Military Readiness
DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft Availability Goals in the New Security Environment Gao ID: GAO-03-300 April 7, 2003The attacks on September 11, 2001, show that threats to U.S. security can now come from any number of terrorist groups, at any number of locations, and in wholly unexpected ways. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD) is shifting to a new defense strategy focused on dealing with uncertainty by acting quickly across a wide range of combat conditions. One key ingredient of the new strategy is the availability of aircraft to carry out their missions. Key measures of availability include the percentage of time an aircraft can perform at least one or all of its assigned missions, termed the "mission capable" (MC) and "full mission capable" (FMC) rates, respectively. GAO examined whether key DOD aircraft have been able to meet MC and FMC goals in recent years, and DOD's process for setting aircraft availability goals.
Less than one-half of the 49 key active-duty aircraft models that GAO reviewed met their MC or FMC goals during fiscal years 1998-2002. The levels of mission capability varied by military service and type of aircraft, and the levels at which the goals were set also varied widely, even among the same type of aircraft. However, the MC and FMC goals for each model changed little over time. Since 1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a change to their goals. Seven of the changes were to raise the goals to higher levels. Difficulties in meeting the goals are caused by a complex combination of logistical and operational factors. Despite their importance, DOD does not have a clear and defined process for setting aircraft availability goals. The goal-setting process is largely undefined and undocumented, and there is widespread uncertainty among the military services over how the goals were established, who is responsible for setting them, and the continuing adequacy of MC and FMC goals as measures of aircraft availability. Uncertainty and the lack of documentation in setting the goals ultimately obscures basic perceptions of readiness and operational effectiveness, undermines congressional confidence in the basis for DOD's funding requests, and brings into question the appropriateness of those goals to the new defense strategy. DOD guidance does not define the availability goals that the services must establish or require any objective methodology for setting them. Nor does it require the services to identify one office as the coordinating agent for goal setting or to document the basis for the goals chosen. DOD officials told GAO that the guidance has not been updated since 1990 to reflect the new security environment of increased deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold War.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-300, Military Readiness: DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft Availability Goals in the New Security Environment
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
April 2003:
MILITARY READINESS:
DOD Needs a Clear and Defined Process for Setting Aircraft Availability
Goals in the New Security Environment:
Military Readiness:
GAO-03-300:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-300, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The attacks on 9/11/2001 show that threats to U.S. security can now
come from any number of terrorist groups, at any number of locations,
and in wholly unexpected ways. As a result, the Department of Defense
(DOD) is shifting to a new defense strategy focused on dealing with
uncertainty by acting quickly across a wide range of combat
conditions. One key ingredient of the new strategy is the availability
of aircraft to carry out their missions. Key measures of availability
include the percentage of time an aircraft can perform at least one or
all of its assigned missions, termed the ’mission capable“ (MC) and
’full mission capable“ (FMC) rates, respectively.
At the Subcommittee‘s request, GAO examined whether key DOD aircraft
have been able to meet MC and FMC goals in recent years, and DOD‘s
process for setting aircraft availability goals.
What GAO Found:
Less than one-half of the 49 key active-duty aircraft models that GAO
reviewed met their MC or FMC goals during fiscal years 1998-2002. The
levels of mission capability varied by military service and type of
aircraft, and the levels at which the goals were set also varied
widely, even among the same type of aircraft. However, the MC and FMC
goals for each model changed little over time. Since 1998, only 11 of
49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a change to their goals.
Seven of the changes were to raise the goals to higher levels.
Difficulties in meeting the goals are caused by a complex combination
of logistical and operational factors.
Despite their importance, DOD does not have a clear and defined
process for setting aircraft availability goals. The goal-setting
process is largely undefined and undocumented, and there is widespread
uncertainty among the military services over how the goals were
established, who is responsible for setting them, and the continuing
adequacy of MC and FMC goals as measures of aircraft availability.
Uncertainty and the lack of documentation in setting the goals
ultimately obscures basic perceptions of readiness and operational
effectiveness, undermines congressional confidence in the basis for
DOD‘s funding requests, and brings into question the appropriateness
of those goals to the new defense strategy. DOD guidance does not
define the availability goals that the services must establish or
require any objective methodology for setting them. Nor does it
require the services to identify one office as the coordinating agent
for goal setting or to document the basis for the goals chosen. DOD
officials told GAO that the guidance has not been updated since 1990
to reflect the new security environment of increased deployments and
other changes since the end of the Cold War.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOD review the current goals to ensure that they
have a valid basis and are appropriate to the new defense strategy,
and revise its instructions to ensure that such measures are based on
a clearly defined and documented process and objective methodology.
DOD concurred or partially concurred with all of GAO‘s recommendations
and outlined planned actions to address them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-300.
To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Neal Curtin at
(757) 552-8100 or Curtinn@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOD Aircraft Experienced Widespread Problems in Meeting MC and FMC
Goals:
Mission Capable Problems Caused by a Combination of Factors:
DOD'S Goal-Setting Process Is Largely Undefined and Undocumented:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, Fiscal Years 1991-2002:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Key DOD Aircraft Models:
Table 2: Air Combat Command Interim MC Goals, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Table 3: Aircraft Ages and 2002 MC Rates/Goals:
Figures:
Figure 1: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC and FMC Goals,
Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Figure 2: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC Goals by Service,
Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Figure 3: Average Annual MC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Figure 4: Average Annual FMC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Figure 5: Average Annual MC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002:
Figure 6: Average Annual FMC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FMC: full mission capable:
GAO: General Accounting Office:
MC: mission capable:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 7, 2003:
The Honorable Joel Hefley
Chairman
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, clearly demonstrated that
the U.S. security landscape has changed. The familiar Cold War threats
of large-scale wars between nation states in predictable areas such as
the Koreas and the Middle East have been joined by a broad array of new
threats characterized by surprise and uncertainty. Attacks on U.S.
security can now come from any number of terrorist groups such as al
Qaeda, in any number of locations, and in wholly unexpected ways. As a
result of the changed security environment, the Department of Defense
(DOD) has rethought defense strategy and is shifting to a
"capabilities-based" approach focused on contending with uncertainty by
enhancing its ability to act quickly and decisively across a wide range
of combat conditions and locations.
One key ingredient of the new strategy is the availability of aircraft
to carry out their assigned missions. DOD requires each military
service to establish availability goals for aircraft and other major
weapon systems, and measures of the degree to which those goals are
met.[Footnote 1] Key measures include the percentage of time that an
aircraft can perform at least one or all of its assigned missions,
termed the "mission capable" (MC) and "full mission capable" (FMC)
rates, respectively. MC and FMC goals and rates are fundamental
indicators of readiness expectations. They are also used by DOD as
indicators of maintenance and supply effectiveness and are made
available to the Congress for its general oversight of DOD. Moreover,
the level at which the goals are set also influences large amounts of
military spending for aircraft procurements, spare parts inventories,
and other resources needed to meet the goals. However, our recent
reports have identified problems in meeting MC goals among certain
aircraft. For example, we reported in June 2000 that many of the cargo
aircraft needed to meet wartime airlift requirements were not meeting
MC goals.[Footnote 2]
Concerned that the new capabilities-based strategy may be difficult to
carry out if aircraft are experiencing problems in meeting existing
availability goals, you requested that we examine DOD's structure for
establishing MC and FMC goals for aircraft in the Air Force, Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps. This report addresses (1) whether key active-
duty aircraft have been able to meet existing MC and FMC goals, (2) the
causes of any difficulties in meeting those goals, and (3) whether DOD
has a clear and defined process for setting aircraft availability
goals. We performed our review from February through November 2002 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II describes the scope and methodology of our work.
Results in Brief:
Less than one-half of DOD's key active-duty aircraft models have met
their MC and FMC goals since 1998.[Footnote 3] For example, during
fiscal years 1998-2002, only 23-35 percent of the 49 aircraft models we
reviewed were able to meet their MC goals. Similarly, some 31-49
percent of the models met their FMC goals during the same period. In
most cases, the actual rates were at least 5 percentage points below
the goals. The level of mission capability varied by military service
and by type of aircraft. The Army and Air Force had the highest average
MC rates, at 77-83 percent over the past 5 years; followed by the
Marines, at about 71-75 percent; and the Navy, at 61-67 percent. Rates
have increased slightly since fiscal year 2001 in all services except
the Navy. Average MC rates were the highest for helicopters, at 76-80
percent; followed by cargo aircraft and tankers, at 75-79 percent;
fighter/attack aircraft, at 75-77 percent; bombers, at 64-69 percent;
and electronic command/control aircraft, at 60-67 percent. Average FMC
rates followed similar rank order patterns. The level at which the
goals were set showed little consistency, varying widely even among the
same type of aircraft. For example, MC goals for the bombers and
fighters in our review ranged from 50 to 80 percent and 65 to 83
percent, respectively. While the level at which the goals were set
showed little consistency, MC and FMC goals have changed little over
time. Since 1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent)
experienced a change to their goals. Seven of these changes were to
raise the goals.
Difficulties in meeting the goals are caused by a combination of
interrelated logistical and operational factors, with no dominating
single problem. For example, depending upon the missions and
capabilities it was designed to provide, each aircraft can be
inherently complex and prone to failure or be simple and easy to
maintain and available more often. Complex aircraft require well-
trained and experienced maintenance personnel. However, service
officials frequently cited shortages of such personnel as a key cause
of difficulties in meeting MC goals, and we have cited this as a major
problem area for years. Age and overuse of the aircraft were cited as
key factors as well. While age may affect MC rates, we found no
statistical evidence that age alone explains the difficulties in
meeting the MC goals. MC rates are also undermined by spare parts
shortages. Such shortages may be particularly troublesome for older
aircraft as they near the end of their projected life and spare parts
inventories are reduced. We have previously reported on problems with
spare parts shortages, and DOD is taking steps to increase the
inventories of some parts.[Footnote 4] Finally, perceived low funding
levels and the way that maintenance systems are structured were also
viewed as keys to low MC rates. For example, increases in the use of
centralized depot-level maintenance were cited as a cause of
maintenance delay and lowered MC rates. We have raised concerns for
years that DOD's downsizing of its depot infrastructure and workforce
was done without sound strategic planning and that investments in
facilities, equipment, and personnel have not been sufficient to ensure
the long-term viability of the depots.
