful
incentives to retain valued employees; and (3) sometimes do not develop
performance measures for evaluating workforce plans to identify
corrective actions needed to improve planning efforts.
Several challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning for the
long-term viability of the workforce industrial workforce. First, given
the aging of the workforce and the eligibility for retirement of about
43 percent of the workforce over the next 7 years, the services could
have difficulty maintaining the viability of these activities. Yet, the
implementation of short-term workforce planning rather than strategic
planning does not address this challenge. Second, the services are
having difficulty implementing multiskilling--an industry and
government best practice for improving the flexibility and productivity
of the workforce--even though this technique could help depot planners
do more with fewer workers. Multiskilling is the process of training
maintenance employees in specific skills that cross the traditional
trade or craft lines and then ensuring that the work is performed. A
major advantage of multiskilling is that particular jobs that require
more than one craft--not necessarily more than one individual--can be
performed by fewer personnel. Being able to provide additional
compensation to workers for obtaining the desired new complementary
skills could enhance the depots' ability to implement this program
successfully. Finally, the need for both increased funds and innovation
in the training program will challenge efforts to revitalize the
depot workforce.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to strengthen
strategic workforce planning for DOD industrial activities. DOD
provided oral comments after reviewing a draft of this report,
concurring with seven of our nine recommendations. DOD's response
highlighted the importance the department places in human capital
management. In non-concurring with two of our recommendations, DOD
officials said that DOD's new National Security Personnel System will
provide all the flexibilities and authorities needed to maintain and
enhance human resources competencies, capabilities, and performance
across the department. Since the proposed new system has not yet been
considered by the Congress, we believe it is premature to assume that
all its provisions will be approved and that the new system will
address our concerns.
Background:
DOD Industrial Activities:
DOD owns and operates industrial activities that support the military
mission by repairing; rebuilding; overhauling; and upgrading
components, ammunitions, or end items to return them to a like-new
condition or by manufacturing new systems components or ammunitions. As
of January 2003, and as shown in figure 1, DOD industrial activities
included:
* twenty-two maintenance depots--11 in the Navy (three aviation depots,
four shipyards, and four warfare centers--two associated with ship
systems and two associated with engineering analyses and command and
control), 5 in the Army, 4 in the Air Force, and 2 in the Marine Corps;
* three Army arsenals[Footnote 4] that have a manufacturing mission;
and:
* two Army ammunition manufacturing plants that are government-owned
and -operated.
Figure 1: Location of 27 Key DOD Industrial Activities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
These activities, which are a part of the combined public and private
sector industrial base and are largely staffed by DOD civilians, are
described in appendix II. This appendix also describes the type of work
performed at the activities and the number of DOD civilians employed in
each. The activities generally require extensive shop facilities and
specialized equipment and employ a range of personnel from highly
skilled technicians and engineers to laborers. Figure 2 shows a
collection of maintenance or manufacturing activities performed in some
of the 27 industrial activities. In fiscal year 2002, these activities
employed about 72,000 civilian employees--about 10 percent of DOD's
civilian workforce. About 1,200 military personnel are also employed in
these activities, with over half the military assigned to the Pearl
Harbor Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Activity, which in 1998
consolidated its depot and intermediate maintenance work into one
activity, bringing together the largely military workforce employed in
the intermediate activity with the largely civilian population employed
in the shipyard. In the other DOD industrial activities, military
personnel are largely in managerial or supervisory positions. Of the
approximately 72,000 civilian employees, the Army employs about 14,200;
the Navy, about 35,500; the Marine Corps, about 1,300; and the Air
Force, about 21,100. Various factors (such as the downsizing of the
U.S. military force structure; increased use of the private sector for
performing support activities; and changes in repair processes,
increasing equipment's time in the field) have resulted in significant
reductions in the number of personnel working in these facilities. For
example, the number of personnel assigned to DOD maintenance depots was
reduced by about 60 percent between 1987 and 2001--from about 156,000
to about 64,500 workers, while the total amount of maintenance work was
cut in half during that period.
Figure 2: Collection of Various Maintenance and Manufacturing
Activities Performed in Selected Industrial Activities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:
Improved strategic planning has been a key goal of the federal
government in recent years, with the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 providing guidance on strategic planning for government
activities.[Footnote 5] Strategic plans are intended to be the starting
point for each agency's performance measurement efforts. Each plan is
to cover a period of 5 years and must include a comprehensive mission
statement, which discusses, among other things, the agency's major
functions and operations, a set of outcome-related goals and
objectives, and a description of how the agency intends to achieve
these goals and objectives. We previously reported that high-performing
organizations begin their strategic planning by defining what they want
to accomplish and what kind of organization they want to be.[Footnote
6] Similarly, agencies establish their missions, visions for the
future, core values, goals and objectives, and strategies.
Strategic Workforce Planning:
High-performing public organizations have found that strategic planning
and management can address human capital, or workforce, shortfalls.
Strategic workforce planning--planning that focuses on developing
long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining an
organization's people and for aligning human capital approaches that
are clearly linked to achieving programmatic goals--is a key part of
human capital management. In short, according to a National Academy of
Public Administration guide on building successful organizations,
strategic workforce planning is a systematic process for identifying
the human capital required to meet organizational goals and developing
the strategies to meet these requirements. To help meet organizational
goals, organizations use workforce planning--getting the right people
with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time--that is
explicitly linked to the agency's overall mission and goals.
While many organizations have developed models for workforce
planning,[Footnote 7] putting aside variations in terminology, the
models generally include the following steps.
* Set strategic direction, including the identification of
organizational vision and objectives at that point in the future on
which planning will be based. This direction should also include human
capital goals.
* Identify workforce skills and competencies needed to achieve the
objectives. Analyze the present workforce to determine what skills and
competencies are present. Compare the present workforce skills and
competencies to those needed in the future. This step is sometimes
referred to as "gap analysis.":
* Develop an action plan to transition from the present workforce to
the future workforce. The action plan should address recruiting,
hiring, training, succession, and retention.
* Implement the action plan by developing well-defined objectives,
specific measurable workforce goals, and timetables and milestones;
conducting recruiting and training; and putting retention strategies
into practice.
* Establish performance measures; periodically evaluate the workforce
action plans, review the mission and objectives to ensure they remain
valid; and make adjustments as required by changes in mission,
objectives, and workforce skills and competencies.
Strategic workforce planning is an iterative process, as demonstrated
by the OPM's workforce planning model in figure 3.
Figure 3: Office of Personnel Management's Workforce Planning Model:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As a guide to help agencies in their human capital management efforts,
the OPM issued the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability
Framework in November 2002. This document provides standards for
success that include, among other things: (1) strategic alignment,
(2) workforce planning and deployment, and (3) suggested performance
indicators. Criteria provided in other workforce planning models we
reviewed are compatible with the more recent OPM framework.
DOD Lacks Strategic Planning to Guide Future Planning for
Industrial Activities:
Although we have previously recommended the development and
implementation of a strategic plan for depot maintenance, DOD does
not yet have a strategic plan to guide the future development of depot
maintenance activities, and questions continue about core capabilities
and future work. While the DOD depot system has been a key part of the
department's plan to support military systems, the increased use of the
private sector to perform work previously performed by DOD employees
has decreased the role of the services' depots and raised questions
regarding their future. Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides direction
regarding the role that DOD depots should play in supporting the
fighting forces and in how depot work should be allocated between the
public and private sectors. However, while some action has been taken
to begin formulating a depot strategic plan, DOD does not yet have a
strategic plan for its depot maintenance activities, and it is
uncertain when it will be completed. Absent a comprehensive DOD plan,
the services have in varying degrees initiated a strategic depot
planning effort. Generally, however, the service versions do not
identify what work will be performed in the service depots in the
future, and it is uncertain whether these activities will continue to
be viable as the systems they support age and are phased out of the
inventory.
Legislation Provides Direction Regarding the Continued Performance of
Depot Maintenance in DOD Activities:
Although legislation requires the continued performance of some key
industrial activities--core capabilities--in government-owned
facilities and by government personnel and specifies that not more than
50 percent of funds spent for depot maintenance may be spent for work
performed by the private sector, DOD has in recent years increasingly
relied on the private sector for the performance of various logistics
activities, including depot maintenance. In the past, the department
requested repeal of legislative provisions that influenced the
continued use of DOD facilities and personnel performing depot
maintenance activities and recently again considered proposing the
repeal in order to gain flexibility for its business decisions.
However, the identification and acquisition of future core capabilities
are key to strategic depot planning.
Section 2464 of title 10 requires the Secretary of Defense to identify
and maintain a core logistics capability. Under that provision, the
core logistics capability is to be owned and operated by the government
to ensure the existence of a ready and controlled source of technical
competence and resources so that the military can effectively and
timely respond to mobilization, national defense emergencies, and
contingencies. The core capabilities are to include those necessary to
maintain and repair the weapon systems and military equipment that the
Secretary, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, identifies as necessary to meet the nation's military needs.
Furthermore, the Secretary is to identify the workloads required to
maintain those core capabilities and to require their performance in
government facilities. Finally, the Secretary is to assign these
facilities sufficient workloads to ensure peacetime cost efficiency,
technical competencies, surge capacity, and reconstitution
capabilities to support military strategic and contingency plans.
Nonetheless, the concept of core capabilities is not precise and has
been controversial. We have previously reported that the department's
implementation of the core statute is not comprehensive and that the
policy and implementing procedures and practices provide little
assurance that core maintenance capabilities are being developed as
needed to support future national defense emergencies and
contingencies.[Footnote 8] In response to our report, DOD has revised
its core policy to improve the department's guidance to the military
services regarding how core capability requirements should be
developed. Although this guidance has been issued, questions remain
about the guidance and the services are not accomplishing key analyses
to identify essential core capabilities.
In addition, 10 U.S.C. 2466 specifies that no more than 50 percent of
the funds made available for depot maintenance may be spent for private
sector performance, unless the requirement is waived for a particular
fiscal year. This sets aside 50 percent of the funding for public-
sector performance of these workloads. In recent years, our mandated
reviews of the allocation of depot maintenance work between the public
and private sector with regard to the 50 percent funding rule have
found that increasing amounts of the service's depot work was going to
the private sector. For example, during fiscal 2001 and 2002, the Air
Force exceeded the 50 percent limit and waived the requirement; we
could not determine with precision whether the Army was in compliance
with the 50 percent provision.[Footnote 9]
Because DOD implemented an acquisition policy that called on the
private sector for life-cycle logistics support of its weapons systems,
during the 1990s most new weapon system programs called for using
private-sector maintenance providers, with depot repair of few new
programs going to military depots.[Footnote 10] With some increased
visibility and awareness of the 50-50 and core provisions, DOD has
recognized the need to revitalize the depots. DOD guidance supports the
use of public-private partnerships. In some of these partnerships,
private-sector logistics providers subcontract with military depots for
some depot maintenance work. We recently reported that public-private
partnerships comprise only about 2 percent of DOD's depot maintenance
work, and while the department plans to significantly increase the use
of such partnerships, there are some challenges that must be overcome
if the department's planned expansion of partnerships is to be
realized.[Footnote 11] It is uncertain the extent to which public-
private depot maintenance partnerships will result in contractor
personnel replacing DOD civilian personnel in depots. However, because
the 50-50 guidance provides that the funds for some depot partnerships
are not counted when applying the 50 percent limitation, partnership
work could be a vehicle for transferring significant amounts of
maintenance to the private sector without exceeding the 50 percent
limitation.
DOD recently considered proposing changes to title 10 depot
maintenance provisions. A legislative proposal that was associated
with the department's transformation agenda suggested repealing six
sections that impose limitations on the management of depot-level
maintenance and repair by requiring certain amounts of work to be
performed in public depots.[Footnote 12] According to the proposed
repeal, these limitations reduce the flexibility necessary for the
department to make proper and efficient business decisions in
determining the source for depot-level maintenance and repair. Although
DOD decided not to submit this proposed repeal at this time, similar
language could be proposed in the future.
DOD Still Has No Strategic Depot Maintenance Plan and the Future of the
Depots Is Uncertain:
We previously recognized the importance of the depot maintenance
mission, noted that it is unclear what future role is planned for the
military depots in supporting DOD's military mission, and recommended
that the department develop a strategic plan for the military
depots.[Footnote 13] However, while DOD has initiated some action
toward developing a depot strategic plan, the department still has no
depot strategic plan and the future of these activities is uncertain.
Thus, DOD continues to manage its depots on an ad hoc basis
without clearly defining their role for the future and the capabilities
that are required to assure the continued performance of that role. The
implications for the future are uncertain. In short, as we have
reported, the future capability for performing work in the military
depot maintenance facilities is questionable because no overall plan
exists that ties investments in depot maintenance facilities and plant
equipment with future workloads and, in turn, with human capital needs.
Furthermore, no other department plan provides required direction to
shape the future of these facilities and their workforce. Without
strategic planning that identifies which capabilities these activities
will need to provide in the future, there is no assurance they will be
able to support future readiness requirements as they have in the past.
For example, DOD's latest logistics strategic plan, which was developed
in August 1999, neither mentioned maintenance nor the large
infrastructure and cadre of personnel required to operate and support
the DOD maintenance depots.[Footnote 14] This occurred even though
maintenance is an important logistics activity that is essential for
keeping complex weapon systems ready to perform even though about half
the department's depot maintenance work is currently performed in
military depots.
Under the Government Performance and Results Act, federal agencies
are required to develop strategic plans that include mission
statements, strategic goals and objectives, and describe how the
agencies intend to achieve their goals and objectives through their
activities, human capital, information, and other resources. Depot
officials said it is difficult to develop a depot strategic plan with
so many uncertainties about how the military depots will be used in the
future. This is particularly true in light of the support initiatives
implemented in recent years to contract out to the private sector most
logistics support activities, including depot maintenance, for new and
upgraded systems and also in light of the base realignment and closure
process that is planned for 2005. These initiatives indicate that the
role of military depots could be further reduced in the future. But how
much it will be reduced is not clear. However, as long as title 10
requirements remain, DOD will be limited in the extent to which it can
reduce the amount of work performed in DOD depot repair activities.
