Military Base Closures
Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves Gao ID: GAO-03-723 June 27, 2003While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded property, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making processes used to establish reserve enclaves. Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1)specific infrastructure needs for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.
The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves created under the previous base realignment and closure process was generally not identified until after a defense base closure commission had rendered its recommendations. While the Army generally decided it wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves before the time of the commission's decision making during the 1995 closure round, time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently, in some instances the Army created enclaves that were nearly as large as the bases that were being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force reserve enclaves was more defined during the decision-making process. Moreover, DOD's enclave-planning processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of military activities that may have benefited by their inclusion in a nearby enclave. The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure savings during the decision-making process, but the Air Force apparently did so in forming its enclaves. GAO's analysis showed that the Army overestimated savings and underestimated the time required to recoup initial investment costs to either realign or close those bases with proposed enclaves. However, these original cost omissions have not materially affected DOD's recent estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the Army subsequently updated its estimates in its budget submissions to reflect expected enclave costs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-723, Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves
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Report to the Secretary of Defense:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2003:
Military Base Closures:
Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve Enclaves:
GAO-03-723:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-723, a report to the Secretary of Defense
Why GAO Did This Study:
While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department
of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded
property, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres
and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed
or realigned bases for use by the reserve components. In view of the
upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO undertook this review to
ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making
processes used to establish reserve enclaves. Specifically, GAO
determined to what extent (1) specific infrastructure needs for
reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and
closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and
maintain enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings
for realigning or closing bases.
What GAO Found:
The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves
created under the previous base realignment and closure process was
generally not identified until after a defense base closure commission
had rendered its recommendations. While the Army generally decided it
wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves before the
time of the commission‘s decision making during the 1995 closure
round, time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying
specific training acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently,
in some instances the Army created enclaves that were nearly as large
as the bases that were being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure
needed for Air Force reserve enclaves was more defined during the
decision-making process. Moreover, DOD‘s enclave-planning processes
generally did not include a cross-service analysis of military
activities that may have benefited by their inclusion in a nearby
enclave.
The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its
reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure
savings during the decision-making process, but the Air Force
apparently did so in forming its enclaves. GAO‘s analysis showed that
the Army overestimated savings and underestimated the time required to
recoup initial investment costs to either realign or close those bases
with proposed enclaves. However, these original cost omissions have
not materially affected DOD‘s recent estimate of $6.6 billion in
annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the
Army subsequently updated its estimates in its budget submissions to
reflect expected enclave costs.
What GAO Recommends:
As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for
2005, GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense provide the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission with data that clearly
specify the (1) infrastructure needed for any proposed reserve
enclaves and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain such
enclaves.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-723.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Barry Holman at (202)
512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Infrastructure Needs of Many Enclaves Not Identified Until after BRAC
Decision Making:
Many Initial Base Savings Estimates Did Not Account for Projected
Enclave Costs:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves
(Pre-BRAC and Post-BRAC):
Appendix II: Reserve Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD Pre-BRAC and Post BRAC Base Acreage and Facilities for
Bases Where Major Reserve Enclaves Were Created:
Table 2: Estimated Annual Costs to Operate and Maintain Selected Army
Reserve Enclaves:
Table 3: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings and Payback
Periods for Selected Bases with Reserve Enclaves:
Figures:
Figure 1: Major Reserve Component Enclaves Created under Previous
BRAC Rounds:
Figure 2: Property Layout of the Former March Air Force Base:
Figure 3: Navy Compound at March Air Reserve Base:
Abbreviations:
BRAC: base realignment and closure:
COBRA: Cost of Base Realignment Actions:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 27, 2003:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Since 1988, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undergone four rounds
of base realignments and closures and has reportedly reduced its base
infrastructure by about 20 percent, saving billions of dollars in the
process. While the closure process has afforded DOD the opportunity to
divest itself of property it no longer needed[Footnote 1] to meet its
national security requirements, it has, at the same time, retained more
than 350,000 acres of land and nearly 20 million square feet of
facilities, typically referred to as enclaves,[Footnote 2] on closed or
realigned bases for use by the reserve components. Most of the larger
enclaves were established during the 1995 round of base closures and
are now managed by either the Army National Guard or Army Reserve
rather than the active component.
We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities as
authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 717 and are providing it to you because of
your responsibilities in the upcoming base closure round authorized for
2005.[Footnote 3] In view of this round, we undertook this review to
ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the planning and decision-
making processes that were used to establish reserve enclaves in the
previous closure rounds. Specifically, our objectives were to determine
to what extent (1) specific infrastructure needs (e.g., needs for
acreage and facilities) for reserve enclaves were identified as part of
base realignment and closure decision making in previous closure rounds
and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain enclaves were
considered in deriving the net estimated savings for realigning or
closing bases.
In performing our work, we focused our attention on the processes used
by the department to define infrastructure needs for major[Footnote 4]
reserve enclaves for the Army in the 1995 round and for the Air Force
in the earlier rounds. We did not validate the need for any of the
department's enclaves nor the specific infrastructure needs for those
enclaves. Of the 10 major reserve enclaves created during the previous
closure rounds, 7 are within the Army and 3 are within the Air Force.
Neither the Navy nor the Marines have formed a major enclave (see
app. I for a brief description of DOD's major reserve component
enclaves). We visited five major Army enclaves--Fort Hunter Liggett,
California; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort
McClellan, Alabama; and Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania--that were
created during the 1995 closure round and account for nearly
90 percent, or more than 310,000 acres, of DOD's total major reserve
component enclave acreage. We also visited two of three major Air Force
enclaves at Grissom Air Reserve Base in Indiana (a 1991 round action)
and March Air Reserve Base in California (a 1993 round action). We also
visited a smaller Air Force enclave at Rickenbacker Air National Guard
Base in Ohio (a 1991 round action) to gain a perspective on Air Guard
enclave formation processes. Our review efforts were constrained by the
limited availability of officials (owing to the passage of time) who
had participated in previous rounds of base closure decision making and
the general lack of planning documentation regarding enclave
infrastructure needs and estimated costs.
Results in Brief:
The specific infrastructure needed for many reserve enclaves was
generally not identified until after the base closure and realignment
commission for a closure round had rendered its recommendations.
