Military Space Operations
Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions Gao ID: GAO-03-825R June 2, 2003In fiscal year 2003, the Department of Defense expects to spend more than $18 billion to develop, acquire, and operate satellites and other space-related systems. Satellite systems collect information on the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. They enable military forces to be warned of a missile attack and to communicate and navigate while avoiding hostile action. And they provide information that allows forces to precisely attack targets in ways that minimize collateral damage and loss of life. DOD's satellites also enable global communications, television broadcasts, weather forecasting; navigation of ships, planes, trucks, and cars; and synchronization of computers, communications, and electric power grids. Congress requested that we review reports we issued on satellite and other space-related programs over the past two decades and identify common problems affecting these programs.
The majority of satellite programs cost more than expected and took longer to develop and launch than planned. In reviewing our past reports, we found that these results were commonly tied to the following problems. Requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must perform were not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or were changed significantly once the program had already begun. Investment practices were weak. For example, potentially more cost-effective approaches were not examined and cost estimates were optimistic. Acquisition strategies were poorly executed. For example, competition was reduced for the sake of schedule or DOD did not adequately oversee contractors. Technologies were not mature enough to be included in product development. Several factors contributed to these problems. First, DOD often took a schedule-driven instead of a knowledge-driven approach to the acquisition process. As a result, activities essential to containing costs, maximizing competition among contractors and testing technologies were compressed or not done. Second, there is a diverse array of organizations with competing interests involved in overall satellite development--from the individual military services, to testing organizations, contractors, civilian agencies, and in some cases international partners. This created challenges in making tough tradeoff decisions, particularly since, for many years, there was no high-level official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense dedicated to developing and enforcing an overall investment strategy for space. Third, space acquisition programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of technologies to achieve the full capability. This approach made it difficult to match requirements to available resources (in terms of time, money, and technology). Other factors also created challenges for the satellite acquisition programs we reviewed. These include a shrinking industrial base, a declining space workforce, difficulties associated with testing satellites in a realistic environment, as well as challenges associated with launching satellites.
GAO-03-825R, Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions
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June 2, 2003:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects
on Satellite and Related Acquisitions:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In fiscal year 2003, the Department of Defense expects to spend more
than $18 billion to develop, acquire, and operate satellites and other
space-related systems. Satellite systems collect information on the
capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. They enable
military forces to be warned of a missile attack and to communicate and
navigate while avoiding hostile action. And they provide information
that allows forces to precisely attack targets in ways that minimize
collateral damage and loss of life. DOD's satellites also enable global
communications, television broadcasts, weather forecasting; navigation
of ships, planes, trucks, and cars; and synchronization of computers,
communications, and electric power grids.
You requested that we review reports we issued on satellite and other
space-related programs over the past two decades and identify common
problems affecting these programs. In addition to analyzing past
reports, we interviewed Air Force space acquisition officials and
reviewed past DOD studies as well as DOD's selected acquisition reports
to the Congress. As agreed with your office, given the short timeframe
of this assignment, we did not thoroughly assess underlying causes of
problems identified or the effectiveness of actions being taken to
address these problems. However, we plan to do so as part of a follow-
on study. To the extent possible, we looked at the current status of
programs we reviewed. However, because we principally relied on past
GAO and DOD reports, some recent changes in status and cost may not be
reflected. We conducted our review from April 2003 through May 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
RESULTS IN BRIEF:
The majority of satellite programs cost more than expected and took
longer to develop and launch than planned. In reviewing our past
reports, we found that these results were commonly tied to the
following problems.
Requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must
perform were not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or
were changed significantly once the program had already begun.
Investment practices were weak. For example, potentially more cost-
effective approaches were not examined and cost estimates were
optimistic.
Acquisition strategies were poorly executed. For example, competition
was reduced for the sake of schedule or DOD did not adequately oversee
contractors.
Technologies were not mature enough to be included in product
development.
Several factors contributed to these problems. First, DOD often took a
schedule-driven instead of a knowledge-driven approach to the
acquisition process. As a result, activities essential to containing
costs, maximizing competition among contractors and testing
technologies were compressed or not done. Second, there is a diverse
array of organizations with competing interests involved in overall
satellite development--from the individual military services, to
testing organizations, contractors, civilian agencies, and in some
cases international partners. This created challenges in making tough
tradeoff decisions, particularly since, for many years, there was no
high-level official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
dedicated to developing and enforcing an overall investment strategy
for space. Third, space acquisition programs have historically
attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of
the design challenge or the maturity of technologies to achieve the
full capability. This approach made it difficult to match requirements
to available resources (in terms of time, money, and technology).
Other factors also created challenges for the satellite acquisition
programs we reviewed. These include a shrinking industrial base, a
declining space workforce, difficulties associated with testing
satellites in a realistic environment, as well as challenges associated
with launching satellites.
DOD has studied problems affecting its satellite acquisitions and is
undertaking efforts to address these problems. We plan to evaluate
these efforts in a subsequent review. Therefore, we are not making
recommendations in this report.
BACKGROUND:
DOD's current space network is comprised of constellations of
satellites, ground-based systems, and associated terminals and
receivers. Among other things, these assets are used to perform
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions; perform
missile warning; provide communication services to DOD and other
government users; provide weather and environmental data; and provide
positioning and precise timing data to U.S. forces as well as national
security, civil, and commercial users. Table 1 identifies specific
satellite systems used for these purposes. Appendix I describes these
systems in more detail.
Table 1: Current and Planned Satellite Systems:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
All of these systems are playing an increasingly important role in
military operations. According to DOD officials, for example, in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, approximately 70 percent of weapons were
precision-guided, most of those utilizing GPS capabilities. Weather
satellites enabled warfighters to not only prepare for, but also to
take advantage of blinding sandstorms. Communications and intelligence
satellites were also heavily used to plan and carry out attacks and to
assess post-strike damage.
Some of DOD's satellite systems--such as GPS--have also grown into
international use for civil and military applications and commercial
and personal uses. In addition, many satellites launched over the past
two decades have lasted longer than expected. For example, some of the
later DSP spacecraft have operated for more than 10 years--well past
design lifetime.
The Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands are responsible for
establishing overall requirements while the services are responsible
for satisfying these requirements to the maximum extent practical
through their individual planning, programming, and budgeting systems.
According to DOD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
intelligence community's Community Management Staff provide high-level
leadership for national security space activities. The Air Force is the
primary procurer and operator of space systems and spends the largest
share of defense space funds, annually averaging about 85 percent. The
Air Force Space Command is the major component providing space forces
for the U.S. Strategic Command.
The Army controls the Defense Satellite Communications System and
operates ground mobile terminals. The Navy operates the Ultra High
Frequency follow-on satellites, the Geosat follow-on satellites, a
weather satellite, and some space systems that contribute to
surveillance and warning. And the National Reconnaissance Office
designs, procures, and operates space systems for intelligence and
defense activities.
In addition, the National Security Space Architect and National
Security Space Integration Directorate coordinate national security
space architectures and plans for future national security space
activities. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Marine Corps,
and other DOD agencies also participate in national security space
activities.
COMMON PROBLEMS AFFECTING SATELLITE ACQUISITIONS:
The majority of satellite programs we have reviewed over the past two
decades experienced problems during acquisition that drove up costs and
schedules and increased technical risks.
First, requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it
must perform were not adequately defined at the beginning of a program
or were changed significantly once the program had already begun. This
made it more difficult for programs to ensure that they could match
their requirements to their resources (in terms of money, time, and
technology). The more requirements were added or changed, the more that
cost and schedule increased.
Second, investment practices were weak. At times, programs did not
explore potentially more cost-effective investment approaches. Once
they settled on an approach, programs often did not develop realistic
cost estimates. From a broader perspective, investments in programs
were not made in accordance with an overall space investment strategy
for DOD. Funds were sometimes shifted from healthier programs to pay
for weaker ones. Further, according to DOD officials, decisions
external to the program office were sometimes imposed that resulted in
unexpected funding cuts.
Third, acquisition strategies were poorly executed. For example,
competition was reduced for the sake of schedule or DOD did not
adequately oversee contractors. At times, contract type was not
suitable for the work being done.
Fourth, programs did not always ensure that technologies were mature
before making heavy investments in the program. This often caused cost
and schedule increases due to the need to fix problems later in
development. A continuing problem is that software needs are poorly
understood at the beginning of a program.
Table 2 identifies examples of problems identified in our reports and
affected systems.
Table 2: Specific Common Problems Identified in GAO Reports:
Problems: Requirements--Defining what the system needs to do and how
well it needs to perform; Program did not adequately define
requirements; Unresolved conflicts among users on requirements;
Frequent changes made to requirements after product development began;
Systems Affected by One or More Problems: DSP replacement programs;
Milstar; AEHF; SBIRS-High.
Problems: Investment Strategy--Choosing a path that offers the most
cost-effective solution and ensuring costs are contained; Program did
not adequately analyze investment alternatives; Cost and/or schedule
estimates were optimistic; Funding was unstable; Systems Affected by
One or More Problems: DSP replacement programs; SBIRS-Low/STSS;
Milstar; AEHF; SBIRS-High; GPS III.
Problems: Acquisition Strategy--Maximizing competition and contractor
reliability; Level of competition was reduced or eliminated; Contract
type was not suitable for work being done; Poor oversight over
contractors; Systems Affected by One or More Problems: AEHF; SBIRS-
High; SBIRS-Low; STSS; EELV.
Problems: Technology--Ensuring technology is mature before heavy
investments are made in the program; Technology not sufficiently
mature at program start; Software needs poorly understood; Testing
compressed, skipped, or done concurrently with production; Systems
Affected by One or More Problems: DSP replacement programs; Milstar;
SBIRS-Low; AEHF; SBIRS-High.
[End of table]
Several factors contributed to the problems identified in our reports.