Absent DOD Direction, the Military Services' Efforts to Develop
Strategic Plans Vary, but Generally Are Weak in Defining Future Work:
Without benefit of a departmentwide strategic depot plan that clarifies
the future role of military depots, the military services to varying
degrees have provided a prospective for future depot management, with
that of the Air Force and the Navy shipyards being the most mature.
However, by and large, the vision provided is based on short-term
workload projections--1 to 2 years beyond the current year--and does
not provide the strategic long-term look that is needed to guide future
workforce decision making.
Army:
The Army does not have a current strategic depot plan, and its outdated
plan was not comprehensive. According to Army planners, although the
Army had a Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, the plan was
suspended pending reassessment of depot capabilities and requirements
as part of an ongoing study of depot proliferation. Further, while the
suspended plan was intended to provide mission and vision statements,
it was generally oriented toward improving depot business operations
and it was not a comprehensive plan that provided a basis for guiding
future depot planning.
Although not specifically addressed in the plan, in recent years, work
assigned to the Army depots has greatly declined as have the workforces
assigned to the depots. We reported in November of 1998, however, that
the Army did not have a sound basis for identifying the number of
positions to be eliminated from its depots.[Footnote 15] This was
particularly the case in determining the number of direct labor
personnel needed to support depot workload requirements. To address
this problem, the Army implemented the Army Workload and Performance
System to correlate workload and funding requirements with the depot
workforce. Nonetheless, this system does not provide the visibility of
new systems, modernization programs, and upgrades that will have depot
work that could be assigned to the depots.
Depot planners said they have little assurance that new systems will be
brought in, as the older systems they currently work on are phased out
of the inventory. Recently, ownership of Army depots has shifted to
subordinate commands of the Army Materiel Command that are responsible
for the sustainment of Army systems. It was hoped that this change
would increase the commands' use of the depots and better integrate
depot work into the overall command mission performance, but it is too
soon to know if this will be successful. The subordinate commands such
as the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command and Aviation and Missile
Command, which are responsible for making decisions about how support
work will be allocated between the public and private sectors, were
also responsible for decisions that moved responsibility for much of
the work that used to be performed by the depots to the private sector.
These actions were based on new acquisition guidance encouraging the
use of contractor support.
The Army's suspended depot strategic plan identified five issues, one
of which relates to depot workforce planning by keying in on the
capability of the depot workforce to meet future requirements. The
plan's goal for this strategic issue was "to ensure a sustainable,
multi-skilled workforce that is capable of meeting future depot
maintenance requirements;" and the plan identified implementation
objectives and measurable criteria. Nonetheless, as previously noted,
it is unclear what the depots' future work will be. Therefore, as older
systems are phased out of the inventory, it is unclear what, if any,
new work will be phased in. This was not addressed in the
suspended plan.
The arsenals and manufacturing ammunition plants have strategic plans
or draft plans providing a mission, vision statements, and goals for
the organizations. However, it is unclear whether the extent that the
vision these activities have for themselves is the same as the one that
Army headquarters and the parent commands have for these organizations.
Neither the Army nor most of the parent commands have officially
published strategic plans that identify the vision and objectives for
these activities. Most arsenals' workload and corresponding workforce
have been declining for years. The arsenals generally project workload
and corresponding workforce requirements primarily by consulting
customers and prospective customers regarding their future workload for
the arsenals. Arsenal officials said that this methodology provides a
reasonable workload projection for only 2 years. Further, some of the
work that is done in the arsenals is not the type of manufacturing work
the arsenals used to perform. For example, instead of manufacturing
large artillery systems, more than 40 percent of workload performed in
the Rock Island arsenal is manufacturing and assembling tool kits--
ranging from carrying-case sized sets to fully equipped maintenance
shelters. A recent Rand study proposed privatizing the arsenals, but it
is unclear to what extent the Army will pursue this strategy in the
future.
The ammunition plants have a fluctuating workload, sometimes increasing
and sometimes declining. The work at two government-owned and
government-operated ammunition plants has declined in the past years,
but it is now increasing. The McAlester, Oklahoma, ammunition plant,
for example, will hire more than 200 new employees in fiscal year 2003,
primarily because the bomb production workload has increased. According
to ammunition plant managers, they are generally aware of their
workload from less than 1 year to 2 years in advance.
Navy:
The Navy does not have an overall strategic plan that covers all
Navy depot maintenance activities, but the naval shipyard and aviation
communities each have strategic planning efforts.
The Navy's plan for shipyards, called the Naval Shipyard Business Plan
for Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005, has the essential elements of a
strategic plan. It is aligned to the Naval Sea Systems Command's
corporate strategy. The plan communicates the purpose and direction for
naval shipyards and focuses on ship maintenance, workload performance,
and associated improvement initiatives, including making investments in
training, skills, and facilities necessary through 2005. It includes
workload information from fiscal year 2001 to 2010. The plan has a
strategic workforce goal for the naval shipyard workforce to have the
skills and flexibility required to meet the demands of the future
workload and business environment.
The naval shipyard plan describes the relationship of the naval
shipyards, which comprise the public sector's share of the ship
industrial base, to the overall industrial base--the total force.
According to the plan, the shipyards must have a workforce that is
capable of doing all the work. However, Navy officials said that, in
reality, with regard to the ship repair business, the public sector and
private sector personnel are complementary and personnel from both
sectors are now used to support work that is primarily the
responsibility of a shipyard from the other sector. This strategic
planning approach would appear to drive workforce planning that is also
complementary, but the shipyard business plan does not discuss private
sector shipyard personnel.
The naval aviation community published its Depot Maintenance Strategic
Plan in December 2002. This document is not a complete plan, but it
provides the framework for general doctrinal policies and principles
that will provide the future direction of naval aviation maintenance.
It defines four strategic goals for the depot system: (1) maximize the
ability to favorably impact war fighter readiness and safety,
(2) reduce the war fighters' total cost of ownership, (3) fully
integrate depot maintenance into total life-cycle logistics management,
and (4) become the knowledge base for naval aviation depot maintenance.
The plan does not identify the workload and a workforce capability
expected to be required at individual depots but does reveal that
airframe work and modification work will be reduced and component
rework and in-service engineering and logistics support work increased.
The plan indicates that public-private partnerships will be pursued and
are expected to be a significant share of the Navy depot maintenance
business. According to Naval Aviation Systems Command officials, the
strategic plan is the first of several documents that will be produced,
with a depot business plan and comprehensive depot human resources plan
to follow. The plan also noted that changes in title 10 legislation
could be needed to implement the plan.
Strategic planning for the naval warfare centers is done for an entire
center and includes the depot maintenance function. Depot maintenance
is not the primary function of the centers but is integrated within
several departments' operations and is not centrally managed. For
example, depot maintenance at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane
Division supports engineering efforts within three departments and is
not centrally managed; rather each department manages the depot
operations. Strategic planning does not specifically address depot
operations but includes workforce goals for the center, which includes
depot workers.
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has depot operations
located at two centers but depot maintenance is not the primary
function of the centers. Each center has a strategic plan that includes
depot operations. Depot operations are managed at the division levels
in the centers, which provide engineering support for various systems.
The divisions have strategic plans that include workforce goals, which
include depot workers. The two centers' depot operations are not
structured like other Navy depots and shipyards, where certain types of
repairs are directed. Instead, they compete with other depots and
repair activities for work.
Marine Corps:
The Marine Corps does not yet have an approved strategic plan to guide
actions to hire, develop, and retain the depot workforce of the future.
However, efforts are under way to improve strategic planning at the
Headquarters and at the Materiel Command, which is responsible for
identifying depot maintenance requirements and the amounts and types of
workload for the depots.
Headquarters Marine Corps has a draft plan, Depot Level Maintenance
Strategic Plan, that contains mission and vision statements and
three related goals for improving the support of weapon systems and
equipment at the depot level. This draft plan does not identify the
Marine Corps organizations or offices responsible for implementing or
monitoring the plan. According to a Headquarters Marine Corps official,
no schedule has been established for the plan to be reviewed, approved,
and issued.
The Materiel Command's draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2003
through 2008 contains mission and vision statements and six goals to
improve materiel life cycle management of weapon systems and equipment
at the depot level, but it is not depot specific. Command officials
said that the plan, when finalized, would have metrics to evaluate
implementation but is on hold pending decisions regarding the
reorganization of the Materiel Command. As of February 2003, the
command had no schedule for finalizing the plan. Logistics Bases, a
subordinate command of Materiel Command, which owns the depots,
published its first strategic plan about 2 years ago. Its current plan
is not depot specific and is mostly business-process oriented, with
only one of its six broad goals focused on workforce issues. Although
the plan has mission and vision statements, Logistics Bases officials
acknowledged that planning efforts do not yet address all the elements
of workforce planning suggested by OPM and GAO because the command did
not yet have the data it needed (such as attrition rates, retirement
trends, and skill gaps) for these analyses. Officials of Logistics
Bases also said the command has recently contracted for data collection
and analysis on depot workforce and equipment activities that would
provide a baseline for future strategic planning. Further, officials
said they plan to use metrics to implement the plan and evaluate
the results.
Air Force:
The Air Force is the most progressive in its depot maintenance
strategic planning. In August 2002, the Air Force issued a Depot
Maintenance Strategy and a Depot Maintenance Master Plan covering
fiscal years 2004-2020. These plans provide a roadmap designed to
ensure the continuing viability of Air Force's three military depots to
meet the war-fighter mission needs. However, the plans did not include
the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center. The plans are
intended to posture the Air Force's three other depots to support both
new weapons systems and new technologies entering the inventory, as
well as its aging systems. They have a workforce component, which calls
for new and younger workers to be acquired and trained prior to the
loss of the highly skilled workers who are nearing retirement to
leverage their knowledge and skills. In addition, the Air Force plans
call for an increased capital investment of approximately $150 million
per year over the next 6 fiscal years, starting in fiscal year 2004, to
modernize the Air Force depots. However, key financial elements of the
strategy and plan have changed somewhat since the issuance of the
strategic and master plans. Most significantly, future capital
investment plans, operational improvements, and workforce enhancements
are still evolving and uncertain. For example, according to our
analysis, funds for replacing and modernizing equipment used to
accomplish current workloads are less than projected; funding amounts
and sources for acquiring new capabilities to be provided by weapon
system acquisition programs and the private sector are lagging and
uncertain; and funding is not sufficient to implement initiatives to
improve depot operations and financial systems and for workforce
enhancements.
Services' Efforts to Develop Industrial Workforce Plans
Vary and Generally Lack Some Key Planning Elements:
Strategic workforce planning is intended to focus on developing, by its
definition, long-term human capital strategies that are linked to
achieving key programmatic goals. Strategic workforce planning requires
a strategic plan, and as previously discussed, DOD still has not
developed a depot strategic plan. Thus, the services generally do not
perform strategic workforce planning that is tied to meaningful long-
term visions, objectives, and strategic goals for their services'
military roles and missions. However, in varying degrees, each of the
services performs short-term depot workforce planning that is tied to
the budget preparation process. The services' existing short-term
workforce plans usually do not assess the workforce competencies needed
to address future skill gaps, do not have comprehensive retention
plans, and sometimes lack performance measures to evaluate the
plans--all areas identified as key to successful workforce planning.
Service Depot Workforce Planning Is Largely Short-Term:
Each of the services performs short-term workforce planning that is
tied to the budget process. While largely not strategic in nature, the
services perform most aspects of workforce planning, which in varying
degrees address some elements of workforce planning identified by the
OPM and high-performance organizations. Appendix III provides a
synopsis of the services' short-term depot workforce planning efforts.
Army:
The Army Materiel Command and its subordinate commands are responsible
for determining the work for the Army's five maintenance depots.
Semiannually, they hold workload conferences to review, analyze,
document, and assign work to the depots. Once workload is assigned,
the depots determine the number of employees needed to support the
workload, including (1) direct labor workers who charge time to finite
job taskings; (2) indirect workers, such as shop supervisors and parts
expediters, whose time supports the overall depot maintenance process
rather than finite jobs; and (3) general and administrative overhead
personnel such as production managers, technical specialists, financial
managers, personnel officers, logisticians, contracting officers,
computer programmers, and computer operators. Determining personnel
requirements is an iterative process that begins with the depots and
subordinate commands. The commands use the Army Workload and
Performance System to identify projected workload and the future
staffing requirements based on year-to-year workload changes, known
organizational adjustments, efficiencies such as the Quadrennial
Defense Review, and most efficient organization studies. After
agreement is reached, the proposed staffing levels, which are included
in the consolidated depot budgets, are forwarded for review up the
chain of command. These commands can revise the levels initially
requested based on past performance and other evolving workload and
staffing information. Once the staffing levels are approved, the depots
establish plans and take actions to size and reshape the workforce to
support workload. These actions, in keeping with workforce planning,
include identifying what skills may be lacking to support the workload
and developing hiring plans to recruit new workers; training plans for
new and existing workers to develop and enhance critically needed
skills; or, if staffing levels are low, measures to accomplish the
assigned workload such as increased use of overtime. These plans could
also include reducing the number of depot workers, if the projected
work does not support the number of workers.
Although each of the three arsenals determine their future workload and
estimate future workforce requirements somewhat differently, the
arsenals generally accomplish the task by (1) examining the currently
funded work, (2) requesting customers and prospective customers to
predict their workload for the arsenals for the next 2 to 3 years and
estimating the labor hours and skills to provide the predicted
products, (3) examining historical trends such as unexpected orders
received, (4) discussing workload with their parent organizations, and
(5) developing their workload and workforce requirements. The projected
workload and workforce requirements are reviewed and approved at the
parent organizations using a predictive staffing model to validate the
arsenals' computations. Most arsenals estimate the workload and
workforce requirements for 2 to 3 years in advance, and officials said
their estimates for this time period are generally fairly accurate. The
Watervliet Arsenal in New York estimates its workload for 6 years in
advance, but officials acknowledged that estimates beyond 3 years are
subject to change. However, they believe estimates are generally
reliable.
The Army's two ammunition manufacturing plants' workload generally
comes from their parent organization--the Joint Munitions Command
(formerly Operations Support Command)--based on customer orders.