DOD does not have a clear and defined process for setting aircraft
availability goals. DOD's goal-setting process is largely undefined and
undocumented, and there is widespread uncertainty among the services
over how the goals were established and who is responsible for setting
them. Furthermore, the services have basic questions about the adequacy
of those goals as measures of aircraft availability. Uncertainty and
the lack of documentation in setting MC and FMC goals ultimately
obscures basic perceptions of readiness and operational effectiveness,
undermines congressional confidence in the basis for funding requests,
and brings into question the appropriateness of those goals to the new
defense strategy. For example, the services could not explain and
document how the original MC and FMC goals were set for any of the
aircraft in our review. Navy and Air Force officials believed that the
goals were generally based on analyses of historical performance rates
of similar aircraft and/or subjective judgment. Moreover, in many
cases, the services identified multiple offices as being responsible
for setting the goals. But when contacted, each believed that the other
was responsible. Some officials questioned which goals--the MC goals,
the FMC goals, or some other goal--were the right ones to use in the
new security environment. For example, a new measure of aircraft
availability is being developed for the new Joint Strike Fighter, and
MC and FMC goals are not being used. DOD's instruction provides little
or no guidance on these and other key issues.[Footnote 5] For example,
it requires the services to establish availability goals but does not
define which goals should be established, even though it specifically
requires the services to collect condition status information on MC,
FMC, and other availability measures. The instruction also provides no
standardized methodology for setting goals, requiring only that they
include estimates of maximum aircraft performance, assuming peacetime
usage levels and full funding of logistical support systems. Nor does
it require the services to identify the pros and cons of setting the
goals at different levels and the guiding principles used to make those
decisions. Finally, it does not require the services to identify one
office as the coordinating agent for goal setting or to document the
basis for the goals chosen. DOD officials told us that the instruction
has not been updated since 1990 to reflect the new security environment
of increased deployments and other changes since the end of the Cold
War.
To ensure that aircraft availability goals are appropriate to the new
defense strategy and consistent with a clear and defined process, we
are recommending that DOD and the services (1) determine whether
different types of goals are needed; (2) validate the basis for the
existing goals; and (3) revise Instruction 3110.5 to clearly define the
goals required to be established and their performance measures,
establish a standard methodology with objective principles of analysis
to be used by all services in setting goals, and require each service
to identify a focal point for the development and documentation of the
goal setting process.
In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with our
recommendations. However, it believed that including the performance
measures associated with the goals in Instruction 3110.5 would result
in their being used as the primary measure of the overall state of
materiel readiness. We agree that determinations of overall materiel
readiness require consideration of a variety of factors beyond those
identified in Instruction 3110.5. However, to avoid confusion and
misunderstanding about basic aircraft performance, it is necessary to
clearly identify the performance measures associated with the
availability goals selected. This does not preclude the use of other
metrics in broader assessments of materiel readiness. DOD also believed
that the individual services, not the department, should be responsible
for establishing their own detailed methodologies for goal setting
because of the potential for variations in service environments and the
types of goals used. We also agree that the services should have some
leeway to accommodate differences between them. However, we continue to
believe that all services should adhere to a standard set of
overarching principles of analysis to safeguard objectivity and
transparency in the goal-setting process. Such principles could be
established in coordination with the services. The services could then
develop detailed methodologies consistent with these principles but
tailored to their own environments. For these reasons we made no change
to our recommendations.
Background:
DOD aircraft are used to perform a variety of different missions.
However, for the purpose of this report, we have grouped them into five
basic categories: (1) various models of fighter/attack aircraft, such
as the F/A-18 Hornet, provide air superiority or close air support of
ground forces; (2) bombers, such as the B-1 Lancer, provide long-and
short-range delivery of heavy munitions; (3) electronic command and
control aircraft, such as the E-3 Sentry, provide airspace and
battlefield reconnaissance, command, and control services; (4) tankers
and cargo aircraft, such as the KC-135 Stratotanker and the C-5 Galaxy,
respectively, provide air refueling services and the ability to carry
troops and equipment anywhere in the world; and (5) helicopters, with
their ability to hover as well as conduct long-and short-range
operations, are used for a variety of missions, including
transportation of troops and equipment, air assault and reconnaissance,
and search and rescue operations. Our review included a total of 49
different aircraft models (over 5,600 individual aircraft in 2002) in
these five categories.[Footnote 6] These aircraft were considered by
the services to be their key active-duty operational aircraft.[Footnote
7] Table 1 lists these aircraft models, along with the military service
using them, and their MC and FMC goals for fiscal year 2002.
Table 1: Key DOD Aircraft Models:
2002 mission capable/full mission capable goals in percents.
Fighter/Attack aircraft: A-10 Thunderbolt; Aircraft Service: Air
Force; Goal: 82[A]/NA[B]; Bombers: B-1 Lancer; Air Force; 67[A]/NA[B];
Electronic command/control: E-3 Sentry; Air Force; 85[A]/NA[B];
Tankers/Cargo aircraft: C-5 Galaxy; Air Force; 75[A]/45[B];
Helicopters: AH-64A Apache; Aircraft Service: Army; Goal: 75[A]/70[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F-15 Eagle; Aircraft Service: Air Force;
Goal: 83[A]/NA[B]; Bombers: B-2 Spirit; Air Force; 50[A]/NA[B];
Electronic command/control: E-8 Joint Stars; Air Force; 75[A]/NA[B];
Tankers/Cargo aircraft: C-17 Globemaster; Air Force; 88[A]/78[B];
Helicopters: AH-64D Apache; Aircraft Service: Army; Goal: 75[A]/70[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F-15E Eagle; Aircraft Service: Air Force;
Goal: 81[A]/NA[B]; Bombers: B-52 Stratofortress; Air Force;
80[A]/NA[B]; Electronic command/control: RC-135 Rivet Joint; Air
Force; 75[A]/NA[B]; Tankers/Cargo aircraft: C-130 Hercules; Air Force;
75[A]/48[B]; Helicopters: UH-60A Black Hawk; Aircraft Service: Army;
Goal: 80[A]/75[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F-16 Fighting Falcon; Aircraft Service: Air
Force; Goal: 83[A]/NA[B]; Electronic command/
control: U-2; Air Force; 85[A]/NA[B]; Tankers/Cargo aircraft: C-141
Starlifter; Air Force; 80[A]/59[B]; Helicopters: UH-60L Black Hawk;
Aircraft Service: Army; Goal: 80[A]/75[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F-117 Nighthawk; Aircraft Service: Air Force;
Goal: 80[A] /NA[B]; Electronic command/control: S-3B
Viking; Navy; 70[A]/54[B]; Tankers/Cargo aircraft: KC-135
Stratotanker; Air Force; 85[A]/77[B]; Helicopters: CH-47D Chinook;
Aircraft Service: Army; Goal: 75[A]/70[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F-14A Tomcat; Aircraft Service: Navy; Goal:
65[A]/50[B]; Electronic command/control: E-2C
Hawkeye; Navy; 70[A]/54[B]; Tankers/Cargo aircraft: KC-10 Extender;
Air Force; 85[A]/77[B]; Helicopters: OH-58D Kiowa; Aircraft Service:
Army; Goal: 75[A]/70[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F-14B Tomcat; Aircraft Service: Navy; Goal:
65[A]/50[B]; Electronic command/control: P-3C Orion;
Navy; 85[A]/61[B]; Tankers/Cargo aircraft: KC-130F Hercules; Marines;
72[A]/53[B]; Helicopters: SH-60B Seahawk; Aircraft Service: Navy;
Goal: 77[A]/58[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F-14 D Tomcat; Aircraft Service: Navy; Goal:
71[A]/61[B]; Electronic command/control: EA-6B
Prowler; Navy/ Marines; 73[A]/54[B]; Tankers/Cargo aircraft: KC-130R
Hercules; Marines; 75[A]/58[B]; Helicopters: SH-60F Seahawk; Aircraft
Service: Navy; Goal: 75[A]/60[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F/A-18A Hornet; Aircraft Service: Navy/
Marines; Goal: 75[A]/58[B]; Helicopters:
MH-53E Sea Dragon; Aircraft Service: Navy; Goal: 70[A]/60[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F/A-18C Hornet; Aircraft Service: Navy/
Marines; Goal: 75[A]/58[B]; Helicopters: CH-46E
Sea Knight; Aircraft Service: Marines; Goal: 80[A]/77[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F/A-18D Hornet; Aircraft Service: Marines;
Goal: 75[A]/58[B]; Helicopters: CH-53D Sea
Stallion; Aircraft Service: Marines; Goal: 73[A]/65[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: F/A-18E Super Hornet; Aircraft Service: Navy;
Goal: 75[A] /58[B]; Helicopters: CH-53E Super
Stallion; Aircraft Service: Marines; Goal: 70[A]/60[B].
Fighter/Attack aircraft: AV-8B Harrier; Aircraft Service: Marines;
Goal: 76[A]/70[B]; Helicopters: AH-1W Super
Cobra; Aircraft Service: Marines; Goal: 85[A]/75[B].
Helicopters: UH-1N Huey; Aircraft Service: Marines; Goal: 85[A]/75[B].
Source: Military services' records.
Legend: NA = not applicable.
[A] 2002 mission capable goal.
[B] 2002 full mission capable goal.
[End of table]
DOD Instruction 3110.5, dated September 1990, requires all military
services to establish quantitative availability goals and corresponding
condition status measurements for these aircraft and other mission-
essential systems and equipment. The goals established must estimate
the maximum aircraft performance that is achievable on the basis of the
aircraft's design characteristics and planned peacetime usage, and
assuming full funding and optimal operation of the peacetime manpower
and logistic support systems. Military personnel, civilian contractors,
or both may perform the required maintenance under these systems. The
instruction prescribes a basic set of condition status measures,
including FMC, partial MC, and MC, that each service must use to
describe the capability of systems or equipment. FMC indicates that an
aircraft has all of the mission-essential systems and equipment it
needs to perform all of its missions installed and operating safely.