According to Army officials, while the Army had generally decided it
wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves prior to
completion of commission decision making during the 1995 round, time
constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training
acreages and facility needs until after the commission made its
recommendations. Consequently, while some of the commission's
recommendation language[Footnote 5] for the 1995 closure round
suggested that many Army reserve enclaves would be small, it was
nevertheless sufficiently general to allow, in practice, the Army wide
flexibility in creating such enclaves. Subsequently, the Army created
several enclaves that were nearly as large as the closing bases on
which they were located. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air
Force enclaves was more defined during the decision-making process and
subsequent commission recommendations were more specific than those
provided for the Army. Moreover, the department's enclave-planning
processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of the
needs of military activities or organizations near the enclaves that
may have benefited by inclusion in them. Without more complete data
regarding the extent of needed enclave infrastructure and cross-service
needs--important considerations in the decision-making process, the
risk continues that a future base closure commission will not have
sufficient information to make informed judgments on the establishment
of proposed enclaves, including informed decisions on the facility
needs of these enclaves, decisions that can affect expected closure
costs and savings. Nor can the department be assured that it is taking
advantage of opportunities to achieve operational, economic, and
security benefits--such as enhanced readiness, savings, and enhanced
force protection--that cross-servicing can provide. However, the
department recently issued guidance for the upcoming base closure round
that addresses the potential benefits of considering cross-service
needs in its infrastructure analyses.
Although the Army did not include estimated costs to operate and
maintain most of its major reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated
base savings during the decision-making process, the Air Force
apparently did so in forming its enclaves. The Army Audit Agency
reported in 1997[Footnote 6] that about $28 million in estimated annual
costs to operate and maintain four of the Army's major enclaves were
not considered in the bases' savings calculations as part of the 1995
closure round. Our analysis showed that the omission of these costs had
a significant impact on the estimated savings and payback
periods[Footnote 7]--important considerations in the realignment and
closure decision-making process--for several of these bases. In
particular, the estimated savings were overstated and the estimated
payback periods were understated for those specific bases. For example,
if expected enclave costs would have been considered at one Army
location, the annual recurring savings estimate for the base would have
been reduced by over 50 percent. However, these original cost omissions
have not materially affected the department's recent estimate of
$6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the previous closure
rounds because the Army has subsequently updated its savings estimates
to reflect expected enclave costs. On the other hand, Air Force
officials told us that it had considered expected costs to operate and
maintain its proposed reserve enclaves in deriving its base closure
savings estimates.[Footnote 8] We were unable to verify this point,
however, because of the passage of time and lack of available
supporting documentation. In the absence of more complete data
regarding cost and net savings estimates, a base closure commission may
be placed in the position of recommending realignment or closure
actions without sufficient information on the financial implications of
those proposed actions.
We are making recommendations that are intended to ensure that data
provided to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission for
2005 round actions clearly specify enclave needs and costs to operate
and maintain any proposed enclaves. In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD concurred with our recommendations.
Background:
To enable DOD to more readily close unneeded bases and realign others
to meet its national security requirements, the Congress enacted base
realignment and closure (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure
rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. A special commission established
for the 1988 round made recommendations to the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. For the remaining
rounds, special BRAC commissions were set up to recommend specific base
realignments and closures to the President, who in turn sent the
commissions' recommendations with his approval to the Congress. The
four commissions generated nearly 500 recommendations--on 97 major base
closures and hundreds of realignments and smaller closures.
As a result of the BRAC process, DOD has reported that it reduced its
infrastructure[Footnote 9] by about 20 percent; has transferred over
half of the approximately 511,000 acres of unneeded property to other
federal and nonfederal users and continues work on transferring the
remainder; and generated about $16.7 billion in estimated savings
through fiscal year 2001, with an estimated $6.6 billion in annual
recurring savings expected thereafter.[Footnote 10] We and others who
have conducted reviews of BRAC savings have found that the DOD's
savings are substantial, although imprecise, and should be viewed as
rough approximations of the likely savings.[Footnote 11] Under the
property disposal process, unneeded DOD BRAC property is initially made
available to other federal agencies for their use. After the federal
screening process has taken place, remaining property is generally
provided to state and local governments for public benefit and economic
development purposes. In other cases, DOD has publicly sold its
unneeded property.
Under the decision-making processes during the last 3 BRAC rounds,
DOD assessed its bases or activities for closure or realignment using
an established set of eight criteria covering a broad range of
military, fiscal, environmental, and other considerations. DOD
subsequently forwarded its recommended list of proposed realignments
and closures to the BRAC Commission for its consideration in
recommending specific realignments and closure actions. Although
military value considerations such as mission requirements and impact
on operational readiness were critical evaluation factors, potential
costs and savings, along with estimated payback periods associated with
proposed closure or realignment actions were also important factors in
the assessment process. To assist with the financial aspects of
proposed actions, DOD and the BRAC Commissions used a quantitative
analytical model, frequently referred to as the Cost of Base
Realignment Actions (COBRA), to provide decision makers with a relative
assessment of the potential costs, estimated savings, and payback
periods of proposed alternative realignment or closure actions.
Although the COBRA model was not designed to produce budget-quality
financial data, it was useful in providing a relative financial
comparison among potential alternative proposed base actions. DOD
generally provided improved financial data for each of the services in
its annual BRAC budget submission to the Congress following a BRAC
Commission's recommendations.[Footnote 12]
The four previous BRAC Commissions recommended 27 actions in
which either a reserve enclave or similar reserve presence was to be
formed at a base that was to be realigned or closed (see app. II). In
many instances, these actions were relatively minor in that they
involved only several acres, but in other cases the actions involved
creating enclaves with large acreages and millions of square feet of
facilities under reserve component management to conduct training for
not only the reserve component but also the active component as well.
Figure 1 shows the locations of DOD's 10 major (i.e., sites exceeding
500 acres) reserve component enclaves established under the previous
BRAC rounds.
Figure 1: Major Reserve Component Enclaves Created under Previous
BRAC Rounds:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 1, the Army has 7 enclave locations; all of these
enclaves, with the exception of Fort Devens (a 1991 round action),
were created during the 1995 round. The Air Force has the remaining
3 enclaves: Air Reserve--Grissom Air Reserve Base (a 1991 round
action); Homestead Air Reserve Base (a 1993 round action); and March
Air Reserve Base (a 1993 round action). Neither the Navy nor the
Marines created any major enclaves.[Footnote 13]
Infrastructure Needs of Many Enclaves Not Identified Until after BRAC
Decision Making:
Many of DOD's specific enclave infrastructure needs were not identified
until after the commission for a BRAC round held its deliberations and
had rendered its recommendations. Although the Army's enclave planning
process--particularly for the 1995 BRAC round--began before the
issuance of commission recommendations,[Footnote 14] specificity of
needed infrastructure was not defined until after the recommendations
were finalized. The subsequent size of several of these enclaves was
much greater than seemingly reflected in commission recommendations
that called for minimum essential facilities and land for reserve use.
