Military Personnel
Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership Costs Gao ID: GAO-03-520 June 9, 2003The cost of a ship's crew is the single largest incurred over the ship's life cycle. One way to lower personnel costs, and thus the cost of ownership, is to use people only when it is cost-effective--a determination made with a systems engineering approach called human systems integration. GAO was asked to evaluate the Navy's progress in optimizing the crew size in four ships being developed and acquired: the DD(X) destroyer, T-AKE cargo ship, JCC(X) command ship, and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship. GAO assessed (1) the Navy's use of human systems integration principles and goals for reducing crew size, and (2) the factors that may impede the Navy's use of those principles.
The Navy's use of human systems integration principles and crew size reduction goals varied significantly for the four ships GAO reviewed. Only the DD(X) destroyer program emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process and established an aggressive goal to reduce crew size. The Navy's goal is to cut personnel on the DD(X) by about 70 percent from that of the previous destroyer class--a reduction GAO estimated could eventually save about $18 billion over the life of a 32-ship class. The goal was included in key program documents to which program managers are held accountable. Although the Navy did not set specific crew reduction goals for the T-AKE cargo ship, it made some use of human systems integration principles and expects to require a somewhat smaller crew than similar legacy ships. The two other ships--the recently cancelled JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship--did not establish human systems integration plans early in the acquisition programs, and did not establish ambitious crew size reduction goals. Unless the Navy more consistently applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process. For example, the Navy has not clearly defined the human systems integration certification standards for new ships. Several factors may impede the Navy's consistent application of human systems integration principles and its use of innovations to optimize crew size: (1) DOD acquisition policies and discretionary Navy guidance that allow program managers latitude in optimizing crew size and using human systems integration, (2) funding challenges that encourage the use of legacy systems to save near-term costs and discourage research and investment in labor-saving technology that could reduce long-term costs, (3) unclear Navy organizational authority to require human systems integration's use in acquisition programs, and (4) the Navy's lack of cultural acceptance of new concepts to optimize crew size and its layers of personnel policies that require consensus from numerous stakeholders to revise.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-520, Military Personnel: Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership Costs
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
June 2003:
Military Personnel:
Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total
Ownership Costs:
GAO-03-520:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-520, a report to Congressional Requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The cost of a ship‘s crew is the single largest incurred over the
ship‘s life cycle. One way to lower personnel costs, and thus the cost
of ownership, is to use people only when it is cost-effective”a
determination made with a systems engineering approach called human
systems integration. GAO was asked to evaluate the Navy‘s progress in
optimizing the crew size in four ships being developed and acquired:
the DD(X) destroyer, T-AKE cargo ship, JCC(X) command ship, and LHA(R)
amphibious assault ship. GAO assessed (1) the Navy‘s use of human
systems integration principles and goals for reducing crew size, and
(2) the factors that may impede the Navy‘s use of those principles.
What GAO Found:
The Navy‘s use of human systems integration principles and crew size
reduction goals varied significantly for the four ships GAO reviewed.
Only the DD(X) destroyer program emphasized human systems integration
early in the acquisition process and established an aggressive goal to
reduce crew size. The Navy‘s goal is to cut personnel on the DD(X) by
about 70 percent from that of the previous destroyer class”a reduction
GAO estimated could eventually save about $18 billion over the life of
a 32-ship class. The goal was included in key program documents to
which program managers are held accountable. Although the Navy did not
set specific crew reduction goals for the T-AKE cargo ship, it made
some use of human systems integration principles and expects to
require a somewhat smaller crew than similar legacy ships. The two
other ships”the recently cancelled JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R)
amphibious assault ship”did not establish human systems integration
plans early in the acquisition programs, and did not establish
ambitious crew size reduction goals. Unless the Navy more consistently
applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and
establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may
miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which
are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process (see
figure). For example, the Navy has not clearly defined the human
systems integration certification standards for new ships.
Several factors may impede the Navy‘s consistent application of human
systems integration principles and its use of innovations to optimize
crew size: (1) DOD acquisition policies and discretionary Navy
guidance that allow program managers latitude in optimizing crew size
and using human systems integration, (2) funding challenges that
encourage the use of legacy systems to save near-term costs and
discourage research and investment in labor-saving technology that
could reduce long-term costs, (3) unclear Navy organizational
authority to require human systems integration‘s use in acquisition
programs, and (4) the Navy‘s lack of cultural acceptance of new
concepts to optimize crew size and its layers of personnel policies
that require consensus from numerous stakeholders to revise.
What GAO Recommends:
To facilitate the Navy‘s efforts to optimize ship crew sizes and
minimize total ownership costs, GAO is recommending that the Secretary
of the Navy: (1) require that ship programs use human systems
integration to establish crew size goals and help achieve them, (2)
clearly define the human systems integration certification standards
for new ships, (3) formally establish a process to examine and
facilitate the adoption of labor-saving technologies and best
practices across Navy systems.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with GAO‘s
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-520.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Henry L. Hinton, Jr., at (202)
512-4300 or hintonh@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Navy's Use of Human Systems Integration to Optimize Crew Size and
Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary Considerably Across
Ship Programs:
Several Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Application of Human
Systems Integration and May Impede the Navy's Ability to Optimize
Crew Size:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition:
Appendix IV: Summary of DD(X) Destroyer Gold Team Trade Studies:
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD(X) Crew Sizes:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected DD(X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by Northrop
Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from 1998-2002:
Table 2: Comparison of Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A and the
DD(X):
Table 3: Comparison of Crew Size for Selected Special Evolutions on DDG
51 Flight IIA and DD(X) Destroyers:
Figures:
Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System's
Development:
Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases, Milestones, and
Key Activities:
Abbreviations:
DD(X): destroyer
DOD: Department of Defense
JCC(X): joint command and control ship
LHA(R): amphibious assault ship replacement
MSC: Military Sealift Command
T-AKE: auxiliary cargo and ammunition ship:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 9, 2003:
The Honorable Jim Talent Chairman The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Seapower Committee on Armed
Services United States Senate:
The cost of a ship's crew is the single largest expense incurred over
a ship's life cycle. As such, transitioning from the personnel-and
workload-intensive ships of the past to optimally crewed ships with
reduced workloads has tremendous potential to free up resources for the
Navy to use in recapitalizing the fleet. The Department of Defense's
(DOD) planned procurement rate for fiscal years 2004-2008 is 7.4 ships
per year, a rate that supports a fleet of about 259 ships--below the
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review goal of 310 and farther below the
Navy's desired fleet of 375 ships. In recognition of the budgetary
challenges the Navy faces in recapitalizing its fleet, House and Senate
conferees have expressed an interest in identifying ways to reduce
these personnel expenses through the acquisition of ships that would
require smaller crews.[Footnote 1]
One way to lower costs associated with personnel is to use people only
when it is cost-effective to do so--determining this by using a systems
engineering approach known as human systems integration. In this
process, tasks and functions are systematically analyzed and assigned
to the most cost-effective solution--humans, software, or hardware.
When applied to ships early in their development and throughout their
design, human systems integration has the potential to substantially
reduce requirements for personnel, leading to significant cost savings.
Additionally, it can improve operational performance by enhancing
situational awareness and decision making; reduce human error, which
causes an estimated 80 percent of ship accidents; and reduce training
difficulty and cost. Human systems integration also has the potential
to improve shipboard habitability, reduce workload and fatigue, and
thereby improve a sailor's quality of life--key enablers for recruiting
and retention.
Because the size of ship crews has such a significant impact on long-
term costs, you asked us to evaluate the Navy's progress in optimizing
the crew size in four new ships that DOD was in the process of
developing and acquiring: the DD(X) destroyer,[Footnote 2] the T-AKE
cargo ship,[Footnote 3] the recently canceled JCC(X) command
ship,[Footnote 4] and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship. During our
review, three of these ships were in the early stages of development
while only one ship, the T-AKE, had entered acquisition phase three,
production and deployment. (App. II includes a description of the
ships' missions and acquisition program history and status.) In this
report, we assess (1) the Navy's use of human systems integration
principles and goals to reduce crew size on these four ships and
(2) the factors that may impede the Navy's use of human systems
integration principles in developing new ships.
To assess the Navy's use of human systems integration principles and
crew size reduction goals, we obtained and analyzed key program and
ship crewing documents as well as human systems integration plans and
analyses. We also assessed whether and to what extent human systems
integration principles and crew reduction goals were addressed in the
first two acquisition phases (concept and technology development and
system development and demonstration) and reflected in key acquisition
documents. To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy's application
of human systems integration principles, we interviewed DOD officials,
contractors, and human systems integration experts and reviewed
acquisition guidance to determine the extent to which it discusses or
requires the use of human systems integration principles in ship
programs. We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The
scope and methodology used in our review are described in further
detail in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
The Navy's use of human systems integration and crew size reduction
goals varied significantly in the four ship programs we examined. Only
the DD(X) destroyer program placed a significant emphasis on human
systems integration early in the acquisition process and established an
aggressive goal to reduce crew size. The Navy's goal for the DD(X)
destroyer, which was included as a principal program goal or key
performance parameter, is expected to cut the ship crew size by about
60 to 70 percent from that of the previous destroyer ship
class,[Footnote 5] a reduction we estimated could save about
$18 billion (fiscal year 2002 dollars)[Footnote 6] in personnel-related
costs over the service life of a future class of 32 ships.[Footnote 7]
This goal was established at program initiation, provided the
initiative for developing a comprehensive human systems integration
plan, and was reiterated in the key program documents to which the
program manager is held accountable at key milestone reviews. For the
T-AKE cargo ship, the Navy made some use of human systems integration
and expects to require somewhat fewer personnel than the legacy ships
it is replacing. It did not, however, establish specific crew size
reduction goals or apply human systems integration principles to the
ship's primary mission, intership underway replenishment. The remaining
two programs, the JCC(X) command and the LHA(R) amphibious assault
ships, did not develop comprehensive human systems integration plans
early in the acquisition process and do not have crew size reduction as
a formal program goal. Because the Navy did not consistently apply
human systems integration principles and set goals for reducing crew
size for three of the ships we reviewed, it may have missed
opportunities to reduce crewing requirements and lower total ownership
costs, which are determined largely by decisions made early in the
acquisition process but which will be incurred throughout these ships'
30-40 year life spans.
Based on briefings and discussions with agency officials and a review
of acquisition policies, we found that a number of related factors
contribute to the Navy's inconsistent application of human systems
integration principles and may impede the adoption of innovations to
optimize crew size. These factors include the following:
* DOD and Navy acquisition policies allow program managers considerable
latitude in optimizing crew size and in determining the timing and
extent to which they employ human systems integration.
* Funding challenges when acquiring new ships encourage the use of
legacy subsystems to save near-term costs instead of the investment in
research and development of labor-saving technologies that would reduce
costs over the long term.
* Most Navy organizations responsible for human systems integration
oversight are not empowered to require the use of human systems
integration to optimize crew size. The Naval Sea Systems Command's
newly established directorate for human systems integration, which is
responsible for certifying that ships delivered to the fleet have
optimized crews, had not established a process or criteria for
achieving certification.
* Even when new labor-saving approaches and technologies are identified
during the concept and technology development phase, implementing them
is a difficult and time-consuming process due to the Navy's
long-standing traditions and culture and the extensive network of
personnel, safety, training, maintenance, and other policies and
procedures that affect ship personnel levels. Moreover, there is no
process to help Navy program managers identify and coordinate with
other stakeholders to modify or eliminate policies and procedures that
may impede the introduction of labor-saving practices and technology
identified during ship design.
These factors cause Navy decision makers to set goals of not exceeding
the crew size of 30-year old ships, for program managers to wait until
preliminary design to begin human systems integration efforts, and
exclude primary and secondary ship functions from rigorous analysis. As
a result, the Navy is designing and procuring some new ships that may
not cost-effectively address one of the biggest cost drivers in the
Navy--personnel. The DD(X) experience also shows that even when these
practices are followed, the program will still face challenges in
achieving these goals and encounter pressures to relax the goals as the
system design progresses, thereby supporting human systems integration
experts' view that human systems integration plans and activities
should receive continued review and focus throughout the acquisition
process. Unless the Navy more consistently applies human systems
integration at the earliest stages of the development process and
establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss
opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are
determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process.
To facilitate the Navy's efforts to optimize ship crew sizes and
minimize total ownership costs, we are recommending that the Secretary
of the Navy (1) require that ship programs use human systems
integration to establish crew size goals and help achieve them,
(2) clearly define the human systems integration certification
standards for new ships, (3) formally establish a policy evaluation
function to examine and facilitate the adoption of cost-saving
technologies and best practices across Navy systems. In commenting on a
draft of this report, DOD agreed with our recommendations.