The orders may come from other services or from commercial
organizations, but the orders are placed through the parent
organization. A predictive staffing model is used to determine the
workforce requirements. Firm orders are usually placed no more than 1
year in advance, and the plants' workloads are generally known from
less than 1 year to 2 years in advance.
Naval Aviation Depots:
The Naval Air Systems Command distributes the annual and future
(2 years) industrial-based workload to the three naval aviation depots.
Once the depots receive the workload, they use historical workload data
and staffing models to determine the civilian manpower requirements
needed to accomplish the assigned workload. The staffing models break
the total workload into the number of workers needed in each shop and
the related trade skills required. These models include historical
factors such as direct labor personnel, leave, and
overtime percentages. The depots then develop the workforce
requirements for the aircraft, engines, and component programs. Once
the requirements are developed, the depots also prepare plans that
include the specific skills, numbers, and types of workers needed in
each production shop. These plans are used to establish hiring,
training, and recruitment efforts at the depots. After the depots
establish the workforce requirements, they are forwarded for review and
approval to the Naval Air Systems Command.
Naval Shipyards:
The Naval Sea Systems Command distributes the workload to the four
shipyards that determine the workforce requirements to accomplish the
planned work. The Naval Sea Systems Command provides the shipyards with
depot maintenance workload for at least 6 years. The shipyards'
workload is predetermined from legislation, the availability of ships,
depot-level maintenance requirements, and the budget. The primary tool
the Naval Sea Systems Command and shipyards use to forecast workloads
and workforces for budgeting and planning purposes is the Workload
and Resource Report, which includes data on the current year and
2 subsequent years. Each shipyard is provided its assigned workload
schedules so they can develop their workload and resource reports for
the workforces of each production shop. As part of the shipyards'
processes for determining the workforce and skills to efficiently
execute the workload, each shipyard uses a resource allocation process.
The resource allocation process determines the right number of workers
with the right skills to efficiently execute the workload. Also, the
shipyards' production shops implement hiring and training plans and
skills assessments to support critical skills that are determined to be
necessary for successful execution of ship maintenance. After the
shipyards' workforce requirements are determined, they are forwarded
for approval to the Naval Sea Systems Command and included in the
command's budget.
The Naval Sea Systems Command also has two warfare centers. Depot
operations at both centers receive annual projected workload
allocations from their prospective customers. The centers use the
annual budget workload forecasts and knowledge of program's future
plans to determine the civilian workforce requirements. Also, civilian
workforce requirements are based on workforce demographics such as
attrition and retirements. The workload allocations combined with
changes in the civilian workforce demographics provide hiring and
training requirements for the centers. The civilian workforce
requirements for the depot operations are forwarded through the centers
for approval and review up the chain of command.
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers:
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has two depot maintenance
activities that are not structured like the other naval depots and
shipyards, where certain types of repairs are directed. Rather, these
centers compete with other depots and repair activities for their
workload. The depot operations' workforce allocations are directly
dependent on the annual workloads they solicit and maintain from
customers such as the Naval Inventory Control Point, other services,
and naval commands. Depot operations at the centers receive annual
workload information from their perspective customers, which are used
to develop civilian workforce requirements. Hiring and training plans
are developed according to the annual civilian depot workforce
requirements. The centers' depot workforce requirements are forwarded
through the centers for approval and review up the chain of command.
Marine Corps:
The Logistics Bases, a subordinate command of the Marine Corps Materiel
Command, is responsible for identifying depot maintenance requirements
and workloading at the Marine Corps' two maintenance depots. Annually,
once depot maintenance requirements and related funding are identified,
the two centers begin the process for determining the total number of
workers to support the workload--including direct labor and indirect
labor workers. The centers send their staffing requests back up the
chain of command for review and approval. Revisions to staffing
requests can occur as a result of the centers past performance, other
evolving workload information, and staffing information. Once the
centers have an approved staffing level, they establish plans and take
actions to size and reshape the workforce to support workload. Such
actions include, among others, identifying skills needed to support the
workload; developing hiring plans to recruit new workers and training
plans for new and existing workers to develop and enhance critically
needed skills; or if staffing levels are reduced, identifying measures
to accomplish the assigned workload such as increased use of overtime;
or, if necessary, reducing the number of depot workers.
Air Force:
In early 2000, the Air Force Materiel Command, which has management and
oversight responsibility for the four Air Force maintenance depots,
developed and institutionalized workforce shaping processes to assist
depot managers in planning and achieving their overall workforce
objective. That objective is to obtain by fiscal year 2005 a trained,
flexible workforce of sufficient size with the appropriate mix of
skills and expertise to accomplish the depot mission. A key aspect of
the command's workforce planning process is the development of
accession or hiring/appointment data. The command requires the depots
to provide annual accession data in order to determine the number of
potential vacancies by job series that each center is likely to
experience in the current and the next 5 fiscal years. The command, in
turn, applies a probability loss model to produce out-year accession
numbers using attrition and retirement rates and other loss data, such
as separations and deaths, for each depot by occupational job series.
The final accession numbers basically become the depots "hiring plan.":
According to depot officials at each center we visited, change in the
mission workloads is just one of many factors used in computing future
accession requirements. They further stated that as a general rule,
projected accessions are based primarily on current workloads and
attrition rates rather than on future workload estimates. According to
these officials, because the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan
does not identify new work to be performed in the depots, they cannot
predict with a high level of confidence what their expected workload
volumes will be more than 2 or 3 years out. Depot officials told us
that their projected accession numbers beyond 2 or 3 years are their
best guess. In addition, the depots annually conduct a bottoms-up
workforce review to ensure that their civilian workforce is the right
size and aligned to meet identified workload requirements. If properly
done, the workforce planning process provides management with the
needed data to make sound workforce decisions from implementing
effective recruitment and retention programs, to developing valuable
training programs, and to arranging for successful accession
management.
Some Depot Workforce Planning Efforts Lack Competency Assessments,
Comprehensive Retention Plans, and Evaluative Performance Measures:
Depot workforce planning, as done by the services' depots, generally
does not address elements of three steps identified by OPM and
high-performing organizations as key to effective workforce planning:
(1) the assessment of competencies needed to address skill gaps;
(2) the development of comprehensive retention plans; and (3) the
implementation of performance measures to evaluate the success of the
workforce plans. Table 1 provides an assessment of the status of
service depots' short-term workforce planning efforts in nine key areas
of the five steps in strategic workforce planning. (See also
appendix III.):
Table 1: Status of Service Depots' Short-Term Workforce
Planning Efforts:
Army:
Service/depot type: Depots; Human capital goals: Yes; Vision &
objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]: [Empty]; Gap analysis: Yes;
Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes; Training plans: Yes; Succession
plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and
adjust: Yes.
Service/depot type: Arsenals; Human capital goals: Yes; Vision &
objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]: [Empty]; Gap analysis: Yes;
Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes; Training plans: Yes; Succession
plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and
adjust: [Empty].
Service/depot type: Ammo; Plants; Human capital goals: Yes; Vision &
objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]: [Empty]; Gap analysis: Yes;
Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes; Training plans: Yes; Succession
plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and
adjust: [Empty].
Navy:
Service/depot type: Aviation; Depots; Human capital goals: Yes; Vision
& objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]: [Empty]; Gap analysis: Yes;
Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes; Training plans: Yes; Succession
plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and
adjust: Yes.
Service/depot type: Shipyards; Human capital goals: Yes; Vision &
objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]: [Empty]; Gap analysis: Yes;
Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes; Training plans: Yes; Succession
plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and
adjust: Yes.
Service/depot type: Naval Surface and Undersea Warfare Centers; Human
capital goals: Yes; Vision & objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]:
Yes[B]; Gap analysis: Yes; Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes;
Training: plans: Yes; Succession plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention
plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and adjust: Yes.
Service/depot type: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers; Human
capital goals: Yes; Vision & objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]:
[Empty]; Gap analysis: Yes; Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes;
Training plans: Yes; Succession plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention
plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and adjust: Yes[C].
Service/depot type: Marine Corps; Human capital goals: Yes; Vision &
objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]: [D]; Gap analysis: Yes;
Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes; Training plans: Yes; Succession
plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and
adjust: Yes.
Service/depot type: Air Force; Human capital goals: Yes; Vision &
objectives: Yes; Assessed Competencies[A]: Yes[B]; Gap analysis: Yes;
Recruiting and/or hiring plans: Yes; Training plans: Yes; Succession
plans: Yes; Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]; Evaluate plans and
adjust: Yes.
Source: DOD (data), GAO (analysis).
Note: Yes Checkmark indicates efforts under way to address elements in
these steps.
[A] All the services and depots assessed their skills to address gaps
relative to the future workforce requirements.
[B] The Naval Surface Warfare Center and the Air Forces' Directorates
of Maintenance at Ogden Air Logistics Center, Oklahoma City Air
Logistics Center, and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center did not assess
competencies.
[C] Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego did not have
performance measures.
[D] The Marine Corps reported that it has an initiative underway to
study establishing competencies and career paths for its logistics and
facilities communities. However, the results of that initiative have
not been published.
[End of table]
Most Depots Did Not Separately Assess Competencies Needed for
the Depot Workforce:
Although one Naval Undersea Warfare Center and the Air Force's
Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center assessed competencies,
most depots have not assessed the competencies--a set of behaviors that
encompass skill, knowledge, abilities, and personal attributes that are
critical to successful work accomplishment;[Footnote 16] competencies
can identify where gaps exist in the skills of the current depot
workforce relative to those needed in the future.
As shown in table 1, most depot officials did not usually separately
assess competencies for depot workers, relying instead on job skills,
series, or classifications. Workforce planning models, however, suggest
that the assessment of competencies provides more than is discussed in
position descriptions. A survey of several top-performing organizations
suggests that a better approach is to conduct an actual assessment of
employees' competency levels. An actual assessment will provide much
more useful information for determining the number of those available
and capable of fulfilling future functional requirements. It can also
give good information as to what recruitment, training, and other
strategies will be needed to address workforce gaps and surpluses.
Workforce planning models point out the need for identifying
competencies. For example, the required competencies identified for
GAO analysts include, among others, thinking critically, improving
professional competence, achieving results, collaborating with others,
and facilitating and implementing change. According to the state of
Washington's Workforce Planning Guide, competencies provide management
and staff with a common understanding of the skills and behaviors that
are important to the organization and the accomplishment of
its mission.
Although most depots did not assess competencies separately for their
depot workers, a couple of depots did competency assessments, with one
depot doing competency assessments for its entire workforce and one
doing an assessment for only a segment of its workforce. The Naval
Undersea Warfare Center identified the following competencies in its
assessment: innovative thinking, situational leadership, managing a
diverse workforce, conflict management, interpersonal/team skills,
technical competence, problem solving, and oral and written
communications. According to warfare center personnel, these attributes
are critical to the successful achievement of its mission and goals.
Additionally, the Air Force's Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration
Center developed a supervisor's needs assessment that identified
supervisor competencies. They included integrity, communication,
listening, empowering others, accepting responsibility, planning,
being a team player, dependability, consistency, fairness, and
effective prioritization. These competencies resulted in the
development of a core-training curriculum for supervisors.
Services Lack Comprehensive Retention Plans:
Although all of the services had some retention strategies to ensure
continuity of leadership and for keeping high performing and highly
skilled personnel, none have comprehensive retention plans to further
enhance these strategies.
According to OPM, an important principle behind maintaining a quality
workforce is employee retention. A critical analysis of workforce
trends is essential to determine what factors most affect retention.
Current workforce research has identified the following factors as
being critical to enhancing the retention necessary for the
construction of a high performance organization: diversity, career
development and advancement, work life balance, recognition, employee
benefits, and performance. Furthermore, OPM's 5-Step Workforce
Planning Model states that a comprehensive retention plan should:
* determine those employees who are critical to accomplishment of
organizational goals,
* develop a means to provide constant feedback between these critical
employees, and supervisors/managers to determine what they want and
need to become long-term assets of the organization, and:
* develop a means of providing incentives and/or working conditions
designed to retain valued employees.
Most activities we evaluated had developed a means of providing
incentives designed to retain valued employees. However, only the Air
Force identified a separate list of occupations critical to
accomplishment of organizational goals, with most depots reporting that
every employee was critical. Overall, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center
and Navy shipyards were further along in developing their retention
plans.
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Keyport, Washington, developed
a personnel retention program that includes its depot workforce,
concentrating on (1) work and job design, (2) career progression,
(3) awards and compensation, and (4) quality of life. The center
developed the retention program to make the center a great place to
work. For example, the center has reinstituted new hire briefings,
developed an employee handbook, and initiated an improvement award
program to provide incentives to employees to submit new ideas for
process improvement.
The Navy's shipyard retention strategies focus on bonuses, helper-to-
worker programs, recognition programs, employment development and
career opportunities, and leadership training. For example, the
shipyards' helper-to-worker programs include, among other things,
academics and trade theory training. Also, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
has used retention incentives to pay up to 25 percent of salary to
retain approximately 30 employees who possessed engineering and
technical knowledge that was critical to the shipyard's success.
Meanwhile, an Air Force depot lost 8 of 12 workers in a shop because
the highly skilled software engineers were disgruntled over not being
able to get higher pay, even though their skills were critical,
required years to acquire, and were and are not widely available.
Some Service Depots Lacked Performance Measures for Evaluating
Workforce Plans:
Although workforce planning models emphasize the need for establishing
performance measures to provide a basis for evaluating workforce
planning effectiveness, the workforce plans of some service depots did
not have this element.
The Government Performance and Results Act stresses the need for
establishing and using performance measures. Additionally, OPM's 5-Step
Workforce Planning Model as well as some state and federal agencies
stress the importance of measuring the effectiveness of workforce
action plans as an element of effective workforce planning. Measuring
performance allows organizations to track the progress they are making
toward their goals and gives managers crucial information on which
to base their organizational and management decisions. Leading
organizations recognize that performance measures can create powerful
incentives to influence organizational and individual behavior.
According to the workforce planning guide of one high performance
organization, leaders should regularly review performance measurement
information, assess what is working and not working, and make needed
adjustments to the plan and strategies.