First, DOD took a schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven approach to
the acquisition process. As a result, activities essential to
containing costs, maximizing competition among contractors and testing
technologies were shortchanged. Second, there was a diverse array of
organizations with competing interests involved in overall satellite
development--from the individual military services, to testing
organizations, contractors, civilian agencies, and in some cases, even
international partners. This created challenges in making tough
tradeoff decisions, particularly since, for many years, there was no
high-level official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
dedicated to developing and implementing an overall investment strategy
for space.[Footnote 1] Often, disagreements within DOD would go
unresolved for a long period of time. Third, space acquisition programs
have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single
step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of
technologies to achieve the full capability. This approach made it
difficult to match requirements to available resources (in terms of
time, money, and technology). Table 3 further illustrates how these
cross-cutting factors can contribute to problems in requirements,
investment strategy, acquisition strategy and technology.
Table 3: Cross-cutting Factors Contributing to Space Acquisition
Problems and Potential Outcomes:
Cross-Cutting Factors; Requirements; Investment; Acquisition Strategy;
Technology.
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Other Factors Created:
Challenges for Acquisitions:
Other factors also created challenges for the satellite acquisition
programs we reviewed. Specifically, as with other defense industry
sectors, the satellite industry has seen a high rate of consolidation
resulting in reduced levels of competition. In 1998, we reported that
since 1990 the number of defense satellite contractors shrunk from 8 to
5. Moreover, in recent years, the U.S. commercial space industry has
seen decreasing demand and increasing international competition. Our
work has found varying levels of success in maintaining and promoting
competition within this environment.
DOD has also had difficulty in maintaining the capability to launch its
satellites--partly due to problems within the expendable launch sector
and partly due to a decision in the 1970s to fly all DOD spacecraft on
NASA's space shuttle. According to a DOD report[Footnote 2], as a
result of the latter, DOD investments in space launch infrastructure
and vehicle improvements virtually halted until the Challenger accident
of 1986. The accident itself disrupted launch schedules for programs
such as GPS. At the same time, the lack of investment in launch
capabilities for so many years contributed to higher launch costs after
the accident and serious operational limitations due to aging and
obsolete launch vehicle components and a dependence on outdated launch
vehicle production lines. In 1998, we reported that the number of
contractors in this sector fell from 6 to 2.
Air Force officials also cited challenges related to DOD's space
workforce. In 2001, a congressionally chartered commission looking at
space issues, known as the Space Commission, noted that from its
inception the defense space program has benefited from world-class
scientists, engineers, and operators, but now many experienced
personnel are retiring and recruitment and retention of qualified space
personnel is a problem. Further, the commission concluded that DOD does
not have the strong military space culture--including focused career
development and education and training--it needs to create and maintain
a highly trained and experienced cadre of space professionals who can
master highly complex technology as well as develop new concepts of
operation for offensive and defensive space operations.
Unique aspects of satellite development and testing also presented
challenges for programs we reviewed. For example, some testing on
satellites can be done on the ground in thermovac or other
environmental simulation chambers. Some systems can also be tested via
aircraft. However, the only way to test satellites in the true
operational space environment is to build one or more demonstrator
satellites and launch them into orbit. Launching demonstrators is
costly and time-consuming but it offers greater assurance that
satellites will work as intended. Also, a high degree of coordination
between space and ground segments as well as user equipment is
necessary. Typically, satellite software is used to test the satellite
before it is shipped for launch. Ground control software is typically
installed/fielded a year before launch to allow for training and
rehearsals. Therefore, scheduling slips within any one of these
activities can cause problems for other activities. At the same time,
the timing of the launching of satellites must coincide with the
deployment of ground receivers, but this can be difficult to do when
ground and space segments are funded by different military services.
In addition, satellite programs require a significantly larger
investment in the acquisition phase than other weapons systems. This is
because satellites are RDT&E intensive, go through extensive
development testing, and need to have all of their sustainment
capabilities on board when launched. Once on orbit they require a
reduced amount of funding to operate when compared with the funding
profile of a typical, large production DOD program. Air Force space
acquisition officials stated that the funding profile for a satellite
program is typically the reverse of the funding profile for a typical
DOD program. The notional DOD lifecycle profile shows approximately 28
percent of a program's budget funding its development and 72 percent of
its budget funding the production of hundreds of units and paying for
the operations and sustainment that goes with it. For a satellite
program, the funding profile is "front-loaded" with 60-70 percent of
its budget funding development and launch with 30-40 percent of the
budget funding operations and maintenance of the satellite system.
According to Air Force officials, this sort of profile makes it
difficult to adapt to unknowns that arise since it is not possible to
trade out-year production funding to fund near-term problems since the
production numbers for satellite systems are so small.
HOW PROBLEMS AFFECTED SPECIFIC PROGRAMS:
Nearly every program we reviewed over the past several decades
experienced one or more of the problems we identified and experienced
cost and scheduling increases as a result. Corrective actions were
taken on some programs to reduce cost, schedule or technical risks
after they were identified. For example, the NPOESS program took a
range of actions to reduce program risks, including deferring
development of requirements, deciding to rely on existing versus new
technology for some sensors, and using aircraft to test sensors. In
other cases, problems were allowed to persist to the point where DOD
needed to step in a restructure the program. SBIRS-Low, for example,
was restructured after continuing to experience cost growth and
scheduling delays, and SBIRS-High was restructured last year after
experiencing continued cost growth and schedule delays. In the 1990s,
three separate programs designed to replace DSP satellites were
abandoned after it became clear that they would be either too costly
and/or technically risky to pursue.
Recent cases are discussed in more detail below. A chronology of our
findings related to individual systems is also provided in appendix I.
Advanced EHF Satellite:
The AEHF is a satellite system intended to replace the existing Milstar
system and to be DOD's next generation of higher speed, protected
communication satellites. We recently reported that cost estimates
developed by the Air Force for this program increased from $4.4 billion
in January 1999 to $5.6 billion in June 2001 for five satellites.
Moreover, DOD will not meet its accelerated targeted date for launching
the first satellite in December 2004. In fact, the first satellite's
new launch date is December 2006. (DOD has since decided to purchase
three satellites with options to purchase the fourth and fifth. The
December 2002 Selected Acquisition Report for the AEHF showed current
program costs at $4.7 billion for three satellites. ):
Several factors contributed to cost and schedule overruns and
performance shortfalls. First, in the early phases of the AEHF program,
DOD substantially and frequently altered requirements. Although
considered necessary, many changes were substantial, leading to cost
increases of hundreds of millions of dollars because they required
major design modifications. Second, based on a satellite constellation
gap caused by the failure of a Milstar satellite, DOD decided to
accelerate its plans to build the AEHF satellites. The contractors
proposed, and DOD accepted, a high risk schedule that turned out to be
overly optimistic and highly compressed-leaving little room for error
and depending on a chain of events taking place at certain times.
Substantial delays occurred when some events did not occur on time. DOD
decided to take this approach on the grounds it offered a chance to
meet unmet warfighter requirements caused by the loss of the Milstar
satellite. Third, at the time DOD decided to accelerate the program, it
did not have the funding needed to support the activities and the
manpower needed to design and build the satellites quicker. The lack of
funding also contributed to schedule delays, which in turn, caused more
cost increases.
Advanced Wideband Satellite System (AWS):
AWS (also known as the Transformational Communications Satellite or
TSAT) is a fairly new program focused on supplementing AEHF and
replacing DOD's Wideband Gapfiller Satellite system (WGS). DOD plans to
include laser crosslinks on the satellite to significantly increase
capacity. In 2003, GAO reported that the AWS program is scheduled to
enter product development with only one of its five critical
technologies mature according to best practice standards. Four immature
technologies were scheduled to reach maturity by January 2006, more
than 2 years after development start. Three of four technologies have a
backup technology in case of development difficulties. But the Single
Access Laser Communications technology has no backup, and according to
program officials, any delay in maturing this technology would result
in a slip in the expected launch date.
SBIRS-High:
SBIRS-High satellites are being developed to replace DOD's older
missile warning satellites. In addition to missile warning and missile
defense missions, the satellites will perform technical intelligence
and battlespace characterization missions. After the program was
initiated in 1994, it faced cost, scheduling, and technology problems.
GAO reports from 1995 through 2001, for example, noted that the program
was facing serious hardware and software design problems. In 2001, the
program reported that it had exceeded the 25 percent cost threshold
established in 10 U.S.C. 2433. In 2002, an independent review team
chartered by DOD to examine the reasons behind cost and scheduling
problems in the SBIRS-High program reported that a key root cause was
that system requirements were not well-understood when the program
began and as it evolved. In addition, the requirements setting process
was often adhoc with many decisions being deferred to the contractor.
The review team also found that the program was too immature to enter
system design and development. Further, there was too much instability
on the program after the contract award--with DOD undertaking four
major replanning efforts. DOD has since restructured the program and
taken corrective actions, but the team noted that there were still
risks within the program, including risks related to the schedule.
SBIRS-Low:
SBIRS-Low satellites are to perform missile warning and missile
tracking functions. Because of their low-earth orbit, they may be
particularly useful in tracking missiles through the midcourse of their
flight--when missiles themselves have cooled down and become more
difficult to track.
SBIRS-Low has been restructured due to cost, scheduling, and technical
problems. Despite spending several billion dollars on these efforts,
DOD has not launched a single satellite or demonstrated any space-based
missile tracking capabilities from space using technologies similar to
those to be used by SBIRS-Low (now called the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System, or STSS). In 2001, GAO reported that DOD was not
adequately analyzing or identifying cost-effective alternatives to
SBIRS-Low that could satisfy critical missile defense requirements,
such as a Navy ship-based radar capability. At the time, other studies
supported the possibility that other types of sensors could be used to
track missiles in midcourse of their flight and to cue interceptors. In
2001, GAO reported that the SBIRS-Low acquisition schedule was at high
risk of not delivering the system on time or at cost or within expected
performance. Satellite development and production, for example, were to
be done concurrently, leaving the Air Force at risk of having to
correct problems discovered during testing at late stages of the
acquisition process, when they are more expensive and time-consuming to
fix. SBIRS-Low also had high technical risks because some critical
satellite technologies were judged to be immature for the current stage
of the program, including the scanning infrared sensor, tracking
infrared sensor, and technologies used to cool down satellite sensors.