Mission-essential systems are those required to perform primary
functions such as fire control, bombing, communications, electronic
countermeasures, or radar. Partial MC indicates that an aircraft has
the operable mission-essential equipment it needs to perform at least
one of its missions, but not all. For example, an aircraft expected to
be able to carry troops into combat during wartime in all weather
conditions, as well as to be able to fly humanitarian missions during
peacetime, would be considered partial MC if some of its equipment were
broken and it could fly only humanitarian missions in clear weather. MC
consists of the sum of the partial MC and FMC measures; that is, the
number of MC aircraft is equivalent to the sum of the aircraft rated
partial MC and the aircraft rated FMC. This report focuses on MC and
FMC goals because the Army, Navy/Marines, and parts of the Air Force do
not establish separate partial MC goals.
DOD Aircraft Experienced Widespread Problems in Meeting MC and FMC
Goals:
Many of DOD's key aircraft have been unable to meet their MC and FMC
goals since at least 1998. For example, during fiscal years 1998-2002,
only 23-35 percent of the 49 aircraft models we reviewed were able to
meet their MC goals, and 31-49 percent met their FMC goals.[Footnote 8]
In most cases, the actual rates were at least 5 percentage points below
the goals. Average MC and FMC rates varied by service and type of
aircraft. For example, the Army and Air Force had the highest average
MC rates, followed by the Marines and the Navy. These rates have
increased slightly since fiscal year 2001 in all services except the
Navy. Among aircraft types, the average MC rates varied from 60 to 80
percent. Average MC rates were the highest for helicopters, followed by
cargo aircraft and tankers, fighter/attack aircraft, bombers, and
electronic command/control aircraft. While the rates have fluctuated,
MC and FMC goals have generally remained constant over time. Since
1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a change
to their goals--and 7 of these changes were to raise the goals.
Less Than One-Half of the Aircraft Models Met Goals:
DOD's key, high-demand aircraft have experienced widespread
difficulties in meeting MC and FMC goals since at least 1998. (Appendix
I provides a full listing of MC and FMC goals, rates, and other
information by year for each aircraft model we reviewed.) For example,
during fiscal years 1998-2002, the percentage of aircraft models
meeting their MC goals never exceeded 35 percent. (See fig.
1.)[Footnote 9] During this period, the rates for the individual
aircraft models were more than 5 percentage points below their MC goals
in 62 percent of the cases. The percentage of aircraft models meeting
FMC goals during the same period ranged from 31 to 49 percentage
points, and 71 percent of the cases were more than 5 percentage points
below the goals.
Figure 1: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC and FMC Goals,
Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
At the service level, Army aircraft generally met their MC goals the
most frequently, followed by the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy.
(See fig. 2.) The same rank order held for FMC goals.
Figure 2: Percentage of Aircraft Models Meeting MC Goals by Service,
Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As previously shown in table 1, the level at which the goals were set
showed little consistency, varying widely even among the same type of
aircraft. For example, MC goals for the bombers in our review ranged
from 50 to 80 percent, and MC goals for the fighters, from 65 to 83
percent.
Actual MC Rates Varied by Service and Type of Aircraft:
Actual MC rates also varied between services and the various aircraft
types. MC and FMC rates are based on the ratio of the number of hours
an aircraft was actually available to the total number of hours it
could have been available. The Navy/Marines and Air Force reduce the
latter figure by the amount of time an aircraft was away for scheduled
depot maintenance, while the Army does not make this adjustment. We
computed the average rates by service and aircraft type from service
data on the total number of hours each aircraft model was MC and FMC,
and the total hours each aircraft model was available each year.
The average annual MC and FMC rates for the services as a whole are
shown in figures 3 and 4. The Army and the Air Force had the highest
average MC rates, at 77-83 percent during fiscal years 1998-2002;
followed by the Marines, at about 71-75 percent; and the Navy, at 61-67
percent. A similar pattern follows for the average FMC rates for the
services.
Figure 3: Average Annual MC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Average Annual FMC Rates by Service, Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
When grouped by type of aircraft, average annual MC rates were highest
for helicopters (76-80 percent), cargo/tankers (75-79 percent), and
fighter/attack aircraft (75-77 percent). Average annual MC rates for
bombers (64-69 percent) and electronic command/control aircraft (60-67
percent) were somewhat lower. Average FMC rates showed similar rank
orders. (See figs. 5 and 6.):
Figure 5: Average Annual MC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002:
[See PDF for image]
Note: EC/C refers to electronic command and control aircraft:
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Average Annual FMC Rates by Aircraft Type, Fiscal Years 1998-
2002:
[See PDF for image]
Note: EC/C refers to electronic command and control aircraft.
[End of figure]
Goals Generally Remained Constant over Time:
MC and FMC goals have generally remained constant over time. Since
1998, only 11 of 49 aircraft models (22 percent) experienced a change
to their MC goals, FMC goals, or both. Seven models had their goals
raised, and three had their goals lowered. One model's MC goal was
changed but then returned to its initial level. Ten of the 11 changes
were for aircraft operated by the Air Force. The remaining change was
for a Marine Corps aircraft. (See app. I for additional details.):
In fiscal year 2002, for example, the Air Force raised the MC goal for
its E-8 Joint Stars electronic command and control aircraft from 73 to
75 percent. According to officials, the E-8 is a relatively new (3-
year-old) aircraft that is slowly increasing its performance level as
it matures and Air Force maintenance personnel understand the aircraft
better. The increase in the MC rate was based on an analysis of actual
E-8 MC rates that were showing an upward trend in performance. The Air
Force is the only service that routinely conducts formal reviews of its
goals. Air Force officials told us that they generally try to keep the
goals high because it is difficult to stop the goals from dropping
further once they begin to be lowered. Moreover, officials believed
that contractors need to be held to high standards to keep spare parts
inventories and other aspects of maintenance at high levels. In another
case, the MC goal for the Marine Corps' F/A-18D Hornet fighter was
raised from 60 to 75 percent, and its FMC goal, from 46 to 58 percent
at the beginning of fiscal year 2000. According to Navy documents, this
increase was due to a change in the aircraft's assigned mission.
While most of the goals were either unchanged or increased, the Air
Force's Air Combat Command developed a set of interim goals in fiscal
year 2000 for some of the fighters, bombers, and electronic command/
control aircraft under its command. These interim goals were lower than
its official MC goals.[Footnote 10] In 1999, the Command determined
that problems with suppliers and manpower shortages were undercutting
its ability to meet MC goals and lowering unit morale. To combat this
problem, the Command developed the interim goals listed in table 2. In
2002, the Command returned to using the pre-2000 goals for all but six
aircraft (A-10, E-3, F-15 C/D, F-15 E, RC-135, and U-2). According to
Command officials, the lower goals applied only to their units. Goals
for suppliers remained at official levels to keep spare parts
inventories high. Neither the other services nor the Air Force's other
major commands responsible for aircraft operations have developed
interim goals.
Table 2: Air Combat Command Interim MC Goals, Fiscal Years 2000-2002:
Percent.
A-10; 2000: MC goal: 84; 2000: Interim goal: 74; 2001: MC goal: 84;
2001: Interim goal: 78; 2002: MC goal: 82; 2002: Interim goal: 78.
B-1; 2000: MC goal: 67; 2000: Interim goal: 57; 2001: MC goal: 67;
2001: Interim goal: 63; 2002: MC goal: 67; 2002: Interim goal: NA.
B-52; 2000: MC goal: 80; 2000: Interim goal: 79; 2001: MC goal: 80;
2001: Interim goal: NA; 2002: MC goal: 80; 2002: Interim goal: NA.
E-3; 2000: MC goal: 85; 2000: Interim goal: 73; 2001: MC goal: 85;
2001: Interim goal: 81; 2002: MC goal: 85; 2002: Interim goal: 83.
F-15 C/D; 2000: MC goal: 83; 2000: Interim goal: 75; 2001: MC goal: 83;
2001: Interim goal: 77; 2002: MC goal: 83; 2002: Interim goal: 81.
F-15 E; 2000: MC goal: 80; 2000: Interim goal: 75; 2001: MC goal: 80;
2001: Interim goal: 77; 2002: MC goal: 81; 2002: Interim goal: 77.
F-16; 2000: MC goal: 84; 2000: Interim goal: 79; 2001: MC goal: 84;
2001: Interim goal: 81; 2002: MC goal: 83; 2002: Interim goal: NA.
RC-135; 2000: MC goal: 75; 2000: Interim goal: 65; 2001: MC goal: 75;
2001: Interim goal: 72; 2002: MC goal: 75; 2002: Interim goal: 72.
U-2; 2000: MC goal: 85; 2000: Interim goal: 83; 2001: MC goal: 85;
2001: Interim goal: 84; 2002: MC goal: 85; 2002: Interim goal: 80.
Source: U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command.
Legend: NA = not applicable:
[End of table]
Mission Capable Problems Caused by a Combination of Factors:
According to DOD officials, difficulties in meeting MC and FMC goals
are caused by a complex combination of interrelated logistical and
operational factors, with no dominating single problem. The complexity
of aircraft design, the lack of availability and experience of
maintenance personnel, aircraft age and usage patterns, shortages of
spare parts, depot maintenance systems and other operational factors,
and perceived funding shortages were all identified as causes of
difficulties in meeting the goals. As indicated below, our work found
that some indicated factors were valid causes, while the impact of
others was less certain.
Aircraft Design Considered Key:
Officials believe that the complexity of military aircraft affects its
availability, and thus its ability to meet MC goals. Military aircraft
are designed to handle a specific set of missions and provide a
specific set of capabilities over a projected useful lifespan.