On the other hand, the Air Force's planning process was reportedly
further along and enclave needs were better defined at the time the
commission made its recommendations. In addition, DOD's enclave-
planning processes generally did not include a cross-service[Footnote
15] analysis of the needs of military activities or activities in the
vicinity of a realigning or closing base with a proposed enclave. As a
result, the commission often held deliberations without the benefit of
some critical information, such as the extent of the enclave
infrastructure needed to support training and potential opportunities
to achieve benefits by collocating nearby reserve components on enclave
property.
Army Enclave Infrastructure Needs Not As Well Defined As Those of the
Air Force during BRAC Decision Making:
While the Army's enclave planning process for the 1995 round began
previous to completion of the BRAC Commission's deliberations, specific
enclave infrastructure needs were not identified until after commission
recommendations had been issued on July 1, 1995. Army officials told us
that it was recognized early in the process that the Army wanted to
retain the majority of existing training land at some of its bases
slated for closure or realignment that also served as reserve component
maneuver training locations, but time constraints precluded the Army
from fully identifying specific enclave needs before the commission
completed decision-making. According to a 1999 DOD report on the effect
of base closures on future mobilization options, the retention of much
of the Army maneuver training acreage at the enclave locations served
not only to meet current training needs but also could serve, if
necessary, as future maneuver bases with new construction or renovation
of existing facilities for an increased force structure.[Footnote 16]
In testimony before the commission, the Army had indicated that much of
the training land should be retained, but the Army was less specific on
the size and facility needs (i.e., in total square footage) for
the enclaves. Most facility needs fall within the enclaves' primary
infrastructure (or cantonment area)[Footnote 17] necessary to operate
and maintain the enclaves.
The Army formed an officer-level committee--a "Council of Colonels"--
that reviewed reserve component enclave proposals but did not approve
them for higher-level reviews until July 7, 1995--about 1 week after
the BRAC Commission had issued its recommendations. Following the
Council of Colonels' approval, a General Officer Steering Committee
worked with the Army reserve components to refine the infrastructure
needs for the enclaves, needs that the steering committee approved
(except for Fort Hunter Liggett[Footnote 18]) in October 1995--more
than 3 months following the 1995 BRAC Commission's recommendations.
Although Army approval for most of its enclaves' infrastructure needs
occurred in late 1995, the number of acres and facilities for some
installations changed as various implementation plans took effect to
establish the enclaves. Changes occurred as a result of Army decisions
and community reuse plans for property disposed of by the department,
as illustrated in the following examples.
* At Fort Hunter Liggett, the number of facilities to be retained in
the enclave increased over time based on an Army decision to retain
some of the family housing (40 units); morale, welfare, and recreation
facilities (9 facilities) and other training-related facilities
(3 barracks and 2 classrooms) that had originally been excluded from
the enclave.
* At Fort McClellan, the expected cantonment area decreased
considerably from an initial proposal of about 10,000 acres (excluding
about 22,200 training-range acres) to about 286 acres in response to
concerns raised by the local community.
The Air Force's enclave infrastructure needs were reportedly more
defined than those of the Army at the time of commission deliberation
and decision making. Air Force officials told us that the base
evaluation process for the 1991 and 1993 rounds--the rounds when the
Air Force's major reserve enclaves were created--included a detailed
analysis of the infrastructure needed for the enclaves, including
enclave size, identification of required facilities, and expected costs
to operate and maintain its proposed enclaves prior to commission
consideration of its proposals. These officials did note that some
revisions in the sizing of the enclaves and associated enclave
boundaries were minor and have occurred over time as plans were further
defined, but stated that these changes did not materially affect
enclave costs. Although documentation on the initial plans was not
available (due to the passage of time), we were able to document some
enclave revisions made after the issuance of the BRAC Commissions'
recommendations as follows:
* At March Air Reserve Base, the Air Force made at least 3 sets of
revisions to its enclave size which now encompasses 2,359 acres. These
revisions were relatively minor in scope, such as one revision that
expanded the boundaries by about 38 acres to provide a clear zone for
flight operations.
* At Grissom Air Reserve Base, the Air Force has made one revision--an
exchange of about 70 acres with the local redevelopment
authority[Footnote 19]--to its enclave configuration, which now
encompasses 1,380 acres. In addition, base officials are negotiating
with the redevelopment authority for acquisition of a small parcel to
improve force protection at the enclave's main gate.
* At Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, the Guard made several
revisions prior to reaching its current 168-acre enclave, including
the transfer of 3.5 acres of unneeded property to the local
redevelopment authority after the Guard relocated its fuel tanks for
force protection reasons.
The degree of specificity in a commission's recommendation language for
proposed enclaves varied between the Army and the Air Force. In
general, the recommendation language for the Army's 1995 round enclaves
was based largely on the Army's proposed language, specifying that the
bases were to be closed, except that minimum essential ranges,
facilities, and training areas be retained for reserve component use.
In contrast, for Army and Air Force enclaves created in earlier rounds,
the recommendation language was more precise--even specifying specific
acreages to be retained in some cases.
Acting on the authority contained in the commissions' recommendations,
the Army and Air Force created enclaves that varied widely in size
(i.e., from several acres to more than 164,000 acres). Table 1 provides
a comparison of the reported size and number of facilities of pre-BRAC
bases with those of post-BRAC enclaves for DOD's 10 major enclaves.
Table 1: DOD Pre-BRAC and Post BRAC Base Acreage and Facilities for
Bases Where Major Reserve Enclaves Were Created:
Service: Army:
Base: Fort Hunter Liggett; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC:
164,762; Number of acres: Post-BRAC: 164,272; Number of acres: Percent
Retained: 100; Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC:
836,420; Square footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 832,906; Square
footage of facilities: Percent Retained: 100.
Base: Fort Chaffee; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: 71,381; Number of
acres: Post-BRAC: 64,272; Number of acres: Percent Retained: 90; :
Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC: 4,839,241; Square
footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 1,695,132; Square footage of
facilities: Percent Retained: 35.
Base: Fort Pickett; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: 45,145; Number of
acres: Post-BRAC: 42,273; Number of acres: Percent Retained: 94; :
Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC: 3,103,000; Square
footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 1,642,066; Square footage of
facilities: Percent Retained: 53.
Base: Fort Dix; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: 30,997; Number of acres:
Post-BRAC: 30,944; Number of acres: Percent Retained: 100; :
Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC: 8,645,293; Square
footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 7,246,964; Square footage of
facilities: Percent Retained: 84.
Base: Fort Indiantown Gap; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: 17,797;
Number of acres: Post-BRAC: 17,227; Number of acres: Percent
Retained: 97; : Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC:
4,388,000; Square footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 1,565,726; Square
footage of facilities: Percent Retained: 36.
Base: Fort McClellan; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: 41,174; Number of
acres: Post-BRAC: 22,531; Number of acres: Percent Retained: 55; :
Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC: 6,560,687; Square
footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 873,852; Square footage of
facilities: Percent Retained: 13.