The Air Force depots and the naval shipyard communities did establish
measures for evaluating the effectiveness of their workforce planning
efforts. In April 2001, the Air Force Materiel Command issued a command
wide Human Resources Strategic Plan that addressed critical workforce
issues for depot maintenance workers as well as all other materiel
command personnel. The plan contained, among other things, performance
measures and milestones for each human-resource enabling task. For
example, it identified various performance measures for the
task "Develop and Implement Methods to Attract and Recruit High-quality
Employees." They included, among others, determining whether milestones
had been completed on time and whether appropriate actions had been
taken after analysis of data from new employees' entrance surveys.
The Naval Sea Systems Command also developed performance measures for
evaluating the effectiveness of workforce plans for Navy shipyard
personnel. Performance measures for the Navy's shipyards include, among
others, measuring the success of the hiring process by comparing actual
to planned hires. Also, shipyards track the average age to determine
whether the effect of workforce plans is lowering the average age of
the overall shipyards' workforce. Furthermore, evaluations of
shipyards' training plans include post training evaluations and review
of the budgeted training funds expended.
Some Army depots and arsenals and one naval depot have not established
performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of workforce
plans. Army and Navy officials said they did not develop such
performance measures because their focus was on various business
metrics that assessed the cost, schedule, and performance of their
depot operations. However, while those metrics provide details about
depot operations and worker productivity, they provide little insight
into the progress being made toward achieving workforce goals and
objectives.
Performance measures are an important element of workforce planning.
Without establishing and using performance measures, managers will
likely not be able either to evaluate the progress made toward the
attainment of workforce planning goals relative to recruiting, hiring,
training, retention, and succession or to measure the workforce's
contribution toward achieving programmatic goals.
A Number of Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic Workforce Planning:
The services' depots face a number of challenges that adversely affect
DOD's strategic workforce planning for the viability of its civilian
workforce. First, the services may have difficulty maintaining the
depots' long-term viability by replacing up to 31,000 skilled depot
workers, if these workers retire when they are eligible by 2009.
Second, the services are having difficulty implementing multiskilling-
-having one worker capable of performing more than one skill, or trade,
in the depot--which has been shown to improve worker efficiency and
productivity and could help the depots do more with less. The Navy and
the Air Force have attempted to implement multiskilling but are having
difficulty because additional compensation or other financial
incentives have not been approved or are not available. Lastly, the
need for increased training funding and innovation for workers who
replace the large number of potential retirees will also pose a
challenge. The Air Force is already facing unfunded training costs for
its depot workers.
Difficulty Maintaining Depot Viability if Large Numbers of Eligible
Skilled Workers Retire:
As a result of depot downsizing, the DOD civilian depot workforce has
about 31,000 personnel eligible to retire over the next 5 to 7
years.[Footnote 17] This creates a challenge for the depots in
retaining their viability, assisting service readiness, and
revitalizing their workforces.
Table 2 provides age and retirement eligibility information for the
27 DOD industrial facilities. The average age ranges from 44 in the
McAlester, Oklahoma, ammunition plant and 45 in three naval shipyards
(where officials have actively worked to lower the average age), to 52
in the San Diego Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center and the Air
Force's Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center. In Army
maintenance depots, where the average age is 49, depot officials said
it is difficult to bring down the average age because there are not
many new hires and some of those hired tend to be older employees.
Table 2: Civilian Personnel in Industrial Facilities Eligible to
Retire:
Defense industrial facilities: Navy depots:
Defense industrial facilities: Cherry Point Aviation Depot; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 3,839; Average: age: 46; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 99; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 24; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 34.
Defense industrial facilities: Jacksonville Aviation Depot; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 3,928; Average: age: 48; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 133; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 27; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 37.
Defense industrial facilities: North Island Aviation Depot; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 3,138; Average: age: 49; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 109; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 31; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 43.
Defense industrial facilities: Norfolk Naval Shipyard; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 7,525; Average: age: 45; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 527; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 27; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 38.
Defense industrial facilities: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 3,500; Average: age: 46; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 251; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 30; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 41.
Defense industrial facilities: Puget Sound Naval Shipyard; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 8,608; Average: age: 45; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 676; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 28; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 38.
Defense industrial facilities: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 3,987; Average: age: 45; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 122; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 27; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 38.
Defense industrial facilities: Crane Naval Surface Warfare Center[A];
FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 311; Average: age: 45; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 10; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 32; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 40.
Defense industrial facilities: Keyport Naval Undersea Warfare Center;
FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 608; Average: age: 48; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 26; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 41; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 55.
Defense industrial facilities: Charleston Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center; FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 49; Average: age:
51; Number of civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 5; Percent:
eligible to retire by FY 2007: 47; Percent eligible to retire by
FY 2009: 59.
Defense industrial facilities: San Diego Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center; FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 70; Average: age:
52; Number of civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 1; Percent:
eligible to retire by FY 2007: 43; Percent eligible to retire by
FY 2009: 47.
Defense industrial facilities: Total Navy; FY 2002: civilian: staffing:
levels: 35,563; Average: age: [Empty]; Number of civilians: eligible to
retire: in FY 2002: 1,959; Percent: eligible to retire by FY 2007:
[Empty]; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: [Empty].
Defense industrial facilities: Army facilities[B]:
Defense industrial facilities: Anniston Army Depot; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 2,429; Average: age: 48; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 408; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: 48; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 60.
Defense industrial facilities: Corpus Christi Army Depot; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 2,869; Average: age: 49; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 223; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 22; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 27.
Defense industrial facilities: Letterkenny Army Depot; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 1,082; Average: age: 49; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 147; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 46; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 59.
Defense industrial facilities: Red River Army Depot; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 1,478; Average: age: 48; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 203; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: 42; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 55.
Defense industrial facilities: Tobyhanna Army Depot; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 2,237; Average: age: 49; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 502; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: 58; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 72.
Defense industrial facilities: Rock Island Arsenal; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 1,156; Average: age: 50; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 82; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: 36; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 41.
Defense industrial facilities: Watervliet Arsenal; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 484; Average: age: 50; Number of civilians: eligible
to retire: in FY 2002: 28; Percent: eligible to retire by FY 2007: 42;
Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 61.
Defense industrial facilities: Pine Bluff Arsenal; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 804; Average: age: 49; Number of civilians: eligible
to retire: in FY 2002: 89; Percent: eligible to retire by FY 2007: 43;
Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 63.
Defense industrial facilities: Crane Army Ammunition Activity; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 620; Average: age: 49; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 181; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: 49; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 60.
Defense industrial facilities: McAlester Army Ammunition Plant; FY
2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 1,075; Average: age: 44; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 226; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 30; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 48.
Defense industrial facilities: Total Army; FY 2002: civilian: staffing:
levels: 14,234; Average: age: [Empty]; Number of civilians: eligible to
retire: in FY 2002: 2,089; Percent: eligible to retire by FY 2007:
[Empty]; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: [Empty].
Defense industrial facilities: Marine Corps depots:
Defense industrial facilities: Maintenance Center Albany; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 659; Average: age: 48; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 128; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: 47; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 64.
Defense industrial facilities: Maintenance Center Barstow; FY 2002:
civilian: staffing: levels: 664; Average: age: 47; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 118; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: 43; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 56.
Defense industrial facilities: Total Marine Corps; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 1,323; Average: age: [Empty]; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 246; Percent: eligible to retire by FY
2007: [Empty]; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: [Empty].
Defense industrial facilities: Air Force depots[C]:
Defense industrial facilities: Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration
Center; FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 439; Average: age: 52;
Number of civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 139; Percent:
eligible to retire by FY 2007: 65; Percent eligible to retire by
FY 2009: 77.
Defense industrial facilities: Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden ALC;
FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 5,852; Average: age: 47; Number of
civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 1,015; Percent: eligible to
retire by FY 2007: 39; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 49.
Defense industrial facilities: Directorate of Maintenance, Oklahoma
City ALC; FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 8,533; Average: age: 45;
Number of civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 1,167; Percent:
eligible to retire by FY 2007: 33; Percent eligible to retire by
FY 2009: 41.
Defense industrial facilities: Directorate of Maintenance, Warner
Robins ALC; FY 2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 6,328; Average: age:
45; Number of civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 988; Percent:
eligible to retire by FY 2007: 33; Percent eligible to retire by
FY 2009: 41.
Defense industrial facilities: Total Air Force; FY 2002: civilian:
staffing: levels: 21,152; Average: age: [Empty]; Number of civilians:
eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 3,309; Percent: eligible to retire by
FY 2007: [Empty]; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: [Empty].
Defense industrial facilities: Total Defense industrial facilities; FY
2002: civilian: staffing: levels: 72,272; Average: age: 48[D]; Number
of civilians: eligible to retire: in FY 2002: 7,603; Percent: eligible
to retire by FY 2007: 33; Percent eligible to retire by FY 2009: 43.
Source: DOD (data), GAO (presentation).
[A] Staffing level as of November 2001.
[B] Army industrial facilities include depots, arsenals and government-
owned and-operated ammunition plants.
[C] Air Force data as of September 30, 2001.
[D] Total weighted average age based on the number of civilian staff at
each industrial facility.
[End of table]
As table 2 shows, about 7,600 employees in these activities--about
12 percent of the total workforce--were eligible to retire in fiscal
year 2002. However, depot officials told us they cannot hire
replacement workers until the vacancies occur. Given that years of
experience are required to get the average worker to a journeyman
level, these officials are concerned about the impact on depot
operations of trying to replace large numbers of workers during a short
time period. This situation will be aggravated during the next few
years as the number of workers eligible to retire increases
significantly. For example, the percent eligible to retire by fiscal
year 2007 ranges from a low of 22 in one Army depot and 24 in one naval
aviation depot to a high of 65 percent at one Air Force depot and 58 at
one Army depot. In 2009, 77 percent of the workers will be eligible
to retire at one Air Force depot, 72 percent at one Army depot, and
64 percent in one Marine Corps depot.
Air Force officials said they expect to hire 13,000 depot workers by
September 2009 to replace retiring workers. They expect to encounter
difficulties during that process, similar to those they experienced
when they hired approximately 4,500 workers during the last 2 years
(primarily as a result of Base Realignment and Closures and transfers).
Those difficulties included the following:
* engineering positions were particularly difficult to fill, and the
use of pay incentives to increase salary levels of engineers and other
hard-to-fill positions was essential;
* some qualified and desirable potential employees went elsewhere
because the hiring process took too long;
* new hires were not "shop ready" when they come in the door and needed
additional training; and:
* more supervisors are needed to manage the new workers.
According to officials at the Air Force's Directorate of Maintenance,
Ogden Air Logistics Center, workers in one software engineering shop
became discouraged at not getting additional pay and 8 out of 12 quit
and went to work for a local contractor. Unable to fill these highly
skilled positions or otherwise get the work accomplished in the depot,
the depot hired the contractor to do the work formerly done in the
depot at a considerably higher cost than was incurred when the work was
done in the depot.
Army officials noted that a higher average age does not necessarily
equate to high retirement eligibility. For example, workers at the
Corpus Christi depot have an average age of 49, but the number of
workers eligible to retire by 2009 is 27 percent--the lowest of any
depot. According to Corpus Christi depot officials, during the mid-
1980s they hired about 1,700 workers in their mid-30s, many of which
were ex-military. Additionally, Army officials noted that many depot
workers continue to work after they are eligible to retire.
Nonetheless, Army depot officials recognize that with about 52 percent
of the depot workforce eligible to retire by 2009, it will be difficult
to maintain a viable, trained workforce if the retirement eligible
employees choose to retire over a short period of time.
We analyzed Army retirement eligibility data for the Army depot
workforce and observed that some work centers could lose a majority
of their staff within the next 5 years. Depot officials acknowledged
that some work centers are at risk if all or most of the workers leave
during a short period of time and that realignments, or job transfers,
are needed to make sure a large number of retirement eligible employees
are not assigned to any one area. However, the depots have limited
plans to deal with this situation. They said they cannot hire
replacement workers until after an employee retires. Additionally,
transfers to balance retirement eligible employees could be unwelcomed
by personnel and could have an adverse impact on shop productivity, as
workers require time to gain skills in new areas. It will be a major
challenge to balance such concerns about current operational impacts
and increased training now against longer term concerns about
retirement eligibility over the next 5 to 7 years. However, the depots
are generally not making such analyses and trade-offs.
According to Marine Corps depot officials, attrition rates are low and
the centers have hired few new permanent employees. However,
the percent of employees eligible to retire will increase from 43 and
47 percent in 2007 to 56 and 64 percent in 2009. Officials said it
would be difficult to bring on such large numbers of new workers if
these retirement-eligible personnel do retire about the same time.
However, the centers' workload has declined significantly in the past.
Systems that used to comprise the bulk of the centers' work are phasing
out of the inventory, and questions remain about whether replacement
systems will be maintained in the Marine Corps depots or the private
sector. Officials acknowledged that it is difficult to plan for the
revitalization of the center workforce without knowing what work will
be available for them to do.
An aging workforce has some advantages--particularly when the workload
is relatively stable over time. Officials pointed out that as DOD was
downsizing its depot workforce and doing no new hiring, there were
fewer demands for training programs. About half of the depots
have apprenticeship programs, which are the most comprehensive and
expensive type of training for industrial workers. Some of these
programs have been re-established in the past few years. Nonetheless,
according to depot officials, it would be unaffordable to hire enough
apprentices to replace the large numbers of workers who will be
eligible to retire over the next 5 to 7 years.
Difficulty Implementing Multiskilling Even Though It Could Improve
Worker Efficiency and Productivity:
The services are having difficulty implementing or are not trying to
implement multiskilling--a private-sector initiative designed to
improve the flexibility, efficiency, and productivity of workers.
Multiskilling is the process of training maintenance employees in
specific skills that cross the traditional trade or craft lines and
then ensuring the work is performed. It involves reviewing work
processes to identify situations where efficiency and productivity can
be enhanced by training workers in one skill area or occupational
series to perform some tasks in another occupational series. A major
advantage of multiskilling is that particular jobs that require more
than one craft--not necessarily more than one individual--can be
performed by fewer personnel. It can reduce the time it takes to
perform jobs involving multiple skill requirements by eliminating the
time a depot worker must wait for another worker to arrive and perform
a task that the first worker is not trained to do. For example, an
aviation mechanic trained in certain electrical tasks can reduce the
times an electrician must be called when doing aircraft repair.
