Missile Defense
Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain Gao ID: GAO-03-441 April 30, 2003The Department of Defense (DOD) would like to build a capable missile defense system that paces an ever-evolving threat. This is an expensive and risky endeavor because it requires a diverse set of technologies to be quickly developed, integrated, and deployed across an array of platforms. DOD estimates that it will need $50 billion for missile defense research and development over the next 6 years and likely additional funds in subsequent years. GAO was asked to review the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) strategy for this investment and determine what knowledge-based practices characteristic of successful programs are being adopted by MDA; what significant practices are not being adopted; and whether MDA is following the practices that it has adopted.
Our work has shown that programs are most successful when they evolve products over time rather than try to make big leaps in capability and when the programs adopt knowledge-based acquisition processes. Similarly, MDA is taking an evolutionary approach to developing the missile defense system by developing capabilities in spirals or "blocks" rather than attempting to deliver all desired capabilities at one time. The agency intends to facilitate this approach by keeping requirements flexible before beginning activities to integrate technologies into a planned block, following a knowledge-based development plan, and demonstrating that technologies work as intended before beginning system integration of a block. In addition, the agency is seeking to involve stakeholders--such as the military services and operational testers--early in the development effort. However, MDA has not adopted some knowledge-based practices regarding long-term investment decision-making and, as a result, the missile defense program's success could be hampered. First, MDA is not making an early determination of the full cost of a capability. Such an estimate would help decision makers more effectively evaluate which technologies to include because they offer the best capability for the funds invested. Second, DOD is not allocating a "wedge" of funds in its Future Years Defense Plan for system production and operations. Without this wedge, DOD may not have the funds needed to procure and maintain the missile defense system. In addition, the President's directive to begin fielding a missile defense capability by 2004 places MDA in danger of getting off track early and impairing the effort over the long term. This danger is highlighted by MDA's decision to not follow some of its knowledge-based practices as it develops the first block of the system. For example, MDA is beginning system integration of its first block with immature technology and limited testing. While doing so may help MDA meet the President's deadline, it also increases the potential that some elements may not work as intended.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-441, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
April 2003:
Missile Defense:
Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain:
GAO-03-441:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-441, a report to Congressional Requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (DOD) would like to build a capable missile
defense system that paces an ever-evolving threat. This is an
expensive and risky endeavor because it requires a diverse set of
technologies to be quickly developed, integrated, and deployed across
an array of platforms. DOD estimates that it will need $50 billion for
missile defense research and development over the next 6 years and
likely additional funds in subsequent years. GAO was asked to review
the Missile Defense Agency‘s (MDA) strategy for this investment and
determine what knowledge-based practices characteristic of successful
programs are being adopted by MDA; what significant practices are not
being adopted; and whether MDA is following the practices that it has
adopted.
What GAO Found:
Our work has shown that programs are most successful when they evolve
products over time rather than try to make big leaps in capability and
when the programs adopt knowledge-based acquisition processes.
Similarly, MDA is taking an evolutionary approach to developing the
missile defense system by developing capabilities in spirals or
’blocks“ rather than attempting to deliver all desired capabilities at
one time. The agency intends to facilitate this approach by keeping
requirements flexible before beginning activities to integrate
technologies into a planned block, following a knowledge-based
development plan, and demonstrating that technologies work as intended
before beginning system integration of a block. In addition, the
agency is seeking to involve stakeholders”such as the military services
and operational testers”early in the development effort.
However, MDA has not adopted some knowledge-based practices regarding
long-term investment decision making and, as a result, the missile
defense program‘s success could be hampered. First, MDA is not making
an early determination of the full cost of a capability. Such an
estimate would help decision makers more effectively evaluate which
technologies to include because they offer the best capability for the
funds invested. Second, DOD is not allocating a ’wedge“ of funds in
its Future Years Defense Plan for system production and operations.
Without this wedge, DOD may not have the funds needed to procure and
maintain the missile defense system.
In addition, the President‘s directive to begin fielding a missile
defense capability by 2004 places MDA in danger of getting off track
early and impairing the effort over the long term. This danger is
highlighted by MDA‘s decision to not follow some of its knowledge-
based practices as it develops the first block of the system. For
example, MDA is beginning system integration of its first block with
immature technology and limited testing. While doing so may help MDA
meet the President‘s deadline, it also increases the potential that
some elements may not work as intended.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DOD prepare life cycle cost estimates for
missile defense elements before beginning integration activities and
explore the option of setting aside funds to produce and operate the
missile defense system over the long term.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-441.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Robert Levin at (202) 512-4841 or
levinr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Acquisition Strategy Adopts Many Knowledge-Based Practices:
Two Knowledge-Based Practices Have Not Been Adopted:
MDA Is Not Following Some Knowledge-Based Practices in Developing
2004 Capability:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Table:
Table 1: Events and Accomplishments within MDA's Integrated Master
Plan:
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of Missile Defense Programs Transferred from
Services into MDA:
Figure 2: Notional Architecture of Future Ballistic Missile Defense
System:
Abbreviations:
BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
MDA: Missile Defense Agency:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2003:
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Jack Reed
United States Senate:
The threat from foreign ballistic missiles has grown steadily since the
end of the Cold War. At least 25 countries now have or are in the
process of acquiring missiles capable of delivering nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons. Countering this threat demands not
only that the Department of Defense (DOD) develop cutting-edge
technology, but also that it acquire and deploy complex systems more
rapidly and effectively.