Base: Fort Devens; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: Air Force:
9,930; Number of acres: Post-BRAC: Air Force: 5,226; Number of acres:
Percent Retained: Air Force: 53; Air Force: Square footage of
facilities: Pre-BRAC: Air Force: 5,610,530; Square footage of
facilities: Post-BRAC: Air Force: 1,537,174; Square footage of
facilities: Percent Retained: Air Force: 27.
Service: Air Force;
Base: March Air Force Base; Number of acres: Pre-
BRAC: 6,606; Number of acres: Post-BRAC: 2,359; Number of acres:
Percent Retained: 36; Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC:
3,184,321; Square footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 2,538,742; Square
footage of facilities: Percent Retained: 80.
Base: Grissom Air Force Base; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: 2,722;
Number of acres: Post-BRAC: 1,380; Number of acres: Percent Retained:
51; Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC: 3,910,171;
Square footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 1.023,176; Square footage of
facilities: Percent Retained: 26.
Base: Total: Homestead Air Force Base; Number of acres: Pre-BRAC:
Total: 2,916; Number of acres: Post-BRAC: Total: 852; Number of acres:
Percent Retained: Total: 29; Total: Square footage of
facilities: Pre-BRAC: Total: 5,373,132; Square footage of facilities:
Post-BRAC: Total: 867,341; Square footage of facilities: Percent
Retained: Total: 16.
Service: Total; Base: Number of acres: Pre-BRAC: 394,430;
Number of acres: Post-BRAC: 351,386; Number of acres: Percent Retained:
89; Square footage of facilities: Pre-BRAC: 46,450,795; Square
footage of facilities: Post-BRAC: 19,823,079; Square footage of
facilities: Percent Retained: 43.
Source: DOD.
Note: "Major" reserve enclaves refer to those enclaves with more than
500 acres. "Pre-BRAC" refers to base data at the time of the BRAC
Commission recommendation while "Post-BRAC" refers to enclave data as
of the end of fiscal year 2002. Percentages are rounded to nearest
whole number.
[End of table]
As shown in table 1, the vast majority--nearly 90 percent--of the
pre-BRAC land has been retained for the major reserve enclaves with
most enclaves residing in Army maneuver training sites (e.g., Forts
Hunter Liggett, Chaffee, Pickett, and Indiantown Gap). While the
management of these Army enclaves has generally shifted from the active
to the reserve component, the training missions at these Army bases
have remained, although the extent of use[Footnote 20] has decreased
slightly in some instances and increased in others (see app. I). On the
other hand, the Air Force enclaves are generally much smaller in
acreage than those of the Army due in large part to the departure of
active Air Force organizations and associated missions from the former
bases. While the Army retained much of the pre-BRAC acreage, it
generally made greater reductions in the amount of square footage for
its enclave facilities. Many of these reductions were due in part to
the demolition of older unusable facilities built during World War II,
and the transfer of other facilities (such as family housing activities
once required for the departing active personnel) to local
redevelopment authorities. At Fort Indiantown Gap, for example, the
Army has reportedly demolished 349 facilities since the Army National
Guard assumed control of the base in 1998. As shown in table 1, the Air
Force significantly reduced the amount of its facilities' square
footage for 2 of its 3 major enclaves.
While the language of the 1995 BRAC Commission recommendations
regarding enclaves allowed the Army to form several enclaves of
considerable size, these enclaves are considerably larger than one
might expect from the language, which provided for minimum essential
land and facilities for reserve component use. In this regard, the
Army's Office of the Judge Advocate General questioned proposed enclave
plans during the planning process. For example, the Judge Advocate
General questioned Fort Indiantown Gap and Fort Hunter Liggett enclave
plans,[Footnote 21] calling for retention of essentially the entire
former base while the commission's recommendation would suggest smaller
enclaves comprising a section of the base. Nonetheless, the Army
approved the implementation plans based on mission needs. Having more
complete information regarding expected enclave infrastructure would
have provided previous commissions with an opportunity to draft more
precise recommendation language, if they chose to do so, and produce
decisions having greater clarity on enclave infrastructure and expected
costs and savings from the closure and realignment actions.
Enclave Planning Analyses Generally Did Not Consider
Cross-Service Needs:
DOD generally did not consider cross-service needs of nearby military
activities in planning for many of its reserve enclaves, although their
inclusion may have been beneficial in terms of potential for increased
cost savings, force protection, or training reasons. While some other
reserve activities have subsequently relocated on either enclaves
created as part of the closure decision or later on former base
property after it was acquired by local redevelopment authorities,
those relocations outside enclave boundaries have not necessarily been
ideal for either DOD or the communities surrounding the enclaves.
Ideally, enclave planning analyses would involve an integrated cross-
service approach to forming enclaves and enable DOD to maximize its
opportunities for achieving operational, economic, and security
benefits while, at the same time, providing for the interests of
affected communities surrounding realigning or closing bases.
Officials at several Air Force bases we visited told us that while
other service and federal government organizations that had already
resided on the former bases may have been included in the enclaves,
military activities of other services in the local area were not
generally considered for possible inclusion in the proposed enclaves.
These officials told us that these activities were either not
approached for consideration or were not considered due to service
interests to minimize the size and relative costs to operate and
maintain the enclaves.
Following the formation of the enclaves, some additional reserve
activities have since relocated on either enclave or former base
property. Some have occupied available facilities on enclaves as
tenants and are afforded various benefits such as reduced operating
costs, training enhancements, or increased force protection. For
example, a Navy Reserve training center, originally based in South
Bend, Indiana, moved its operations to an available facility at Grissom
Air Reserve Base in August 2002 because the activity could not meet
force protection requirements at its previous facilities in South Bend.
After the move, the commander of the activity told us that his
personnel have experienced enhanced training opportunities since they
can now work closely with other military activities on "hands-on"
duties during weekend reserve drills. This opportunity has led, in
turn, to his assessment that both his recruiting efforts and readiness
have improved.
On the other hand, the relocation of some activities to the former
base, or those remaining on the former property outside the confines of
the enclave, has resulted in a less-than-ideal situation for both the
department and the communities surrounding the former base. For
example, at the former March Air Force Base in California, other
service activities from the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy
Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve reside outside the enclave boundaries
in a non-contiguous arrangement. This situation, combined with the
enclave itself and other enclave "islands" established on the former
base, has resulted in a "checkerboard" effect, as shown in figure 2, of
various military-occupied property interspersed with community
property on the former base.
Figure 2: Property Layout of the Former March Air Force Base:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Reserve properties are owned by DOD
but are not a part of the enclave.
