Military Readiness
Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces Gao ID: GAO-03-505 May 2, 2003Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of providing air support close to troops on the ground. Such close air support requires timely, well-practiced procedures and communication between ground and air elements. While most close air support operations in Afghanistan were successful, "friendly fire" incidents have resulted from mistakes made while conducting the mission. At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide adequate close air support training, as well as efforts to enhance the equipment used to support this mission.
The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized close air support training necessary to prepare them for joint operations. This is the result of four interrelated factors: (1) ground and air forces have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment; (2) home station training is often restricted and thus does not always provide realistic training to prepare troops to perform the mission; (3) the services use different training standards and certification requirements for personnel responsible for coordinating close air support; and (4) within the individual services, joint close air support training is often a lower priority than other missions. While the department recognizes the need to improve the training for the mission, progress has been slow on many of the issues because the services have been unable to agree on joint solutions. In the interim, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air support missions are forced to conduct last-minute training or create ad hoc procedures on the battlefield. Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform the joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision weapons capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD's goals for interoperability and cost-effectiveness. Advanced systems improve the accuracy of battlefield information and can speed the transmission of information from the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft. However, the services have acquired equipment that is not able to communicate across the services, a key requirement in joint operations. Moreover, the services are procuring equipment independently to meet individual service needs, thereby missing opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint service purchases.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-505, Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces
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Report to the Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on Total Force
and Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
May 2003:
Military Readiness:
Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground
Forces:
GAO-03-505:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-505, a report to the Ranking Minority Members of
the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on
Armed Services
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of providing
air support close to troops on the ground. Such close air support
requires timely, well-practiced procedures and communication between
ground and air elements. While most close air support operations in
Afghanistan were successful, ’friendly fire“ incidents have resulted
from mistakes made while conducting the mission.
At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on
Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO
reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide adequate close
air support training, as well as efforts to enhance the equipment used
to support this mission.
What GAO Found:
The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the
barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic,
standardized close air support training necessary to prepare them for
joint operations. This is the result of four interrelated factors: (1)
ground and air forces have limited opportunities to train together in
a joint environment; (2) home station training is often restricted and
thus does not always provide realistic training to prepare troops to
perform the mission; (3) the services use different training standards
and certification requirements for personnel responsible for
coordinating close air support; and (4) within the individual
services, joint close air support training is often a lower priority
than other missions. While the department recognizes the need to
improve the training for the mission, progress has been slow on many
of the issues because the services have been unable to agree on joint
solutions. In the interim, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air
support missions are forced to conduct last-minute training or create
ad hoc procedures on the battlefield.
Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform
the joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision
weapons capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD‘s goals for
interoperability and cost-effectiveness. Advanced systems improve the
accuracy of battlefield information and can speed the transmission of
information from the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft.
However, the services have acquired equipment that is not able to
communicate across the services, a key requirement in joint operations.
Moreover, the services are procuring equipment independently to meet
individual service needs, thereby missing opportunities to achieve
cost benefits from joint service purchases.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending several initiatives to provide the leadership and
accountability needed to resolve the lingering close air support
training shortfalls. GAO is also recommending actions to achieve
greater equipment interoperability among the services.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
report‘s recommendations and is in the process of establishing
specific completion dates for initiatives that will address the
lingering training and equipment interoperability shortfalls.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-505.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Neal Curtin at (757) 552-8100 or
curtinn@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Despite DOD's Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies
Remain:
Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers
Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft That Perform Close Air Support:
Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire
Accidents:
Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to
Maintain Currency:
Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for Ground-
Targeting Equipment:
Table 3: Units and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft:
Table 4: Continued:
Table 5: Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf
War:
Table 6: 2001 Action Items Status:
Figures:
Figure 1: Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close
Air Support Mission:
Figure 2: Percentage of Time That Close Air Support Operations Met
Ground Commander's Intent at Army's National Training Center (Calendar
Years1998-2000):
Figure 3: Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined Visual
and Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice
Communication:
Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground Controllers
and Selected Aircraft:
Figure 5: Selected New Ground-Targeting Equipment Procurements:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 2, 2003:
The Honorable Vic Snyder
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Total Force
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The success or failure of our military forces in combat is directly
linked to the realism and thoroughness of their training beforehand.
This axiom is especially true when aircraft are needed to deliver bombs
on targets close to troops on the ground. Such close air support
requires painstaking coordination between air and ground elements.
Timely, well-practiced procedures and communication are essential
because close air support on the battlefield often has to happen fast
to achieve its objective. Failure to respond to a call for air support
can leave troops exposed to enemy fire; however, mistakes in
communications and targeting can result in fatalities among friendly
forces. In Afghanistan, close air support became particularly critical
because light forces were introduced into battle without artillery,
leaving air power as their sole means of fire support. Though we
completed our work before hostilities began in Iraq, this operation
also showed the increased importance of integrating air power into the
ground fight. While most recent close air support operations have been
successful, "friendly fire" incidents tragically illustrated the
dangers of the mission. Even before the war in Afghanistan, the
Department of Defense (DOD) had begun looking for solutions to long-
standing problems facing the close air support mission. Because joint
close air support is--by its nature--a joint mission that transcends
any single military service, DOD has formed steering groups and other
interservice task forces to examine the mission area. The working
groups have addressed a myriad of issues, but their primary focus has
been on improving training and equipment interoperability[Footnote 1]
across the services in both the active and reserve components.
Because of concerns about such unfortunate "friendly fire" occurrences,
you requested that we review close air support training and doctrine to
ensure that the U.S. military is prepared for future conflicts. You
asked that we recommend any actions that DOD and the services could
take to improve close air support effectiveness while simultaneously
reducing risk to friendly forces. Thus, our objectives were to assess
efforts by DOD and the military services to (1) provide adequate
training for joint close air support missions and (2) enhance the
capabilities of the equipment used to support this mission. A detailed
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent
troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is
needed to prepare them for joint operations. In discussions with
military officials and during our visits to training sites, we found
that adequate realistic training[Footnote 2] is often not available
because of four lingering problems: (1) Ground and air forces have
limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment. When
such joint training does occur, according to DOD reports and unit
officials, it is often ineffective. Data from national training centers
show that joint close air support training seldom meets the
expectations and needs of the ground commander. (2) Similarly, the
training that troops receive at their home stations is usually
unrealistic because of range restrictions; moreover, it lacks variety-
-for example, pilots often receive rote, repetitive training because of
limited air space and other restrictions. (3) The services train their
aircraft controllers, who are the linchpin for close air support
coordination, to different standards. The lack of universal standards
hampers the ability of these controllers to perform in a joint
operation. (4) Finally, within individual military services, the
training for close air support missions is often given a lower
priority--in doctrine, school curriculum, and training exercises--than
other missions. For example, the Air Force focuses more on deep strike
and air-to-air employment during large force exercises, while the Army
places more emphasis on training for artillery and the use of its own
fire support. While DOD has recognized the need to improve the
effectiveness of training the mission,[Footnote 3] the steering
committee tasked to implement the action plan has been unable to
resolve most of the plan's 15 action items because of the time and
effort required to solve the issues and the services' inability to
reach agreement on them. DOD changed the responsibility for chairing
the executive steering committee to Joint Forces Command in hopes of
resolving the lingering interservice issues. Until these problems are
resolved, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air support missions will
be forced to conduct last-minute training or create ad hoc procedures
on the battlefield--practices that reduce the effectiveness of the
mission and increase the risk of injury or death to friendly forces.
Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used in joint
close air support have not kept pace with precision weapons
capabilities and, as a result, do not achieve DOD's goals for ensuring
interoperability and cost-effectiveness. The services have acquired
digital transmission systems that are used to share information
instantly between airborne and ground personnel. However, these systems
are not yet interoperable across the services, potentially hampering
their effectiveness in joint operations. While the services have
recognized the need for such a system and have plans to field one by
2007, the absence of an interoperable system in the near term limits
the ability of air and ground forces to coordinate air attacks
efficiently and under all conditions. Moreover, the services have
acquired a variety of ground-targeting systems, which allow ground
controllers to accurately locate targets for attacking aircraft, but
they are not purchasing these systems cost-effectively. Although DOD
has tasked the services to develop joint requirements for ground-
targeting equipment, they have not yet completed them. As a result, the
services are procuring a variety of systems independently and may be
missing opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint purchases.
We are making several recommendations to help resolve DOD's lingering
close air support training shortcomings and ensure that equipment
procured for this mission is interoperable and meets interservice
requirements. In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our recommendations
and is in the process of establishing specific completion dates for
each of the issues identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support
Action Plan.
Background:
Close air support is an air action by either fixed and rotary wing
aircraft against hostile targets which are near friendly forces and
which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire
and maneuver of those forces. Several different types of aircraft are
assigned the close air support mission; examples are described in
appendix II. To be successful, this type of combat mission requires
detailed integration and close coordination between air and ground
forces.[Footnote 4] Air is only one type of fire support available to
ground forces--other forms include artillery, mortars, and naval
surface fires. Ideally, these fires will be integrated to achieve the
intended effect on the target. The controller plays the key role in
coordinating the close air support mission. The controller is often
located on the ground alongside maneuver forces; however, airborne
controllers may also control attacks. The controller is responsible for
ensuring that aircraft strike the target accurately while avoiding
hitting friendly troops. During battle, when a ground commander needs
air support, this specially trained controller initiates a call, using
voice or digital communications, to the aircraft. The controller
provides the attacking aircraft with the location of the target as well
as the position of any friendly troops in the area. Based on this
information, the aircraft's crew directs the plane's bombs to the
target. Figure 1 depicts a typical mission.
Figure 1. Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of
a Close Air Support Mission:
[See PDF for image]
Note: GAO analysis of DOD documents.
[End of figure]
DOD is in the process of developing technologically advanced equipment
to improve the military's ability to conduct close air support missions
under all types of conditions. Historically, such missions were
conducted during the day under favorable weather conditions. This
allowed both aircrews and ground controllers to visually acquire and
attack ground targets. Today, these missions are typically undertaken
at night or under poor visibility conditions. In addition, because the
rules of engagement have placed strict limits on collateral damage, the
aircraft need to deliver munitions precisely. For example, the use of
bombers flying at high altitudes to perform close air support in recent
operations in Afghanistan shows how the mission has evolved. Bombers
carried out missions using precision weapons from altitudes that
prevented aircrews from visually acquiring targets. The use of these
weapons required controllers to provide more accurate target
information to the attacking aircraft. In addition, technological
advancements in equipment continue to improve the accuracy by which
aircraft can strike their targets. For example, equipment such as laser
rangefinders and systems that allow controllers to transmit information
digitally improve accuracy and help mitigate the risk of human error.
Significant differences exist in the services' approaches to close air
support. Controllers from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and special
operations forces attend different schools to learn the basics of
controlling attack aircraft. To support Army ground units, the Air
Force incorporates officers and enlisted controllers into Army units.
These Air Force personnel live and work with the Army and are intended
to become an integral part of the unit's fire support staff. The Army
must rely on aircraft from other services during training or combat. In
contrast, the Marine Corps uses its own aviators--on a rotational
assignment with ground forces--to control aircraft. The Marine Corps'
attack aircraft squadrons are attached to Marine expeditionary forces,
and their primary mission is to support ground forces. Day to day, this
means that Marine Corps ground commanders have attack aircraft at their
disposal, allowing them to more easily incorporate close air support
into their training events. The inherently joint nature of the mission
requires that all the services train together to be adequately
prepared. Training is fundamental, according to a DOD assessment of the
mission area, because technological advancements are "meaningless if
not supported by training.":
Despite DOD's Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies
Remain:
DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent
troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is
needed to prepare them for joint operations. These lingering problems
include few opportunities for ground and air forces to train together
in a joint environment, a lack of realistic training opportunities at
troops' home stations, differences in the training standards for
aircraft controllers, and the low priority placed on joint close air
support training in the services' school curriculum and exercises.
While DOD has acknowledged the need for more effective training in its
2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan, it has been unable to resolve
most of the plan's action items because of the time and effort required
to resolve the issues and disagreement among the services.
Close Air Support Training Barriers Continue to Linger:
According to joint doctrine, training must be habitually emphasized in
a joint training environment, and proficiency can only be obtained
though dedicated, realistic joint training.[Footnote 5] Historical
experience shows that realistic training is critical to success in
combat. Realistic training is particularly important in the close air
support mission where detailed coordination is required to effectively
deliver bombs close to friendly forces. However, DOD has acknowledged
that joint close air support mission deficiencies have existed for many
years. We reviewed documents from the mid-1990s that showed that
shortfalls in close air support procedures have led to decreased
mission effectiveness and a greater chance of fratricide. Recent
operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated that the military is
placing an increased emphasis on joint close air support, but some
serious challenges remain. Many of the soldiers, pilots, and aircraft
controllers who are asked to perform this mission in combat told us
that they feel ill prepared to do so. Service personnel told us that it
was common for both pilots and ground controllers to be forced to learn
new procedures "on the fly" during actual combat operations. During our
unit visits, personnel from all services expressed concerns over their
ability to perform the joint close air support mission. These concerns
revolve around four interrelated factors, discussed below, which
adversely affect training.
Joint Training Opportunities Are Infrequent and Ineffective:
Pilots, controllers, and ground commanders from the services that are
involved in joint close air support need to train together frequently
in order to develop confidence in one another and become familiar with
one another's procedures. Without such regular exercises, pilots are
not willing to fully trust the instructions they receive from
controllers, and ground commanders are not confident that the air
support will be timely and accurate.
However, opportunities for the services to train together to prepare
for the joint close air support mission are infrequent. Within the
United States, there are primarily three training facilities that have
the necessary maneuver and air space to adequately train close air
support with both ground forces and attacking aircraft. These are the
Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Army's
Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Marine
Corps' Air Ground Combat Center at Twenty-nine Palms, California. These
training centers provide the maneuver space, airspace, and live
ordnance delivery freedom to train for this mission under simulated
combat conditions that are not available at home station training
ranges. The centers are designed to offer the most realistic and
challenging battlefield experiences available; however, units normally
train at one of these locations only once every 12 to 18 months and for
only 3 weeks at a time.
Information collected from training exercises at the Army's National
Training Center has pointed to the need for more training in joint
close air support procedures. The Center for Army Lessons Learned,
which collects and consolidates data from operations and training
events, identified several long-standing problems associated with the
execution of close air support during these exercises. For example, in
1995 it reported that the full effects of the mission are rarely
achieved during training, and in 1998 it found that integration issues
between Army and Air Force personnel continued to hamper the execution
of the mission and may contribute to fratricides.
