Military Transformation
Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison Gao ID: GAO-03-671 May 30, 2003The first step of the U.S. Army's ongoing transformation was to form two of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip the brigades with a new interim armored vehicle--the Stryker. The fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act required the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan to compare the operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the Stryker and a medium Army armored vehicle, the Department of Defense's (DOD) director of testing and evaluation approve the plan, and the Army to conduct the operational effectiveness and cost comparison. The Secretary of Defense was also to certify to Congress that Stryker Brigades did not diminish the Army's combat power. As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the Army's 2002 efforts to (1) assess whether the Army's plan for the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2) determine whether the evaluation's resulting data were sufficient to measure the two vehicles' relative effectiveness.
The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, that met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act. As required, the plan proposed comparing the operational effectiveness and cost of the Stryker and a troop-carrying medium armored vehicle selected by the Army--the M-113A3 armored personnel carrier. Regarding the operational effectiveness, the plan's scope included the use of various data, such as that obtained during operational vignettes, for which all participants and observers received training regarding the vehicles, and from technical testing. The plan focused on the armored vehicles' effectiveness; suitability in support of infantry units, such as maintenance; and survivability during operations. Regarding the cost comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost analysis be conducted between the two vehicles. GAO determined, based on its observation and analysis of evaluation plans and results, that the Army's conduct of the plan provided sufficient data to determine the two vehicles' relative effectiveness. To obtain the data concerning the vehicles' operational effectiveness, survivability, and suitability, the Army conducted and evaluated operational training events and multiple technical tests. According to the Army Test and Evaluation Command, both the Stryker and the M-113A3 enabled the infantry to complete missions. However, the Command concluded that the Stryker provided more advantages in force protection, support for dismounted assault, and close fight and mobility and was more survivable against ballistic and nonballistic threats. The Army also conducted a comprehensive cost analysis. GAO determined that the costs used in the analysis were reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine the vehicles' relative cost--with the Stryker being more expensive to acquire than the M-113A3 but less so to operate and maintain. The Secretary of Defense, as required, certified to Congress that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team did not diminish Army combat power.
GAO-03-671, Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison
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113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for
Statutorily Mandated Comparison' which was released on May 30, 2003.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
May 2003:
MILITARY TRANSFORMATION:
Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles
Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison:
GAO-03-671:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-671, a report to Congressional Committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
The first step of the U.S. Army‘s ongoing transformation was to form
two of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip
the brigades with a new interim armored vehicle”the Stryker. The
fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act required the
Secretary of the Army to develop a plan to compare the operational
effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the Stryker
and a medium Army armored vehicle, the Department of Defense‘s (DOD)
director of testing and evaluation approve the plan, and the Army to
conduct the operational effectiveness and cost comparison. The
Secretary of Defense was also to certify to Congress that Stryker
Brigades did not diminish the Army‘s combat power.
As part of a series of ongoing reviews of Army transformation, GAO
monitored the Army‘s 2002 efforts to (1) assess whether the Army‘s
plan for the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2)
determine whether the evaluation‘s resulting data were sufficient to
measure the two vehicles‘ relative effectiveness.
What GAO Found:
The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD‘s Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, that met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001
National Defense Authorization Act. As required, the plan proposed
comparing the operational effectiveness and cost of the Stryker and a
troop-carrying medium armored vehicle selected by the Army”the M-113A3
armored personnel carrier. Regarding the operational effectiveness,
the plan‘s scope included the use of various data, such as that
obtained during operational vignettes, for which all participants and
observers received training regarding the vehicles, and from technical
testing. The plan focused on the armored vehicles‘ effectiveness;
suitability in support of infantry units, such as maintenance; and
survivability during operations. Regarding the cost comparison, the
plan proposed that a comprehensive cost analysis be conducted between
the two vehicles.
GAO determined, based on its observation and analysis of evaluation
plans and results, that the Army‘s conduct of the plan provided
sufficient data to determine the two vehicles‘ relative effectiveness.
To obtain the data concerning the vehicles‘ operational effectiveness,
survivability, and suitability, the Army conducted and evaluated
operational training events and multiple technical tests. According to
the Army Test and Evaluation Command, both the Stryker and the M-113A3
enabled the infantry to complete missions. However, the Command
concluded that the Stryker provided more advantages in force
protection, support for dismounted assault, and close fight and
mobility and was more survivable against ballistic and nonballistic
threats. The Army also conducted a comprehensive cost analysis. GAO
determined that the costs used in the analysis were reasonable and
provided sufficient data to determine the vehicles‘ relative cost”with
the Stryker being more expensive to acquire than the M-113A3 but less
so to operate and maintain. The Secretary of Defense, as required,
certified to Congress that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team did not
diminish Army combat power.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making any recommendations. In commenting on a draft of
this report, DOD concurred with the findings.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-671.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Army's Comparative Evaluation Plan Met Legislative Requirements:
Evaluation Provided Sufficient Data for Comparison of Vehicles:
Secretary of Defense Certified to the Combat Power of the Army
and Released Funding for the Third Brigade's Vehicles:
Agency Comments:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning Limitations
on Army Transformation Actions:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Table:
Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub-Issues in the Army's
Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV):
Figures:
Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle:
Figure 2: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier:
Figure 3: Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion:
Figure 4: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress Excursion:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
MANPRINT: Manpower and Personnel Integration:
MAV: Medium Armored Vehicles:
PA&E: Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate:
Letter May 30, 2003:
Congressional Committees:
In early 2000, the U.S. Army began transforming its force to one that
is expected to be more strategically responsive, rapidly deployable,
and able to effectively operate in all types of military operations,
whether small-scale contingencies or major theater wars. The first step
was to form two of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat
teams and equip the brigades with a new interim armored vehicle known
as the Stryker. The first two brigades are located at Fort
Lewis, Washington.