In a 1998 review of Army industrial facilities we pointed out
inefficiencies in the depots and arsenals and stated that improved
systems and procedures for shifting maintenance workers between
different organizational units and skill areas would offer better
opportunities to effectively use limited numbers of maintenance
personnel.[Footnote 18] Depot officials had noted that prior practices
made it difficult to transfer workers between organizational units and
skill areas to adjust for unanticipated work stoppages caused by
changes in work priorities, parts shortages, technical problems, or
temporary labor imbalances. We pointed out that multiskilled workers
offered added flexibility and could allow depot managers to use a
limited number of workers more cost effectively. We recommended that
the Secretary of the Army encourage depot managers to pursue worker
agreements to facilitate multiskilling in industrial facilities.
Although the Army has not been successful in implementing
multiskilling, this initiative remains a goal Army depot planners would
like to pursue.
In recent years, the naval aviation community has done the most to
begin using multiskilling as a depot improvement initiative, but full
project implementation has been delayed because they have not been
given permission to allow an additional pay grade for workers having
more than one skill. Although the Air Force first tried multiskilling
in 1993 and its current depot improvement initiative calls for
determining cost effective ways to implement multiskilling, the Air
Force's multiskilling initiative is also floundering. In addition,
although service, depot, and other officials attribute improved
workforce flexibility and cost-effectiveness to multiskilling, Army
depots and Marine Corps centers and Navy shipyards are not implementing
it.
Naval Aviation Multiskill Efforts Are Delayed:
The naval aviation community has attempted to implement multiskilling
since 1999. Although its current request to pilot a multiskilling
demonstration project to use a certain compensation system had not been
approved as of March 2003, the community is implementing the pilot with
an alternative compensation approach.
As a result of an extensive business process reengineering project
completed in 2002, the Naval Air Systems Command identified
multiskilling as a solution to achieve a more flexible workforce. The
program is intended to provide a more flexible, multitraded, trained
workforce that could react more quickly to fluctuating workloads
because managers can reassign employees based on workload demands.
According to naval aviation managers, a multiskilled worker could be
particularly cost-effective when depot workers go to the weapon system
in the field rather than bringing the weapon to the depot. For example,
a worker trained as both a pneudraulic systems mechanic and an aircraft
engine mechanic could be sent to an operational location to accomplish
the work that previously required workers trained in each of these
skills. As a result, cost reductions should occur in field team
assignments, which comprise an increasing share of Navy aviation
depots' work.
The naval aviation community's current multiskilling initiative used a
business case analysis to justify a demonstration project that would
provide training for workers who are at the journeyman level in one
skill, such as a sheet metal mechanic, to attain journeyman status in a
second trade, such as an aircraft mechanic. The project called for
compensating the workers involved by increasing their pay by an
additional wage grade.[Footnote 19] According to Naval Air Systems
Command officials, the economic analysis indicated savings could be
achieved even though the workers would receive increased compensation.
Increased throughput is expected to result in efficiencies of up to
20 percent due to redirected travel savings and increases in volume
efficiencies. This same business case analysis indicated that during a
single year one depot could potentially accomplish 519 additional
maintenance tasks for the same amount of budget. According to depot
planners, private sector workers receive increased compensation under
similar circumstances, and union officials believe government workers
should also.
However, OPM's Job Grading Standards do not contemplate providing
compensation for an additional grade for two equal trades. OPM's job
grading standards state that pay is based on the highest level of work
performed, regardless of how many different trades an employee is
required to perform. According to Naval Air Systems Command officials,
OPM's standard inhibits their ability to pursue multiskilling
initiatives and achieve reengineering efficiencies.
The Naval Air Systems Command sought permission to go to OPM to request
a demonstration project with additional compensation in September 2000;
but Headquarters, Department of the Navy disapproved the request. Based
on the results of the 2002 business case analysis, which showed that
the multiskill concept would increase readiness by providing a more
flexible and well-trained workforce, in September 2002 the naval
aviation community again sought approval for the proposed demonstration
project, including increased compensation.
Navy headquarters has not yet approved the request, but aviation
depot officials are going forward with the project using an alternative
compensation approach. They have established a compensation award
at each site, not to exceed a $2,500 annual award. Five different skill
combinations have been proposed for the Cherry Point Depot and two for
the Jacksonville depot. One combination has begun at the North Island
depot. According to naval aviation officials, workers are reluctant to
participate because while in training they would not have the
opportunity for overtime pay. Officials believe that getting an
additional grade would be sufficient to increase the willingness of
depot workers to participate--a goal that is likely critical to getting
the program to sufficient numbers to make it cost-effective.
Air Force Multiskilling Program Is Older but Declining:
Although the Air Force's current depot maintenance improvement effort
calls for determining cost effective ways to implement multiskilling,
officials are generally supportive of it as a workload tool; however,
the Air Force's multiskilling program is declining in size. In 1993,
the Air Force Materiel Command prototyped a multiskilling concept using
aircraft mechanics at the Oklahoma City depot. The program involved
training and certifying mechanics in multiple skills (aircraft, sheet
metal, and electrical) that were capable of performing a series of
tasks involving general airframe, structural, and electrical
maintenance. By 1997, the program had over 100 participants. However,
since then, depot officials told us the program has lost its popularity
and currently consists of only 49 participants. Officials said that due
to production requirements, many of the skilled workers participating
in the original project are now working in their primary skill and new
hires show little interest because there are no financial incentives.
At the Warner Robins depot, officials designated a specific occupation
job series, 8801, as multiskilling to provide workers with greater job
flexibility and a better career path. As of September 2001, 148 workers
were functioning in this job series. Multiskilled workers primarily
performed tasks in two occupations, such as aircraft mechanic and
electrical mechanic or aircraft mechanic and sheet metal mechanic.
According to depot officials, they used this occupational job series as
a hiring tool to attract younger, multiskilled workers at the entry
level. However, workers did not receive any additional salary.
As a part of its depot maintenance improvement efforts, the Air Force
has refocused on multiskilling. Officials conducted a business case
analysis to determine the feasibility of various opportunities for
using multiskilling at the depots. After several months of data
gathering and analysis, officials said they were not able to provide a
strong business case for developing a standardized approach or
expanding the use of multiskilling at the depots. We found that, except
in very limited cases, the depots are not doing true multiskilling
today. Rather, the depots are doing something similar called
multicrafting that does not involve the combination of two or more
skills at the journeyman skill level. Despite the results of the
business case analysis, officials from Headquarters, Air Force Materiel
Command, and the depots were generally supportive of multiskilling as a
tool to deal with fluctuating homogenous workloads and to facilitate
movement of employees as workload demands fluctuate.
Multiskilling Is Cited as Improving Flexibility and Cost-Effectiveness
of Depot and Other Workforces:
Service, depot, and other organization officials cite the multiskilling
concept as a way to provide a more flexible, productive workforce that
can react more quickly to fluctuating workloads, a key issue in trying
to improve the cost-effectiveness of maintenance operations as well as
meet readiness needs.
According to officials of the Naval Air Systems Command, the extensive
business case analysis they conducted indicated that multiskilling will
provide a trained workforce, more flexible for increased readiness, and
more capable of being able to be reassigned on demand to better support
fluctuating workloads. The officials also indicated that a
multiskilling program could also better support readiness by serving as
an incentive to skilled, near-retirement workers to stay and provide
on-the-job training for younger workers. In addition, depot officials
reported, on the basis of the economic analysis that savings would be
achieved even though workers would receive increased compensation.
Various organizations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority are
exempt from OPM's job grading standards and are allowed to establish
a classification system that is more flexible and better fits their
environment. Among the flexibilities the Tennessee Valley Authority
has implemented is a multiskilled work force that receives additional
compensation for additional skills and work. The Tennessee Valley
Authority's program will involve about 1,400 current employees as well
as new hires. According to Authority officials, multiskilling is
improving the flexibility and efficiency of the workforce. As North
America's largest public power company, the Tennessee Valley Authority
developed its union agreements on multiskilling in fiscal year 2000 and
fully implemented its pilot program by the end of fiscal year 2001,
with the program expected to be fully implemented by 2005. The plan is
to review all preventive maintenance activities and reassign them to
utilize multiskill employees. Authority officials said that the
multiskilling training program is resulting in a more efficient way to
accomplish their work and to obtain and maintain a versatile group of
employees. They reported that increases in productivity and efficiency
were expected to reduce restaffing after attrition by about 15 percent.
Private sector industrial activities have also implemented
multiskilling. According to Naval Air Systems Command and Air Force
officials, they did benchmarking in the private sector before they
began trying to put together their own multiskilling programs. Navy
depot officials also noted that they see increased usage of this
concept when they do private sector wage grade comparability studies.
Need for Increased Funding and Innovation Driven by Increased
Training Requirements:
Based on the potential retirement of about 31,000 depot workers out of
the approximately 72,000 workers in the workforce eligible to retire by
2009, training requirements will increase significantly for new hires,
and innovation will be required to develop more cost-effective training
alternatives. For over 10 years, most depots had training costs much
smaller than would normally be required for industrial activities since
depot downsizing resulted in hiring few new employees. However, because
the Air Force currently has a significant deficit in funding training
for new hires and refresher training, depot officials raised concerns
over their ability to fund future training requirements needed for
workforce revitalization. Furthermore, as the depots face the challenge
of developing and implementing plans to address skill imbalances
occurring due to attrition and retirement over the next 5 to 7 years,
the need for increased funding will likely drive the need to find new
funding sources and to develop innovative training programs that cost
less.
The Air Force is already challenged by unfunded training costs. Air
Force workers who had received little training for years were required
to take "back-to-basics training." This came about after accidents
occurred at two depots and additional training requirements evolved
from the personnel changes resulting from closing two Air Force depots
and transferring their work to other locations. However, although
training requirements increased, training budgets have not kept pace.
For example, when Air Force Materiel Command depot managers requested
$10 million in 2001 to train first-line supervisors, the Command did
not approve any of that funding. And when managers requested
$11.5 million for budget years 2002 to 2007 to provide added training
for new workers, the Command only funded a portion of that request.
Lacking sufficient training dollars to fund their requirements, Air
Force depot managers have been seeking ways to partner with state
government programs. Partnering with the states to develop training
programs and curriculum for co-op students at high schools, vocational
technical colleges, and universities was a cost-effective strategy that
enabled depots to hire certified and credentialed workers to replace
retirees. For example, the Warner Robins and Oklahoma City depots are
working primarily with the states of Georgia and Oklahoma to establish
training programs with local community colleges and high schools so
that new hires will be trained and certified as Federal Aviation
Association Aircraft and Power Plant license holders. Each of the Air
Force depots is developing courses to groom the next generation of
leaders and managers. But according to depot planners, much more needs
to be done and where the funding is to come from is unclear. This is
particularly true as the Air Force plans for the potential retirement
of 43 to 52 percent of its depot workforce over the next 5 to 7 years.
The other service depots are also experiencing challenges in funding
training as they begin to hire new employees after years of downsizing.
About half of the depots provide new industrial workers with training
through apprentice programs. The Air Force and one Marine Corps
center are using cooperative education programs, because they believe
apprenticeship programs, which take 3 to 4 years to qualify workers for
becoming journeymen-level workers, are too expensive. The Army Materiel
Command estimated that $7.9 million was needed to sustain
79 apprentices already in the program and to add 50 additional
apprentices for fiscal year 2002, or about $55,000 for each apprentice.
However, the Command did not receive this level of funding, which
caused the Command to transfer the costs to the depots as a cost of
their operations. Army Materiel Command reported that it has requested
additional funding for the apprentice program to support an average of
184 apprentices each year for the 7-year period, fiscal years 2003
through 2009. Army depot officials said that the program was too small
in number to significantly impact future worker needs. In addition,
without the Army directly funding the program costs; customers pay for
depot services will increase, which could lead to a loss of customer
support. Two of the five Army maintenance depots decided that no
additional apprentices will be accepted into the apprenticeship program
unless the program can be directly funded.
In confronting the human capital challenge of revitalizing the depot
workforce, the services have the opportunity to develop innovative
training programs that cost less and to identify new funding sources
for training. According to Navy and Air Force officials, centralized
training programs and centralized funding could be considered cost-
effective ways to support depot revitalization. Officials also noted
that centralized training programs would help ensure consistency in the
quality of training provided to depot workers. Also, centralized
funding would be another source of funding and would provide
centralized oversight and accountability over how the funds are
disbursed.
Conclusions:
Continued shortfalls in DOD's strategic planning process, including the
lack of a DOD depot strategic plan and a strategic plan for arsenals
and ammunition facilities have created questions regarding the future
of the 72,000 civilians in the depot maintenance, arsenal, and
ammunition manufacturing plant workforce and their ability to support
future military operations. Without a strategic perspective that
complements the department's overall mission and objectives, the
services do not have the long-term visibility they need to ensure the
continued performance of these important support missions. When this is
coupled with DOD's adoption of increased contracting of work to the
private sector, the future role of these industrial facilities and
their workforce is clearly in doubt. The situation is compounded by
questions regarding DOD's implementation of the core maintenance
statute, which is an essential feature in defining the depot workforce
of the future. While in some cases the services have made a start at
defining future objectives for the industrial facilities that are
centered around the development of public-private partnerships, it is
unclear how these partnerships should be folded into future industrial
facilities planning. Further, without a departmental approach that has
been approved by the Congress, future depot planning will continue to
be fragmented, inconclusive, and inefficient. Since we have previously
recommended that DOD develop a depot strategic plan, we are not
repeating that recommendation in this report. However, we continue to
believe a depot strategic plan is needed and we will continue to follow
DOD's progress toward implementing one.
The absence of strategic guidance regarding the future of the DOD
industrial facilities has generally prevented the development of
comprehensive strategic workforce plans that are required for
effectively managing DOD's 72,000 civilian industrial facilities
workers to meet the challenges of the future. For example, without
having long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining
their workforce that are clearly linked to achieving programmatic
goals, the services continued to downsize these activities without a
vision for what capabilities would be required in the future. The
result of downsizing is that the remaining depot maintenance workforce
averages 47 years of age and has skill imbalances. With workload in
some activities continuing to decline and with uncertainties about new
work for the future, officials in depots, arsenals, and ammunition
plants are uncertain whether they should plan to replace retiring
workers and about what skills will be needed in the future.