Observations made by the Secretary of Defense's Joint Close Air Support
Joint Test and Evaluation task force further confirmed that significant
problems exist. Chartered in 1998, the task force has collected and
analyzed a large quantity of data from the Army's National Training
Center. By early 2001, it had observed 22 simulated battles that
included more than 200 close air support sorties. One of the key
conclusions from its study is that close air support seldom achieved
the outcome sought by the ground commander during such training
exercises. As figure 2 shows, close air support operations met the
ground commander's intent--that is, they destroyed or otherwise
disrupted enemy troops--less than one-third of the time. More often
than not, close air support failed to meet the ground commander's
needs.
Figure 2: Figure 2. Percentage of Time That Close Air Support
Operations Met Ground Commander's Intent at Army's National Training
Center (Calendar Years1998-2000):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The task force attributed this low success rate to several factors, in
particular the lack of integration between the Air Force controllers
and Army fire support teams, whose mission is to coordinate different
types of firepower. Ideally, air power would be employed seamlessly
along with artillery and other fire support. We heard frequently about
this issue from the commanders of Army units we visited in the United
States, Germany, and Korea. They told us that Army teams did not view
assigned aircraft controllers as a part of their teams and, thus, were
not as comfortable relying on the controllers to provide support as
they were with their own unit personnel. Army unit personnel work with
the controllers only a few times a month or during field training
exercises. Consequently, a deployed Army team may have to rely on
controllers with whom they have not worked during training and in whom
they have not developed confidence. On the other hand, Air Force
controllers who are trying to integrate themselves into the Army
structure must still report to Air Force leadership, and thus they have
to satisfy the needs of two different commanders. Perhaps most telling,
the task force observers also noted that integrating close air support
was often an "afterthought" during ground maneuver exercises. Some
participants they interviewed expressed concerns about how well they
were prepared for the mission. Air Force participants, for example,
noted they did not get enough practice with the Army's teams, and Army
participants pointed out that training for this mission was often
overlooked and underemphasized.
In addition to infrequent training opportunities, many of the unit
leaders and soldiers we interviewed expressed disappointment with the
effectiveness of the close air support training they received at the
Army's training centers. Pilots told us that because training scenarios
at the centers are scripted to maximize training benefits for maneuver
forces, ground commanders fail to use aircrews effectively. In short,
available aircraft are underutilized, thus limiting the training pilots
receive. In the United States, personnel from the 18th Air Support
Operations Group told us that because the Army runs the training
events, nearly all of the training time at the centers is devoted to
Army maneuver tasks rather than to joint close air support. As a
result, ground controllers are often not included in the planning and
execution of missions. In Europe, personnel from the 4th Air Support
Operations Group told us that the Army limits their controller training
to an hour a day at the Army's Combined Training Center at Grafenwoehr,
Germany. On the other hand, aircraft availability is sometimes a
problem. According to military officials, joint close air support is
planned into all exercises, but in many cases the aircraft do not
arrive for a variety of reasons, such as weather conditions and
mechanical problems. One brigade official told us that during his
unit's last training center rotation in Germany, 12 sorties were
planned, but none was actually undertaken.
While the Marines are widely considered to be proficient at integrated
close air support training, the training they provide at the Twenty-
nine Palms training center, for example, is typically not joint.
Marines supply their own attack aircraft and ground controller assets
to train for close air support missions. Overall, the task force
concluded that Marine Corps ground controllers figure prominently in
the development of offensive and defensive operational plans and that
the mission was generally well planned and executed. However, the
training center presents its own challenges. The aircraft maneuver
space is restrictive, a simulated enemy rather than a well-trained
opposing force is used, and the exercises focus more on training than
on evaluating capabilities.
Combined training events between U.S. and coalition forces are also
infrequent. For example, U.S. officials in Korea told us that Army and
Air Force personnel rarely practice close air support with South Korean
ground controllers or aircrews. In addition, U.S. ground controllers
and pilots stationed in Korea and Germany said that barriers such as
accents and the use of nonstandard phraseology by foreign aircrews
impact the effectiveness of combined training. Dutch military officials
told us that it is difficult to train with U.S. personnel. While two
combined training exercises promote close air support training--Clean
Hunter and Flying Rhino--Dutch officials stated that U.S. ground
controllers have not participated. Furthermore, these officials said
that while A-10s from the 81st Fighter Squadron support Dutch ground
controller training, this relationship is informal and they cannot rely
on U.S. support. U.S. officials stated there are opportunities to train
with coalition military personnel. For example, Navy officials said
that they schedule combined training with British forces as part of
their Joint Maritime Course. Moreover, they told us that because the
Navy does not own training ranges in the European theater, it schedules
training events with host nations to gain access to live-fire ranges.
In addition, U.S. Air Force officials in Korea told us that they are
planning to combine ground controller training for both U.S. and South
Korean personnel.
Range Restrictions Limit Home Station Training:
Air Force and Navy units also have limited opportunities for realistic
joint training for air support missions at their home stations,
primarily because of various air space and range restrictions.[Footnote
6] For example, Air Force officials in South Korea said that their
pilots experience numerous airspace restrictions near the demilitarized
zone separating North and South Korea. Because of such restrictions,
the Air Force rarely synchronizes its training with the U.S. Army or
South Korean forces. This impedes the Air Force's ability to train all
the integrated elements they would need to have in combat. Moreover,
Air Force officials told us that because of live ordnance limitations
during training, fighter pilots may employ live munitions for the first
time in combat, under hostile conditions, and close to friendly forces.
Because range limitations often force units to perform air attacks from
the same direction and oriented on the same targets, training officials
frequently refer to this limited training as "range close air support,"
which means that it is done in a specific way because of range
restrictions rather than as it would be carried out in actual combat.
In short, the training is not realistic, and its value is diminished
because trainees become familiar with the terrain and target. The
following are other additional examples of restricted training
environments:
* The Fort Bragg, North Carolina, range used by the 23rd Fighter Group
has altitude and laser restrictions and prohibits the use of tactical
rockets. As a result, close air support cannot be realistically
practiced.
* The ground controllers from the 25th Air Support Operations Squadron
in Hawaii are not able to maintain their currency requirements[Footnote
7] at their home stations because there are no close air support
aircraft available to train them; thus, they must return to the
mainland periodically to train.
* Airspace restrictions in Germany force A-10 pilots from the 81st
Fighter Squadron to train at altitudes of 17,000 to 20,000 feet rather
than 5,000 feet, where the A-10was designed to operate.
* About 10 percent of last year's planned close air support missions
for the 31st Fighter Wing in Italy were executed. In addition, the
squadron does not have a range where close air support can be
undertaken with a ground controller or where units can train at night.
Likewise, home station training for Navy pilots is limited not only
because of range restrictions but also because of the Navy's 18-month
deployment cycles. Before they are deployed, Navy pilots are sent to
the Naval Strike Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station,
Nevada, for 4 weeks of training. The proficiency pilots gain at Fallon,
however, erodes during their 18-month deployment cycle because they
have access to few ranges, many of which may be inadequate. A second
challenge comes after deployment, when the pilots return to their home
stations. According to Navy personnel, the pilots' mission skills
continue to erode because they have limited access to aircraft and
equipment, and they are restricted to using only local ranges for
training that they feel is inadequate. Marine
Corps pilots at units we visited echoed the concerns voiced about range
restrictions and the lack of varied training opportunities. For
example:
* Dare County Bomb Range, North Carolina, has only a 7-mile range when
30 miles is necessary for the F/A-18 to effectively employ air-to-
ground weapons for close air support training.[Footnote 8]
* One range attached to the Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station,
North Carolina, is not much larger than the Dare County range and is
considered inadequate for effective close air support training. Another
range near the air station prohibits the use of live ordnance.
