Tactical Aircraft
Status of the F/A-22 Program Gao ID: GAO-03-603T April 2, 2003The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years. Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in February and March 2003 respectively. This testimony summarizes our work on the F/A-22 program, covering performance, cost, and scheduling issues.
In the past several years, we have reported on a range of problems affecting the development of F/A-22. Specifically, F/A-22 estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration, maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and range in searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems have surfaced related to overheating during high-speed flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication, navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however, testing in some areas is restricted. Each year since 1998, we have reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000 that flight-test program efficiency--the amount of flight-testing accomplished--has been less than planned. Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since development began in 1991. Since 1997, the Air Force's estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has increased by $3.2 billion bringing the total estimate to $21.9 billion. In addition, over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated production cost growth bringing the total estimate to $42.2 billion--which exceeds the congressionally mandated production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Further, modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. Actions to offset estimated cost growth have had mixed success. These problems have dramatically affected the F/A-22 program. Cost increases, in part, have forced the Air Force to substantially decrease the number of aircraft to be purchased--from 648 to 276. Delays in testing also have significant consequences. Continuing to acquire aircraft before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could serve to further increase production costs. Moreover, F/A-22 problems have limited DOD's ability to upgrade its aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its original goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft with F/A-22 aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will not begin replacing aircraft until late 2005 at the earliest. The rate of replenishment will be substantially lower, due to the decrease in the number of new aircraft to be purchased. As a result, DOD will have to continue to use tactical aircraft that contribute to increased operating and support costs and it will have to wait longer than anticipated to have access to the advanced capabilities to be offered by the F/A-22.
GAO-03-603T, Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-603T
entitled 'Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program' which was
released on April 02, 2003.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products‘ accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Wednesday, April 2, 2003:
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT:
Status of the F/A-22 Program:
Statement of Allen Li, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
GAO-03-603T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-603T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of
F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior
to the F-15 by being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer
distances, less detectable, and able to provide the pilot with
substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us
to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine whether
the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. We
have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have also
reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years.
Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in
February and March 2003 respectively.
This testimony summarizes our work on the F/A-22 program, covering
performance, cost, and scheduling issues.
What GAO Found:
In the past several years, we have reported on a range of problems
affecting the development of F/A-22. Specifically:
* F/A-22 estimated performance in the areas of supercruise,
acceleration, maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and
range in searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However,
problems have surfaced related to overheating during high-speed flight-
testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication,
navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as
excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made
to some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now,
however, testing in some areas is restricted.
* Each year since 1998, we have reported that assembly of the test
aircraft was requiring more time than planned and that this was causing
the test aircraft to be delivered late to the test center for flight-
testing. We have also reported annually since 2000 that flight-test
program efficiency”the amount of flight-testing accomplished”has been
less than planned.
* Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since development
began in 1991. Since 1997, the Air Force‘s estimated cost to develop
the F/A-22 has increased by $3.2 billion bringing the total estimate to
$21.9 billion. In addition, over the last 6 years, DOD has identified
about $18 billion in estimated production cost growth bringing the
total estimate to $42.2 billion---which exceeds the congressionally
mandated production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Further,
modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years.
Actions to offset estimated cost growth have had mixed success.
These problems have dramatically affected the F/A-22 program. Cost
increases, in part, have forced the Air Force to substantially decrease
the number of aircraft to be purchased”from 648 to 276. Delays in
testing also have significant consequences. Continuing to acquire
aircraft before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could
serve to further increase production costs.
Moreover, F/A-22 problems have limited DOD‘s ability to upgrade its
aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its
original goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft
with F/A-22 aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will not begin
replacing aircraft until late 2005 at the earliest. The rate of
replenishment will be substantially lower, due to the decrease in the
number of new aircraft to be purchased. As a result, DOD will have to
continue to use tactical aircraft that contribute to increased
operating
and support costs and it will have to wait longer than anticipated to
have access to the advanced capabilities to be offered by the F/A-22.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony. However,
recommendations in several prior GAO reports have stressed the need for
the Air Force to not increase annual production rates until greater
knowledge is achieved through the completion of testing
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-603T.