Furthermore, the industrial planners, in their short-term planning,
have followed some but not all of the steps identified by OPM and high
performing organizations, with the naval shipyard community and
Air Force more comprehensive in their workforce planning approaches.
However, the planners, have not, in general, identified competencies,
developed comprehensive retention plans, or evaluated the performance
of workforce planning efforts and taken corrective actions--all best
practices that could help depots more effectively meet current and
future challenges.
A number of challenges confront DOD's workforce planning for the
revitalization of this industrial workforce, about 12 percent of which
are eligible to retire in fiscal year 2002 and about 43 percent of
which will be eligible to retire by 2009. First, workforce planning
efforts, which are generally focused on the short-term, do not address
the potential loss of a third to over 40 percent of the depot workforce
over a short period of time, a challenge that could threaten the
depots' viability. Only the Air Force has taken action to ensure the
continued viability of its depots in 2007 and beyond. Secondly, the
current occupational series may not be the best to most efficiently
perform required maintenance operations. Multiskilling, which has been
successfully implemented in the private sector and in some government
activities, has flexibilities unavailable to most government
activities. However, depot activities trying to implement the
flexibilities have been confronted by rules that do not allow providing
an additional grade for performing work in additional skill areas.
While the naval aviation community is trying an approach that would use
a bonus rather than additional pay, naval aviation officials believe
the additional flexibilities are still needed. We also believe that if
it proves to be cost-effective, the full option of providing an
additional grade would help ensure the greatest potential for success.
Finally, with the large number of workers eligible to retire by 2009,
training requirements and funding for training will increase
significantly for new hires. Further, the need for increased funding
for training will likely drive the need to find new funding sources and
to develop cost-effective training programs. A centralized DOD depot
training program could be a very practicable way to introduce more
innovative and cost-effective approaches to producing and funding the
required training to support depot revitalization, if the department
intends to continue using the depots as an important part of its
industrial base.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the management and direction of DOD's strategic planning for
maintenance depots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel
Readiness to:
* complete the revisions to DOD's core policy and develop a schedule
for the services to complete the computation of core requirements;
* require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to develop revised core capabilities to provide a baseline for
defining workloads that should be performed in government facilities by
government personnel; and:
* require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to develop, or complete the development of, and implement
strategic plans that are linked to the services' mission and objectives
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense's depot strategic plan when
it is developed and that delineate industrial workloads to be
accomplished in each service's depots, other service's depots, by
contractors at their own sites and at government sites and using
partnerships and identify the workforce requirements to support the
performance of this work.
To improve the management and strategic direction of DOD's strategic
planning for arsenals and ammunition plants, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense require the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to develop a strategic plan that
provides guidance and a schedule for identifying long-term capabilities
to be provided by the private sector, those to be provided in
government-owned and -operated plants; and those to be provided in
government-owned and contractor-operated plants.
To improve the quality and comprehensiveness of the services' workforce
planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of the services and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps develop strategic workforce plans
that include improvements in areas identified in this report as being
deficient, such as assessing workforce competencies required for the
current and future workforce; implementing action plans that include
comprehensive retention plans; and establishing performance metrics to
use in evaluating workforce planning efforts and a mechanism for
performing assessments of prior workforce planning efforts. The
strategic workforce plans should be linked to DOD's strategic plan for
depot maintenance and the strategic plan for arsenals and ammunition
plants when they are developed.
To improve DOD's strategic workforce planning to ensure the viability
of its depot maintenance workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, in coordination with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, to coordinate the implementation
of an initiative to:
* provide guidance for developing workforce revitalization strategies
and strategic plans to address expected depot attrition over the next 5
to 7 years;
* provide options for incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce
planning initiatives; and:
* implement a working group to explore options for innovative and cost-
effective training and to explore appropriate funding alternatives, to
include centralized funding, to revitalize the depot workforce.
Given the difficulties the Department of Defense is having implementing
multiskilling and its potential for improving the flexibility and
productivity of the department's maintenance workforce, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness to implement a demonstration project that
would give the military depots the flexibility to provide additional
compensation for multiskilled depot workers when the services have
demonstrated by a cost-benefit analysis the benefits of such a program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of Defense reviewed a draft of this report and provided
oral comments from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness. The department concurred with seven of our
nine recommendations dealing with the need for completion of the
identification of core depot maintenance requirements and capabilities
and for improved strategic planning and workforce planning for depots,
arsenals, and ammunition plants. The department did not concur with our
recommendation to implement a working group to explore (1) options
for innovative and cost-effective training and (2) appropriate funding
alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce. Also, the
department did not concur with our recommendation to implement a
demonstration project for multiskilling.
The department's comments noted that the importance of human capital
strategic planning was clearly recognized in the Quadrennial Defense
Review, is the first item on the President's Management Agenda, and is
a top priority for the department. Further, in early 2003, the
department published its FY 2003 Year of Execution Plan as an Annex to
the integrated DOD Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan, and focuses
on seven goals to direct and improve all aspects of human capital
strategic planning. We recognize that the high-level strategic planning
efforts undertaken by the department are a necessary first step, but we
also believe that much more needs to be done to assure that
successively lower levels of organizations and activities accomplish
complementary human capital planning that addresses specific issues
that may be of concern for a given subset of the department's
population, such as for the workers in the department's industrial
activities.
DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department complete
revisions to DOD's core policy and our recommendation to develop
revised core capabilities that provide a baseline for defining
workloads that should be performed in government facilities by
government personnel. Officials noted that the department is finalizing
required changes to its revised methodology and, upon completion, will
task the military services with computing their depot maintenance core
requirements. Regarding our recommendation, to develop depot strategic
plans that are linked to the services' mission and objectives and to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense's depot strategic plan when it
is completed, DOD officials concurred, noting that in some cases it may
be more practical to include these plans as part of a logistics or
systems command strategic plan. DOD agreed with our recommendation to
develop a strategic plan that provides guidance and a schedule for
identifying long-term capabilities for arsenals and ammunition plants.
DOD also agreed with our recommendation to improve the quality and
comprehensiveness of the services' workforce planning efforts. DOD
partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance for
developing workforce revitalization strategies and strategic plans to
address expected depot attrition over the next 5 to 7 years. Officials
said that the department developed the DOD Civilian Human Resources
Strategic Plan--2002-2008 to ensure a DOD-wide civilian workforce
capable of responding rapidly, efficiently, and effectively to mission
requirements. However, they agreed that a near-term strategic plan is
needed at the depot level. We do not believe that the human resources
strategic plan cited in DOD's response provides the required guidance
for developing workforce revitalization strategies and strategic plans
and supporting the other issues we noted in our recommendation because
it is at a higher level and does not address issues that need to be
dealt with for this work force group, such as how to provide affordable
technical training for large numbers of blue-collar workers.
Additionally, to be useful in supporting revitalization of the depot
workforce, a depot strategic plan should address long-term as well as
near-term requirements.
Regarding our recommendation that the department develop options
for incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce planning
initiatives, the department concurred, stating that its proposed
National Security Personnel System will provide personnel flexibilities
designed to address multiskilling requirements. However, the National
Security Personnel System is a proposed change to the current personnel
system that DOD has requested the Congress to consider as a part of a
large and diverse DOD transformation legislative proposal. Because the
Congress has not yet acted on the department's transformation proposal,
we believe that it is premature to assume that Congress will approve
this new personnel system. We continue to believe that whether or not
the new personnel system is approved, the depots need options for
incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce planning initiatives.
DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation to implement a working group
to explore (1) options for innovative and cost-effective training and
(2) appropriate funding alternatives to help revitalize the depot
workforce. The department stated that a working group is not necessary
to explore options already offered by new authorities and flexibilities
in the proposed National Security Personnel System. Because the
proposed new personnel system has not yet been considered by the
Congress, we believe that is premature to assume that it will be
implemented, and we continue to believe that a working group's
exploration of options would benefit depot workforce revitalization.
DOD also nonconcurred with our recommendation regarding the
implementation of a demonstration project that would give the military
depots the flexibility to provide additional compensation for
multiskilled depot workers when the services have demonstrated by a
cost-benefit analysis the benefits of such a program. Again, the
department's response assumes the flexibilities and authorities
expected from the proposed National Security Personnel System will
cover the problems multiskilling is intended to address. As with our
comments on the prior recommendations, we believe that this response is
premature and that independent action should be taken to implement the
recommendation.
The department provided technical comments that have been incorporated
when appropriate.
We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the
Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have questions regarding this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov or Julia Denman at
(202) 512-4290 or denmanj@gao.gov. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix V.
Derek B. Stewart
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Derek B. Stewart:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement
a strategic plan for depot maintenance, we interviewed officials and
reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act to identify
guidance on developing strategic plans and various laws providing
guidance on the role of DOD depots.
To determine the extent to which the services have developed and
implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot
workforce to meet future requirements, we interviewed officials and
obtained and reviewed:
* DOD's Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan 2002-2008 and the
services' strategic plans for depot maintenance where available to
identify human capital goals, visions, and objectives and:
* services' and depots' workforce plans (including recruiting/hiring
plans, training plans, succession plans, and retention plans) to
determine whether they had a strategic/long-term perspective or a
short-term focus that was oriented toward the budget process.
In analyzing the extent to which these workforce plans positioned the
civilian depot workforce to meet future mission requirements, we
compared the elements of the depots' workforce plans to applicable
workforce planning documents and guidance issued by the OPM, the
GAO, the National Academy of Public Administration, and other federal
and state government agencies. Based on our analyses, we identified
efforts underway that addressed aspects of these elements.
Additionally, we analyzed the services':
* civilian depot workforce skills and competency assessments to
determine whether they had identified the skills and competencies
needed to address current and future workforce requirements,
* civilian depot workforce retention plans to determine whether they
had the factors identified by current research as being critical to
enhancing the retention necessary for the construction of a high-
performance organization, and:
* assessments of workforce plans to determine whether they included
performance measures that evaluated the effectiveness of their
workforce plans.
Moreover, because OPM had identified the elements that should be
included in a comprehensive retention plan, we compared those elements
to those found in the services' retention plans. We did not do this
type of comparison for the services' recruiting/hiring, training, and
succession plans because OPM did not identify comprehensive plans for
these elements of workforce plans.
To determine what challenges adversely affect DOD's strategic planning
for the viability of its civilian depot workforce, we interviewed
officials and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documentation to
identify the types of challenges that might impact planning for the
viability of the civilian depot workforce. In doing so, we also
determined:
* civilian depot workforce retirement eligibility and whether the
services will have difficulties replacing an aging workforce if large
numbers of eligible retirees retire over the next 5 to 7 years,
* the total weighted average age based on the civilian staffing at each
industrial facility,
* whether the services are having difficulties implementing the
multiskilling concept to improve worker efficiency and productivity,
and:
* whether increased funding will be needed to address increased
training requirements.
During this review, we visited and obtained information from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine
Corps headquarters, all in the Washington, D.C., area; Headquarters,
Army Materiel Command in Alexandria, Virginia; and 5 subordinate Army
commands--the Army Aviation and Missile Command, Huntsville, Alabama;
Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the
Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Michigan; Operations
Support Command (now the Joint Munitions Command), Rock Island,
Illinois; and the Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland. Additionally, we visited the following depots
and activities:
* Army: Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama; Corpus Christi Army
Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas; Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania; Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas; Tobyhanna Army
Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania; Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island,
Illinois; Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York; Pine Bluff Arsenal,
Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, Indiana;
and McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma.
* Air Force: Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio; Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center, Tucson,
Arizona; Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden, Utah; Directorate of
Maintenance, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Directorate of Maintenance,
Warner Robins, Georgia; and the Joint Depot Maintenance and Activities
Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
* Navy: Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval
Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Aviation Depot,
Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Aviation Depot North Island, San
Diego, California;
* Navy: Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.; Norfolk Naval
Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth,
New Hampshire; and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington.
* Navy: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, Charleston, South
Carolina.
* Marine Corps: Marine Corps Materiel Command, Albany, Georgia; Marine
Corps Logistics Bases Albany, Georgia; Marine Corps Logistics Bases
Barstow, California; Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Albany, Georgia;
and the Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Barstow, California.
Additionally, we received written responses to audit questions from the
following activities: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate
Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center San Diego, California; Naval Surface Warfare Center
Crane Division, Crane, Indiana; and Naval Undersea Warfare Center
Keyport Division, Keyport, Washington.
We conducted our review from October 2001 to March 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services' Depots:
Table 3:
Army:
Army Depots:
Depots: Anniston Army Depot; Anniston, Alabama; Principal work: The
depot performs maintenance on heavy and light-tracked combat vehicles
and components and is the designated center of technical excellence for
the M1 Abrams tank.; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 2,429.
Depots: Corpus Christi Army Depot; Corpus Christi, Texas; Principal
work: As the Army's only aviation facility, the depot overhauls and
repairs DOD rotary wing aircraft and components, such as the AH-64
Apache, CH-47 Chinook, and the UH-60 Blackhawk.; Number of civilian
depot employees per location: 2,869.
Depots: Letterkenny Army Depot; Chambersburg, Pennsylvania;
Principal work: This depot provides repair and overhaul support for air
defense and tactical missiles such as the Patriot, Hawk, Avenger,
Multiple Launch Rocket System, and Sidewinder.; Number of civilian
depot employees per location: 1,082.
Depots: Red River Army Depot; Texarkana, Texas;
Principal work: For combat and tactical systems, the depot supports
systems such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Multiple Launch Rocket
System, and vehicles for the Patriot and Hawk missiles.; Number of
civilian depot employees per location: 1,478.
Depots: Tobyhanna Army Depot; Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania; Principal work:
From handheld radios to satellite communication, the depot provides
repair and overhaul support for hundreds of communications and
electronic systems.; Number of civilian depot employees per location:
2,237.
Depots: Army arsenals:
Depots: Rock Island Arsenal; Rock Island, Illinois; Principal work: The
arsenal is primarily a metal manufacturing facility with foundry,
forging, machining, finishing, and fabricating capabilities. It
produces tank and artillery components such as gun mounts and recoil
mechanisms, spare parts, and other equipment. It also fabricates and/or
assembles tool sets ranging from carrying case-sized sets to fully
equipped shelters.; Number of civilian depot employees per location:
1,156.