Because these brigades are an entirely new organizational design, many
questions have arisen as to the unit's cost, combat effectiveness, and
suitability. In the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization
Act,[Footnote 1] Congress required:
* the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan for comparing the
operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of
the interim armored vehicle and a medium armored vehicle currently in
the Army inventory, although the legislation did not provide specifics
regarding the comparison;
* the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
Defense (DOD) to approve the comparison plan before the Army could
carry it out;
* the Army to conduct the operational effectiveness and cost
comparison; and:
* the Secretary of Defense to certify that the Stryker brigade combat
team did not diminish the Army's combat power.
The statute further provided that vehicles for the third brigade could
not be acquired until 30 days after the certification.
See appendix I for the full text of the law.
On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored
and assessed the Army's efforts during 2002 to meet the requirements of
the legislation. In doing so, we observed operational training events
held at Fort Lewis, Washington, which the Army used to collect
comparison data, and a vehicle survivability test at Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland. Our objectives were to (1) assess whether the Army's
plan for the comparison met the legislative requirements and
(2) determine whether the results of the evaluation provided the data
needed to measure the relative effectiveness of the two vehicles. The
report also discusses the Secretary of Defense's report to Congress and
certification regarding the combat power of the Army. We are providing
this report, our fifth in a planned series related to Army
transformation,[Footnote 2] to you because of your committees'
oversight responsibility.
Results in Brief:
The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD's Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, which met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001
National Defense Authorization Act. As contained in the congressional
mandate, the plan proposed comparing the operational effectiveness and
cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the troop-carrying
medium armored vehicle currently in the Army inventory--the M-113A3
armored personnel carrier. With regard to operational effectiveness,
the plan's scope included the use of various data, such as that
obtained during operational vignettes and technical testing. The plan
focused on three main comparison issues relating to the armored
vehicles--their effectiveness, suitability in support of infantry units
such as vehicle employment and maintenance, and survivability during
operational missions. Regarding the cost comparison, the plan proposed
that a comprehensive cost analysis be conducted between the
two vehicles.
Based on our observation and analysis of evaluation plans and results,
the Army's implementation of the plan provided sufficient data to
determine the relative effectiveness of the vehicles. The Army
conducted and evaluated eight operational training events per vehicle
type and data from technical tests to compare the operational
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability between the two vehicles.
Prior to the operational vignettes, all participants and evaluators
received training pertinent to their roles. The Army also conducted a
comprehensive cost analysis as part of the plan. After analyzing the
Army's cost plan and data, we found that the costs used were reasonable
and provided sufficient data to determine the relative cost of the two
vehicles. Based on the results of the evaluation, the Secretary of
Defense certified to Congress that the Stryker brigade combat team did
not diminish the combat power of the Army. The Secretary of Defense
also approved obligating funds for the Stryker vehicles to equip the
third brigade.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
report's findings.
Background:
In October 1999, the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army
unveiled their vision to transform the U.S. Army into a more
strategically responsive force that could dominate across the full
spectrum of military operations--from small-scale contingencies to a
major theater war. In testimony before the U.S. Senate in March
2000,[Footnote 3] the Chief of Staff of the Army stated that the Army
had to transform to meet current and future strategic requirements such
as the rise of sub-national and transnational groups, including
criminal and terrorist elements that may pursue objectives that
threaten U.S. interests. The Army believes that the transformation is
necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the growing number of
peacekeeping operations and small-scale contingencies and (2) the
challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as urban operations in
biological/chemical environments. The Army plans to transform its
forces over a 30-year period.
In initial efforts to meet this new vision, the Army's Training and
Doctrine Command developed a concept that described the capabilities,
organization, and operations of a new brigade combat team. This brigade
would provide a capability that the Army did not possess: a rapidly
deployable, early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and
capable of operating in all types of military operations, from small-
scale contingencies to a major theater of war. As an early-entry force,
the brigade is expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to
conduct immediate combat operations upon arrival in theater if
required. The brigade would be formed around a new, medium weight,
armored vehicle. The Army chose an armored wheeled vehicle, designated
as the Stryker, as its primary combat platform. The Army selected one
light infantry brigade and one mechanized infantry brigade at Fort
Lewis, Washington, to become the first Stryker brigade combat teams.
The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division was selected to
transform first.
Congress supported the Army's efforts to transform into a force that
not only was lethal, versatile, suitable, and survivable but could also
deploy rapidly. However, members agreed that the Army must conduct
an evaluation that compared the operational effectiveness and cost
between a medium armored vehicle currently in the Army's inventory
and the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle planned for the brigades. The
comparative evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2001 National
Defense Authorization Act. For the comparison, the Army selected the
M-113A3 armored personnel carrier as the medium armored vehicle
currently in the inventory. Figures 1 and 2 show the Stryker Infantry
Carrier vehicle and the M-113A3, respectively. The Army began
conducting the comparison in September 2002.
Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Army's Comparative Evaluation Plan Met Legislative Requirements:
The Army-developed and the DOD Operational Test and Evaluation
Director-approved plan for evaluating the Stryker Infantry Carrier
vehicle and the M-113A3 armored personnel carrier, currently in the
Army's inventory, met legislative requirements to compare both
operational effectiveness and cost. The Army developed a plan that
compared the operational effectiveness and cost between the two
vehicles. The congressional mandate did not provide specifics regarding
the comparison but specified that DOD's Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, approve the Army's plan.[Footnote 4] The purpose of the
plan was to (1) assess and compare measures of operational
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability and (2) compare the costs
of the two vehicles. As required by the statute, the DOD Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, approved the operational effectiveness
portion of the plan in August 2002 and the cost comparison portion in
December 2002.
Army's Plan Evaluated Operational Effectiveness, Suitability, and
Survivability of the Two Vehicles:
The primary objective of the comparison evaluation was to assess
and compare measures of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability for each of the vehicles. The Army Test and Evaluation
Command developed a detailed comparison evaluation plan that, as the
law required, was approved by DOD's Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, on August 23, 2002.[Footnote 5] The plan's scope included
using existing data and data developed during physical examination of
the vehicles, modeling and simulation, and live fire testing of
vehicle-mounted weapons. Data collected from production verification
tests that evaluated vehicle performance--such as braking,
acceleration, traction, and sustained speed over various types of
terrain--was also included. The operational portion of the comparison
involved a series of platoon level tasks, including operations in
complex rural terrain and urban areas under various light and weather
conditions. The plan focused on 3 main comparison issues and 10 sub-
issues. The main comparison issues were defined as follows:
* Effectiveness: How well the unit performs and what capabilities the
vehicles provide in support of operational missions.
* Suitability: How the vehicles are deployed, operated, and
logistically supported while performing tasks that support the infantry
platoons in conducting their missions.
* Survivability: How well the vehicles protect the crew and infantry
squad, vehicle system survivability, and the effect of vehicle damage
on mission performance.
The plan included evaluating each of the issues and sub-issues
(see table 1) during various evaluation events. These events included
examination, modeling and simulation, technical testing, and
operational testing.
* Examination: A review and analysis of available vehicle design and
performance data. The vehicles would be physically examined to obtain
specific measures and characteristics. Existing data was the primary
source, but other appropriate data sources such as historical data were
also used.
* Modeling and Simulation: Application of existing and collected data
to determine the mobility characteristics of the vehicles.
* Technical Testing: The measurement of demonstrated performance
characteristics and capabilities not available through existing data or
modeling and simulation. Additional data were provided from events held
during the acquisition process and ballistic survivability testing at
the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, test center.
* Operational Testing: The Army designed operational vignettes to
directly compare two equally organized and trained infantry platoons.
The platoons conducted identical tasks and missions against a common
opposing force with one platoon employing the M-113A3 and the other
employing the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle. The opposing force
consisted of mounted and dismounted military units, paramilitary
forces, and civilians.
Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub-Issues in the Army's
Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command's
comparison evaluation plan.
[End of table]
Army Compared Costs as Required by the Statute:
The Army directed its Cost and Economic Analysis Center to conduct a
cost comparison between the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the
M-113A3 armored personnel carrier. The Analysis Center developed a plan
to determine and compare the life-cycle costs of the Stryker vehicle to
the life-cycle costs of the M-113A3 currently in the Army inventory.
The Army directed that the Analysis Center examine the costs of
equipping, training, fielding, and maintaining the vehicles for use in
the Stryker brigades. To determine these costs, the Analysis Center
emphasized the costs associated with vehicle manufacturing, military
personnel, replenishment parts, and fuel/petroleum for each vehicle. On
October 4, 2002, the Army submitted the cost comparison portion of the
plan to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, for approval. As
required by the law, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
officially approved that portion on December 17, 2002, as the Secretary
of the Army submitted the comparison evaluation report to DOD.
Evaluation Provided Sufficient Data for Comparison of Vehicles:
Based on our observation of the vignettes, unit and evaluator training,
and a technical test and on our analysis of the test results and review
of cost comparison assumptions, the Army's conduct of the Army Test and
Evaluation Command plan produced enough data to gauge the relative
effectiveness and cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the
M-113A3 armored personnel carrier. To ensure competency during
evaluation events, the Army certified that the units conducting the
operational vignettes received comparable amounts of training in their
vehicles and that the evaluators were familiar with appropriate
infantry tactics and doctrine. The purpose of the comparison evaluation
plan was to collect data to measure the relative effectiveness,
suitability, and survivability of both vehicles. To do so, the plan
consisted of operational vignettes, augmented by gunnery exercises,
modeling and simulations; physical and other vehicle examinations; and
technical testing. Comparison data included surveys, results of force
on force exercises, and mission success and task performance ratings.
The plan also assessed the costs of both vehicles.
Unit and Evaluators Certified Prior to Conduct of Operational
Vignettes:
Prior to conducting the operational effectiveness segment of the
comparison evaluation, the two infantry platoons and the event
evaluators received training specific to their roles in the comparison.