To view the full testimony, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or
Lia@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Weldon, Ranking Member Abercrombie, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the F/A-22
development and production programs. Today‘s hearing occurs at a
critical time--with the Department of Defense (DOD) conducting
operations overseas while seeking to respond to changes in security
threats and still meeting the challenge of transforming the military.
DOD is spending an average of $150 billion annually on acquisition to
support its current missions and to invest in future capabilities. The
magnitude of this investment, combined with fiscal pressures across the
government and the public‘s growing expectations for demonstrable
results, clearly requires DOD to be as efficient and effective as
possible in obtaining new weapons systems.
The F/A-22 Raptor, designed to be superior to any known or projected
adversary aircraft, is a key component in DOD‘s modernization strategy
as it is designed to replace the F-15 fighter. As you know, the Air
Force started developing the F/A-22 in 1991. While it plans to complete
development in July 2004, important operational test and evaluation
activities have yet to be completed. Low-rate production was approved
in August 2001, and the Air Force plans to procure a minimum of 276
aircraft for $42.2 billion.
As requested, I will discuss our past and recent findings related to
the F/A-22 program. Specifically, I will highlight the Air Force‘s
progress in (1) addressing performance issues and the status of actions
to address them, (2) resolving delays in flight-testing and (3) dealing
with cost growth. I will also identify risks in the Air Force‘s
acquisition plan. Problems in these areas have dramatically affected
the program. For example, cost increases have been a factor in the Air
Force substantially decreasing the number of aircraft to be purchased-
-from 648 to 276. Performance problems, which are now being addressed,
have limited the Air Force‘s ability to test the aircraft. Delays in
testing have significant consequences. Continuing to acquire aircraft
before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could serve to
further increase production costs.
Together, these problems have rippling effects on DOD‘s ability to
upgrade its aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had
met its original goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older
aircraft with F/A-22 aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will
not begin replacing aircraft until late 2005 at the earliest. Moreover,
the rate of replenishment will be substantially lower, due to the
decrease in the number of new aircraft to be purchased. As a result,
DOD will have to continue to use tactical aircraft that contribute to
increased operating and support costs and it will have to wait longer
than anticipated to have access to the advanced capabilities offered by
the F/A-22.
Background:
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22[Footnote 1] aircraft to replace
its fleet of F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to
be superior to the F-15 by being capable of flying at higher speeds for
longer distances, less detectable, and able to provide the pilot with
substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998[Footnote 2]
requires us to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and
determine whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and
cost goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We
have also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3
years. Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development
in February and March 2003, respectively.[Footnote 3]
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the
development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation
for both the development and production programs.[Footnote 4]
Subsequently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002 eliminated the cost limitation for the development program but
left the cost limit for production in place.[Footnote 5] The production
program is now limited to $36.8 billion.[Footnote 6] The current cost
estimate of the development program is $21.9 billion.
Performance Issues:
In the past several years, we have reported on a range of performance
issues that have arisen during the development of the F/A-22. F/A-22
estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration,
maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and radar range in
searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems
have surfaced related to some overheating concerns during high-speed
flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar,
communication, navigation, identification and electronic warfare
functions as well as excess movement of the vertical tails.
Modifications are being made to some test aircraft to address some of
these problems. For now, however, testing in some areas is restricted.
In 2001, we reported on continuing increases in aircraft weight and
that more frequent maintenance than planned on the aircraft was being
required. We also reported on structural inadequacies in the aft (rear)
fuselage and on problems with the separation of some materials within
the horizontal tail section and cracking of the clear section of the
canopy. In 2002, we again reported that the F/A-22‘s performance could
be affected by increased aircraft weight and maintenance needs as well
as a potential problem with ’buffeting“, or excessive movement, of the
aircraft‘s vertical tails. We also continued to report on problems with
the separation of materials within the horizontal tail section and
cracking of the clear section of the canopy.