As the program was experiencing cost and schedule problems, DOD
restructured the program, moving it from the Air Force to the Missile
Defense Agency to reflect the increased focus on missile defense and
renaming it the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS).
In May 2003, we reported that the STSS program was not considering two
potentially more cost effective alternatives--(1) delaying the launch
date by one year and (2) stopping efforts to launch existing technology
for research purposes and concentrating instead on new technology.
Moreover, the program faced investment and scheduling risks since it
recently reduced competition within the program and it decided on a
2007 launch date without knowing the extent of work that must be done
on the satellite equipment it plans to assemble and launch.
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS):
This program essentially combined separate weather satellite efforts
being pursued by DOD and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) after it was determined that doing so could
reduce duplication and save money. Our earlier reviews identified
potential requirements setting problems attributable to the broad base
of internal customers each agency has and the diversity of requirements
that needed to be met. DOD's selected acquisition report on NPOESS
stated that coordination and validation of the broad-based requirements
took longer than anticipated and delayed a request for proposal release
by 6 months. In 1997, the NPOESS program assessed specific technical,
scheduling, and cost risks facing the program, and determined there
were risks within the interface data processing segment, the space
segment, and the overall system integration segment. To reduce these
risks, the program deferred development of requirements either because
the technology needed to implement them did not exist or the
requirement was too costly. It undertook earlier development of some
satellite sensors in order to allow more time to mature technologies.
It decided, in some cases, to use existing sensor technologies instead
of building new ones. It also increased testing to demonstrate
satellite sensors and to deliver early data to users to that they could
begin to work with the data.
Global Positioning System (GPS):
GPS satellites, which provide positioning, navigation, and timing
information to military forces and civilian users, have existed for
over 25 years, but a full constellation of satellites has been
operational for only 7 years. In 1980, we reported that the cost to
acquire and maintain GPS satellites through 2000 increased from $1.7
billion to $8.6 billion due largely to estimates not previously
included for replenishment satellites, launches, and user equipment. In
1983, we reported that costs might still be understated since system
design changes were being considered. Costs and schedule were
significantly affected in 1987 as a result of the Challenger accident,
since DOD was depending on the space shuttle to launch GPS satellites.
Reliability problems with GPS receivers also affected schedule
throughout the program. In 1991, for example, we reported that DOD
postponed full-rate production for receiver sets by 2 years due to
reliability problems. Last fall, according to GPS program officials,
the program was on track to launch the first GPS III satellite in 2012.
However, following a review by the Under Secretary of the Air Force,
funding for the program was zeroed for fiscal year 2004, and $46
million was withheld from the fiscal year 2003 budget. Without a full
release of the withheld funding, the program office believes the launch
date may slip past 2012.
DOD HAS STUDIED ACQUISITION PROBLEMS:
DOD has studied many of the problems related to satellite acquisitions
identified in our reviews and is making changes. A 1994 study performed
by the U.S. Space Command, for example, stated that DOD's process of
defining requirements for space systems needed to be improved to ensure
greater Joint Staff and Service influence in decisionmaking. With
increasing budget pressures and dramatically different post Cold War
strategies, the U.S. Space Command also noted that it was essential for
all services to better understand the costs and benefits of
requirements. A 1998 study performed by the United States Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board advocated adopting commercial practices such
as business case analysis, streamlined procurement, and spiral
development of ground segments as a way to improve acquisition
practices. The study also called for improved oversight by high-level
officials, development of improved cost/performance models that
increase visibility into program status and emerging problems, and
maintaining adequate budget reserves in acquisition programs to
minimize reprogramming actions and avoid program disruptions.
More recently, the U.S. Space Commission, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld,
found that DOD's budgeting process and declining space workforce
created difficulties for acquisitions. Specifically, the Commission
noted that when satellite programs are funded in one budget and
terminals in another, the decentralized arrangement can result in
program disconnects and duplication. It can result in lack of
synchronization in the acquisition of satellites and their associated
terminals. It can also be difficult for user requirements to be
incorporated into the satellite system if the organization funding the
system does not agree with and support those user requirements.
Last year, the independent review team studying the SBIRS-High program
recognized that there were broad, systemic issues that need to be
addressed on space programs. These include: the need for pre-
acquisition rigor up front (requirements); increased funding stability;
and the need for block upgrades since preplanned product improvements
are very difficult for space systems, particularly for space craft. The
team also noted that space programs tend to have "inclusive"
requirements supporting multiple DOD and warfighting needs with many
mission partners.
A range of actions are being undertaken by DOD and individual military
services to streamline space acquisition. For example, the Air Force
has developed a new space system acquisition process designed to
shorten timeframes for technical assessments and facilitate faster
decisionmaking. This approach will establish key decision points
earlier in the acquisition process, as compared to the acquisition
process for non-space systems, and will provide more oversight earlier
in the development of complex satellite technology. According to DOD,
the new process will conduct an independent cost estimate as part of
the key decision point (KDP) authorizing the start of the system design
effort and will then also conduct another cost estimate after the
design is complete as part of the KDP prior to the start of system
build, test and launch activities. A key feature of the new process is
that it will use an independent program assessment team composed of
members with appropriate expertise to thoroughly review a space program
before each KDP. The assessment will be done on a full-time basis over
a two to four week period in an effort to perform relevant technical
and programmatic reviews in less time than the traditional, part-time,
multi-layered integrated product team approach. We plan to study DOD's
new space policy as part of our follow-on review and to assess whether
DOD will have adequate knowledge about technology, design, and costs
for making its decisions.
To strengthen space planning, DOD undertook efforts to develop a plan
that would set overall objectives for space and provide a high-level
10-to 15-year roadmap for the direction of space program. The plan is
expected to be completed sometime in fiscal year 2003. In response to
the Space Commission's recommendation,[Footnote 3] the Secretary of
Defense also designated the Air Force to be the executive agent for
space within DOD, with departmentwide responsibility for planning,
programming, and acquiring space systems. In October 2001, DOD
established a "virtual" major force program for space to increase
visibility of resources allocated for space activities. The virtual
major force program identifies spending on space activities within the
other major force programs in DOD's Future Years Defense Budget and
provides information by functional area. Further, in recent testimony,
the Under Secretary of the Air Force noted that the Air Force was
working with the Director of OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group to
form a national security space cost assessment team to provide a
useful, accurate, and timely independent cost estimate with common
methodology in support of space acquisition.
We plan to review these and other actions being taken to address
satellite acquisition problems in a subsequent review.
AGENCY COMMENTS:
DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this letter. These
comments were largely focused on ensuring technical accuracy in our
reporting of individual systems and providing updated information. We
incorporated these comments where possible. DOD did not comment on our
overall findings.
- - - --:
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Key contributors to this report were
Cristina Chaplain, Jean Harker, Natalie Britton, Bradley Terry and Art
Gallegos.
Katherine V. Schinasi:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
Signed by Katherine V. Schinasi:
Appendix I:
Profiles of Satellite Acquisitions:
This appendix profiles satellite programs covered by GAO reviews during
the past two decades. It also profiles two launch systems, given their
importance to the success of satellite programs. Among other things,
the profiles describe the programs':
Mission:
Primary users:
Manager:
Architecture and key technologies:
Contractors/contract type:
Original cost/quantity and current cost/quantity[Footnote 4]
Total spent/percent total spent[Footnote 5]
The profiles also identify key GAO findings related to requirements,
investment planning, acquisition strategy, and technology. A summary of
these findings and our report coverage are highlighted below. In
addition to analyzing past GAO reports, we also relied on DOD Selected
Acquisition Reports to the Congress and several DOD studies.
Table I.1 Summary of GAO Coverage and Key Findings:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Mission: Missile Warning:
Program: Defense Support Program (DSP) and early proposed replacements:
Background information.
DSP is a strategic surveillance and warning satellite system with an
infrared capability to detect ballistic missile launches
(intercontinental and submarine-launched). It provides near real-time
detection information in support of DOD'S integrated tactical warning
and attack assessment (ITW/AA) mission. DSP began in 1967, and the
first operational satellite was deployed in 1971. The most recent DSP
satellite launch (number 21) was in August 2001. In the late 1970s, DOD
decided that DSP should be replaced since the system did not satisfy
all the validated military requirements for a space-based ITW/AA
sensor. It followed this decision with several attempts to develop
replacement systems, but these efforts failed due to high costs and
technology immaturity. DOD eventually made enhancements to DSP. The
SBIRS-High program is focused on replacing DSP.
Architecture/Key Technologies.
The number of DSP satellites in orbit is classified SECRET. DSP
satellites use infrared sensors to detect heat from missile and booster
plumes against the earth's background. Over the last 29 years, there
have been five major design changes. Historically, DSP satellites have
been launched atop the Titan III & IV family of launch vehicles; one
was launched aboard the Space Shuttle. Currently, DSP satellites are
launched into geo-synchronous orbit using a Titan IV-B launch vehicle
with an Inertial Upper Stage. DSP Flight 23 will be launched on an
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV).
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Program.
Technology immaturity; Unanticipated costs; Lack of adequate analysis
of alternatives; Note: Issues mostly affecting DSP replacement
programs.
Chronology of Key Findings.
* 1992: GAO reported that DOD was not adequately analyzing alternatives
to DSP. DOD first proposed replacing DSP with a system called the
Advanced Warning System (AWS), but this proposal never fully
materialized because of immature technology and high costs. A
subsequent proposal, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System was
discontinued after DOD decided to pursue other technologies for
tracking ballistic missiles. AWS was proposed for remaining tactical
warning and attack assessment missions in 1990 but was later scaled
down to a less costly and less capable system called the Follow-on
Early Warning system (FEWS). GAO reported that while the current
proposal for FEWS may provide more capability than the existing DSP
system, DOD still needed to consider other alternatives, including an
enhanced DSP which could be nearly as effective and cost billions
dollars less than a fully capable FEWS. Several DOD studies supported
this point.