Background:
Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System's Development:
Decisions made in setting requirements very early in a ship's
development have enormous impact on the total ownership costs.[Footnote
8] Total ownership costs include the costs to research, develop,
acquire, own, operate, maintain, and dispose of weapon and support
systems; the costs of other equipment and real property; the costs to
recruit, retrain, separate, and otherwise support military and civilian
personnel; and all other costs of DOD's business operations. Navy
analyses show that by the second acquisition milestone (which assesses
whether a system is ready to advance to the system development and
demonstration phase), roughly 85 percent of a ship's total ownership
cost has been "locked in" by design, production quantity, and schedule
decisions while less than 10 percent of its total costs has actually
been expended. (See fig. 1.):
Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System's
Development:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 1 depicts the relative apportionment of research and
development, procurement, and operating and support costs over the
typical life cycle of a ship program (the complete life cycle of a
ship, from concept development through disposal, typically ranges from
40 to 60 years). Research and development funds are spent at program
initiation and generally comprise only a small fraction of a new ship's
total ownership costs. Then, in the next acquisition phase, procurement
funds, comprising about 30 percent of total ownership costs, are spent
to acquire the new ship. The vast majority of the total ownership
costs, about 65 percent, is comprised of operating and support costs
and is incurred over the life of the ship. Personnel costs are the
largest contributor to operating and support costs--approximately
50 percent.
Defense Acquisition Policy Requires Setting Goals to Optimize
Performance and Minimize Cost:
Recognizing that fiscal constraints pose a long-term challenge, DOD
policy states that total ownership costs of new military systems should
be identified and that DOD officials should treat cost as a military
requirement during the acquisition process.[Footnote 9] This approach,
referred to as treating cost as an independent variable, requires
program managers to consider cost-performance trade-offs in setting
program goals.
During the acquisition process, program managers are held accountable
for making progress toward meeting established goals and requirements
at checkpoints, or milestones, over a program's life cycle.[Footnote
10] (See app. III for a discussion of the DOD acquisition process).
These goals and requirements are contained in several key documents.
The first to be generated is a mission need statement that describes a
warfighting deficiency, or opportunity to provide new capabilities, in
broad operational terms and identifies constraints such as crewing,
personnel, and training that may affect satisfying the need. These
capabilities and constraints are examined during the initial phase of
the program in a second key document, a study called the analysis of
alternatives. This study assesses the operational effectiveness and
estimated costs of alternative systems to meet the mission need. The
analysis assesses the pros and cons of each alternative and their
sensitivity to possible changes in key assumptions. The analysis should
consider personnel as both a life-cycle cost and a design driver.
Systems engineering best practices dictate that the analysis of
alternatives should be supported by a front-end analysis[Footnote 11]
and trade-off studies so that better and more informed decisions can be
made. Using the results of the analysis of alternatives, program
objectives are formalized in an operational requirements document. This
third key document specifies those capabilities or characteristics
(known as key performance parameters) that are so significant that
failure to meet them can be cause for the system to be canceled or
restructured. In establishing key performance parameters, DOD officials
specify both a threshold and an objective value. For performance, the
threshold is the minimum acceptable value that, in the user's judgment,
is necessary to satisfy the need. For schedule and cost, the threshold
is the maximum allowable value. The objective value is the value
desired by the user and the value the program manager tries to work
with the contractor(s) to obtain.
During our review, DOD was revising its acquisition guidance. On
October 30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense canceled three key
DOD documents governing the defense acquisition process and issued
interim guidance in a memorandum. DOD officials expect to issue a new
acquisition guidance in the near future.[Footnote 12] The Deputy
Secretary's interim guidance retains the basic acquisition system
structure and milestones, emphasizes evolutionary acquisition,
modifies the requirements documents, and makes several other changes.
For example, the mission need statement and the operational
requirements document are replaced by three new documents: (1) the
initial capability document replaces the mission need statement at
milestone A, (2) the capability development document replaces the
operational requirements document at milestone B, and (3) the
capability production document replaces the operational requirements
document at milestone C. (See app. III for a discussion of the
acquisition process and milestones.):
Human Systems Integration Has Potential to Optimize Ship Crew Size and
Reduce Costs for New Systems:
Human systems integration is a systems engineering approach to optimize
the use of people. Optimized crewing for ships refers to the minimum
crew size consistent with the ship's mission, affordability, risks, and
human performance and safety requirements. When initiated from the
outset of a new ship acquisition (during concept exploration and prior
to establishing key performance parameters) and continued through ship
design, human systems integration has the potential to reduce workload
leading to smaller, optimized crews; reduced operating and support
costs; and improved operational performance. According to human systems
integration experts, for Navy ship acquisitions, human systems
integration may begin with a top-down requirements analysis that
examines the ship's functions and mission requirements and determines
whether human or machine performance is required for each task. By
reevaluating which functions humans should perform and which can be
performed by technology, human systems integration minimizes personnel
requirements while maximizing gains from technological applications. A
human systems integration approach also ensures that a person's
workload and other concerns, such as personnel and training
requirements, safety, and health hazards, are considered throughout the
acquisition process. In a recent memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs stated, "failure to
incorporate HSI [human systems integration] approaches can only lead to
increasing manpower costs in the future that will threaten the ability
of the Department to sustain the transformation, readiness and
investment priorities we have established.":
Human systems integration has been used successfully in military and
commercial settings. MANPRINT, the Army's human systems integration
program, reports that the Comanche helicopter program, when fielded,
will avoid $3.29 billion in operating and support costs ($2.67 billion
of which resulted from personnel reductions) due to the application of
human systems integration. Human systems integration has also been
used in airplane cockpit design, aircraft maintenance, and in
rear-center automobile brake lights design. Additionally, foreign
navies' efforts, such as those to develop British Type 23 and Dutch M-
Class Frigates, achieved a 30 to 40 percent reduction in crew size
relative to the previous generation of ships by employing a human
systems integration approach.
DOD's acquisition policy for using human systems integration is general
in nature but requires program managers to develop a human systems
integration approach early in the acquisition process to minimize total
ownership costs. The Navy's acquisition guidance requires that human
systems integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along
with other engineering and logistics elements beginning at program
initiation, but the guidance does not provide for specific procedures
and metrics.[Footnote 13]
Navy's Use of Human Systems Integration to Optimize Crew Size and
Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary Considerably Across
Ship Programs:
Despite the potential of human systems integration to optimize crew
size and reduce total ownership costs, the Navy's use of human systems
integration and goals to reduce crew size varied considerably across
the four new ship acquisition programs we examined. Only the DD(X)
destroyer program used human systems integration extensively to
optimize crewing during the concept and technology development phase of
the acquisition. In doing so, the program developed a comprehensive
plan that describes the human systems integration objectives, strategy,
and scope and mandated its use by means of key program documents.
The T-AKE cargo ship program was required to apply human systems
integration principles to the ship's design, but not to the ship's
primary mission of intership underway replenishment. In contrast, the
JCC(X) command ship and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship programs had not
emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process
or developed a comprehensive human systems integration approach. The
Navy's crew size reduction goals for the four ships range from an
aggressive goal of about 60 to 70 percent on the DD(X) destroyer, to a
lack of any formal reduction goal on the JCC(X) command ship and the
LHA(R) amphibious assault ship. The inconsistent use of human systems
integration to optimize ship crews and the lack of formal crew size
reduction goals for three of the four programs we examined represent a
missed opportunity to potentially achieve significant savings in total
ownership costs.
DD(X) Program Has Aggressive Crew Size Reduction Goals and Uses Human
Systems Integration Extensively:
From the inception of the program through the selection of a design
agent in 2002, the DD(X) program has had a significant crew size
reduction goal and has used human systems integration to identify
potential ways to achieve this goal. Requirements for using human
systems integration and crew size goals were included in the key
acquisition documents to which program managers are held accountable.
The program began human systems integration activities in the first
acquisition phase--concept and technology development--by inviting
industry to develop conceptual designs to meet these goals and produce
a human systems integration plan. Subsequently, the Navy restructured
the program in November 2001 and is reevaluating the ship's operational
requirements, including crew size. However, the Navy's contract with
the design agent continues to specify a significant crew size reduction
calling for a crew of between 125 and 175. These revised crew size
requirements still represent a greater than 50 percent reduction when
compared to the legacy ship it is replacing.
From the earliest stages of the program and continuing through award of
the design agent contract, the program maintained a focus on optimizing
crew size. For example:
* The 1993 mission need statement directed "the ship must be automated
to a sufficient degree to realize significant manpower reductions." The
document also required a human systems integration-type
analysis,[Footnote 14] to recommend options to exploit technology to
reduce crewing, personnel, and training requirements and directed that
trade-offs to reduce these requirements be favored during design and
development.
* The 1998 cost and operational effectiveness analysis (currently known
as the analysis of alternatives) included an analysis of the ship crew
and personnel requirements for the various alternatives that ultimately
influenced the Navy's decision to initially establish an aggressive
crew size goal of 95 and identify human systems integration
requirements to be included in the operational requirements document.
This goal represents a greater than 70 percent reduction in crew size
from that of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers developed in the 1980s.
* In 1997, the DD(X) operational requirements document specified a crew
size goal of between 95 and 150 as a key performance
parameter.[Footnote 15] It also required that human systems integration
be used to minimize life-cycle costs and maximize performance
effectiveness, reliability, readiness, and safety of the ship and crew.
* In 1997, the program also established a ship crewing/human systems
integration integrated process team whose charter requires a top-down
functional analysis, the analytical centerpiece of the Navy's human
systems integration approach, in the early phases to obtain a major
reduction in personnel.
* In 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology continued to hold DD(X) destroyer program managers
accountable for achieving an aggressive crew size reduction when he
required validation that the DD(X) crew size will meet the key
performance parameter threshold before ship construction begins.
* The Phase 1 solicitation issued in 1998 for trade studies and
analyses and development of two competitive system concept designs
required that both contractors provide a human systems integration
plan.
* The design agent contract awarded in 2002 requires the contractor to
develop and demonstrate a human systems integration engineering effort
that addresses the crewing, personnel, training, human performance,
sailor survivability, and quality of life aspects of the DD(X) design.
It also relaxed the original crew size goal, stating that crewing
requirements shall not exceed 175.
To achieve the proposed reductions, the DD(X) program plans to employ
human-centered design and reasoning systems, advances in ship cleaning
and preservation, a new maintenance strategy, and remote support from
shore-based facilities for certain administrative and personnel
services. For example, cleaning requirements are expected to be reduced
by a ship design that capitalizes on commercial shipping practices such
as cornerless spaces and maintenance-free deck coverings. The ship will
also rely on an integrated bridge system that provides computer-based
navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar plotting, and
automated ship control.
DD(X) program officials stated that their experience in using the human
systems integration engineering approach, establishing an aggressive
crew size reduction goal early in the acquisition process, and
including this goal as a key performance parameter in the operational
requirements document has been critical in maintaining a focus on
reducing crew size. Moreover, these practices led to examining
innovative approaches from the beginning and holding program managers
accountable during program reviews. Program officials anticipate that
the emphasis on reducing crew size will help to minimize DD(X)
operating and support and total ownership costs once the ship is built
and enters the fleet. For illustrative purposes, we calculated that the
Navy could avoid personnel-related costs of about $600 million per ship
over a 35-year service life if it achieves a crew of 150 sailors rather
than requiring the 365 sailors needed to operate its legacy ship, the
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. This could potentially save more than
$18 billion for a class of 32 ships (both amounts are in fiscal year
2002 dollars).[Footnote 16] See appendix V for a comparison of crew
functions and workload on the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and
those proposed for the DD(X).
DD(X) program officials also stated that, even with sustained early
emphasis on crew size reduction and the use of human systems
integration for crew optimization, achieving such an aggressive crew
size goal remains a significant technological challenge as the program
is relying on a number of immature labor-saving technologies, such as
those required to conduct damage control and run the ship's computers.
Program officials stated that informal goals or those established later
in the acquisition process would not have been nearly as effective in
getting the program to focus on achieving significant personnel
reductions. However, in recognition of the technological challenge of
achieving the crew size goal and several other technological
challenges, the Navy restructured the DD(X) program in November 2001 to
better manage the program's risk. As such, it adopted an acquisition
strategy consisting of multiple capability increments, or "flights."
The newly restructured program relaxed the crew size goals to between
125 and 175, which still represents a greater than 50 percent reduction
below legacy ship levels, for the first of three planned DD(X) flights.
While briefings prepared by Navy officials retain the original crew
size goals for the third DD(X) flight, it is unclear whether these
goals will be retained as key performance parameters in the operational
requirements document currently under revision.
T-AKE Cargo Ship Program Used Human Systems Integration in Some Aspects
of Ship Design, Expects Crew Size Reductions, but Did Not Establish
Specific Crew Size Goals:
In developing the T-AKE cargo ship, which is in procurement and is
expected to become operational in 2005, elements of human systems
integration were used to streamline intraship cargo handling and to
refine the requirements for civilian mariners and active-duty
personnel. However, human systems integration was not applied to the
process of intership underway replenishment, the transfer of cargo
between ships while at sea.[Footnote 17] Moreover, early acquisition
documents for the T-AKE cargo ship program did not establish specific
goals for reducing crew size, although they required the use of
civilian mariners or Merchant Marines instead of active-duty Navy
personnel and mandated the examination of cargo handling innovations to
reduce crew workload. Use of Merchant Marines or Military Sealift
Command personnel generally results in a smaller crew because these
organizations employ more experienced seamen, have reduced
watchstanding requirements, and use a different maintenance and
training philosophy. The T-AKE will be operated by the Military Sealift
Command, and its projected crew will be between 5 and 20 percent
smaller than the crew of the command's legacy ships and about
60 percent smaller than the legacy ships previously operated
exclusively with Navy sailors.[Footnote 18]
The following examples illustrate the strengths and limitations of
the program's use of human systems integration early in the acquisition
process.