The two infantry platoons received training that ensured all
participating personnel were proficient with the vehicles, digitized
equipment, and the associated support equipment. For example, one
platoon trained on the Stryker vehicle while the other trained on the
M-113A3 vehicle. All vehicle commanders were trained on the M2 .50-
caliber machine gun and the MK19 grenade launcher--the weapon systems
for the two types of vehicles. The two platoons participated in a 20-
day training exercise and practiced incorporating the use of the two
types of vehicles in missions assigned to a platoon in a Stryker
brigade combat team. The brigade commander certified that the two
platoons were trained according to doctrine and that both were
similarly manned and trained.
During the comparison evaluation, subject matter experts[Footnote 6]
evaluated the units' performance during each operational vignette.
Similar to the two platoons' personnel, the evaluators were certified
as trained in current Infantry doctrine and tactics. Furthermore,
personnel from the Army Test and Evaluation Command trained the subject
matter experts in data collection methods, test instrumentation, and
familiarization of the vehicle types and the terrain in which the
vehicles were compared. Prior to conducting the operational vignettes,
the evaluators participated in a pilot test where full data collection
and test controls were rehearsed. After completing the pilot test, test
officials certified that the subject matter experts were trained and
that they complied with the established data collection procedures. The
subject matter experts observed each unit and recorded comments on task
performance and mission success by filling out performance matrices.
Upon completion of an event, Army Test and Evaluation Command data
collectors harvested and validated data collected during that
particular activity. All data collected and validated were included in
the Army's database and analyzed by the Army Test and Evaluation
Command.
Vignettes, Gunnery, and Modeling and Simulation Used to Determine
Operational Effectiveness:
Effectiveness is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle allows
a unit to successfully perform tasks in support of infantry platoons
conducting missions in an operational environment. To determine
effectiveness, the Army compared the two vehicles' capability to
(1) support infantry platoon missions, (2) move around the battlefield,
(3) store and move personnel and equipment, and (4) employ their weapon
systems during day, night, and limited visibility conditions. Data for
the comparison came from operational vignettes, gunnery, physical
examination of the vehicles, modeling and simulation, technical
testing, and operational testing of the vehicles. The most visible of
these data sources were the operational vignettes conducted at Fort
Lewis, and the other data collection methods augmented those findings.
The Army conducted the comparison of the two types of vehicles during
a scheduled training event held from September 12 to October 2, 2002,
at Fort Lewis. The comparison, used to assess mission support, payload,
and mobility, included two 2-hour road marches and two platoon-level
training exercises designed by the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry
Division and approved by the Army Test and Evaluation Command.
During each exercise, the vehicles were loaded with all unit
personnel and equipment according to unit procedures. The two road
marches--designed to demonstrate the vehicles' ability to move on and
off road, store and transport personnel and equipment, and provide
human factors data--were conducted over varying terrain like paved
and gravel roads, rutted and uneven trails.
The operational vignettes required the platoons to execute selected
small-scale contingency missions such as a raid or an attack with
events lasting from 12 to 17 hours. The evaluations were conducted in
environments designed to ensure similar training and conditions for
both platoons and vehicles. For example, the missions were conducted in
the same light conditions, against the same opposing force and using
the same doctrine and tactics. Fort Lewis' terrain is densely wooded
and open and undulating. Rocky terrain is common. During the vignettes,
the vehicles were operated over different types of terrain, including
paved and gravel roads, rutted and uneven wooded trails of varying
slopes. In some vignettes, the vehicles traversed loose soil about 3 to
6 inches in depth. We observed that the Stryker and M-113A3 vehicles
were operated over the same terrain during the operational vignettes.
The operational comparison was divided into two exercises. To
compare how the platoons employed the vehicles, we attended the
same vignettes for both exercises. We observed varying phases of the
vignettes such as an obstacle breach, checkpoint security operations,
civilian disturbances, and a rescue of endangered indigenous personnel
to determine how the subject matter experts and the data collection
personnel documented the key actions and outcomes as each of the
platoons conducted its tactical missions.
During the first phase of the training events, we observed that the
employment of the M-113A3s and the Stryker infantry carriers was
minimal. For example, both platoon leaders used the vehicles primarily
as a troop transport and had their soldiers egress from the vehicles
before reaching the mission site. By doing so, the platoon leaders were
unable to support their mission by employing the vehicles' weapons
system. During the second training exercise, both platoons moved closer
to the mission site and used the vehicles' weapons system to support
their specific mission. Based on our observations and discussions with
unit leadership, we concluded that this was due to the units' limited
amount of experience in employing either of the vehicles. Other factors
that impacted the vehicles' employment included platoon composition and
command guidance. Both platoons were comprised of a mix of soldiers who
had and had not previously served in mechanized infantry units, and the
employment of the vehicle was entirely subjective on the part of the
platoon leadership. Neither platoon had published platoon or company
standard operating procedures for the vehicles. These observations and
conclusions on the employment of the vehicles were validated in the
test team observation section of the Test and Evaluation Command's test
data report.