According to officials, each aircraft can be inherently complex and
maintenance intensive, or, depending upon the missions and capabilities
it was designed to provide, simple and easy to maintain. For example,
the B-2 bomber had the lowest MC rates (32-44 percent) of any aircraft
we reviewed. However, according to Air Combat Command officials, one
reason for these low rates is the complex design of the aircraft. The
B-2 is a very advanced aircraft with low observable (stealthy)
characteristics using new composite materials, and Air Force personnel
are still learning how to maintain the aircraft. In contrast, the B-52
bomber had some of the highest MC rates (76-84 percent) of all the
aircraft we reviewed. According to Air Force officials, the B-52 is a
relatively simple and flexible design intended for ease of maintenance
and durability.
Availability and Experience of Maintenance Personnel Have an Impact:
Service officials also frequently linked shortages of the total number
of maintenance personnel, as well as their experience level, to the
failure to meet MC goals. Navy officials told us that the growing
sophistication of their aircraft in general requires maintenance
personnel to take longer to learn the complex computer and electronic
skills needed to handle the aircraft. However, high demand for these
skills in the private sector makes it difficult to retain personnel
with these maintenance skills, leading to turnover and increasing the
difficulty in meeting the MC goals. Similarly, a recent study published
in the Air Force Journal of Logistics found that the number and
experience level of maintenance personnel correlated highly with the MC
rates of F-16 aircraft.[Footnote 11] As the number of experienced
personnel assigned to an aircraft increased, the MC rates increased as
well. Army officials also cited shortages of experienced maintenance
personnel as a cause of lower MC and FMC rates. However, they also
stated that it may be possible to raise the rates by maximizing the
time that maintenance personnel actually spend maintaining the
aircraft. For example, one Army Audit Agency study in 1998 found that
maintenance personnel at one unit were spending about 70 percent of
their time on nonmaintenance activities such as administrative duties,
training, and time attending to personal duties.[Footnote 12]
Personnel management is an area that we have cited as a major
management challenge and program risk for DOD.[Footnote 13] For years,
DOD has been wrestling with shortages of key personnel because of
retention problems. In 1999 we reported that the majority of factors
cited as sources of dissatisfaction and reasons to leave the military
were related to work circumstances, such as the lack of spare parts and
materials needed to perform daily job requirements.[Footnote 14]
Aircraft Age and Usage Patterns Also Believed to Influence
Availability:
The advancing age and usage patterns of aircraft were other factors
often cited by service officials as reasons why aircraft did not meet
MC goals. DOD's inventory of aircraft is getting older. The
Congressional Budget Office recently reported that from 1980 to 2000,
the average age of active-duty Navy aircraft rose from 11 years to more
than 16 years; Air Force aircraft, from 13 to more than 20 years; and
Army helicopters, from 10 to over 17 years.[Footnote 15] Logistics
officials told us that aging influences on MC rates typically follow a
cyclical pattern over the life of an aircraft. When aircraft are
initially introduced, they go through a "shake down" period and have
low MC rates as new equipment and supply systems stabilize and
maintenance personnel learn to understand the aircraft. Eventually, MC
rates begin to rise and then stabilize at a higher working level.
However, as more and more flying time is accrued over the passing
years, problems due to materials and parts fatigue, corrosion, and
obsolescence increase, and MC rates begin to fall again. Modernization
programs are then instituted to replace worn and obsolete equipment,
and the pattern begins again.
Although age may affect MC rates, we found no statistical evidence that
age alone explains difficulties in meeting MC goals. For example, our
analysis of average aircraft ages and 2002 MC rates found no indication
that older aircraft have the lowest MC rates. (See table 3.)[Footnote
16] With an average age of 40 years, the B-52 is the second oldest
aircraft in DOD's inventory. However, its MC rate of 81 for 2002 and
historical MC rates consistently in the upper 70s and low 80s rank it
among the highest performers we reviewed. According to Air Force
officials at the Air Combat Command, in addition to their simplicity,
B-52s have a relatively low number of actual flight hours, averaging
about 16,000 hours each despite their age. These officials believed
that accrued flight hours are a more appropriate measure of wear and
tear than chronological age. Moreover, according to these officials,
the B-52 was originally scheduled to retire in the mid-1990s. However,
because of its durability and flexibility, the Air Force decided to
retain the aircraft until the average age reaches 32,000 hours,
projected at about 2040.
Table 3: Aircraft Ages and 2002 MC Rates/Goals:
Aircraft: model: KC-130F; Average age (years): 40.1; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 64/72; Aircraft: model: F-14D; Average: age (years): 15.3;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 67/71.
Aircraft: model: B-52; Average age (years): 40.0; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 81/80; Aircraft: model: B-1; Average: age (years): 14.6;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 61/67.
Aircraft: model: KC-135; Average age (years): 39.6; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 82/85; Aircraft: model: CH-47D; Average: age (years): 14.4;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 75/75.
Aircraft: model: RC-135; Average age (years): 38.3; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 76/75; Aircraft: model: AH-64A; Average: age (years): 14.2;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 83/75.
Aircraft: model: C-141; Average age (years): 35.0; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 74/80; Aircraft: model: SH-60B; Average: age (years): 13.7;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 63/77.
Aircraft: model: CH-46E; Average age (years): 33.6; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 76/80; Aircraft: model: CH-53E; Average: age (years): 13.7;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 70/70.
Aircraft: model: CH-53D; Average age (years): 31.9; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 78/73; Aircraft: model: AH-1W; Average: age (years): 12.3;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 73/85.
Aircraft: model: C-130; Average age (years): 29.2; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 81/75; Aircraft: model: MH-53E; Average: age (years): 11.5;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 48/70.
Aircraft: model: UH-1N; Average age (years): 27.6; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 69/85; Aircraft: model: F-16; Average: age (years): 11.1;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 80/83.
Aircraft: model: S-3B; Average age (years): 26.2; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 43/70; Aircraft: model: F-117; Average: age (years): 10.7;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 83/80.
Aircraft: model: KC-130R; Average age (years): 25.4; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 65/75; Aircraft: model: SH-60F; Average: age (years): 10.6;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 54/75.
Aircraft: model: P-3C; Average age (years): 24.5; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 61/85; Aircraft: model: F-15E; Average: age (years): 10.2;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 76/81.
Aircraft: model: E-3; Average age (years): 22.0; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 74/85; Aircraft: model: F/A-18C-Navy; Average: age (years):
10.2; 2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 66/75.
Aircraft: model: F-14A; Average age (years): 21.0; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 69/65; Aircraft: model: F/A-18C-Marine; Average: age
(years): 10.2; 2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 82/75.
Aircraft: model: A-10; Average age (years): 20.1; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 76/82; Aircraft: model: E-2C; Average: age (years): 10.2;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 51/70.
Aircraft: model: C-5; Average age (years): 20.0; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 66/75; Aircraft: model: F/A-18D; Average: age (years): 9.6;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 78/75.
Aircraft: model: EA-6B-Navy; Average age (years): 19.8; 2002 MC rate/
goal (percent): 58/73; Aircraft: model: OH-58D; Average: age (years):
8.5; 2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 88/75.
Aircraft: model: EA-6B-Marine; Average age (years): 19.8; 2002 MC rate/
goal (percent): 68/73; Aircraft: model: UH-60L; Average: age (years):
7.6; 2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 84/80.
Aircraft: model: F-15C/D; Average age (years): 18.7; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 79/83; Aircraft: model: B-2; Average: age (years): 7.4; 2002
MC rate/goal: (percent): 44/50.
Aircraft: model: UH-60A; Average age (years): 18.4; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 76/80; Aircraft: model: AV-8B; Average: age (years): 7.0;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 71/76.
Aircraft: model: U-2; Average age (years): 18.3; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 76/85; Aircraft: model: C-17; Average: age (years): 4.1;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 83/88.
Aircraft: model: KC-10; Average age (years): 16.9; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 83/85; Aircraft: model: AH-64D; Average: age (years): 3.3;
2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 83/75.
Aircraft: model: F-14B; Average age (years): 16.0; 2002 MC rate/goal
(percent): 73/65; Aircraft: model: E-8; Average: age (years): 3.0; 2002
MC rate/goal: (percent): 84/75.
Aircraft: model: F/A-18A-Navy; Average age (years): 16.0; 2002 MC rate/
goal (percent): 62/75; Aircraft: model: F/A-18E; Average: age (years):
1.8; 2002 MC rate/goal: (percent): 71/75.
Aircraft: model: F/A-18A-Marine; Average age (years): 16.0; 2002 MC
rate/goal (percent): 80/75.
Source: Military services' data.
[End of table]
Logistics officials also believe that MC rates are affected by usage
patterns and whether the aircraft is operated under the conditions for
which it was designed. Officials told us that the large increase in
deployments in recent years has caused many DOD aircraft to be operated
at rates higher than expected during their design, thus accelerating
aging problems. For example, according to the Air Force Journal of
Logistics study, F-15 fighters sent to Saudi Arabia in 1997 were flown
at over three times their normal rate.[Footnote 17]
Spare Parts Inventories Critical:
Shortages of spare parts have been recognized by us and others for
years as a major contributor to lower-than-expected MC rates. As a
result, we have also cited DOD inventory management as a major
management challenge and program risk since 1990.[Footnote 18] Service
officials continued to cite spare parts shortages as a frequent cause
of difficulties in meeting MC goals. Spare parts shortages are caused
by a number of problems, including underestimates of demand, and
contracting and other problems associated with aging aircraft or small
aircraft fleets.
We have reported on DOD's problems in estimating aircraft spare parts
requirements for years. For example, in 1999 and again in 2001, we
reported that shortages of spare parts caused by inaccurate forecasting
of inventory requirements was degrading MC rates for key Air Force
aircraft such as the B-1B bomber, C-5 cargo planes, and F-16
fighters.[Footnote 19] In 2001 we reported that key Navy aircraft were
also having readiness problems because of spare parts shortages
resulting from underestimates of demand.[Footnote 20] Officials
continued to raise this issue as an underlying factor in spare parts
shortages. In addition, some officials also believed that the higher
operating tempos associated with increased deployments have caused
parts to fail quicker than expected, exacerbating weaknesses in
forecasting inventory requirements.