While range restrictions curtail realistic home station training
opportunities, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel told us that a
close air support simulator device could provide a mechanism to augment
live training opportunities. For example, officials said that the
development of a ground controller simulated training device, linked to
an attack aircraft simulator, would provide valuable training for both
controllers and pilots. DOD recognizes that simulators can enhance the
planning, preparation, and training for close air support. According to
its capstone requirements document, simulators enable units to practice
the communication and coordination procedures associated with the close
air support mission when constraints prohibit live-fire training.
However, the United States does not currently own any close air support
simulated training devices.[Footnote 9] In Europe, the Air Force has
arranged to lease simulator time from the Dutch military. We visited
the training facility in the Netherlands and observed controllers using
the device to practice simulated close air support missions. Both Dutch
and U.S. officials believe such a simulator provides the capability to
train close air support effectively in a safe environment.
Inconsistent Controller Training Hampers Joint Operations:
The individual services and the special operations communities do not
use common certification or currency requirements to train their
aircraft controllers. For initial certification, the Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps operate formal schools that have curriculums based on
the individual services' interpretation of DOD's Joint Publication 3-
09.3, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support
(1995). Overall, this initial instruction is fairly common among the
schools, and the Navy and Marine Corps schools have the same
requirements. The Air Force and the Navy/Marine Corps curriculums cover
such topics as intelligence, equipment operation, integration of close
air support with other fires, and battle damage assessments. However,
the time devoted to each topic, as well as the specific instructional
material presented, varies among the services. Two notable differences
exist in initial certification requirements between the Navy/Marine
Corps and the Air Force programs. The Navy/Marine Corps program
requires its controllers to practice close air support with a variety
of aircraft, including helicopters. The Air Force does not require
helicopter practice because it does not have combat helicopters in its
conventional force, and the Army does not use its helicopters in a
close air support role. A second difference is that the Navy/Marine
Corps requires its controllers to practice coordinating live indirect
fire support, such as artillery. The Air Force does not require
practice with live artillery for its initial certification. Usually,
the Army coordinates the use of indirect fires on the battlefield. The
controller certification debate is further complicated by the fact that
NATO certification requirements are more demanding and comprehensive in
some areas than those for U.S. personnel. For example, NATO standards
require controllers to have 12 successful low-level controls,
controlling close air support attacking aircraft at altitudes below 500
feet, to be qualified. No such standard exists for U.S. controllers.
Once schooling is complete and controllers are sent back to their
units, they are required to maintain a level of proficiency throughout
the year. These annual currency requirements vary by service. (See
table 1.) For example, the Marine Corps and Air Force require
controllers to practice 12 times a year to remain current, while NATO
controllers need 24 practices.
Table 1: Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to
Maintain Currency:
Marine Corps; Total number of practices: 12; Number of daylight
practices: 8; Number of nighttime practices: 4.
Air Force; Total number of practices: 12; Number of daylight
practices: 10; Number of nighttime practices: 2.
NATO; Total number of practices: 24; Number of daylight practices:
20; Number of nighttime practices: 4.
Source: DOD and NATO.
Note: GAO analysis of DOD and NATO training publications.[Footnote 10]
[End of table]
Likewise, currency requirements for controllers in the special
operations community differ among the Air Force, Navy, and Army because
they are required to meet their service-directed requirements. Special
operations controllers receive their initial certification by attending
one of the service schools. However, the services have different
requirements for maintaining their controllers' status. In fact, only
Air Force special operations controllers have a specific annual
currency requirement to maintain. Because of this situation, some
personnel we interviewed told us that during operations in Afghanistan,
ground commanders were hesitant to have non-Air Force personnel
directing close air support missions, and, in most cases, asked to have
Air Force ground controllers attached to their special operations
teams. In addition, it was not clear how recently non-Air Force special
operations controllers had practiced this skill, adding to the ground
commanders' reluctance to use them.
In interviews, controllers from conventional forces told us that while
they have currency standards to maintain, it is difficult to meet them.
According to Air Force officials, 50 percent of the assigned Air Force
ground controllers in Europe are not current in nighttime or live
ordnance controls. One contributing factor is that Air Force pilots can
meet all of their close air support training requirements using an
airborne controller, thus negating the need to provide air support for
ground controller training. For example, according to personnel from
the 81st Fighter Squadron in Germany, less than 20 percent of their
close air support training sorties involve the use of a ground
controller. Recognizing this shortage, Air Force officials have
requested funding for a simulator to help train their ground
controllers stationed in Europe.
Beyond certification and currency standards, some stark differences
exist in the procedures that U.S. and NATO forces use to pass target
information from ground controllers to attacking aircraft. U.S.
controllers are trained to use a standardized 9-linebriefing format,
while NATO troops use a 15-line briefing. This lack of commonality
creates a potentially hazardous battlefield situation in operations
involving U.S. military allies.
Some Services Give Low Priority to Joint Close Air Support Training:
One of the primary reasons the services do not provide the training
needed to adequately prepare U.S. forces to plan and execute the joint
close air support missions is the low priority they give to this
mission in comparison with other training requirements. This lack of
emphasis is apparent in operational doctrine, school instruction, and
the number of pilot sorties devoted to close air support, all of which
prevent aircrews and controllers from developing their mission skills.
The Air Force has historically not placed a high priority on close air
support in its doctrine. Service officials we interviewed stated that
the Air Force tends to emphasize air-to-air and deep attack missions
over close air support. In our review of Air Force doctrine, we found
that the Air Force prioritizes air superiority, strategic attack, and
air interdiction missions because it views such missions as a more
effective and efficient use of its resources. While officials indicated
that the Air Force would provide joint close air support when it was
needed to support ground troops, they said that it is more efficient to
use the aircraft to attack enemies before they come in contact with
friendly forces.
Key Air Force and Navy pilot training schools also give a low priority
to close air support training in their curriculums. At the Air Force
weapons school, for example, only 13 percent of the F-16's flight
syllabus is devoted to this mission. Moreover, for pilots of the A-10-
-an aircraft primarily designed to perform close air support--only 31
percent of Weapons School training sorties were for the mission. At the
Navy's air warfare center, pilots receive 8 days of close air support
training during their 4-week course. However, because of the number of
pilots attending the course, the 8 days devoted to close air support
only allow aircrews to fly two close air support missions.
Furthermore, some Air Force unit training programs place low emphasis
on this mission. According to the Air Force, active duty F-16 squadrons
stationed in the United States devote only about 5 percent of their
training sorties to close air support. In addition, an Air Force
official in Europe stated that less than 10 percent of his F-16
squadron's training program is devoted to close air support, while 50
percent is for air-to-air missions. Given the difficult nature of the
mission, many pilots believe that this level of training is not
sufficient to develop adequate mission skills.
According to DOD's task force, the lack of integration between the
Army's fire support elements and the Air Force's ground controller
personnel is the top problem facing joint close air support training.