Although providing data for all of the sub-issues measuring
effectiveness, the Army augmented data collected from the vignettes
through gunnery exercises and modeling and simulation. Upon completion
of the vignettes, the Army sent both platoons to the Yakima Training
Center, Washington, to conduct gunnery exercises. While at the training
center, live fire of the weapons provided additional data to augment
observations from the vignettes and the previous technical testing. To
further evaluate mobility, the Army used modeling and simulation at
Aberdeen Proving Ground to determine how well each vehicle would travel
over different terrain types. Measurements included movement over
simulated terrain in Korea, Europe, and Southwest Asia under both wet
and dry weather conditions.
We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
compared the two vehicles during the operational vignettes. Subject
matter experts and test personnel were consistent in their data
collection while observing vignettes for both the Stryker and the
M-113A3 vehicles. Moreover, the vignettes provided sufficient data to
determine the relative operational effectiveness of the two vehicles,
and the additional data collected accentuated the findings. According
to the Army Test and Evaluation Command, both vehicles enabled infantry
squads to complete platoon missions and effectively transport personnel
and prescribed equipment. The Stryker infantry carrier provided
advantages in employing its weapon systems and mobility during most
situations, and the M-113A3 had an advantage in off-road mobility.
Human Factors and Technical Data Used to Assess Vehicle Suitability:
Suitability is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle, when
deployed to an objective area, can maneuver, be maintained, and
supported in combat operations. To determine suitability, the Army
compared (1) transportability, (2) reliability and maintainability,
(3) integrated logistics support, and (4) MANPRINT[Footnote 7] data for
the two vehicles. Primary data for this comparison came from physical
examination, technical testing, and operational testing of the
vehicles. Of the four areas used to compare suitability, manpower and
personnel integration was the only area that occurred during events
that we directly observed. Data collected for the other three measures
of suitability combined data and information from a variety of sources.
Data collection for manpower and personnel integration occurred during
the vignettes at Fort Lewis and was used to compare the effect of the
vehicles on soldiers performing necessary tasks. The Army's MANPRINT
data collection team collected both quantitative and qualitative data
by interviewing soldiers and collecting soldier surveys prior to and
after the completion of certain events. The primary events used to
facilitate MANPRINT collection were road marches and performance of
common soldier tasks. Postvignette interviews with soldiers were also
used to collect data.
The road marches were used to determine the effect that riding in
vehicles had on soldiers' stress levels. Two self-assessment
questionnaires, one a list of adjectives that soldiers checked to
indicate their current feelings and the other an individual stress
rating, were administered prior to and after each road march. In
addition, data collectors took saliva samples from soldiers before and
after each road march to determine changes in soldiers' stress
levels.[Footnote 8] To facilitate a comparison, soldiers rotated
vehicles during the second road march.
To determine the effect of vehicles on common soldier tasks, the Army
designed short events, entitled excursions, to collect data on the
effects of entering and exiting the vehicles during a variety of
different combat situations. After the first road march, each platoon
arrived into assembly areas and conducted several excursions, with
soldiers entering and exiting vehicles under duress, in chemical
protective gear and while conducting casualty evacuations. Data
collectors measured the length of time for each of these excursions,
and upon completion of all events, soldiers filled out questionnaires.
Figures 3 and 4 show examples of these excursions, with soldiers
entering a Stryker infantry carrier and leaving a M-113A3.
Figure 3: Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 4: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress Excursion:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Upon completion of each training exercise, soldiers filled out another
series of questionnaires designed to gauge ergonomic factors.
Questionnaires, again administered by MANPRINT data collectors, asked
soldiers about sound level, space, seat comfort, ability to communicate
within the vehicle, situational awareness, and other safety issues.
To assess transportability, reliability and maintainability, and
integrated logistics support, the Army relied on existing data from
previous events, developed projections where data was lacking, or is in
the process of collecting additional data during the continuing
developmental testing. Using existing data, the Army determined that
both vehicles were transportable; however, the M-113A3 was more
deployable by air because of its reduced weight but less deployable by
road because, for longer distances, it required either rail or truck
support. To assess the Stryker vehicle's reliability and
maintainability, the Army is continuing to collect data. While the Army
is able to claim that there are no specific failure patterns, the
relatively low number of Stryker miles prevents a statistically
reliable forecast. To assess the M-113A3's reliability and
maintainability, the Army primarily relied on existing data. Because
the system is still in development, the Army used projections to
determine that the Stryker vehicle is more logistically supportable
because the family of vehicles and higher gas mileage reduce the
overall size of the logistic footprint. For example, the Stryker
vehicles are built on a common chassis and thus require fewer different
parts. Moreover, the Stryker, as a wheeled-vehicle, requires fewer
mechanics to maintain it.
We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
compared suitability for both types of vehicles. According to our
review of the Army Test and Evaluation Command report, both vehicles
are transportable and both have manageable failures for maintenance and
reliability. In terms of human factors, the MANPRINT data indicate that
soldiers riding in a Stryker infantry carrier reported reduced fatigue;
more ability to move within, inside, and outside the vehicle; lower
levels of stress; less irritation; and a better ability to communicate
than those riding in a M-113A3.