Air Force officials told us that aging aircraft, in particular, may
experience parts shortages and delays in repairs because original
manufacturers may no longer make required parts. To obtain a new part,
officials must wait for it to be manufactured. However, this may not be
a high priority for the commercial supplier because of the relatively
low profit potential. Alternatively, another company could make the
part if the original manufacturer were willing to give up its
proprietary rights. However, this can take longer and be more expensive
than simply waiting for the original manufacturer. Moreover, officials
also told us that spare parts inventories are sometimes reduced when
aircraft are nearing the end of their projected life. For example, Air
Force officials said that in the mid-1990s they began to shut down the
spare parts supply for the B-52 because of its anticipated retirement.
This resulted in a depletion of inventories, the canceling of
contracts, and ultimately a drop in MC rates from 1997 to 2000. As a
result of the decision to retain the B-52, the supply system is
recovering and MC rates are moving up.
Similarly, the size of the aircraft fleet can also influence spare
parts inventories and MC rates. According to officials, manufacturers
may see little profit in stocking large inventories of spare parts for
a small fleet of specialized military aircraft. Small fleets of
aircraft can also suffer from having their MC rates strongly influenced
by the MC failures of just a few aircraft. Large fleets of aircraft
also have an advantage in having more opportunities to remove
serviceable parts from one aircraft and install them in another--termed
"cannibalizing"--thus helping to insulate their MC rates from the
impact of parts shortages. However, we recently reported that while
cannibalization is a widespread practice among the services, it
increases maintenance personnel workloads and lowers morale and
retention.[Footnote 21]
Maintenance Approach and Other Operational Factors May Affect MC Rates:
Air Force and Navy officials cited changes to their maintenance
approaches as a significant cause of slower repair times and lowered MC
rates. In the mid-1990s the Air Force changed from a three-level
maintenance approach to a two-level approach.[Footnote 22] This change
moved much of the intermediate maintenance functions, such as the
replacement or emergency manufacture of parts, away from the air base
level to centralized maintenance depots. According to officials at both
the Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command, these changes slowed
the pace of repairs significantly. Repair expertise was taken away from
the base level, and aircraft were shipped away from home base more
often for repairs. Moreover, officials believed that many experienced
maintenance people were lost as they refused to move to other locations
associated with the reorganizations. In this regard, our 1996 review of
depot closures noted that DOD's outplacement program helped limit the
number of involuntary separations and that jobs were often available
for employees willing to relocate.[Footnote 23]
The Army continues to use a three-level maintenance system, as does the
Navy. However, Navy officials said they also changed their system in
the mid-1990s by introducing the integrated maintenance concept. This
approach, in contrast to the Air Force approach, increased the amount
of aircraft modernization and other work performed at the base level
during a time when funding for depot-level work was being reduced.
However, officials believed this change overloaded the base-level
maintenance systems and ultimately lowered reported MC rates.
From fiscal year 1988 to fiscal 2001, DOD reduced the number of major
depots from 38 to 19. During this same period, the maintenance
workforce was reduced by about 60 percent (from 156,000 to 64,500).
These reductions were the result of overall force structure reductions
since the end of the Cold War, as well as DOD's desire to reduce costs
by relying more on the private sector for the performance of depot
maintenance. We have raised concerns that DOD's downsizing of its depot
infrastructure and workforce was done without sound strategic planning
and that investments in facilities, equipment, and personnel in recent
years have not been sufficient to ensure the long-term viability of the
depots.[Footnote 24]
Other operational factors can also affect MC rates. For example, from
1997 to 2000, the Air Force's B-1 bomber had a major power system
problem that lowered MC rates by 12 points. To address the problem, the
Air Combat Command instituted a system of frequent video
teleconferences between the offices involved in the maintenance
response to provide more intensive management of the response. This
approach worked, as the MC rate climbed by 9 points by 2002. Management
integration between the operations and logistics sides of the
organization was also viewed as key. Good coordination between these
two groups is essential because of the complex and multifaceted causes
of MC problems. Finally, Air Force officials noted that some of the
problems with Air Force MC rates could be explained by a change in
reporting procedures. During the mid-1990s, the Air Force returned an
aircraft to MC status after it was repaired but prior to the actual
check flight to ensure that it was operating correctly. Now, the
aircraft must pass the check flight before being classified as MC.
Officials believe that this change would tend to lower MC rates
slightly.
Funding Levels Raise Concerns:
Officials from all services cited underfunding of spare parts
inventories, maintenance depots, and other aspects of the maintenance
and supply systems as a key problem. For example, Army and Navy
officials told us that they often use remanufactured parts instead of
new parts to save money.
DOD reports in its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report that it has
increased funding for spare parts and depot maintenance
requirements.[Footnote 25] For example, the report indicates that
funding for depot maintenance increased from $5.58 billion to $7.01
billion from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal 1999 (most recent year that
data are available). However, the report also acknowledges an unfunded
requirement of about $1.18 billion in fiscal year 1999. Notwithstanding
claims regarding the lack of funding for spare parts, we recently
reported that when provided additional funds for spare parts, DOD was
unable to confirm that those additional funds were used for that
purpose.[Footnote 26]
The pressures for more funding to maintain DOD's aircraft may well go
up even more in coming years as the aircraft inventory continues to
age. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that spending for
operations and maintenance for aircraft increases by 1 to 3 percent for
every additional year of age.[Footnote 27]
DOD'S Goal-Setting Process Is Largely Undefined and Undocumented:
Despite the importance of MC and FMC goals as measures of readiness and
logistical funding needs, we found widespread uncertainty over how the
services' MC and FMC goals were established and who is responsible for
establishing them, as well as basic questions about the adequacy of
those goals as measures of aircraft availability. The services could
not explain and document how the original MC and FMC goals were set for
any of the aircraft in our review. Furthermore, some officials
questioned which goals are the best to use in reviewing aircraft
availability: MC goals, FMC goals, or perhaps a new type of goal. DOD's
instruction provides little or no guidance on these and other key
issues. DOD officials told us that the instruction has not been updated
to reflect the current environment of increased deployments and other
changes since the end of the Cold War.
Goals Are Important Indicators of Readiness, Operational Effectiveness,
and Logistical Funding Needs:
MC and FMC goals are used as fundamental measures of readiness
throughout DOD, used as indicators of operational effectiveness, and
used to help determine the size of spare parts inventories and other
logistical resources needed to maintain aircraft availability. As a
result, the level at which the goals are set can influence not only
perceptions about operations and readiness, but also millions of
dollars in spending for logistical operations.
In addition to the requirement to maintain MC and FMC data set forth by
DOD Instruction 3110.5, the services use MC and FMC measures as a
component of overall unit readiness determinations under DOD's Global
Status of Resources and Training System.[Footnote 28] The System
requires commanders to rate their unit's readiness at levels 1
(highest) through 5 on the basis of a combination of their professional
judgment and the readiness ratings in four specific areas: personnel,
training, equipment on hand, and equipment condition. MC and FMC
measures are used to determine the ratings for equipment condition. For
example, the Army measures equipment condition (termed "serviceability"
by the Army) for aircraft by using the FMC rate. An FMC rate of 75
percent or more is required for a level-1 readiness rating, the highest
available. Congress also requires DOD to include Status of Resources
and Training System information on the condition of equipment as well
as specific information on equipment that is not mission capable in its
quarterly readiness reports to Congress. These reports assist Congress
in its general responsibilities for overseeing DOD readiness and
operations.
Similarly, according to DOD and service officials, MC and FMC goals are
used as management tools within DOD units to diagnose problems and
motivate personnel. For example, officials in the Air Combat Command
told us that their use of lower interim goals beginning in fiscal year
2000 was an attempt to raise unit morale that had suffered as a result
of their inability to meet the actual goals owing to shortages of
personnel and spare parts. In this regard, DOD's instruction
specifically calls for the services to use the goals and condition
status measurements, such as MC and FMC, to review maintenance and
supply effectiveness and to have programs to identify and correct
problems with systems and equipment.
Service officials told us that the goals also affect DOD's funding
levels because the goals are used to help determine the size of spare
parts inventories and other logistical resources needed. Higher goals
require more money to maintain parts inventories and other resources
needed to achieve the goals. For example, officials told us that in the
early 1990s, a $100 million contract for logistics support for one Air
Force aircraft contained an MC goal of 90 percent. During this period,
the contractor kept supply bins full of parts and MC goals were met.
However, in the mid-1990s a new contractor was brought in, and the MC
goal was dropped to 85 percent. According to Air Force officials, their
decision to lower the MC goal by 5 percentage points allowed the
contractor to lower spare parts inventories and reduced the price of
the maintenance contract by $10 million. However, MC rates also dropped
and eventually fell below the new goal. The services have developed
mathematical models to determine the size and cost of the spare parts
inventories needed to support various levels of MC and FMC goals and
other measures of aircraft availability. For example, the Navy uses a
model called "Readiness Based Sparing" that takes a given FMC goal and
determines the level of funding and spare parts inventories needed to
reach that goal. Such models are useful in the case of spare parts
inventories. However, we were not able to identify any models in
widespread operational use that integrated the other influences on MC
rates, such as maintenance personnel assigned, into an overall model
able to predict the impact of changes in those resources on MC and FMC
rates. Army and Air Force officials told us that they had recently
developed such integrated models, and they are currently in limited use
to test their validity. Navy officials told us that they did not yet
have an integrated model.
The potential amount of funds affected by the level at which MC and FMC
goals are set is large. Military service estimates of the spending of
operations and maintenance funds for aircraft spares and repair parts
were over $7 billion in fiscal year 2001.[Footnote 29] This figure does
not include spending from other sources such as procurement and working
capital funds.