* 1993: GAO reported that adding global processing
capability--which would enable processing of data generated by the
satellite constellation network to be done in a single station--in
upgrades to ground processing stations for DSP might not be cost-
effective. One reason was that there were no corresponding plans to
reduce the number of ground stations. Another reason was that
operational requirements were not yet complete.* 1994 GAO reported
that Congress had appropriated $515 million for FEWS for fiscal years
1992 through 1994, but terminated the program in late 1993 based on
affordability reasons. In late 1994, the Air Force selected ALARM
(Alert, Locate, and Report Missiles system) to be DSP's replacement.
ALARM was to be smaller than DSP and less capable than FEWS with an
emphasis on greater support to tactical forces. At the time of GAO's
review, concerns were that DOD was about to make a substantial
investment in ALARM without fully defining operational requirements.
Moreover, while DOD cost estimates showed ALARM to be more affordable
than FEWS in the short term, the total life cycle costs lead GAO to
question whether ALARM, with projected upgrades, would actually be a
more expensive system.
* 1994: GAO reported that the Air Force plans to
accelerate ALARM schedule by 2 years from 2004 to 2002 could add costs
to the program which in turn could put DOD in a similar unaffordable
position when it rejected the FEWS program. At the time, the program
office had identified an additional $434 million that would be needed
to support the new schedule. Accelerating schedule could also save as
much as $700 million because it could obviate the need to procure an
additional DSP satellite, its launcher, and an inertial upper stage.
However, acceleration could also create program risks by shortening the
demonstration and validation phase of the acquisition process by 10
months and performing the critical design review a full year ahead of
the original schedule. Air Force officials contended that previous
engineering efforts on DSP earlier replacement programs provided enough
experience to offset this risk.
* 1994: GAO reported that funds for
developing two critical technologies for ALARM--infrared focal plane
array and radiation-hardened electronics--were frozen. Contractors
stated that no private sector funds would be available for these
technologies.
* 2003: CRS report recapped history of DSP, noting that
none of the proposed replacement programs reached fruition, and
instead, enhancements were made to the DSP series. For example, DSP was
designed to detect launches of strategic long range missiles (such as
intercontinental ballistic missiles) but following the Persian Gulf War
DOD recognized that the threat was changing from intercontinental
ballistic missiles to tactical missiles like the SCUD-C. In 1995, DOD
added the ALERT (Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater) system,
a ground-processing center that uses DSP data, to augment its missile
warning capabilities.
GAO Reports.
GAO/NSIAD-92-39, GAO/NSIAD-93-148, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-108, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-
164, GAO/NSIAD-94-253.
Mission: Missile Warning:
Program: Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High):
(Continued From Previous Page)
Background information.
The SBIRS system was initiated in 1994 as an effort to replace DSP, the
current system used to detect missile launches. Until recently, SBIRS
had two components: SBIRS-High, which would consist of launch detection
satellites in geo-synchronous and highly elliptical orbits and SBIRS-
Low which would consist of launch detection and tracking satellites in
low earth orbits. In 2000, SBIRS-Low was shifted back to the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization, which is now the Missile Defense Agency.
SBIRS-Low is primarily focused on supporting the missile defense
mission. SBIRS-High is being managed by the Air Force. It is focused on
missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and
battlespace characterization.
Architecture/Key Technologies.
SBIRS-High features a mix of four geo-synchronous earth orbit (GEO)
satellites and a spare, two highly elliptical earth orbit (HEO)
payloads, and associated ground hardware and software. SBIRS-High will
have both improved sensor flexibility and sensitivity over DSP. Sensors
will cover short-wave infrared like its predecessor, expanded mid-wave
infrared and see-to-the-ground bands allowing it to perform a broader
set of capabilities as compared to DSP. Currently in the engineering,
manufacturing, and development phase, the first SBIRS-High HEO payload
is scheduled for delivery in 2003 and the first GEO satellite is
expected to launch in 2006.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Program.
Requirements definition; Technology immaturity; Unanticipated software
growth; Significant cost growth; Schedule delay; Program instability.
Chronology of Key Findings.
* 1995-2001: GAO reports found the program was facing serious hardware
and software design problems including sensor jitter, inadequate
infrared sensitivity, and stray sunlight.
* 2001: DOD selected
acquisition report stated the program experienced significant cost
growth and schedule delays. Driven by poor cost and schedule
performance and the contractor's projection of a fiscal year 2002
funding shortfall, the System Program Office and Lockheed Martin Space
Systems Company (LMSSC) completed a preliminary Estimate at Completion
(EAC) exercise in October 2001. The preliminary EAC results indicated
potential cost growth in excess of $2 billion across the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development contract and schedule delays of 12 to 36
months.
* 2001: Secretary of Air Force reported a Nunn McCurdy Unit Cost Breach
(10 U.S.C. 2433) exceeding 25 percent to Congress. House Appropriations
Committee report (House Report 107-298) cited scheduling, cost, and
technology problems, including unanticipated software code growth, high
number of discrepancy reports in ground mission software, unbudgeted
payload redesign activities, notable schedule slippages.
* 2002: An Independent Review Team (IRT) was chartered by DOD to look
at the reasons behind significant cost increases, and program
management and execution problems affecting the program. Key root
causes identified included: (1) the program was too immature to enter
system design and development, (2) system requirements decomposition
and flowdown were not well understood as the program evolved, and
(3) there was a significant breakdown in execution management.
* 2002: IRT reported
that in general, the complexity, schedule, and resources required to
develop SBIRS were, in hindsight, misunderstood. This led to an
immature understanding of how requirements translate into detailed
engineering solutions. In addition, the requirements setting process
was often ad hoc with many decisions being deferred to the contractor.
While SBIRS-High adopted a more commercial approach to doing business
within the defense related industry--the winning contractor assumed
Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) for the integrated
architecture--TSPR was not properly understood or implemented on the
SBIRS-High program. The way TSPR was initially applied circumvented
traditional program management and integrated product team roles and
responsibilities.
* 2002: IRT also observed that there had been far too
much instability on the program since the contract award. In a 5-year
timeframe, the program underwent four major replanning efforts and four
program directors. The team acknowledged that corrective actions were
being taken on the program, but noted that there were still significant
risks within the program, including risks related to the schedule for
first high-elliptical orbit launch and ground software.
* 2002: Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
certified SBIRS-High to Congress as essential to national security, no
alternatives offering equal or greater military capability at same or
lower costs existed, new cost estimates were reasonable, and management
structure was adequate to manage and control unit costs.
* 2003: CRS
reported that SBIRS-High has become controversial because of cost
growth and schedule slippage caused by technical challenges that have
been encountered in developing the sensors and satellites.
* 2003: GAO
reported that three critical technologies--the infrared sensor, thermal
management, and on-board processor--are now mature. When the program
began in 1996, none of its critical technologies were mature. GAO could
not assess design stability relative to best practices, because program
was not tracking the number of releasable drawings and did not know how
many total drawings were expected for SBIRS-High. However, GAO reported
that design stability has been an issue for this program. GAO could not
assess production maturity relative to best practices because the
contractor does not use statistical process control to assure that
production processes are stable.
GAO Reports.
Three reports from 1995-2001 and GAO-03-476.
Mission: Missile Warning/Tracking:
Program: Space Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low); now known as the
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS):
Background information.
STSS started in 1990 as Brilliant Eyes, was transferred in 1993 from
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to the Air Force and
renamed the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS). In 1994, DOD
terminated the SMTS program, consolidated its infrared space
requirements, and selected SBIRS as a "system of systems" approach with
two components: SBIRS-High, which would consist of launch detection
satellites in geo-synchronous and highly elliptical orbits and SBIRS-
Low, which would consist of launch detection and tracking satellites in
low earth orbits. In 2000, SBIRS-Low was shifted back from the Air
Force to the BMDO, which is now the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In
2002, SBIRS-Low was renamed STSS. While STSS is primarily focused on
supporting the missile defense mission, SBIRS-High is focused on
missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and
battlespace characterization and is managed by the Air Force.
Architecture/Key Technologies.
STSS is a capabilities-based development. STSS will build a few
satellites at a time with later satellites being more capable than
earlier ones. Using the advantage of a lower operational altitude, STSS
will track tactical and strategic ballistic missiles against the cold
background of space. The satellite's sensors will operate across long
and short-wave infrared, as well as the visible light spectrum. These
wavebands allow the sensors to acquire and track missiles during the
boost phase as well as in midcourse. STSS is expected to launch its
first satellites in 2007.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Program.
Requirements definition; Technology immaturity; Lack of competition;
Cost growth; Inadequate analysis of alternatives; Note: Problems mostly
affecting past SBIRS-Low efforts.
Chronology of Key Findings.
* 1997: GAO assessed various options for accelerating SBIRS-Low
deployment date, which had been set for 2006, given congressional
concerns about direction of the program. GAO reported that moving up
the date by 3 or 4 years would result in high program risk because of
the high degree of concurrent activities between planned flight
demonstrations and development and fabrication of satellites.
Additional funding might also be required. Moving up the date 2 years
would reduce the need for concurrency, and therefore lower risks, but
still require additional funds to account for schedule compression.
Moving up the date 1 year would reduce scheduling risks and could
require less funding. DOD subsequently changed deployment date to
2004.
* 2001: GAO reported that SBIRS-Low acquisition schedule was at
high risk of not delivering the system on time or at cost or within
expected performance because satellite development and production, for
example, was expected to be done concurrently. SBIRS-Low program also
had high technical risks because some critical satellite technologies
were judged to be immature for the current stage of the program,
including scanning infrared sensor, tracking infrared sensor, and
technologies used to cool down satellite systems.
* 2001: GAO also
reported that DOD was not adequately analyzing or identifying cost-
effective alternatives to SBIRS-Low that could satisfy critical missile
defense requirements, such as a Navy ship-based radar capability. At
the time, other studies supported the possibility that other types of
sensors could be used to track missiles in midcourse of their flight
and to cue interceptors.
* Subsequent to 2001 GAO report, DOD
restructured the SBIRS-Low program because of cost and scheduling
problems, and put the equipment it had partially built into storage. In
2000, the Congress directed the Air Force to transfer the program to
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (now MDA). DOD was also
directed to study alternatives (such as ground-based radar systems) to
SBIRS-Low.