DOD faces significant technical challenges in building a missile
defense program. So far, DOD has had mixed results in achieving a "hit-
to-kill" capability to destroy enemy warheads reliably, and DOD is
still completing development of the components needed to detect and
track a missile in all phases of its flight--from the boost phase,
through the midcourse, and into the terminal phase. As it works to
develop and prove these capabilities, DOD must also make sure that all
missile defense elements can work together as an integrated system--a
complex task in itself, given the number and diversity of elements
involved in missile defense. Once these basic hurdles have been
overcome, DOD still faces a far greater technical challenge in
achieving target discrimination--that is, the capability to distinguish
real warheads from decoys--to defeat more sophisticated threats.
DOD also faces the challenge of delivering a weapon system with the
capability promised and within the time and cost promised. For example,
previous efforts to develop an airborne laser system and a space-based
tracking and surveillance system encountered substantial delays, cost
overruns, and other difficulties because DOD undertook these efforts
without fully understanding the effort that would be needed to mature
technologies critical to developing the systems'
required capabilities.[Footnote 1]
Lastly, the development of missile defense weapon systems will also
be costly. DOD estimates that it will need about $50 billion for
missile defense research and development between fiscal years 2004 and
2009, or an average of over $8 billion per year. This investment does
not include funding after 2009 to complete development of those
systems, let alone the funding needed before and after 2009 to produce
and operate the systems.
In January 2002, facing these challenges, the Secretary of Defense
directed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to orchestrate the
integration of DOD's diverse missile defense elements into one layered
"system of systems" and to change its acquisition strategy as needed in
doing so. In response, MDA has sought to implement practices that have
proven successful in other DOD and commercial-sector programs. Taken
together, these practices demand a high level of knowledge about a
product at key junctures during development and that this knowledge be
used to make prudent investment decisions. For example, developers
should know that a technology has been demonstrated to work as intended
before it is integrated into a product.
The importance of making the best decisions possible is underscored by
the time-critical nature of MDA's efforts. In December 2002, the
President directed DOD to begin fielding an initial capability in 2004
to protect the United States against missile attacks. To help ensure
that MDA is using its resources wisely to develop the best possible
system, you asked us to determine the extent to which the agency's
acquisition strategy incorporates the knowledge-based practices
characteristic of successful development programs. To better answer
your question, we separated it into three parts: (1) What knowledge-
based practices are being adopted by MDA? (2) What significant
practices are not being adopted? and (3) Is MDA following the
knowledge-based practices that it has adopted?
Results in Brief:
MDA has adopted practices that offer the best opportunity to develop
a complex weapon system successfully. Similar to the successful product
development practices of leading commercial organizations, MDA is
developing the missile defense system in "blocks," rather than trying
to make a big leap in capability. The agency intends to facilitate this
evolutionary approach by keeping the system's requirements flexible
before beginning activities to integrate technologies into a planned
block of the missile defense system, following a knowledge-based
development plan, and maturing technology before beginning system
integration of a block. In addition, the agency is seeking to involve
stakeholders--such as the military services and the operational
testers--early in the development effort.
However, MDA has not adopted two significant practices regarding
long-term investment decision making, and, as a result, the program's
success could be hampered. First, MDA is not making an early
determination of the full cost of a capability. Specifically, before
beginning system integration, MDA does not estimate the total costs for
development, production, operations, and sustainment of that block.
Such an estimate would help decision makers in evaluating which
technologies to include because they offer the best capability for the
funds invested. MDA officials told us that they are considering steps
to provide such estimates earlier. Second, DOD is not allocating a
"wedge" of funds in its Future Years Defense Plan (fiscal years 2004
through 2009) for system production and operations. MDA officials told
us that such a wedge has not been set aside because MDA's acquisition
strategy does not presume that a decision will be made to produce and
operate the system. DOD risks, however, that when it is ready to
procure and maintain the missile defense system, it will not have the
funds to do so unless it reduces or eliminates its investment in other
important weapon systems. This approach brings little transparency to
future investment choices and may constrain options for
decision makers.
The President's directive to begin fielding an initial defensive
capability in 2004 also places MDA in danger of getting off track early
and introducing more risk into the missile defense effort over the long
term. This danger is highlighted by MDA's decision to not follow some
of its knowledge-based practices as it develops the first block of the
missile defense system, which will provide the initial capability.
Because of time pressures, MDA must include components that have not
been demonstrated as mature and ready for system integration into a
particular element, let alone the block overall. For example, MDA has
encountered considerable difficulty in developing a new three-stage
booster and has yet to flight test interceptor boosters in
configurations planned for fielding in September 2004. Also, MDA's test
program has been limited to date and is under considerable schedule
pressures. A knowledge-based approach to testing validates whether
components (1) work individually, (2) work together as a system in a
controlled setting, and (3) work together as a full system in a
realistic setting. MDA's integrated flight tests to date have used
surrogate and prototype components and have been executed under non-
stressing conditions. As a result, testing to date has provided only
limited data for determining whether the system will work as intended
in 2004. Also, MDA has no plans to demonstrate through flight testing
the upgraded primary radar in Alaska that will be used to detect and
track enemy missiles.
We are making recommendations to DOD for providing decision makers with
more timely information on the cost and funding needs of missile
defense. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with
our recommendations.
Background:
In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense refocused the ballistic
missile defense program. The Secretary delegated to MDA authority to
manage all ballistic missile defense systems under development and
shifted such programs controlled by the military services--such as the
Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense program--to the agency. Other
programs moved to MDA are highlighted in figure 1. These programs,
previously recognized by DOD as major defense acquisition programs, are
now considered "elements" and have been consolidated into one overall
major program called the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).