Depots: Watervliet Arsenal; Watervliet, New York; Principal work: This
arsenal is a metal manufacturing facility whose capabilities include
forging, casting, machining, heat-treating, plating, and fabrication.
Its primary products are cannons--such as the large gun tubes for tanks
and howitzers--and mortars.; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 484.
Depots: Pine Bluff Arsenal; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Principal work: The
facility produces, renovates, and stores smoke, riot control, and
incendiary ammunitions such as red and white phosphorus. Also, it
manufactures and refurbishes chemical and biological defense
equipment.; Number of civilian depot employees per location: 804.
Depots: Army ammunition plants;
Depots: Crane Army Ammunition Activity; Crane, Indiana; Principal work:
The plant produces, renovates, stores, and demilitarizes conventional
ammunition. Its products include the Navy's 5-inch projectile, bombs,
missile warheads, pyrotechnic munitions, and plastic explosives.;
Number of civilian depot employees per location: 620.
Depots: McAlester Army Ammunition Plant; McAlester, Oklahoma;
Principal work: The plant produces, renovates, stores, and
demilitarizes conventional and missile ammunition. Its products include
bombs--ranging from 500 to 5,000 pounds, missile warheads, rockets, and
plastic explosives.; Number of civilian depot employees per location:
1,075.
Depots: Total Army; Principal work: [Empty]; Number of civilian depot
employees per location: 14,234.
Depots: Navy:
Depots: Naval Aviation Depots:
Depots: Naval Aviation Depot,
Cherry Point
North Carolina; Principal work: The depot performs standard depot-level
maintenance and periodic maintenance, modifications, and in-service
repairs for crash and battle damages for helicopters and engines. The
depot performs maintenance on aircraft such as the AV-8, H-53, and H-
46. It also repairs such components as jet fuel starters and auxiliary
power units.; Number of civilian depot employees per location: 3,839.
Depots: Naval Aviation Depot; Jacksonville, Florida; Principal work:
The depot serves as a production center concentrating on repair and
modification of patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft, attack aircraft,
electronic countermeasures, engines, and associated components. The
depot performs maintenance on aircraft such as the P-3, F-14 and SH-60.
Also, the depot repairs components such as electro-optics, electronic
warfare, and antisubmarine warfare systems.; Number of civilian depot
employees per location: 3,928.
Depots: Naval Aviation Depot
North Island; San Diego, California; Principal work: The depot serves
as the production center concentrating on repair and modification of
miscellaneous aircraft and associated components. The depot performs
maintenance on the following aircraft systems: E-2 Hawkeye, C-2
Greyhound, and F/A 18 Hornet. It also provides engineering, logistics,
and calibration services.; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 3,138.
Depots: Naval shipyards:
Depots: Norfolk Naval Shipyard; Portsmouth, Virginia; Principal work:
This shipyard is the East Coast's largest facility for surface ship,
aircraft carrier, and submarine overhauls, maintenance and
modernization. It also repairs, overhauls, dry docks, converts,
modernizes, and inactivates ships. Also, the shipyard can perform any
technical, fabrication, manufacturing, and engineering work required by
its customers on site or through rapid-deployment of special teams to
ships and facilities anywhere in the world.; Number of
civilian depot employees per location: 7,525.
Depots: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate
Maintenance Facility; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Principal work: This
shipyard is the largest ship repair facility between the West Coast and
Far East, and it is responsible for ship maintenance, modernization,
and nuclear ship recycling. Also, the shipyard provides such services
as reactor plant servicing, nuclear propulsion plant work, and ship
maintenance training.; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 3,987.
Depots: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Principal
work: The shipyard performs nuclear submarine overhauls, refuelings,
modernizations, and repairs. Also, it provides nuclear maintenance
engineering and planning for the Los Angeles class submarines.; Number
of civilian depot employees per location: 3,500.
Depots: Puget Sound Naval Shipyard; Bremerton, Washington; Principal
work: The shipyard overhauls and repairs all types and sizes of Navy
ships. Also, the shipyard provides other services such as nuclear
propulsion work, reactor compartment disposal, nuclear-powered ship
recycling, and emergent fleet support.; Number of civilian depot
employees per location: 8,608.
Depots: Naval Warfare Centers:
Depots: Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division; Crane, Indiana;
Principal work: The overall center provides acquisition, engineering,
logistics, and maintenance for the fleet's weapons and electronic
systems, ordnance, and associated equipment components. The majority of
its depot maintenance is in electronic warfare systems, engineering and
industrial base support, electronic module test and repair, microwave
components, and radar systems.; Number of civilian depot employees
per location: 311.
Depots: Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport Division; Keyport,
Washington; Principal work: The overall center provides test and
evaluation, in-service engineering, maintenance and repair, fleet
support, and industrial base support for designated systems. The
largest depot workload is the torpedo program. Also, the depot operates
and maintains shops that accomplish mechanical, electrical and
electronic production, and assembly of complex undersea warfare
equipment.; Number of civilian depot employees per location: 608.
Depots: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers:
Depots: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Charleston; Charleston,
South Carolina; Principal work: Depot operations, managed at the
division level, provide engineering analysis and design, hardware/
software development, and integration. Also the depot operations
include repair, fabrication, installation, and logistics products and
services to DOD and federal government sponsors.; Number of
civilian depot employees per location: 49.
Depots: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego; San Diego,
California; Principal work: The depot operation at the center provides
engineering, management, life cycle support, test, restoration,
assessments, and prototype modeling. The depot operations also include
facilities that enable it to serve as a designated overall point and
repair facility for reparables (i.e., assemblies, modules, and printed
circuit boards drawn from various types of equipment).; Number of
civilian depot employees per location: 70.
Depots: Total Navy; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 35,563.
Depots: Marine Corps:
Depots: Maintenance Center; Albany, Georgia; Principal work: The depot
has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and
upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle,
M1A1 Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and
communications-electronics equipment.; Number of
civilian depot employees per location: 659.
Depots: Maintenance Center; Barstow, California; Principal work: The
depot has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and
upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle,
M1A1 Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and
communications-electronics equipment.; Number of
civilian depot employees per location: 664.
Depots: Total Marine Corps; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 1,323.
Depots: Air Force:
Depots: Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center Tucson, Arizona;
Principal work: The center provides for the storage, regeneration,
reclamation, and disposal of aircraft and related aerospace items such
as tooling, pylons, and engines.; Number of civilian depot employees
per location: 439.
Depots: Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Utah;
Principal work: It provides worldwide engineering and logistics
management for the F-16 and maintains the C-130 aircraft. The center
produces more than 250 aircraft and 16,800 avionics and structural
components annually. In addition, the center is responsible for
logistical support of the nation's fleet of strategic intercontinental
ballistic missiles, including the Minuteman and Peacekeeper missiles.
It also overhauls and repairs landing gear, wheels and brakes, rocket
motors, photonic equipment, avionics, hydraulics, and software.; Number
of civilian depot employees per location: 5,852.
Depots: Directorate of Maintenance,; Oklahoma City Air Logistics
Center, Oklahoma; Principal work: The center is the worldwide manager
for a wide range of aircraft, engines, missile, and commodity items,
aided by some of the most sophisticated technical repair and
manufacturing processes in the world. The center manages an inventory
of 2,267 aircraft, which include the B-1, B-2, B-52, KC-10, C/KC-135,
E-3, and about 25 other contractor logistics support aircraft.; Number
of civilian depot employees per location: 8,533.
Depots: Directorate of Maintenance,; Warner Robins,
Air Logistics Center, Georgia; Principal work: This activity is the
cargo/transport technology repair center for the Air Force. It has
worldwide management and engineering responsibilities for the repair,
modification, and overhaul of the C-130, C-141, C-5, as well as F-15,
U-2, all Air Force helicopters, and all special operations aircraft
and their avionics systems.; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 6,328.
Depots: Total Air Force; Number of civilian depot employees per
location: 21,152.
Depots: Total; Number of civilian depot employees per location: 72,272.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots'
Short-Term Workforce Plans:
Army Depots:
Role and Workforce Size:
The Army Materiel Command, through its three subordinate commands, is
responsible for management of five depots. These depots are located in
Anniston, Alabama; Corpus Christi, Texas; Chambersburg, Pennsylvania;
Texarkana, Texas; and Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania. The depot maintenance
function supports overhauls, repairs, and upgrades to nearly all of the
Army's ground and air combat systems. These systems include tanks,
helicopters, communications systems, and various assemblies and
subassemblies of end items such as helicopter rotor blades,
transmissions, and engines. In fiscal year 2002, the five depots had
10,095 civilian employees.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
The Army's civilian depot workforce is on the verge of a major
turnover. Until recently, few new employees had been hired into the
workforce since large-scale reductions began in the late 1980s. In
fiscal year 2002, the average age of the depot workforce was about 49
years. Currently, about 15 percent (1,483) of the workforce can retire
whenever they choose and by fiscal year 2007, about 42 percent (4,201)
of the current workforce will be eligible for retirement. Depot
officials acknowledge that some work centers are at risk with all
employees eligible for retirement but pointed out that workers
generally do not retire when first eligible.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: Yes
Efforts:
According to Army officials, depot maintenance workforce planning is
accomplished primarily during the annual budget process where workforce
needs are matched with authorized maintenance workloads and funding.
With authorized workloads, the depots follow normal hiring practices
with plans and actions to recruit and retain permanent, term, and/or
temporary workers with needed skills to meet workload requirements and
provide training for these new workers and the existing workforce to
enhance their skills. Most of the depots are addressing the aging
workforce issue and imbalances in critical skills with programs for
apprentices and cooperative education students to help identify and
bring in critical skills and younger workers.
Army Arsenals:
Role and Workforce Size:
The Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command is responsible for
managing the manufacturing arsenals at Rock Island, Illinois, and
Watervliet, New York. The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
manages the manufacturing arsenal located at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Rock
Island and Watervliet are primarily metal manufacturing facilities.
Their primary products include tank and artillery components such as
cannons, gun mounts, and recoil mechanisms; and tool sets ranging from
carrying case size sets to fully equipped shelters. The Pine Bluff
Arsenal produces, renovates, and stores smoke, riot control, and
incendiary munitions. It also manufactures and refurbishes chemical and
biological defense equipment such as protective masks, decontamination
equipment, and filtration systems. In fiscal year 2002, the three
arsenals employed 2,444 civilians.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
Rock Island and Watervliet Arsenals have been experiencing declining
workloads and, as a result, declining workforces. The arsenals are
hiring few, if any, new employees. Rock Island and Pine Bluff hired 42
and 79 employees, respectively, within the last year, and Watervliet
has not hired in several years. The average age of the civilian
workforce is about 50 years; about 965 will be eligible to retire by
fiscal year 2007.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: Yes
Efforts:
Each of the arsenals determines its future workloads and estimates
future workforce requirements. The arsenals have or are planning to
implement several strategies to ensure that the critical skills are
available in light of declining workloads and workforces. For example,
Rock Island and Watervliet have extensively retrained current employees
to provide the critical skills. In addition, Rock Island established an
apprentice program to help replenish critical skills and, in fiscal
year 2002, Watervliet analyzed skill shortfalls and projected attrition
for the next 4 years. As a result, they plan two apprentice programs to
replenish critical skills. Pine Bluff has begun a study to address
projected retirements.
Army Ammunition Plants:
Role and Workforce Size:
The Joint Munitions Command manages the Army's two ammunition-
manufacturing plants-Crane Army Ammunition Activity in Crane, Indiana,
and McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in McAlester, Oklahoma. These
plants produce, renovate, store, and demilitarize conventional and
missile ammunition such as large projectiles, bombs, and explosives. In
fiscal year 2002, Crane and McAlester employed about 1,695 civilian
employees.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
The workload of the ammunition plants fluctuates. At times, both plants
have experienced declining workforces, but presently, Crane is hiring
about 100 additional term (appointed for a specified period of time)
employees, and McAlester plans to hire more than 200 employees (mostly
term) during fiscal year 2003. The average ages of Crane and McAlester
employees are 49 and 44 years, respectively, and 631 employees are
eligible to retire by fiscal year 2007.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: [Empty]
Efforts:
The ammunition plants cope with a fluctuating workload by maintaining a
flexible workforce. About 24 percent of the plants' workforce is
temporary, term, or permanent seasonal-not guaranteed permanent full-
time work. During fiscal year 2002, the McAlester Commander's office
studied all organizations to determine where retirements will occur
within the next 2 years, authorized over hires to prepare for the
impending attrition, and is hiring and training new personnel before
separation of the retirees. McAlester also has a hiring plan for the
additional employees required during fiscal year 2003. Crane
reorganized in late fiscal year 2002; each director identified the
skill imbalances for the new organization; and, with the Commander's
approval, established recruiting priorities to correct the skill
imbalances. In addition, Crane is attempting to hire a younger
workforce by establishing trainee positions for selected skills, hiring
younger people who would meet the requirements for the trainee
positions (but not the journeyman position), and developing the younger
people to meet the journeyman level requirements.
Naval Aviation Depots:
Role and Workforce Size:
The Naval Air Systems Command has three naval aviation depots located
in Cherry Point, North Carolina; San Diego, California; and
Jacksonville, Florida. These depots provide in-depth overhaul repair
and modification of aircraft, engines, avionics, and aeronautical
components. In fiscal year 2002, there were about 10,905 civilian depot
employees at the three aviation depots. Some of the trade skills
include aircraft mechanic, electronics mechanic, and metals inspector.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
The naval aviation depots are experiencing an aging civilian depot
workforce. In the past; 10 years, the civilian depot workforce has been
reduced by 56 percent. As of fiscal year 2002, the average age was 48
years, and approximately 4,100 civilian employees were eligible to
retire in the next 5 years. The average length of service is 19 years.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: [Empty]
Efforts:
Depot maintenance workforce planning is accomplished at the level where
depot operations are performed and primarily involves determining
resource needs and developing plans to address those needs. Naval Air
Systems Command has several initiatives for recruiting and revitalizing
the existing aging civilian depot workforce. They implemented the
People Focus Program that focuses on the command's civilian and
military personnel and their workplace needs. One of the group's major
initiatives is the Campaign for People, which focuses on developing
hiring plans consistent with workload projections, reducing the hiring
cycle time to 66 days and reducing the attrition rate to 5 percent. The
depots participate in Naval Air Systems Command's Senior Executive
Management Development Program, which provides a systematic framework
for developing mid-level managers for senior management positions. They
also have apprenticeship programs designed to develop journey level
production artisans to meet longer-range workforce requirements.