* The 1992 mission need statement lacked a direct reference to human
systems integration, although it does indicate that the ship's size
will be the result of various trade-offs, including cost and crew size,
and required that the ship's design incorporate modern propulsion,
auxiliary, and cargo handling systems to minimize operating and
maintenance personnel requirements.
* The 2001 operational requirements document stated that "human
engineering principles and design standards shall be applied to the
design of all compartments, spaces, systems, individual equipment,
workstations and facilities in which there is a human interface."
However, this document also required the T-AKE cargo ship to use U.S.
Navy standard underway replenishment equipment because of the need to
interface with other U.S. Navy and allied ships, the lack of any
equivalent commercial system, and the costs to redesign existing Navy
equipment and maintain nonstandard equipment. As a result, human
systems integration was not applied to one of the main drivers of crew
size--the number of crewmembers required to perform connected
replenishment at each replenishment station.
Program officials indicated that, because intership underway
replenishment involves the interface between the T-AKE cargo ship and
all other ship classes requiring replenishment at sea, redesign of the
Navy's process of underway replenishment was not within their purview
and, therefore, was not addressed in the program's human systems
integration analyses. Instead, the program's focus was to ensure that
the T-AKE cargo ship's design met the current requirements for
performing underway replenishment and had the flexibility for future
equipment modification. To address underway replenishment across ship
platforms, in 2000 the Navy established a naval operational logistics
integrated product team whose mission is to establish policy and
doctrine for future operational systems and ensure the integration of
operational logistics systems across ships.
Since reexamining intership underway replenishment was beyond the scope
of the ship program, program personnel said they focused on identifying
ways to reduce crew workload. In the first acquisition phase, four
contractors[Footnote 19] prepared trade studies on the integration of
cargo handling functions on the ship.[Footnote 20] In the second
acquisition phase, one of the contractors, National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company, was awarded the contract to design and construct
the ship. Ultimately, labor-saving innovations such as item scanners;
an automated, rather than paper-based, warehouse management inventory
system; and safer and easier to operate elevator doors were
adopted.[Footnote 21]
Although the T-AKE cargo ship is expected to require fewer personnel
than its legacy ships, early acquisition documents did not establish a
specific crew size goal as a key performance parameter and thus did not
hold the program manager accountable for specific reductions. Rather,
the operational requirements document required that the T-AKE be crewed
largely by U.S. Merchant Marines or Military Sealift Command civilian
mariners. The Navy currently estimates that the T-AKE will be crewed by
172 individuals: 123 civilian mariners, 13 active-duty sailors in the
military department who perform cargo management/inventory functions,
and 36 active-duty sailors in the aviation detachment who perform
intership cargo transfer using a helicopter (vertical replenishment).
The T-AKE cargo ship's projected crew size of 172 personnel will be
somewhat smaller than that of its Military Sealift Command legacy
ships, the T-AE 26 Kilauea-class ammunition ships and the T-AFS 1/8
Mars-class and Sirius-class combat stores ships, which have crews of
182-215 personnel and also use civilian mariners. The T-AKE's crew size
is significantly smaller than when these legacy ships were crewed by
active-duty personnel. When crewed entirely by active Navy personnel,
these ships had crews of 435 and 508 sailors, respectively. Despite the
smaller crew size, the T-AKE will have a greater carrying capacity for
dry and refrigerated cargo than its legacy ships. Each T-AKE ship will
be able to carry at least 63 percent of the combined cargo capacity of
a T-AFS 1 and T-AE 26.
Although the ship program did not perform the top-down analyses
recommended by human system integration experts to optimize crewing,
it did use elements of the approach to finalize staffing requirements.
To finalize the requirement for civilian mariners, program personnel
performed a functional analysis (which identified ship functions and
their crew size requirements) and ultimately determined that the
initial crew size estimate developed by the Navy could be reduced by
12, resulting in a final requirement for 123 civilian mariners. The
size of the military department is based on an analysis that projects
workload and personnel requirements for every ship function during the
most labor-intensive operational scenarios and then allocates the
workload and personnel requirements to the minimum number of billets
and skill levels.
JCC(X) Command Ship Program Made Limited Use of Human Systems
Integration and Had No Formal Goals to Reduce Crew Size:
The recently canceled JCC(X) command ship program made very limited use
of human systems integration to optimize crew size and planned to wait
until preliminary design in the next acquisition phase to begin human
systems integration activities. The program also did not hold program
managers accountable for reducing crew size below that of the legacy
command ships. The following are examples.
* The mission need statement did not require the use of human systems
integration. Instead, the document required that the ship "be automated
wherever practical to reduce workload and manpower requirements"
and directed that operation by Military Sealift Command personnel be
considered for selected functions rather than Navy personnel. However,
the document stated that "changes to manpower requirements are not
expected.":
* The analysis of alternatives examined crew sizes ranging from
60 percent smaller to 50 percent larger than those of current command
ships and using civilian mariners to perform JCC(X) crew functions to
reduce crew size. The analysis found that using a mix of military and
civilian personnel rather than all military personnel would reduce
personnel costs by nearly a third, saving $2.3 billion for four ships
over a 40-year service life. However, the analysis did not include a
full human systems integration assessment of each design alternative.
* At the time of its cancellation, the program had not received
approval of its operational requirements document, which would have
established key performance parameters.
Program officials stated that although achieving crew size reduction
was not included in key program documents, they expected to achieve
some crew size reductions on the JCC(X) when compared to existing
command ships through the use of modern, more reliable equipment, for
example, diesel propulsion instead of steam propulsion.[Footnote 22]
Yet, despite the program's informal interest in reducing the size of
the crew needed to operate the ship, the analysis of alternatives did
not examine optimizing via human systems integration one of the main
drivers of crew size--the size of the embarked command staff. The total
crew size of the JCC(X) equals the sum of the embarked joint command
staff and the crew needed to operate the ship and perform basic ship
functions. Navy analyses show that the crew size needed to operate the
ship depends upon the joint command staff size and the mission
equipment that is to be maintained by the crew. Yet, all of the Navy
analyses examined joint command staff alternatives, ranging from 500 to
1,500 staff, which were larger than the fleet commander's staff of 285
to 449 currently embarked on existing command ships. None of the
analyses used human systems integration to determine the optimal size
of the joint command staff.
The program did fund three crewing studies as part of its early
industry involvement effort that included ship crewing, workload, and
functional analyses. However, these analyses were performed only on the
command ship's crew and not on the embarked joint staff. These crewing
studies, prepared by contractors for the JCC(X) command ship program in
June 2002, also reiterated the importance of beginning human systems
integration efforts at the earliest opportunity in the ship acquisition
process and called into question the adequacy of the human systems
integration efforts to date. For example, a study by one contractor
stated that:
"The HSI [human systems integration] team was not part of a larger
JCC(X) System Engineering effort, as would be expected in a full-up
proposal or system development activity. The HSI [human systems
integration] team also did not have contact with potential JCC(X) users
or with Navy/Joint HSI [human systems integration] Team members, as
would be expected and desired in a normal system acquisition
environment. This was due to the unique nature of a very limited scope
manning study with very limited funds.":
The study also urged the program to adopt a human systems integration
approach stating that "a human-centered design approach, implemented at
the front-end and as part of an integrated system engineering process,
will yield an optimal crew size." The study also stated that the same
human systems integration tools could be effectively used to optimize
the size for the embarked command staff.
JCC(X) command ship program officials stated that the program planned
to employ human systems integration to optimize crew size in the next
acquisition phase by contracting with industry to perform a functional
analysis. However, according to Navy officials, the program was
canceled before these efforts began, in part because of the
unacceptably high crew size estimated for the program.
LHA(R) Amphibious Assault Ship Made Limited Use of Human Systems
Integration and Had No Formal Goals to Reduce Crew Size:
The LHA(R) program has not yet developed a comprehensive human systems
integration strategy to outline the program's human systems integration
objectives and guide its efforts. In addition, officials told us that
very little human systems integration work was done early in the
acquisition process because officials plan to begin human systems
integration activities during preliminary design in the next
acquisition phase, called system development and demonstration. Also,
early acquisition documents for the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship
program did not establish formal goals to reduce the number of
personnel required to operate the ship. The following are examples.
* The mission need statement required the use of human systems
integration to optimize manning. However, it also stated that no
changes to Navy personnel requirements were expected. Currently, the
program plans only to not exceed the crew size of the older ships that
perform similar missions. These legacy LHA 1 class ships have a crew of
about 1,230 to operate the ship and can embark about 1,700 Marines.
* The analysis of alternatives stated that in order for the LHA(R) to
achieve major reductions in personnel, significant new technology and
research and development funds to integrate this technology into the
LHA(R) design would be required as well as changes in culture
(organization and procedures) to adapt reduced crew size practices of
the commercial sector to the naval environment.
* At the time of our review, the operational requirements document for
the LHA(R) had not been developed.
The Navy's plans for the LHA(R) are not in concert with the Chief of
Naval Operations' desire for major reductions in the personnel levels
for all new shipbuilding programs. In August 2002, the Chief of Naval
Operations commented on the size of the LHA-1 (the legacy ship that the
LHA(R) is replacing) saying, "I don't want any more ships like that.
The more low technology systems that are on it, the more people we will
need. And we will need more crewmembers for support services. It [the
LHA-1's replacement] will be built from the keel up to support the type
of striking capability that you need in your aviation arm. It is going
to be a totally different ship."[Footnote 23]
Program officials offered two major reasons for not conducting human
systems integration early in the acquisition process: (1) they believed
it was not appropriate to start human systems integration during the
very early phases of the acquisition program (i.e., in concept and
technology development) and (2) the program lacked funding to conduct
human systems integration activities in the first acquisition phase.
Program officials plan to conduct human systems integration efforts
during the system development and demonstration acquisition phase when
the program begins preliminary design efforts. Some of these efforts,
scheduled to begin in February 2003, are to include a top-down
requirements analysis and a total ship manpower assessment.
In contrast to the opinions of LHA(R) program officials, the Navy's
human systems integration experts stated that human systems integration
is a critical part of planning and design in the early stages of
acquisition, including the concept and technology development phase. In
addition, experience with the DD(X) program shows that the potential
personnel-related cost savings resulting from the application of human
systems integration early on in a program can be significant. Moreover,
experts stated that every program, regardless of its funding levels or
its reliance on legacy systems, can benefit from a comprehensive human
systems integration approach, especially those developing crew-
intensive platforms such as the LHA(R).
Several Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Application of Human
Systems Integration and May Impede the Navy's Ability to Optimize
Crew Size:
The program managers and the human systems integration experts we spoke
to identified four factors that inhibit the Navy's ability to
consistently implement human systems integration across programs. These
factors are (1) neither DOD nor Navy acquisition policies establish
specific requirements for using human systems integration, such as its
timing and whether the approach should be addressed in the key
acquisition documents; (2) funding challenges often result in decisions
to defer human systems integration activities and use legacy subsystems
when acquiring new ships to save near-term costs instead of investing
in research and development to reduce costs over the long term; (3) DOD
and Navy oversight of human systems integration activities is limited
and the Naval Sea Systems Command's role in certifying that ships
delivered to the fleet have optimum crew sizes is unclear; and (4) the
Navy lacks an effective process to change its long-standing culture and
the extensive network of policies and procedures that have
institutionalized current manning practices. As a result, some programs
we examined set goals not to exceed the crew size of 30-year old ships,
waited until preliminary design in the second acquisition phase to
begin human systems integration efforts, and excluded primary and
secondary ship functions from a rigorous analysis. In recognition of
these impediments, the Navy has taken steps to resolve some of these
issues.
Lack of Specific Navy Requirements to Use Human Systems Integration
Results in Inconsistent Implementation Across Programs:
Recent DOD and Navy acquisition guidance provides program managers with
latitude about the timing and extent of human systems integration
activities and whether the approach should be addressed in key
acquisition documents. DOD guidance on the role of human systems
integration in acquisition is contained in two documents, the Defense
Acquisition memorandum and the Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook,
issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, both dated October 30, 2002.
Compliance with the Defense Acquisition memorandum is mandatory;
compliance with the Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook is
discretionary. Both documents state that program managers will develop
a human systems integration strategy early in the acquisition process
to minimize total ownership cost. Neither document, however, specifies
how early in the process these efforts should begin or requires that
human systems integration analyses be performed on the various
alternatives considered in the formal analysis of alternatives.
The Navy's main acquisition instruction requires that human systems
integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along with other
engineering and logistics elements beginning at program initiation but
does not provide for specific procedures.[Footnote 24] The Navy's
section of the acquisition deskbook[Footnote 25] provides more detailed
guidance on human systems integration (such as providing a format for
the human systems integration plan and discussing the contents of a
human systems integration program). However, because these sources
provide only broad guidelines or are discretionary, a program manger
can decide when, how, and to what extent they will use human systems
integration in their acquisition program.
The Navy also has developed other guidance on using human systems
integration, but its use is also discretionary. For example, human
systems integration experts developed a guide for the Office of the
Chief Naval Operations, which states that a human systems integration
assessment and trade-off of design alternatives should be conducted
during the first acquisition phase. The Surface Warfare Program
Manager's Guide to Human Systems Integration also states that human
systems integration cost, schedule, and design risk areas for each
alternative concept should be identified and evaluated. The guidance
also recommends that human systems integration assessments should be
conducted at each milestone decision review.