Future architectures of the BMDS may also include "stand-alone"
components (primarily sensors) that would operate in concert with the
various missile defense elements.
Figure 1: Examples of Missile Defense Programs Transferred from
Services into MDA:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
In December 2002, President Bush directed the Department of Defense to
begin fielding the first block of the ballistic missile defense system
for operational use in 2004. That is, in addition to focusing resources
on the development of a testbed for developmental testing of missile
defense elements, he instructed MDA to build in an operational
capability that would protect the United States against missile
attacks. The fielding of such capabilities is referred to as an
"initial defensive operations" capability, and, in a statement by the
Secretary of Defense, "—would be a very preliminary, modest
capability." The initial capability will be based on the testbed and
augmented with additional developmental assets.
When fully deployed, the BMDS will include (1) space-and ground-based
sensors to provide early warning and tracking of missile launches;
(2) ground-based radars to identify and refine the tracks of
threatening reentry vehicles and associated objects; (3) ground-and
sea-based interceptors to destroy enemy missiles through "hit-to-kill"
impacts; and (4) fire control nodes for battle management and execution
of the ballistic missile defense mission. A notional architecture of
future BMDS blocks is illustrated in figure 2. For example, the initial
capability for defense of the United States against long-range missiles
would come from the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element and BMDS
sensors, as follows:
* Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Element. The principal components of
the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element for defensive operations
include interceptors sited at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California; a fire control node for battle management and
execution located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, with a backup
node at Fort Greely; an upgraded Cobra Dane radar at Eareckson Air
Station in Shemya, Alaska; and an upgraded early warning radar at Beale
Air Force Base, California.
* BMDS Sensors. Sensors external to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
element and available for defensive operations include Defense Support
Program satellites for missile warning and forward-deployed Aegis AN/
SPY-1 radars on existing Navy cruisers.
The above assets comprise the initial configuration, which is scheduled
for fielding at the end of September 2004. The agency's near-term
intention is to expand this capability by adding more interceptors at
Fort Greely, Alaska; a sea-based X-band radar deployed in the Pacific
for use in flight testing; and an upgraded early warning radar at
Fylingdales, England, by the end of 2005.
Figure 2: Notional Architecture of Future Ballistic Missile Defense
System:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Acquisition Strategy Adopts Many Knowledge-Based Practices:
To ensure the delivery of high-quality products on time and within
budget, successful developers have adopted acquisition strategies that
are anchored in knowledge. Specifically, they establish decision points
for moving forward from technology development to product development
and on to production.[Footnote 2] At each decision point, decision
makers ask themselves whether they have gained the knowledge they need
to proceed into the next acquisition phase. For example, they determine
whether the work can be completed with the money and time available and
whether the product will be worth the required investment. If any of
these questions are answered negatively, the program does not go
forward. Other practices that facilitate successful outcomes include
developing systems in stages rather than attempting to deliver all
desired capabilities at one time, keeping requirements flexible so that
the system can be produced within available resources, making sure
technology is proven before incorporating it into a development
program, and involving the right people at the right time in decision
making. Commercial and DOD programs that have successfully implemented
these practices have found that they help curb the incentive to rely on
immature technologies and to over-promise the capability that can be
delivered. Moreover, these programs found that keeping stakeholders
involved in decision making ensured that the developed product better
met the customers' needs.
MDA realizes the value of these practices and is seeking to incorporate
them into its acquisition strategy. Specifically, as discussed below,
MDA plans to evolve the missile defense system over time, rather than
trying to make a big leap in its capability. MDA is also planning to
keep the system's requirements flexible before beginning system
integration and to follow a knowledge-based development plan. In
addition, MDA is seeking to involve stakeholders--such as the military
services and the operational testers--early in the development effort.
Evolutionary Development:
Historically, many new development programs in DOD have sought to
achieve a great leap ahead in capabilities. Because the technology was
often not available to make such leaps, programs were often in
development for years while engineers tried to develop and mature the
needed technologies. As the time required to develop a system
increased, so did the cost of the system.
In contrast, development programs are most successful when they take an
evolutionary, or phased, approach. In doing so, they establish time-
phased plans to develop new products in increments. The first increment
often has a limited capability because it incorporates technology that
is already mature or can be matured quickly. As new technology is
developed, it is incorporated into subsequent increments so that the
product's capability evolves over time. This approach reduces risks by
introducing less new content and technology into a program's design and
development effort. An evolutionary strategy also enables developers to
deliver a series of interim capabilities to the customer more quickly.
Recognizing the benefits of evolving systems, DOD recently revised its
acquisition system policy to encourage evolutionary development.
The Missile Defense Agency's new strategy for developing the ballistic
missile defense system adopts evolutionary development. At the
beginning of each block, the agency intends to predict the capability
that can be developed given a "tool box"[Footnote 3] of currently
available technology and then to design that system. As additional
technology matures, the agency can incorporate it into the next block
being developed.
Two key practices adopted by MDA can be expected to help the agency in
taking an evolutionary approach. They include (1) keeping requirements
flexible and (2) following a knowledge-based development plan with
specific decision points and criteria for moving forward.
Flexible requirements:
Customers generally want new products that are high performance at
low cost, delivered as soon as possible. But developing and producing
such a product may exceed the developer's technology or engineering
expertise, or may be too costly and time-consuming for the customer to
accept. Therefore, what a customer needs in a product and what a
developer can produce given available resources must be matched to
form an achievable set of product requirements before development
begins. To make this match, both the customer and the developer must be
flexible so that potential gaps between needs and resources can be
closed. Flexibility represents the customer's ability and willingness
to lower product expectations, coupled with the product developer's
willingness and ability to invest more resources to reduce technical
risks before beginning system integration. Without flexibility,
resources and needs can still be matched, but the options for closing
the gaps between the two are limited to additional investments on the
developer's part. In fact, our past reviews have found that many
traditional DOD acquisition programs incurred substantial cost
increases and schedule delays because requirements by the military
services were unrealistic and inflexible.