We reported last month that the F/A-22 developmental program did not
meet key performance goals established for fiscal year 2002 and
continues to confront numerous technical challenges, specifically:
* Avionics instability: Software instability has hampered efforts to
integrate advanced avionics capabilities into the F/A-22 system.
Avionics control and integrated airborne electronics and sensors are
designed to provide an increased awareness of the situation around the
pilot. The Air Force told us avionics have failed or shut down during
numerous tests of F/A-22 aircraft due to software problems. The
shutdowns have occurred when the pilot attempts to use the radar,
communication, navigation, identification, and electronic warfare
systems concurrently. Although the plane can still be flown after the
avionics have failed, the pilot is unable to successfully demonstrate
the performance of the avionics. Therefore, the Air Force has had to
extend the test program schedule.
The Air Force has recognized that the avionics problems pose a high
technical risk to the F/A-22 program, and in June 2002 the Air Force
convened a special team to address the problem. According to the team,
the unpredictable nature of the shutdowns was not surprising
considering the complexity of the avionics system. The team recommended
that the software be stabilized in the laboratory before releasing it
to flight-testing. The team further recommended conducting a stress
test on the software system architecture to reduce problems and ensure
it is operating properly. The Air Force implemented these
recommendations. Further, the Air Force extended the avionics schedule
to accommodate avionics stability testing and it now plans to complete
avionics testing in the first quarter of 2005. However, Air Force
officials stated they do not yet understand the problems associated
with the instability of the avionics software well enough to predict
when they will be able to resolve this problem.
* Vertical fin buffeting: Under some circumstances, the F/A-22
experiences violent movement, or buffeting, of the vertical fins in the
tail section of the aircraft. Buffeting occurs as air, moving first
over the body and the wings of the aircraft, places unequal pressures
on the vertical fins and rudders. The buffeting problem has restricted
the testing of aerial maneuvers of the aircraft. In addition, unless
the violent movement is resolved or the fins strengthened, the fins
will break over time because the pressures experienced exceed the
strength limits of the fins. This could have an impact on the expected
structural life of the aircraft. Lockheed Martin has developed several
modifications to strengthen the vertical fins.
* Overheating concerns: Overheating in the rear portions of the
aircraft has significantly restricted the duration of high-speed
flight-testing. As the F/A-22 flies, heat builds up inside several
areas in the rear of the aircraft. Continued exposure to high
temperatures would weaken these areas. For example, a portion of the
airframe that sits between the engines‘ exhausts experiences the
highest temperatures. This intense heat could weaken or damage the
airframe. To prevent this heat buildup during flight-testing, the
aircraft is restricted to flying just over 500 miles per hour, about
the same speed as a modern jet liner, and significantly below the
supercruise[Footnote 7] requirement. Currently, the F/A-22 flies with
temperature sensors in those areas of the aircraft and slows down
whenever the temperature approaches a certain level. The Air Force may
incorporate a modification that adds copper sheets to the rear of the
aircraft to alleviate the problem. The Air Force began these
modifications in January 2003 and plans to complete them by July 2003.
* Horizontal tail material separations: F/A-22 aircraft have
experienced separations of materials in the horizontal tail and the
shaft, which allow the tail to pivot. Because the separations reduce
tail strength, the Air Force restricted flight-testing of some aircraft
until it had determined that this problem would not affect flight
safety during testing. The Air Force and the contractor initially
believed that improvements to the aircraft‘s manufacturing process
would solve this problem. However, the Air Force has determined that it
could only solve this problem by redesigning the aircraft‘s tail. The
Air Force plans to conduct flight-testing of the redesigned tail
between February 2004 and April 2004.
* Airlift support requirements: The Air Force estimates it will not
meet the F/A-22 airlift support requirement--a key performance
parameter.[Footnote 8] The airlift support requirement is that 8 C-141
aircraft or their equivalents would be sufficient to deploy a squadron
of 24 F/A-22s for 30 days without resupply. Today, the Air Force
estimates that 8.8 C-141 equivalents will be necessary.