* May 2003: GAO reported that DOD believed that a
discrimination capability (that is, the ability to detect and track
multiple objects and differentiate the threatening warhead from decoys)
would significantly enhance a space-based missile tracking system like
STSS. However, DOD deferred plans to achieve this capability for STSS
given technical challenges. GAO also reported that DOD's unwillingness
to relax requirements for capabilities such as discrimination during
earlier SIBRS-low efforts contributed to cost and scheduling problems.;
* May 2003: GAO reported that in taking on the restructured SBIRS-Low
program, now called Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS), MDA
purposely set out to adopt a strategy that would evolve STSS over time,
deferring some requirements, and calling for competition in development
of sensors aboard the satellite. However, recent decisions were
limiting MDA's ability to achieve its original goals as well as
knowledge that could be gained from its satellite demonstrations. For
example, plans were eliminated to have contractors compete for
production of the sensor to detect missile launches. If it chose to
keep STSS as part of the missile defense system, STSS could end up
being more expensive in the future because MDA could be locked into a
single contractor for the design and product of the larger
constellation of satellites.
* May 2003: GAO reported that MDA was
focused on launching its satellites by 2007 in order to assess its
performance in the missile defense tests. However, it made this
decision without completing its assessment of the working condition of
the equipment it planned to assemble and use to demonstrate STSS
capabilities. Also, MDA was not considering other approaches to
demonstrating capabilities because they would not allow STSS to
participate in 2006-2007 missile defense tests. These include (1)
launching satellites in 2008 instead of 2007 and (2) dropping effort to
demonstrate capabilities with legacy satellites that were based on
older technology and focusing instead on developing new technology.
Both approaches would enable MDA to inject more competition into STSS
program, reduce scheduling risks, and demonstrate more capabilities.
However, they also have drawbacks; primarily, they would delay MDA's
ability to make informed tradeoffs on missile defense sensors.
GAO Reports.
GAO/NSIAD-97-16, GAO-01-6, GAO-03-597.
Mission: Current Communication Systems:
Programs: Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) and Milstar:
(Continued From Previous Page)
Background information.
DSCS and Milstar are current DOD communication satellite systems that
provide protected communications to support globally distributed
military users. The Air Force began launching the current DSCS
satellites in 1982. The Air Force initiated the Milstar program in
1981, but the first Milstar satellite was launched in 1994 and the last
one in April 2003.
Architecture/Key Technologies.
Currently, ten DSCS satellites and five Milstar satellites operate in
geo-synchronous orbit. The DSCS satellites utilize super high frequency
transponder channels that provide the highest data capability, but
require large antennas (4 to 60 feet) for receiving large amounts of
data. The Milstar satellites utilize extremely high frequency
transponder channels that provide low to medium data rate
communications but require small antennas (5 inches to 10 feet) and
provide communications that are more survivable and resistant to
jamming than the DSCS. The Milstar satellites are launched onthe Titan
IV and weigh about 10,000 pounds. The last two DSCS satellites will be
launched by the EELV and weigh about 2,500 pounds.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Programs.
Cost growth; Requirements changes.
Chronology of Key Findings.
1986: GAO reported that in late 1982 the Air Force realized that the
Milstar configuration could not be achieved given existing schedule and
budgetary constraints. As a result, the program office began rescoping
the program to conform to the budgetary constraints in a design-to-
budget exercise. In 1983 the program office rescoped the program for a
second time--this time adding requirements due to user input and
concerns.
* 1986: GAO reported that DOD revised the acquisition
strategy from a total system integration package to an associate
contractor approach because the teaming of TRW and Hughes (they had
previously performed the majority of extremely high frequency work)
presented an insurmountable challenge to other contractors. Under the
associate contractor approach, rather than contracting for the whole
system with a prime contractor, the government contracts with different
firms for components of the system.
* 1992: GAO reported that the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY1991 directed the Secretary of
Defense to develop or carry out a plan for either a restructured
Milstar or an alternative advanced communications satellite program
that would substantially reduce program costs. DOD chose to restructure
the program and lower costs by reducing the constellation size from 8
to 6 satellites, the number of control stations from 25 to 9, and the
number of terminals from 1,721 to 1,467. To provide greater system
utility to tactical forces, DOD decided to add a medium data rate
capability to the satellite (this would increase the volume of
information that could be processed through the satellites).
* 1992:
GAO reported that some satellite issues related to the Army's tactical
use of Milstar had not been resolved. For example, formal agreement had
not been reached on sufficient capacity that the Army claimed it
needed. While DOD expected the medium data rate capacity to allow about
40 million bits of information to be passed through the satellite each
second, Army representatives stated that to satisfy critical Army
communication requirements, at least 34.4 million bits per second would
be needed--about 86 percent of the total planned throughput capacity
for each satellite. After considering the multiservice aspects of the
Milstar program, the Army concluded that to justify its participation
in the Milstar program, the minimum throughput capacity acceptable
would be 30.7 million bits per second--about 77 percent of the total
planned capacity for each satellite. The remaining capacity would be
allocated among the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.
* 1993:
GAO reported that in 1991 as directed by Congress, DOD published its
military satellite communications architecture study that identified 12
alternatives for various communications approaches that ranged from
using all commercial to all military satellite programs. From among the
12 alternatives, DOD selected an all military approach consisting of
existing systems. GAO reported that DOD did not select one alternative,
the dual common bus that provided a better way to demonstrate advanced
technologies.
* 1994: GAO reported that in response to our 1993 report,
DOD agreed with the need to move away from customized, unique busses
toward common busses and stated that the most cost effective approach
for inserting modern technology was to begin developing an advanced,
lower cost, lower weight payload capability.
* 1994: GAO reported that
congressional directives and national policy emphasized greater use of
commercial satellite services to reduce costs of military satellite
services. However, a new criterion used by DOD for establishing
communication requirements reduced general purpose requirements by over
40 percent. This change has reduced the potential for using commercial
satellite communication services. (It should be noted, according to DOD
officials, that there were some pointed objections in the past year to
the DOD's use of commercial satellite systems such as INTELSAT and
INMARSAT because they were "part owned" by countries such as Iraq and
Iran.)
* 1997: GAO reported that during the next decade, DOD
anticipated a significant increase in its high-capacity satellite
communications (DSCS) because of the shift in the national military
strategy and availability of advanced technologies. DOD planned to
replenish the existing DSCS constellation during fiscal year 1997-2003
with the five satellites remaining in inventory. DOD was modifying four
of these satellites to double each satellite's capacity from 100
megabits per second (MBPS) to about 200 MBPS and to replace potentially
defective parts with improved electronic components. Even so DSCS's
replenishment satellites were not expected to keep pace with the
projected requirements, thus an alternative would have been to lease
satellite communications from commercial providers. However, according
to DOD analysis, commercial leasing was more costly than acquiring
equivalent commercial like capabilities.
* 1999: GAO reported that in
1998 a draft operational test report identified four limitations
associated with Milstar I capabilities to support strategic missions.
While DOD had identified corrective actions, final resolutions were
dependent on approval of requirements, verification through testing, a
certification process, or obtaining necessary funds. Regarding tactical
missions, the Air Force had encountered schedule delays related to
software development for a critical Milstar component--called the
automated communications management system--that could adversely
affect Milstar II's timely support to tactical forces.
* 2003: GAO
reported that in 2000, DOD recognized the need to address the
capabilities and coverage gap caused by the April 1999 Milstar launch
failure and adopted a high-risk accelerated schedule for the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite system.
GAO Reports.
GAO/NSIAD-86-45S-15,GAO/NSIAD-92-121, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-39, GAO/NSIAD-94-
48, GAO/NSIAD-97-159, GAO/NSIAD-99-2, GAO/NSIAD-93-216, GAO/T-NSIAD-
94-108, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-164, GAO/NSIAD-94-253.
Mission: Planned Communication Systems:
Programs: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Communications
Satellite, Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (WGS), and Advanced Wideband
Satellite (AWS):
Background information.
The current military satellite communications network represents
decades-old technology. To meet the heightened demands of national
security in the coming years, newer and more powerful systems are being
developed. The AEHF is a satellite system intended to replace the
existing Milstar system and to be DOD's next generation of higher
speed, protected communication satellites. WGS will augment
communications services currently provided by the Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS), which provides super high frequency
wideband communications. WGS will provide an interim solution to assure
DOD's existing worldwide communication support is maintained until the
development and deployment of the Advanced Wideband Satellite System
(AWS) also known as TSAT. AWS is intended to become the cornerstone of
DOD's future communications architecture that includes supplementing
the AEHF system and replacing the WGS system.
Architecture/Key Technologies.
AEHF started in 1998 and the constellation will consist of three
satellites in low inclined geo-synchronous orbits (requirements still
call for five satellites-four operational and one spare) that can
transmit data to each other via cross-links. AEHF entered the
Engineering Manufacturing Development/Production acquisition phase in
November 2001. Each satellite will be launched with the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV); the initial launch is planned for
December 2006.
* WGS started in 2001 and the constellation was planned
to have 3 satellites, but the program recently added two more
satellites because the initial capability of AWS, which is intended to
replace AEHF and some aspects of WGS, may not be able to support all
the super high frequency services that the users require. Thus
additional WGS spacecraft are being acquired to bridge this gap. WGS
combines commercial capabilities--phased array antennas and digital
signal processing technology--into a flexible architecture that will
allow WGS to evolve and satisfy the growing wideband communication
requirements of the warfighter. WGS is currently in full rate
production with the first satellite scheduled for a June 2004 launch
aboard an EELV vehicle.
* AWS' final configuration has not yet
solidified under ongoing milsatcom transformational efforts, but the
concept is one of applied technology and engineering that will remove
capacity as a constraint on warfare communications. AWS plans to take
advantage of the commercial and government technology advances of the
first half of this decade to meet expected needs. Some of the
technologies that AWS plans to use are laser crosslinks, space-based
data processing and routing systems, and highly agile multibeam/phased-
array antennas. DOD plans for the program to enter product development
in October 2003 with the first satellite to be launched at the end of
2009. A key program review is planned for November 2004 to determine if
sufficient technology development has occurred to warrant continuing
the program at its planned schedule or whether the 4[TH] and 5th AEHF
satellites should be acquired.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Programs.