Because of its flexibility, MDA's new "capabilities-based approach" for
the development of missile defense elements provides a greater
opportunity to resolve this potential gap between resources and
needs.[Footnote 4] Instead of proceeding with the development of a
solution based on firm operational requirements set by the services,
the agency, in coordination with the warfighter, considers a number of
system architectural options that can be developed given the mature
technologies that are available. Decision makers evaluate the
alternative architectures according to the potential military utility
that each offers, given the constraints of cost and schedule. For
example, decision makers would compare the regions of the world that
each architecture could defend from missile launches (defended area) or
each architecture's probability of engagement success. This acquisition
approach eliminates any possible gap between resources and needs; the
customer (warfighter) accepts the best capability that the developer
can deliver given available resources and assumes enhanced capabilities
will be built into future blocks.
Knowledge-based development plan:
In the early stages of a major defense acquisition program, DOD
establishes a master schedule for moving through development and into
production. Historically, once these milestones have been established,
they have often been an impetus for moving forward even if requisite
knowledge had not been attained--an action that invariably caused
schedules to slip and costs to rise. By contrast, we have found that
successful developers place more importance on capturing specific
technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge than meeting milestones
and they use this knowledge to make investment decisions. Moreover,
these developers identify and use specific markers or criteria--such as
technology readiness levels, percentage of engineering drawings
released to the manufacturer, or the percentage of manufacturing
processes under statistical control--to ensure that the program has
sufficient knowledge to move forward.
MDA has similarly adopted a structured plan, called the Integrated
Master Plan, for moving forward with requisite knowledge. Every block
would move through eight formal "events," each of which would include
an identified set of accomplishments that should be completed before
the program moves on to the next event. (See table 1 for a list of
events and their associated accomplishments.) As a block moves through
the events, MDA plans to use quantitative criteria whenever possible to
enhance decisions on whether to continue developing the block as it is
or to make changes. At the end of a block's development, MDA expects to
recommend one of four alternative actions to decision makers. Officials
could recommend that the elements be (1) transferred to the services to
be produced and fielded in its current configuration, (2) further
developed in a subsequent block, (3) retained as a test asset in the
missile defense testbed, with some capability available for operational
use, or (4) terminated.
One such quantitative criterion adopted by MDA is technology readiness
levels. Our reviews have found that successful developers often use
technology readiness levels as an analytical tool to assess the
maturity of technology being considered for inclusion in a product.
There are nine levels of maturity. The level increases as the
technology becomes closer in form, fit, and function to the actual
system and is demonstrated in more realistic environments. For example,
technology is least mature, or least ready for inclusion in a product,
when it is an idea being explored in paper studies. Conversely,
technology is most mature when it has been incorporated into the
intended product and that product has been demonstrated in its intended
environment. The lower the level of technology readiness, the more
ground that must be covered to bring the technology to the point at
which it can meet the intended product's cost, schedule, and
performance requirements with little risk. We found that most
successful developers insert new technology into a product only when
the technology has been incorporated into prototype hardware and that
hardware has been demonstrated to work in the environment in which it
is expected to be used.
MDA's knowledge-base development plan incorporates the use of
technology readiness levels at Event 1 to assess the maturity of
technology proposed for a block configuration. The strategy calls for
including new technology at system integration (Event 4) if that
technology has been proven in prototype hardware that works in the
environment in which it is expected to be used. While the incorporation
of mature technology at system integration is MDA's preferred approach,
the strategy retains the flexibility to include less mature technology
if it offers a significant benefit and the risk of including it is
acceptable. In such instances, MDA expects to develop a plan for
reducing the risk of moving forward with immature technology and to
remove the technology from the block if the risk has not been reduced
at subsequent decision points.
Table 1: Events and Accomplishments within MDA's Integrated Master
Plan:
Event 0-Block Capability Alternatives: Block planning process
completed.
Event 0-Block Capability Alternatives: Long lead targets, tests, and
exercises identified.
Event 0-Block Capability Alternatives: Affordability Analysis
completed.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Preliminary block plan
approved.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Preliminary block
description approved.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Technology readiness
levels assessed.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Performance assessments
updated.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Preliminary concept of
operations and operational architecture drafted.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Risks assessed and
mitigation programs established.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Detailed cost estimates
for elements/components available.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Cost/benefit analysis
updated.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Integration/test
objectives defined.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Element/component
preliminary design reviews completed.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Required funding
identified.
Event 1-Preliminary Configuration Definition: Integrated master
schedule completed.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Critical design reviews for all
element/component/targets programs completed.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Performance/cost assessments
updated.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Risks assessed and mitigation
programs updated.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Military utility characterized
and concept of operations refined.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Preliminary integration test
plan available.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Funding available and resources
allocated.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Block definition updated.
Event 2-Configuration Definition: Integrated master schedule
updated.
Event 3-First Development Article: First development article built
and initial tests completed.
Event 3-First Development Article: Targets built and initial tests
completed.
Event 3-First Development Article: Test range and support planning
completed.
Event 3-First Development Article: Concept of operations defined
and operational architecture available.
Event 3-First Development Article: Funding and Estimate at
Completion assessed.