* Impact of maintenance needs on performance: The F/A-22‘s performance
may also be affected by maintenance needs that exceed established
objectives. The Air Force estimates that the F/A-22 should, at this
point in its development, be able to complete 1.67 flying hours between
maintenance actions and 1.95 flying hours by the end of development.
However, aircraft are requiring five times the maintenance actions
expected at this point in development. As of November 2002, the
development test aircraft have been completing only .29 flying hours
between maintenance actions. Therefore, the development test aircraft
are spending more time than planned on the ground undergoing
maintenance.
Flight Test Schedule Delays:
Testing is instrumental to gauging the progress being made when an idea
or a concept is translated into an actual product that people use. DOD
divides testing into two categories: developmental and operational. The
goal of developmental tests is to determine whether the weapon system
meets the technical specifications of the contract. The goal of
operational testing is to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of
the weapon system in realistic combat conditions. Operational testing
is managed by different military test organizations that represent the
customers, such as the combat units that will use the weapons. The
results of operational tests are provided to Congress as well as the
Secretary of Defense and senior service officials.
Our reviews over the years have underscored the importance of not
delaying tests too late in development--when it is more difficult,
costly, and time consuming to fix any problems discovered. Yet, we have
been reporting on delays of flight tests for the F/A-22 and that these
delays have contributed to scheduling and cost problems affecting the
program.
F/A-22 flight-testing began in late 1997. Each year since 1998, we have
reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time
than planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be
delivered late to the test center for flight-testing. We have also
reported annually since 2000 that the flight-test program efficiency--
the amount of flight-testing accomplished--has been less than planned.
In March 2003, we reported that F/A-22 flight-testing was slower than
expected in 2002 in all test areas according to Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) testing officials. Consequently, the Air Force
extended flight test schedules and reduced the number of flight tests.
Many tasks originally planned for 2002 were rescheduled for 2003.
Further, the Air Force now plans to conduct more developmental flight-
testing concurrently with operational testing.
Continuing technical problems were the primary reasons for the most
recent delay in flight-testing. In addition, late delivery of
development aircraft to the flight-test center continued to be a
contributing problem. Late deliveries were due not only to technical
problems but also to ongoing problems associated with the manufacture
and assembly of development aircraft by the prime contractor.
With the new schedule, the Air Force delayed the beginning of
operational testing for 4 months, until the portion of developmental
testing required to begin operational testing could be completed.
Operational testing is now planned to begin in August 2003. Table 1
shows the changes in key F/A-22 schedule events.
Table 1: Schedule Changes for Key F/A-22 Test Program Events:
Key Events: Completion of development flight testing necessary prior to
operational testing; Prior Schedule: Apr. 2003; Revised Schedule: Aug.
2003; Change in months: 4.
Key Events: Start of operational testing; Prior Schedule: Apr. 2003;
Revised Schedule: Aug. 2003; Change in months: 4.
Key Events: Completion of operational testing; Prior Schedule: Dec.
2003; Revised Schedule: Jul. 2004; Change in months: 7.
Key Events: High-rate production decision; Prior Schedule: Mar. 2004;
Revised Schedule: Mar. 2004; Change in months: 0.
Source: U.S. Air Force.
[End of table]
Further, according to OSD officials involved in operational testing,
there is a high risk of not completing an adequate amount of
development flight-testing before operational testing is scheduled to
begin. Indeed, we believe that it is unlikely that the Air Force will
be able to complete all necessary avionics flight-testing prior to the
planned start of operational testing. Based on F/A-22 flight test
accomplishment data and current flight test plans, we project that the
start of operational testing might be delayed until January 2004. As a
result, operational testing could be delayed by several months beyond
the current planned date of August 2003.
Cost Increases:
Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since it began in 1991.
They have spurred Congress to impose spending limits and have forced
the Air Force to scale back production. Nevertheless, the Air Force is
still contending with cost increases in three principal areas:
development, production, and modernization.