Cost growth; Scheduling risks; Requirements Changes; Immature
technology; Note: Problems reported primarily affect AEHF.
Chronology of Key Findings.
AEHF:
2002: DOD selected acquisition report commented on funding cuts.
In fiscal year 2002, AEHF sustained a $70 million fiscal year 2002
congressional reduction to RDT&E funding. The AEHF space segment was a
firm fixed price contract. According to DOD, this sizable reduction
would likely result in a six-month launch delay to satellites l-3,
breach of initial operational capability and a significant overall
program cost increase.
* In 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
decided to change the acquisition strategy of AEHF from a 5-satellite
program to a 3-satellite program. Under the revised strategy, full
capability may no longer be satisfied by an AEHF-only constellation.
(According to DOD officials, the current DOD plan is to meet the full
AEHF operational capability requirement with three AEHF spacecraft and
a combination of one or two AWS spacecraft and zero, one or two
Advanced Polar System spacecraft - this plan is driving the AWS first
launch date of late 2009.)
* 2003: GAO reported in the early phases of
the program, DOD substantially and frequently altered its requirements;
the system design changed. While considered necessary, some changes
increased costs by hundred of millions of dollars and caused scheduling
delays.
* 2003: GAO reported that in December 1999, the two contactor
teams that had been awarded engineering manufacturing and development
contracts a few months earlier offered to form a "national team" to
accelerate the AEHF program. DOD agreed to the national team proposal
even though DOD recognized it meant lack of benefits from competition.;
* 2003: GAO reported that once DOD decided to accelerate its plans to
build the satellites, the contractors proposed and DOD agreed to
support a high-risk schedule that turned out to be overly optimistic
and highly compressed--leaving little room for error and depending on a
chain of events taking place at certain times. Substantial delays
occurred when some events, such as the award of the contract or the
availability of equipment, did not occur on time. In commenting on the
AEHF report, DOD noted the decision to accelerate the program was based
on a satellite constellation gap caused by the loss of a Milstar
satellite. DOD also stated many in DOD expressed concern about the
risks, but believed the risk was acceptable based on information known
at the time.
* 2003: GAO reported that at the time DOD decided to
accelerate the program, it did not have the funding needed to support
the activities and manpower needed to design and build the satellites
quicker. The lack of funding also contributed to schedule delays, which
in turn, caused more cost increases.
* 2003: GAO reported that the
program demonstrated most technology knowledge at development with 11
of 12 critical technologies having reached maturity according to best
practice standards. However, the program office did not project
achieving maturity on the remaining technology--the phased array
antenna--by the design review in June 2004 and did not have a backup
capability. Program officials assessed the software development for the
mission control system as moderate risk and have developed a risk
mitigation strategy. However, until these mitigation actions are
completed, software may be at risk for unplanned cost and schedule
growth.
* 2003: GAO reported that significant design changes affected
cost and delayed the AEHF schedule. For example, software growth
occurred as more requirements were added and as the design of the
system stabilized. These increases in software requirements for both
the satellite and the mission control segments increased the software
cost estimate by over 77 percent or about $223 million.
* 2003: GAO
reported in the area of production maturity that any future problems
with the fabrication of the communications and transmission security
microprocessor, a component designed to limit access to satellite
transmissions to authorized users, could delay the production schedule
and the launch of the first satellite planned for December 2006.
WGS:
* 2003: GAO reported that WGS' critical technologies, design, and
production processes are mature. DOD plans to rely on commercial
technologies that will not require extensive product development.
Program officials were concerned about WGS production risk that was to
be reduced during production of commercial satellite orders. However,
due to drastic loss of commercial satellite orders, only one commercial
satellite with similar technologies as WGS is now leading WGS in the
manufacturing schedule. Recently identified problems found on the
"leader" program will impact WGS manufacturing schedule and might
result in a first launch schedule delay of four to six months.
* 2003:
GAO reported that the 4[TH] and 5th satellites have been directed by
DOD to be launched in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010
respectively. These dates are outside the allowable dates of the WGS
contract options clauses and will require renegotiation to finalize
their cost. These later launch dates could result in cost increases to
compensate for loss of learning curve from over a three-year break in
production, parts obsolescence, and inflation.
AWS:
* 2003: GAO
reported that AWS is scheduled to enter product development with only
one of its five critical technologies mature. The four immature
technologies are scheduled to reach maturity by January 2006, more than
two years after development start. Three of the four technologies have
a backup technology in case of development difficulties. However, the
Single Access Laser Communications technology has no backup and
according to program officials any delay in maturing this technology
would result in a slip in the expected launch date.
* 2003: GAO
reported that the program plans an aggressive development cycle even
though the AWS is expected to provide a transformational leap in
satellite communications capability.
GAO Reports.
GAO-03-476, a report that covers multiple systems, and an AEHF report
in 2003.
Mission: Navigation:
Program: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS):
(Continued From Previous Page)
Background information.
GPS is a space-based radio-positioning system nominally consisting of a
24-satellite constellation that provides navigation and timing
information to military and civilian users worldwide. The full
constellation of GPS satellites has been operational for 7 years. Total
program investment over a 43-year period (through 2016) is estimated at
$18.4 billion.
Architecture/Key Technologies.
GPS satellites, in one of six medium earth orbits, circle the earth
every 12 hours emitting continuous navigation signals on two different
frequencies. In addition to the satellites, the system consists of a
worldwide satellite control network and GPS receiver units that acquire
the satellite's signals and translate them into precise position and
timing information. Four generations of GPS satellites have flown in
the constellation: the Block I, the Block II, the Block IIA, and the
Block IIR. Block I satellites were used to test the principles of
space-based navigation, and lessons learned from these 11 satellites
were incorporated into later blocks. Block II, IIA and IIR satellites
make up the current constellation. Block IIRs began replacing older
Block II/IIAs in 1997. There are currently eight Block IIR satellites
on orbit and they have reprogramable satellite processors enabling
problem fixes and upgrades in flight. Up to eight IIR satellites are
being modified to radiate both a new civil signal (L2C) and a new
military signal (M-Code) for a more robust and capable signal
structure. The first modified Block IIR (designated as the IIR-M) is
planned for launch in 2004. Block IIF satellites are the next
generation of GPS satellites. Block IIF provides all the capabilities
of the previous blocks with some additional benefits as well.
Improvements include an extended design life of 12 years, faster
processors with more memory, and a new civil signal on a third
frequency. The first Block IIF satellite is scheduled to launch in
2006. The Delta II has launched the Block II, IIA, and IIR satellites,
and the EELV (Delta IV and Atlas V) will launch the Block IIF
satellites.
GPS Blocks IIF and IIR.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Program.
Cost Growth; Schedule risk; Component reliability problems.
[Empty].
Chronology of Key Findings.
1980 GAO reported program cost (to acquire and maintain the program
through the year 2000) increased from $1.7 billion to $8.6 billion due
largely to estimates not previously included for replenishment
satellites, launches, and user equipment. Beginning in 1983, DOD
planned to use the Space Shuttle to launch the NAVSTAR satellites. In
the event of Space Shuttle problems, Atlas or Titan launches would need
to be used as an alternative at an additional cost of $12 million to
$38 million per satellite launch. The original full operational
capability date of August 1985 slipped 25 months.
* 1980: GAO reported
that survivability of GPS satellites was a concern due to Soviet
testing of an anti-satellite system and reliability of GPS satellite
atomic clocks emerged during the demonstration and validation phase
when 80 percent either failed or acted abnormally.
* 1983: GAO reported
that the multiyear procurement estimate of $1.4 billion was likely
understated because indications are that the prime contractor would
propose a higher cost and that multiyear procurement savings were not
correctly calculated using the present value analysis method. System
design changes were being considered that would add considerable cost
to the program. The program office expressed concern about the lack of
backup launch vehicles in the event of problems with the Space
Shuttle.
* 1983: GAO reported that integration testing of the
spacecraft with the qualification test vehicle was scheduled to begin 7
to 18 months after the planned March 1983 award date of the production
contract. The consequences of concurrency could lead to design changes
and additional costs. The program office was considering two design
changes to the production spacecraft, a W-sensor and enhancements
related to GPS survivability.
* 1987: GAO reported that following the
Challenger accident in January 1986, the Air Force reduced the number
of GPS satellites planned for launch on the Space Shuttle from 28 to 8,
because it had awarded a contract to McDonnell Douglas to build and
launch 7 medium expendable launch vehicles with an option to purchase
up to 13 more.
* 1987: GAO reported GPS acquisition changes after the
Space Shuttle Challenger's accident: (1) NASA slipped the date for the
first launch schedule for the Block II satellites from January 1987 to
June 1989, (2) since the GPS program was in the production and
deployment phase, the Air Force began stretching out the procurement
process, and (3) the Air Force postponed a planned buy of 20 Block II-
R replenishment satellites because the program office's estimated need
date for these replenishment satellites had slipped 3 years.
* 1987:
GAO reported that since development of GPS user equipment (consists of
1-,2-, and 5-channel radio receiver sets) was almost 3 years behind
schedule due to technical problems, the Challenger loss caused no
further adjustment to user equipment production.
* 1987: GAO reported
that even though user equipment technology was changing rapidly with
miniaturized and less costly sets currently available from several
manufacturers, program office officials expressed concern about
incurring substantial costs by changing to the new equipment and that
the new equipment would not meet military specifications.
* 1991: GAO
reported that DOD postponed full-rate production for receiver sets from
March 1989 to September 1991 due to lingering receiver set reliability
problems and reevaluation of program requirements. During development
testing the Army discovered reliability problems with the one-and two-
channel GPS receiver sets. One 5-channel set experienced a number of
failures during multiservice testing and this led to a marginal rating
of all 5-channel receivers.
GAO Reports.
GAO/PSAD-80-21, GAO/MASAD-83-9, GAO/NSIAD-87-209BR, GAO/NSIAD-91-74.