Because of the wording of DOD guidance and the discretionary nature of
some Navy guidance, new ship program managers vary in when they use
human systems integration during ship development. For example, the
DD(X) program specified using the approach in the mission need
statement and the analysis of alternatives further specified human
systems integration requirements be included in the operational
requirements document. In contrast, the program managers for both the
JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship told us that
they planned to begin their human systems integration efforts during
preliminary design after the design alternative has been selected in
the next acquisition phase--system development and demonstration.
Neither program conducted human systems integration analyses of the
alternative designs during the analysis of alternatives. As such,
program officials lacked information on how each of the alternatives
compared with respect to their proposed crew size and how their crew
size would affect total ownership costs.
Challenges in Funding Acquisition Programs Discourage Investment in
Labor-Saving Technology:
Both JCC(X) and LHA(R) program officials cited challenges in funding a
new acquisition program as a barrier to using human systems integration
to optimize crew size and therefore reduce total ownership cost. These
challenges affect whether programs conduct crew-optimizing human
systems integration activities in the earliest phases of acquisition
and whether the program will choose to invest in labor-saving
technologies.
JCC(X) program officials told us that achieving personnel reductions
and using human systems integration to optimize crew size could
increase acquisition costs. The Navy's human systems integration
experts stated that program managers have long been incentivized to
hold down acquisition costs without considering how such choices may
affect operating and support costs, such as personnel-related costs,
over the life of the ship. According to the Navy's human systems
integration experts, labor-saving technology may add to the acquisition
cost of a ship but may also reduce the operating and support costs
incurred over the ship's service life. Whether to use technology or
sailors to perform a function should be determined by a systematic
analysis of costs and capabilities performed as part of the human
systems integration functional analysis--an effort not undertaken by
the JCC(X) command ship program.
Similarly, at the time the LHA(R) program was initiated in 2001, the
Navy decided not to invest in human systems integration activities and
research and development on new labor-saving technologies for the ship.
The program plans to capitalize, where appropriate, on systems already
in development for other ships such as the DD(X) destroyer and the
CVN(X) aircraft carrier but has not yet identified any labor-saving
technologies or processes that might be adapted from these programs.
Program officials said the program was not resourced to develop new
technologies, having received only $20 million in research and
development funds from program initiation through fiscal year 2002.
However, the up-front savings of not investing in research and
development and human systems integration activities must be weighed
against the higher operating and support costs incurred over the life
of the ship and the foregone capability and quality of life
improvements that can accompany new technology and human-centered
design. For illustrative purposes, we calculated that a nominal
25 percent reduction in a 1,245-person crew could provide a personnel
cost avoidance of nearly $1 billion over the service life of a ship, or
nearly $4 billion for a 4-ship class.[Footnote 26] In addition, DD(X)
destroyer program officials were uncertain about the extent to which
programs now in development outside the DD(X) destroyer family of ships
will be able to leverage its new technology, citing the costs
associated with adapting technology to new platforms that perform
different missions. Rather, DD(X) program officials told us that it is
imperative for the new ship programs to use human systems integration
to inform such decisions.
DOD and Navy Offices Have Limited or Unclear Authority to Require Human
Systems Integration Activities for Ship Programs:
Several offices within DOD and the Navy have an advisory role regarding
the implementation of human systems integration, although they lack the
authority to require that it be used to optimize crew size and that it
be addressed in specific acquisition documents or at each acquisition
milestone. The Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
Readiness, and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division)
Acquisition and Human Systems Integration Requirements Branch both
review new program acquisition documents and provide guidance on human
systems integration policy.[Footnote 27] Additionally, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, assists in the
development of human systems integration policy and addresses policy
issues at meetings of defense acquisition executives. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and
Acquisition) Chief Engineer, uses human systems integration in its
"system of systems" examination of capability above the individual ship
level to ensure that systems can function together across various ships
to perform the mission.[Footnote 28]
In recognition of the need for an organization within the ship
community to "lead the effort to institutionalize humans systems
integration—," the Navy, in October 2002, created the Human Systems
Integration Directorate within the Naval Sea Systems Command whose
missions include:
* establishing human systems integration policy and standards for the
Naval Sea Systems Command;
* ensuring the implementation of human systems integration policy,
procedures, and best practices;
* assisting program offices in developing and sustaining human systems
integration plans; and:
* certifying that ships and systems delivered to the fleet optimize
ship crewing, personnel, and training and promote personnel safety,
survivability, and quality service.[Footnote 29]
Because of its role as the certifying authority for human systems
integration within the Naval Sea Systems Command, the directorate
may have more authority than the previously mentioned organizations to
ensure that human systems integration is implemented. However, the
memorandum establishing the directorate and the instruction specifying
its functions do not specify how certification will be accomplished,
the acquisition stage at which it will be required, or consequences of
noncompliance.
Navy Policies and Culture May Impede Introduction of Labor-Saving
Technologies and Approaches:
Navy acquisition officials also identified the layers of Navy policies,
procedures, and instructions that affect ship crew levels and cultural
resistance to novel concepts as impediments to optimizing ship crews.
They told us that even when human systems integration is used in the
early stages of an acquisition program to identify ways to reduce crew
size, it is difficult to achieve a consensus among numerous
stakeholders within the Navy to change long-standing policies and
practices so that labor-saving approaches or technologies can be
implemented. To facilitate this process, the DD(X) destroyer program
established a forum to evaluate policy barriers to proposed innovations
and facilitate needed changes. However, this effort was limited to
selected ships. Other programs such as the LHA(R) amphibious assault
ship and the JCC(X) command ship had not established a similar forum to
resolve the policy barriers to optimize crewing on these ships. As a
result, the Navy currently lacks an ongoing process to facilitate
examination of outmoded policies and procedures that may impede
optimizing crewing in all new ship acquisition programs.
Policy and Cultural Impediments:
Navy officials explained that changing policies and procedures is a
complex and time-consuming task because the current way of doing
business has been incorporated in instructions at all levels in the
Navy, ranging from the Secretary of the Navy to commanders of the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and across a number of areas, such as
recruiting, retention, training, quality of life, and the environment.
In addition, new ways of doing business, such as those envisioned for
the DD(X) destroyer, will affect and require modifications to Navy
doctrine, tactics, and operational requirements. Furthermore, proposed
changes must be evaluated for compliance with governing statutes in
such areas as compensation, occupational safety and health, and
aviation. As such, any change involves numerous stakeholders who must
be consulted and grant approval. For example, DD(X) officials told us
that it took about 18 months to coordinate with numerous stakeholders
to change applicable policies to reduce the number of crewmembers
required during flight operations from 48 to 15. Moreover, officials
told us that this change is just the beginning since the DD(X)
destroyer program has identified numerous Navy policies and procedures
across a wide spectrum of topics that need to be changed in order to
adopt the innovations proposed by industry to meet the DD(X)'s cost and
capability requirements.
Officials with the other programs we examined also viewed Navy policies
as a barrier to optimized crewing. JCC(X) command ship program
officials reported that current Navy policy and practice would have
been a barrier to implementing potential crew size reductions had this
program gone forward. Two examples cited by program officials are
bridge watchstanding and main propulsion machinery monitoring. At
present, Navy practice for bridge watch requires approximately
11 personnel in contrast to commercial practice, which requires
1 person on watch and 1 on stand by. Similarly, Navy practice for
machinery monitoring requires personnel in the machinery space at all
times to ensure that power is available. This contrasts with commercial
practice, which permits putting machinery on automatic and using
sensors with alarms routed to a watchstanders' stateroom during certain
hours. Officials stated that implementing these commercial practices
would have required evaluating their appropriateness for a Navy
operating environment and, if approved, would have required modifying
existing policies and procedures. Furthermore, the LHA(R) analysis of
alternatives concluded that significant changes in organization and
procedures are crucial to achieving a substantial reduction in crew
size. Cultural change is a particular challenge for the LHA(R) program
because the amphibious mission is complex and both Navy and Marine
organizations would be involved in developing and implementing changes.
Navy officials stated that current funding practices in which personnel
costs are funded from centralized accounts and not out of the operating
fleets' budget do not foster an awareness of the true cost of having
sailors on board ships and encourage viewing sailors as a "free
resource." Additionally, because traditional, time-tested methods and
crewing have proven successful in the past, officials told us that Navy
commanders have little incentive to assume the risks associated with
adopting new ways of accomplishing shipboard tasks with fewer
crewmembers, especially when they lack awareness of and accountability
for personnel costs.
Navy Lacks a Process to Systematically Address Impediments to
Innovation in All New Ship Programs:
Because of the magnitude of changes needed to reduce and optimize
crewing on the DD(X) destroyer, the program established an effort
to identify and resolve policy barriers to implementing labor-saving
approaches that conflict with current policy, statutes, or practice.
This effort includes (1) reaching out to Navywide personnel development
and training organizations and to Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders
and (2) establishing the DD(X) Policy Clearinghouse Web-based tool to
facilitate collaboration with multiple stakeholders and resolve policy
impediments to implementing innovations planned for the DD(X)
destroyer. The DD(X) clearinghouse was recently transferred to the
Naval Sea Systems Command's Human Systems Integration Directorate.
However, there are currently no requirements for this forum to address
the policy barriers to optimizing crewing encountered in all new
ship acquisitions.
Conclusions:
Given the Navy's recapitalization challenges, efforts to control
personnel costs and minimize total ownership costs are becoming
increasingly important. Applying human systems integration principles
to optimize crew size has the potential to result in a host of cost and
operational benefits, including saving billions of dollars by reducing
total ownership costs and increasing operational performance and ship
maintainability. The experience to date in the DD(X) destroyer program
shows that requiring human systems integration from the earliest stages
of a program (during concept and technology development) and using the
results to establish a crew size reduction goal as a key performance
parameter are effective strategies to holding program managers
accountable during program reviews for making significant progress
toward reducing crew size. The DD(X) experience also shows that even
when these practices are followed, the program will still face
challenges to achieving these goals and encounter pressures to relax
the goals as the system design progresses, thereby supporting human
systems integration experts' view that human systems integration plans
and activities should receive continued review and focus throughout the
acquisition process. In contrast, programs such as the JCC(X) and LHA
(R) that do not use human systems integration early and do not hold
program managers accountable during program reviews for crew size
reduction are less likely to achieve the meaningful reduction in crew
size. Unless the Navy more consistently applies human systems
integration early in the acquisition process and establishes meaningful
goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower
total ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions
made early in the acquisition process.
The Navy's varied approach to applying human systems integration has
occurred partly because Navy guidance allows program managers
considerable discretion in determining the extent to which they apply
human systems integration principles in developing new systems. In the
absence of clear requirements that human systems integration programs
will be a key feature of all future acquisition programs, efforts to
optimize crew size will continue to vary due to the competing pressures
placed on program managers, and the Navy is likely to continue to miss
opportunities to reduce personnel requirements for future ships. As a
result, the Navy's funding challenges may be exacerbated, and it may
not be able to build or support the number of ships it believes are
necessary to support the new defense strategy. Although the Navy's
recent efforts to establish a focal point for human systems integration
policy within the Naval Sea Systems Command is a positive step, the
success of this office will depend on its authority to influence
acquisition programs in their initial stages. Because the instruction
establishing this office does not clearly explain the process this
office will use to certify that ships delivered to the fleet will have
optimized crews, there is a risk that the office may not have
sufficient leverage to influence new programs in their early stages and
that this may result in missed opportunities to reduce crew size and
achieve long-term cost savings.
Even when the Navy uses a disciplined human systems integration process
early in an acquisition program to identify ways to optimize crew size,
implementation of new technologies and procedures is often hindered by
the Navy's culture and traditions, which are institutionalized in a
wide array of policies and procedures affecting personnel levels,
maintenance requirements, and training. In recognition of these
barriers, the DD(X) program and the operational logistics community
have established processes to address these barriers for their
particular ship or community. However, not all new ship acquisition
programs have developed or have access to such a forum to facilitate
removing barriers to optimized manning to ensure that costly outdated
policies and procedures are systematically reexamined as new
innovations are developed.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that the nation's multibillion-dollar investment in Navy
ships maximizes military capability and sailor performance at the
lowest feasible total ownership cost, we recommend that the Secretary
of the Navy develop and implement mandatory policies on human systems
integration requirements, standards, and milestones. Specifically, for
each new system the Navy plans to acquire, the Secretary of the Navy
should require that:
* a human systems integration assessment be performed as concepts for
the system are developed and alternative concepts are evaluated;
* human systems integration analyses, including trade-off studies of
design alternatives, be used to establish an optimized crew size goal
that will become a key performance parameter in the program's
requirements document; and:
* human systems integration assessments be updated prior to all
subsequent milestones.
To strengthen the Naval Sea Systems Command's role in promoting the use
of human systems integration for new ship systems, we recommend that
the Secretary of the Navy require the command to clarify the Human
Systems Integration Directorate's role in and process for certifying
that ships and systems delivered to the fleet optimize ship crewing.