Event 4-Integrated Test Readiness Review: Block integration test
planning completed.
Event 4-Integrated Test Readiness Review: Element/component test and
checkout completed.
Event 4-Integrated Test Readiness Review: Target test and checkout
completed.
Event 4-Integrated Test Readiness Review: Ballistic missile defense
system tactics, techniques, and procedures for designated user defined.
Event 4-Integrated Test Readiness Review: Funding and Estimate at
Completion updated.
Event 4-Integrated Test Readiness Review: Operational characterization
of each element completed.
Event 4-Integrated Test Readiness Review: Operational certification of
element completed.
Event 5-Interim Test and Progress Review: 50 percent of system test
objectives accomplished.
Event 5-Interim Test and Progress Review: Support systems defined.
Event 5-Interim Test and Progress Review: Training systems defined.
Event 5-Interim Test and Progress Review: Funding updated and Estimate
at Completion verified.
Event 5-Interim Test and Progress Review: Initial transition plans
completed.
Event 5-Interim Test and Progress Review: Initial operational
characterization completed.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: System/element/
component testing completed.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Operational
characterization completed.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Support systems
planned and budgeted.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Training systems
planned and budgeted.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Transition plans
completed and funded.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Production plans
available.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Updated block
definition available.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Element/
component certification of military utility completed.
Event 6-Element/component transition decision points: Service total
obligation authority available.
Event 7-Block Certification of military utility: Military utility
assessed and system element/component offered for transition.
Event 7-Block Certification of military utility: Ballistic missile
defense system capability demonstrated.
Event 7-Block Certification of military utility: Life cycle cost
estimate indicates long-term affordability.
Event 7-Block Certification of military utility: Reliability,
maintainability, and availability, and support requirements
characterized.
Event 7-Block Certification of military utility: Block certification
of military utility completed.
Event 7-Block Certification of military utility: Integration of
declared block capability of ballistic missile defense system.
Source: DOD.
Note: The events and accomplishments in MDA's Integrated Master Plan
are being revised. This set was in effect as of February 2003.
[End of table]
Involvement of Stakeholders:
Developers have found that if they are to be successful, all groups
that have a stake in the product should be involved at all appropriate
stages in the development effort. For example, cost analysts are needed
to accurately estimate the cost of the product, experts in test and
evaluation are needed to objectively assess the performance of product
prototypes, and others are needed to enhance understanding of the
customer's needs. By involving these groups from the time a product
design is created and keeping them involved throughout the product
integration and demonstration phases, a program can ensure that it has
a complete perspective.
A key forum for stakeholder input is the Missile Defense Support Group,
which includes representatives from the Joint Air and Missile Defense
Organization; the Comptroller's Office; the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation; and other units across DOD. The support group provides
advice on such subjects as policy, operations, testing, acquisition,
and resources to the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
and supports the Senior Executive Council[Footnote 5] in
decision making. In addition, an analytical working group remains in
close contact with MDA management so that it can collect information
for the Missile Defense Support Group as well as conduct independent
analyses of the missile defense program's work.
Initially, not all members of the Missile Defense Support Group and its
working group believed that MDA's approach to stakeholder involvement
would be successful. Soon after the support group was established,
members voiced concern that they were not getting sufficient access to
agency information. Members said that communication with MDA was poor
and that access to knowledgeable MDA individuals was limited, all
of which made it difficult to provide timely advice. For example, in
April 2002, the agency presented options to the support group to
address capability shortfalls in sea-based terminal defense caused by
the loss of the Navy Area missile defense program.[Footnote 6] Members
of the group questioned why a successor to the Navy Area program was
needed. MDA planned additional briefings pertaining to this issue;
however, the group was never briefed and MDA, without additional group
input, went directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics to obtain approval for a particular approach
to sea-based terminal missile defense. DOD officials told us that they
did not seek further input from the group because there was
insufficient time for it to fully understand and evaluate the issue
before a decision had to be made.
Shortly after this, support group members provided comments and
suggestions to the Under Secretary and the MDA director on increasing
communication, obtaining access to MDA personnel, and receiving timely
information. Subsequently, MDA made progress in addressing the support
group's suggestions and concerns relating to these issues. As a result,
according to support group members, the level of interaction,
communication, and involvement has improved. In particular, support
group members attend weekly system and element review meetings and have
regular interaction with agency personnel outside of the Missile
Defense Support Group forum.
Two Knowledge-Based Practices Have Not Been Adopted:
While MDA has adopted many of the practices of successful acquisition
programs, it has not incorporated two particularly significant ones.
Specifically, before beginning system integration, successful
developers reduce their investment risk by estimating total costs and
determining that funding is available for developing, producing, and
operating the system. (We recently reported on the significance of
DOD's costs for operating its weapon systems and keeping them ready for
action over many years.[Footnote 7]):
In MDA's case, decision makers would benefit from having this knowledge
available before MDA begins system integration because decision makers
would be better positioned to consider whether to delay until
subsequent blocks those elements that currently have unaffordable
production, operation, or maintenance costs and whether costs might be
lowered in the future by inserting new technology or implementing
better engineering solutions. The information would also help decision
makers to compare all elements' costs and decide which elements should
be included in a planned block of the missile defense system because
they offer the best capability for the funds invested.
As of February 2003, MDA's draft Integrated Master Plan did not call
for an element's life cycle cost to be estimated at the beginning of
system integration (Event 4) but rather at the point when that element
is considered for transfer to a military service for production,
operation, and maintenance (Event 7). Moreover, MDA may never estimate
the full cost of some elements because, according to officials, some
elements may never be transferred to a military service for production
and operation. For example, MDA plans to continually upgrade elements
such as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element in the missile
defense test bed even though it would be available for combat use. In
such cases, MDA plans to estimate only the element's development costs-
-not its production, operation, and maintenance costs.