Such poor integration is primarily the result of the services' low
emphasis on joint training for this mission. We confirmed this
conclusion during our visits to various units. For example, Army
commanders have been trained to use direct and indirect fire, with
joint close air support being used as a last resort. Joint close air
support is only one of a myriad of support options available to ground
force commanders that must be trained. Army units rarely integrate
close air support into training exercises outside the training centers
and, as a result, joint close air support integration training is often
unrealistic. In addition, the Air Force's selection of air liaison
officers, who provide ground commanders with expertise on the
employment of joint close air support, shows a lack of Air Force
commitment and has added to the lack of confidence on the part of the
Army and the ground controllers. Both Army and Air Force personnel at
several locations we visited raised concerns that this position has not
been considered a career-enhancing position. These officers not only do
not get a chance to fly but they also have to live in the "dirt" with
Army forces during various maneuvers. According to personnel, the best
personnel, or even those with extensive close air support training,
have not filled this position. However, according to Air Force
officials in Europe, beginning in 2000 the service implemented a change
that elevates the selection of candidates for this position to the same
level as picking candidates for flying and operational squadron support
commands for their theater. This should produce higher-quality
candidates for the position.
The Marine Corps emphasizes close air support in its training and
considers integrating aviation with other supporting fires as a
critical element because it lacks the amount of artillery available to
Army commanders. However, Marine Corps training is usually limited to
practicing close air support with its own air assets supporting its own
ground forces. The Marines do not emphasize training these skills with
other services. We found that the Marines rarely conduct joint training
for this mission, which limits their ability to integrate on the
battlefield when they are called upon to perform this mission with
others. According to an internal Operation Enduring Freedom after-
action report, investigators found that Marine Corps ground controllers
require more extensive joint training opportunities, particularly for
controlling air support in joint operations.
DOD is Making Efforts to Resolve Training Deficiencies:
Even before the extensive use of close air support in Afghanistan
highlighted the potential dangers inherent in this mission, DOD had
acknowledged that action was needed to improve its effectiveness. In an
internal assessment, DOD concluded that current capabilities do not
meet all present or projected needs and that the joint community faces
a substantial challenge in attaining the new levels of capabilities
required to support emerging war fighting concepts.[Footnote 11]
In January 2000, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council chartered an
executive steering committee to identify shortfalls across the mission
area. The steering committee developed a Joint Close Air Support action
plan to address a number of training and equipment interoperability
issues. The training issues include such items as increasing joint
training exercises; establishing joint integrated training plans; and
creating a "joint terminal attack controller" with standardized
certifications, which DOD says will improve joint operations and reduce
the potential for accidents and fratricides. However, none of the
action item target dates for completion were met on time. In fact, only
3 of the 15 action items have been completed to date, and the remaining
12 issues have rolled over into the updated 2003 plan. The complete
list of issues contained in the action plan is included in appendix IV.
According to service personnel we interviewed, progress on resolving
the training issues has been slow because of the joint nature of the
mission. Getting agreement across the services is difficult because
there are fundamental differences in how the individual services employ
close air support. Moreover, no joint organization is responsible for
overseeing the training and equipping of the mission. Individual
service and joint staff representatives expressed frustration with the
executive steering committee's inability to resolve the action items.
The services have not been able to agree on several of them. For
example, the services disagree on what to include in the joint terminal
attack controller certification. The committee does not have the
authority to require individual services to train jointly or to
compromise by developing common training standards for their
controllers. In October 2002, DOD changed the responsibility for
chairing the Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee to
Joint Forces Command. Previously, the committee had been cochaired by
the Air Force and the Marine Corps. According to DOD officials, this
action was undertaken, at least in part, in hopes of resolving the
interservice issues. At Joint Forces Command, the Joint Requirements
and Integration Directorate (J8) serves as the lead joint integration
expert, ensuring that the various services and defense agencies combine
their capabilities into a single successful effort.
DOD has acknowledged that such deficiencies in joint training are not
limited to the close air support mission. In March 2002, DOD announced
a plan for transforming all of its training programs. This plan
emphasizes the need to provide comprehensive and systematic joint
training focused on the operational requirements of the combatant
commanders. Furthermore, it acknowledges a need for increasing the use
of live and virtual training in its training environment. According to
DOD, a Joint National Training Capability would be established to
provide training that is less service-focused and more reflective of
how U.S. forces actually fight today. The first training event is
scheduled for May 2003 and will focus on Army maneuver forces at Fort
Irwin, California; however, the event will also include supporting
forces at several locations across the United States.
Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers
Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs:
The military services have not yet achieved DOD's goals for ensuring
that equipment acquired for close air support missions is interoperable
and cost-effective. The digital transmission systems that the services
procured to transmit information instantly between airborne and ground
personnel are not interoperable across the services, and a common
capability is not expected to be fielded until 2007. The lack of
interoperability does not allow participants to take advantage of the
increased effectiveness that digital transmissions add to the mission.
In addition, the services' independent purchases of different kinds of
ground-targeting equipment have precluded them from achieving potential
cost savings from joint purchases.
Current Digital Transmission Systems Are Not Interoperable across the
Services:
Advanced technological systems that allow ground and air forces to
transmit battlefield information digitally can greatly improve the
effectiveness and timeliness of close air support missions. These
systems are designed to allow a ground controller to input the
information needed for a ground attack into a computer and transmit
this information instantly to a computer on board an aircraft. The use
of digital communication has a number of advantages over visual or
voice communication. Digital transmissions speed up the execution of a
mission and can reduce transcription errors between the controllers and
the pilots of attack aircraft. For example, Marine Corps officials told
us that the amount of time required for transmitting and verifying
coordinates could be reduced from about 7 minutes (the time needed for
voice communication) to less than 1 minute for digital communication.
Digital transmissions can also enhance the effectiveness of a mission
during darkness, in inclement weather, or under other conditions when
the ground controller may not be in position to observe the aircraft.
In addition, digital transmission systems can transmit more detailed
information, thereby improving the "situational awareness" of both
ground and air forces. For example, digital systems can provide the
ground controller's mission computer with detailed and constantly
updated battlefield information, including the position of the attack
aircraft, verification of target acquisition, and the location of
friendly forces. According to tests performed at the Army's National
Training Center during February 2002, the use of digitally transmitted
communication significantly improved mission performance. As figure 3
shows, this equipment allowed ground controllers to provide the correct
attack decision more often (89 to 93 percent of the time) than when
they relied on only what they could see and communicate by voice to the
attack aircraft (correct 67 percent of the time).
Figure 3. Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined
Visual and Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice
Communication:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Digital transmission systems are currently available on only four types
of aircraft. The Air Force has installed this equipment on less than
three-quarters of its active-duty F-16 fighter aircraft[Footnote 12]
and has procured a limited number of portable systems for its B-52
bombers. The Marine Corps has installed similar equipment on roughly 95
percent of its AV-8Bs and on about 20 percent of its F/A-18s. Because
of the limited number of aircraft with this equipment, ground
controllers told us that they have had few opportunities to transmit
information digitally to attack aircraft. Even when digital
transmission equipment is available on board an aircraft, it may be
incompatible with the equipment that is on the ground because the
services use different systems. This lack of interoperability across
the services reduces the equipment's effectiveness and limits its
usefulness. Some ground controllers told us that they would hesitate to
bring this equipment to the battlefield because they would not be able
to control attack aircraft from another service. Figure 4 shows that
only one (the AV-8B) of six aircraft that currently perform the close
air support mission is fully capable of receiving digital transmissions
from its own service controllers. However, none is capable of receiving
such transmissions across service lines.
Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground Controllers
and Selected Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Note: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Given the uncertainties surrounding equipment interoperability, ground
troops and aircrews may have to resort to using multiple means of
communication. In Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, for
example, the primary means of passing targeting information from
controllers to attack aircraft was by voice communication. Service
personnel who took part in these operations stated that the use of
multiple modes of communication was a cause of confusion on the
battlefield.