Development Costs:
Since 1997, the Air Force‘s estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has
increased by $3.2 billion. Figure 1 highlights development cost
limitation and estimate increases during the past 6 years.
Figure 1: Development Cost Limitation and Estimate Increases Since
1997:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Increases prior to 1998 have prompted limitations on spending from
Congress. While the Air Force held the position that these limitations
could be met until recently, our reviews showed that there was a
potential for additional increases because of delays. Table 2 presents
a time line of congressional limitations, our findings and DOD‘s
positions.
Figure 2: Chronology of Development Cost Growth:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Adjusted to reflect conferee direction and reduced effect of
inflation.
[B] Adjusted for inflation.
[End of figure]
The initial congressional limitation of $18.688 billion established in
1997 followed an Air Force team‘s review of estimated development and
production costs. That team concluded in 1997 that additional time
would be required to complete the development program and estimated
that costs would increase from $17.4 billion to $18.688 billion. The
team recommended several changes to the development program‘s schedule,
including slower manufacturing than planned for a more efficient
transition from development to low-rate initial production and an
additional 12 months to complete avionics development.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 then
established this $18.688 billion amount as a cost limitation for the
development program.[Footnote 9] Congressional direction in fiscal year
2000 legislation shifted six production representative test aircraft to
the development program and caused the cost limitation to be adjusted
upward to $20.4 billion. In September 2001, DOD acknowledged that the
cost to complete the development program would exceed the cost
limitation by $557 million. This increase brought the development cost
estimate to $21 billion. Subsequently, in December 2001, the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 eliminated the
development cost limitation.
In March 2003, we reported that the Air Force estimated that
development costs had increased by $876 million, bringing total
development cost to $21.9 billion. This increase was due to the
technical problems and schedule delays related to avionics and vertical
fin buffeting discussed earlier.
Production Cost Growth:
Over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in
estimated production cost growth during the course of two DOD program
reviews. As a result, the estimated cost of the production program
currently exceeds the congressional cost limit. The Air Force has
implemented cost reduction plans designed to offset a significant
amount of this estimated cost growth. But the effectiveness of these
cost reduction plans has varied.
During a 1997 review, the Air Force estimated cost growth of $13.1
billion.[Footnote 10] The major contributing factors to this cost
growth were inflation, increased estimates of labor costs and materials
associated with the airframe and engine, and engineering changes to the
airframe and engine. These factors made up about 75 percent of the cost
growth identified in 1997.
In August 2001, DOD estimated an additional $5.4 billion in cost growth
for the production of the F/A-22, bringing total estimated production
cost to $43 billion. The major contributing factors to this cost growth
were again due to increased labor costs and airframe and engine costs.
These factors totaled almost 70 percent of the cost growth. According
to program officials, major contractors‘ and suppliers‘ inability to
achieve the expected reductions in labor costs throughout the building
of the development and early production aircraft has been the primary
reason for estimating this additional cost growth.
Mixed Success With Cost Reduction Plans:
The Air Force was able to implement cost reduction plans and offset
cost growth by nearly $2 billion in the first four production contracts
awarded. As shown in table 2, the total offsets for these contracts
slightly exceeded earlier projections by about $.5 million.
Table 2: Comparison of Planned Versus Implemented Cost Reduction
Offsets for Awarded Production Contracts:
(Dollars in millions).
Fiscal Year 1999 (2 aircraft); Planned
offsets: $199.0; Implemented
offsets: $200.5; Difference: $1.5.
Fiscal Year 2000 (6 aircraft); Planned
offsets: $329.3; Implemented
offsets: $336.4; Difference: $7.1.
Fiscal Year 2001 (10 aircraft); Planned
offsets: $580.2; Implemented
offsets: $611.1; Difference: $30.9.
Fiscal Year 2002 (13 aircraft); Planned
offsets: $827.2; Implemented
offsets: $788.2; Difference: $(39.0).
Total; Planned
offsets: $1,935.7; Implemented
offsets: $1,936.2; Difference: $.5.
Source: Air Force.