[End of figure]
Further, some of the activities located outside the enclave boundaries
have incurred expenses to erect security fences, as shown in figure 3,
for force protection purposes. These fences are in addition to the
fence that surrounds the main enclave area.
Figure 3: Navy Compound at March Air Reserve Base:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Local redevelopment authority officials told us that a combination of
factors (including the dispersion of military property on the former
base along with the separate unsightly security fences) has made it
very difficult to market the remaining property.
In its April 16, 2003, policy guidance memorandum for the 2005
BRAC round, DOD recognizes the benefits of the joint use of facilities.
The memorandum instructs the services to evaluate opportunities to
consolidate or relocate active and reserve components on any enclave of
realigning and closing bases where such relocations make operational
and economic sense. If the services adhere to this guidance in the
upcoming round, we believe it will not only benefit DOD but also will
mitigate any potential adverse effects, such as the checkerboard base
layout at the former March Air Force Base, on community redevelopment
efforts.
Many Initial Base Savings Estimates Did Not Account for Projected
Enclave Costs:
The estimated costs to operate and maintain the infrastructure for many
of the Army enclaves were not considered in calculating savings
estimates for bases with proposed enclaves during the decision-making
process. As a result, estimated realignment or closure costs and
payback periods were understated and estimated savings were overstated
for those specific bases. The Army subsequently updated its savings
estimates in its succeeding annual budget submissions to reflect
estimated costs to operate and maintain many of its enclaves. On the
other hand, Air Force officials told us that its estimated base closure
savings were partially offset by expected enclave costs, but
documentation was insufficient to demonstrate this statement. Because
estimated costs and savings are an important consideration in the
closure and realignment decision-making process and may impact specific
commission recommendations, it is important that estimates provided to
the commission be as complete and accurate as possible for its
deliberations.
Army Enclave Costs Were Not Generally Considered in BRAC
Decision-Making Process:
During the 1995 BRAC decision-making process, estimated savings for
most 1995-round bases where Army enclaves were established did not
reflect estimated costs to operate and maintain the enclaves. The Army
Audit Agency reported in 1997[Footnote 22] that about $28 million in
estimated annual costs to operate and maintain four major Army
enclaves,[Footnote 23] as shown in table 2, were not considered in the
bases' estimated savings calculations.
Table 2: Estimated Annual Costs to Operate and Maintain Selected Army
Reserve Enclaves:
Dollars in millions.
Installation.
Fort Chaffee; Cost[S]: Maintenance: $3.6; Cost[S]: Other support: $3.2;
Cost[S]: Total: $6.9.
Fort Indiantown Gap; Cost[S]: Maintenance: 4.9; Cost[S]: Other support:
3.4; Cost[S]: Total: 8.3.
Fort McClellan; Cost[S]: Maintenance: 3.3; Cost[S]: Other support: 2.6;
Cost[S]: Total: 5.9.
Fort Pickett; Cost[S]: Maintenance: 3.4; Cost[S]: Other support: 3.2;
Cost[S]: Total: 6.6.
Total; Cost[S]: Maintenance: $15.2; Cost[S]: Other support: $12.4;
Cost[S]: Total: $27.7.
Source: U.S. Army Audit Agency.
Note: Estimated costs as reported by the Army Audit Agency in fiscal
year 1995 dollars. Totals may not add due to rounding.
[A] Other support costs include expenses for automated target systems,
environmental, personnel, integrated training-area management, and
security.
[End of table]
Enclave costs are only one of many costs that may be incurred by DOD in
closing or realigning an entire base. For example, other costs include
expenditures for movement of personnel and supplies to other locations
and military construction for facilities receiving missions from a
realigning base. The extent of all costs incurred have a direct bearing
on the estimated savings and payback periods associated with a
particular closure or realignment. Table 3 provides the results of the
Army Audit Agency's review (which factored in all costs) of the
estimated savings and payback periods for the realignment or closure of
the same Army bases shown in table 2 where enclaves were created. As
shown in table 3, the commission's annual savings' estimates were
overstated and the payback periods were underestimated for these
particular bases.
Table 3: Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings and Payback
Periods for Selected Bases with Reserve Enclaves:
Dollars in millions.
Base:
Fort Chaffee; Estimated annual recurring savings: 1995 BRAC Commission:
$13.4; Estimated annual recurring savings: Army Audit Agency: $1.4;
Estimated payback period: 1995 BRAC Commission: 1 year;
Estimated payback period: Army Audit Agency: 18 years.
Fort Indiantown Gap; Estimated annual recurring savings: 1995 BRAC
Commission: 18.4; Estimated annual recurring savings: Army Audit
Agency: 11.8; Estimated payback period: 1995 BRAC Commission:
Immediate; Estimated payback period: Army Audit Agency: 1 year.
Fort McClellan; Estimated annual recurring savings: 1995 BRAC
Commission: 40.6; Estimated annual recurring savings: Army Audit
Agency: 27.4; Estimated payback period: 1995 BRAC Commission:
6 years; Estimated payback period: Army Audit Agency: 14 years.
Fort Pickett; Estimated annual recurring savings: 1995 BRAC Commission:
21.8; Estimated annual recurring savings: Army Audit Agency: 5.9;
Estimated payback period: 1995 BRAC Commission: Immediate;
Estimated payback period: Army Audit Agency: 2 years.
Total; Estimated annual recurring savings: 1995 BRAC Commission: $94.2;
Estimated annual recurring savings: Army Audit Agency: $46.5;
Estimated payback period: 1995 BRAC Commission: Estimated
payback period: Army Audit Agency: [Empty].
Sources: U.S. Army Audit Agency and 1995 BRAC Commission.
Note: GAO analysis of U.S. Army Audit Agency and 1995 BRAC Commission
data.
[End of table]
Our analysis showed that the omission of enclave costs significantly
affected the initial estimates of savings and payback periods at all
locations except Fort McClellan as shown in table 3. For example, the
omission of $6.8 million in enclave costs at Fort Chaffee (see table 2)
accounted for more than 50 percent of the $12 million in estimated
reduced annual recurring savings at that location. Further, the enclave
cost omissions were instrumental in increasing Fort Chaffee's estimated
payback period from 1 year to 18 years. On the other hand, at
Fort McClellan, estimates on costs[Footnote 24] other than those
associated with the enclave had a greater impact on the resulting
estimated annual recurring savings and payback periods.
Although it is unknown whether the enclave cost omissions or any other
similar omissions would have caused the 1995 BRAC Commission to revise
its recommendations for these installations, it is important to have
cost and savings estimates that are as complete and accurate as
possible in order to provide a commission with a better basis to make
informed judgments during its deliberative process.