Recognizing that it needs to improve the interoperability of digital
transmission systems, DOD has developed a plan for the services to
field an interoperable system by 2007. This system, commonly called
"Link 16," would provide an integrated air and ground display of
friendly and enemy battlefield positions. Link 16, as it is currently
fielded, is limited to air-to-air missions, but DOD plans to expand its
capabilities to include the air-to-ground mission. In the interim, the
Air Force and Marine Corps are seeking ways to improve the
interoperability of their current systems by developing common software
applications. However, these efforts are in a preliminary stage and,
according to DOD officials, it will be at least 2004 before the interim
solutions are in place.
Services' Fielding of Multiple Ground-Targeting Systems Do Not Take
Advantage of Possible Cost Savings:
The services are independently procuring a wide variety of different
ground-targeting systems to improve their execution of close air
support missions. However, these service-specific purchases have not
taken advantage of the benefits of buying common equipment that could
reduce overall program costs.
The services are procuring new ground-targeting equipment to improve
their ability to undertake close air support missions during night
operations, in adverse weather conditions, and from increasingly higher
altitudes. In Afghanistan, for example, U.S. forces delivered precision
weapons from medium to high altitudes; this meant that ground
controllers had to determine target coordinates with precision in order
to maximize mission effectiveness and avoid fratricides. According to
DOD officials, recent technological advancements in ground-targeting
equipment are providing this needed precision. Figure 5 shows examples
of the equipment the services are procuring to enhance ground-targeting
capabilities.
Figure 5: Selected New Ground-Targeting Equipment Procurements:
[See PDF for image]
Note: GAO generated based on DOD documents.
[End of figure]
Each service has established its own program to acquire more advanced
systems to enhance the capabilities of its ground-targeting equipment.
The Air Force and Marine Corps, for example, have initiated acquisition
programs to buy equipment that will more precisely locate targets at
all levels of visibility, mark targets for attack by precision weapons,
and increase communication connectivity with all battlefield
participants. Table 2 provides an overview of the Marine Corps and Air
Force programs, which were initiated in 1997 and 1999, respectively.
Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for Ground-
Targeting Equipment:
Dollars in millions.
Marine Corps; Total
program cost: $79.6; Fiscal year 2004 budget
request: $29.8; Examples of ground-targeting
equipment: * Laser rangefinder; * GPS receiver; * Laser target
designator; * Multiband radio; * Mission computer;
Program fielding completion date: 2005.
Air Force; Total
program cost: $344; Fiscal year 2004 budget
request: $15.1; Examples of ground-targeting
equipment: * Laser rangefinder; * GPS receiver; * Multiband radio; *
Mission computer; * Infrared laser; Program
fielding completion date: 2011.
Source: GAO.
Note: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
In addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations
Command have procured technologically advanced ground-targeting
equipment for their special operations forces. This equipment was used
during Operation Enduring Freedom and, according to after-action
reports, it significantly enhanced the ground controllers' ability to
identify ground targets for attack aircraft, thereby improving mission
effectiveness.
Although this equipment can improve mission effectiveness, because of
the lack of joint requirements, the services have fielded multiple
types of equipment with similar capabilities. For example, Special
Operations Command officials told us that U.S. forces used four
different ground-targeting systems in Operation Enduring Freedom. An
analysis of the services' procurement plans shows that a variety of
similar ground targeting equipment will be fielded. For example, the
services have programmed funding to procure at least six different
laser rangefinders and four different laser target designators.
DOD has determined that equipment commonality for the mission could
reduce overall program costs for the services. The Joint Close Air
Support Executive Steering Committee, for example, recommended that the
Air Force and Marine Corps identify opportunities for multiservice
procurement of ground-targeting equipment to meet joint requirements.
U.S. Central Command officials echoed the recommendation that U.S.
forces should acquire a common set of ground-targeting equipment and
further emphasized that all forces should be trained in its use and
characteristics. However, with the services continuing to pursue
individual programs based on service-specific requirements, DOD cannot
provide assurances that the services are acquiring the most cost-
effective systems.
GAO has previously reported that DOD fails to consider joint solutions
and broader mission requirements when proposing systems.[Footnote 13]
While the services conduct considerable analyses in justifying major
acquisitions, these analyses can be narrowly focused and may not fully
consider alternative solutions, such as joint acquisition of a system
with other services. As a result, there is no assurance that DOD and
the services are avoiding costly duplication of systems, investing in
the most cost-effective and affordable solutions, and optimizing
mission performance. Furthermore, because the services plan, acquire,
and operate systems to meet their own operational concepts, not
necessarily the requirements of joint operations, there is no guarantee
that fielded systems will operate together effectively. A joint
acquisition strategy, based on broader mission requirements, would
provide assurances that the services are acquiring systems that are
cost-effective and function together during joint operations.
Conclusions:
DOD needs to provide better and more realistic training to prepare U.S.
forces for joint close air support operations. With forces growing
lighter, ground commanders may need to rely more heavily on close air
support. Even a small mistake in conducting this mission can be deadly
to friendly forces, a tragedy we witnessed in Afghanistan. While
ineffective training is the fundamental problem facing close air
support, technological advancements hold promise for enhancing
battlefield information. However, the services have pursued solutions
to meet their individual needs, and it will be years before DOD takes
advantage of the enhancements on a wide scale. As a result, the
services are spending millions of dollars on uncoordinated efforts to
obtain equipment, and different types of systems are proliferating in
the field.
DOD's efforts to improve close air support training have met with
limited success. DOD's Joint Close Air Support action plan has hit
several roadblocks--primarily because the services have been unable to
agree on joint solutions. Thus, the solutions to long-standing problems
will likely have to come from an organization such as the Joint Forces
Command. DOD and the services understand the issues, but a strong
commitment from senior leadership may help to implement pending action
items and address lingering problems. Such problems may also be
indicative of larger-scale training concerns in the department. DOD
recognizes that significant challenges exist in delivering realistic
joint training to prepare forces for a wide range of missions, not just
close air support. DOD's plans to create a Joint National Training
Capability could ultimately provide a venue for better joint training.
Such training is certainly needed to prepare U.S. troops to conduct
close air support missions.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To resolve the lingering training and equipment close air support
issues, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense give close air
support priority when implementing the department's training
transformation initiatives. Specifically, we recommend that the
Secretary provide the Commander of the Joint Forces Command with the
authority and resources, if necessary, to resolve the issues identified
in the joint close air support action plan. The Command's actions
should include:
* emphasizing close air support as part of the department's new Joint
National Training Capability to ensure that units receive realistic
joint training;
* seeking ways to mitigate home station training limitations, including
the use of simulation to augment live training; and:
* preparing aircraft controllers to perform in a joint environment by
standardizing training and certifications.
We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint
Forces Command or other appropriate organizational entity, review the
services' plans for procuring advanced close air support equipment to
ensure that it is interoperable and meets valid joint requirements.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Because of the long-standing nature of training and equipment issues
associated with the joint close air support mission, Congress may wish
to consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the
progress the department has made toward resolving the identified
issues. Congress needs this information to ensure that U.S. forces are
adequately prepared to perform the mission and that the department is
making cost-effective decisions in procuring equipment to enhance joint
performance on the battlefield.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it
concurred with our recommendations and has tasked the U.S. Joint Forces
Command with establishing specific completion dates for each of the
issues identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and
to fully implement them in a timely manner. DOD further stated that it
would provide a copy of the timetable to GAO by May 30, 2003. DOD's
comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air force, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office
of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others
upon request.