Methods Used to Set Goals Unknown:
Precisely how MC and FMC goals are established is unknown. DOD
officials said that a combined DOD and military service team
establishes operational requirements and MC goals during the
acquisition process. After approval, these requirements are recorded in
the Operational Requirements Document or other documents associated
with the process. According to officials, part of this process involves
an engineering analysis of the expected operational availability of the
aircraft and the underlying level of maintenance support elements
needed. "Operational availability" is an engineering term referring to
the probability that equipment is not down owing to failure.[Footnote
30] In comparison, MC and FMC goals represent the expected percentage
of time that an aircraft will be able to perform at least one or all of
its missions, respectively.
Service officials reviewed the acquisition documents for many of the
aircraft in our review, but were unable to explain and document how the
actual MC and FMC goals were chosen. According to officials, many of
these aircraft were acquired 20 to 30 years ago, under processes that
have changed over the years, and with no clear documentation of the
basis for the specific goal chosen. Moreover, there was often confusion
over which organizations were responsible for setting the goals.
For example, Navy officials pointed to a 1996 Center for Naval Analyses
study that attempted to determine how the MC and FMC goals for Navy
aircraft were originally computed.[Footnote 31] According to the study,
however, "no one knows the origin of the numbers or the method used to
compute them. Now, the numbers are routed to knowledgeable people for
revision, which are made without documenting the rationale for the
changes." In a July 17, 2002, letter to us, the Navy further explained
that it believed that the MC goals were established in the early 1980s
"to be in line with the reported status quo for the day" with "no
analytical rigor applied at the time of their birth." We requested a
written explanation of how the goals were set because, despite repeated
referrals to various offices over several months, no Navy official
could explain how the goals were established or identify the
responsible office. According to Navy officials, there was uncertainty
between the program and policy offices as to who is responsible for
establishing the goals and who should answer our questions.
Similarly, Army officials could not explain how their goals were set,
and two separate Army organizations believed the other was responsible
for setting the goals. The Army's written response to our request for
an explanation of how the goals were set (dated July 31, 2002) was
prepared by officials from the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and
forwarded to us by a letter from the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics. The Deputy Chief of Staff's letter states that MC
goals for Army aircraft are extracted from the System Readiness
Objective contained in the Operational Requirements Document
established during an aircraft's acquisition, and that the Training and
Doctrine Command is responsible for establishing the System Readiness
Objectives.[Footnote 32] However, the Training and Doctrine Command's
letter states that it does not set System Readiness Objectives and that
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics is responsible for establishing
readiness goals. Nonetheless, the Training and Doctrine Command
researched the operational requirements documents for the Army aircraft
in our review in an attempt to answer our question about how the MC and
FMC goals were set. The Command's letter identified the operational
availability requirements for most of the aircraft but did not explain
how these requirements were set or make any reference to the MC or FMC
goals. Officials from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics told us that the Army is considering changing the FMC goals
for all its aircraft to 75 percent to match the requirement for the
highest-level readiness rating for equipment serviceability under the
Global Status of Resources and Training System's criterion. They did
not know how the 75-percent-readiness-rating criterion was chosen.
Air Force officials also could not explain how the initial MC and FMC
goals for their aircraft were established. Officials from the Air
Combat Command--responsible for Air Force fighters, bombers, and
electronic command/control aircraft in our review--told us that they
could find no historical record of the process used to establish most
of the goals. Similarly, officials from the Air Mobility Command--
responsible for the cargo and tanker aircraft--stated that the Command
was formed in 1992 out of elements from the Military Airlift and
Strategic Air Commands and did not know how the previous Commands had
established the goals. According to these officials, each of the major
Commands that operate aircraft and other major weapon systems in the
Air Force is responsible for establishing its own MC goals, and no one
has published a standardized methodology to use. Moreover, some of the
documentation related to the goals was lost when the Military Airlift
and Strategic Air Commands were deactivated. Similar to the Navy,
however, officials from both Commands believed that the goals were set
on the basis of the historical performance of similar aircraft and/or
subjective Command judgments.
While Air Force officials could not explain how the initial goals were
established, they told us that their annual reviews of the goals are
based on a mix of historical trend analysis and requirements reviews.
The Air Force is the only service that conducts formal reviews of its
goals each year. According to officials from the Air Mobility and Air
Combat Commands, until 1997-98, reviews of the goals in both Commands
were based on an analysis of actual historical MC and FMC rates. For
example, analysts at the Air Mobility Command compared the goals with
the actual rates for the previous 2 years. Depending upon actual
performance, the goal could then be changed, sometimes on the basis of
subjective judgments. According to Air Combat Command officials, the MC
goal for the B-2 bomber was set in fiscal year 2000 using an analysis
of historical rates and command judgment. The first B-2 was delivered
in 1993.
In 1997-98, the two Air Force Commands began to develop so-called
"requirements-based analyses" to review the standards. According to
officials at the Air Combat Command, for example, it was recognized
that the historical approach to reviewing the standards can perpetuate
relatively low standards because it simply accepts the low funding
levels and other problems that may lower MC rates without focusing on
actual mission needs. The new approach attempts to factor in wartime
operational requirements, peacetime flying hour requirements for pilot
training, and other such requirements. A mix of both approaches is
currently used by the commands to review the goals.
The services also differed in their treatment of other important
aspects of managing the goals, such as whether to vary the goals on the
basis of an aircraft's deployment posture. The Navy was the only
service to tier its goals on the basis of its traditional practice of
cyclical deployment schedules on board its ships and aircraft carriers.
Operational aircraft in the Navy follow a cyclical pattern of deploying
to sea on aircraft carriers and other vessels for a set period of time,
such as 6 months. Once the deployed units are replaced, they experience
a stand-down period during which they recover from the rigors of
deployment until it is time to begin preparing for the next movement.
The Navy varies the intensity of its maintenance and its MC and FMC
goals according to this pattern. Navy aircraft more than 90 days away
from a deployment have goals that are 5 percentage points lower than
aircraft within 90 days of a deployment, and aircraft actually deployed
have goals that are 5 percentage points higher than those within 90
days of deploying.[Footnote 33] In comparison, aircraft in the Marine
Corps[Footnote 34] and other services have a level approach to
maintenance where the goals do not vary, and maintenance is kept at a
relatively constant level. Navy officials believed that the cyclical
approach to maintenance could lower overall MC rates over time compared
with the level approach. This is because of the reduced maintenance
attention when the aircraft are not deployed.
Adequacy of MC and FMC Goals Questioned:
Some officials questioned whether the MC and FMC goals are adequate
measures of an aircraft's availability. For example, officials from the
Air Force's Air Mobility Command stated that they focused on the MC
goal and not the FMC goal because their primary readiness objective is
the specific mission currently assigned, not every possible mission the
aircraft was designed for. Moreover, the Air Combat Command did not
even establish FMC goals. This Command was the only one we reviewed
that did not set FMC goals for its aircraft. Air Combat Command
officials told us that they could find no documentation to explain why
the Command did not establish FMC goals.
In contrast, Army officials stated that their units focus primarily on
the FMC goal because it is directly connected to readiness ratings
under the Status of Resources and Training System. Furthermore, Navy
officials stated that the military is moving away from the MC and FMC
goals in newer aircraft, such as the Joint Strike Fighter. This is
because the MC and FMC goals provide only a limited historical
perspective and do not address issues that are important to war-
fighting commanders such as how often an aircraft can fly missions over
the course of a day and the probability that the aircraft will complete
its mission. The Joint Strike Fighter, for example, is using a concept
called "mission reliability" instead of MC and FMC goals. Mission
reliability is the probability that the Joint Strike Fighter will
complete its required operational mission without a failure. According
to Navy officials, the predictive value and information on flight
frequency and reliability provided by this new measure is very valuable
to war-fighting commanders and is better for mission-planning purposes
than the MC and FMC measures. Officials said that the mission-
reliability concept could be used throughout DOD's inventory of
aircraft.
DOD Instruction Provides Little or No Guidance on Key Issues:
DOD Instruction 3110.5 provides only vague or no guidance on many of
the key issues raised in this report. For example, the instruction
requires each military service to establish availability goals for its
mission-essential systems and equipment, and a corresponding set of
condition status measures relative to those goals. The instruction
specifically identifies MC, FMC, and other specific capabilities as
measures that the services must maintain. However, it does not identify
the specific goals that must be established--MC, FMC, or any other--or
the primary readiness objective to be served. In this regard, the
instruction states that the services should assume planned peacetime
usage in setting the goals. According to Air Force officials, peacetime
usage can be more taxing than wartime usage because of the extra
training and other requirements. Air Combat Command officials told us
that they believed that the instruction regarding what goals--including
the FMC goal--were required to be established was unclear.
The instruction also provides little guidance on the methodology to be
used in setting the goals. It states that the services should provide
estimates of the maximum performance that is achievable, given the
design characteristics of the aircraft, and that full funding and
optimal operation of the logistics support system should be assumed.
Service officials said they believe that actual levels of funding,
personnel, spare parts inventories, and other key resources should be
factored into the process of setting the goals, since full funding has
not been provided for years. The instruction is silent on the issue of
whether it is appropriate to use historical trends of similar aircraft
in determining the goals, as opposed to a more analytical approach
using actual requirements, for example. The instruction is also silent
on whether the aircraft availability goals should vary on the basis of
the aircraft's deployment posture. Moreover, it includes no requirement
for the services to identify the readiness and cost implications of
setting the goals at different levels, to help clarify the pros and
cons of available choices and the guiding principles used to decide on
those choices.
Similarly, the instruction provides little organizational structure for
the goal-setting process in DOD. For example, it does not require the
services to identify one office as the coordinating organization for
goal-setting and other related activities. Furthermore, it does not
require the services to document the basis for the goals chosen or
outline any of the basic historical documentation that should be
maintained for goal-setting and other key activities during the
process.
According to DOD officials from the office responsible for the
instruction, DOD Instruction 3110.5 dates back to the 1970s when
readiness concerns had reached a high point. The focus was on getting
the services to set benchmark readiness goals, and the instruction gave
them latitude to choose those goals, the methods for setting them, and
the processes for managing them. The instruction was revised in 1990.
However, officials told us that it has not been updated to reflect the
current environment of frequent deployments and other changes since the
end of the Cold War, and some now consider it a relic.