[End of table]
Cost reduction plans exist but have not yet been implemented for
subsequent production lots planned for fiscal years 2003 through 2010
because contracts for these production lots have not yet been awarded.
If implemented successfully, the Air Force expects these cost reduction
plans to achieve billions of dollars in offsets to estimated cost
growth and to allow the production program to be completed within the
current production cost estimate of $43 billion.[Footnote 11] However,
this amount exceeds the production cost limit of $36.8 billion.
In addition, while the Air Force has been attempting to offset costs
through production improvement programs (PIP), recent funding cutbacks
for PIPs may reduce their effectiveness. PIPs focus specifically on
improving production processes to realize savings by using an initial
government investment. The earlier the Air Force implements PIPs, the
greater the impact on the cost of production. Examples of PIPs
previously implemented by the Air Force include manufacturing process
improvements for avionics, improvements in fabrication and assembly
processes for the airframe, and redesign of several components to
enable lower production costs.
As shown in figure 2, the Air Force reduced the funding available for
investment in PIPs by $61 million for lot 1 and $26 million for lot 2
to cover cost growth in production lots 1 and 2.[Footnote 12] As a
result, it is unlikely that PIPs covering these two lots will be able
to offset cost growth as planned.
Figure 3: Planned Versus Actual F/A-22 Production Improvement Program
Investment for Production Lots 1 (Fiscal Year 2001) and 2 (Fiscal Year
2002):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3 shows the remaining planned investment in PIPs through fiscal
year 2006 and the $3.7 billion in estimated cost growth that can
potentially be offset through fiscal year 2010 if the Air Force invests
as planned in these PIPs.
Figure 4: Planned Offsets to Cost Growth From Investing in and
Implementing PIPs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In the past, Congress has been concerned about the Air Force‘s practice
of requesting fiscal year funding for these PIPs but then using part of
that funding for F/A-22 airframe cost increases. [Footnote 13]
Recently, Congress directed the Air Force to submit a request if it
plans to use PIP funds for an alternate purpose.
Modernization Cost Increases:
Modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. In
fiscal year 2001, the Air Force plan was to spend a total of $166
million for upgrades to enhance the operational capabilities of the F/
A-22. Currently, Air Force plans in 2004 call for spending almost $3
billion through fiscal year 2009 for modernization projects. (See fig.
4). Most of the recent increase in modernization funding is necessary
to provide increased ground attack capability. Other modernization
projects include upgrading avionics software, adding an improved short-
range missile capability, upgrading instrumentation for testing, and
incorporating a classified project.
Figure 5: Planned Modernization Funding Increases, Fiscal Year
President‘s budgets for 2001-2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Broader Effects of Cost Increases:
The cost increases experienced by the F/A-22 program have, in part,
forced the Air Force to reduce its planned procurement over time by
more than half (see fig. 5). Such a decrease, in turn, has jeopardized
the Air Force‘s ability to modernize its fleet of tactical aircraft.
In late 2001, in the face of a significant cost overrun in the
estimated cost to produce the F/A-22, the total aircraft to be produced
was reduced. At the same time, DOD requested that Congress remove the
production cost limit. While the congressional limit on production
costs remains in effect, DOD transferred production funding to help
offset $876 million in development cost growth. The net effect was
another decrease in total aircraft to be produced--now estimated at
276.
This reduction may have a negative effect on Air Force plans to
modernize its tactical aircraft fleet. The F/A-22 is designed to be a
replacement for the F-15 aircraft, but the F/A-22 quantity reductions
that have occurred since 1991 tend to exacerbate the increasing trend
in the average age of current Air Force fighter aircraft. In 2001, we
reported that the average age of Air Force tactical fighters would
continue to increase until the fleet reached an average age of 21 years
in 2011. This is almost twice the average age goal of the Air Force.
Aging equipment contributes significantly to increased operating and
support costs.