If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552-8100. Key
contributors to this report were John Pendleton, Laura Durland, Vincent
Balloon, Nancy Benco, Ray Carroll, Matthew Ullengren, and Lester Ward.
Neal P. Curtin
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Neal P. Curtin:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine what efforts the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
services have made in providing adequate training for the joint close
air support mission, we interviewed officials at all levels of DOD from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, and
unit-level service representatives both within the United States and
overseas. Specifically, we met with members of the Joint Close Air
Support Executive Steering Committee to document the actions they had
been able to accomplish in resolving the training shortcomings listed
in their 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to identify the
reasons for their lack of progress. In addition, we gathered data from
each service to determine, from the user's perspective, what barriers
were preventing adequate training in close air support. We also
obtained the training curriculum from each service's ground controller
schools and analyzed these documents, looking for commonalities and
inconsistencies. Table 3 lists all of the major units, commands, and
training facilities that we visited or contacted to obtain our data.
To determine what efforts DOD has made to enhance the capabilities of
the equipment used to support the joint close air support mission, we
obtained the services' acquisition strategies for the specific
equipment they were procuring to enhance mission effectiveness. We
interviewed service personnel and obtained documentation to verify the
value these procurements added and to determine any barriers that would
limit their effectiveness. Once we determined that no joint requirement
existed and that the services were procuring interoperable digital
transmission devices and multiple variants of ground-targeting
equipment, we obtained documentation on the potential solutions for
obtaining interoperable common equipment.
Table 3: Units and Locations Included on This Assignment:
Army:
U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.
U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.
Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
101st Air Mobile Division, Fort Campbell, Ky.
U.S. Army Artillery Training Command, Fort Sill, Okla.
U.S. Army Headquarters Europe, Heidelberg, Germany.
Eighth U.S. Army, Yongsan Post, Republic of Korea.
2nd Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea.
2nd Infantry Division, 1st Brigade, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea.
25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.
Air Force:
Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
U.S. Air Force Reserve Command, Warner-Robbins Air Force Base, Ga.
U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
Detachment 1, 334th Training Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
23rd Fighter Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.C.
18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.C.
19th Air Support Operations Center, Fort Campbell, Ky.
U.S. Air Force Air Ground Operations School, Nellis Air Force Base,
Nev.
U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
6th Combat Training Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
Detachment 1, 28th Test Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
2nd Operations Support Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
20th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
93rd Bomber Squadron (AF Reserve), Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
96th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
548th Combat Training Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La.
303rd Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.
457th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Naval Air Station Joint Reserve
Base, Fort Worth, Tex.
706th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Joint Reserve Base, New Orleans,
La.
U.S. Air Force Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
81st Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany.
555th Fighter Squadron, Aviano Air Base, Italy.
32nd Air Ground Operations School, Germany.
4th Air Support Operations Group, Germany.
1st Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany.
2nd Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany.
Headquarter Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.
7th Air Force, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea.
51st Operations Support Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea.
51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea.
25th Air Support Operations Squadron, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.
Navy:
Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Naval Air Station Fallon,
Nev.
U.S. Naval Safety Center, Naval Air Reserve, Norfolk, Va.
Naval Air Forces-Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station Norfolk, Va.
Strike Fighter Wings Atlantic, Oceana Naval Air Station, Va.
VFA-136, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va.
VF-211, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va.
Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific, Naval Amphibious Base,
Coronado, Calif.
U.S. Navy Europe, London, England.
Marine Corps:
Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policy, and Budget Branch,
Washington, D.C.
Marine Corps, Plans, Policy, and Operations Department, Washington,
D.C.
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.
Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Quantico, Va.
Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twenty-nine Palms,
Calif.
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One, Yuma Marine Corps
Air Station, Ariz.
2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Marine Air Group 14, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air
Station, N.C.
Marine Air Group 29, New River Marine Corps Air Station, N.C.
Marine Air Group 31, Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, S.C.
Marine Forces Pacific Command, Hawaii.
Special Operations:
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.
3rd Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N.C.
5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky.
720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
19th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
Joint Organizations:
Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team, Eglin
Air Force Base, Fla.
Joint Close Air Support Joint Test & Evaluation Task Force, Eglin Air
Force Base, Fla.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training,
Washington, D.C.
The Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments,
Washington, D.C.
U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
U.S. Forces Korea, Seoul, Korea.
U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va.
U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii.
Netherlands:
Royal Netherlands Army Combat Maneuver Training Center,
Netherlands.
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
We conducted our review from April 2002 through March 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that Perform Close Air Support:
The services use many different aircraft to deliver close air support.
Table 4 provides pictures and brief descriptions of these aircraft.
Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOD.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire
Accidents:
DOD and the services identified three close air support training
mishaps that resulted in fatalities since the Persian Gulf War and
three official joint close air support friendly fire events. Friendly
fire is a circumstance in which members of a U.S. or friendly military
force are mistakenly or accidentally killed or injured in action taken
by U.S. or friendly forces actively engaged with an enemy or who are
directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile
force. According to DOD personnel and the conclusions reached in the
investigations, these incidents have been caused by human error, by not
following established standardized procedures, and by lack of
experience and training. Two well-known events did not meet our
criteria and are thus excluded. The April 17, 2002, incident where an
Air National Guard F-16 bombed Canadian troops did not involve air
support of ground forces, so it was not close air support. Secondly,
the July 1, 2002, "wedding party" incident in which civilians were
killed and injured is not by definition a friendly fire incident. Table
5 contains a description of the close air support friendly fire and
training incidents and the status of the investigations.
Table 5: Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf
War:
Training Incidents:
Date: July 18, 1995; Location: Fort Sill, Oklahoma;
Description of incident: An Air Force Reserve A-10
aircraft dropped a 500-pound bomb on a
forward observation post; Who was hurt: One person
was killed and 13 others injured; Status of
incident report: Complete.
Date: April 19, 1999; Location: Atlantic Fleet
Weapons Training Facility, Vieques Island, Puerto Rico; Description of
incident: A Marine FA-18C dropped two 500-pound
bombs that impacted outside the live impact area but within the
confines of the range; Who was hurt: One person
was killed and 4 others injured; Status of
incident report: Complete.
Date: March 12, 2001; Location: Udairi Range,
Kuwait; Description of incident: A Navy F/A-18C
dropped three 500-pound bombs on an observation post during a night
exercise; Who was hurt: Six people were killed and
11 others injured; Status of
incident report: Complete.
Date: Friendly Fire Incidents.
Date: November 26, 2001; Location: Mazar-e Sharif,
Afghanistan; Description of incident: A Navy F/A-18
aircraft dropped a joint direct attack munition that exploded near
friendly forces; Who was hurt: No fatalities and 5
others injured; Status of
incident report: Ongoing.
Date: December 5, 2001; Location: Afghanistan;
Description of incident: A B-52 bomber dropped a
joint direct attack munition that exploded near friendly forces; Who
was hurt: Three people were killed and 19 others
injured; Status of
incident report: Complete.
Date: March 2, 2002; Location: Terghul Ghar,
Afghanistan; Description of incident: During
Operation Anaconda, an AC-130 engaged coalition forces, mistaking them
for the enemy; Who was hurt: One person was killed
and 3 others injured; Status of
incident report: Complete.
[End of table]
Source: DOD.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan:
The 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan contained 15 action items.