We performed our work from February through November 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. The final
publication of this report was delayed by the impact on DOD's report
review and classification process of the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001 and DOD's preparations for potential conflict in Iraq.
Conclusions:
While many of DOD's key aircraft are not meeting MC and FMC goals, it
is difficult to determine how significant this problem is because of
the uncertainty and lack of documentation of the basis for the existing
goals. Moreover, without knowing the basis for the existing goals, it
is also difficult to know whether that basis is appropriate for the
demands of the new defense strategy.
DOD's Instruction 3110.5 fails to clearly define the specific
availability goals that all services must establish. Without the
perspective provided by clear, consistent, and up-to-date goals, the
perceptions of actual performance are subject to continuing uncertainty
and disagreement, and confidence in the funding requests based on those
perceptions is undermined. Moreover, the lack of a standard methodology
for the services to use in setting the goals removes a safeguard for
objectivity from the process, risking the possibility that the methods
used do not realistically reflect actual requirements. This risk is
increased when there is uncertainty or disagreement over basic
questions such as whether it is appropriate to base the goals on a
historical analysis or an analysis of actual requirements, and whether
full funding of logistical support systems should be assumed in an era
of reduced funding. Furthermore, the absence of information on the
readiness and cost implications of setting the goals at different
levels results in a lack of understanding of the pros and cons of
available choices and the guiding principles used to make those
decisions. Ultimately, inappropriately set goals can unnecessarily
raise or lower the cost of spare parts inventories and other logistical
resources by millions of dollars.
Also, DOD's instruction requires the services neither to designate one
office to coordinate the establishment and maintenance of aircraft
availability goals, nor to document the basis for the goals chosen or
other key issues in the process. Clear responsibilities and
requirements in these areas are fundamental to the effective management
of any performance system. Without the transparency provided by
adequate documentation of the process, neither DOD nor the Congress can
be reasonably assured that the services have selected the optimal goals
on the basis of preferred principles.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that aircraft availability goals and their performance
measures are appropriate to the new defense strategy and based on a
clear and defined process, we recommend that (1) DOD and the services
determine whether different types of aircraft availability goals are
needed, (2) as appropriate, DOD and the services validate the basis for
the existing MC and FMC goals, and (3) the Secretary of Defense revise
DOD Instruction 3110.5 to:
* clearly define the specific aircraft availability goals required to
be established by the military services and their accompanying
performance measures;
* establish a standard methodology identifying objective principles of
analysis to be used by all services in setting the goals, including an
identification of the readiness and cost implications of setting the
goals at different levels; and:
* require each service to identify one office to act as a focal point
for coordinating the development of the goals and for maintaining a
documentary record of the basis for the goals chosen and other key
decisions in the goal-setting process.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or
partially concurred with all our recommendations. The department agreed
to determine whether different types of aircraft availability goals are
needed, including the option of tailoring such goals to unique military
service and mission requirements. DOD also agreed to validate the basis
for the existing goals, including the DOD Instruction 3110.5
requirement that full funding of support systems be assumed in
establishing availability goals. In addition, DOD indicated that it
would explore alternative methodologies for setting goals, such as one
based on unit deployment cycles currently in use by the Navy.
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation for a series of
revisions to DOD Instruction 3110.5. It agreed with our recommendation
that the instruction be revised to require each service to designate a
focal point for the development and historical documentation of the
goal-setting process. However, DOD did not agree with the part of our
recommendation calling for it to include the performance measures
associated with the aircraft availability goals in the instruction. DOD
believed that that requirement implied that those performance measures
should be the sole or primary measure of the overall state of materiel
readiness. That was not our intent. Our recommendation is meant to
ensure that the goals and accompanying performance/status measures
selected are clearly defined in the instruction. As pointed out in the
report, this is not currently the case. We agree that determinations of
overall materiel readiness require the consideration of a variety of
factors, such as maintenance manning and supply fill rates, as well as
metrics such as an aircraft's availability. However, we believe that
the instruction should continue its current requirement to include
performance/condition status measures relative to those goals. Clearly
identifying the goals that are sought and their performance measures in
the instruction will help avoid further uncertainty and disagreement
over the level of basic aircraft performance, and does not preclude the
consideration of other metrics in broader assessments of overall
readiness. For these reasons, we believe no change to our
recommendation is needed.
DOD also disagreed with the part of our recommendation calling for the
Secretary of Defense to revise the instruction to establish a standard
methodology identifying objective principles of analysis to be used in
setting the goals. It believed that the services should establish the
detailed analytical methodology because the types of goals and their
basis may vary by service, and the services have a better understanding
of the differences and complexities of their individual environments.
We agree with the need for some leeway at the service level to handle
individual differences between them. However, we continue to believe
that all services should adhere to a standardized set of overarching
principles of analysis in order to safeguard objectivity and
transparency in the goal setting process. Such principles could be
identified in coordination with the services during the department's
planned evaluation of the basis for the current goals and alternative
methodologies. The services could then develop detailed methodologies
consistent with these principles but tailored to their individual
environments. Consequently, no change to our recommendation is
required.
The department's comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the
appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps;
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will
be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Please contact me at (757) 552-8100 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Neal P. Curtin
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management Team:
Signed by Neal P. Curtin:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Mission Capable Goals and Rates, Fiscal Years 1991-2002:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Military service data.
Legend: MC = mission capable, FMC = fully mission capable, FY= fiscal
year, EC/C = electronic command and control.
Notes: We used the "overall" MC and FMC goal for Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft, which is a combined goal for the various categories of
deployment status used by the Navy and Marines in rating aircraft
availability.
Fiscal year 2002 rates are as of February for the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps, and March 31 for the Air Force.
Aircraft ages are as of September 30, 2001 for the Navy/Marines;
December 31, 2001, for the Air Force; and April 2002 for the Army.
Aircraft costs/flying hour are as of January 2001 for the Army, and
September 30, 2001, for the Air Force, Navy, and Marines.
[A] No data or only partial cost/flying hour data available.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To identify Department of Defense (DOD) and service policies and
practices regarding mission capable (MC) goals and rates, we obtained
briefings, reviewed DOD and service regulations and prior reports by us
and others; and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary of
Defense: the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; headquarters offices
of the Army, Navy/Marine Corps, and Air Force; and aviation commands
and other locations as appropriate.
To determine whether key DOD aircraft were meeting established MC and
FMC goals, we requested that each service identify its key active-duty
operational aircraft. We excluded reserve units from the scope of our
review, as well as active-duty training units and executive aircraft
used to transport officials on official business. The resultant list
included a total of 46 different models of aircraft from the four
military services, which we categorized into five basic types: bombers,
cargo/tanker aircraft, electronic command/control aircraft, fighter/
attack aircraft, and helicopters. Three aircraft models (F/A-18A, F/A-
18C, and EA-6B) were used by both the Navy and Marine Corps. For our
review, we counted the Navy and Marine Corps versions of these aircraft
as separate models, resulting in a total of 49 aircraft models for
review. We requested MC and full mission capable (FMC) goal and rate
data, aircraft age and cost, and other data for these aircraft back to
1991 to provide a historical perspective on goal and rate history. The
Army and Air Force provided comprehensive data from fiscal year 1991 to
mid-fiscal year 2002. However, the Navy and Marine Corps could provide
data separated by service only from fiscal year 1998 forward. These
services changed their reporting system in 1998 and were unable to
provide comparable data for prior years. As a result, we focused our
report on the 5-year period beginning in fiscal year 1998. However, we
included the full array of Army and Air Force data in appendix I. We
used these data to conduct analyses of whether the aircraft were
meeting their goals. We also provided each service with these databases
for review, and they confirmed the results for accuracy.
To identify the causes of difficulties in meeting MC and FMC goals, we
reviewed prior reports by us and others and conducted a variety of
comparative analyses of our data by service, aircraft type, model, age,
cost, and fiscal year. We then held discussions with each service to
gain their perspectives on the causes of observed difficulties in
meeting the goals.
To determine whether DOD has a clear and defined process for setting MC
and FMC goals, we reviewed DOD Instruction 3110.5 and other regulations
and conducted discussions with officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and service headquarters in Washington, D.C., and
with officials from the headquarters of the Air Force's Air Mobility
and Air Combat Commands; the Naval Air Systems Command; and Army
Training and Doctrine Command officials at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
Because of the difficulty in obtaining clear information on this issue,
we also wrote formal letters of inquiry to the Secretaries of the Army
and Navy requesting clarification of how the goals were established.
Their responses to those letters of inquiry were used in preparing our
report.
We performed our work from February through November 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. The final
publication of this report was delayed by the impact on DOD's report
review and classification process of the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, and DOD's preparations for potential conflict in Iraq.
[End of section]
Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense:
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS
3500 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3500:
FEB 26 2003:
Mr. Neal P. Cumin:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Cumin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-03-3000, "MILITARY READINESS: DoD Needs a Clear and Defined
Process for Setting Aircraft Availability Goals in the New Security
Environment," dated November 27, 2002 (GAO Code 350147).":
The Department concurs with recommendations 1 and 2, while partially
concurring with recommendation 3. An explanation of the DoD position is
enclosed. Additionally, since portions of the draft report supporting
the recommendations could be misleading, technical comments are
provided to improve the accuracy and clarity of the draft report. The
Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Beckett Principal Assistant:
Signed by Allen W. Beckett:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO CODE 350147/GAO-03-300C:
"MILITARY READINESS: DOD NEEDS A CLEAR AND DEFINED PROCESS FOR SETTING
AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY GOALS IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MoD) COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the DoD and the Services
determine whether different types of aircraft availability goals are
needed.