To facilitate the review of possibly outdated policies and procedures
as new labor-saving innovations are identified through human systems
integration efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy
require that the Naval Sea Systems Command's Human Systems Integration
Directorate establish a process to evaluate or revise existing policies
and procedures that may impede innovation in all new ship acquisitions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
recommendations and indicated that actions were underway or planned
to implement them. DOD stated that actions taken in response to our
recommendations would only enhance ongoing human systems integration
initiatives; ensure more consistent application of human systems
integration processes across all ship acquisition programs; and lead to
optimized ship crews, increased system performance, and reduced life-
cycle costs. The Navy intends to implement our recommendation that it
require ship programs to use human systems integration to establish
crew size goals and help achieve them, in part, by developing a new
program called SEAPRINT (Systems Engineering, Acquisition and PeRsonnel
INTegration), modeled after the Army's MANPRINT program that we cite in
our report. The Navy's SEAPRINT program will develop Navywide policy
that identifies, mandates, and establishes accountability for human
systems integration analyses. This policy will mandate that human
systems integration is to be addressed in:
* a specific plan before the acquisition's earliest milestone,
* the initial capabilities document (formerly called the mission needs
statement),
* the capabilities development document (formerly called the
operational requirements document), and:
* assessments performed as part of concept exploration and development
and updated prior to all subsequent milestones.
DOD also stated that it endorses a manpower-related key performance
parameter for all new ship acquisition programs. In response to our
recommendation that the Navy clearly define human systems integration
certification standards for new ships, DOD stated that the Navy is
developing technical human systems integration criteria and metrics
that will be used for measuring and certifying that ships and ship
systems meet human systems integration standards. With regard to our
recommendation that the Navy formally establish a process to examine
and facilitate the adoption of labor-saving technologies and best
practices across Navy systems, DOD stated that the Navy has established
a new human systems integration clearinghouse, implemented a pilot
study using the clearinghouse, and involved stakeholders from across
the Navy. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated
where appropriate. DOD's comments are included in appendix VI of this
report.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; and
the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call
me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Key staff
members that contributed to this report were Roderick Rodgers,
Jacquelyn Randolph, Suzanne Wren, Mary Jo LaCasse, Charles Perdue, and
Jane Hunt.
Janet A. St. Laurent
Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by Janet A. St. Laurent:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the Navy's use of human systems integration principles to
optimize crews and goals to reduce crew size on the four new ship
programs we were asked to review, we obtained and analyzed key
acquisition documents such as mission need statements, analyses of
alternatives, and operational requirements documents as well as human
systems integration plans and analyses. We also interviewed Naval Sea
Systems Command and Military Sealift Command officials who are
responsible for the DD(X), T-AKE, JCC(X), and LHA(R) programs to
discuss the use of human systems integration and crew size goals. We
obtained current ship crewing documents from the Navy's Manpower
Analysis Center and the Military Sealift Command and compared the crew
size goals for the four ship programs we reviewed to the crew size
levels for older ships that perform similar missions. We also obtained
data from the Naval Sea Systems Command on the Arleigh Burke-class
destroyer program on crew sizing and workload to compare with the
contractor's crew size estimate for the DD(X). To understand the extent
to which the T-AKE's primary mission of underway replenishment affects
crew size, we interviewed (1) experts from the Underway Replenishment
Department at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Port Hueneme Division)
and the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (which designed and
will build the T-AKE) and (2) a subject matter expert on Navy underway
replenishment. To gain an understanding of operational logistics and
cargo storage and warehousing, we interviewed officials from the Chief
of Naval Operations (Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics) and St. Onge
Company (a subcontractor for the T-AKE ship program) and visited the
Defense Distribution Depot Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, one of the
Department of Defense's (DOD) largest and most automated distribution
centers. To obtain information on the Navy's methods of calculating
total ownership costs, we interviewed officials from the Naval Center
for Cost Analysis and the Center for Naval Analyses. To calculate the
ship crewing cost avoidance potential for the DD(X) and LHA(R)
programs, we used data from the Navy's Cost of a Sailor study for
capturing comprehensive personnel costs and converted the data to
fiscal year 2002 dollars.
To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy's use of human systems
integration principles, we obtained and analyzed DOD, Joint Staff, and
Navy systems acquisition directives, instructions, and guidance (e.g.,
the internet-based Defense Acquisition Deskbook and the Program
Management Community of Practice).[Footnote 30] We reviewed the interim
defense acquisition guidance as it pertains to the acquisition process,
human systems integration, and total ownership cost. We did not assess
the ship programs' compliance with the several prior versions of DOD
and Navy acquisition guidance, but we did evaluate the extent to which
human systems integration was applied and whether crew size goals were
established. We also obtained and reviewed numerous articles on
military and civilian applications of human systems integration. To
obtain information on the formulation and oversight of human systems
integration policy and guidance, we met with officials from the offices
of the Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research Development and Acquisition; the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Chief Engineer; and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition
and Human Systems Integration Requirements Branch). To obtain
additional information on the benefits of human systems integration and
best practices, we interviewed subject matter experts with the Naval
Sea Systems Command's Human Systems Integration Directorate, the DD(X)
Program Office, the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) Directorate,
Carlow International Incorporated, and the Office of Naval Research's
Human Systems Science and Technology Department, and we attended the
American Society of Naval Engineers Conference on Human Systems
Integration. To gain insight on labor-saving technologies and changes
to policies and procedures required to implement these innovations, we
met with officials from the Naval Sea Systems Command's SMARTSHIP
Program Office; met with officials and toured the Office of Naval
Research's Afloat Lab in Annapolis, Maryland; and met with officials
responsible for the DD(X) Policy Clearinghouse and the Naval Sea
Systems Command's Human Systems Integration Directorate. We discussed
the funding for human systems integration with the Naval Sea Systems
program managers for the four ship programs we reviewed.
We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation:
DD(X) Destroyer:
In 1995, the Navy established the 21st Century Surface Combatant
program to develop the next generation of surface combatants that would
replace retiring destroyers and frigates on a timely basis. In November
2001, the Navy restructured this program from one intended to develop a
single ship class of 32 ships into its current form known as the DD(X).
The new program aims to develop and acquire three new classes of
surface combatants to include the DD(X) as the centerpiece, a cruiser
called CG(X), and a smaller littoral combat ship.
The first DD(X) destroyer is to be procured in fiscal year 2005 and
enter service in fiscal year 2011. The initial DD(X) is viewed as a
"test bed" for the host of new technologies under development. The Navy
plans to employ a spiral acquisition strategy for the ship class in
which new technology will be phased in over three distinct ship
flights.
Plans call for the DD(X) destroyer to have a number of new features and
technologies, including:
* an advanced electric-drive/integrated power system for propelling the
ship that could become the basis for applying electric-drive technology
more widely throughout the fleet,
* labor-saving technologies that may permit the ship to be operated
with a crew of 125 to 175 people instead of the more than 350 needed to
operate current Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyers,
* a new hull design for reduced detectability,
* two new 155-mm Advanced Gun Systems for supporting Marine forces
ashore, and:
* 128 vertical-launch tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles and
other weapons.[Footnote 31]
The Navy is now reevaluating many of the ship's operational
requirements and cost estimates (which were determined and approved
under the earlier DD-21 program) and may make substantial changes to
the originally envisioned capabilities, including relaxing the crew
size and detectability goals, changing the type of gun and amount of
munitions carried, and reducing the number of vertical launch tubes.
Previously, the Navy projected the unit procurement cost for the DD-21
destroyer to be not more than $750 million in fiscal year 1996 dollars
(the equivalent of about $795 million in fiscal year 2001 dollars)--
somewhat less than the $950 million unit procurement cost of today's
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.[Footnote 32] The DD-21 was also
envisioned to have an operating and support cost of not more than
$6,000 per hour--about one-third less than that of the Arleigh Burke-
class, in large part resulting from the smaller crew planned for the
future destroyer. In April 2002, the Navy selected Northrop Grumman
Ship Systems as the design agent for the DD(X) and the program entered
detailed design.
T-AKE Cargo Ship:
The T-AKE cargo ship is the new combat logistics force ship to be
operated by the Military Sealift Command. The ship's primary mission is
to shuttle food, ammunition, repair parts, supplies, and limited
quantities of fuel to station ships and combatants. The new ship will
replace T-AE 26 Kilauea-class ammunition ships and T-AFS 1/8 Mars-class
and Sirius-class combat stores ships in the Military Sealift Command.
The ship's secondary mission is to operate with an oiler (T-AO 187
Kaiser-class) to provide logistics support to a carrier battle group.
In this capacity, the T-AKE will replace AOE 1 Sacramento-class ships.
The ship program initiated development in 1995 and began procurement in
October 2001. The Navy has purchased 3 of the 12 planned ships for a
total of almost $1 billion, with delivery expected in fiscal years 2005
and 2006. Current plans are to purchase the 4TH through 12TH ships
between fiscal year 2003 and 2007 for delivery between fiscal year 2006
and 2010. Once all are purchased and delivered, T-AKE cargo ships will
represent 41 percent of the recapitalized combat logistics force fleet
(at full operating status).
Military Sealift Command officials mentioned several factors--mission
requirements and personnel policies--that explain why, in comparison to
the Navy, they are able to operate combat logistics force ships with
smaller crews. Logistics ships in the Military Sealift Command have
fewer missions and therefore can operate with smaller crews. For
example, unlike Navy ships, Military Sealift Command logistics ships do
not carry weapons and therefore their crews do not require weapon
operators. Military Sealift Command ships also incorporate several
other crew reduction practices, including an unattended engine room,
minimal bridge watch by use of integrated bridge system technology,
self-service laundry facilities and food service initiatives. Command
officials also said that because of their personnel policies, civilian
mariners are more experienced than their Navy counterparts.
Specifically, because there are no personnel policies requiring job
rotation or that individuals leave the service if they are not promoted
("up or out"), civilian mariners are more likely to have been in their
current job longer than active-duty Navy personnel. Command officials
said that these personnel policies result in a workforce that is more
experienced than their Navy counterparts.[Footnote 33]
The Military Sealift Command's operating policies also enable it to
operate cargo ships with smaller crews than the Navy. For example,
command officials said that their policy requires 9 crewmembers per
underway replenishment station and that the Navy requires 20 per
station. The Military Sealift Command also does not assign a safety
officer to each underway replenishment station as the Navy does.
JCC(X) Command Ship:
In November 1999, the Navy established the Joint Command and Control
(Experimental) or JCC(X) program to replace the Navy's four aging
command ships built in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, the
JCC(X) was intended to provide an afloat platform for performing joint
command and control functions, such as those performed by a joint force
commander without the need to obtain permission from host countries to
establish a land-based headquarters operation.
By November 2001, the Navy had received the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's endorsement for an afloat command capability and completed
its formal analysis of alternatives. This analysis showed that the
assigned Navy crew (the ship's operators) would account for roughly
half the life-cycle cost for a JCC(X). It also showed that a mix of
Navy sailors and civilian mariners would be capable of performing the
crew functions at two-thirds of the personnel cost, saving about
$2 billion for four ships over a 40-year service life. The analysis
further estimated that a newly designed ship sized for an embarked
command staff of about 800 (these people are in addition to the ship's
crew) would cost about $1 billion for a lead ship in fiscal year 2006
and $850 million for a follow-on ship if three were built. Subsequent
to this analysis, the Navy's draft 2004 budget plan eliminated funding
for the JCC(X) and instead directed another ship program, the Maritime
Prepositioning Force (Future),[Footnote 34] to study developing joint
command and control modules or variants.
LHA(R) Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement:
In 2001, the Navy established the Amphibious Assault Ship, General
Purpose (Replacement) or LHA(R) program to replace its five aging LHA 1
Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships. These ships are primarily
designed to move large quantities of Marines, their equipment, and
supplies onto any shore during hostilities.
The first LHA ship will be replaced by a Wasp-class amphibious assault
ship, the LHD-8,[Footnote 35] in approximately fiscal year 2007, and
the remaining ships will be replaced by a modified version of the LHD 8
no later than fiscal year 2024. The modified variant will be made
longer and wider to accommodate the larger and heavier aircraft the
Marines are developing, the MV-22 Osprey and the Joint Strike Fighter.
The Navy estimates the cost for the first ship to be about $3 billion
with the three successor ships costing about $2.1 billion
each.[Footnote 36] The ship's annual operating and support cost is
estimated to be about $111 million. The LHA(R) program is currently in
the first acquisition phase called concept technology and development.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition:
Although its regulatory structure is undergoing change, the Department
of Defense's (DOD) complex process to deliver a new ship class to the
fleet occurs in three steps. First, the Navy's requirements community
establishes requirements for a new system. Second, the Navy's
acquisition organizations and contractors design and produce the ship.
Finally, after building the ship, the warfighter assumes responsibility
for operating and maintaining the ship. DOD's policy is to acquire
weapons systems using a disciplined systems engineering process
designed to optimize total system performance and minimize total
ownership costs.[Footnote 37] The regulation, requirements, and design
aspects of the acquisition process are discussed below.
Defense Acquisition Regulatory Structure Is Undergoing Change:
Weapons systems acquisition is governed by a complex regulatory
structure ranging from public laws to nonmandatory policies, practices,
and guidance. Until recently, three major DOD regulatory documents
guided the management of Defense acquisition: DOD Directive 5000.1,
"The Defense Acquisition System;" DOD Instruction 5000.2,
"The Operation of the Defense Acquisition System;" and DOD Regulation
5000.2-R, "Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition
Programs." On October 30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
canceled all three documents and by memorandum issued interim guidance.