Also, DOD has not allocated funds in its Future Years Defense Plan
(fiscal years 2004 through 2009) for the production, operation, and
maintenance of any elements that might be transferred in the future to
the military services. MDA has established optional decision points
called "off ramps" where elements such as Theater High Altitude Area
Defense could be transferred to the military services, but DOD has not
set aside a "wedge" of funding for the element's production and
operating costs.
MDA officials told us that the agency is considering revisions to its
Integrated Master Plan so that it can provide decision makers with
complete life cycle cost information on each element prior to beginning
system integration activities for each block of the missile defense
system. For example, MDA anticipates defining each element's training
and support systems before it begins system integration activities. The
officials said that that they are still, however, in the process of
determining the cost information that needs to be collected and the
timing of its collection. In terms of setting aside a wedge of funding
in the Future Years Defense Plan for production and operations costs,
MDA officials told us that no such action is planned at this time
because MDA's acquisition strategy does not presume that a decision
will be made to transfer the element to the military service. They told
us that they expect funding would be made available.
However, we believe that unplanned operation and maintenance costs
could be a particular problem for DOD because its budget for these
expenses is already stressed by the rising cost to operate and maintain
many aging weapon systems. Also, when DOD is at the point of deciding
whether to transfer elements of the missile defense system to a
military service for production and operation, DOD could find that it
does not have the funds available for missile defense without reducing
or eliminating funding for other important weapon systems.
MDA Is Not Following Some Knowledge-Based Practices in Developing
2004 Capability:
Because the President directed that a missile defense capability be
fielded beginning in 2004, MDA will not be able to follow some
knowledge-based practices in developing the initial capability in
this brief time. As noted earlier, MDA's draft Integrated Master Plan
recommends that when a block enters system integration it include
mature technology but the plan allows for the inclusion of less mature
technology if the benefits are significant and if risks can be
mitigated. Given the Presidential direction, MDA must include
components in the block that have not been demonstrated as mature and
ready for integration into a particular element, let alone the block
overall. MDA's plan also calls for rigorous testing before the agency
recommends that the system or its elements be available for fielding.
However, MDA's test program has been limited to date and is under
considerable time pressures.
System Integration of Block 2004 Begins with Some Immature
Technologies:
Our past reviews of DOD and commercial product development programs
have shown that programs are in a much better position to succeed if
components that incorporate new technologies are matured to a high
level before being integrated into a product. Conversely, developers
that initiated product developments with immature technology increased
the risk that their products would fail tests and that some aspects of
the products' design would have to be reworked because components did
not perform as predicted. The overall impact of such problems was often
that products did not deliver the promised capability or the developers
had to spend additional time and money to develop that capability.
While its draft Integrated Master Plan recommends that system
integration begin with mature technologies (Event 4), MDA has begun
including components into the Block 2004 configuration that are not yet
mature. Two examples are the Cobra Dane radar and the boosters for the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense interceptors.
* The Cobra Dane radar is located at Eareckson Air Station in the
western end of the Aleutian Islands chain in Alaska. Planned hardware
and software upgrades intended to provide the radar with real-time
acquisition and tracking capabilities are expected to be completed in
fiscal year 2004. MDA has no plans, however, to demonstrate the
expected functionality of the radar through integrated flight tests.
* MDA has encountered considerable difficulty in developing a three-
stage booster for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense element and has
yet to flight test interceptor boosters in configurations planned for
fielding in September 2004. By the time the new booster was flight
tested in August 2001, it was already about 18 months behind schedule.
The first booster flight test was successful, but the second booster
drifted off course and had to be destroyed 30 seconds after launch.
Subsequently, the agency authorized two new contracts for developing
boosters for use in the Block 2004 capability. While this strategy
should reduce risk in the program, the first demonstrations of these
boosters will occur in the flight tests scheduled later this year.
MDA officials told us that they could not deploy an initial capability
in the timeframe directed by the President if they did not continue to
develop the technology while designing the system. MDA officials told
us that they expect to follow their knowledge-based development plan as
they develop the next block (Block 2006) of the missile defense system.
Testing under Pressure and Limited to Date:
The fundamental purpose of testing is to gauge the progress being made
when an idea or concept is translated into an actual product and,
ultimately, to make sure the product works as intended. Leading
commercial firms conduct testing to discover potential developmental
problems early. The firms focus on validating that their products have
reached increasing levels of product maturity at given points in time.
The firms' products have three maturity levels in common: components
work individually, components work together as a system in a controlled
setting, and components work together as a full system in a realistic
setting. Testing in this systematic manner helps ensure that problems
are identified and corrected early, when the cost of solving problems
is lower and more options are available. Over time, disciplined testing
helps confirm that the product eventually produced will meet the
customer's needs.
In the past, when DOD programs have been schedule--rather than event--
driven, program managers have found it difficult to slow the program if
problems were identified during testing. MDA has been placed in a
similar, pressured position as it prepares to field an initial
capability by September 2004. Also, only limited test data is available
for determining whether a credible capability will be available at that
date.
One system-level test is planned prior to fielding:
The capability that MDA expects to deploy is essentially a collection
of elements that are connected by battle management software.