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD (L&MR), in coordination with the
Services, will determine the need for aircraft availability goals for
different types of aircraft, consistent with the current defense
strategy. Consideration will be given to goal categories (e.g., MC,
FMC, PMC) tailored for unique Service and mission requirements. For
example, the draft report states that the Army prefers FMC goals and
its linkage to their readiness reporting system) while the Air Force's
Air Mobility Command prefers MC goals due to the primary mission of its
aircraft. Further, DUSD (L&MR) will consider selected alternatives to
aircraft availability goals, as may be requested by the Services, such
as the potential use of a mission reliability goal for the Joint Strike
Fighter. Finally, DoD will examine the desirability of establishing new
aircraft availability goals for legacy systems. Appropriate DoD policy
documents will be revised to incorporate any changes resulting from
this effort.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that DoD and the Services
validate the basis for existing MC and FMC goals.
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. DUSD (L&MR), in coordination with the Services,
will validate the basis for the aircraft availability goals and, if
required, will develop, coordinate, and disseminate revised DOD policy
guidance. The existing basis contained in DODI 3110.5, Materiel
Condition Reporting for Mission-Essential Systems and Equipment,
(maximum availability achievable with optimal resourcing and peacetime
usage), will be evaluated in light of its relevance to the current
defense strategy. Alternatives that DUSD (L&MR) will explore include a
mission requirements-based methodology; a blend of the maximum
availability and mission requirements-based methods; and the use of
flexible goals (such as the Navy's which are based on the unit's
deployment cycle).
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
revise DoD Instruction 3110.5 to:
* (a) clearly define the specific aircraft availability goals required
to be established by the Military Services and their accompanying
performance measures;
* (b) establish a standard methodology identifying objective principles
of analysis to be used by all Services in setting the goals, including
an identification of the readiness and cost implications of setting the
goals at different levels, and;
* (c) require each service to identify one office to act as a focal
point for coordinating development of the goals and for maintaining a
documentary record of the basis for the goals chosen and other key
decisions in the goal setting process.
DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. DUSD (L&MR) and the Services will
consider a number of issues relevant to aircraft availability goals in
response to Recommendation 3. The issues that will be addressed include
the following:
* (a) While aircraft availability is an important metric, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Services routinely use it in
conjunction with other key metrics (e.g., Customer Wait Time,
cannibalization, maintenance manning, supply fill rates, MICAP
incidents, and aircraft-in-depot status) to assess the overall state of
materiel readiness. In addition, the importance of aircraft
availability goals is being considered as part of an on-going study
that will identify a balanced set of key materiel readiness metrics for
use by the DUSD (L&MR).
* (b) While the GAO draft report only addressed active duty aircraft,
any DoD policy guidance must consider aircraft from the Active and the
Reserve Components as well as other mission-essential weapon systems
and equipment including ground combat vehicles and ships.
* (c) The degree that aircraft availability goals are used as the basis
for resourcing (via the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) as
opposed to more common methods such as annual flying hour programs and
aircraft sustainability modeling.
In addition, any revised DoD guidance may be promulgated in a document
other than DODI 3110.5.
With respect to the actions in RECOMMENDATION 3 pertaining to revision
of DoD Instruction 3110.5:
DoD response to 3 (a): Per the DoD responses to recommendations 1 and
2, DUSD (L&MR) and the Services will determine the need for different
types) of aircraft availability and/or mission reliability goals and
the basis for such goals. However, DUSD (L&MR) does not concur with the
inclusion of other performance measures in DoDI 3110.5. The degree that
designated aircraft availability/mission reliability goals are (or are
not) met should be measured by OSD and the Services in concert with
other key metrics and form the basis for a more complete assessment of
materiel readiness. Focusing solely on a performance measure for
aircraft availability would distort that assessment.
DoD response to 3 (b): DUSD (L&MR), in coordination with the Services,
will review appropriate policy document(s) to ensure sufficient overall
readiness goals are available for the Services to set their respective
aircraft availability/mission reliability goals. OSD will review
overall Service readiness plans and programs as part of the annual
budget preparation. Because the types and bases for goals may vary by
(and possibly within) each Service, detailed analytical methodology
should be retained by the Services. The Services are responsible for
the logistical support and operational employment of the Department's
weapon systems, and they best understand the differences in complexity
of those systems and how they are employed in support of operational
requirements. Spares funding, manpower/skill level issues, depot
capacity, and wartime tasking are just a few of the Service level
factors that impact goals and readiness and are clearly understood at
the Service level. In addition, the factors influencing establishing
goals at different levels (such as age, complexity, mission
requirement, and unit operational priority) are numerous and dynamic
and thus better addressed in Service-controlled guidance.
DoD response to 3 (c): DUSD (L&MR) will revise appropriate policy
document(s) to include the establishment of the requirement for the
Services to designate focal points for the development, periodic
review, and historical documentation of aircraft availability and/or
mission requirement goals.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
William C. Meredith (retired) John W. Nelson (404) 679-1949:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, Bernice Benta, Katherine Chenault,
and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] See Department of Defense Instruction 3110.5, Materiel Condition
Reporting for Mission-Essential Systems and Equipment, Sept. 14, 1990.
[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Air
Transport Capability Falls Short of Requirements, GAO/NSIAD-00-135
(Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2000).
[3] We focused our report on fiscal years 1998-2002 because the Navy
and Marine Corps changed their reporting system in 1998 and were unable
to provide data separated by service for previous years. (The Marine
Corps is a separate service under the Department of the Navy and
follows Navy regulations governing MC and FMC goals and performance
measures.). Appendix I provides MC and FMC data for all services,
including Army and Air Force data back to fiscal year 1991.
[4] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Depot Maintenance:
Management Improvements Needed for Backlog of Funded Contract
Maintenance Work, GAO-02-623 (Washington, D.C.; June 20, 2002).
[5] See DOD Instruction 3110.5.
[6] Three models (F/A-18A, F/A-18C, and EA-6B) were used by both the
Navy and Marines. For our analyses, the Navy and Marine versions of
each were considered to be separate models.
[7] To determine which aircraft should be included in the scope of our
review, we used listings of key active duty aircraft provided by each
service. We excluded aircraft operated by reserve units from the scope
of our review, as well as active duty aircraft used for training and
for transporting service officials on official business.
[8] FMC goals appear to be more difficult to meet because aircraft must
be capable of performing more missions to meet them than MC goals.
However, since the FMC goals were always lower, this resulted in higher
percentages of aircraft models meeting the FMC goals in fiscal years
1998-2001. For example, current MC goals range from 3 to 30 percentage
points higher than FMC goals, with an average difference of 13
percentage points.
[9] The services provided overall yearly MC and FMC rates for each
aircraft model we reviewed. We computed the percentage of aircraft
models meeting their MC and FMC goals by taking the ratio of the total
number of aircraft models meeting the goal in that year to the total
number of aircraft models that could have met the goals in that year.
[10] The Air Force refers to the MC and FMC goals as "standards." For
simplicity and consistency with the other services, we use the term
"goals" throughout this report.
[11] Steven A. Oliver, et al, "Forecasting Readiness: Regression
Analysis Techniques," Air Force Journal of Logistics (fall 2001): 1, 3,
31-43.
[12] Army Audit Agency, Aviation Maintenance: 25th Infantry Division
(Light) and U.S. Army Hawaii, AA 98-185 (May 4, 1998).
[13] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges
and Program Risks: Departments of Defense, State, and Veterans Affairs,
GAO-01-492T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2001).
[14] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel:
Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical
Specialties, GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR (Washington, D.C.: August. 16, 1999).
[15] Congressional Budget Office, CBO Paper: The Effects of Aging on
the Costs of Operating and Maintaining Military Equipment (Washington,
D.C.: August 2001).
[16] We performed a statistical test of the relationship between
average age in years and the MC level and found no relationship between
those two factors.
[17] Steven A. Oliver, et al (fall 2001).
[18] See GAO-01-492T.
[19] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Continuing
Challenges in Managing Inventories and Avoiding Adverse Operational
Effects, GAO/T-NSIAD-99-83 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 1999), and U.S.
General Accounting Office, Air Force Inventory: Parts Shortages Are
Impacting Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness, GAO-01-587
(Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2001).
[20] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Navy Inventory: Parts
Shortages Are Impacting Operations and Maintenance Effectiveness,
GAO-01-771 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001).
[21] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft: Services
Need Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations, GAO-02-86 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 21, 2001).
[22] Under the three-level approach, maintenance is divided into
organizational, intermediate, and depot categories. Organizational
maintenance is performed at the air base level and includes functions
such as inspections, minor repairs, and servicing. Intermediate
maintenance generally takes place at shops on the air bases and
consists of activities such as calibration, repair, or the emergency
manufacture of parts, and technical assistance. The more sophisticated
depot maintenance requires more extensive facilities and is conducted
at government or contractor industrial facilities.
[23] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Closing Maintenance Depots:
Savings, Workload, and Redistribution Issues, GAO/NSIAD-96-29
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 1996).
[24] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions
Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System,
GAO-02-105 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001).
[25] See U.S. Department of Defense, Government Performance and Results
Act: Department of Defense FY 2000 Performance Report (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 2001).
[26] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Information
on the Use of Spare Parts Funding Is Lacking, GAO-01-472 (Washington,
D.C.: June 11, 2001).
[27] See Congressional Budget Office (August 2001).
[28] The Global Status of Resources and Training System is the
automated reporting system within DOD used as the central registry of
readiness information for all U.S. operational units.
[29] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Inventory: Better
Reporting on Spare Parts Spending Will Enhance Congressional Oversight,
GAO-03-18 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2002).
[30] Operational availability is calculated by dividing the mean time
between maintenance events by the sum of the mean time between
maintenance events and mean downtime (time needed for corrective and
preventive maintenance and waiting time).
[31] See Center for Naval Analyses, Naval Aviation Goals Study
(Alexandria, Va.: June 1996).
[32] The System Readiness Objective is defined as the measurable
criterion used to assess the ability of a weapons system to undertake a
set of missions at planned utilization rates.
[33] As agreed with Navy officials, we used "overall" MC and FMC goals
in our analyses of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. The overall goals
are a combined goal for the various categories of deployment status.
[34] Marine Corps aircraft share the same goals as the Navy aircraft.
However, according to officials, Marine Corps aircraft do not follow
the cyclical pattern of deployments and thus maintain the same goal
throughout the year.
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