On an interim basis, the DOD 5000.2-R was reissued as a guidebook,
Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, to be used for best practices,
lessons learned, and expectations; but its guidance is not
mandatory.[Footnote 38] Additional, supporting, discretionary best
practices; lessons learned; and expectations are posted on DOD's
internet Web site, DOD 5000 Series Resource Center.[Footnote 39] The
interim DOD guidance retains the basic acquisition system structure
(i.e., no new phases), emphasizes evolutionary acquisition, modifies
the requirements generation documents, and makes several other changes.
Policies and procedures for developing and approving requirements for
new systems are also under revision.[Footnote 40]
The Acquisition Process Contains Several Checkpoints for Assessing
Progress:
DOD's acquisition process, as outlined in its interim guidance issued
October 30, 2002, provides an ordered structure of tasks and activities
to bring a program to the next major checkpoint. These checkpoints,
called milestones, are the points at which a recommendation is made and
approval sought regarding starting or continuing an acquisition program
into one of three phases: concept and technology development, system
development and demonstration, and production and deployment
(see fig. 2). The phases are intended to provide a logical means of
progressively translating broadly stated mission needs into
well defined system-specific requirements and ultimately into
effective systems. A fourth phase, operations and support, follows the
system acquisition. This phase represents the ownership period of the
system when a unit, in this case a ship, is fielded and operated by
sailors for a period of 30 to 50 years. A program's progress toward
established program goals, or key performance parameters, is assessed
at milestones.
Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases, Milestones, and
Key Activities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The concept and technology development phase has two major efforts:
concept exploration and technology development. This phase begins with
a milestone A decision to enter concept and technology development.
Entrance into this phase depends upon a validated and approved initial
capability document [mission need statement]. Concept exploration
typically consists of competitive, parallel, short-term concept studies
guided by the initial capability document (mission need statement). The
focus of these studies is to refine and evaluate the feasibility of
alternative solutions to the initial concept and to provide a basis for
assessing the relative merits of these solutions. Analyses of
alternatives are used to facilitate comparisons. A project may enter
technology development when a solution for the needed capability has
been identified. This effort intends to reduce technology risk and to
determine the appropriate set of technologies. A project exits
technology development when an affordable increment of militarily-
useful capability has been identified, the technology for that
increment has been demonstrated in a relevant environment, and a system
can be developed for production within a short time frame (normally
less than 5 years). During technology development, the user is required
to prepare the capability development document [operational
requirements document] to support subsequent program initiation. An
affordability determination is made in the process of addressing cost
as a military requirement and included in the capability development
document [operational requirements document], using life-cycle cost or,
if available, total ownership cost.
The purpose of the system development and demonstration phase is to
develop a system. This phase has two major efforts: system integration
and system demonstration. The entrance point is milestone B, which is
also the initiation of an acquisition program. The system integration
effort intends to integrate subsystems and reduce system-level risk.
The system can enter system integration when the program manager has a
technical solution for the system, but has not yet integrated the
subsystems into a complete system. The critical design review during
system development and demonstration provides an opportunity for mid-
phase assessment of design maturity. The system demonstration effort
intends to demonstrate the ability of the system to operate in a useful
way consistent with the validated key performance parameters. The
program can enter system demonstration when the program manager has
demonstrated the system with prototypes. This work effort ends when a
system demonstrates its capabilities in its intended environment using
engineering development models or integrated commercial items (in
addition to several other criteria).
The purpose of the production and deployment phase is to achieve an
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. The decision to
commit DOD to low-rate initial production takes place at milestone C.
Continuation into full-rate production results from a successful
full-rate production decision review. During this effort, units shall
attain initial operational capability.
Operations and support has two major efforts: sustainment and disposal.
The objectives of this activity are the execution of a support program
that meets operational support performance requirements and sustainment
of systems in the most cost-effective manner for the life cycle of the
system. When the system has reached the end of its useful life, it must
be disposed of in an appropriate manner.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summary of DD(X) Destroyer Gold Team Trade Studies:
Trade studies are required to support decisions throughout the systems
engineering process. During a requirements analysis, requirements are
balanced against other requirements or constraints, including cost.
Requirements analysis trade studies examine and analyze alternative
performance and functional requirements to resolve conflicts and
satisfy customer needs. As part of the design competition for the DD(X)
destroyer, the competing contractors conducted trade studies and
analyses on their system concept designs and the related systems
requirements. Table 1 highlights some of the 23 trade studies conducted
by the winning design agent, Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and
Raytheon.
Table 1: Selected DD(X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by Northrop
Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from 1998-2002:
Study topic: Command center design; Scope of analysis: Incorporated
analytic processes from Westinghouse Electric commercial nuclear power
plant design efforts.
Study topic: Operator crewing--propulsion, electrical, and auxiliary
plant; Scope of analysis: Studied processes and toured U.S.N.S. Red
Cloud,[A] operated by Maersk Line Limited, Inc,b to gain insight into
civilian crewing of noncombat portions of ship operations.
Study topic: Food service; Scope of analysis: Investigated commercial
advanced food service program used by many hotel chains.
Study topic: Damage control; Scope of analysis: Investigated chemical
plant firefighting methods, particularly telerobotics, for inclusion in
the automated fire suppression system engineering development model.
Study topic: Cognitive work analysis; Scope of analysis: This process,
which was the foundation of the human systems integration effort, was
developed in the Netherlands.
Study topic: Training concepts; Scope of analysis: Investigated Ford
Motor Company distance learning and "Just-in-Time" training system for
their maintenance and service department personnel.
Study topic: Remote equipment monitoring; Scope of analysis: Received
briefings on the Delta Airlines and Boeing Corporation remote
monitoring capability of in-flight data from their commercial airline
fleet.
Study topic: Facility maintenance/cleaning; Scope of analysis: Reviewed
design requirements and practices of Maersk Line, Ltd., for reductions
in the work required for common area cleaning and maintenance.
Study topic: Self-service laundry; Scope of analysis: Reviewed Maersk
Line, Ltd., use of self-service laundry on its United States Naval Ship
contract ships. Reviewed both reliability of the equipment and crew
satisfaction.
Study topic: Ashore administrative, personnel, and disbursing service;
Scope of analysis: Reviewed program provided by Northrop Grumman
Information Technology to the Navy at the precommissioning sites.
Study topic: Reduced bridge watchstanders; Scope of analysis:
Investigated United States Naval Ship and commercial operations with
Maersk Line, Ltd., as well as Navy Smart Ship and Sperry Integrated
Bridge System programs.
Study topic: Portable computing; Scope of analysis: Investigated
wearable computers developed by Boeing in Seattle, Washington, and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab at Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Source: Navy.
[A] U.S.N.S. Red Cloud is a Watson-class large, medium speed, roll-on/
roll-off sealift ship. The ship is operated by the Military Sealift
Command and crewed by contract civilian mariners.
[B] Maersk Sealand is one of the largest liner shipping companies in
the world, serving customers all over the globe.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and DD(X) Crew Sizes:
Plans for the DD(X) destroyer envision significant reductions when
compared to previous destroyer ships in the number of crewmembers
required to man watches, provide support functions, and perform special
evolutions. For example, DD(X) plans call for 20 watchstations,
requiring 60 billets,[Footnote 41] a significant reduction from the DDG
51 destroyer, which has 61 watchstations requiring 163 billets.
Similarly, DD(X) ship crew sizing studies project that 833 hours will
be required per week for own unit support functions such as
administration, messing, and supply while the DDG 51 requires 5,500 for
the same functions. To achieve these proposed reductions, the DD(X)
plans to employ a new operational crewing concept, human-centered
design and reasoning systems, advances in ship cleaning and
preservation, a new maintenance strategy, an automated damage control
system, and "reach back" technologies and distance support. Officials
emphasized that the DD(X) plans will continue to evolve as the program
matures. In addition, changes to the DD(X) destroyer's operational
requirements, which are currently being reevaluated, will likely
further affect these estimates.
DD(X) Operational Crew Size Concept:
The approach to operational crewing on the DD(X) destroyer will differ
markedly from that employed on legacy ships. The older ship classes
tend to have legacy systems and watchstations that are "stovepiped,"
meaning that they maintain separate stations and databases for such
things as sensors, weapon systems, and logistics, which are not linked
together and which require people to be specially trained on these
systems. This results in an inflexible work environment in which
commanders are unable to level workload across watchstanders because
they are trained in separate disciplines. It requires extra people,
with little increase in capability. The DD(X) concept is to have
watchstanders trained functionally across warfare areas who can be
flexibly employed as the situation demands. This approach results in a
more compact, flexible watch team, which requires fewer augmentations
and which is designed to flexibly respond to a variety of tactical
situations. Underpinning this concept is a strategy in which
crewmembers will be highly trained across multiple warfare areas or
maintenance tasks and advanced skills will apply across multiple
disciplines with specialized skills only being used periodically.
Human-Centered Design and Reasoning Systems:
The DD(X) destroyer envisions reducing underway watchstanding through
greater use of human-centered design and reasoning systems such as:
* integrated bridge system technologies demonstrated in CG 47
Ticonderoga-class "smart ship" and many commercial ships that provide
computer-based navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar
plotting, and automated ship control;[Footnote 42]
* the integrated command environment that provides reduced combat
information center crewing by using "multi-modal watchstation" type
displays, the ability to monitor more than one watchstation at each
console, and the use of decision support systems to facilitate
instantaneous situational awareness;
* computerized engineering control systems that are extensively used in
the commercial shipping industry and machinery space design that
permits zero underway crewing by using remote monitors and sensors;
and:
* a flexible watch team-type organization.
Advances in Cleaning and Preservation:
The DD(X) destroyer plans to use advances in ship cleaning and
preservation to free sailors from traditional maintenance and
preservation duties and privatizing the preservation work that cannot
be engineered away. Reliability-centered maintenance[Footnote 43] and
condition-based maintenance[Footnote 44] concepts will be employed on
the DD(X) instead of the traditional planned maintenance system
currently used on DDG 51 destroyers. This change is expected to reduce
noncorrective type maintenance and significantly reduce corrective
maintenance induced by the planned maintenance system. In addition,
routine maintenance on the DD(X) is projected to be reduced by
increased equipment reliability and a strategy of replacing failed
components on board instead of repairing them at sea. Lastly, cleaning
is expected to be reduced by better ship design that capitalizes on
commercial shipping industry best practices such as cornerless spaces
and maintenance-free deck coverings.
DD(X) Maintenance Strategy:
The DD(X) destroyer maintenance strategy focuses on allowing sailors
to concentrate on war-fighting tasks and skills rather than on ship
maintenance and preservation (i.e., "rust busting" skills). The DD(X)
maintenance strategy envisions no organizational level repair conducted
on the ship. As such, many repair watches have been eliminated. Three
key elements of the DD(X) maintenance strategy include:
* reducing maintenance requirements through improved system reliability
and redundancy and to leverage labor-saving advances in corrosion
control materials and technology,
* improving maintenance work efficiency by conducting condition-based
maintenance instead of scheduled maintenance, and:
* using reach back and remote monitoring support while deployed.
Automated Damage Control System:
The DD(X) destroyer will employ extensive automated damage
control systems, integrated with an optimally manned damage control
organization to quickly suppress and extinguish fires and control
their spread.
Use of Reach Back Technologies and Distance Support:
The DD(X) destroyer plans to use "reach back" technologies and distance
support to reduce crew workload. "Tele-systems" initiatives are being
studied for ship crew reduction in the areas of medicine, personnel,
pay, training, and maintenance. DD(X) also envisions having real-time
collaboration between the ship and shore, and between ships. Ships
would access expertise from the systems commands, industry, and other
deployed ships on a year round, around the clock basis.
Table 2 compares the workload and crew composition for the DDG 51
Flight IIA and those proposed for the DD(X).
Table 2: Comparison of Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A and the
DD(X):
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations:
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Tactical action officer;
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 1; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: Position: Tactical action officer; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: No change anticipated.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Combat systems
coordinator; Own ship display controller Combat systems office of the;
watch/combat system; maintenance supervisor; Fire control supervisor;
Radar repairman; Computer repairman; Display repairman; Electronics
support supervisor; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 8;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Command center warfare officer; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: * DD(X) maintenance strategy (increase reliability and
replace instead of repair) will eliminate need for on-station
repairmen; * Automated damage control system.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Combat information
center; supervisor; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 1;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Watch supervisor cross warfare area
advanced; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload
reduction enablers: No change anticipated.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Engineering officer of
the; watch; Propulsion/auxiliary control; console operator; Electrical
plant control; console operator; Engine room operator; Auxiliary system
monitor; Engine room operator; Propulsion system monitor; Damage
control/integrated; survivability management; system operator;
Sounding and security watch; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 9;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Engineering officer of the
watch; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload
reduction enablers: * Use of condition-based maintenance philosophy and
reliability-centered maintenance instead of planned maintenance
system; * Increased systems reliability; * Use of monitors and sensors;
* System redundancy; * Speedy "plug & play" repairs; * Automated damage
control system.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Tactical information;
coordinator; Local area network manager; DDG51 Flight II A
watchstations: No.: 2; DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position:
Information dominance advanced; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1;
Potential workload reduction enablers: Human-centered design
and reasoning systems with integrated information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Intelligence console
operator; Intelligence console operator; Tactical intelligence
operator; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 3; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: Position: Cross warfare area basic (intelligence);
DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: Human-centered design and reasoning systems with integrated
information displays[B].