Initially, the mission of the software will be to hand off data from
the radars that detect and track enemy missiles to the shooters that
launch interceptors to kill the missiles. For example, the battle
management software could communicate to the Ground-Based Midcourse
element data on the position of an intercontinental ballistic missile
being tracked by the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense radar. MDA has
begun the development of battle management hardware/software and has
completed some ground tests of its capability. However, MDA plans to
deploy the block although the battle management software's ability to
interoperate with the elements as an integrated missile defense system
will not be flight tested until the Spring of 2004.
Element flight-test data is limited:
Integrated flight tests to date have demonstrated that the Ground-Based
Midcourse Defense and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense elements can
defeat a mock warhead in a test environment. However, the tested
elements did not include all of the same components that will be part
of the elements deployed in 2004. Instead these elements were tested
using some surrogate and prototype components. For example, all tests
of the Ground-Based Midcourse element have included a surrogate booster
and a prototype kill vehicle. In addition, tests of this element have
not included the Cobra Dane radar that will be used in September 2004
to detect and track intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Cobra Dane
radar will not actively participate in integrated flight tests at least
through September 2007.
Element flight tests have also been executed under nonstressing
conditions that are not fully representative of the environments that
the elements would experience in combat. All flight tests completed to
date have been limited to a single corridor and intercept region, that
is all targets have been launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California, and interceptors have been launched from the Reagan Test
Site in the Marshall Islands. As a result, flight-test engagement
conditions are limited to those with slower closing velocities and
shorter intercept ranges. Testing under conditions such as these
significantly limit the data MDA can collect on system effectiveness
and readiness.
Operational test data is limited:
An operational test assesses the effectiveness of the system against
the known threat and its suitability for combat use. U.S. law requires
that such tests be carried out on major defense acquisition programs
and assessed by DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, before
a full-rate production decision is made. The purpose of the Director's
assessment is to advise the Secretary of Defense and Congress on the
effectiveness of the system against the known threat and its
suitability for combat use.
MDA does not plan to operationally test the Block 2004 Ground-Based
Missile Defense element before it is available for initial defensive
operations. The September 2004 fielding is not connected with a full-
rate production decision that would clearly trigger statutory
operational testing requirements. Nonetheless, according to DOD
officials, MDA plans to incorporate both developmental and some
operational test requirements in integrated flight tests.
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, will provide comments on
an element's operational effectiveness and suitability as demonstrated
in these tests.[Footnote 8] However, Operational Test and Evaluation
officials said that because developmental tests are scripted, planned
events, they do not provide the opportunity to assess how the equipment
and its operators will function under unforeseen conditions.
Conclusion:
MDA is attempting to build a ballistic missile defense capability that
paces an ever-evolving threat. This is an expensive and risky endeavor,
because it requires a diverse set of technologies that must be quickly
developed, integrated, and deployed across an array of land-, air-,
sea-, and space-based platforms. Whether MDA can successfully meet the
challenge of quickly developing an effective and suitable missile
defense system depends in large part on its willingness to adopt
practices that have made other developers successful and to implement
those practices as it develops each block.
Certainly, the presidential directive has already caused MDA to not
follow some of the knowledge-based practices that it had adopted as it
develops Block 2004. Giving up this approach opens the door to greater
cost and performance risks. Beginning system integration of Block 2004
with immature technology increases the potential that some element may
not work as intended. If this happens, MDA will be faced either with
fielding a less than credible system or likely spending more money in
an attempt to develop the desired capability within the time allowed.
In addition to the challenge it faces in Block 2004, MDA faces the
challenge of getting its acquisition program back on track. Because the
ballistic missile threat is rapidly increasing, MDA could always
believe it is operating in an emergency environment. Yet, it has never
been proven that it takes longer to acquire a weapon system if a
knowledge-based acquisition plan is followed. Instead, the opposite
should be true, because such a plan decreases the likelihood that
deadlines will be missed because critical elements do not work as
intended.
MDA and DOD also need to address the long-term implications of their
investment strategy. Both are assuming increased investment risk by not
having the right information available for decision makers at the right
time. The level of anticipated spending magnifies this risk. MDA
officials told us they are considering changes to MDA's Integrated
Master Plan to identify life cycle costs at the beginning of system
integration activities so that tradeoff decisions can be made in a more
timely manner. However, because DOD has not yet set aside funds to
cover its long-term costs, the department could find that it cannot
afford to procure and maintain that system unless it reduces or
eliminates its investment in other important weapon systems. By setting
aside funds in the Future Years Defense Plan, we believe DOD would
bring needed visibility to the impending trade-offs between missile
defense and other weapon system spending for procurement and
operations.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist MDA and DOD decision makers in determining which elements or
components should be included in each new block of the Ballistic
Missile Defense System, we recommend that the Missile Defense Agency,
before beginning integration activities, prepare a life cycle cost
estimate for configuring the element or component that the agency is
considering including in the block.
To help ensure that funds are available to produce and operate the
elements of the missile defense system when a decision is made to
transfer elements to the military services, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense explore the option of requiring the services to
set aside funds for this purpose in the Future Years Defense Plan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD concurred with
our recommendations.
Regarding our recommendation that MDA prepare life cycle cost
estimates before beginning integration activities, DOD said that MDA
will prepare its best estimate of life cycle costs based upon projected
hardware life, operational cost drivers, and initial capability
quantities prior to integration activities for each block.
Regarding our recommendation that DOD set aside funds in its Future
Years Defense Plan in anticipation of the transfer of missile defense
system elements to the military services, DOD said that there is
benefit in budgeting funds when such a transfer is anticipated. Doing
so would promote budget stability and improve the likelihood that an
element or component would actually be fielded.