Vehicle Survivability Assessed against a Variety of Threats:
Survivability is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle
survives under different threat conditions and protects the crew and
the equipment. The Army's Test and Evaluation Command decided that
vehicle survivability would be determined through a comparison of
existing test data, technical data, and modeling and simulation. The
vehicles had to demonstrate that they could provide an adequate level
of protection to the infantry squad and vehicle crew against threats
such as small arms, artillery, and mines. The M113A3 was designed to
provide protection against a standard 7.62mm threat. The Army intended
the Stryker to have an all-around 7.62mm armor-piercing protection,
plus 14.5 mm protection on the front, sides, and rear. The top will
have 7.62 mm armor-piercing and 152mm high explosive airburst
protection, and protection against antipersonnel mines through the
vehicle floor. Stryker also has an embedded spall liner. Also assessed
was the vehicles' ability to support missions under different
battlefield conditions such as nuclear, biological, and chemical
environments. Most of the technical evaluation occurred at the Aberdeen
Proving Ground test center. The Test Command concluded that the Stryker
vehicle was more survivable than the M-113A3 against both of these
types of threats.
We also observed a vehicle survivability test at the Aberdeen test
center. Based on our observations of the testing and data collection
process, we determined that the test community had systems designed to
collect objective, technical data on the vehicles. We obtained and
analyzed the Test and Evaluation Command's evaluation report; however,
we are unable to comment on specific test results because the results
are classified and technical testing remains ongoing. Our observations
and analysis do allow us to generally comment that the technical
testing procedures appeared to be objective and sufficient to provide
data to determine the relative survivability of the two types of
vehicles.
DOD and the Army Assessed the Costs of Stryker and the M-113A3
Vehicles:
The Army's Cost and Economic Analysis Center and DOD's Program Analysis
and Evaluation Directorate (PA&E) estimated the life-cycle costs of
equipping the brigade teams with either the Stryker or the M-113A3
vehicle. The Center included both investment and operating costs in its
calculations and defined the appropriate life cycle as 20 years. PA&E,
using the Center's cost calculations, applied a slightly different
methodology to assess the costs for one Stryker brigade. Both PA&E and
the Army concurred that the Stryker infantry carrier is more expensive
than the M-113A3. However, each report had a slightly different
methodology. We reviewed the assumptions of the cost comparison and
found they conformed to cost analysis guidance provided to federal
agencies by the Office of Management and Budget. We found no instances
in which these cost assumptions seemed to favor one vehicle over
another. Based on this review, the magnitude of the increased costs of
the Stryker vehicle appeared reasonable.
The Stryker vehicle has a higher investment cost than the M-113A3.
According to both PA&E and the Army cost reports, acquiring a Stryker
vehicle is $1.42 million each. The acquisition cost for an M-113A3
depends on how it is acquired, either through reassigning vehicles
currently in the Army inventory or upgrading existing M-113A2s.
The Army currently has 4,100 M-113A3s in its inventory, so a zero cost
investment option would be to assign these existing vehicles to the new
Stryker brigades. According to the Army, pursuing this course would
adversely affect the readiness of the losing units, which would then be
equipped with older versions of the M-113. PA&E noted that the loss
of vehicles could be accepted as an additional risk to the current
force structure, which will begin transforming to the future force in
2008. A second option would be to upgrade existing M-113A2s. PA&E and
the Army reports agree that the cost of upgrading an M-113A2 is about
$303,000 per vehicle with an inherited value of $67,000 per vehicle,
making the total cost of upgrading at least $370,000 per vehicle.
Capabilities costs are also not reflected in the investment costs of
the M-113A3. Unlike the M-113A3, the Stryker vehicle was designed with
two significant capabilities: 14.5-mm armor protection and a Remote
Weapon Station. The M-113A3's armor protection is less than the Stryker
vehicle's and an upgrade package will cost about $73,000 per vehicle.
The M-113A3 does not have the Remote Weapon Station, which would cost
another $200,000 per vehicle. Not included in this estimate are the
costs of testing and integrating the Remote Weapon Station with the
M-113A3, assuming that it can be done at all. Moreover, this estimate
does not include the effect that the additional weight from the armor
protection and Remote Weapon Station would have on the M-113A3's
transportability or suitability.
PA&E and the Army agreed that the Stryker infantry carrier has lower
operating costs than the M-113A3. Over a 20-year lifespan, both
agencies estimated that each Stryker vehicle would cost $2.9 million to
operate and maintain compared to $3.1 million for the M-113A3. These
cost savings come from three main areas: fuel efficiency, replacement
parts, and training costs. Both agencies agree that the Stryker vehicle
is more fuel-efficient and requires fewer repair parts and consumables.
Additionally, training costs encompass several different areas, namely
the cost to train and staff mechanics, as well as instruct new crews on
how to operate the vehicles.
With the exception of the number of brigades used to calculate costs,
the methodology used by PA&E and the Army to calculate operating costs
was consistent. The Army based its cost calculations on equipping 6
brigades, for a total of 686 vehicles. In contrast, PA&E based its
calculations on equipping 1 brigade, for a total of 118 vehicles.
Although the two methods result in different total costs for the
vehicle systems, they do not change the relative price difference, or
the fact that the Stryker vehicle is more expensive than the M-113A3.
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially approved the
Army's cost comparison on December 17, 2002. The comparison found that
the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle was more costly than the M-113A3.
Based on our review of the methodologies used, we concluded that the
cost comparison was reasonable.