Figure 6: Aircraft Quantity Reduction Since 1991:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Risks in the F/A-22 Acquisition Plan:
Despite continuing development problems and challenges, the Air Force
plans to continue acquiring production aircraft at increasing annual
rates. For example, the Air Force plans to acquire 20 aircraft during
2003, rather than the maximum of 16 Congress allowed without DOD‘s
submittal of a risk assessment and certification.[Footnote 14] Since
2001, we have reported that this is a very risky strategy because the
Air Force runs the chance of higher production costs by acquiring
significant quantities of aircraft before adequate testing is complete.
Late testing could identify problems requiring costly modifications to
achieve satisfactory performance.
As shown in figure 6, the Air Force is committed to acquiring 73
production aircraft (26 percent) before operational and development
testing is complete. We believe that this is an overly optimistic
strategy given the remaining F/A-22 technical problems and the current
status of testing. As we have noted, acquiring aircraft before
completing adequate testing to resolve significant technical problems
increases the risk of costly modifications later. If F/A-22 testing
schedules slip further--as we believe is likely--even more aircraft
will be acquired before development and operational testing is
complete, and the risk of costly modifications will increase still
more.
Figure 7: Number of Production Aircraft on Contract Prior to Completion
of Operational Testing:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
The F/A-22 has the potential for being the most advanced air
superiority aircraft ever to join the Air Force‘s inventory--using
several advanced technologies and capabilities. But performance
problems, schedule delays, and cost overruns threaten the program‘s
success as well as DOD‘s ability to modernize its tactical aircraft
fleet. Moreover, uncertainties about some of the performance
capabilities have increased the risk that the Air Force will have to
modify a larger quantity of aircraft after they are built. For these
reasons, our recommendations have stressed the need for the Air Force
to (1) avail itself of all opportunities for gaining manufacturing
efficiencies during production, (2) find ways to fund cost reduction
plans that require initial government investment instead of using
funding to cover cost growth in earlier aircraft lots, and (3)
reconsider its decision to increase the annual production rate beyond
16 until greater knowledge on any need for modifications is established
through operational testing. Moreover, we have also recommended, in
light of the high risk nature of the program, that Congress be informed
about the amount of cost reduction plans identified to offset cost
growth, the potential cost of production if cost reduction plans are
not as effective as planned, or the quantity of aircraft that can be
produced within the cost limit. Congress would be able to use this
information to help exercise proper program oversight.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to respond
to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li,
(202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions include Marvin E.
Bonner, Edward Browning, Cristina Chaplain, Gary Middleton, Sameena
Nooruddin, Don M. Springman, and Ralph White.
FOOTNOTES
[1] ’F/A“ stands for fighter/attack aircraft. The Air Force changed the
designation from F-22 to F/A-22 in September 2002 to reflect the
aircraft‘s air-to-surface attack capability.
[2] P.L. 105-85, section 217, Nov. 18, 1997.
[3] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs to
Better Inform Congress about Implications of Continuing F/A-22 Cost
Growth, GAO-03-280 (Washington D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003) and Tactical
Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase F/A-22 Production
Rates While Development Risks Continue, GAO-03-431 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 14, 2003).
[4] P.L. 105-85, section 217, Nov. 18, 1997.
[5] P.L. 107-107, section 213, Dec. 28, 2001.
[6] The cost limitation, before adjustment under the act‘s provisions,
was $43.4 billon.
[7] Supercruise is the aircraft‘s ability to travel at high speeds for
long ranges. The F/A-22‘s supercruise requirement is approximately
1,000 miles per hour.
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays
Indicate Initial Production Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks,
GAO-02-298 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2002).
[9] P.L. 105-85, section 217, Nov. 18, 1997.
[10] Based on a plan to procure 438 aircraft.
[11] The F/A-22 President‘s budget for fiscal year 2004 would transfer
$876 million in production funding to help fund estimated cost
increases in development. As a result, the current production cost
estimate is $42.2 billion.
[12] Production lot 1 was awarded in fiscal year 2001 and production
lot 2 was awarded in fiscal year 2002.
[13] Report 107-298, Nov. 19, 2001.
[14] DOD justified this strategy in the December 2002 risk assessment
and certification it submitted to Congress.