Although the Army omitted enclave operation and maintenance costs
from its savings calculations for most of its 1995 actions during the
initial phases of the BRAC process, it subsequently updated many of
these savings estimates in its annual budget submissions to the
Congress. In our April 2002 report on previous-round BRAC actions, we
noted that even though DOD had not routinely updated its BRAC base
savings estimates over time because it does not maintain an accounting
system that tracks savings, the Army had made the most savings updates
of all the services in recent years.[Footnote 25] According to Army
officials, the Army Audit Agency report provided a basis for the Army
to update the annual BRAC budget submissions and adjust the savings
estimates at the installations reviewed. As a result, the previous
estimated cost omissions have not materially affected the department's
estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings across all
previous round BRAC actions due to the fact that the savings estimates
for these locations have been updated to reflect many enclave costs in
subsequent annual budget submissions.
Because of the passage of time and the lack of supporting
documentation, we were unable to document whether the Air Force had
considered enclave costs in deriving its savings estimates for the
former air bases we visited at Grissom in Indiana (a 1991 round
action), March in California (a 1993 round action), and Rickenbacker in
Ohio (a 1991 round action). Air Force Reserve Command officials,
however, told us that estimated costs to operate and maintain their
enclaves were considered in calculating savings estimates for these
base actions. Officials at the bases we visited were unaware of the
cost and savings estimates that were established for their bases during
the BRAC decision-making process.
Conclusions:
With an upcoming round of base realignments and closures approaching
in 2005, it is important that the new Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission have information that is as complete and
accurate as possible on DOD-proposed realignment and closure actions in
order to make informed judgments during its deliberations. Previous
round actions indicate that, in several cases, a commission lacked key
information (e.g., about the projected needs of an enclave
infrastructure and estimated costs to operate and maintain an enclave)
because DOD had not fully identified specific infrastructure needs
until after the commission had issued its recommendations. Without the
benefit of more complete data during the deliberative process, the
commission subsequently issued recommendation language that permitted
the Army to form reserve enclaves that are considerably larger than one
might expect based on the commission's language concerning minimum
essential land and facilities for reserve component use. In addition,
because DOD did not adequately consider cross-service requirements of
various military activities located in the vicinity of its proposed
enclaves and did not include them in the enclaves, it may have lost the
opportunity to achieve several benefits to obtain savings, enhance
training and readiness, and increase force protection for these
activities. DOD has recently issued policy guidance as part of the 2005
closure round that, if implemented, should address cross-service
requirements and the potential to relocate activities on future
enclaves where relocation makes operational and economic sense.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for
2005, we recommend that you establish provisions to ensure that data
provided to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission clearly
specify the (1) infrastructure (e.g., acreage and total square footage
of facilities) needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and
(2) estimated costs to operate and maintain such enclaves.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations
to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the House Committee
on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this
report. A written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this report.
Agency Comments:
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs concurred with our recommendations. The
department's response indicated that it would work to resolve the
issues addressed in our report, recognizing the need for improved
planning for reserve enclaves as part of BRAC decision making and
include improvements in selecting facilities to be retained,
identifying costs of operation, and assessing impacts on BRAC costs and
savings. DOD's comments are included in appendix III of this report.
Scope and Methodology:
We prepared this report under our basic legislative responsibilities as
authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 717. We performed our work at, and met with
officials from, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the
headquarters of the Army Reserve Command and Air Force Reserve Command,
and Army and Air Force BRAC offices. We also visited and met with
officials from several reserve component enclave locations, including
the Army's Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania;
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Fort Hunter
Liggett, California; as well as the Air Force's March Air Reserve Base,
California; Grissom Air Reserve Base, Indiana; and Rickenbacker Air
National Guard Base, Ohio. We also contacted select officials who had
participated in the 1995 BRAC round decision-making process to discuss
their views on establishing enclaves on closed or realigned bases. Our
efforts regarding previous-round enclave planning were hindered by the
passage of time, the lack of selected critical planning documentation,
and the general unavailability of key officials who had participated in
the process.
To determine whether enclave infrastructure needs had been identified
prior to BRAC Commission decision making, we first identified the scope
of reserve enclaves by examining BRAC Commission reports from the four
previous rounds and DOD data regarding those enclave locations. To the
extent possible, we reviewed available documentation and compared
process development timelines with the various commission reporting
dates to determine the extent of enclave planning completed before a
commission's issuance of specific BRAC recommendations. We examined
available commission hearings from the 1995 round to ascertain the
extent of commission discussion regarding proposed enclaves. We also
interviewed officials at most of the major enclave locations as well as
at the major command level to discuss their understanding of the
enclave planning process and associated timelines employed in the
previous rounds. We also discussed with these officials any previous
planning actions or actions currently underway to relocate various
reserve activities or organizations to enclave locations.
To determine whether projected costs to operate and maintain reserve
enclaves were considered in deriving estimated savings during the
BRAC decision-making process, we reviewed available cost and savings
estimation documentation derived from DOD's COBRA model to ascertain if
estimated savings were offset by projected enclave costs. We reviewed
Army Audit Agency BRAC reports issued in 1997 on costs and savings
estimates at various BRAC locations, including some enclave sites.
Further, we analyzed how omitted enclave costs affected estimated
annual recurring savings and payback periods at selected Army bases. We
also discussed cost and savings estimates with Army and Air Force BRAC
office officials as well as officials at bases we visited. However, as
in our other efforts, we were generally constrained in our efforts by
the general unavailability of knowledgeable officials on specific
enclave data and adequate supporting documentation. We also examined
recent annual BRAC budget submissions to the Congress to ascertain if
savings estimates at the major enclave locations had been updated over
time.
In performing this review, we used the same accounting records and
financial reports DOD and reserve components use to manage their
facilities. We did not independently determine the reliability of the
reported financial and real property information. However, in our
recent audit of the federal government's financial statements,
including DOD's and the reserve components' statements, we questioned
the reliability of reported financial information because not all
obligations and expenditures are recorded to specific financial
accounts.[Footnote 26] In addition, we did not validate infrastructure
needs for DOD enclaves.
We conducted our work from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional
committees and members. In addition, the report is available to others
upon request and can be accessed at no charge on GAO's Web site at
www.gao.gov.
Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any
questions regarding this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Barry W. Holman,
Director
Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Barry W. Holman:
[End of section]
Appendix I: General Description of Major Reserve Component Enclaves
(Pre-BRAC and Post-BRAC):
Installation: Fort Hunter Liggett; BRAC recommendation: Realign Fort
Hunter Liggett by relocating the Army Test and Experimentation Center
missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Retain minimum essential
facilities and training area as an enclave to support the reserve
component; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army Reserve managed
the base, assuming control of the property in December 1994 from the
active Army; * In September 1997, the base became a sub-installation
of the Army Reserve's Fort McCoy. The training man days have increased
by about 55 percent since 1998.