Secretary of Defense Certified to the Combat Power of the Army
and Released Funding for the Third Brigade's Vehicles:
The Army completed the comparison evaluation and developed a report
that included reports from the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the
Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center. On December 17, 2002, the
Secretary of the Army forwarded a memorandum of certification to the
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army certified that, in
terms of operational effectiveness, the comparison evaluation
demonstrated that the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle is more
survivable and provides better overall performance and mobility when
employed in combat operations than the M-113A3. The Secretary of the
Army also certified that the Stryker brigade combat team increased the
aggregate combat power of the U.S. Army.
However, in the report submitted to Congress, DOD's conclusions were
not quite as positive. The DOD report, prepared by its PA&E
Directorate, summarized conclusions based on the Department of the Army
report that included the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the Army
Cost and Economic Analysis Center reports. The Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, also provided comments from a draft report. The
DOD report stated that neither vehicle was preferred for all the
criteria. The Stryker vehicle was superior under some criteria, the
M-113A3 was superior on others, and the two vehicles were equal on yet
others. However, DOD and the Army both agreed that the Stryker brigade
combat teams would not diminish the combat power of the Army, and DOD
so certified. As a result of the evaluation, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense approved obligating the funding for the Stryker vehicles to
equip the third brigade.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
report's findings. DOD's response also provided technical comments for
clarifying two areas in the report, which we incorporated. Appendix II
contains the full text of DOD's comments.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine whether the Army's plan for the comparison was adequate to
satisfy legislative requirements, we focused our efforts on
understanding the Army's overall comparison evaluation plan. We
obtained and analyzed the Army's Comparative Evaluation plan, data
collection plans, and technical test plans and reviewed comments of the
plan provided by various DOD and Army agencies. We interviewed
officials and analysts involved in both the design and evaluation of
the plan at Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary
of the Army; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army Forces Command;
Army Training and Doctrine Command; Army Tank and Automotive Command;
Army Operational Test Command and Army Test and Evaluation
Command; Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center; and I Corps,
Fort Lewis, Washington.
To determine whether the comparison evaluation plan and its
implementation would provide the data needed to measure the relative
effectiveness of the vehicles, we attended the operational vignettes
and associated training events scheduled in the Army's plan and
reviewed the results taken from those events. For example, we reviewed
the training procedures and attended the training sessions for the data
collectors and subject matter experts administering the operational
vignettes held at Fort Lewis, Washington. We examined the methods used
by the test administrators to collect, store, and process the data. To
determine if the conditions favored one vehicle over the other, we
observed the terrain to be used during the operational vignettes. We
observed 8 of 16 events conducted during the operational vignettes.
These events included the road march, loading of vehicles, and various
tactical missions. In addition, we rode in and drove both types of
vehicles. We also interviewed the Army Operational Test Command
officials who were administering the test, as well as representatives
from the office of DOD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
and the Institute for Defense Analysis and Army commanders of the unit
participating in the evaluation. Upon completion of the vignettes, we
interviewed soldiers who had participated in the events. For technical
testing, we visited Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We received
briefings from the Developmental Test Command as to how the Army
conducts technical tests on vehicles. We obtained and analyzed
classified and unclassified ballistic testing plans and observed a
vehicle survivability test that was comparable to other types of
technical testing. We also reviewed the reports issued by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense; Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate;
Secretary of the Army; the Army Test and Evaluation Command; and the
Army Cost Economic and Analysis Center. We compared the results and
conclusions of these reports to our own observations.
We reviewed the Army's Cost Economic and Analysis Center's cost report
and the comments on the report made by the PA&E and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense regarding cost comparison methodology. While we
verified the general procedures and assumptions used in these analyses,
we did not perform detailed checks of the many calculations they
entailed.
Our review was performed from May 2002 to May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government audit standards.
:
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to appropriate congressional committees and to other
interested parties on request. In addition, the report will be
available at no cost on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at
(202) 512-8365.
Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Leo B.
Sullivan; Robert Ackley; Timothy A. Burke; Kenneth Daniell; M. Jane
Hunt; William McNaught; Jim Melton; and Sidney Schwartz.
William M. Solis
Director,
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by William M. Solis:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning Limitations
on Army Transformation Actions:
SEC. 113. REPORTS AND LIMITATIONS RELATING TO ARMY TRANSFORMATION.
(a) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS.--The Secretary of the Army shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on the process for developing the objective
force in the transformation of the Army.
The report shall include the following:
(1) The operational environments envisioned for the objective force.
(2) The threat assumptions on which research and development efforts
for transformation of the Army into the objective force are based. (3)
The potential operational and organizational concepts for the objective
force. (4) The operational requirements anticipated for the operational
requirements document of the objective force. (5) The anticipated
schedule of Army transformation activities through fiscal year 2012,
together with--(A) the projected funding requirements through that
fiscal year for research and development activities and procurement
activities related to transition to the objective force; and (B) a
summary of the anticipated investments of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency in programs designed to lead to the fielding of future
combat systems for the objective force. (6) A proposed plan for the
comparison referred to in sub-section (c).
If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (5) is not
available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall
include in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of
that information.
(b) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS.--Not later than March 1, 2001, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the process
for developing the objective force in the transformation of the Army.