Mission: Weather:
Programs: Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) and National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS):
(Continued From Previous Page)
Background information.
Since the 1960s, the U.S. has operated two separate polar-orbiting
meteorological satellite systems. These systems are known as the Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), managed by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), managed by DOD. These
satellites obtain environmental data that are the predominate input to
numerical weather prediction models--all used by weather forecasters,
the military and the public. Polar satellites also provide data used to
monitor environmental phenomena as well as data that are used by
researchers for a variety of other studies, such as climate monitoring.
Given the expectation that converging the POES and DMSP program would
reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994
Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the
two satellite programs into a single program capable of satisfying both
military and civilian requirements. The converged program is called the
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS).
Architecture/Key Technologies.
DMSP satellites circle the Earth at an altitude of about 500 miles in a
near-polar, sun-synchronous orbit. Each scans an area 1,800 miles wide
and covers the entire Earth in about 12 hours. Pointing accuracy of the
satellites is maintained by four reaction wheel assemblies that provide
three-axis stabilization. The primary sensor on board is the
Operational Linescan System that observes clouds via visible and
infrared imagery for use in worldwide forecasts. A second important
sensor is the Special Sensor Microwave Imager, which provides all-
weather capability for worldwide tactical operations and is
particularly useful in typing and forecasting severe storm activity.
DMSP satellites also carry a suite of additional sensors, which collect
a broad range of meteorological and space environmental data for
forecasting and analysis. Historically DMSP satellites have been
launched on Titan II boosters from Vandenberg Air Force Base with the
most recent launch occurring on December 12, 1999. One more DMSP
satellite will be launched on a Titan II booster. The remaining four
DMSP satellites will be launched on Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) boosters from Vandenberg Air Force Base. There are two
operational DMSP satellites.
* NPOESS program acquisition plans call
for the procurement and launch of six NPOESS satellites over the life
of the program and the integration of 14 instruments, including 12
environmental sensors. Together, the sensors and spacecraft receive and
transmit data on atmospheric, cloud cover, environmental, climate,
oceanographic, and solar-geophysical observations. Additional
instruments are carried to support search and rescue efforts and data
collection from a variety of globally deployed transmitters. NPOESS
will be a launch-on-demand system, and satellites must be available to
back up the planned launches of the final POES and DMSP satellites. The
first NPOESS satellite--designated C1--is scheduled for delivery in
late 2009, according to Air Force officials.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Program.
Requirements definition/meeting user needs; Technical/scheduling
risks; Note: Problems reported affect NPOESS rather than DMSP.
Chronology of Key Findings.
* 1987: GAO reported that the program could save millions of dollars by
converging NOAA and DOD weather satellite programs, which would reduce
the number of satellites from four to three.
* 1987: GAO reported that
NOAA and Air Force requirements were diverging in several respects,
making the effort to converge the two programs more difficult. For
example, NOAA wanted to change its approach from using expendable
convention satellites to installing sensors on serviceable platforms.
The Air Force plans to continue using its current, conventional design
of DMSPs (expendable and rocket launched) into the late 1990s before
redesigning a new system. NOAA and Air Force also differed on quality
standards for electronic components.
* 1995: GAO reported that while
the planned delivery date for the first satellite was 2004,
transferring two DMSP satellites to NOAA might require that delivery be
accelerated to as early as 2001. Such an action would increase both
technical and schedule risks and require substantial increases in the
convergence program's near-term budget.
* 1995: GAO reported that
interchangeable components between DMSP and NOAA satellites were less
than earlier estimated. Of 63 platform components, only 15 (24
percent), such as the inertial measurement unit and earth and sun
sensing equipment, could be used on NOAA satellites without
modifications. Another 13 components (21 percent), such as the power
supply electronics, battery charge assembly, and solar array
electronics, could be used if they were modified, at additional cost.
The remaining 35 components (55 percent) were either substantially
different or unique and had no value to NOAA. Additionally, DMSP
mission sensors could not be used because they are unique and would not
satisfy NOAA's requirements.
* 1997: NPOESS integrated program office
determined that there were scheduling, technical and cost risks
associated with the interface data processing segment and overall
system integration and with the space segment.
* 2001: DOD selected
acquisition report commented on schedule delays being reported to
Congress. Specifically, DOD stated that the Joint Agency Requirements
Group final review of the updated NPOESS requirements took longer than
planned. As a result the engineering and manufacturing development
request for proposal release, initiation of the life cycle cost
estimate update, and the final release of the technical requirements
document were delayed. The milestone decision was moved from February
2002 to August 2002.
* 2002: GAO reported that technical, schedule, and
cost risks were being reduced by deferring development of requirements,
initiating earlier development of sensors and/or relying on existing
versus new technology, conducting ground-based demonstrations of data
processing system, and using aircraft to test sensors, among other
activities.
* 2002: GAO reported that processing centers face
challenges in handling the massive increase in the volume of data that
would be sent by the new satellites. Whereas current polar satellites
produce approximately 10 gigabytes of data per day, NPOESS is expected
to provide 10 times that amount. Agencies involved in the program were
working to address this problem by improving data management
infrastructure, but more could be done to coordinate and further define
these efforts.
* 2003: GAO reported that NPOESS entered product
development in August 2002 with most of its technologies mature. The
program also completed a significant portion of the engineering
drawings well in advance of the design review; however, the total
number has yet to be determined. Over 5 years ago, program officials
considered the program to have several high-risk areas. Since then,
officials have implemented several efforts, which are expected to
reduce all program areas to low risk by the first NPOESS launch,
currently scheduled for the 2008-2009 time frame.
GAO Reports.
GAO/NSIAD-87-107, GAO/NSIAD-95-87R, GAO-02-684, GAO/NSIAD-94-253.
Mission: Launch:
Programs: Titan IV and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV):
Background information.
Over the years DOD has used a fleet of expendable launch vehicles--
Delta, Atlas, and Titan--to transport a variety of satellites into
space. The Titan IV is a heavy-lift space launch vehicle used to carry
DOD payloads such as Defense Support Program (DSP) and Milstar
satellites into space. The Titan IV was designed to complement the
National Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle) and serve as an
independent vehicle system to assist in assuring DOD access to space.
Air Force contracted for a total of 41 Titan IV vehicles with the last
launch scheduled for 2004. DOD considers these launch vehicles to
currently operate at or near their maximum performance capacity and to
be very costly to produce and launch. Since 1987, the government has
made several attempts to develop a new launch vehicle, but these
attempts were canceled either because of funding issues, changing
requirements, or controversy regarding the best solution.
* In 1994,
by congressional direction, DOD developed a space launch modernization
plan that led to the initiation of the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program. With EELV, the Air Force hoped to cut its
heavy-lift mission costs by about 50 percent and its overall launch
mission costs by at least 25 percent. The intent of the EELV program
was to develop a family of launch vehicles, using common components,
standard services and supporting systems that would significantly
reduce the life-cycle cost compared to today's systems. Due to a sudden
projected increase in commercial demand that was forecast in 1997, Air
Force approved a plan to develop the Atlas V and Delta IV EELVs, rather
than just one of them. The additional cost of maintaining two EELV
launch infrastructures was intended to be offset by more competitive
pricing. The successful launches of the medium-lift models of the Atlas
V and Delta IV rockets in 2002 fulfilled part of the engineering,
manufacturing, and development segment of the Air Force EELV contract
to Boeing and Lockheed Martin. In the initial launch service award
(1998) Boeing was awarded 19 launch services and Lockheed Martin was
awarded 9 launch services. Current launch services awards have been
modified after the 2000 EELV restructure to 19 missions for Boeing and
7 missions for Lockheed Martin. Both contractors plan to deploy their
commercial launch service to launch both commercial and government
missions.
Architecture/Key Technologies.
Each Titan launch vehicle is made up of a core, a fairing, and a set of
solid rocket motors. Solid rocket motors along with liquid rockets in
the core provide the propulsion for the Titan IV. The Titan IV may also
have an optional upper stage to provide the additional booster capacity
that some satellite payloads require to reach their intended orbit. The
EELV will use the Delta IV launch vehicle built by Boeing and the Atlas
V built by Lockheed Martin. Boeing developed the RS-68 liquid-oxygen/
liquid-hydrogen main engine, for the Delta IV, which is the first
cryogenic engine built in the United States since the Space Shuttle
Main Engine. Lockheed Martin's main engine, the RD-180, is a liquid-
oxygen/kerosene engine developed in a joint venture between
NPOEnergomash, a Russian company, and UTC/Pratt and Whitney.
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Issues Affecting Programs.
Schedule risk with transition to new launch vehicle; Acquisition
strategy changed DOD oversight role; Cost reductions uncertain; Note:
Problems report affect EELV rather than Titan IV.
Chronology of Key Findings.
Titan IV; 1991 GAO reported that slowing down Titan IV production may
eventually result in an overall increase in program costs, but that
budgetary requirements may be reduced by $47 million in FY1992 and $11
million in FY1993.
* 1991: GAO reported that the Air Force planned to
slowdown production of the Titan IV launch vehicle to better
synchronize production and launch schedules. This restructuring of the
program would result in slowing down production from 8-10 vehicles per
year to not more than 6 vehicles per year beginning in 1992. The Titan
IV has an optional upper stage, the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) and the
newer Centaur, to provide addition booster capacity for some satellite
payloads like the DSP. However, the DSP satellites to be boosted by the
IUS were not under contract and their launch was expected to be
delayed. In addition, planned production of the IUS vehicles for 1992
would likely slip to 1995.
* 1991: GAO reported that numerous problems
had delayed the transition of the solid rocket motor upgrade program
from development and testing to production. For example, during the
first static firing test of the rocket motor upgrade the test motor
exploded which would likely result in at least a one-year delay in
production from October 1991.
* 1993: DOD Bottom-Up Review noted that
there are two types of requirements for space launch: (1) performance-
-the ability to deliver a satellite reliably to a specific orbit, and
(2) operational flexibility. This review reported that current launch
systems generally met the first objective but not the second.