Installation: Fort Chaffee; BRAC recommendation: Close Fort Chaffee
except for minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas
required for a reserve component training enclave for individual and
annual training; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army
managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of training
man days (75 percent) while the active component had 24 percent; the
remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel; * In October
1997, base management transferred to the Arkansas National Guard.
Overall training has decreased 51 percent with reserve component
training being down 59 percent.
Installation: Fort Pickett; BRAC recommendation: Close Fort Pickett
except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a
reserve component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual
and annual training; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1995, the Army
Reserve managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of
the training man days (62 percent) while the active component had 37
percent; the remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel; the
remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel; * In
October 1997, base management transferred to the Virginia National
Guard. Overall training has increased by 6 percent.
Installation: Fort Dix; BRAC recommendation: Realign Fort Dix by
replacing the active component garrison with an Army Reserve garrison.
In addition, it provided for retention of minimum essential ranges,
facilities, and training areas as an enclave required for reserve
component training; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1995, the active Army
managed the base. The reserve components had the majority of training
man days (72 percent) while the active component had 8 percent; the
remaining training was devoted to non-DOD personnel; * In October
1997, base management transferred to the Army Reserve. Overall training
has increased 8 percent.
Installation: Fort Indiantown Gap; BRAC recommendation: Close Fort
Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential ranges, facilities and
training areas as a reserve component training enclave to permit the
conduct of individual and annual training; Utilization: * Prior to
BRAC 1995, the active Army managed the base. The reserve components had
the majority of training man days (85 percent) while the active
component had 3 percent; the remaining training was devoted to non-DOD
personnel; * In October 1998, base management transferred to the
Pennsylvania National Guard. Overall training has increased by about
7 percent.
Installation: Fort McClellan; BRAC recommendation: Close Fort
McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a reserve
component enclave and minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to
provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at
Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1995, the
active Army managed the base; * In May 1999, base management
transferred to the Alabama National Guard. Overall training has
increased 75 percent.
Installation: Fort Devens; BRAC recommendation: Close Fort Devens.
Retain 4600 acres and those facilities necessary for reserve component
training requirements; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1991, the active
Army managed the base; * In March 1996, base management transferred to
the Army Reserve as a sub-installation of Fort Dix.
Installation: March Air Reserve Base; BRAC recommendation: Realign
March Air Force Base. The 445[TH] Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve, 452nd
Air Refueling Wing, 163th RECONNAISSANCE GROUP, THE AIR FORCE Audit
Agency and the Media Center will remain and the base will convert to a
reserve base; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1993, the active Air Force
managed the base, with major activities being the 452[ND] Air Refueling
Wing, 445th Airlift Wing and the 452nd Air Mobility Wing, 163rd Air
Refueling Wing; * In April 1996, base management transferred to the
Air Force Reserve with major activities being the 63rd Air Refueling
Wing and the 144[TH] Fighter Wing as well as tenants such as U.S.
Customs.
Installation: Grissom Air Reserve Base; BRAC recommendation: Close
Grissom Air Force Base and transfer assigned KC-135 aircraft to the Air
reserve components; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1991, the active Air
Force managed the base with major activities being the 434th Air
Refueling Wing and several Air Force Reserve units; * In 1994, base
management transferred to the Air Force Reserve. Grissom Air Reserve
Base houses the 434[TH] Air Refueling Wing as well as other tenants
such as the Navy Reserve.
Installation: Homestead Air Reserve Base; BRAC recommendation: Realign
Homestead Air Force Base. The 482d F-16 Fighter Wing and the 301[ST]
Rescue Squadron and the North American Air Defense Alert activity will
remain in a cantonment area; Utilization: * Prior to BRAC 1991, the
active Air Force managed the base, with major activities being the
482[ND] Fighter Wing and the 301st Rescue Squadron; * In August 1992,
Hurricane Andrew destroyed most of the base. After the base was rebuilt
and management transferred to the Air Force Reserve, operations were
reinstated with major activities being the 482[ND] Fighter Wing and the
NORAD Air Defense Alert activity.
[End of table]
Sources: 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC Commission reports and DOD.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Reserve Enclaves Created under Previous BRAC Rounds:
BRAC Round: 1988; Bases With Enclaves: Fort Douglas, Utah; Acreage: 50.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Sheridan, Ill; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 100.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Hamilton Army Airfield, Calif;
Acreage: BRAC Round: 150.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Mather Air Force Base, Calif;
Acreage: BRAC Round: 91.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round1991: Pease Air Force Base, N.H;
Acreage: BRAC Round1991: 218.
BRAC Round: 1991; Bases With Enclaves: Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind;
Acreage: 138.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Devens, Mass; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 5,226.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Grissom Air Force Base, Ind; Acreage:
BRAC Round: 1,380.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round1993: Sacramento Army Depot, Calif;
Acreage: BRAC Round1993: 38.
BRAC Round: 1993; Bases With Enclaves: Griffiss Air Force Base, N.Y;
Acreage: 39.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Homestead Air Force Base, Fla;
Acreage: BRAC Round: 852.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: March Air Force Base, Calif; Acreage:
BRAC Round: 2,359.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round1995: Rickenbacker Air National Guard
Base, Ohio; Acreage: BRAC Round1995: 168.
BRAC Round: 1995; Bases With Enclaves: Camp Kilmer, N.J; Acreage: 24.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Camp Pedricktown, N.J; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 86.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fitzsimmons Medical Center, Colo;
Acreage: BRAC Round: 21.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Chaffee, Ark; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 64,272.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Dix, N.J; Acreage: BRAC Round:
30,944.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Hamilton, N.Y; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 168.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif; Acreage:
BRAC Round: 164,272.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa; Acreage:
BRAC Round: 17,227.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort McClellan, Ala; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 22,531.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Missoula, Mont; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 16.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Pickett, Va; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 42,273.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Ritchie, Md; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 19.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC Round: Fort Totten, N.Y; Acreage: BRAC
Round: 36.
Bases With Enclaves: BRAC RoundBases With Enclaves: Oakland Army Base,
Calif; Acreage: BRAC RoundAcreage: 27.
Sources: 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC Commission reports and DOD.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
RESERVE AFFAIRS:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC
20301-1500:
19 JUN 2003:
Mr. Barry W. Holman:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Holman:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, GAO-03-723, "MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: Better Planning Needed for
Future Reserve Enclaves," dated May 15, 2003 (GAO Code 350231).
An important element of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAG) process
is the timely collection of complete and accurate data used by the
Department and the BRAG Commission in the evaluation process. The GAO
report provides two recommendations that would require DoD to provide
the Commission with specific infrastructure requirements (e.g. acreage
and total square footage of facilities), and estimated operation and
maintenance costs for any Reserve component enclave proposed in BRAG
2005.