The report shall include the following:
(1) The joint warfighting requirements that will be supported by the
fielding of the objective force, together with a description of the
adjustments that are planned to be made in the war plans of the
commanders of the unified combatant commands in relation to the
fielding of the objective force. (2) The changes in lift requirements
that may result from the establishment and fielding of the combat
brigades of the objective force. (3) The evaluation process that will
be used to support decisionmaking on the course of the Army
transformation, including a description of the operational evaluations
and experimentation that will be used to validate the operational
requirements for the operational requirements document of the objective
force.
If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (3) is not
available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall
include in the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of
that information.
(c) COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDIUM ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES FOR THE
INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.--(1) The Secretary of the Army shall
develop a plan for comparing--(A) the costs and operational
effectiveness of the infantry carrier variant of the interim armored
vehicles selected for the infantry battalions of the interim brigade
combat teams; and (B) the costs and operational effectiveness of the
troop-carrying medium armored vehicles currently in the Army inventory
for the use of infantry battalions. (2) The Secretary of the Army may
not carry out the comparison described in paragraph (1) until the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
Defense approves the plan for that comparison developed under that
paragraph. (d) LIMITATION PENDING RECEIPT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
REPORT.--Not more than 80 percent of the amount appropriated for fiscal
year 2001 for the procurement of armored vehicles in the family of new
medium armored vehicles may be obligated until--(1) the Secretary of
the Army submits to the congressional defense committees the report
required under subsection (a); and (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed
from the date of the submittal of such report.
(e) LIMITATION PENDING COMPARISON AND CERTIFICATION.--No funds
appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of the Army
for any fiscal year may be obligated for acquisition of medium armored
combat vehicles to equip a third interim brigade combat team until--
(1) the plan for a comparison of costs and operational effectiveness
developed under subsection (c)(1), as approved under subsection (c)(2),
is carried out; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the
congressional defense committees, after the completion of the
comparison referred to in paragraph (1), a certification that--(A) the
Secretary approves of the obligation of funds for that purpose; and (B)
the force structure resulting from the acquisition and subsequent
operational capability of interim brigade combat teams will not
diminish the combat power of the
Army; and (3) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the
certification under paragraph (2).
(f) DEFINITIONS.--In this section:
(1) The term "transformation", with respect to the Army, means the
actions being undertaken to transform the Army, as it is constituted in
terms of organization, equipment, and doctrine in 2000, into the
objective force.
(2) The term "objective force" means the Army that has the
organizational structure, the most advanced equipment that early
twenty-first century science and technology can provide, and the
appropriate doctrine to ensure that the Army is responsive, deployable,
agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable for the full
spectrum of the operations anticipated to be required of the Army
during the early years of the twenty-first century following 2010.
(3) The term "interim brigade combat team" means an Army brigade that
is designated by the Secretary of the Army as a brigade combat team and
is reorganized and equipped with currently available equipment in a
configuration that effectuates an evolutionary advancement toward
transformation of the Army to the objective force.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION:
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
1700 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1700:
May 13, 2003:
Mr. William M. Solis:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Solis,
This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report,
GAO-03-671, "MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and
MI 13A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for
Statutorily Mandated Comparison," dated April 21, 2003, (GAO Code
350179). The Department of Defense concurs with the report. GAO
concluded that the Army conducted an objective and unbiased evaluation,
data collected was sufficient to support a meaningful evaluation, and
the evaluation met legal requirements.
We request GAO modify their report in two areas. First on page 12,
paragraph titled "Vehicle Survivability Assessed Against a Variety of
Threats," add the sentences: The M1 13A3 was designed to provide
protection against a 7.62mm ball threat. The Army intends Stryker to
have an all-around 7.62mm armor piercing protection, plus 14.5mm
protection on the front, sides, and rear. The top will have 7.62mm
armor-piercing and 152mm high explosive airburst protection, and
protection against anti-personnel mines through the vehicle floor.
Stryker also has an embedded spall liner. Secondly, would like to
clarify the subheading on page 12 of the report, "Department of Defense
and the Army Assessed the Costs of Stryker and the MI 13A3 Vehicles."
The paragraph implies that the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Program, Analysis and Evaluation did an independent life cycle cost
estimate of equipping the brigade teams with either the Stryker or
M113A3. Program, Analysis and Evaluation estimated operating cost for
one brigade, and compared its cost with the Army's estimate for all six
brigades.
With these technical adjustments, we believe the GAO report will more
accurately capture key points of Stryker survivability and cost data.
The Department of Defense appreciates the opportunity to comment on the
final report.
Stephen C. Daly
Deputy Director, Conventional Systems
Signed by Stephen C. Daly:
(350179):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, P.L. 106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment
of External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the
Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation
Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003); Military
Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future
Interim Brigade Combat Teams, GAO-02-442 (Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2002); Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for
Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges, GAO-02-96
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001); Defense Acquisition: Army
Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311
(Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001).
[3] Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Mar.
1, 2000.
[4] The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense, concerning operational testing,
including assessments of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
survivability of the items tested.
[5] The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army's independent
operational test activity and is responsible for overall management of
the Army test and evaluation programs.
[6] Subject matter experts are usually noncommissioned officers who
have extensive experience with the studied equipment, recent unit
experience, and a background as a trainer or in training development.
[7] MANPRINT data measures human factors such as vehicle ride-ability,
noise levels, and fatigue.
[8] Within saliva, there is an enzyme called amylase. Research has
shown that the concentration of salivary amylase reflects substances
produced by the body in response to stress.
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