All of the items originally had completion dates tasked within fiscal
year 2002. However, 12 of them have not yet been completed, and the
executive steering committee has recommended that they transition into
the updated 2003 action plan. Table 6 lists the action items for 2001,
their original estimated completion dates, and whether the action item
has been completed.
Table 6: Status of Fiscal Year 2001 Action Items:
Action items: Standardize ground controller training; Original date
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Standardize airborne controller training; Original date
for completion: Mar. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Expand air liaison officer course; Original date
for completion: Dec. 2001; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Expand fire support element curriculum; Original date
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Produce joint mission essential task lists; Original
date
for completion: Feb. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Establish joint integrated training plans; Original date
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Increase use of simulated training; Original date
for completion: Jan. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Increase joint exercises; Original date
for completion: Feb. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Include new concepts in joint publication 3-09.3;
Original date
for completion: Periodic; Completed: Yes.
Action items: Update service tactic techniques and procedures
to reflect joint publication 3-09.3 revisions; Original date
for completion: Sep. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Develop new concepts experiments to validate systems and
procedures; Original date
for completion: Feb. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Publish a capstone requirements document; Original date
for completion: Aug. 2002; Completed: Yes.
Action items: Explore joint Air Force-Marine Corps ground controller
equipment procurement; Original date
for completion: May. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Standardize symbols and graphics; Original date
for completion: Apr. 2002; Completed: [Empty].
Action items: Coordinate with Combat Identification action plan team on
overlapping issues; Original date
for completion: Apr. 2002; Completed: Yes.
Source: GAO.
Note: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of table]
In addition to the 12 remaining items, of which 2 have been combined,
the executive steering committee has proposed adding 3 new items to the
updated plan. These are the inclusion of unmanned aerial vehicles in
joint close air support operations, an increased emphasis on precision
targeting, and an increase in live sortie and artillery resources.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
March 31, 2003:
Mr. Neal P. Curtin Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Curtin,
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-03-505, `MILITARY READINESS: Lingering Training and
Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces', dated March 10,
2003 (GAO Code 350192). The Department appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the recommendations contained in the report.
The Department concurs with the recommendations and is in the process
of establishing specific completion dates for each of the issues
identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan. We will
provide a copy of this timetable by May 30, 2003.
Paul W. Mayberry:
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Readiness:
Signed by Paul W. Mayberry:
Enclosures: a/s:
GAO CODE 350192/GAO-03-505:
"MILITARY READINESS: LINGERING TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT ISSUES HAMPER AIR
SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
give close air support priority when implementing the Department's
training transformation initiatives. (Page 26/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will work
closely with U.S. Joint Forces Command to fully implement the JCAS
Action Plan in a timely manner and ensure that JCAS will be a priority
joint tactical task in JNTC events.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
provide the Commander of the Joint Forces Command with the authority
and resources, if necessary to resolve the issues identified in the
joint close air support action plan. (Page 26/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. As the lead agent for the JCAS Action Plan, U.S.
Joint Force Command makes recommendations to the Services regarding
JCAS and facilitates issue resolution. The Department is exploring
alternatives to provide the necessary authority to direct the
Department's efforts to improve joint close air support.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Commander of the Joint
Forces Command take action to resolve the issues identified in the
joint close air support action plan that includes emphasizing close air
support as part of the Department's new Joint National Training
Capability to ensure that units receive realistic joint training. (Page
26/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. U.S. Joint Forces Command, as the Chair of the
JCAS Executive Steering Committee, will develop an implementation
schedule for all issues detailed in the JCAS Action Plan to ensure
timely completion of those issues.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Commander of the Joint
Forces Command take action to resolve the issues identified in the
joint close air support action plan that includes seeking ways to
mitigate home station training limitations, including the use of
simulation to augment live training. (Page 26/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The JCAS Action Plan includes issues on training
plans, live sortie/artillery resource plans, joint CAS exercises, and
training simulation support, all of which specifically address ways to
mitigate home station training limitations. These issues, as all the
issues in the Action Plan, will be assigned completion dates in order
to ensure timely implementation.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Commander of the Joint
Forces Command take action to resolve the issues identified in the
joint close air support action plan that includes preparing aircraft
controllers to perform in a joint environment by standardizing training
and certifications. (Page 26/Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Standardized procedures for Joint Terminal Attack
Controller (JTAC), will be established in the soon to be published
Joint Publication 3-09.3 (Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
(JTTP) for Close Air Support). The 2003 JCAS Action Plan specifically
addresses JTAC standardization of training and certification. A JTAC
Working Group has developed recommendations for JTAC certification and
currency requirements for the JTAC.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense,
through the Joint forces Command or other appropriate organizational
entity, review the Services' plans for procuring advanced close air
support equipment to ensure that it is interoperable and meets valid
joint requirements. (Page 26/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur. U.S. Joint Forces Command is the lead
organization for the Close Air Support Capstone Requirements Document
(CAS CRD). USJFCOM will conduct a gap analysis between the JCAS
Integrated Architecture, Service CAS Operational Requirements
Documents, and the CAS CRD. This gap analysis will identify equipment
capability and interoperability issues along with an investment
strategy to ensure Service CAS equipment is interoperable and meets
valid joint requirements.
GAO CODE 350192/GAO-03-505:
"MILITARY READINESS: LINGERING TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT ISSUES HAMPER AIR
SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS ON THE MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION:
SUGGESTION 1: The GAO suggested that the Congress may wish to consider
requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the progress the
Department has made toward resolving the identified issues. The GAO
noted that Congress needs this information to ensure that U.S. Forces
are adequately prepared to perform the mission and that the Department
is making cost-effective decisions in procuring equipment to enhance
joint performance on the battlefield. (Page 27/Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: To ensure the Action Plan issues are addressed in a
timely manner, the Department is in the process of establishing
specific completion dates for each of the issues identified in the 2003
JCAS Action Plan. Once these dates are established, U.S. Joint Forces
Command will report to the Department their status on a periodic basis.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Interoperability refers to the ability of one system to provide and
accept information from another system.
[2] Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised).
[3] Joint Close Air Support Action Plan, November 2001.
[4] Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised).
[5] Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Close Air Support, December 1995 (currently being revised).
[6] Such range limitations have been the subject of related GAO work,
including, Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not
Reflected in Readiness Reporting, GAO-02-525 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
30, 2002) and Military Training: DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to
Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614 (Washington, D.C.:
June 11, 2002).
[7] A currency requirement is the frequency with which a skill needs to
be practiced during a given period of time.
[8] The 30-mile standard is documented in the Navy's Top Gun manual,
Volume IV - Employment/Tactics, May 2002.
[9] After completion of our audit work, Air Force officials indicated
that they have incorporated extremely limited simulated close air
support training devices in their Joint Firepower Course.
[10] The publications are as follows: Marine Corps order P3500.37,
Aviation Training and Readiness Manual vol. 9 Tactical Air Control
Party Officer, dated May 8, 2001; Air Force Instruction 13-102, Air
Support Operations Center and Tactical Air Control Party Training and
Evaluation Procedures, dated September 1, 1996; Minimum Qualifications
for Forward Air Controllers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Standardization Agreement #3797, dated February 26, 1979.
[11] Capstone Requirements Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 067-
02, May 6, 2002.
[12] In addition to the active duty Air Force effort to enhance digital
transmission capabilities, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard
have developed the Situational Awareness Data Link. However, primarily
only Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard F-16s are equipped with
this system.
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks, Department of Defense. GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003).
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