DOD also suggested technical changes, which we incorporated as
appropriate. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix I.
Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we analyzed documents that detailed the
Missile Defense Agency's new acquisition practices and compared the
practices to those of successful development programs. We also obtained
detailed briefings from Missile Defense Agency officials regarding the
agency's plan for the implementation of these practices and contrasted
that plan to the implementation plan of successful programs. In
addition, we discussed the challenges and risks that the agency faces
as it implements its new plan with the Institute of Defense Analyses,
Alexandria, Virginia. We also discussed these issues with all members
of the Missile Defense Support Group, including the Office of the
Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the
Undersecretary for Policy; Office of the Undersecretary (Comptroller);
General Counsel; Office of the Assistant Secretary (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence); Office of the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation; Office of the Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation; Office of the Director, Cost Analysis Improvement Group,
in Washington, D.C.; and the Joint Staff; Department of the Army;
Department of the Air Force; Department of the Navy; and the Missile
Defense Agency in Arlington, Virginia.
We conducted our review from March 2002 to March 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As arranged with your staff, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from its issue date. At that time, we plan to provide copies of this
report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services; the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Defense; the House Committee on Armed Services; the
House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense; the
Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Missile Defense Agency. We will
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://
www.gao.gov/.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report were
Katherine Schinasi, Barbara Haynes, Cristina Chaplain, David Hand,
Alan Frazier, Randy Zounes, Adam Vodraska, Jose Ramos, and Greg Lagana.
R. E. Levin
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by R. E. Levin:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
17 APR 2003:
Mr. R. E. Levin:
Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management U.S. General
Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Levin:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "MISSILE DEFENSE: Knowledge-Based
Practices Are Being Adopted but Risks Remain," dated March 18, 2003
(GAO Code 1201351GAO-03-441). The Department appreciates the
opportunity to comment on the draft report.
The Department concurs with the recommendations it contains. Specific
comments for each recommendation are enclosed. We are also providing
recommendations for factual corrections in a separate enclosure. My
point of contact for this report is CAPT Michael J. Crugge, USN, (703)
695-8815, michael.cregge@osd.umil.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed for Glenn F. Lamartin
Director Defense Systems:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED MARCH 18, 2003 GAO CODE 120135/GAO-03-441:
"MISSILE DEFENSE: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted but
Risks Remain":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: To assist MDA and DoD decision makers in determining
which elements or components should be included in each new block of
the Ballistic Missile Defense System, the GAO recommended that the
Missile Defense Agency, before beginning integration activities,
prepare a life-cycle cost estimate for the configuration of the element
or component that the agency is considering including in the block. (p.
23/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. MDA will prepare its best estimate of life-cycle
costs based upon projected hardware life, operational cost drivers, and
initial capability quantities prior to integration activities for each
block. As indicated in the Integrated Master Plan, MDA considers system
costs throughout the knowledge-based development process. Cost analysis
begins at the earliest prototype development and continues through any
potential off-ramps and/or transition to the Services. Relevant
construction requirements, production ramp-ups, training, and other
support functions are considered, with most costs analyzed prior to
integration activities.
RECOMMENDATION 2: To help ensure that funds are available to produce
and operate the elements of the missile defense system when a decision
is made to transfer elements to the Military Services, the GAO
recommended that the Secretary of Defense explore the option of
requiring the Services to set aside funds in the Future Years Defense
Plan for this purpose. (p. 23/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Clearly, there is benefit in budgeting funds
within the Future Years Defense Plan when a procurement/fielding action
can be anticipated. Doing so would not only promote the stability of
the overall defense budget, but would also significantly improve the
likelihood that an element or component would actually be fielded. The
Department will certainly consider this option for elements and
components that have demonstrated sufficient maturity to enter into
production.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based
Decision Making Needed to Reduce Risks in Developing Airborne Laser,
GAO-02-631 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2002). U.S. General Accounting
Office, Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-low at Risk
of Missing Initial Deployment Date, GAO-01-6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
28, 2001).
[2] The three acquisition phases are distinguished by the activities
that occur during each of the three phases. During technology
development, scientists apply scientific knowledge to a practical
engineering problem and demonstrate that components with desired
capabilities can be developed. Product development includes integrating
those components into a stable system design and demonstrating that the
design will result in a product that meets the customer's needs and can
be produced with the time and money available. Production is the
manufacturing of the product.
[3] All possible elements/components and interfaces that could be used
in a ballistic missile defense system.
[4] At the beginning of systems integration, MDA plans to establish
system capability specifications. As in any organization, these
specifications may change if testing shows that they are unattainable
or that meeting them will be too costly or take too much time.
[5] The Senior Executive Council is led by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and its members are the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. The Council provides oversight of MDA's activities
and is responsible for making program adjustments and deciding to
transition or transfer a capability to the services. Furthermore, the
Council approves MDA's investment strategy and decisions.
[6] DOD cancelled the Navy Area program in 2001 due to cost overruns.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting
Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems' Total Ownership
Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2003).
[8] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L.
107-107) requires the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to
(1) annually assess, and report to Congress on, the adequacy and
sufficiency of MDA's test program during the preceding fiscal year,
(2) monitor the development of MDA's plan for ensuring that each
critical technology for a missile defense program is successfully
demonstrated in an appropriate environment before that technology
enters into operational service (and provide the Director of MDA with
appropriate comments), and (3) review, on an ongoing basis, the
development of MDA's annual program goals (including testing goals) and
annual program plan (including schedules for flight tests and other
significant testing activities) and provide any resulting comments on
the plans to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of MDA.
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