Performance and flexibility was inadequate because of (1) the need to
sustain three separate launch teams and associated equipment; (2) the
aging and obsolescence of major ELV components; and (3) continued
dependence on outdated launch vehicle production lines and manpower-
intensive launch processes. This report also found that there was
overcapacity in the American space launch industry. As a result, the
three manufacturers operated at less than 50% capacity, which raised
the unit cost of each launch vehicle. The ability to sustain three
launch suppliers over the long term was in doubt. Foreign competition
was also a factor. DOD examined three options to address these issues:
(1) extend the life of the current launch vehicle fleet to the year
2030; (2) develop a new family of expendable launch vehicles to replace
the current fleet starting in 2004; and (3) pursue a technology-focused
effort to develop a reusable launch vehicle. Option 1 was selected as
the most cost-effective option in the near-term while meeting DOD's
requirements.
* 1994: DOD Space Launch Modernization Plan sought to
develop roadmap options establishing priorities, goals, and milestones
for the modernization of U.S. space launch capabilities. This report
cited the growing sense within Congress and others that while space
launch is a critical issue for America's future in space, there is no
coherent national plan to guide our actions into the next century. The
study developed 15 recommendations concerning, among others, the
industrial base, investment, requirements, and coordination. The most
consistent theme of the study is that space launch is the key enabling
capability for the Nation to exploit and explore space.
* 1994: GAO
reported that according to the April 1994 Moorman report, fewer
satellites, with longer lives, perform more work, which has resulted in
decreased launch rates and excess launch vehicle production and
processing capacity. The accompanying negative effect is low,
inefficient production rates that raise unit costs.
* 1994: GAO
reported that DOD lacked an adequate and validated set of requirements
for a future launch system. While DOD desired to improve and evolve the
existing expendable launch vehicle fleet, it hadn't established an
approach for acquiring and evaluating Russian launch vehicle components
and technologies to incorporate into future designs.
EELV:
* 1997: GAO
reported that cost risk was inherent in the vehicle acquisition plan
because production could be initiated from 1 to 2 years before the
first system development test flight. Such a strategy could result in
costly modifications to the production vehicles. Since there was
uncertainty in program cost the potential exists for program cost
increases. Cost dictated that there would not be any launches for
operational test and evaluation purposes.
* 1997: GAO reported that the
program had schedule risk because DOD would purchase the last of its
existing expendable launch vehicles before the first system development
test flight was scheduled to occur. If the test flight was
unsuccessful, coupled with the expiration of existing contracts, this
could create a void in DOD's launch capability. GAO had reported on
numerous occasions about the risks associated with program concurrency
and initiating production without adequate testing.
* 1997: GAO
reported that the Air Force had identified vehicle propulsion, systems
integration, and software as technical risk areas. Propulsion systems
were expected to require significant development. Integrating all
design, engineering, testing, manufacturing, and launch functions and
the software information system were expected to be challenging tasks.
The commercial application of the EELV posed a unique situation for the
government with the winning contractor potentially enjoying an enhanced
competitive edge (the demand for commercial launches has not
materialized and two contractors were awarded EELV contracts) from
DOD's investment in the program.
* 1998: GAO reported that the primary
benefits associated with the EELV program should be reduced cost to the
government, but that DOD's cost reduction estimate was uncertain due to
fluctuations in number, type and timing of launches.
* 1998: GAO
reported that meeting launch site facility preparation schedules as the
primary program risk because construction had to begin shortly after
the milestone II decision in June 1998 to support the first EELV launch
in fiscal year 2002.
* 1998: GAO reported that DOD's use of other
transaction instruments, a relatively new acquisition method, would
challenge DOD in determining how best to protect the government's
interests. Other transactions are generally not subject to the federal
laws and regulations governing standard procurement contracts.
Consequently, when using other transaction (10 U.S.C. 2731) authority,
contracting officials are not required to include standard contract
provisions that typically address such issues as financial management
or intellectual property rights, but rather may structure the
agreements as they consider appropriate. In addition, the two
contractors were not willing to guarantee system performance because
DOD's financial risk was to be capped at $500 million per contractor,
while the contractor's financial risk would be an open-ended
commitment. As a result, the contractors would not guarantee a launch
vehicle capability to meet the government's requirements (would only
agree to provide a "best effort").
* 2001: DOD selected acquisition
report commented on satellite weight growth for the Wideband Gapfiller
Satellite (WGS) and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellites. For example, the WGS spacecraft weight growth had driven a
need to upgrade from Medium to Intermediate for both Delta IV and Atlas
V launch vehicle configurations for the first three WGS missions.
Spacecraft weight growth on the AEHF satellite had also resulted in
additional funding being added to the budget in order to upgrade to an
Intermediate class vehicle.
GAO Reports.
GAO/NSIAD-91-271, GAO/NSIAD-94-253, GAO/NSIAD-97-130, GAO/NSIAD-98-
151.
Appendix II:
Related GAO Reports:
Missile Warning and Tracking:
Missile Defense: Alternative Approaches to Space Tracking and
Surveillance System Need to be Considered. GAO-03-597. Washington,
D.C.: May 23, 2003.
Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-low at Risk of
Missing Initial Deployment Date. GAO-01-6. Washington, D.C.: February
28, 2001.
National Missile Defense: Risk and Funding Implications for the Space-
Based Infrared Low Component. GAO/NSIAD-97-16. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 1997.
Defense Support Program: Ground Station Upgrades Not Based on Validated
Requirements. GAO/NSIAD-93-148. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1993.
Early Warning Satellites: Funding for Follow-on System Is Premature.
GAO/NSIAD-92-39. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 1991.
Communications:
Military Satellite Communications: Concerns With Milstar's Support to
Strategic and Tactical Forces. GAO/NSIAD-99-2. Washington, D.C.:
November 10, 1998.
Defense Satellite Communications: Alternative to DOD's Satellite
Replacement Plan Would Be Less Costly. GAO/NSIAD-97-159. Washington,
D.C.: July 16, 1997.
Military Satellite Communications: DOD Needs to Review Requirements and
Strengthen Leasing Practices. GAO/NSIAD-94-48. Washington, D.C.:
February 24, 1994.
Military Satellite Communications: Opportunity to Save Billions of
Dollars. GAO/NSIAD-93-216. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 1993.
Military Satellite Communications: Milstar Program Issues and Cost-
Saving Opportunities. GAO/ NSIAD-92-121. Washington, D.C.: June 26,
1992.
Military Satellite Communications: Potential for Greater Use of
Commercial Satellite Capabilities. GAO/ T-NSIAD-92-39. Washington,
D.C.: May 22, 1992.
DOD Acquisition: Case Study of the MILSTAR Satellite Communications
System. GAO/NSIAD-86-45S-15. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1986.
Navigation:
Global Positioning System: Production Should Be Limited Until Receiver
Reliability Problems Are Resolved. GAO/NSIAD-91-74. Washington, D.C.:
March 20, 1991.
Satellite Acquisition: Global Positioning System Acquisition Changes
After Challenger's Accident. GAO/NSIAD-87-209BR. Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 1987.
Issues Concerning the Department of Defense's Global Positioning System
as It Enters Production. GAO/ MASAD-83-9. Washington, D.C.: January 26,
1983.
NAVSTAR Should Improve the Effectiveness of Military Missions--Cost Has
Increased. GAO/ PSAD-80-21. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 1980.
Weather:
Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and Future Data
Management Challenges. GAO-02-684T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.
Meteorological Satellites. GAO/NSIAD-95-87R. Washington, D.C.:
February 6, 1995.
Weather Satellites: Economies Available by Converging Government
Meteorological Satellites. GAO/NSIAD-87-107. Washington, D.C.: April
23, 1987.
Launch:
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Guidance Needed to Protect
Government's Interest. GAO/NSIAD-98-151. Washington, D.C.: June 11,
1998.
Access to Space: Issues Associated With DOD's Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-130. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1997.
Titan IV Launch Vehicle: Restructured Program Could Reduce Fiscal Year
1992 Funding Needs. GAO/NSIAD-91-271. Washington, D.C.: September 6,
1991.
Reports Covering Multiple Space Programs and Management Issues:
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs. GAO-03-476.
Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.
Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further
Management Actions Needed. GAO-03-379. Washington, D.C.: April 18,
2003.
Military Space Operations: Planning, Funding, and Acquisition
Challenges Facing Efforts to Strengthen Space Control. GAO-02-738.
Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2002.
Defense Industry: Consolidation and Options for Preserving
Competition. GAO/NSIAD-98-141. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 1998.
National Space Issues: Observations on Defense Space Programs and
Activities. GAO/NSIAD-94-253. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1994.
Military Space Programs: Comprehensive Analysis Needed and Cost Savings
Available. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-164. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 1994.
Military Space Programs: Opportunities to Reduce Missile Warning and
Communication Satellites' Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-108. Washington,
D.C.: February 2, 1994.
Military Space Programs: An Unclassified Overview of Defense Satellite
Programs and Launch Activities. GAO/NSIAD-90-154FS. Washington, D.C.:
June 29, 1990.
(120236):
FOOTNOTES
[1] In 1994, DOD established the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Space. The Deputy was responsible for developing,
coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of space policy. The
Deputy also had oversight responsibility for space architectures as
well as space acquisition programs. In 1998, this office was dissolved
and its responsibilities divided and given to other offices within OSD
and the military services.
[2] Aspin, Les, Secretary of Defense, Report on the Bottom-up Review,
October 1993.
[3] We recently reported on the status of DOD's efforts to implement
the Commission's recommendations. See Defense Space Activities:
Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions Needed
(GAO-03-379, April 2003).
[4] Original and current cost estimates were inflated from the base
year reported in the SAR to 2003 current dollars using DOD escalation
factors. For older SARs with very early base years such as DSP,
inflating the dollar amounts may be subject to error based on accuracy
of escalation factors. In some cases, DOD provided us with updated cost
information.
[5] Total dollars spent were inflated from the year the SAR was issued
to 2003 dollars. The percent total spent was taken from the latest SAR
available and was not calculated by GAO. In some cases, DOD provided us
with updated cost information.