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Communications
supervisor; Communication systems; manager; Communications systems;
operator No. 1; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 3; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: Position: Cross warfare area basic communications;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: Human-centered design and reasoning systems with integrated
information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Electronic warfare
supervisor; Damage control console; operator; Super rapid blooming off-
; board chaff operator; Identification supervisor; DDG51 Flight II A
watchstations: No.: 4; DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position:
Information dominance advanced; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1;
Potential workload reduction enablers: * DDG 51 workload
involves electronic warfare "soft kill" signatures management. Improved
signatures on the DD(X) will negate the need for countermeasures and
chaff operators.; * Human-centered design and reasoning systems with
integrated information displays; * Automated damage control system.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Antiair warfare
coordinator; Missile system supervisor; Radar system controller; DDG51
Flight II A watchstations: No.: 3; DD(X) watchstations[A]:
Position: Cross warfare area advanced (Antiair warfare); DD(X)
watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: * Multifunction radar provides improved capability and
reduced human anti-air warfare workload; * Human-centered design and
reasoning systems with integrated information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Land attack warfare;
coordinator[C]; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 1; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: Position: Land attack warfare specialist; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: No change anticipated.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Gun fire control system;
console operator; Tomahawk weapons system; supervisor; DDG51 Flight II
A watchstations: No.: 2; DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position:
Cross warfare area basic (land attack warfare); DD(X) watchstations[A]:
No.: 1; Potential workload reduction enablers: Human-centered
design and reasoning systems with integrated information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Tomahawk weapons system;
operator; Tomahawk weapons system; operators (+3)[D]; DDG51 Flight II A
watchstations: No.: 2; DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Cross
warfare area advanced; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1;
Potential workload reduction enablers: Human-centered design and
reasoning systems with integrated information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Quarter master of the
watch; Boatswain mate of the watch; ship control; DDG51 Flight II A
watchstations: No.: 3; DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position:
Assistant officer of the deck; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1;
Potential workload reduction enablers: Human-centered design and
reasoning systems with integrated information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Junior officer of the
deck; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 1; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: Position: Junior officer of the deck; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: No change anticipated.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Officer of the deck;
Messenger; Surface detector tracker; Lookout starboard; Lookout port;
Lookout aft; Signal watch Supervisor/operator; recorder; DDG51 Flight
II A watchstations: No.: 8; DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position:
Officer of the deck; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential
workload reduction enablers: * Change to current Navy policy and
procedures for bridge crewing; * Use of cameras; * Electronic log
keeping; * Improved communications; * Integrated bridge system.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Surface/subsurface/;
engagement control officer; warfare coordinator; Surface/subsurface
warfare; supervisor; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 2;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Cross warfare area basic integrated
air/surface dominance; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1;
Potential workload reduction enablers: Human-centered design and
reasoning systems with integrated information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Undersea warfare
coordinator; sonar supervisor; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 2;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Cross warfare area basic
undersea warfare; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential
workload reduction enablers: Human-centered design and reasoning
systems with integrated information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Undersea warfare console;
operator; Undersea warfare console; operator; Undersea warfare console;
operator; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 3; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: Position: Undersea warfare specialist; DD(X)
watchstations[A]: No.: 1; Potential workload reduction
enablers: Human-centered design and reasoning systems with integrated
information displays.
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Air intercept controller
Antisubmarine/surface; tactical air controller; Unmanned aerial
vehicle; controller[E]; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 3;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Antisubmarine/surface
tactical air controller; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1;
Potential workload reduction enablers: Human-centered design and
reasoning systems with integrated information displays.
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Flex watchstation cross
warfare area[F]; DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 1;
DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: Position(s): Total (163 watch billets
over a 3 section watch)[G]; DDG51 Flight II A watchstations: No.: 61;
DD(X) watchstations[A]: Position: Total (60 watch billets over
a 3 section watch); DD(X) watchstations[A]: No.: 20; Potential
workload reduction enablers: [Empty].
Source: Navy:
[A] This table was created by us based on data provided by Naval Sea
Systems Command (PMS 500). Watchstation numbers for the DDG 51 Flight
II A destroyer are from the ship's Preliminary Ship Manning Document,
dated October 5, 2002, version for Flight IIA. Watchstation numbers for
the DD(X) destroyer are from the design agent's (Gold Team) Phase III
working document dated September 26, 2002, which reflects a summary of
the design agent's Phase II crewing studies. Officials stated that this
is the closest comparison possible from the DDG 51 to the DD(X). They
noted that not all responsibilities clearly map to the new system.
Officials also stated that these numbers will continue to evolve as the
program matures. This table has been reviewed by PMS 500 officials for
accuracy and includes official comments provided to us on November 18,
2002.
[B] Officials noted that intelligence system requirements will be
dictated to DD(X) and that achieving reductions in this area relies
heavily on successful software development efforts. The DD(X) design
agent is currently working on this area.
[C] This is one of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack.
[D] This is three of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack.
[E] This is one of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack.
[F] This position provides flexibility in the event of workload surges.
[G] Total does not equal 3 times 61 due to the fact that some watches
are not always manned.
[End of table]
In addition to the daily shipboard routine of standing watches in the
various ship's departments, designated crewmembers also have collateral
duties to support special events, referred to as special evolutions.
These evolutions involve activities such as underway replenishment of
fuel, food and ammunition transferred from either helicopters or other
ships, flight operations, small boat operations, and anchoring. The
number of people required and the estimated labor hours per week for
these special evolutions are other indicators of ship workload. Table 3
compares the number of billets and weekly workload required for
selected special evolutions on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer with
those estimated for the DD(X) destroyer. Table 3 compares the billets
and labor hours required per week for special evolutions on the DDG 51
Flight IIA and those proposed for the DD(X).
Table 3: Comparison of Crew Size for Selected Special Evolutions on DDG
51 Flight IIA and DD(X) Destroyers:
Evolution: Fueling at sea; DDG 51 Flight IIA: Billets: 57; DDG 51
Flight IIA: Labor hours per week: 228; DD(X) Gold Team Phase
II: Billets: 9; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Labor hours per week: 11.61;
Change in billets: 48; Percent change in labor hours: -95.
Evolution: Connected replenishment; DDG 51 Flight IIA: Billets: 38; DDG
51 Flight IIA: Labor hours per week: 19; DD(X) Gold Team Phase
II: Billets: 12; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Labor hours per week: 6.12;
Change in billets: 26; Percent change in labor hours: -68.
Evolution: Vertical replenishment; DDG 51 Flight IIA: Billets: 32; DDG
51 Flight IIA: Labor hours per week: 7.8; DD(X) Gold Team
Phase II: Billets: 11; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Labor hours per week:
5.61; Change in billets: 21; Percent change in labor hours: -
28.
Evolution: Boat operations; DDG 51 Flight IIA: Billets: 15; DDG 51
Flight IIA: Labor hours per week: 8.4; DD(X) Gold Team Phase
II: Billets: 6; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Labor hours per week: 5.67;
Change in billets: 9; Percent change in labor hours: -33.
Evolution: Flight operations; DDG 51 Flight IIA: Billets: 41; DDG 51
Flight IIA: Labor hours per week: 351; DD(X) Gold Team Phase
II: Billets: 16; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Labor hours per week: 87.50;
Change in billets: 25; Percent change in labor hours: -75.
Evolution: Restricted navigation operations; DDG 51 Flight IIA:
Billets: 12; DDG 51 Flight IIA: Labor hours per week: 12.2;
DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Billets: 3; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Labor
hours per week: .93; Change in billets: 9; Percent change in
labor hours: -92.
Evolution: Towing/towed; DDG 51 Flight IIA: Billets: 41; DDG 51 Flight
IIA: Labor hours per week: 5.9; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II:
Billets: 7; DD(X) Gold Team Phase II: Labor hours per week: 3.13;
Change in billets: 34; Percent change in labor hours: -47.
Source: Navy.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: A GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appears at
the end of this appendix.
See comment 1.
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
PERSONNEL AND READINESS:
12 MAY 2003:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General
Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report (GAO-03-520), "MILITARY PERSONNEL:
Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total
Ownership Costs, " dated April 17, 2003 (GAO Code 350269/350132).
The Department acknowledges receipt of the draft report and generally
concurs with the report. Specific comments related to each
recommendation are enclosed. The Department appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the draft report.
My point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Spencer Rutledge III. He can
be reached at 703-693-1214 or via e-mail at spencer.rutledge@osd.mil.
Deput:
Sincerely,
Jeanne B. Fites:
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Integration):
Signed for Jeanne B. Fites:
Enclosure As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED APRIL 17, 2003 GAO-03-520 (GAO CODE 350269/
350132):
"MILITARY PERSONNEL: Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and
Reduce Total Ownership Costs":
General Comments:
It is the Department's belief that actions taken in response to GAO's
proposed recommendations would only enhance ongoing Human Systems
Integration (HSI) initiatives, ensure more consistent application of
HSI processes across all ship acquisition programs, and lead to
optimized ship crews, increased system performance and reduced life
cycle costs. DoD concurs with all recommendations.
While providing well-deserved recognition of the DD(X) program's
extensive HSI efforts, the Department echoes the Navy's concerns that
the general tone of the report implies a lack of interest or desire to
pursue aggressive manpower reductions and HSI goals by other ship
acquisition programs. A number of the observed differences between the
DD(X) HSI efforts and those of the other ship acquisition programs
studied (i.e., LHA(R), T-AKE and JCC(X)) are directly related to
factors outside the control of the Program Manager (PM), and even the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM). For example, LHA(R) is not
able to implement as aggressive an HSI program as DD(X) because it was
not resourced to do so. This lack of funding applies not only to the
HSI analyses required to determine appropriate ship crew optimizations,
but also to the research and development (R&D) required to pursue
advanced technology that enables these workload and manpower
reductions. External influences and PM constraints on a program's
ability to implement aggressive HSI analyses are not limited to funding
shortfalls. Joint command staff manpower requirements for JCC(X) were
the purview of the DoD Joint Staff (JS), not the JCC(X) PM,
NAVSEASYSCOM, or even OPNAV. Optimization of these manpower
requirements can only be done in cooperation with the JS.
Any actions taken to ensure HSI is more consistently applied early in
the acquisition process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size
reduction must be sensitive to multiple perspectives and external
influences, yet broad and bold enough to address not only HSI
processes, but larger capability definition, acquisition and
resourcing/funding issues.
Comments on specific GAO Recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Navy,
develop and implement mandatory policies on human systems integration
requirements, standards and milestones. (p. 37/GAO Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with comment.
The Navy is pursuing a program to address these concerns. Systems
Engineering, Acquisition and PeRsonnel INTegration (SEAPRINT) is: (a) a
philosophy based on the premise that manpower and human performance are
design drivers, not design consequences; (b) a technical approach that
integrates analyses among the domains of HSI, and between HSI analyses
and the systems engineering and acquisition processes, and (c) an
emerging set of tools that will enabler PMs to execute the required HSI
activities in a resource effective manner. SEAPRINT will provide the
mechanism whereby programs can perform HSI assessments as concepts for
programs are developed and alternatives are evaluated. It will
determine appropriate and achievable HSI requirements, identify those
that should be KPPs, and track their progress throughout system
development and trade-offs.
A cornerstone of the SEAPRINT program is development of Navy-wide HSI
policy that identifies, mandates and holds responsible authorities
accountable for HSI analyses, requirements and results. The policy is
expected to be similar to the Army's AR 602-2, MANPRINT in the System
Acquisition Process. It will be consistent with (i.e., flow down from)
DoD-and DoN-level HSI policy and guidance. Navy had strong
representation and influence in the development of these higher-level
policies. Therefore, even though these policies are still in flux, Navy
will be able to develop HSI policy and guidance that accommodates the
future requirements determination and acquisition environments. This
policy will mandate that (among other things), an HSI Plan (HSIP) be in
place before the acquisition program's earliest milestone; a Target
Audience Description (TAD) be developed during concept exploration; HSI
implications and constraints be included in the Initial Capabilities
Document (ICD); well-defined, capability-based, testable HSI
requirements be included in the Capabilities Development Document (CDD)
and refined in the Capabilities Production Document (CPD); test and
evaluation activities be based on human-in-the-loop modeling and
simulation techniques, and HSI assessments be performed as part of
concept exploration and development, and be updated prior to all
subsequent milestones. This Navy-wide policy will apply to all Navy
organizations and is intended to facilitate coordination, cooperation
and increased partnership between the SYSCOMs. This cross functional
teaming is vitally important as we embark on even greater "born joint"
concepts, and continue to develop integrated shipboard, aviation and
C4ISR system/family-of-systems. CNO N12 (Director Total Force
Programming and Manpower), who is the Navy-wide office/sponsor for HSI
policy and processes, is executing the $1.05M Congressional plus up to
investigate and develop a MANPRINT-like HSI program for Navy. Work on
this program began in January 2003. Initial efforts, including the
Navy-wide HSI policy, will be completed by September 2003.