I recognize that in the past, Reserve components may have been required
to obtain real property in "all or none/as-is" condition that resulted
in higher than projected operation and maintenance costs. However, the
Secretary of Defense in his November 2002 memorandum reemphasized
efficient and effective basing strategies for BRAG 2005. It is
certainly more efficient to capture real property requirements for
Reserve components early in the BRAG process to the maximum extent
practicable, and present that data to the Commission in the same level
of detail as presented for the Active components.
It is imperative that the Reserve components receive early notification
of potential realignments or closures to effect efficient planning of
future Reserve enclaves. I agree that when establishing a Reserve
enclave, it is important to recognize the "move-in" costs associated
with assuming the responsibilities of becoming an installation host. In
past BRAC rounds, the Reserve components' requirements were considered
later in the process, which led to less effective use of Department
resources.
I concur with the recommendations as stated, and will work to resolve
the issues addressed within this report and ensure that the need for
appropriate planning is recognized early in the BRAC process.
Sincerely,
T.F. Hall:
Signed by T.F. Hall:
Enclosure:
GAO DRAFT REPORT, GAO-03-723:
"MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve
Enclaves," (GAO Code 350231).
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: As part of the new base realignment and closure round
scheduled for 2005, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish provisions to ensure that the data provided to the base
realignment and closure commission clearly specify the infrastructure
(e.g., acreage and total square footage of facilities) needed for any
proposed reserve enclaves. (Page 20/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment.
As the GAO stated in the report, "information provided to the
commission should be as complete and accurate as possible". The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs recommends that
Reserve component facilities information presented to the BRAG
commission should be at the same level of detail as presented for the
Active components.
RECOMMENDATION 2: As part of the new base realignment and closure round
scheduled for 2005, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish provisions to ensure that the data provided to the base
realignment and closure commission clearly specify the estimated costs
to operate and maintain such enclaves. (Page 21/Draft Report).
DoD RESPONSE: Concur with comment.
In some cases, the Reserve components may have been required to pick up
real property in "as-is" condition resulting in higher than projected
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs recommends that Reserve component cost data
presented to the BRAG commission capture as complete and accurately as
possible projected O&M costs for future Reserve enclaves.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Michael Kennedy (202) 512-8333:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Julie Chamberlain, Shawn
Flowers, Richard Meeks, Maria-Alaina Rambus, James Reifsnyder,
Donna Weiss, and Susan Woodward made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] DOD reported that, as of December 2002, it had disposed of about
272,000 acres (53 percent) of an approximately 511,000 acres that it
had identified during the previous base closure rounds as unneeded and
being made available to others for reuse.
[2] See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1995 Report to
the President (Washington D.C.: July 1, 1995), B-2. An enclave is "a
section of a military installation that remains intact from that part
which is closed or realigned and which will continue with its current
role and functions subject to specific modifications."
[3] A single round of base realignments and closures in 2005 was
authorized with the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002.
[4] For the purpose of this report, we defined "major" as exceeding
500 acres. The amount of acreage has no bearing on the relative
importance of the missions being performed at these or other enclave
locations.
[5] See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1995 Report.
The report recommendation language generally provided that the Army
bases be "closed, except that minimum essential ranges, facilities, and
training areas" be retained for reserve component use.
[6] U.S. Army Audit Agency, Base Realignment and Closure: 1995 Savings
Estimates, Audit Report AA97-225 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1997).
[7] A payback period is the time required for cumulative estimated
savings to exceed the cumulative estimated costs incurred as a result
of implementing BRAC actions.
[8] An exception is the commission-recommended enclave on the former
Homestead Air Force Base; DOD did not submit this as a recommendation
to the commission and therefore had not considered any costs related to
this action in its submission.
[9] The BRAC legislation--the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base
Realignment Act (P.L.100-526, as amended) for the 1988 round and the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, as
amended) for the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds--was applicable to
military installations in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American
Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the
United States.
[10] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures:
Progress in Completing Actions from Previous Realignments and Closures,
GAO-02-433 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2002).
[11] See GAO-02-433 and U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base
Closures: DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains Substantial, GAO-
01-971 (Washington D.C.: July 31, 2001); Congressional Budget Office,
Review of the Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment
and Closure (Washington D.C.: July 1, 1998); Department of Defense,
Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Cost and Savings for
1993 Defense Realignments and Closures, Report No. 98-130 (Washington
D.C. May 6, 1998); and U.S. Army Audit Agency, Base Realignment and
Closure: 1995.
[12] An exception to this involves the Air Force, which did not
routinely update its savings estimates from the COBRA model as part of
BRAC decision making.
[13] We have excluded any joint reserve bases established by a BRAC
Commission, such as the Navy-managed Joint Reserve Base-Ft. Worth in
Texas, because they do not conform to the definition of an enclave as
previously defined.
[14] This advance planning was based on the recommendations for an
enclave having already been included in the recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense, which were forwarded to the BRAC Commission for
its review.
[15] Various service component (both active and reserve) units travel
to and conduct training at many reserve enclaves.
[16] Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations),
Report on the Effect of Base Closures on Future Mobilization Options
(Washington D.C.: Nov. 10, 1999).
[17] A cantonment area is that part of a base containing the majority
of the facilities and most areas that are not part of the training
areas.
[18] The infrastructure needs for the Fort Hunter Liggett enclave were
not approved until November 1997.
[19] A local redevelopment authority is the DOD-recognized local
organization whose role is to coordinate efforts of the community to
reuse assets of a former military base.
[20] Comparative data on training day usage were not readily available
at the Ft. Devens location.
[21] See U.S. Army Judge Advocate General memorandum, Review of
Implementation Plan for Fort Indiantown Gap (Washington D.C.: Aug. 22,
1995) and U.S. Army Judge Advocate General memorandum, Legal Review of
Fort Hunter Liggett Facilities Utilization Plan (Washington D.C.: Jan.
25, 1996). These memorandums were prepared for the Army Assistant Chief
of Staff for Installation Management in response to his request for a
review of plans to implement BRAC actions at these specified locations.
[22] See U.S. Army Audit Agency, Base Realignment and Closure: 1995.
[23] The remaining two 1995 major enclaves--Fort Dix and Fort Hunter
Liggett--were not reviewed by the Army Audit Agency. An Army BRAC
official told us that enclave costs were considered in deriving net
savings estimates for Fort Dix but not for Fort Hunter Liggett.
Supporting documentation was unavailable to verify this statement.
[24] The cost estimates included about $19 million in annual
recurring costs, about $40 million in one-time construction costs and
about $26 million in one-time operations and maintenance costs related
to the Fort McClellan closure.
[25] See GAO-02-433.
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Defense, GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2003).
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