Furthermore, the depots' Student Career Experience Program trains
student for careers in administrative, professional, or vocational/
technical occupations by integrating work experience with periods of
academic study at local colleges.
Naval Shipyards:
Role and Workforce Size of Shipyards:
The Naval Sea Systems Command has four naval shipyards located in
Portsmouth, Virginia; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Portsmouth, New Hampshire;
and Bremerton, Washington. The shipyards maintain, repair, and
modernize the Navy's surface ships, submarines, and carriers, and
provide inactivation and disposal services for decommissioned fleet
assets. They also overhaul vessels, perform depot-level maintenance and
repair work, and emergency repair work. In fiscal year 2002, there were
approximately 23,620 civilian shipyard employees at the four Naval
Shipyards. Some of the trades at the shipyards are electricians,
painters and blasters, pipe fitters, and welders.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
The Naval shipyards are currently faced with maintaining adequate
numbers of skilled mechanics and supervisors, while the workforce ages
and retires. As of July 2002, the average age of the Naval shipyards'
workforce was 45 years, and approximately 7,500 employees were eligible
to retire in the next 5 years. Also, over 33 percent of the workforce
was over 50 years old.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: Yes
Efforts:
The Naval Sea Systems Command is monitoring the shipyards' average age
of its workforce as part of its revitalization program. The goal is to
have a declining average age by fiscal year 2005. The shipyards have
implemented several near-term workforce initiatives to revitalize and
reduce the aging workforce to reach the Command's goal to revitalize
the workforce. First, the Naval shipyards are hiring to maintain
current employment levels and critical skills. Second, in varying
degrees, each shipyard has an apprenticeship program that prepares
students for wage grade occupations by alternating periods of academic
study and work experience. Also, some of the shipyards have programs
that recruit high school or college students and provide them work
experience and later recruit them for future employment. For
recruitment purposes, most shipyards offer bonuses of between $4,000-
$8,000 to attract only engineers and nuclear engineers. Furthermore,
some shipyards have leadership or mentoring programs and strategies
such as helper training programs to retain qualified workers.
Naval Surface and Undersea Warfare Centers:
Role and Size of Workforce:
The Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division (Crane, Indiana) and
Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport Division (Keyport, Washington)
are managed by the Naval Sea Systems Command. Crane provides
acquisition, engineering, 'logistics, and maintenance for the fleet's
weapons and electronic systems, ordinance, and associated equipment.
Keyport provides test and evaluation, in-service engineering,
maintenance and repair, and industrial base support for designated
systems. In fiscal year 2002, there were about 608 and 311 civilian
depot workers at Keyport and Crane, respectively.
Depot maintenance performed at the centers is integrated within the
overall divisions' operations and is not centrally managed. Crane's
civilian depot employees do not work full-time on depot operations
because the maintenance is embedded within several departments. The
civilian workers at Keyport work full time in depot maintenance. Some
of the positions at the centers include engineering technicians,
electrical engineers, and welders.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
The Naval Surface and Undersea Warfare Centers are experiencing an
aging civilian depot workforce. In fiscal year 2002, the average age of
civilian depot workers was 45 and 48 at Crane and Keyport,
respectively. By fiscal year 2007, about 32 percent of the Crane's and
about 41 percent of Keyport's civilian depot workers will be eligible
to retire.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: Yes
Efforts:
According to depot officials, workforce planning is accomplished at the
level where depot operations are performed and primarily involves
determining resource needs and developing plans to address those needs.
Both centers have implemented several workforce strategies to reduce
the aging workforce that include hiring and training plans. For
example, in 2001 Crane established an apprenticeship program to replace
the workforce with well-trained, capable employees that are being lost
through attrition. Likewise, Keyport has a hiring plan to recruit
scientist, engineers, and other workers for fiscal years 2002 to 2007.
Note 1: Crane Warfare Center did not do a competency assessment.
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers:
Role and Workforce Size:
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Centers in San Diego, California
and Charleston, South Carolina are under the Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Command. The Charleston depot provides engineering analysis and
design, hardware/software development, integration, repair,
fabrication, installation, and logistics products and services for DOD
and federal government sponsors. The San Diego location is responsible
for engineering, management, life-cycle support, and prototype
modeling, and is a repair facility for reparables from command control,
communications, computers, and intelligence. In fiscal year 2002, there
were 49 civilian depot workers at Charleston and 70 at San Diego. Some
of the positions at the centers include electronics technician,
engineering specialist, and equipment specialist.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
Both centers are experiencing an aging depot workforce. In fiscal year
2002, the average age for civilian depot workers at Charleston was 51;
twelve employees were eligible for retirement, and an additional 15
will be eligible by fiscal year 2009. Also, in fiscal year 2002, the
average age for San Diego civilian depot workers was 52; twenty-one
were eligible to retire, and an additional 12 will be eligible to
retire by fiscal year 2009.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: Yes(Note 2)
Efforts:
According to depot officials, workforce planning is accomplished at the
level where depot operations are performed and primarily involves
determining resource needs and developing plans to address those needs.
To manage the current aging civilian workforce, the Charleston depot
has implemented a hiring plan, student cooperative program, and
training program. The hiring plan is for fiscal years 2002-2009; during
that time officials expect to hire at least 21 employees. Although the
San Diego depot does not have any formal workforce plans, according to
depot officials there are overall workforce plans for the center. Depot
officials said there is no formal depot hiring plan because the number
of employees leaving the depot is relatively small (at least one per
year). Also, the San Diego area has a large military technical base to
recruit and hire qualified depot workers.
Note 2: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego did not have
performance measures.
Marine Corps Depots:
Role and Workforce Size:
The Marine Corps' Materiel Command is responsible for managing two
depot maintenance centers located in Albany, Georgia, and Barstow,
California. Both centers have multicommodity capability to support
overhauls, repairs, and upgrades for weapons systems such as the
Amphibious Assault Vehicle, MIA1 Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar,
small arms, and communications-electronics equipment. In fiscal year
2002, there were about 1,300 civilian employees at the two centers.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
The Marine Corps is facing a major human resource management challenge
in staffing its civilian depot workforce for the future. Until
recently, few new employees had been hired into the workforce since
reductions began in the late 1980s. The civilian depot maintenance
workforce is aging. In fiscal year 2002, the average age of the
civilian workforce was about 48 years. Currently, about 19 percent
(246) of the civilian workforce can retire whenever they choose and by
fiscal year 2007, about 45 percent (591) of the current workforce will
be eligible for retirement.
Status of Overall Workforce Plans:
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty]
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: Yes
Efforts:
The Marine Corps' Materiel Command has not yet established workforce
plans to position its depot workforce for the future. Officials at the
Materiel Command and the centers said that workforce planning is
accomplished primarily through the annual budget process that matches
civilian depot workforce requirements to authorized workload and
funding. To address its aging civilian depot workforce and replenish
critical worker skills, the Marine Corps has a Student Temporary
Employment Program and Student Career Experience Program (co-op
program) being used by one of its centers. Apprentice programs are not
being utilized because depot officials said that the programs were not
affordable under the current requirement for the depots to fund the
costs from their overhead budgets.
Air Force Depots:
Role and Workforce Size:
The Air Force Materiel Command has management responsibility for the
Air Force's four depot maintenance centers located in Ogden, Utah;
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Tucson, Arizona; and Warner Robins, Georgia.
The depots' primary mission is to repair systems and spare parts that
ensure readiness in peacetime and provide sustainment to combat forces
in wartime. The depots currently employ about 22,000 civilian employees
in a variety of highly skilled and technical maintenance positions. Of
those, about 68 percent are blue-collar workers. Some of the blue-
collar occupations include aircraft mechanics, aircraft electricians,
sheet metal mechanics, and electronics integrated systems mechanics.
Condition of Civilian Depot Workforce:
Because of past hiring freezes, the Command reported in April 2000 that
the depot workforce was primarily journeyman-level positions. With an
average age of 47, nearly 35 percent of the civilian depot workforce
will be eligible to retire by 2005. Hard-to-fill occupational job
series like mechanical and software engineers are major recruiting
challenges because salaries are non-competitive.
("Yes" indicates efforts under way to address elements in these
steps.)
Step 1:
Human capital goals: Yes
Vision/Objectives: Yes
Step 2:
Skills Assessment: Yes
Competency assessment: [Empty] (Note 2)
Gap Analysis: Yes
Steps 3 and 4:
Recruiting and hiring plans: Yes
Training plans: Yes
Succession plans: Yes
Comprehensive retention plans: [Empty]
Step 5:
Performance Measures: monitor/evaluate/adjust: Yes
Efforts:
Depot maintenance civilian workforce planning is accomplished at the
personnel offices at Air Force Materiel Command and the depots by
primarily determining resource needs and developing plans to address
those needs. Based on the results of its 2000 workforce shaping study,
the overall workforce objective is to develop a qualified, flexible
workforce in sufficient numbers with appropriate employment and skill
mix by 2005. In April 2001, the Command issued a command-wide human
resource strategic plan to govern its workforce-shaping efforts. With
the anticipated mass retirements, the depots plan to hire an additional
13,000 workers by 2009. Each depot has tailored its workforce shaping
and hiring efforts by, among other things, partnering with local
vocational-technical/trade schools and paying incentives or bonuses for
hiring.
[Note 3] The Directorates of Maintenance at Ogden Air Logistics Center,
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, and Warner Robins Air Logistics
Center did not assess competencies.
Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments:
Acknowledgments:
Carleen Bennett, Johnetta Gatlin-Brown, Thomas W. Gilliam, M. Jane
Hunt, Steve Hunter, Jeanett Reid, Jose Watkins, and Bobby Worrell made
significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Depot Maintenance: Public-Private Partnerships Have Increased
but Long-Term Growth and Results Are Uncertain. GAO-03-423.
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Human Capital: Building on the Current Momentum to Address High-Risk
Issues. GAO-03-637T. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003.
DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human Capital
Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and Sourcing
Decisions. GAO-03-475. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2003.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.
Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.:
January 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies
in Managing Their Workforces. GAO-03-2. Washington, D.C.:
December 6, 2002.
Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain Momentum
of DOD's Strategic Human Capital Planning. GAO-03-237.
Washington, D.C.: December 5, 2002.
Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and Requirements Could
Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-03-16. Washington, D.C.:
October 18, 2002.
HUD Human Capital Management: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce
Planning Needed. GAO-02-839. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.
Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to Drive
Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002.
Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-
373SP. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.
Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing
and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2002.
Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the
Public Depot System. GAO-02-105. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
Human Capital: Implementing an Effective Workforce Strategy Would Help
EPA to Achieve Its Strategic Goals. GAO-01-812. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2001.
Defense Logistics: Strategic Planning Weaknesses Leave Economy,
Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Future Support Systems at Risk.
GAO-02-106. Washington, D.C.: October 11, 2000.
Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders. GAO/OCG-
00-14G. Washington, D.C.: September 2000 Version 1.
Human Capital: Managing Human Capital in the 21ST Century.
GAO/T-GGD-00-77. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2000.
Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DOD Civilian Workforce
Management. GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-00-120. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2000.
Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce Requirements and Related Issues
Affecting Depots and Arsenals. GAO/NSIAD-99-31. Washington, D.C.:
November 30, 1998.
Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for New Weapon
Systems to the Private Sector. GAO/NSIAD-98-8. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 1998.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD has nine other active ammunition manufacturing plants that are
government-owned and contractor-operated. These nine plants have a
total of 145 government civilians, 6 military personnel, and 5,314
contractor personnel. They are not included in this
report's discussion.
[2] Since 1997, we have issued several reports dealing with DOD's
implementation of strategic planning initiatives generated as a result
of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, P. L. No. 03-62.
Aug. 3, 1993.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed
to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
[4] The Arsenal Act (10 U.S.C. 4532) provides that the Army is to have
its supplies made in U.S. factories or arsenals provided they can do so
economically. The act further provides that the Secretary of the Army
may abolish any arsenal considered unnecessary.
[5] P.L. No. 103-62, Aug. 3, 1993.
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-Assessment
Checklist for Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, D.C.:
September 2000).
[7] For example, OPM's Workforce Planning Model (http://www.opm.gov/
workforce planning/wfpmodel.htm) and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-
373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed
to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Change in
Reporting Practices and Requirements Could Enhance Congressional
Oversight, GAO-03-16 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 18, 2002).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD
Shifting More Workload for New Weapon Systems to the Private Sector,
GAO/NSIAD-98-8 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 1998).
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Public-Private
Partnerships Have Increased, but Long-Term Growth and Results Are
Uncertain, GAO-03-423 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003).
[12] The sections that DOD considered proposing for repeal were 2460,
2464, 2466, 2469, 2470, and 2472.
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed
to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
[14] DOD has not updated its logistics strategic plan since the 1999
plan. The document highlighting current logistics initiatives is the
Future Logistics Enterprise, which consists of six elements, one of
which is depot maintenance partnerships.
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Industrial Facilities:
Workforce Requirements and Related Issues Affecting Depots and
Arsenals, GAO/NSIAD-99-31 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 1998).
[16] As defined by several state and federal agencies such as the
Washington State Department of Personnel, New York State Department of
Civil Service, and the U.S. Departments of Interior and Health and
Human Services.
[17] Retirement projections were based on date the employee becomes
eligible for optional retirement under the Civil Service Retirement
System or the Federal Employees Retirement System.
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Industrial Facilities:
Workforce Requirements and Related Issues Affecting Depots and
Arsenals, GAO/NSIAD-99-31 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 1998).
[19] The additional grade would allow increased compensation (e.g., at
wage grade 10) for work in two equal skills (e.g., both wage grade 09)
when the worker performs the functions of the two skills for a minimum
of 25 percent of the time at work.
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