Navy will be considering additional policy to address HSI in
architectures. The new draft DoD architecture Framework Document
includes significant HSI, but is currently a guidance document, not
policy. Once the content of this document (in total) has been
validated, Navy will consider recommending the language for a DoN or
DoD policy.
While concurring with this recommendation, Navy wishes to stress that
without appropriate emphasis on the HSI assessments early in the
process, manpower-related key performance parameters (KPPs) may be
developed without using the principles of Top Down Functional Analysis
(TDFA), and may not address all capability, acquisition and funding/
resource implications and constraints. Without this analysis, manpower-
related KPPs may be arbitrary and ultimately a detriment to the
program's ultimate success relative to life cycle and total ownership
cost. Also, Navy recognizes that not all programs should have a
manpower-related KPP. Authority to set manpower KPPs should reside with
the manpower requirements office (DCNO (Manpower and Personnel) (CNO
N1)), who will coordinate with the warfare sponsor and PM. Navy does
endorse a manpower-related KPP for all new ship acquisition programs.
Manpower-related KPPs will be identified on an ongoing basis.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Navy,
require the Naval Sea Systems Command to clarify the Human Systems
Integration Directorate's role in and process for certifying that ships
and systems delivered to the fleet optimize ship crewing. (p. 38/Draft
Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with comment.
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM) Human Systems Integration
Directorate (SEA 03) is developing acquisition, and technical Human
Performance criteria and metrics for ship system acquisition programs.
In developing these metrics and conducting the assessments, SEA 03 has
involved many of the Navy HSI stakeholders. When this work is
completed, the proposed metrics will be shared with all appropriate
Navy entities. Once approved, SEA 03 will also recommend incorporating
these metrics into the DoN Acquisition process. Approved metrics will
be used to measure and certify that ship and ship systems meet human
performance criteria as part of the total ship/system performance and
certification process. As part of this process, SEA 03 is currently
reviewing all NAVSEA acquisition programs with respect to HSI
effectiveness. Expected completion date is December 2003.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Navy,
require that the Naval Sea Systems Command Human Systems Integration
Directorate establish a process to evaluate or revise existing policies
and procedures that may impede innovation in all new ship acquisitions.
(p. 38/Draft Report):
DOD RESPONSE: Concur with comment.
As the GAO stated in its report, the DD(X) program started the Policy
Clearinghouse (PCH) to address policies and procedures. NAVSEA's HSI
Directorate (SEA 03) has taken over the DD(X) PCH, and has expanded the
application to all ships and submarines. When SEA 03 expanded the PCH,
it broadened the scope to include issues
beyond policies and procedures. The program is now called the HSI
Clearinghouse for Issues and Policies (CLIP). A pilot study using CLIP
is being developed in conjunction with the Commander Surface Forces,
Pacific reduced manning experiment aboard DDG 51 and CG 47 class ships.
Also, the DD(X) Design Agent has developed issues and is preparing to
post them in CLIP. Because some policies and procedures are outside of
NAVSEA's authority, successful execution of the CLIP requires
participation from across the Navy stakeholders. NAVSEA will work with
these stakeholders to require and identify the necessary means (i.e.,
resources) for policy and procedure owners to participate in CLIP as
required. Overall expected completion date is June 2004.
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Defense's letter
dated May 12, 2003.
GAO's Comment:
1. We disagree that the tone of our report implies a lack of interest
or desire on the part of program managers to pursue manpower
reductions. Rather, our report notes that a number of factors,
including funding issues, create barriers that make it more difficult
for program managers to pursue manpower reductions and develop robust
human systems integration programs. Moreover, we agree that resourcing
human systems integration and supporting analyses at the earliest
stages of the program is a responsibility that does not wholly reside
with the program manager but is shared by the Navy staff. As our report
clearly points out, given the existing barriers and an absence of
specific requirements to implement a comprehensive human systems
integration approach, the JCC(X) and LHA(R) programs did not identify
or request resources for performing human systems integration and
related analyses to support the research and development required to
pursue advanced technology that could have enabled workload and
manpower reductions.
FOOTNOTES
[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 Conference
Report 107-772 (Nov. 12, 2002).
[2] At the time the ship's mission need statement was developed, it was
referred to as the Surface Combatant 21, a term used in the early
stages of the Land Attack Destroyer program. It eventually became known
as DD 21 and subsequently as the DD(X). For uniformity, we will refer
to the ship as the DD(X) in all of its stages.
[3] The ship program was previously known as the Auxiliary Dry Cargo
Carrier (ADC(X) or T-ADC(X)). The program subsequently became known as
the Auxiliary Cargo and Ammunition Ship (T-AKE). For uniformity, we
refer to the ship as the T-AKE or the T-AKE cargo ship in all of its
stages.
[4] The program was formally named the Joint Maritime Command and
Control Capability Ship Program, hereafter referred to as the JCC(X)
command ship. DOD's fiscal year 2004 Program Objective Memorandum
canceled the JCC(X) program. Instead, DOD has directed that the
analysis of alternatives for the Maritime Prepositioning Force
(Future), or MPF(F), examine the feasibility of incorporating as a
module or variant an additional mission package that provides joint and
coalition command and control. MPF(F) ships are the Marine Corps'
forward-deployed floating warehouses of military ammunition, fuel, and
food that are the centerpiece of the Navy's future sea basing concept.
[5] A ship class represents a number of vessels built alike or nearly
so.
[6] Unless otherwise noted, all dollars are expressed as current
dollars (also known as then-year dollars).
[7] Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is
not yet clear how many DD(X)s will be purchased.
[8] In another report we recommend that DOD treat total ownership costs
as a performance requirement equal in priority to any other performance
requirement prior to beginning the acquisition program. See U.S.
General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting Requirements
Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems' Total Ownership Costs,
GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2003).
[9] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition,
Attachment 1, The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002, sec.
3.23.
[10] According to defense acquisition system policy, the program
manager is assigned the single point of accountability for
accomplishment of program objectives--a minimum number of cost,
schedule, and performance parameters that describe the program over its
life cycle. Progress toward meeting these objectives is assessed at
milestone decision meetings and during interim senior management
reviews.
[11] In Navy new ship acquisitions, the front-end analysis consists of
a top-down requirements analysis supported by a variety of mission and
functional analyses that together inform designers about the human
requirements for the ship under study.
[12] On May 12, 2003, DOD released a new version of DOD Directive
5000.1 and DOD Instruction 5000.2. A streamlined version of the
nonmandatory Guidebook is under development. Because this guidance was
issued following the completion of our audit work, the description of
the acquisition process in this report is based on DOD's interim
guidance issued on October 30, 2002.
[13] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, "Implementation of
Mandatory Procedures for Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition
Programs and Major and Non-Major Information Technology Acquisition
Programs," December 6, 1996.
[14] The Surface Combatant for the 21st Century [DD(X)] Mission Need
Statement recommended performing a military crewing/hardware
integration ("HARDMAN") analysis in accordance with Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 5311.7, "Determining Manpower,
Personnel, and Training (MPT) Requirements for Navy Acquisitions,"
August 12, 1985. HARDMAN is one type of human systems integration
methodology.
[15] The document specified 95 as the objective value and 150 as the
threshold value. These values represent a 60 to 70 percent reduction
from the DDG-51 class crew level of 365.
[16] Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is
not yet clear how many DD(X)s will be purchased.
[17] Underway replenishment may be accomplished via connected
replenishment (in which the receiving and cargo ships are alongside and
connected to each other by hoses/cables) or via vertical replenishment
(in which a helicopter transfers solid cargo from ship to ship).
[18] The Navy's Military Sealift Command is one of three components of
the U.S. Transportation Command, the DOD command that manages the
defense transportation system.
[19] The following four contractors were each awarded $1.5 million to
complete Phase I Ship/Cargo Integration Design studies: Avondale
Industries (now Northrop Grumman Ship Systems Avondale Operations);
Halter Marine, Inc. (now Friede Goldman Halter); Litton Ingalls
Shipbuilding (now Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipbuilding); and National
Steel and Shipbuilding Company. Phase I concluded on May 5, 2000, and
on October 18, 2001, the Navy announced it had awarded National Steel
and Shipbuilding Company the Phase II Detail Design and Construction
contract.
[20] The studies addressed one or more of five topic areas: (1)
warehouse management system/automation; (2) material handling
equipment/cargo handling systems/cargo elevators; (3) cargo flow
studies/modeling and simulation; (4) general arrangements/cargo hold
and transfer deck design; and (5) cargo heating, ventilation, air
conditioning, and refrigeration.
[21] T-AKE officials also provided us with the titles of 16 studies
involving safety, human engineering, manpower, personnel, training, and
habitability domains of human systems integration that were included in
the shipbuilding contract.
[22] To achieve these reductions, the Navy would have to adopt the
latest fleet work practices and automation, eliminate functions not
relevant to the JCC(X), reduce engineering watchstanders, and use a
centralized galley and Military Sealift Command-like food service.
[23] Kauchak, Marty, "Navigating Changing Seas, Navy Chief Harbors No
Illusions About the Challenges That Lie Ahead," Armed Forces Journal
International, August 2002.
[24] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, "Implementation of
Mandatory Procedures for Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition
Programs and Major and Non-Major Information Technology Acquisition
Programs," December 6, 1996.
[25] "Department of the Navy (DON) Section (Discretionary) of Defense
Acquisition Deskbook (Reference Library), Appendix XI-Acquisition
Program Plans Formats, February 12, 1997 (the "Acquisition Deskbook" is
now called the "Acquisition Knowledge Sharing System").
[26] Fiscal year 2002 dollars.
[27] The Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division) Acquisition
and Human Systems Integration Requirements Branch also encourages
manning reductions of up to 20 percent, if possible, for new
acquisition programs. It has, however, no authority to require
such reductions.
[28] This approach embodies the overarching system requirements for a
broad mission need, such as surveillance or missile defense.
[29] Naval Sea Systems Command Notice 5400, "Establishment of the Human
Systems Integration (HSI) Directorate (SEA 03)," October 15, 2002.
[30] The program management communities of practice include
acquisition, systems engineering, total ownership costs, and many other
related disciplines. The communities may be accessed at http://
www.pmcop.dau.mil/.
[31] The number of vertical-launch tubes is being reevaluated.
[32] Cost estimates are for the fifth destroyer built by each
shipbuilder involved in the program.
[33] To confirm whether civilian mariners were more experienced than
their Navy peers, we compared the average age and tenure of civilian
mariners to active-duty Navy personnel. Relative to Navy personnel,
civilian mariners were older (average age is 46 years, Navy average is
about 29), although they had similar tenure (average tenure in
the Military Sealift Command is about 8 years; the Navy average is
almost 9). The Military Sealift Command provided data on civilian
mariners. Navy age data was taken from Population Representation in the
Military Services, Fiscal Year 2000, dated February 2002. Navy tenure
data was calculated from Tabulations of Responses from the 1999 Survey
of Active Duty Personnel, Volume 2: Programs and Services, Family,
Economic Issues, and Background, conducted by the Defense Manpower Data
Center, dated September 2000.
[34] The MPF(F) ships will be the Marine Corps' civilian operated
forward-deployed floating equipment warehouses. The MPF(F) ships are
intended to replace and update the capability currently provided by 13
aging Maritime Prepositioning Ships.
[35] The Wasp-class LHD is the Navy's largest amphibious assault ship.
This class is an improved follow-on the to five Tarawa-class LHA ships.
The LHD 8, currently under construction, will incorporate improvements,
including a gas-turbine propulsion system and a new electrical
auxiliary system that will eliminate steam service.
[36] All LHD cost figures are in constant fiscal year 2003 dollars.
[37] Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition,
Attachment 1, The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002.
[38] On May 12, 2003, DOD released a new version of DOD Directive
5000.1 and DOD Instruction 5000.2. A streamlined version of the
nonmandatory Guidebook is under development. Because this guidance was
issued following the completion of our audit work, the description of
the acquisition process in this report is based on DOD's interim
guidance issued on October 30, 2002.
[39] See http://dod5000.dau.mil/. Another internet-based aid, commonly
known as "The Acquisition Deskbook," is located at http://
deskbook.dau.mil/jsp/default.jsp.
[40] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01B,
Requirements Generation System, Apr. 15, 2001. The new CJCSI 3170.01C
and CJCSM 3170.01 are expected to be reissued in mid-2003.
[41] Watchstations are manned in three sections, or 8-hour shifts, over
the course of a day.
[42] According to the Smart Ship Assessment Report, the experiment
aboard a Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser has reduced workload
and ship crewing requirements while enhancing combat readiness and
improving the crew's quality of life. The experiment validated the use
of cost-effective commercial technology and policy changes to allow
sailors to focus on their war fighting and professional skills by
freeing them from repetitive tasks.
[43] Reliability-centered maintenance is a maintenance scheme based on
the reliability of the various components of the system or product in
question. It requires extensive knowledge about the reliability and
maintainability of the system and all of its subsequent components,
including the mean time to repair and failure rates of the product or
system. Implementing this kind of preventative maintenance program can
greatly reduce the cost of ownership.
[44] The objective of condition-based maintenance is to accurately
detect the current state of mechanical systems and accurately predict
systems' remaining useful lives. This enables organizations to perform
maintenance only when needed to prevent operational deficiencies or
failures, essentially eliminating costly periodic maintenance and
greatly reducing the likelihood of machinery failures.
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